TRANSFORMING THE FIELD ARTILLERY
OF THE ARMY NATIONAL GUARD

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This SRP is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the Master of Strategic Studies Degree. The U.S. Army War College is accredited by the Commission on Higher Education of the Middle States Association of Colleges and Schools, 3624 Market Street, Philadelphia, PA 19104, (215) 662-5606. The Commission on Higher Education is an institutional accrediting agency recognized by the U.S. Secretary of Education and the Council for Higher Education Accreditation.

The views expressed in this student academic research paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.
1. REPORT DATE
18 MAR 2005

2. REPORT TYPE
-

3. DATES COVERED
-

4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE
Transforming the Field Artillery of the Army National Guard

5a. CONTRACT NUMBER
-

5b. GRANT NUMBER
-

5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER
-

5d. PROJECT NUMBER
-

5e. TASK NUMBER
-

5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER
-

6. AUTHOR(S)
Kenneth Reiner

7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)
U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Carlisle, PA, 17013-5050

8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER
-

9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)
-

10. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S ACRONYM(S)
-

11. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S REPORT NUMBER(S)
-

12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT
Approved for public release; distribution unlimited

13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES
-

14. ABSTRACT
See attached.

15. SUBJECT TERMS
-

16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:

<table>
<thead>
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<th>a. REPORT</th>
<th>b. ABSTRACT</th>
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17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT
-

18. NUMBER OF PAGES
30

19a. NAME OF RESPONSBILE PERSON
-

Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98)
Prescribed by ANSI Std Z39-18
Several diverse strategic initiatives including transformation, force structure realignment and Homeland Security mission requirements are simultaneously impacting the United States (US) Army’s Field Artillery (FA) branch. While these initiatives affect the entire FA branch, the primary impact occurs at the FA Brigade (BDE) level, and is acutely felt by the Army National Guard. This paper focuses on the effects of both transformation and Homeland Security mission requirements upon the FA BDE, using the third initiative of force structure realignment to shape the discussion as it impacts the transformed FA force. The first section of this three section paper sets the stage for a detailed analysis of the changing FA BDE by reviewing the background, the guidance and the implications of each of the external factors described above. The second section examines the structure of the transformed FA Brigade and reviews its function in the transformed Army while the final portion uses the DOTMLPF (Doctrine, Organization, Training, Material, Leader Development, Personnel and Facilities) model to analyze the effects of transformation and Homeland Security mission requirements upon the FA BDE, and provides recommendations to ensure the new NG Fires BDEs are ready to support the fight.
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TRANSFORMING THE FIELD ARTILLERY OF THE ARMY NATIONAL GUARD

THE STAGE IS SET.

Today’s Army National Guard Field Artillery Brigades (ARNG FA BDEs) are facing monumental changes in the near term based on the effects of three diverse strategic initiatives including transformation, force structure realignment and Homeland Security (HS) mission requirements. The effects of transformation create a new FA BDE structure (Fires BDE), force structure realignment processes dramatically reduce the number of FA BDEs found in the Army National Guard (ARNG) and HS mission requirements affect the training plans and operational focus of the Fires BDE.

The strategic guidance concerning implementation of these initiatives originates from various levels and offices, but includes the President, the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF), the Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA), the Chief of National Guard Bureau (CNGB) and the Governors of 54 separate States and Territories. Strategic guidance establishes the operational framework within which the transformed FA BDEs must function and defines the standards for success within each initiative. This paper will examine the effects of transformation and potential HS mission requirements (using force structure realignment impacts to shape the discussion) on the NG Fires BDE and identify issues requiring action to facilitate the success of the NG Fires BDE.

THE GUIDANCE TO TRANSFORM

The Commander in Chief, President George W. Bush, initiated today’s military transformation, the largest change to the US Army since the end of World War II, when he described the threat to America today as, “…terrorism [the] premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against innocents,” and noted that this threat so differs from our historic struggle between liberty and totalitarianism that a new type of US military was required to adequately respond. The President noted that today’s military, “A military structured to deter massive Cold War-era armies must be transformed to focus more on how an adversary might fight rather than where and when a war might occur.” The SECDEF has further described the President’s transformed military as; “A … force … defined less by size and more by mobility … easier to deploy and sustain, [relying] on … precision weaponry and information technologies,” and as “fundamentally joint, [and] network-centric…. “ Other critical senior level guidance includes that transformation must start now and occur concurrently with ongoing operations, and that “transformation is not an end point,” but a way of thought and mindset.
This senior level guidance forms the backdrop for a move to a modular Army, one organized around BDEs, versus Divisions,\textsuperscript{10} creating an Army easier to task organize, quicker to deploy and more expeditionary in nature. The modular BDEs, (three maneuver variants [Heavy, Light and Stryker]), Aviation, RSTA (Recon, Surveillance and Target Acquisition), Maneuver Enhancement (Engineer), Sustainment and Fires\textsuperscript{11}, are designed as building blocks, each adding unique capabilities to the whole. [Note: Because of their diverse organic task organization, the maneuver modular BDEs are often referred to as Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs).] A command and control organization known as a UEx [read Division or Corps] provides the “primary tactical and lower level operational warfighting headquarters”\textsuperscript{12} for a BDE mix [from the list above] precisely tailored for a specific mission, while a UEy provides Theater and Army level strategic and operational command and control functions.

In the modular context, the modularized FA combines the functions of today’s Army of Excellence (AOE) designed FA BDEs, Division Artilleries (DIVARTYs) and Corps Artillery cells into two organizations identified as a Fires BDE and a Fires Effects Cell (FEC), both designed to augment and support a UEx. (See Figure 1) The FEC is relatively small; meaning the impact of consolidation is primarily felt at the Fires BDE level. Not only does the Fires BDE Commander inherit multiple tasks and functions, he also remains the UEx Commander’s “senior fires and effects advisor,”\textsuperscript{13} much as the DIVARTY Commander served the Division Commander in the AOE Divisions. Unlike the AOE DIVARTY Commander, however, the Fires BDE Commander does not organizationally own the Direct Support (DS) Cannon Battalions (BNs) currently task organized to the maneuver BDEs because the modular construct makes those DS FA BNs organic to the BCTs.\textsuperscript{14} At the Army/Theater level, the only change involves portions of the AOE Corps Artillery Cell standing up a (UEy) level FEC. The Battlefield Coordination Detachment (BCD) remains to facilitate the synchronization of joint (Air Force and Army) aviation operations.
FIGURE 1: FIELD ARTILLERY COMPONENTS OF A MODULARIZED ARMY

FORCE STRUCTURE REALIGNMENT AND REDISTRIBUTION BETWEEN COMPONENTS

Since establishment in 1636, the use and integration of the National Guard into the Active Forces has varied, but today finds the Guard at the “top of its game,” participating fully as part of the total force and actively involved in the defense of our nation. As the Chief of National Guard Bureau, (CNGB) LTG Blum, told the assembled Governors of our nation in February, 2004, “…today, the Guard’s mission has shifted from a strategic reserve built on a cold war deterrence construct to an operational reserve that must be capable of joint and expeditionary operations.”

As successful as the National Guard’s involvement in the Global War on Terror (GWOT) has been, however, the force structure of an Army designed to defeat echelons of Warsaw Pact forces in the Fulda gap has not provided the correct force mix for the GWOT. In fact, the current force mix has proven so inadequate, that many FA units have been retrained in alternate Military Occupational Skills (MOSs) and deployed to support Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) in those roles. Ensuring the correct force structure for the Army has become so critical that the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) specifically identified it as an issue by stating; “…DoD will continue to rely on Reserve Component forces….. [and] will undertake a comprehensive review of the Active and Reserve mix, [and] organization,…” Force structure realignment and redistribution decisions and moves are currently ongoing and are fully supported by the CNGB as he builds a more ready, reliable, essential and accessible force. The combined effects of transforming the force while realigning and redistributing the force
dramatically reduces the number of Fires BDEs (from 17 to 6)²⁰ remaining in the National Guard.

HOMELAND SECURITY MISSION REQUIREMENTS

Extensive discussion concerning the role of National Guard units (including FA) in the conduct of Homeland Security (HS) is ongoing, both at the federal and state level. While expectations vary from state to state based on gubernatorial direction, available NG forces within the state and various Department of Homeland Security requirements, the general expectation is that HS requirements will include traditional consequence management activities and security operations / terrorism response tasks.²¹ The congressionally mandated dual mission requirement of the NG force is currently based on the precept that units bring their wartime assets and skills to the HS fight, versus creating a separate structure to conduct HS requirements. The transformed structure of the NG Fires BDE is solely a product of warfighting requirements and those are the assets and skills that the Fires BDE will provide HS.

While specific HS tasks remain to be identified, the individual and collective training conducted by units to prepare for federal wartime deployment will prepare that unit for a large percentage of anticipated HS requirements. Because wartime assets and skill sets are the predominant contribution of ARNG units to HS, the CNGB, in concert with 54 states and territories, is working to rebalance NG forces across the nation in an effort to support each Governor with a force mix capable of providing multi-spectrum support.²² The rebalancing of the force is outside the scope of this paper, but will likely affect individual NG Fires BDEs in terms of physical location.

A TRANSFORMED FIELD ARTILLERY BRIGADE

While the mission of the Field Artillery remains to “…destroy, neutralize or suppress the enemy by cannon, rocket, and missile fire (lethal and non-lethal) and to synchronize the integration of all support assets in Joint and Combined Arms Operations,”²³ the transformed Fires BDE significantly changes the methods of achieving those capabilities. The modifications made to the modular Fires BDE are “nested” within the transformation imperatives described by the President and SECDEF and are specifically characterized as precision fires, conducted by a joint, interdependent, net-work centric expeditionary force.

The organizational construct of the modular Fires BDE illustrated below (Figure 2) is significantly different than today’s FA BDE, which consists of a Headquarters (about 109 soldiers)²⁴ and a mix of three to five FA BNs (rocket or cannon). The Fires BDE retains the headquarters element, but keeps only one firing (rocket²⁵) BN, with all others being added as
situationally required. An organic Support BN and Signal Company provide the Fires BDE with enhanced capabilities in those Battlefield Operating Systems, providing improved expeditionary and self sustaining capabilities. The collapsing of AOE echelons means the radars previously located at Division and Corps level (Target Acquisition Detachments) are now organic to the BDE. The “eyes” of the BDE are enhanced through an Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) Company, dramatically improving the BDE’s ability to both locate targets and conduct accurate Battle Damage Assessment (BDA). This modular structure provides the Fires BDE with all the assets required to successfully conduct the Decide, Detect, Deliver and Assess (D3A) process, an ability never before contained in one FA element.

FIGURE 2. FIELD ARTILLERY BRIGADE STRUCTURE

The ability of the Fires BDE to fight jointly is enhanced by five joint billets in the Headquarters element while appropriate networked digital systems allow the Fires BDE to coordinate with other elements (higher, lower, adjacent, and joint) on the battlefield. Personnel assets are added to provide the Fires BDE the capability to command and control attached ground and air maneuver forces and function as a maneuver headquarters. Transformational changes create a Fires BDE structurally organized and equipped to provide the modularized, expeditionary, joint, network centric force required to simultaneously meet the President’s and SECDEF’s guidance concerning transforming the force while continuing to support the
maneuver force. The transformation process of changing traditional FA BDEs to modular Fires BDEs produces numerous second and third order effects, requiring several significant paradigm shifts as described in the following analysis.

AN ANALYSIS USING THE DOTMLPF\textsuperscript{28} MODEL

DOCTRINE

The key conceptual imperative driving doctrinal change is that future US forces will likely be challenged by adversaries who possess a wide range of capabilities, including asymmetric terrorist approaches, massed land warfare and everything in between, to include weapons of mass destruction.\textsuperscript{29} The doctrinal result is that the US Army must be capability based,\textsuperscript{30} and focus on how an adversary might fight rather than on who the adversary is.\textsuperscript{31} Today’s combat leaders must be prepared to deal with a wider range of challenges than ever before\textsuperscript{32} and services must plan for asymmetric warfare as well as major combat operations.\textsuperscript{33} Key to success in this arena are doctrinal traits described as versatile, expeditionary, joint, interdependent, precision and network centric, all of which have been incorporated into the construct of transformed FA formations, and are described in the following paragraphs.

The doctrinal trait of versatility and expeditionary in the transformed force is enhanced at the tactical level by the assignment of an organic cannon battalion to each BCT, creating the ability for significant indirect fire support without a Fires BDE. While this change is in accordance with transformational guidance, it modifies the long standing doctrine of a Force Fires Headquarters (FF HQ) commanding and controlling all artillery in a maneuver commands area of operations; because the senior FA commander loses direct command of the fires BN organic to the maneuver BCT commander.\textsuperscript{34} This change will have minimal operational impact however; because the doctrinal task and purpose of artillery at the BCT level does not change, although the DS column of the seven inherent responsibilities chart\textsuperscript{35} now requires updating.

The joint and interdependent doctrinal trait means the tendency of the Army to rely on organic assets to accomplish the mission must change. We will always fight jointly\textsuperscript{36} and in fact, will become interdependent on other services for specific battlefield competencies. For the Fires BDE, this doctrinal requirement generates the ability to coordinate all indirect fire assets in the military, to include land, sea, (surface and sub-surface) and air,\textsuperscript{37} greatly expanding the units Mission Essential Task List (METL).\textsuperscript{38}

Technological advances fuel the precision and network centric doctrinal traits. The move to precision munitions generates a modified FA logistical resupply doctrine based on less ammunition consumption while networked fires improve information sharing and enables
collaboration and shared situational awareness,\textsuperscript{39} enhancing the FA's ability to coordinate appropriate munitions on the right target at the right time. For the Fires BDE commander and staff, the conscious decision to structure the Fires BDE with the organic ability to be a supported command\textsuperscript{38} is a significant doctrinal change and expansion of responsibility, and adds dramatically to the training and coordination requirements of the Fires BDE.

HS doctrine (initially outlined at the national level by the 2002 \textit{National Strategy for Homeland Security}) is rapidly evolving as DOD, DHS and 54 states and territories work to define and plan the security of our homeland. While the doctrinal issues of HS will have no impact on the organization of the Fires BDE, (because the Fires BDE is organized and structured for a war time mission) the NG Fires BDE training plan deployment cycle will be affected. (These issues are discussed fully in the training portion of this model.)

\textbf{ORGANIZATION}

At the FA branch level, the largest organizational impact produced by transformation is the dramatic reduction in force structure. The combined effects of modularization and rebalancing replaces 23 FA BDEs (17 NG, 6 AC)\textsuperscript{41}, 18 DIVARTYs (8 NG, 10 AC)\textsuperscript{42} and 4 Corps Arty Cells (1 NG, 3 AC) with 11 Fires BDEs (6 NG, 5 AC)\textsuperscript{43} and one FEC per UEx, significantly modifying the historic allocation of at least one FA BDE to Division (or one Fires BDE to UEx). It also appears with the large proportion of NG to AC Fires BDEs (6/5) relative to the respective ratio of UExs (8/13)\textsuperscript{44} that the Army has adopted the philosophy of “One Army” with regard to FA force structure and created the necessity for cross component support between Fires BDEs and UExs.

At the NG level, the reduction from 17 FA BDEs to 6 will cause significant changes in the number and composition of units within individual states. The combined effects of decreasing the number of NG FA BDEs while rebalancing the force means that states that lose an FA BDE will likely not receive a FA type replacement unit, causing MOS reclassification issues and unit/armory shuffling. These effects are typically mitigated by state involvement in stationing plans, but for some states, the hard work of transforming unit types will be a reality. For the states receiving a Fires BDE, the additional 660 organic slots in the Fires BDE\textsuperscript{45} is structure that may or may not fit within the state in terms of recruiting ability and/or HS force structure issues. It is likely that most Fires BDEs will have organic elements spread between states, producing command and control, training and funding issues similar to those faced by today’s multi-state NG Divisions. For those states not familiar with multi-state operations, a trip to NGB or a state already involved in multi-state operations should set the stage for success.
The most important organizational consideration, however, is the concept that the BDE, not the Division is the key warfighting organization of the Army. To support that concept, the Fires BDE now contains the assets required to perform the FA job historically performed by the combined efforts of the FA BDE, DIVARTY, and Corps Arty cells, in addition to gaining the requirement to act as a “maneuver command.” This enhanced fires and maneuver capability is supported by the appropriate increase in organic force structure and fundamentally alters the character of the organization, dramatically increasing its scope and area of responsibilities. While this increase in scope and responsibility is well within the capability of the new Fires BDE, the amount and variety of training dramatically increases.

HS mission requirements do not currently affect the number of Fires BDEs within the Force Structure, because force structure decisions are based strictly on war fighting requirements. The primary organizational impact of HS missions on the Fires BDE will likely be the distribution of elements of the Fires BDE between states as the CNGB works to rebalance NG forces across the nation in an effort to provide multi-spectrum support to each Governor. Because HS responses typically occur within individual states, the multi-state Fires BDE may find itself responding to HS missions without specific and perhaps critical elements. Recognizing these issues and training / planning for potential personnel or equipment shortfalls should mitigate their effects.

TRAINING

The training of a fundamentally new organization with new doctrinal requirements is critical and must begin with “…changing the way people think and the way organizations operate.” The CSA is concerned that the Army develops an expeditionary mindset and the training standards promulgated by the Department of Defense focus on developing “…individuals and organizations that think and act jointly, … improvise and adapt to emerging crises [and] achieve unity of effort from a diversity of means.” Within this context, joint is expanded outside of DOD to include the interagency, highlighting the requirement for the NG Fires BDE to train jointly for traditional combat roles and with the interagency (Highway Patrol, Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), local Sheriff, etc.) in the realm of Homeland Security.

As the Fires BDE enters this new training arena, the first challenge is the quantitative reduction of Fires BDEs throughout the force, which nullifies the consistent and habitual training relationships currently in place between FA BDEs and Divisions/Corps. With 11 Fires BDEs and 21 UEExs, a doctrine emphasizing expeditionary modularity, and a force rotating in and out
of combat operations in different cycles (AC every 2-3 years, RC every 5-6), the possibility of creating long-term consistent training relationships between Fires BDEs and UExs is negligible. Because Fires BDEs and UExs must train together, however, the synchronization of "which" training events a Fires BDE participates in, with "who," is critical, to the point that centralized management of Fires BDEs training events is required.

This requirement for centralized FA BDE management however, supersedes training coordination, because for modularity to succeed, units must be trained to the same standard, equipped the same, and use similar Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) and Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs). No longer can Fires BDEs incorporate the SOP of a single DIVARTY into their Tactical SOP. To ensure this ability for Fires BDEs to operate modularly, and to synchronize training requirements and events, some entity (e.g. Forces Command) must be assigned the role of ensuring training readiness and consistency between all Fires BDEs; NG and AC. This is an issue that should be addressed by the Field Artillery Advisory Council (FAAC) and staffed for successful implementation.

While habitual training relationships between UExs and Fires BDEs are problematic, the inverse is true concerning Fires BDEs and FA BNs. The ratio of FA BNs to Fires BDEs clearly supports habitual relationships. Based on the assumption that these relationships are based on geographical proximity, the symbiotic nature of habitual relationships enhances both training options and personnel benefits within both components. (For example; career progression is enhanced when a FA soldier assigned at the BN level can move to a Fires BDE on post [AC] or within the state [NG] for promotion within the same MOS.) These relationships should be determined, documented and supported as soon as possible and include both FA BNs organic to maneuver BDEs and non-affiliated FA BNs.

As the Fires BDEs prepare to train in a joint, interagency environment, the additional factors of meeting readiness requirements for a dual (state and nation) mission set and fulfilling the evolving requirements of an “operational” versus “strategic” reserve require consideration. Current indications are that the NG will continue to deploy at current levels, with a goal of deploying separate units no more than once every five or six years. The deployment model established by NGB (see figure 3) provides an excellent baseline to plan and synchronize training while incorporating the competing demands on the National Guard, helps stabilize the force and provides predictability to units and soldiers. This new rotational construct works extremely well for a six ARNG Fires BDE force, permitting each Fires BDE to occupy a different position (year) on the circle with annual sequential rotation. By design and critical to the success of the model, one Fires BDE is trained, ready and available to deploy each cycle. The
deployment of the Fires BDE could be in support of an AC or NG UX and whether the Fires BDE actually deploys is irrelevant, because the focused training that the Fires BDE conducted in preparation for deployment creates a better unit.

Pending the realities of a global war, the proposed model provides stability to the force and forms the foundation for a coordinated training plan, allowing a Fires BDE to focus on its various (federal/state) missions throughout the cycle. While new (post 9/11) formal specific HS mission tasks at the state level are not well defined, the goal of the Fires BDE should be to maintain a high HS readiness posture in the currently assumed mission set while maintaining a solid baseline in their “Go to War” tasks while in the HS portion of the circle. As the Fires BDE rotates to the set position and prepares to deploy, the training requirement shifts to achieving and maintaining a high state of readiness for “Go to War” tasks while the HS tasks receive lesser attention. Throughout the cycle, the Fires BDE actually trains in both required mission sets, knowing that in some cases, the tasks are mutually supporting. (For example, the task of establishing and defending a unit perimeter is much like establishing a perimeter around and defending a potential piece of critical national infrastructure, a likely HS task.)

![Diagram of National Guard Full Spectrum Availability Model and Goals](image)

**FIGURE 3. NATIONAL GUARD FULL SPECTRUM AVAILABILITY MODEL AND GOALS**

Using the six year NGB training/deployment model and a six NG Fires BDE structure, I would propose the following generic Fires BDE training plan, starting with the re-set period. Key tasks during the re-set period include soldier and family care and the repair and replacement of
equipment. Based on the length of the deployment, significant professional military individual education requirements for both Officers and NCOs are likely and must be the training priority. The end state of the reset period should be a well equipped unit with individual soldiers high in morale, current in professional educational requirements, prepared to re-enlist, sustain their combat skills and assume responsibilities for securing our homeland.

The next period, defined primarily as year two-four, has the Fires BDE training in their dual “Go to War” / HS mission sets. It is imperative that the entire Fires BDE conduct collective training (in both mission sets) during this time frame and that the Fires BDE staff participates in a Battle Command Training Program (BCTP) war fighter exercise in order to sharpen and/or maintain their staff skills. The BCTP exercise should be joint and exercise several of the Fires BDEs potential missions. The BDE staff should also conduct several table top exercises with HS agencies (FBI, Sheriff, State Police, etc.) and operate in the field with those same agencies to train as an interagency force. With adequate planning, training in both of these mission sets is possible and should in fact be mutually supporting.

Year five involves the Fires BDE beginning to transition out of the HS phase and starting to prepare almost exclusively for their “Go to War” mission. Early identification of units and the opportunity to focus training effort and resources early allows the Guard to change the Cold War deployment protocols of “train, alert, mobilize, train, certify and deploy” for a streamlined concept of “train, certify, alert and deploy.”

Not only must the Fires BDE train as a collective entity, it must train jointly. Filling the five joint slots identified in the Fires BDE’s Headquarters to facilitate joint fires and synchronization at the tactical/operational level should be an immediate priority. One possibility for filling these joint slots is to use Air National Guard (ANG) Officers and/or Non-Commissioned Officers (NCOs). (One of the slots should be an Active Guard and Reserve (AGR) position with a training focus.) Another possibility for filling one or more of these five positions is an active duty Air Force, Navy or Marine Corps Officer. The assignment of joint officers at a tactical/operational level facilitates the ability to train jointly and helps build cross component relationships prior to deployment. Creating these positions as official “Joint” billets in accordance with Goldwaters Nichols promotion requirements would facilitate this process. Joint training must become the norm with jointness eventually inculcated into unit mindset. The goal, according to DOD, is joint training that produces “Intellectual interoperability … consist[ing] of joint knowledge, … experience … education and training.”

Several NG unique funding issues arise concerning joint, interagency training. Current regulations stipulate that one component may fund travel and per diem for other components,
but are precluded from providing pay and allowances. This means that if unit X, an ARNG unit from state A wants to conduct joint training with elements of a Marine Corps reserve unit from state B, unless the Marine Corps unit will fund the pay and allowances for its Marines to participate there is currently no way for unit X to provide those resources. A source of “purple” money, available to fund joint exercises and other training events must be generated and made available at the Fires BDE level. The Fires BDE is a key player in the joint environment and must always train and operate that way.

In a closely related issue, jointness within the HS mission set includes the interagency and the Fires BDE must train with those departments. This training typically occurs outside of DOD and raises an interesting dilemma. Current regulations preclude NG forces from executing training for state purposes with federal money. When NG forces train with the state interagency in HS type missions, are the NG forces involved in state training (which must be funded by the Governor) or in a new federal (HS) mission (which would authorize use of federal funds), or both? This status conundrum and definition of mission requires clarification.

Training jointly requires the information management systems to support the applicable processes. The Army system used to schedule individual training, the Army Training Requirements and Resources System (ATRRS), requires improvement in the area of joint course management. While many joint schools are currently on ATRRS, the list is not comprehensive and the actual securing of a training seat is often difficult, both in terms of allocation and processes.60

LEADER DEVELOPMENT

In concert with the guidance issued by the CSA, we must develop an expeditionary mindset in the minds of our NG soldiers. For the Guardsman, such a mindset involves two elements; initially, the Guardsman must accept that he/she is part of the “operational reserve” and understand deployment requirements; secondly, the change in tactical doctrine as described by the CSA, requires an expeditionary approach to warfare, an approach, again described by the CSA, as; “the probability of a very austere operational environment, and the requirement to fight on arrival throughout the battlespace.”62 The expeditionary method of deploying and fighting must be developed through innovative training exercises that stress unit leaders and soldiers. In the same manner, HS mission sets demand a certain agility. Our NG soldiers could be involved in multiple, near simultaneous, diverse mission sets and must be trained to jump from their federal war time mission to serving their neighbor, and back again.
MATERIEL

Ensuring that each NG Fires BDE is fielded with all of their authorized equipment (unlike today) with no substitutes must be the materiel management goal. Total materiel readiness will involve significant equipment fielding and new equipment training as the Army transforms, and require significant coordination with and effort from state level logisticians and maintainers. Extra training will likely be required by maintainers to care for new equipment. Keeping the NG Fires BDEs maintained and equipped to standard is a critical component of successfully supporting the modularity concept and meeting future deployability requirements.

Because the Fires BDE equipment has not been designed or fielded to specifically contribute to the HS mission, it is critical that the Fires BDE, in concert with the state interagency, review planned contingencies and determine the viability of the Fires BDE’s equipment for potential HS missions. For example, the Army radio, constructed to operate securely in a tactical environment, may not interface with the radios currently in use within the interagency, requiring a pre-determined work around or alternate approach. The support arrangements that have been used within the states for many years to facilitate NG involvement in forest fires and other natural disasters will provide a solid foundation for such a review. This is not a Fires BDE unique issue and must be addressed in total by states and NGB as the HS mission matures.

PERSONNEL

The future of the Army is centered on its soldiers and our transformation efforts must include and ensure their success. The same soldiers who are performing so admirably now are the same soldiers that will lead us through the transformation process. As stated in the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review, “Having the right kinds of imaginative, highly motivated ... personnel, at all levels, is the essential prerequisite for achieving success.” It is critical that the Army continue to recruit, care for and retain the right soldiers to ensure success.

For the Fires BDE, taking care of soldiers mandates several actions in today’s high OPTEMPO (operational tempo) environment. First, the BDE must reach and maintain 110% (or greater) assigned versus authorized strength and as close to a 100% MOS (Military Occupational Specialty) qualification rate as possible while managing the other deployment discriminators. (Family care plans, etc.) The ongoing NG force structure authorization reductions coupled with the effects of a NG TTHS (Training, Transients, Holdees and Students) account will help mitigate, but not solve ongoing strength and MOS qualification issues. It is absolutely imperative that the Fires BDEs fix the root cause (lack of available MOS
qualified soldiers) of the current requirement to cross level soldiers between units and sometimes between states before deploying units. These types of actions adversely affect soldiers because it deploys them outside of “their” units and adversely affects units by deploying them with fillers versus trained unit members. While NGB is taking the correct internal steps to ameliorate the issue, it will not completely resolve itself. I recommend that the Army study the possibility of filling empty slots in deploying NG units with soldiers from the IRR (Individual Ready Reserve). The soldiers maintained in this status are by definition MOS qualified individual replacements, precisely what is needed to fill NG units. While this option involves cross component support, this is a “One Army” solution to a “One Army” problem.

Second, our soldiers expect to deploy (nobody wants to sit on the bench) and will. It is incumbent on the Fires BDE leadership to provide the best possible care for the soldier, his/her family and his/her employer throughout the training cycle, and prepare them all for the inevitable deployment. The stability and predictability provided by the six year deployment model provides a great baseline. That baseline must be built upon and extended by continuously providing outstanding soldier support in terms of pay, bonus processing, supply actions, etc. Families must become a part of the team and a fully operational family support group is critical for the long term success of the unit. As the Chief of the Army National Guard, LTG Schultz said at the 126th National Guard Association of the United States conference, “Family readiness … equates to unit readiness.” It has been said that the Army enlists a soldier but reenlists a family, and working towards that reenlistment starts the day the soldier enlists. Employers are often overlooked, but form a key part of the Guard Team. Taking care of the employer means providing predictability, training and deployment information, and recognition for the support they provide. Multiple deployments only increase these support requirements and makes it essential that the Fires BDE work closely with the State Employer Support of the Guard and Reserve (ESGR) committee. To facilitate the care of families and employers, the Fires BDE, when deployed, must leave behind a very strong rear party cell.

The reduction of Fires BDEs will limited career progression for FA NCOs and Officers assigned to FA BNs in states that lose FA BDEs without gaining Fires BDEs. Similarly, the reduction of multiple FA BNs may reduce the number of FA BNs in individual states that maintain Fires BDEs. The net effect of these organizational changes is twofold; 1) Individual careers will be stifled and 2) Unit effectiveness may be degraded because the best soldier available for a specific job may not be selected based on the fact that selection and promotion opportunities typically occur within State boundaries. For example, a LTC commanding an FA BN in state A will not normally compete for command of a Fires BDE in State B even though he
may be better qualified than the commander of a FA BN in State B. These actions detrimentally affect the entire force and should be remedied with some sort of cross state selection method and soldier care provisions. This is a complex issue, potentially involves multiple states, individual and command tolerance to travel time and distance, and would break significant historic paradigms in personnel manning. One possible solution is to create multi-state boards or regional groupings to select certain positions, such as 06 command slots.

Personnel issues within the HS arena dovetail into those discussed above. Whether a soldier is activated for service overseas or within the continental United States, he/she is still not at home or at work and the same support structures must be in place.

FACILITIES

The facility requirements for a Fires BDE will depend largely on the organic equipment of the new Fires BDE (e.g. wheeled or track). Facilities will be required to house and maintain the equipment and personnel assigned to the unit. Based on the uniqueness of this requirement, each Fires BDE should analyze their requirements against their assets and raise discrepancies to NGB through their chain of command. HS mission requirements have negligible effect on facility requirements.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The effects of the three diverse strategic initiatives of transformation, force structure realignment and Homeland Security (HS) mission requirements are dramatically transforming the NG FA BDE. The changes are fully nested within and fully support the implementation guidance outlined by the President and the SECDEF, and reach into every section of the DOTMLPF strategic analysis model. To enhance the transformation process however, several modifications to current training practices, leader development trends and personnel management systems must be made. At the State level, the joint billets in the Fires BDEs must be filled to facilitate joint training and the materiel compatibility of the BDE’s equipment with HS missions must be reviewed and remedied, if required, at the state or NGB level. In the same manner, the adequacy of facilities identified for the Fires BDE must be reviewed and appropriate actions taken. The state must ask for assistance from their higher headquarters, in this case NGB, to help formulate joint funding procedures, develop guidance concerning training status requirements to conduct HS type training and remedy ATRRS shortfalls. Additionally, within the personnel arena, NGB should pursue using IRR soldiers as fillers for NG personnel shortages in deploying units, work regionally to enable some sort of cross state selection, assignment and promotion system and push for 110% manning authorizations. The quantitative reduction in
Fires BDEs requires assistance from the FAAC, the FA Commandant or Forces Command to assign and/or establish habitual training relationships between Fires BDEs and FA BNs as well as determining who will centrally manage Fires BDEs. With these modifications in place, the future of the NG Fires BDE and the “King of Battle” within the transformed Army is bright.
ENDNOTES


3 Ibid., III.

4 Ibid., 29.


6 Ibid., 1.


8 Ibid., 32.


10 Ibid., 14.

11 “Why we are Changing the Army,” briefing slides, Las Vegas, 126th NGAUS Conference, 16 September 2004.


13 Ibid., 30.


16 Steven Blum, Script from Lieutenant General H. Steven Blum’s Address to the National Governors Association Winter Meeting, Washington D.C., 22 February 2004.


18 Rumsfeld, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, 23.

19 Haskell, 1.
20 Per conversation with COL Olin Oedekoven, 115th Field Artillery Brigade Commander and FAAC member, subsequent to November 2005 FAAC committee meeting.


22 Blum, script. LTG Blum defined the type of forces required in each state as “we [NGB] believe … the military capabilities a Governor needs to meet the State mission, and the …Homeland Security requirements … [as assets from] these key areas …: Joint Force Headquarters, Civil Support Team, Maintenance, Aviation, Engineer, Medical, Communications, Transportation and Security.”

23 Fires Brigade Organizational and Operational Plan, 28.


25 Note: Rocket BNs come in two types and are generally described by the type of weapon system contained within the Battalion. Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) BNs are equipped with a tracked rocket launcher capable of firing 12 rockets without reloading while High-Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) BNs contain a wheeled launcher with 6 onboard rockets.


27 Graham. Note: Chart has been modified by author to better accommodate audience.

28 The DOTMLPF (Doctrine, Organization, Training, Material, Leadership, Personnel and Facilities) is an analytic tool used throughout the Army to analysis how change affects organizations. It provides a holistic and organized analytical approach and is used extensively within Army and Joint Force Development circles. For an example of implementing instructions, see CJCSI 3180.01 dated 31 October 2002.

29 Rumsfeld, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, 3.

30 Ibid., 13.

31 Ibid., 17.

32 Ibid.


34 Fires Brigade Organizational and Operational Plan, 28.

35 The seven inherent responsibilities chart is a widely used tool within the United States Field Artillery community to determine who is responsible for certain actions in various support
relationships. Four support relationships make up the horizontal axis; Direct Support, Reinforcing, General Support Reinforcing and General Support. The seven responsibilities (vertical axis) include; Answers calls for fire in priority from, Has as its zone of fire, Furnishes FIST of FSE, Furnishes Liaison Officer, Establishes Communications with, Is positioned by, Has its fires planned by.


37 Fires Brigade Organizational and Operational Plan, 12.

38 A list of tasks that a unit must be able to perform to standard in order to conduct the mission of that type of unit. In order to deploy, a unit must prove proficiency in its METL tasks.


40 Fires Brigade Organizational and Operational Plan, 28.

41 Graham.

42 Ibid.

43 Oedekoven, discussion.

44 As of 7 December 2004. The numbers represented here are current per a speaker participating in the U.S. Army War College lecture series.

45 Calculated as – Fires BDE Structure (1313) less organic BN (540) less current FA BDE MTOE (109)


47 Blum.


50 Department of Defense, Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, 1.

51 Graham. The ratio of total BNs to Fires BDEs is about 11:1. If you strip out the DS BNs, the ratio becomes about 4:1.

52 Department of Defense, Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, 3.

53 Blum.

55 One potential solution is described by Olin Oedekoven and Michael Lloyd in their analysis conducted for the State of Wyoming as reported in *Qualifying and Assessing Capabilities of the Wyoming National Guard for Wyoming Homeland Security Missions* (see note 54) as “…preventing, preparing, responding and recovering from domestic and international terrorism and natural or human caused disasters”


58 Department of Defense, Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, 16.

59 Title 32. These funds are used to train NG soldiers in their federal “Go to War” mission and applies at both the individual and unit level.

60 Mark Pfenning mark.pfenning@wy.ngb.army.mil, “7 Dec 04,” electronic mail message to Luke Reiner luke.reiner@us.army.mil, 7 December 2004.


65 A TTHS account holds and accounts for soldiers when they are not actively involved in unit operations, (i.e. attending schools or sick). The National Guard does not currently have a functioning TTHS account, meaning that soldier who are not available to deploy for some reason are reported through the system as a member of the unit. This has the effect of creating units that look good on paper but do not have the available personnel to back up the report.

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