AFGHANISTAN: RECONSTITUTING A COLLAPSED STATE

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# Afghanistan: Reconstituting a Collapsed State

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FOREWORD

There must be a beginning of any great matter, but the continuing unto the end until it be thoroughly finished yields the true glory.

Sir Francis Drake

Sooner or later it seems, all great powers have found themselves in Afghanistan, and their experience is replete with bitter resistance, harsh conditions, and failure. In contrast to its predecessors, the United States came not as a conqueror, but as a liberator. Equally unprecedented, the United States seeks to reinstitute Afghanistan as a fully sovereign and functioning state.

In this monograph, Lieutenant Colonel Raymond A. Millen examines warlordism as the principal impediment to Afghanistan’s revival and offers a shift in strategy that addresses the war of ideas, the counternarcotics initiative, and the incorporation of the Afghan National Army into the provincial reconstruction teams. As Lieutenant Colonel Millen observes, all the resources are in place; they simply need a shift in focus.

Lieutenant Colonel Millen takes into account the historical, cultural, and economic factors that impede central authority and the reforms needed for modern states. His problem-solving approach is insightful, pragmatic, and innovative.

The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to offer this monograph as a topic of debate concerning post-conflict operations and counter-insurgency warfare.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute
LIEUTENANT COLONEL RAYMOND A. MILLEN is currently assigned as the Director of European Security Studies at the Strategic Studies Institute. He graduated from the U.S. Military Academy in 1982, was commissioned as an infantry officer, and has held a variety of command and staff assignments in Germany and Continental United States. He has also served as the U.S. Army Infantry School Liaison Officer to the German Infantry School at Hammelburg, Germany; Battalion Executive Officer, 3-502d Infantry, Fort Campbell, Kentucky; and Chief of Intelligence Section and Balkans Team Chief, Survey Section, SHAPE, Belgium. He served in Kabul from July through November 2003 on the staff of the Office of Military Cooperation-Afghanistan, focusing on the Afghan National Army and the General Staff. Lieutenant Colonel Millen is a Foreign Area Officer for Western Europe. He has published articles in a number of scholarly and professional journals to include Comparative Strategy Journal, Infantry Magazine, and the Swiss Military Journal. His book, Command Legacy, was published by Brassey’s in April 2002. Lieutenant Colonel Millen is a graduate of the U.S. Army’s Command and General Staff College, and holds an M.A. degree in National Security Studies from Georgetown University. He is currently pursuing a Ph.D. in World Politics at Catholic University of America.
SUMMARY

Over 2 decades of incessant warfare destroyed Afghanistan as a functioning state, fracturing its institutions and devastating its economy. In the maelstrom of incessant internecine fighting in the 1990s, the Taliban clawed its way to power and installed a medieval regime, providing stability through brutality. The Taliban regime likely would have defeated the last of the resisting warlords and continued its rule had Osama bin Laden’s al Qaeda not provoked the United States into a war with the Taliban as a result of September 11, 2001 (9-11). The swift expulsion of the Taliban and al Qaeda militants resulted in yet another regime change, but it did not ameliorate the fundamental malaise afflicting Afghanistan—warlordism. Because of their power and wealth, Afghan warlords and their militias represent the greatest challenge to Afghanistan’s rehabilitation as a functioning state, but any strategy which seeks a direct confrontation with them will likely ignite a war. Ultimately, resuscitation of Afghanistan lies with the Afghan people, and government policies must be geared towards garnering their loyalty and trust.

It would be a mistake to demonize the warlords, however. Without a doubt, they and their militias had a hand in the ruination of Afghanistan, but they are also regarded as patriots and providers of security and livelihood. One must recognize that xenophobia, regionalism, and distrust of centralized authority are entrenched in Afghan society. It therefore follows that the warlords will attempt to safeguard their powerbase by maintaining a well-armed militia, profiting from the opium market, and preserving the allegiance of their constituents. President Hamid Karzai certainly recognizes the dynamic tensions keeping Afghanistan intact but could just as quickly tear it asunder if he miscalculates. In this sense, it would be more prudent to view each warlord as a latent insurgent rather than a mere nuisance to the central government.

Recognizing warlordism as Afghanistan’s salient challenge requires no radical shift in strategy. For the most part, the resources are in place; they simply need a shift in emphasis. This monograph proposes a slight shift in coalition strategy, placing greater stress
on three approaches: 1) initiating a sophisticated public awareness campaign to win the war of ideas; 2) weaning Afghan society off the opium market; and 3) ending the culture of warlordism without sparking an insurgency.

The public awareness campaign must be an open and public enterprise, and should not carry any hint of subterfuge. In this nation of Madison Avenue and Hollywood certainly, the various information media have no qualms with unabashedly influencing American cultural behavior, so marketing ideas in support of policy objectives would be no great leap. A sophisticated public awareness campaign requires the marrying of marketing experts with the expatriate Afghan artists in order to entertain Afghan citizens first, and foremost, then inform and persuade them, as well as rebut adversarial propaganda. Once firmly established in the Afghan society, the media can be adapted to address any variety of issues—Islamic extremism, the opium trade, warlord oppression, and the virtues of the Afghan National Army.

The failure of the counternarcotics strategy for Afghanistan reflects fundamental inattentiveness to the economics of the opium culture, the potential ethical and social forces, and the opiate processing nodes. The central actors in weaning Afghanistan off opium are the farmers. Persuading the farmer to grow legitimate crops requires crop subsidies that permit profits equal to opium and access to foreign markets. Although subsidies may be exorbitant, given that 75 percent of the world’s opiates come from Afghanistan, it is actually cheaper to pay off farmers as compared to the costs associated with national and international drug interdiction, law enforcement, and criminal prosecution. Permitting greater access to global markets is a matter of lifting trade barriers. Because nearly all the heroin in Europe originates in Afghanistan, a major incentive to relax Europe’s agricultural trade barriers with Afghanistan exists. Moreover, the United Nations (UN) can assist in providing special access into Africa, Asia, and Latin America.

Addressing the ethical and social aspects of poppy cultivation is a powerful tool in targeting Afghan behavior. In this regard, a public awareness campaign would be particularly effective in reaching the greatest audience. Making an appeal that narcotics violate the tenets
of Islam and are dishonorable will likely resonate with the deeply religious Afghan citizens.

The British and American forces in Afghanistan are assisting in training and supporting Afghan drug interdiction forces. In view of the limited opium processing plants and smuggling routes, the central government can apply pressure against the warlords and their lieutenants without hurting the farmers directly. This approach is less volatile than attempting to eradicate poppy growth directly. In view of the ease and speed with which poppies are grown, as well as the financial investment farmers have in their fields, focusing on interdiction will likely be more effective over time than hunting for will-o'-the-wisp poppy fields.

Ending the culture of warlordism would represent the culmination of effort in Afghanistan. In order to end this culture, an alternative must be available. Warlords provide two commodities for their constituents—security and a livelihood. The central government and coalition can assume both commodities using the Afghan National Army (ANA) and the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT). The ANA has only recently achieved the necessary numbers to establish a presence in the provinces. Some may decry this use of the ANA as a diversion from its main task of providing security (e.g., fighting insurgents). The fact is that the coalition has been managing the Taliban/al Qaeda insurgency for the past 4 years, and for practical purposes, this insurgency is defanged. Although insurgent remnants may continue low level activities for years, the Afghan police forces should be able to shoulder a greater part of the burden in 2005. Under these circumstances, the ANA can bolster the legitimacy of the central government by establishing security and participating in local projects that resonate with the people, such as reconstruction, agricultural events, and ceremonies. The increased interaction between the ANA and the local Afghans will enhance recruitment of quality soldiers and provide a tangible association with the central government.

Correspondingly, the coalition PRTs are an excellent vehicle for introducing the ANA and perhaps police forces into the provinces, as well as providing local employment through reconstruction projects. The number and size of PRTs can increase, with the increase of ANA
soldiers into them. PRTs may be the best method for transforming international financial aid into reconstruction and local vocational training. Providing labor and skills to local individuals is an effective way to help the Afghans help themselves. In the long term, providing manual labor tools for dozens of workers and supervising the work projects over a period of weeks may yield a greater payoff than a PRT conducting reconstruction with bulldozers, backhoes, and other equipment in a matter of days. The use of PRTs with ANA soldiers offers an unobtrusive way to increase the presence and influence of the central government without a direct confrontation with the warlords. Their use also provides a benign way for Afghanistan to permit the passage of warlordism into history.

Recommendations:

- Adapt ways and means to support the main objective—the legitimacy of the central government in the eyes of the Afghan people.
- Invest resources for a public media campaign and test it in Afghanistan. Adapt it to other operations in the pursuit of the global war on terror.
- Wean Afghan society off the opium market by targeting the economics of the trade, emphasizing the un-Islam dimensions of illicit drugs, and interdicting the trade before it leaves Afghanistan.
- Invest heavily in PRTs and then populate with ANA soldiers and coalition cadre.
- Remain cognizant of Afghanistan’s propensity towards xenophobia, regionalism, and conflict when executing sector security reform and supporting stratagems.
Preconceived notions, especially in war, are dangerous, because they give their own particular colour to all information that comes in; and . . . stifle any real understanding of the actual situation . . .

General Aleksei A. Brusilov

Introduction.

Every insurgency is unique, requiring a unique counterinsurgency strategy. The most egregious error in conducting a counterinsurgency campaign is to attempt a cookie-cutter approach from one insurgency to another. Afghanistan’s uniqueness stems not from the series of insurgencies that have plagued the state for over 2 decades; rather, it is the state of commonplace lawlessness that challenges the central government, coalition, and the United Nations (UN).

The collapse of Afghanistan as a state can be traced to events leading up to and including the Soviet Union’s invasion in December 1979. During their 1980-88 war to destroy the mujahidin insurgents, the Soviets destroyed the socio-economic fabric of Afghanistan by killing 1.3 million Afghans, expelling another 5.5 million, destroying crops and irrigation systems, bombing granaries, razing villages, mining pastures and fields, and killing livestock. The withdrawal of the Soviet army in 1989 led to a further descent into chaos as mujahidin insurgents continued to fight the communist government, which slowly lost control of Afghanistan over the next 4 years. The mujahidin, or more accurately at this stage in the conflict, the warlord militias, did not discriminate between combatants and noncombatants. From 1992 through 1994, militia forces killed between 40,000 to 50,000 noncombatants in the course of fighting around Kabul alone. Their sheer rapacity throughout Afghanistan simply ravaged the economy. The rise of the Taliban in 1994 only exchanged rapacity for a medieval reign, but the civil war continued until the U.S.-supported Afghan Militia Forces (warlord militias) ousted the Taliban in late 2001.
By the time President Hamid Karzai’s Islamic Transitional Government of Afghanistan was established as a result of the December 2001 Bonn Agreement, Afghanistan was in the worst sense a collapsed state as described by William Zartman. Afghanistan could no longer perform the basic functions of a sovereign government. It no longer possessed a decisionmaking center of government; centralized law and order were nonexistent, and social cohesion only existed at the tribal level; it was no longer a symbol of identity, as the inhabitants reserved their allegiance to their warlords or tribal chiefs; and it had lost its domestic legitimacy as it could not provide any socioeconomic services to the citizens. Twenty-three years of war had destroyed all vestiges of state functions.

Regarding the road to rehabilitation, Zartman recommends reversing the process of collapse as follows: 1) the central government must gain control of its state agents (functioning, uncorrupt military and police forces, subordinated to the government); 2) government authorities must practice positive politics (elections, platforms, and legislation); 3) the central government must make progressive reforms (not eschew difficult decisions); 4) the central government must expand its political power base beyond the immediate circle or capital; and 5) the central government must extend its authority throughout the state so that local warlords and neighboring states do not fill the vacuum. Technically, Zartman is correct in his assessment, and technically, the UN-mandated International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) is attempting to reverse the process with its Sector Security Reform (SSR) strategy. However, rebuilding Afghanistan’s sovereignty is not a matter of putting the pieces back in place and hoping Afghanistan will reanimate automatically as a functioning state.

It may surprise some to know that the main purveyors of Afghanistan’s continued lawlessness are the warlords and not the Taliban/al Qaeda militants. Because of their power and wealth, Afghan warlords and their militias represent the greatest challenge to Afghanistan’s rehabilitation, but a confrontational strategy with them will likely lead to widespread fighting. Coalition strategy must not forget that the ultimate medium for change resides in the Afghan people, and every aspect of SSR must nurture their allegiance towards
and trust in the Afghan central government. Afghanistan’s domestic legitimacy necessitates this recognition. For the most part, the needed resources for strategy implementation are readily available and only require a change in focus.

This monograph proposes a slight shift in coalition strategy, placing greater stress on three approaches: 1) initiating a sophisticated public awareness campaign to win the war of ideas; 2) weaning Afghan society off the opium market; and 3) ending the culture of warlordism without sparking an insurgency. As this monograph will seek to demonstrate, all elements of this strategy are mutually supporting and synergistic. This strategy not only creates a compelling methodology for restoring Afghanistan as a functioning state, but it also possesses tools useful for similar nation-building efforts elsewhere.

The Warlord Gordian Knot.

Recognizing that the warlords are the central problem to Afghanistan’s future is one thing, but finding a way to deal with them is quite another. Not only were the warlords and their militias the freedom fighters against the Soviet occupation, they were also the principal allies of the United States against the Taliban and al Qaeda. Not surprisingly, the United States continues “to rely on the independent warlords for help hunting down remnant units of the Taliban and al Qaeda.” And as the central government and coalition pursue a host of activities, the warlord militias still function as a home guard, protecting their provinces from militant infiltration.

Yet, the warlords and their militias are a double-edged sword. Despite their service to Afghanistan, they and their militias are not yielding to the authority of Karzai’s central government. Three years have passed since the UN stipulated the subordination of the 200 or more warlords and their militias to the central government. The principal vehicle for the dissolution of the militias is the Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) initiative as part of the Japanese-led Afghan New Beginnings Program (ANBP). In early 2003, ANBP established an arbitrary DDR target goal of 100,000 militiamen because the true size of the Afghan Militia Force was unknown and remains unknown due to warlord and
militia commander obstructionism. United Kingdom (UK) Colonel Peter Babbington, who is responsible for executing DDR, regards the necessity for warlord compliance as the fatal flaw in the whole process, with a persistent gulf between their words and deeds. Warlords and militia leaders are able to shroud their troop strengths by paying their militiamen with profits from the illicit opium trade. Without government fiscal oversight, the true size of the militia forces is not knowable; hence force estimates have ranged wildly from 60,000 to 250,000. Militia end-strengths are practically a side issue, though, since few militia forces (under 17,000) have processed through DDR, and those that have are considered by the warlords as the most expendable. Moreover, contrary to the spirit of DDR, the warlords have turned in obsolete, incomplete, and nonfunctioning weapons and equipment for the fledgling Afghan National Army (ANA), reserving the most modern and well-maintained weapons and equipment for their militia. One conclusion is incontestable: DDR alone will not defang the warlords.

In response to warlord recalcitrance, Karzai recently proclaimed warlord militias as the greatest threat to Afghanistan, a threat even greater than the Taliban insurgents, and that he planned to institute new measures to disarm them. Exactly what new measures Karzai intends to employ are inscrutable. In the past he has used various stratagems to pare the power of various warlords: persuading some to comply with DDR and co-opting others by appointing them as provincial governors, cabinet ministers, and to similar positions; and in some cases, deploying elements of the ANA ostensibly to quell fighting among warlords, but in reality, a subtle way of establishing his authority without being too confrontational. His boldest and riskiest move was the recent dismissal of Ismail Khan, the governor of the Herat province and a warlord thought to be untouchable. Throughout his political maneuvering, Karzai remains sensitive to honoring the past sacrifices and patriotism of the warlords and militia. Reflecting Karzai’s sensitivities, U.S. Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad avers that the government must balance the use of force with incentives when addressing the warlords and their militias: “There must be a place of honor for those who cooperate.”

Such a measured approach is much more than yielding to nostalgia. A government and coalition military campaign to crush
the warlords would likely lead to renewed fighting or even a full fledged insurrection. Afghanistan has a “long tradition of resistance to central authority and foreign interference.” A product of numerous historical invasions and compartmentalized geography, Afghan society is actually a quilt-work of “village states” comprising various tribes and ethnicities. The basic subnational unit is the Qawm, a social “identity based on kinship, residence, and sometimes occupation.”

When not fighting foreign invaders, Afghans have a rich history of internecine warfare among regions or between warlords and the central government due to tribal rivalries, ungovernable tribes, blood feuds, and chieftain ambitions. With loyalties devolving to the family and tribe, progress at the national level remains a slow process, but from the Afghan perspective, these arrangements also serve to protect the Qawm from an oppressive central government or invader.

It would be wise to regard Afghan warlordism as a latent insurgency. Regardless of any exigencies justifying the use of force against the warlords, even small operations risk sparking a visceral uprising that could easily spread throughout Afghanistan. The Taliban, al Qaeda, and Hizb-I Islami Gulbuddin (HIG) insurgents would be quick to exploit this change in fortunes for a revival of their jihad against the West. Hence, confronted by powerful and often irascible warlords, a low-level insurgent threat from the Taliban and other militants, and a country left destitute by 23 years of warfare, the central government and coalition must be open to new approaches if the path to a functioning state is to continue.

Public Awareness Campaign.

A public awareness campaign is an integral part of information operations, but it should not be regarded as merely a news provider or a clandestine operation. A sophisticated public awareness campaign seeks to engage its audience by being entertaining, first and foremost. In the process, it weaves in daily themes to inform and persuade the public, and to rebut adversarial propaganda. To illustrate, the U.S. propaganda efforts during World War II provide a useful framework for reference. The Office of Strategic Services (OSS)
designed a clandestine media operation to connect with the German people and soldiers by recruiting German and Austrian expatriate actors, musicians, comedians, and playwrights to produce radio programs, which provided entertainment while subtly weaving in OSS themes. The expatriates possessed the linguistic, cultural, and political skills needed to resonate with German listeners. The operation was a resounding success, albeit never advertised even after the war. German soldiers and civilians eagerly but secretly tuned into the programs for their entertainment value. The subtle messages and humor poking fun at the Nazi regime had the desired effect and even prompted an uprising in Bavaria near the end of the war.

Care must be taken not to use the public awareness campaign for deception, which is a specific intelligence operation aimed at deluding enemy leaders. Deception performs a valuable service during a conflict, but in this role it would be counterproductive because credibility is crucial. A public awareness campaign should be an open enterprise and rely on facts to inform and persuade the public.

To launch the campaign with the greatest and most immediate effect, the coalition should recruit expatriate Afghan entertainers and journalists from coalition member states for radio and television programs. Naturally, qualified Afghans living in Afghanistan would be eligible, and close cooperation with the Afghan government would be a prerequisite for such an operation. Like the German case, only these professionals possess the requisite skills to reach the Afghan people. To provide coherence of effort, the production staff should be comprised of professional marketing and media executives, anthropologists, and government policy officials (both U.S. and Afghan). Because Afghanistan is comprised of diverse ethnic groups and languages (Pashtu, Dari, and Turkic, among others), the programs would need to adapt the content for the targeted audience.

Approximately 36 percent of the population is literate, so the campaign should rely predominantly on the visual and oral media. In this pursuit, the enterprise would require an investment in sufficient station equipment, studios, and towers to cover all of Afghanistan, as well as enough transistor radios and televisions (for community TV
centers) for adequate reach. Because of the mountainous geography, satellite radio and television transmissions may be better. Besides the entertainment value with interwoven themes, the programs could gradually expand to panel debates, talk shows, and so forth, so as to air differing viewpoints, hearsay, and grievances. It stands to reason that once the audience grows, the law of economics will take over and the programs will turn a profit. By opening a public dialogue, the people will not be as susceptible to extremist rhetoric, rumors, and disinformation. Feedback through surveys and polls will enhance the quality of the public awareness campaign. Initially, the public media focus should be on the insurgents, but as the medium matures, it can shift to other issues, such as the opium problem, warlord corruption, the progress of the ANA, and other government initiatives.

Despite the intrinsic value of a public media campaign, the U.S. Government may be reticent to adopt it due to preconceived ideas. In a recent article, Charles Krohn, a former deputy chief of public affairs in Iraq, believes that, in general, Americans view public media operations as dishonorable and underhanded. Krohn develops his thesis further. Ironically, the media is engrained in American culture because it is used to market ideas (e.g., speeches, press conferences, and news programs) and to market products (e.g., basic advertising, the armed forces, and coalitions). A public media campaign in reality is a form of advertising, and the product is the promotion of democracy as well as the free exchange of ideas. Regional Islamic extremists and their affiliates readily and unabashedly attempt to marginalize the United States in the war of ideas, so refusing to engage the local citizens in this arena places the coalition on the defensive. The public awareness campaign seeks to win the allegiance of the undecided, and the initial step in separating the extremists from the moderate Moslems is to persuade them that the efforts of the United States are noble and to their benefit.

The appropriate agency for the public media campaign should probably lie in the government-civilian sector. Mr. Krohn observes that the Department of Defense has made such operations an unintended secret enterprise by relegating them to psychological operations (PSYOP) units within the Special Operations Command. The Combined Forces Command-Afghanistan (CFC-A) and the ISAF
operate five PSYOP radio stations, and CFC-A supports numerous independent radio stations for PSYOP and public affairs messages. CFC-A also uses Afghanistan’s existing radio and TV stations, as well as the international media, to disseminate information. Because surveys have revealed that radio is the most effective media for spreading messages, CFC-A gives away transistor radios to Afghans. The question remains whether these efforts resonate effectively with the Afghan people. More importantly, does the fact that PSYOP units operate these stations evoke any suspicions with the Afghans? In the long term, a professional media effort operating as a public service will most likely provide the greatest payoff.

Resolving Afghanistan’s Addiction to Opium.

With its poppy cultivation increasing unabated, Afghanistan produces 75 percent of the world’s illicit opium. Years of poverty, conflict, and shattered central authority have created, or significantly contributed to, the entrenchment of opium in Afghan society. Afghanistan’s poppy cultivation has gained international attention because it exacerbates drug problems in other countries, and its drug trade provides tremendous wealth for organized crime and terrorist organizations. Poppy growth in Afghanistan is rampant, taking place in 28 of the 32 provinces. Farmers are drawn to poppy cultivation because poppies are easy to grow in arid climates and generate vastly greater profits than other crops. For example, the aid organization, German Agro Action, estimates that profits for opium are $600 to $1,000 per kilogram, as opposed to $1 per kilogram for rice or wheat. Afghanistan could easily become a narco-state with traffickers and drug lords increasing their hold over the farmers and the economy, generating billions in profits and providing between 50 to 60 percent of Afghanistan’s economy. Although the farmers are drawn to poppy cultivation for a living, the majority of the profits go to the traffickers, warlords, militia leaders, and even the Taliban, al Qaeda, and Hizb-i-Islami (HIG).

Earlier errors by the UK and the UN contributed to Afghanistan’s current socio-economic addiction to opium. In accordance with its counternarcotics strategy, the British paid poppy farmers to eradicate
their crops for legal crops; however the strategy backfired because it prompted other farmers to start growing poppies in order to enjoy the windfall as well. The UN alternative crops program failed because the UN imported wheat into Afghanistan at the same time Afghan farmers were growing wheat. As a result, the UN unintentionally crippled the domestic market for Afghan wheat farmers.39

Although U.S. and other agencies have discussed using the U.S. military in counternarcotics efforts, to include crop eradication, both carry unintended consequences. Senior U.S. military and civilian leaders recommend confining the antidrug campaign to law enforcement. “Enmeshing U.S. troops in drug fights…would alienate many Afghans—some of whom have become useful intelligence sources—and also divert attention from the core U.S. military missions of combating insurgents and aiding reconstruction.”40 Aid workers warn that Afghans depend on the opium trade for their livelihood, and senior coalition military leaders believe eradication could spark an additional insurgency by the warlords.41 The one imperative of the counternarcotics campaign must be to avoid driving the Afghans into the arms of the warlords.

The counternarcotics strategy should target three poppy pressure points in Afghanistan: the economic, the ethical/social, and the opiate processing nodal points. The UN Office on Drugs and Crime asserts that the laws of economics can be used to diminish the opium market.42 The United States and European Union (EU) should subsidize legal crops, paying farmers as much for them as they would receive for opium. Although such subsidies appear exorbitant, given the amount of money and resources devoted to combating drug trafficking globally, shifting more money to nip the market in the bud seems relatively cheap.43 The UN, United States, and EU can bolster Afghanistan’s legal agricultural exports by providing greater access to foreign markets. In 2004, 35 countries worldwide required external food assistance: 24 in Africa, 5 in Asia/Near East, 5 in Latin America, and 1 in Europe.44 Because Europe receives the lion’s share of opiates from Afghanistan, representing 95 percent of its heroin consumption, it is in the EU’s best interests to relax some provisions of its Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), permitting Afghan agricultural products into the EU.45 In this case, the EU could collaborate with Afghanistan
to import a high value agricultural product for European consumers. The UN can permit greater agricultural access to other needed areas as well to provide an enduring market. The bottom line must transcend domestic agricultural concerns and barriers and permit Afghanistan to develop its agricultural market so as to undercut the illegal opium market. Understandably, the warlords will likely coerce these profits from the farmers, but the immediate goal is to interrupt poppy cultivation long enough for the institutional knowledge to dissipate and the market to shift to other regions. Once this shift occurs, then the government can focus on warlord racketeering.

Increasing comprehension through the public awareness campaign accentuates the unethical aspects of poppy cultivation. Specifically, the media campaign would target Afghan ethical values by emphasizing that opium consumption is against the tenets of Islam and is dishonorable. For those Afghans that rationalize opium consumption as affecting only nonbelievers, the public awareness campaign should emphasize the legal ramifications of getting caught, as well as the human tragedy stories related to opium use among Afghans. Highlighting one’s honor in this enterprise taps into the Afghan psyche. Lastly, emphasizing that warlords and Islamic extremists are reaping huge profits from the drug trade, while Afghans struggle with poverty, helps to isolate the former from Afghan society.

A greater emphasis on targeting processing laboratories and movement of opium products places pressure on the drug lords without affecting the farmers directly. Only around 12 industrial labs process the opium into heroin in the northern, eastern, and southern provinces. Forty percent is smuggled through Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and other northern states, whereas 30 percent goes through Iran and Pakistan. In response, the British have trained an Afghan narcotics interdiction force, and existing counternarcotics police units are expanding. A special judiciary task force comprising prosecutors and judges is planned to operate in a secure facility near Kabul. Moreover, the U.S. military plans to support Afghan narcotics interdiction operations with airlift and intelligence to increase border security. Ostensibly, attempting to interdict the finished product appears much more difficult than simply eradicating poppy fields, but in 2004 alone, an estimated 321,236 acres were used for poppy
growth, much of it in small, isolated fields. Because poppies are so easy to grow in Afghanistan, farmers can rapidly establish new fields as fast as they are eradicated. Focusing intelligence and interdiction forces on processing laboratories and smuggling routes makes more practical sense than attempting to scour Afghanistan for poppy fields, and the farmers are not directly affected.

If the opium market can be eliminated in Afghanistan, the resulting diminution of global supplies and higher prices will cause the opium/heroin market to collapse. Even if opium cultivation shifts to other countries, such as Myanmar and Laos, their low opium yield areas will not restore supply levels for cheap heroin at the current level. Anecdotal evidence suggests that Afghans would not grow poppies if a viable agricultural market was available. In this regard, integrating the ethics of the illicit drug trade into the counternarcotics campaign is a powerful tool in Afghanistan’s deeply religious culture. Persuading the EU to relax its Common Agricultural Policy to accept Afghan agricultural products will be much more difficult, but the heavy consumption of heroin in Europe provides a powerful incentive. Lastly, concentrating on the processing and smuggling nodal points makes greater use of the finite intelligence and interdiction forces. With the loss of their largest source of wealth, the warlords would not be able to maintain their militia forces at current levels and they would find their power flagging. In short, the counternarcotics campaign has the greatest potential for setting Afghanistan on a progressive course.

**Ending the Culture of Warlordism.**

The warlords provide two services for their constituents—security and employment—which in turn generate local fealty. For the central government to challenge the warlords’ traditional position in Afghan society, it must present an image which resonates with the average citizen. Ultimately, the central government wants to be the primary authority in Afghanistan, but it risks sparking an uprising if it becomes too confrontational. In this regard, a steady encroachment into the provinces stands a better chance of a peaceful change in authority. Since Karzai is co-opting many warlords into the government, the transition to legitimate central authority is complementary.
Currently, the ANA is the embodiment of the central government and has the greatest potential concerning citizen identification with the central government. As such, it becomes necessary to promote a greater presence of the ANA in the provinces, even though this measure may provoke an outcry within the military because of its diversion from a traditional security role. Nonetheless, the ANA has two stated missions: to protect the national government and to project government authority and influence throughout all the provinces. Hence, a greater ANA presence in the provinces would be an appropriate role.\textsuperscript{50}

Critics still may question whether assigning the ANA to an essentially image-enhancing role rather than fighting insurgents is not counterproductive. After all, the idea behind training the ANA is to permit the central government to assume the task of security rather than relying on coalition forces. Realistically, CFC-A has been fulfilling this security mission for several years, and during this window of opportunity, the ANA can be utilized for greater political effect.\textsuperscript{51} The 18,000 coalition forces and the Pakistani forces across the border have successfully neutralized the Taliban, al Qaeda, and HIG insurgents. The greatest indication of Taliban weakness was its inability to interrupt the October 9, 2004, presidential election. Recent revelations indicate that rivalries within Taliban ranks, internal dissension, and loss of its former Pakistani sponsors have severely reduced its capabilities.\textsuperscript{52} More promising, Taliban militants recently have indicated that they wish to lay down their arms in exchange for amnesty.\textsuperscript{53} Residual Taliban and al Qaeda militants may possess the funding and capability to continue a low level insurgency for years, but the threat will remain manageable, especially once Afghanistan’s law enforcement assumes a greater role.\textsuperscript{54}

To date, the Germans have trained 20,000 policemen with an ultimate goal of 50,000 policemen by 2005 and 12,000 border police thereafter. The U.S. Department of State has built four police academies, with another two planned.\textsuperscript{55} Law enforcement agencies will become more professional as better vetting of recruits, greater salaries, and adequate equipment are introduced.\textsuperscript{56} Since the coalition has the insurgency contained, it only makes sense to focus the ANA where it can do the most good, and that is to extend the authority of the central government throughout the provinces.
In view of Afghanistan’s traditions and history, the question arises whether the ANA can compete with the militia forces for the pride and respect of the local citizens. The warlord militia forces probably enjoy some residual approbation as a result of the mythological lore that surrounds the mujahidin, but they are also stigmatized by their predacious behavior throughout the warring years. It is well-known that the warlords were responsible for pre-Taliban oppression and atrocities that pervaded Afghanistan after the Soviets withdrew. Presently, many warlords and militia forces are complicit in the opium market, corruption, extortion, and intimidation of Afghan citizens.\(^{57}\) Notwithstanding the contrast in ethical behavior, the ANA is better trained, disciplined, and led than the militia forces.\(^{58}\)

This sanguine assessment may be surprising in view of the ANA’s precarious start. Established in May 2002, the ANA has a headline goal of 70,000 by 2008. As previously mentioned, the warlords only contributed their worst soldiers and equipment to the national army, and the majority of recruits were pressed into service. Consequently, desertion rates as high as 50 percent plagued the ANA due to poor motivation, low pay, corruption, and hazing. The second half of 2004 revealed a leveling off of the high attrition primarily due to military and government reforms, although the specter of Soviet military doctrine may linger in some circles.\(^{59}\) To secure the ANA’s recruitment base, the coalition has established 23 National Army Volunteer Centers throughout Afghanistan, with a final goal of 35. The ANA has the capacity to train 3,000 recruits organized into four training battalions every 10 weeks. By September 2004, the ANA had an end-strength of 13,400, with an expected end-strength of 16,000 by the end of 2004.\(^{60}\) Thus, the ANA now has the numbers to start making an impact throughout Afghanistan.

The media awareness campaign can enhance the ANA’s image in the eyes of the people through general advertisements but also by ANA participation in reconstruction programs, farming projects, ceremonial events, and presence patrols in villages. Devoting air time to soldiers helping to rebuild the country and rendering assistance to the people not only enhances the appeal of the ANA, but also establishes a national bond between the people and the central government. Consequently, recruitment of quality volunteers for
national service will gain momentum, extending the appeal of the central government and loosening the regional parochialism. Given the choice between the militia and the ANA, Afghan youths will increasingly choose the ANA.

Correspondingly, the coalition provincial reconstruction teams (PRT) are an excellent vehicle for introducing the ANA and perhaps police forces into the provinces, as well as providing local employment through reconstruction projects. PRTs already conduct a host of activities in consultation with the local authorities that extend the authority and legitimacy of the central government through reconstruction projects, good governance initiatives, promotion of security, and other SSR related projects. Currently, the coalition operates 19 PRTs in the north and west, with future expansion to the south and east planned. Still, the PRTs are relatively small, ranging in size from 50 to 500 soldiers and depending on coalition member states to fill the ranks, a precarious source of manpower. Incorporating ANA soldiers into PRTs would permit an increase in the number and size of PRTs, as well as enhancing local cooperation, trust, and security. Through an expanded PRT labor and training program, local people could acquire new vocational skills, employment, and self-worth.

The interface between the PRTs and local officials has been facilitated by the central government’s Afghan Reconstruction Group, which organizes reconstruction efforts among the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), UN, Afghan agencies, and nongovernment organizations (NGOs). Moreover, the central government has established the “National Solidarity Program which seeks to create local governing councils and to empower these councils to make decisions about local reconstruction priorities.” Reckoning that democracy in Afghanistan is best cultivated at the local level, the development council members are elected by secret ballot. By giving the inhabitants a voice and assistance, they can reconstruct the country on their own. With this in mind and because the Afghans will inevitably assume the task of reconstruction, it may serve the interests of the coalition to place more ANA soldiers under coalition leadership into the PRTs.

PRTs may be the best method for transforming international financial aid into reconstruction and local vocational training.
Although it is troubling that international aid pledges have proven to be more rhetoric than reality, reconstruction and assistance efforts must continue. PRTs can become the primary means for translating aid into assistance. PRTs are best placed to maximize monetary and equipment contributions by employing local labor. From an Afghan perspective, it may be more self-affirming for local Afghans and PRT personnel to work with picks, shovels, and wheelbarrows over a period of weeks rather than watch a PRT accomplish the same task alone with dump trucks, bulldozers, and backhoes in a week. Which method builds stronger bonds? Supplemented by a public awareness campaign, PRTs can become the locomotion of rapid reconstruction and social change to the farthest reaches of Afghanistan.

The use of PRTs is not without controversy though. NGOs in Afghanistan believe they confuse the local inhabitants, who cannot differentiate between PRTs and NGOs. NGOs fear compromise by association, and many practice strict impartiality and eschew coordination with military forces and government authorities as a matter of political philosophy. This distinct separation is, from the standpoint of the NGOs, nonnegotiable. For coalition and central government efforts, this arrangement translates into some redundancies and inefficiencies. This leads to a meditative question: are NGOs a valued commodity to post-conflict operations or an obstacle to recovery? Afghanistan’s Ministry of Planning has 2,296 NGOs and 321 international governmental organizations (IGOs) registered in its books, but only 100 are well-established organizations. Ramazan Bachardoust, the former head of the Ministry of Planning, has claimed that most of the NGOs are not legitimate aid organizations and are only interested in the money. Fair or not, the spreading perception among Afghans that NGOs are motivated by profits rather than reconstruction and assistance badly tarnishes their image, resulting in hostility and noncooperation. Add to this stigma the fact that NGOs and IGOs cannot visit parts of Afghanistan because of the security risks, the need for more PRTs becomes imperative. The intent of this section is not to denigrate NGOs, but merely to point out that self-serving aid organizations in Afghanistan have compromised the standing of NGOs. By necessity, military organizations like CFC-A will take a pragmatic stance,
devoid of niceties—reinforce success, not failure. In this regard, PRTs have greater potential and should get the resources.

Expanding the role of the ANA and the PRTs into the provinces increasingly will provide security and jobs. The increased interaction between the ANA and the local Afghans will enhance recruitment of quality soldiers and provide a tangible association with the central government. PRTs have the potential to generate jobs and skill sets among the local citizens, as well as increasing their sense of security and stability. Once law and order becomes self-perpetuating, the influence of the warlords will fade. The task of the central government is to set the conditions for the graceful exit of warlordism.

Conclusions.

Turning Afghanistan into a functioning state would be a very difficult enterprise, even without an ongoing insurgency, illicit opium market, and powerful warlords. As current trends portend, SSR will not fail catastrophically per se, but neither will it achieve the desired end state. Warlords remain the most virulent obstacle to Afghanistan’s future as a self-functioning and sovereign state. Because an open confrontation with the warlords would likely spark a widespread insurgency, which the Taliban, al Qaeda, and HIG would exploit, the coalition must seek imaginative stratagems to divorce Afghanistan from warlordism. Winning the hearts and minds requires an investment in a public awareness campaign, weaning the society off opium, and providing security and legitimate sources of livelihood which give Afghans hope in the future. These programs must complement and supplement SSR.

Recommendations.

- Adapt ways and means to support the main objective—the legitimacy of the central government in the eyes Afghan people.
- Invest resources for a public media campaign and test it in Afghanistan. Adapt it to other operations in the pursuit of the global war on terror.
• Wean Afghan society off the opium market by targeting the economics of the trade, emphasizing the un-Islam dimensions of illicit drugs, and interdicting the trade before it leaves Afghanistan.

• Invest heavily in PRTs and then populate with ANA soldiers and coalition cadre.

• Remain cognizant of Afghanistan’s propensity towards xenophobia, regionalism, and conflict when executing SSR and supporting stratagems.

Regarding the last recommendation, many warlords are potent adversaries who will be quick to counter threats to their powerbase. But, given past warlord oppression and exploitation of the Afghan people, the aforementioned stratagems provide a powerful means to isolate the warlords from the people subtly. Without a source of revenues and manpower, the majority of warlords will likely reach the appropriate conclusions, and seek accommodations with the central government or retire with honor. Should a few warlords opt to resist and seek a confrontation, the government will have the means in place to manage the threat. The public awareness campaign will assist in isolating these recalcitrant warlords politically, and the better trained and supported ANA will bring them to justice, solidifying the authority and legitimacy of the central government. The situation in Afghanistan is unique, but the use of a public awareness campaign, adaptive economic programs, and PRTs provides a paradigm for nation-building that resonates with the affected people. Failed states likely will remain on the international agenda; the leading powers should pursue effective and cost-effective ways to manage them.

ENDNOTES

1. The military coup by Mohammed Daoud in 1973 created discontent as a result of his harsh rule. Following his assassination on April 27, 1978, Afghan communists seized power and created the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. The influx of Soviet advisors and communist-inspired reforms created a backlash throughout Afghanistan, leading to greater Soviet involvement until it concluded that only an invasion could stabilize the communist government. Stephen Tanner, Afghanistan: A Military History from Alexander the Great to the Fall of the Taliban, New York: De Capo Press, 2002, pp. 229-241.


5. Tanner, pp. 279-287.


7. Ibid., p. 5.

8. Ibid., p. 10.

9. Sector Security Reform is a lead-nation approach to rebuilding Afghanistan as a sovereign state. The five pillars of the strategy are: establishing the Afghan National Army (United States); establishing the judiciary system (Italy); establishing law enforcement agencies (Germany); disarmimg, demobilizing, and reintegrating the Afghan Militia Forces into society (Japan); and counter-narcotics (United Kingdom).

10. For superb analysis and unique insights regarding the American-Northern Alliance war against the Taliban and al Qaeda, see Stephen Biddle, Afghanistan and the Future of War: Implications for the Army and Defense Policy, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, November 2002.


14. As an incentive, processed militiamen are given $200 for their rifle, some food, and vocational training. Even here, the militia commanders undercut the incentives by seizing the $200 afterwards, claiming the rifles belonged to them. Astill, internet; Michael Bhatia, Kevin Lanigan, and Phillip Wilkinson, “Minimum Investments, Minimal Results: The Failure of Security Policy in Afghanistan,” Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, June 2004, p. 16, internet, http://www.areu.org.af. Hereafter referred to as AREU.


16. As of September 2004, only 16,861 militiamen processed through DDR, far below the interim goal of 40,000 by the October 9 presidential elections. P. M. Cruickshank, “ANBP Status Report for 23 September,” Planning and Interim A&F. Colonel Randy Pullen, Public Affairs Officer, Office of Military Cooperation-Afghanistan, provided the weekly ANBP Status Reports via email.


24. Gulbuddin Hikmatyar founded Hizb-I Islami Gulbuddin (HIG) as a faction of the Hizb-I-Islami party in 1977, and it was one of the major mujahedin groups in the war against the Soviets. HIG has long established ties with Bin Ladin. In the early 1990s, Hikmatyar ran several terrorist training camps in Afghanistan and was a pioneer in sending mercenary fighters to other Islamic conflicts. Hikmatyar offered to shelter Bin Ladin after the latter fled Sudan in 1996. HIG operates in Eastern Afghanistan, particularly Konar and Nuristan Provinces and adjacent to Pakistan’s tribal areas. [Intelligence Research Program, “Hizb-I-Islami Gulbuddin, HIG,” Federation of American Scientists, http://www.fas.org/irp/world/para/hig.htm](http://www.fas.org/irp/world/para/hig.htm).

25. Despite regime threats to punish violators, German citizens and soldiers tuned into this radio station for its entertainment value.


29. Mr. Krohn uses the term “propaganda,” which, by strict definition, is a neutral term. However, the historical context gives the term such a pejorative flavor that it unduly distracts the reader from the main points. As a result, I have adopted the term public awareness campaign. Charles A. Krohn, “The Role of Propaganda in Fighting Terrorism,” *Army Magazine*, Vol. 54, No. 12, Association of the U.S. Army, December 2004, pp. 7-8.

30. Krohn believes U.S. assumptions regarding the nature of warfare are behind the neglect of propaganda. With the U.S. military superiority in conventional warfare, the need for propaganda seems an unnecessary appendage. After all, once the United States has
defeated the enemy forces on the battlefield, the enemy government is supposed to reach the appropriate conclusions and surrender. But what does the United States do if the enemy resorts to insurgent operations as part of a contingency plan, or post-conflict operations result in wide-spread internal power struggles? Ibid., pp. 7-8.

31. Ibid., p. 7.

32. Major Scott Nelson, Deputy Joint Interagency Effects Chief and CFC-A Spokesman, email inquiry, September 2004. “The Taliban is very effective with the use of information to influence the local population and the international community. They take credit for widely reported incidents and use intimidation, threats, night letters, and calls to Pakistan [sic], Afghan, and Western Media outlets to spread their messages.”

33. Ibid.

34. For a variety of technical reasons, coalition patrols meeting with village elders remains the primary means of disseminating coalition messages. Ibid.


36. Ibid., pp. 11, 13.


45. Graham.

46. Graham; Bagley.

48. Graham; Dinmore. In the future, Robert Charles, the Assistant Secretary of State for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, points out that the U.S. and UK authorities will assist in target selection, such as heroin laboratories, and provide support and training to the Afghans. The U.S. development agency, USAID, will provide development projects and aid packages to Afghan farmers before eradication occurs.


50. In support of these goals, the key to establishing the ANA as an enduring institution rests on the creation of three pillars: 1) well-trained and disciplined combat forces, 2) creation of military educational and training institutions, and 3) a reformed Ministry of Defense and General Staff. “ANA Building Program Briefing,” Office of Military Cooperation-Afghanistan, ANA Plans and Design Team, October 2003. Presented by Colonel Michael Taliento.

51. The ANA should continue its rotation of units in counterinsurgency operations for combat experience, but the rest of the ANA needs to place unit training schedules on hiatus until warlordism is excised.


impressment, abuses, and corruption were prevalent. Dating back to 1919, the Soviet-Afghan military cooperation has left an enduring imprint. Grau, p. 10.


66. It was apparent by June 2004 that NATO had fallen short on its pledges to Afghanistan. The United States had provided $1.42 billion out of $3.3 pledged, and the European Commission, $386 million out of $1.24 billion pledged. Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer had tried in vain to compel NATO member states to fulfill their pledges ranging from supplies, equipment, manpower, headquarters, transport planes, helicopters, and intelligence assets. Even the initiative to deploy five more PRTs fell short of pledges. “A NATO Meeting of the Minds?” *Washington Times*, June 28, 2004, p. 16, internet.


69. Sawyer, internet; Ramazan Bachardoust, the head of the Ministry of Planning, has 335 IGOs and 2,300 Afghan Groups in his registry. He charged that 1,935 were not operating in accordance with the law and planned to dissolve them, but instead he has resigned over the issue. Carlotta Gall and Amy Waldman, “Under Siege In Afghanistan, Aid Groups Say Their Effort Is Being Criticized Unfairly,” *New York Times*, December 19, 2004, internet.

70. *Ibid*. 