USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

PETROLEUM EXECUTIVE AGENCY -
A FORCING FUNCTION FOR JOINTNESS

by

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ABSTRACT

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Jointness is the essential capability that sets the U.S. military apart from all others. Interoperable and interdependent Services enable the Combatant Commander to choose from a vast array of capabilities to achieve the desired effects. This is true in Combat, Combat Support as well as in Combat Service Support roles. The National Military Strategy states that “Defeating adaptive adversaries requires flexible, modular and deployable joint forces with the ability to combine the strengths of individual Services, combatant commands, other government agencies and multinational partners. Joint forces will require new levels of interoperability and systems that are “born joint,” i.e. conceptualized and designed with joint architectures and acquisition strategies.” While our military can fight as a joint team, significant barriers stand in the way of efficiency and effectiveness. The challenge for the future is to eliminate, or at least reduce the effects of the obstacles and gain the synergy that jointness brings to the battlefield.

The Department of Defense (DoD) Transformation Planning Guidance made Strengthening Joint Operations as one of the four pillars of defense transformation. The DoD seeks to guide the transformation of the Services and DoD itself on the path to jointness through the Joint Operating Concepts, the supporting Joint Operations Concepts and Joint Functional Concepts. One of the tools DoD established to facilitate this process is Executive Agency (EA). Properly executed, use of an EA can be a powerful tool in promoting jointness among the Services.

This paper will lay a foundation by examining the conceptual underpinnings of EA and the changes resulting from Department of Defense Directive 5101.1, DoD Executive Agent. It will then examine DoDD 5101.8, Executive Agent for Bulk Petroleum identifying significant changes that affect the Services and DoD. The paper concludes with recommendation for improving DoD EA for Bulk Petroleum as well as the EA program as a whole.
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The synergistic effect created by the simultaneous application of complementary capabilities is what makes us the best joint force in the world.

-Gordon R. Sullivan

Jointness is the essential capability that sets the U.S. military apart from all others. Interoperable and interdependent Services enable the Combatant Commander (COCOM) to choose from a vast array of capabilities to achieve the desired effects. This is true in Combat, Combat Support as well as in Combat Service Support roles. The National Military Strategy states, “Defeating adaptive adversaries requires flexible, modular and deployable joint forces with the ability to combine the strengths of individual Services, combatant commands, other government agencies and multinational partners. Joint forces will require new levels of interoperability and systems that are “born joint,” i.e. conceptualized and designed with joint architectures and acquisition strategies.” While our military can fight as a joint team, significant barriers stand in the way of efficiency and effectiveness. The challenge for the future is to eliminate, or at least reduce the effects of the obstacles and gain the synergy that jointness brings to the battlefield.

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CONCEPTUAL UNDERPINNINGS

The function of serving as an EA is not a new concept. The designation of a Service to provide support and coordinate the efforts of the other Services dates back to American Revolution when the Continental Army provided necessary support to the Navy and Marines
when operating on-shore. Designating a single agency to lead the effort for the government can conserve scarce resources, provide the commander with backup and redundant capability where needed as well as eliminate redundancy where it is appropriate. Service responsibilities for Support to other Services are based in a myriad of documents including but not limited to: Title 10, Joint Doctrine, DoDD and Regulations, COCOM Operations Plans and Operations Orders, Inter-Service Support Agreements, and International Standards and Agreements. The numerous, arbitrary and often conflicting requirements placed on the Services made it difficult, to almost impossible, for them to track and manage external requirements. In 1997, the U.S. Air Force (USAF) reported to the DoD that they, to the best of their knowledge, had 267 separate EA responsibilities. The Army struggled to compile a comprehensive list of its EA responsibilities, but never could truly get a firm grip on the issue. To add greater complexity and frustration to the mix, EA was routinely used to shift budgetary and manpower requirements from the DoD or the COCOMs to the individual Services. By appointing an EA and assigning responsibility without additional resources the Services were routinely forced to reprogram assets in order to meet the requirement. The resulting responsibility/resource mismatch often resulted in limited or poor execution of the EA responsibilities.

In attempting to bring some standardization, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) included a definition and guidelines for EA in Joint Publication 0-2 United Action Armed Forces (UNAAF); the JCSs foundational document for Joint operations. JP 0-2 defined an EA as, “delegation of authority by the Secretary of Defense to a subordinate to act on the Secretary’s behalf…. executive agent, in and of itself, confers no authority. The exact nature and scope of the authority delegated must be stated in the document designating the executive agent.” This definition requires that EA authority resides with the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) and that when conferred EA status must be clearly stated in the establishing directive. This was a good first step, but as JP-02 is only a doctrinal publication and does not carry the authority of the law or regulation, the Services saw little change in the field.

**DOD 5101.1 DOD EXECUTIVE AGENT**

In a May 2001 memorandum, the Secretary of the Air Force requested that the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) conduct a review of EA and provide clear guidance to the Services. In response to this request, the SECDEF directed the Office of the Director of Administration and Management (ODA&M) to lead a multi-service Integrated Process Team (IPT) to draft a new EA policy. On 3 September 2002, Deputy Secretary of Defense, Paul Wolfowitz, signed DoDD 5101.1 one of the most significant defense documents of the decade.
DoDD 5101.1 generated five significant changes in the EA structure. These included defining EA, empowering EA to act for the SECDEF, limiting the circumstances for appointing an EA, establishing roles and responsibilities for managing the EA program, and authorized the Services to budget force structure for EA responsibilities. These changes provide a structure within, which DoD can facilitate, jointness and provide the Services with clear and specific responsibilities and authorities.

The first and perhaps most important change resulting from DoDD 5101.1 was establishment of a common DoD definition. Prior to the directive each DoD Service, agency, and COCOM had their own definition and expectations of EA. DoDD 5101.1 defines EA as, “The Head of a DoD Component to whom the Secretary of Defense or the Deputy Secretary of Defense has assigned specific responsibilities, functions, and authorities to provide defined levels of support for operational missions, or administrative or other designated activities that involve two or more of the DoD Components. The nature and scope of the DoD Executive Agents responsibilities, functions, and authorities shall…Be prescribed at the time of assignment.” This leaves no doubt that the EA is acting at the authority of the SECDEF and that the EA is empowered to execute the assigned responsibilities, functions and authorities. This common definition enables the Services to understand their roles under EA as well as that of the EA itself.

A second change is that the EA is empowered by the SECDEF to act in his stead. DoDD 5101.1 limits the authority designate an EA to the SECDEF and Deputy SECDEF and specifies that the EA would receive a written DoDD establishing the responsibilities, functions, and authorities inherent in the appointment. Assigning the EA at the SECDEF level makes it clear to the Services and Agencies that the EA carries the SECDEFs authority. DoDD 5101.1 reinforces this point by stating that, “Within the scope of assigned responsibilities and functions, the DoD Executive Agent’s authority takes precedence over the authority of other DoD Component officials performing related or collateral joint or multi-component support responsibilities and functions.” It is clear that the SECDEF intends the EA to exercise preeminent authority over the other DoD Services and Agencies within the assigned scope of the appointment. The intent to subordinate DoD Services or Agencies to one another as a routine business practice is a significant change that will have far-reaching effects. It is conceivable that the EA could, and probably should, exercise its authority requiring other Services to program allocated resources in line with EA directives, for example require the Army to add personnel and equipment to provide a given level of support to the Air Force. This fact is not lost on the Services and is
watched closely in the halls of the Pentagon. In response, the USAF has developed an online tutorial aimed at increasing its personnel’s awareness of EA.

The third change was to limit the appointment of an EA to instances where, “…No existing means to accomplish DoD objectives exists…DoD resources need to be focused on a specific area or areas of responsibility in order to minimize duplication or redundancy, or…is required by law, Executive order, or Government-wide regulation…where no existing means are available to accomplish the objective.” These restrictions have greatly reduced the number of EA assignments. After DoDD 5101.1 was published, a review of the 269-USAF EA assignments resulted in reductions and the validation of only 59 designations. The US Army experienced similar review and reductions. While no definitive list of Army EA designations existed prior to the DoDD 5101.1, the Army currently has 98 separate EA designations. By limiting EA to only those areas that DoD considers essential, the Services have been able to focus their efforts, greatly improving the overall effectiveness.

The fourth significant change was establishing roles and responsibilities for managing the EA program. DoDD 5101.1 appoints the Director ODA&M to develop policy, coordinate EA designations, and maintain the EA designations listing. This centralized management has enabled the Services to better manage and coordinate across the spectrum of EA requirements. The ability of the Services to share a common understanding of the many EA designations, and the accompanying responsibilities, functions, and authorities has gone a long way to clearing the fog and confusion inherent in the program prior to DoDD 5101.1.

The fifth significant change is authorizing the Services to budget force structure for EA responsibilities. Some EA designations carry significant budgetary and manpower related requirements. The DoD EA functions previously where accomplished as extra duties or Ad Hoc organizations were used resulting in less than optimal results. The ability to properly budget and man these functions has contributed to the current efficiency and effectiveness of the program.

The concept of an EA, as defined in DoD 5101.1, is intended to force jointness on the Services and derive economies by standardizing processes, procedures, and systems across the DoD. The true challenge is in the application of DoDD 5101.1. It is necessary for the EA to balance its authority against the Services Title 10 responsibilities, while guiding the DoD toward the goal of jointness. In order to understand the implications of EA program it is necessary to understand how the Services and Defense Agencies function within the EA construct. We will analyze this in relation to DoDD 5101.8, Executive Agent for Bulk Petroleum.
DODD 5101.1 EXECUTIVE AGENT FOR BULK PETROLEUM

The impetus for DoDD 5101.8 traces back to the Fiscal Year (FY) 1999 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff CJCS J-4 sponsored Focused Logistics Warfare (FLOW) Exercise. The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics identified the requirement for a Petroleum EA to the J-4. After validation in the FY 00 FLOW Exercise the Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Logistics and Material Readiness tasked the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) to draft an EA directive and associated Concept of Operations. Although this task was given to DLA it was sub-delegated to the Defense Energy Support Center (DESC) to orchestrate a cooperative effort among DLA, the Services, and the Combatant Commanders. The result of this effort is that on 11 August 04, Paul Wolfowitz signed a DoDD giving DLA EA for Bulk Petroleum. DLA then sub-delegated this responsibility to DESC. To facilitate the EA process DESC established the DoD Class III Component Steering Group (CSG). This group consists of representatives from the JCS, DESC, the COCOM Joint Petroleum Offices (JPO) and the Services. The CSG supervises subordinate IPTs that address functional issues such as facilities, training, and quality.

While designating the DESC as executive agent for bulk petroleum in itself connotes a change in the status quo; most EA responsibilities already reside within the DESC charter per current DoD Directives and regulations. The DoDD 5101.8 even states that, “Nothing in this Directive alters the responsibilities of the DoD Components to execute the responsibilities defined in DoD Directive 4140.25 [Bulk Petroleum Management Policy]...” This is at odds with the fundamental nature of appointing a change agent. The core of the EA program is to facilitate jointness and achieve the resulting efficiencies and effectiveness. This wording in DoDD 5101.8 restricts DLAs ability to achieve this goal. In spite of this, an analysis of the specifics identifies five areas that alter the current relationship between DoD, DLA and the Services. These changes include establishing a central integrated management information system, standardization of equipment, management of war reserves, increased responsibility for operational planning, and management of joint bulk petroleum training. These changes influence Service Title 10 responsibilities as well as the responsibilities set forth in DoDD 4140.25. Currently DESC and the Services are struggling to come to terms with the inconsistency.

The first significant change is that that DoDD 5101.8 directs the EA to, “Establish and maintain an integrated management information system to support the implementation of this Directive, to include: …Bulk petroleum management information and financial accounting system…visibility for US Government, allied, coalition, host-nation, and commercial bulk
petroleum assets." DoDD 5101.8 is broad in scope and subject to interpretation. The
directive appears to require a DoD wide information management system that is capable of
providing visibility of distribution systems, equipment, personnel as well as petroleum stocks.
The system would require the flexibility to integrate data not only from the Services but other US
Government, allied, coalition, host-nation, and commercial activities. This task is daunting
within the DoD, but the inclusion of non-DoD entities pose significant challenge for DLA.

In order to accomplish this task DLA (DESC) would have to field a capability with the
ability to interface with DoD Services, other US Government, allied, coalition, host-nation, and
commercial systems. DESCs current system, the Defense Fuel Accountability System (DFAS),
has some of the required functionality but requires extensive training and is not flexible or
adaptable enough to fulfill the stated requirements. DoD and the Services are migrating the
their Logistics Information Systems (LIS) to the Global Combat Service Support System. In all
cases, less the USAF, they are using a commercial off the shelf system based on SAP
(Systeme, Anwendungen, Produkte) Inc. software. SAP is widely used in industry and by many
allied militaries, and can be readily configured to interface with non-SAP based systems through
NetWeaver, a SAP application designed for the purpose. The DLA has embraced this program
and is currently fielding Business Modernization System (BSM), a SAP based LIS. DESC as a
corporate entity has resisted the possibility of transforming DFAS into an integrated
subcomponent of BSM. DESC has a significant corporate investment in DFAS and has been
adamant that it be retained a stand-alone legacy system. So far, DLA has agreed to let DFAS
continue as the DLA LIS for bulk petroleum. Given the scope of the information management
task stated in DoDD 5101.8 this position requires reconsideration.

The second significant change revolves around standardization of equipment. DoDD
5101.8 states that the EA will, "Ensure effective end-to-end distribution for establishing
equipment standards and interoperability requirements in collaboration with the Military Services
and the Combatant Commands." This directive has two significant impacts; first, it subjugates
the Services Title 10 responsibility to equip the force and second it restricts the COCOMs ability
to negotiate certain aspect of international agreements.

Title 10 of the US Code tasks the Services to organize, train, and equip their force. This
includes the requirement to develop systems that meet the need of the force. While all Services
agree that standardization would reduce cost and improve efficiency they are hesitant to commit
to a course of action that could sub-optimize there performance. For example, the Army and
Marines require petroleum pumps mounted on heavy-duty trailers capable of cross-country
towing. The Air Force and the Navy have no such requirement. Under DoDD 5101.8, if DESC
establishes the standard to Army and Marine requirement the Air Force and Navy would be required to purchase unnecessary capabilities. If you compound this problem across the force, each Service would be required to purchase unneeded capabilities in the name of standardization. While the intent is to gain efficiencies for DoD implementation may require sub-optimization at the Service level to reap the benefits.

Also related to standardization of systems is the impact on international agreements. The COCOM Commander has the responsibility for negotiating international agreements for military cooperation within their theaters. While DESC has had a long-standing requirement to negotiate international agreement for supply of petroleum products, the authority to dictate system specifications brings DESC into the standard agreement process. Standard North Atlantic Treaty Organization Agreement (STANAG) 3756 dictates the properties of couplings for fuel systems within North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces. Under DoDD 5101.8 DESC would have the authority to direct US specifications and would have the option to invalidate or reinforce existing agreements. While it is reasonable that DESC would not toss out existing agreements without due consideration, it is significant that the authority to establish international agreements for bulk petroleum standards no longer resides totally with the COCOM.

The third significant change involves management of war reserves and prepositioned stocks. DoDD 5150.8 states, "Under special agreement with the Military Services, the DLA may procure (to include periodic replacement from capital accounts), lease, capitalize, distribute, and through the use of contract services, maintain and centrally store tactical equipment." All Services maintain some level of War Reserves or Prepositioned Stocks. Petroleum related stocks generally include items such as fuel bladders, hoses, pumps, filters, and fuel trucks. While it makes sense at the DoD level to centrally pool assets to gain economies of scale, the Services are reluctant to enter into an agreement that may result in loss of control of Service owned assets. What if the Air Force stocks were issued to the Navy in a time of need? This could adversely affect Air Force readiness and seriously complicate contingency planning. It is conceivable that DESC could both improve quality of support and decrease the overall level of stocks for DoD, but the Services will be reluctant to sign up voluntary.

DoDD 4140.25 states that the DLA (DESC) will "Provide contingency support in concert with the Combatant Commanders to acquire necessary petroleum products, storage, and/or services to support military needs." This supporting role has always defined and limited DESC’s participation in operational and tactical planning. Reality has significantly changed, Combatant Commanders routinely utilize DESC contract providers to supplement or replace
Service assets. According to Fuel Line Magazine, “From Oct. 1, 2001 - October 28, 2003, DESC has issued 1,814,474,209 gallons of fuel in support of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and the war on terrorism in Afghanistan”. This is an astounding quantity of fuel delivered by DESC through contractors, into the combat zone, without the use of Service tactical petroleum distribution capabilities. This has even greater significance in that doctrinally “the Army has the responsibility of planning and executing inland distribution of bulk fuel…” In spite of this, DESC planned and executed a theater level mission with minimal Army planning support. It is clear that in spite of the limiting effect of DoD directives and regulations, DESC has become a significant player in the operational and tactical level of support. The DESC’s role on the battlefield has changed requiring a similar change in doctrine and the planning process.

To address this new reality the fourth change is that the EA will, “Participate in joint operations planning and execution processes to include:... Negotiating agreement with the Combatant Commanders that establish levels of support ... Coordinating with the DoD Components to ensure fuel requirements, operations, and constraints are addressed in the fuels annex of operation plans with assigned time-phased force deployment data...” In spite of the citation in DoDD 5101.8 stating that, “Nothing in this Directive alters the responsibilities of the DoD Components to execute the responsibilities…” this directive significantly alters DESC’s role in wartime planning and operations.

To facilitate this new role as EA, the DESC has placed senior civilians with each COCOM to serve as planners. There is some concern that the DESCs new role as EA coupled with its full time presence in the COCOM JPO could subordinate the Army’s role in planning and executing inland distribution of bulk petroleum. DoDD 4140.25 states that, “The Secretary of the Army shall provide wartime planning and management of overland petroleum distribution support, including inland waterways, to US land-based forces of all DoD Components.” The Army allocates substantial force structure to the execution of this function and has concerns over the impact if the DESC assumes the lead role in Operations Planning. These concerns are well founded. While it clear from Operation Iraqi Freedom that contractors cannot fully replace soldiers in the combat zone, the DESC as EA may be in a better position to develop, in conjunction with the COCOM JPO, the theater strategic plan.

The fifth and last area of change is that the DESC is directed to, “Coordinate with the DoD Components to expand joint bulk petroleum training...” This is a daunting task, especially so as training management is not a DESC core capability. The DESC is a business entity founded on efficiency and economies which is often in conflict with military training. The idea of “training
to standard not to time” is not easy to fit into the DESC business model. The CSG does provide a forum to discuss and coordinate joint training opportunities however the members of the CSG represent their Service supply function. Any agreements on expanded joint training would necessarily need to be coordinated through the individual Services training function. While EA will provide an expanded capability to dialogue on expanding joint training, there are significant roadblocks to success.

Under DoDD 5101.8 a paradigm has shifted; inland distribution is no longer the sole purview of the Army. It is clear that DoDD 5101.8, in spite of stating, “Nothing in this Directive alters the responsibilities of the DoD Components…” has resulted in a significant shift, requiring all DoD agencies to analyze and modify, as needed the current process. The DESC has emerged as an operational entity in the COCOM force structure. It will take time to explore all the nuances of these changing relationships and to define the new roles and mission within DoD. It seems that DESC currently envisions little change in the Service roles but expects to have more influence COCOM and Service programs. In spite of significant authority, the DESC is hesitant to act where it may directly affect Service programs. The SECDEFs intent is that the EA exercise preeminent authority over the other DoD Services and Agencies within the assigned scope of the appointment. The current Bulk Petroleum EA directive is a starting point but requires substantial revision to truly be a forcing function for jointness.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The complexity of the EA function, the general nature of the DoD Directive and inherent conflict in guidance and doctrine has resulted in a period of opportunity to shape the future structure of petroleum support within the DoD. The Chief of Staff of the Army, General Peter Schoomaker, pointed out that, “This war, as unfortunate as war always is, provides momentum and focus and resources to transform that you might not have outside of this…and what we are able to do, as we rotate forces, as we reset them, is this momentum and focus allows us to reset them for the future, not reset them as they were in the past. And so this has given us a great forcing function to allow us to do it [reset].” It is critical that the DESC act now and decisively to capitalize on this moment in time and drive the Services toward the goal of Jointness. The DESC is on the right track but there are areas where change is necessary to achieve the SECDEFs intent for EA.

The first change needed is a comprehensive update and synchronizing of DoD regulations and Directives. The intent of EA from the beginning has been to empower an organization to lead the effort in a given area. In a briefing to the J4 EA Rapid Improvement Team it states that,
“We must move from a perception of Executive Agents as merely one among many to a shared recognition and acceptance of Executive Agents as the first among equals.”

DoD and DLA perpetrated the status quo by allowing the DESC to develop the wording for the EA directive. The statement “Nothing in this Directive alters the responsibilities…” sends the signal that it is business as usual. Clearly, this is not the intent, but sadly, it is the current reality. To correct this DoD should revise and synchronize DoDD 5101.8 and related publications in order to eliminate restrictions and barriers to the function of the EA. This effort would serve to synchronize the Services and empower the DESC as an agent of change.

The second change is that DoD should accept risk by maintaining DFAS at its current functionality while fielding a SAP based integrated capability. DLA, Army Material Command, Army, Navy, and Marines have adopted SAP, a commercial off the shelf program as their business standard. Of the Services, only the Air Force has resisted the move to SAP. As this program, moves through the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System there will be ever increasing pressure for the Air Force to conform. In spite of DLA adopting SAP as its system, DESC chose to maintain DFAS for the future. The conjunction of DoD transformation and supplemental funding for OEF and OIF has provided the DoD with a window of opportunity for change. This period will not last long so it is critical that the DESC act now and migrate its automation system to SAP in order to better integrate its capability with the Services and DLA.

The third recommendation involves changing the management and focus for standardizing of petroleum systems. The acquisition of material systems or parts is not a DESC core capability or that of any of the members of the CSG. As system users, petroleum managers clearly have input into the process but, DLA may be better suited to this task than DESC. DLA has the expertise and routinely procures, stores and issues material for the Services. While the DESC has extensive experience in a similar capacity in the bulk fuels arena, there are significant differences between the storing fuel and material goods. DLA is best suited for this role and should retain EA for this area. Additionally, the focus of standardization should change from the system to the component level. The Army’s Future Combat Systems (FCS) program has a similar approach. The Operational Requirements Document for the FCS states, “The FCS FoS [Family of Systems] will maximize platform and component commonality within each system (manned/unmanned) class to a level of 70% (Threshold) 90% (Objective). Engine, drive train, suspension and power generation, and platform LRUs [Logistical Replacement Unit] must be interchangeable on all manned variants.”

A similar approach could apply to petroleum systems. By using required Performance Based Agreements, contractors could achieve a specified level of component standardization across a
range of systems and could be incentivized to achieve even greater levels. In this vein, each Service could acquire required capabilities at the lowest cost while achieving economies through scale and life cycle support. DLA has extensive experience in material management and Performance Based Agreements making it the logical choice to manage standardization of system.

Similarly to standardization, the forth issue is the DLA should reconsider delegating DESC the responsibility to maintain Service petroleum war reserve equipment. DoDD 5101.8 states that, "Under special agreement with the Military Services, DLA may procure (to include periodic replacement from capital accounts), lease, capitalize, distribute, and through the use of contract services, maintain and centrally store tactical equipment." It is important to point out that fielding joint systems is an essential step to achieving a truly joint force. Barriers between the Services have often resulted in sub-optimal use of resources due to the inability or unwillingness to allow access to capabilities resident in other Services. By placing war reserve capability in DLA’s possession, COCOMs can access an even greater combination of potential capabilities. As with procurement of materiel, storage, and distribution of material is not a DESC core capability. DLA has an extensive storage and distribution capability that would bring significant economies to the effort.

The fifth change is that DESC should fully embrace its operational warfighting role. Currently the COCOM JPO consists of two or three field grade officers and a recently added DESC senior planner. This augmentation has clearly increased the JPOs capability but does not meet the operational need to rapidly expand operations rapidly during contingencies. During a crisis, the JPO staff expands through a pick up team of individual augmentees and Service liaisons. To integrate into the warfighting function fully, DESC should organize and maintain a rapidly deployable augmentation package documented and battle rostered to the COCOM JPO. By focused training and participation in joint exercises, this staff could provide the JPO a core capability to call on during crisis. By fully integrating into the joint and interagency process, DESC can be a combat multiplier for the warfighter.

The last recommended change is that the DoD should assign Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) as facilitator for joint bulk petroleum training. DESCs core capabilities are the procurement, distribution and storage of energy products and is not the appropriate command to integrate joint petroleum training. This tasking is also duplicative of the JFCOM role as the Joint Forces Trainer. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3500.01B, Joint Training Policy for the Armed Forces of the United States, states that, “USJFCOM is a centralized organization capable of structuring, executing, and/or facilitating joint training events
across the full spectrum of joint training of the Armed Forces of the United States, supporting agencies, and its allies. While DESC can provide a forum through the CSG to discuss and coordinate joint-training opportunities JFCOM is the appropriate command to serve as the joint trainer.

CONCLUSION

DoD5101.1 states that OSD Principal Staff Assistants will “Assess periodically, but not less than every three years, DoD Executive Agent assignments and arrangements associated with such assignments, under their cognizance for continued need, currency, and effectiveness and efficiency in satisfying end user requirements. Recommend establishment, continuation, modification, or cancellation of those DoD Executive Agent assignments and arrangements associated with such assignments, under their cognizance, as appropriate.” If the EA for Bulk Petroleum is going to be a driver of change, it is important to revise the base directives and related regulations to eliminate barriers and obstacle and fully empower the EA. I recommend DLA serve as the lead for this effort and that DoD and the Services play an extensive role. Change is clearly required if EA for Bulk Petroleum is to achieve its intended forcing function for jointness.

WORD COUNT=5,126
ENDOOTES


5 United States Air Force, “Detailed Executive Agent (EA) Awareness Training,” 3


7 Department of Defense, *DoD Executive Agent*, 2.

8 Ibid., 3.


10 MAJ Keith Sylvia, <Keith.Sylvia@hqda.army.mil>, “FW: EA request for information (UNCLASSIFIED),” Electronic mail message to COL Dan Jennings, <dan.jennings@us.army.mil>, 5 November 2004.


12 Ibid., 3.

13 Ibid., 3.


15 Department of Defense, *DoD Executive Agent (DoD EA) for Bulk Petroleum*, 3.


19 Department of Defense, *DoD Executive Agent (DoD EA) for Bulk Petroleum*, 4.

20 Ibid., 3.


22 Department of Defense, *DoD Executive Agent (DoD EA) for Bulk Petroleum*, 4.

23 Ibid., 3.


26 Department of Defense, *DoD Executive Agent (DoD EA) for Bulk Petroleum*, Department of Defense Directive 5101.8, 3.


28 Department of Defense, *DoD Executive Agent (DoD EA) for Bulk Petroleum*, Department of Defense Directive 5101.8, 3.


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BSM</td>
<td>Business Modernization System</td>
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<tr>
<td>CJCS</td>
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<td>CJCSI</td>
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<td>LRU</td>
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<tr>
<td>SAP</td>
<td>Systeme, Anwendungen, Produkte in der Datenverarbeitung (German: Systems, Applications &amp; Products in Data Processing)</td>
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