

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

**PERSONNEL TRANSFORMATION – CONSOLIDATION  
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE HUMAN  
RESOURCE SYSTEM INTO A JOINT SYSTEM**

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This SRP is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the Master of Strategic Studies Degree. The U.S. Army War College is accredited by the Commission on Higher Education of the Middle States Association of Colleges and Schools, 3624 Market Street, Philadelphia, PA 19104, (215) 662-5606. The Commission on Higher Education is an institutional accrediting agency recognized by the U.S. Secretary of Education and the Council for Higher Education Accreditation.

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# Report Documentation Page

*Form Approved  
OMB No. 0704-0188*

Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.

1. REPORT DATE <b>18 MAR 2005</b>	2. REPORT TYPE	3. DATES COVERED -			
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE <b>Personnel Transformation Consolidation of the Department of Defense Human Resource System Into a Joint System</b>		5a. CONTRACT NUMBER			
		5b. GRANT NUMBER			
		5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER			
6. AUTHOR(S) <b>Christopher Ladra</b>		5d. PROJECT NUMBER			
		5e. TASK NUMBER			
		5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER			
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) <b>U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Carlisle, PA, 17013-5050</b>		8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER			
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)		10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)			
		11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)			
12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT <b>Approved for public release; distribution unlimited</b>					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES					
14. ABSTRACT <b>See attached.</b>					
15. SUBJECT TERMS					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT	18. NUMBER OF PAGES <b>29</b>	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT <b>unclassified</b>	b. ABSTRACT <b>unclassified</b>	c. THIS PAGE <b>unclassified</b>			



## ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: Christopher L. Ladra  
TITLE: Personnel Transformation – Consolidation Of The Department Of Defense Human Resource System Into A Joint System  
FORMAT: Strategy Research Project  
DATE: 18 March 2005      PAGES: 29      CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

The Department of Defense (DOD) is transforming the services to face current and future challenges. Recent studies indicate a need to integrate our forces to better serve our nation's requirements. The current DOD system is disjointed in its efforts to accomplish similar missions. The time has come to combine services in similar areas to leverage technology, reduce unnecessary redundancy, enhance cohesion and conserve resources. A way to increase integration and support transformation is by combining the Army, Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps Human Resource Systems into a joint system comprising military, DOD civilians and contractors to operate more efficiently to meet our nation's strategic requirements under DOD's Under Secretary for Personnel and Readiness using the United States Joint Forces Command as the Field Operating Agency to execute the program.



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## PERSONNEL TRANSFORMATION – CONSOLIDATION OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE HUMAN RESOURCE SYSTEM INTO A JOINT SYSTEM

### BACKGROUND

The Department of Defense (DOD) is in the process of redefining how it operates which includes managing the personnel required to perform DOD missions. This was caused by the end of the Cold War, the current Global War on Terrorism and the expected future resource constraints to man units and systems which have brought about this need for inner reflection. Resolution of this important issue is crucial to ensuring the strategic objective of defending the homeland is met in the ongoing transformation process.

The circumstances and timing warrant consideration of combining the Army, Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps Human Resource Systems into a joint DOD Human Resource System comprising military, DOD civilians and contractors to operate more efficiently to meet our nation's strategic requirements under the DOD Under Secretary for Personnel and Readiness using the United States Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) as the Field Operating Agency to execute the program. Combining these organizations would eliminate the redundant service Human Resource Systems, enable joint management of the DOD personnel force, intuitively save resources through economy of force operations, and provide streamlined management from DOD to the Combatant Commands in Human Resource functions.

USJFCOM is the appropriate command to execute this mission since it is the designated DOD joint force provider to the Combatant Commanders. Although the current system under Title 10 of tasking services to resource missions basically works, it requires considerable coordination, time and effort to get the right personnel for the mission. By having one Joint Human Resource System, DOD could streamline the manning and management process thereby enabling enhanced support to the Combatant Commanders.<sup>1</sup> USJFCOM is also the DOD command tasked for force transformation which would place the Human Resource System consolidation into its area of responsibility. Implementing this proposal would require amending Title 10, subtitles B thru E regarding service secretaries' appointed duties of manning the force.

Coordination with the DOD Transformation Office confirmed that their office is not currently looking at consolidation of the services' Human Resources Systems. The services' cultural differences, focus on operational force issues, and DOD's reliance on the services to work internal manpower requirements, preclude placing limited DOD manpower to research this area. However, the DOD point of contact did concur that consolidation will probably occur within the next 15-20 years as the force becomes more joint.<sup>2</sup> As such, one of the

recommendations in this paper is to have DOD research the feasibility of combining the services Human Resource Systems within the next few years.

## **STATUS QUO**

The Department of Defense consists of three personnel resource categories; military, DOD civilians and contractors. Each category of personnel is required in the day to day operation of the organization. DOD comprises approximately 1.4 million active duty members, 1.3 million reserve members,<sup>3</sup> and about 700,000 DOD civilians,<sup>4</sup> and a significant number of contractors which varies on any given day but who serve across the spectrum of operations especially in the logistics and technology fields. The current system of having each military service manage their own human resource program dates back to the origins of the War Department (Army and now a separate Air Force) and the Department of Navy (which includes the Marine Corps) as a stove-pipe management tool.

Title 10 of the U.S. Code and DOD Directive 5100.1, Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major Components, authorizes and directs each of the services to recruit, train, organize forces and establish reserves of manpower for the defense of the nation.<sup>5</sup> The management of these programs relies on each of the services to maintain their own human resource organization to carry out their mission for the Secretary of Defense. These organizations were created when the services were first formed and have expanded with the services increase in size and complexity over the years. This resulted in stove-piped human resource systems which developed their own management programs for evaluations, promotions, assignments, awards, schools, etc. Although they are operational for their specific service, they were never designed to operate in today's joint environment where the services are integrated in the fight.

## **WHY SHOULD DOD TRANSFORM**

The Secretary of Defense, Donald H. Rumsfeld, has recognized the need to review the current organization of the Department of Defense to ensure that it meets the strategic goals of the nation. He stated recently that we are fighting a 21<sup>st</sup> century global war on terror with management and personnel systems dating back to the Cold War and earlier.

Our enemy is flexible with the ability to leverage technology, transfer money across boundaries, purchase the latest weapons, and shift people at a moments notice. We cannot afford to keep bureaucratic processes of the industrial age if we wish to succeed in the information age. We must transform the way we recruit, retain and manage our workforce.<sup>6</sup>

The 9/11 Commission findings stressed that the United States tried to solve terrorism problems through government institutions and capabilities used in the Cold War and its immediate aftermath which have proven inadequate.<sup>7</sup> Resolving this problem necessitates integrating agencies and sharing information and unity of command. It also must deal with the specialized personnel resource requirements associated with this endeavor. The United States has a critical shortage of skilled linguists, counter-terrorism analysts and people with other high demand skills to man all the agencies.<sup>8</sup> To overcome this current shortage, DOD and the Department of Homeland Defense must develop a strategic human resource management plan defining where these personnel are most critical in the various agencies. These same areas of transformation are also addressed in The National Security Strategy of the United States of America. The focus is on recruitment and retention of the force, management of the Department of Defense, and how the United States can meet the challenges and opportunities at hand to improve our national security institutions.<sup>9</sup> The key to these findings is increased integration and management of national level agencies to include DOD.

The DOD Director of Transformation, Retired Navy Admiral Art Cebrowski, remarked that we must change not simply to make changes, but to remain capable of performing new required missions.<sup>10</sup> Network-centric operations is one of his top five goals and a hot area which requires new kinds of joint forces that are more expeditionary, more lethal, and able to leverage the intelligence gathering and communication assets available to our forces more efficiently. This often requires working with other services that operate the unmanned aerial vehicles, the unmanned undersea vehicles and the robotics, which provide the crucial intelligence.<sup>11</sup> Thus, when looking at the national system, DOD must have a vision of working together across the military services and agencies to complete the mission.

Based on the comments by the 9/11 Commission, the NSS and the Secretary of Defense, as well as Congress' concern that DOD lacks the personnel to man U.S. operational commitments, it is questionable that the current national policy for managing the force is tailored to meet current and future strategic requirements.<sup>12</sup> DOD is currently looking at converting 320,000 uniformed people performing non-military jobs as part of the solution but this will be a slow process.<sup>13</sup> Congress' concern in this area resulted in increasing the manning of DOD by 30,000 personnel in the last defense authorization bill based on the perceived manning shortfalls as evident by the increasing OPTEMPO rates and the significant use of reserve forces.<sup>14</sup> While this may seem good for the services, the Chief of Staff of the Army, General Schoomaker, is concerned that without additional congressional funding, programs must be cut to pay the bill. Roughly five procurement dollars would be cut for every personnel dollar added

to the service.<sup>15</sup> None of these current solutions addresses the need to integrate forces or transform the management of DOD. Instead, these programs adjust the category of personnel in existing organizations.

An examination of consolidating the services human resource organizations may allow migration of personnel to more critical DOD positions thereby decreasing the need for expensive long term manpower increases. It would more importantly, provide for integrated management of the force by having one joint agency operating the DOD Human Resource system. The Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS) is an example of a successful joint service venture that conserves personnel spaces, consolidates the services' finance programs, and effectively services their customers. The Defense Logistics Agency is another example of consolidation success that combines some of the services' logistics programs to enhance efforts in that arena. Creation of these agencies has not completely eliminated the services' from performing functions in their respective areas, but they have taken on the bulk of the mission through consolidation which enhances DOD and joint operations. Solutions are available as discussed in the external reviews, proposals and recommendations in this paper that would preclude increasing personnel strength and its associated costs.

#### **EXTERNAL REVIEWS AND PROPOSALS**

The issue of how to balance joint and service interests was directly addressed in the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. There were nine objectives that the drafters used to build the legislation:

- Strengthen civilian authority
- Improve military advice to the President, Secretary of Defense, and National Security Council
- Place clear responsibilities on the unified commanders in chief for mission accomplishment
- Ensure that a unified commander's authority is commensurate with his responsibilities
- Increase attention to strategy formulation and contingency planning
- Provide for the more efficient use of resources
- Improve joint officer management
- Enhance the effectiveness of military operations
- Improve Defense Department management and administration<sup>16</sup>

The result of this legislation's implementation has been overwhelming operational success on the battlefield from Operation Just Cause in Panama to Operation Iraqi Freedom. Looking at how DOD operates, it is extremely difficult to find a major deployment or action that is not joint. Unfortunately, DOD has yet to reach all the benefits associated with the intent of the law. Joint officer management has not reached the levels expected nor has significant improvement occurred in defense management and administration according to James Locher in his analysis of the legislation's results.<sup>17</sup>

A Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) March 2004 study also concluded that significant reforms are required to meet the challenges of a new strategic era. Overall, they found that DOD needs to maintain the viability of the military services but jointness must be extended to enhance interagency and coalition operations.<sup>18</sup> The study maintained the premise that defense resources should continue to be organized along service lines.

One recommendation that came out of the study is based on the need for only one source of advice on personnel matters to the Secretary of Defense and Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. Combining the DOD J1 Manpower & Personnel office and relevant pieces of OSD's, Personnel & Readiness office into an integrated civilian and military office under a military deputy, who would report directly to the Under Secretary for Personnel and Readiness would help alleviate this shortfall.<sup>19</sup> This proposal would also enhance management of contractors on the battlefield by having this office responsible for coordinating with the Defense Contract Management Agency for contractor personnel service issues.

A second finding was the need to reduce the tooth-to-tail ratio by eliminating unnecessary bureaucracy and utilizing those savings on the operational side. The service headquarters have redundant capabilities and are often mired in protracted coordination actions which do not benefit the services' management. Eliminating these duplications will free up resources that can be used to enhance DOD capabilities.<sup>20</sup> Having each service provide human resource services such as; assignments, evaluations and promotions, is duplicative and nonproductive given today's technology and requirement for jointness in DOD.

Another timely recommendation would be using Dr. Don Snider's (Professor of Political Science at the US Military Academy) proposal of creating a Joint Warfare Professional with entry at the major and DOD civilian equivalent grade to meet joint requirements. These personnel would eventually fill all the Joint Duty Assignment List positions in joint commands and defense agencies.<sup>21</sup> Examination of his plan could be the basis for the creation of a joint human resource professional.

Dr Snider offers six arguments for a joint warfare professional, which make sense when looking at Secretary Rumsfeld's transformation goals of having innately joint professionals in the service. First, these officers would possess the expert knowledge and human expertise for joint warfare through extended joint assignments. Second, it is accepted practice that U.S. Forces will fight under a joint command in most future endeavors thereby increasing the value of serving in joint positions. Third, civil-military relations would be improved by reducing inter-service rivalry through enhancing civilian control at the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Congress through resource allocations. Fourth, a joint warfare professional would be legitimized through political sponsored actions such as the recommended Goldwater-Nichols II type legislation which would establish the profession. Fifth, this profession would drastically reduce the annual outflow of officers from the services to fill joint billets. At first, the significance would not be realized, but once established, this core of joint professionals would reduce by two-thirds the demand for the services to provide officers on an annual basis. Finally, the current system has failed to provide the innately joint officers the Secretary of Defense is looking for or Goldwater-Nichols I intended. This is primarily caused by flaws in managing the program, lack of repetitive assignments, and a commitment to joint operations over service rivalry.<sup>22</sup>

The key is making changes while DOD focuses on transformation and restructuring the organization to meet future requirements. Even though Dr Snider would limit joint professionals to the field grades and above, his premise and supporting arguments are useful for creating a joint human resources professional that would be the basis for working human resource actions for DOD in a joint environment. These professionals would possess the expert knowledge associated from working consistently in the joint arena, reduce inter-service rivalry through having one human resource system, and meet the intent of Congress for jointness.

#### **TRANSFORMATION OF THE SERVICES INTO A JOINT FORCE**

Fortunately, the Department of Defense has already begun transforming the military to fit the enhanced information age warfare required to meet current and projected challenges. DOD is undergoing an enormous transformation, which incorporates a significant change in the personnel mix associated with the organization. This began in the early 1990s and continued with the arrival of Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, who saw the need to adjust the military to the new missions associated with the ending of the Cold War and the rise in global terrorism. DOD no longer fights predominantly on a linear battlefield, but is now facing an asymmetric environment where DOD forces are integrated with their sister services and other government

agencies. To ensure a lead agency was identified, DOD assigned the mission to USJFCOM to work the DOD transformation as the joint force provider.

The Army's transformation efforts include scaling back the number of large heavy combat units and focusing on smaller, integrated, and lighter, yet more lethal, brigade sized elements that Cold Warriors may liken to the old Regimental Combat Task Force or Armored Cavalry Regiment minus the aviation piece. These organizations have considerably increased the personnel requirement for intelligence and communications experts at the lower level while reducing artillery and air defense personnel requirements. They will provide the flexibility and adaptability to fight global terrorists, perform humanitarian missions and other missions envisioned by DOD leaders.<sup>23</sup> They also are designed to fight as an integrated joint force with the other services.

The Air Force began transforming its force after the first Gulf War in 1991. It reorganized into an Air and Space Expeditionary Force, which significantly changed it into a Continental United States (CONUS) and capabilities based force. Part of this transformation is an increase in advanced platforms, command, control, computer and information systems and a higher degree of interoperability with other services and agencies. These changes directly impact on the skills, abilities and knowledge required by Air Force personnel. The additional requirement for technical, information and intelligence skilled personnel often competes with the demands of other organizations, civilian and military. This is a challenge that Air Force leaders are working on through recruiting and retention programs, innovative organizational structures and better use of reserve components.<sup>24</sup>

The Navy and the Marine Corps likewise are undergoing transformation that is impacting on the type of forces required. Like the Army and Air Force, platform and organizational changes are greatly impacting on how they conduct business. The Navy and Marine Corps realize the need to accomplish the myriad tasks of a modern navy with a smaller force that is better trained, educated and capable of joint operations. Part of the solution is transitioning to a new generation of more capable ships which requires less maintenance and needs fewer but higher skilled personnel to operate. The DOD Transformation Chief is concerned in this area that the U.S. is not growing the scientists, mathematicians and other skilled professionals needed for DOD to leverage information age technology and man the critical positions.<sup>25</sup> The Navy is also pursuing replacing non-military essential personnel with civilians and contractors, which frees up funds and manpower for transformation.<sup>26</sup>

The common denominator for all the services' transformation programs is an increase in expertise required, smaller and more adaptable organizations, leveraging technology, greater

reliance on contractors to perform certain activities and increased operations in a joint environment. Coordination with the Joint Forces Command J1, Special Operations Command J1 and the Army G1 Personnel Directorate resulted in concurrence that a single DOD Human Resource System could enhance management of the joint force versus the current practice of having each service work their own actions.<sup>27</sup>

#### **A WAY DOD CAN GET THERE FROM HERE**

In the human resource arena, DOD must manage three types of personnel; military (active and reserve component), DOD civilians and contractors. In actuality, each of the service's Transformation Plans places the person as the key to transformation. To support DOD's transformation initiatives, the remainder of this analysis/research paper will highlight how DOD currently manages these categories and illustrate where it is going and what DOD should consider doing to meet the challenges of the future and to remain relevant in the human resources arena. Included are several studies which reflect possible changes DOD may want to consider to resolve inefficiencies in the current system and a few proposals based on information collected through research on this issue. The first step is addressing DOD civilians, contractors and then military personnel areas of concern.

#### **DOD CIVILIAN MANAGEMENT**

The DOD civilian workforce, which comprises approximately 700,000 personnel, is a critical piece of the human resource system.<sup>28</sup> The Government Accounting Office (GAO) Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, the Federal Workforce and the District of Columbia, examined the current transformation of the federal government to determine if it was pursuing a strategic approach to human capital management. The GAO study focused on four areas: conducting strategic workforce planning, strengthening federal employee training and development, implementing pay for performance, and creating strategic human capital offices. All of these are important to the overall program, but the key to integrating civilians into the strategic solution is the first: conducting strategic workforce planning.<sup>29</sup>

During the 1990s, downsizing caused the civilian workforce to become unbalanced in terms of skill, age, and location. This severely affected a leader's ability to properly man the force to meet changing missions. Secretary Rumsfeld used the following point to illustrate how an improper mix of skills and bureaucracy in deploying civilians impacted on DOD civilian support for Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). When looking at all civilians deployed for OIF, approximately 83% were contractors, while only 17% were DOD civilians. The reason for the

fewer DOD civilians on the ground was primarily due to problems with assignment procedures for deploying civilian personnel. This challenge, combined with obsolete rules, pay problem issues, and promotion inflexibility is directly impacting on DOD's ability to get the best personnel into the most critical positions. This problem will increase with the aging of baby-boomers who comprise 50% of the workforce and are expected to retire in the next five years taking their experience and expertise with them.<sup>30</sup>

DOD and GAO feel the recently approved funding for development of a National Security Personnel System (NSPS) will fix many of the current problems in this area. The NSPS will allow for greater flexibility in recruiting, assigning, compensating, and managing DOD civilians. NSPS should allow DOD to obtain the right mix of personnel at the right time.<sup>31</sup> The Secretary of Defense is also looking at the NSPS to enhance his ability to transform approximately 320,000 military positions into non-military jobs.<sup>32</sup> DOD's efforts in this area along with the Homeland Security system which is similar, has the potential to change the entire civil service system. Regardless, it will certainly be the template for change within the government.<sup>33</sup> This new civilian personnel system should enable human resource managers to place the best qualified person in the position based on greater integration within the civil service system.

In order to see the benefits from the new system, GAO has recommended that DOD address the following shortfalls in its strategic workforce plan:

- Analyze and document the gaps between current and critical skills and competencies and those needed for the future workforce.
- Develop workforce strategies to fill the identified skills and competency gaps.
- Establish results-oriented performance measures to use in evaluating workforce planning efforts.<sup>34</sup>

Currently, all of the services have not developed tools to collect, measure and store the data above which is needed to design workforce strategies to accomplish future DOD missions.<sup>35</sup> One solution is consolidating the services' civilian human resource activities with the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel & Readiness which would provide unity of effort in managing the civilian workforce.

#### **INTEGRATION OF CONTRACTORS**

Contractors are becoming a critical force multiplier within DOD across a vast array of programs which impact on the strategic manning of DOD. Three primary factors have led to the growth of contractors within DOD: force reductions, the need for initial and lifetime support for

high-tech weapons, and increased outsourcing and privatization of former military functions.<sup>36</sup> “In contingency operations since 1990, DOD has relied extensively on logistics support contractors to provide many of the supplies and services needed by deployed U.S. forces.”<sup>37</sup> The significance of this change in operating cannot be overstated and impacts human resource programs such as accountability. The Focused Logistics Warfighting (FLOW), under Joint Staff J4 oversight, prepared a draft DOD directive to establish strategic level guidance for managing contractors in joint operations.<sup>38</sup> The Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) is DOD’s agency responsible for coordinating personnel service contracts and ensuring correct service support, integration and management are included in the contract.<sup>39</sup> The DCMA is not currently coordinating with the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel & Readiness to ensure DOD has the necessary human resource concerns in the contract. This is a concern, since DOD relies on contractors to fill former military personnel requirements which are making contractors essential to completing the mission. As such, DOD should establish coordination with DCMA and the appropriate DOD Human Resource agency to ensure compliance with the above issues.

### **CORE MILITARY SERVICE COMPONENT HUMAN RESOURCE FUNCTIONS**

Listed below are the human resource responsibilities per DOD Directive 5100.1, which each of the services is currently tasked to accomplish in its force provider role:

- Prepare forces and establish reserves of manpower for the effective prosecution of war and military operations other than war and plan for the expansion of peacetime components to meet the needs of war.
- Maintain in readiness mobile reserve forces, properly organized and trained for employment in an emergency.
- Recruit, organize and train interoperable forces for assignment to combatant commanders.
- Assist each other in the accomplishment of their respective functions including the provisions of personnel and services.<sup>40</sup>

The result is considerable duplication of effort within DOD in managing military human resource areas. Currently, each service has a separate human resource center which manages its forces (Army Human Resource Command, Navy Personnel Command, and Air Force Personnel Center). These organizations manage the same human resource areas listed below:

- assignments
- promotions
- evaluations

- retirements and separations
- selection boards
- schools
- awards
- reclassification
- casualty operations

In reviewing these functions, DOD publishes directives or sets standards per Title 10, Subtitle A, part 1, ch 4, 136, from the DOD Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness. The primary difference on how the services implement these actions appears to be based on service culture. "Each service has a different culture, and subcultures, reflecting different historical antecedents and differences in operating environments".<sup>41</sup> For instance, the Air Force has historically been looked at as the most responsive to the force on managing its personnel. Although there are no studies which validate this belief, it is associated with a technically skilled and smaller force that emphasizes closer involvement by personnel in working with their human resource representative in routine actions. Conversely, the Army is seen as generally less skilled, larger, and as such, appears less personable in dealing with its personnel. Navy and Marine Corps personnel receive service based on their ship/home port which tends to impact on their customer satisfaction.

On the officer side, some of the culture differences may be tracked back to the commissioning source. The Air Force and Army rely primarily on the Reserve Officer Training Corps commissioning program while the Navy and Marine Corps on Officer Candidate School which indicates more military experience on their part.<sup>42</sup> The Army and Marine Corps also tend to operate in combined arms teams where soldiers and marines of different occupational skills are integrated in completing the mission. This assists in breaking down cultural bias across the services' through their close association.

Although a thorough study of service culture impact on consolidation may be warranted, the real issue appears not to be the directives or forms but what is emphasized by the service and how the programs are executed. For example, the assignment process, given the technology in place today, enables service personnel in the field to go online to arrange their next assignment. The Air Force Assignment Management System (AMS) allows an airman to put in for various positions and locations in the Air Force. This sets up an online dialogue with the assignment manager at Air Force Personnel Command located at Randolph Air Force Base who works with the airman to secure the assignment. The same process occurs with the Navy and Marine Corps through their Job Advertising Selection System (JASS) and the Army through

the Human Resource Command AKO system. Each service has a high school senior program, and is affected by stop movement and loss programs and an Exceptional Family Member Program. Personal experience with the Army assignment system resulted in selecting, requesting and receiving a follow-on assignment through the internet web site without ever speaking with an assignment manager. This is a significant change to the time intensive way the services operated in the past. In each case, the difference is not so much the system but how the service member is assisted on the other end by the assignment manager.

Two other key consolidation areas of concern for many military leaders are promotions and evaluations. The significant difference for promotions is within the enlisted ranks where the Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps have testing requirements prior to advancement as a non-commissioned officer where the Army does not. However, the Army is again reviewing the possibility of testing similar to the old Skills Qualification Test (SQT). All service officer systems have a central selection process that focuses on similar areas of performance, leadership, stratification and potential. They are also based on requirements for each officer specialty. Each service is required to follow Title 10 U.S. Code, which incorporates the Defense Officer Personnel Management Act (DOPMA) and the Reserve Officer Personnel Management Act (ROPMA) as well as joint guidance when selecting officers for promotion.<sup>43</sup> This is completed through each service's Secretariat for Selection Boards, which are very similar in operation.

The evaluation system presents a more complex issue for consolidation due to cultural influence and diversity of forms. This area would require the most effort to overcome current service cultural biases on what should be emphasized for success. Currently, each service has their own evaluation report design; however, each one covers performance, character/personal traits and potential over a specified time period for both officers and non-commissioned officers. The Army has the fewest number of forms with one for officers and one for enlisted members. The Air Force is on the other end of the scale with six reports covering general officers to technical sergeants. In order to enhance efficiency, the services need to agree and establish DOD evaluation forms for officers and NCOs which will enable evaluators and personnel managers to process the forms without service specific training. These forms would replace the current separate service evaluation forms. A joint database would enhance tracking evaluations across the services.

#### **DEFENSE INTEGRATED MILITARY HUMAN RESOURCES SYSTEM (DIMHRS)**

In order to provide human resource support to Combatant Commanders who operate in the joint arena, the Secretary of Defense convened the 1995 Defense Science task force on

Military Personnel Information Management to advise him on the best strategy for supporting military personnel and pay functions. The outcome recommended creation of an integrated automated system which would fix functional shortfalls, and reduce excessive development and maintenance costs within DOD. This resulted in a congressionally mandated and funded system which allows the services to operate one integrated Human Resource system that provides the services, including the reserve components with the following capabilities:

- Accurate and timely data on personnel assets
- Standard data for comparison across Services and Components
- Properly track Reservists for both pay and service credit
- Tracking of all military personnel into and around the theater
- Integrated personnel and pay functions<sup>44</sup>

The success of DIMHRS will provide the technological capability to combine the military services human resource commands into one organization. The common operating principles will enable one joint manager to work all the service actions based on core versus service unique tasks. To complete the capability of merging the services' human resource organizations requires standardizing the remaining service specific documents such as, evaluations and awards plus standardizing how they are completed. Full implementation of DIMHRS could reduce the number of personnel required to support personnel and pay functions and move DOD closer to a joint force.<sup>45</sup>

## **RECOMMENDATIONS**

An examination of the 9/11 commission findings, the Secretary of Defense transformation guidance, and the President's National Security Strategy, results in the recurring theme of interoperability and the need to combine assets to meet the emerging threats to the nation. One way to accomplish this is through the consolidation of similar type missions. Why have four services perform the same mission?

The first area DOD can maximize its resources and interoperability is by ensuring systems such as DIMHRS are used and exploited by the services to build common personnel and pay functions that are not service unique. By having one standard, DOD can eliminate redundant human resource managers performing service specific functions who are currently located within each military service department. The key to success is having DOD eliminate the need for each service to work add-on service unique requirements to these systems. To ensure success, the Secretary of Defense must place limits on service chiefs from creating additional requirements on DOD human resource programs.

DOD civilian management can become extremely efficient by ensuring the National Security Personnel System (NSPS) is designed correctly and implemented under the Office of the Secretary of Defense. By following the principles outlined in its charter, DOD can have a system that is effective, flexible and integrated, and capable of reaping benefits from the US Office of Personnel Management's past success. The primary areas requiring further work are developing recruiting programs to get the right skills into the human resource arena and resolving the union concerns about termination and employee rights.

To increase the management of contractors, an office to coordinate the use of contractors should be placed in the Office of the Secretary of Defense under a senior level human resource civilian. This office would work with the DOD Joint Staff, Combatant Commanders, and DCMA to ensure standards are set and incorporated into the planning documents for support, legal status, and accountability. Coordination with the DOD J4 and Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) should be initiated prior to implementation to resolve any concerns.

A recommendation for the future would be consolidation of the military services human resource systems. United States Code (USC) Title 10, Subtitles B-E, provides for the services to recruit, organize and train personnel for each service in their force provider role. It does not preclude DOD from creating a joint organization in which those functions could occur. Currently, USJFCOM is the DOD joint force provider and could be organized to perform this mission. A phased approach to incorporating the changes below would reduce the cultural issues associated with the following actions per consultation with the DOD Transformation office.

The first phase would merge the services plans and policies offices currently located under the services human resource directors (such as the Army G1, etc) into the DOD J1 with oversight by the OSD Under Secretary for Personnel and Readiness. This organization would provide a single DOD human resource plans and policy agency which would service G-Staffs and the DOD J-Staff enabling easier coordination for necessary actions. This would support the conclusion that CSIS arrived at in their study discussed earlier. The personnel, office space and equipment saved by merging the Human Resource service staffs at the PENTAGON into a more robust DOD J1 could go back to the services for use in other areas as an incentive to creating a joint human resource system. This would result in reduced coordination requirements for the operators when human resource input is required to accomplish the mission.

The next phase is establishment of a joint human resource management organization to work human resource programs once evaluation forms can be standardized. Assignment,

promotion, casualty, awards and other core functions require minimum changes to standardize them across the services. Ideally, to maximize resources, the services' human resource commands should be consolidated at one location under the USJFCOM J1 which should be the FOA for the DOD J1 and OSD. However, based on current technology, this is not a requirement for consolidation since the appropriate service Human Resource command and control slice could be merged under the USJFCOM J1 to begin initial operations within the next few years. This would increase the short term burden on the J1 until the new structure, equipment and personnel could be placed under USJFCOM to accomplish the mission.

Consolidation of the human resource managers could occur as the services become more joint and begin managing personnel by function (i.e. joint aviation, land warrior, joint logistics, etc.). To ensure Title 10 service force provider roles are maintained initially, an HR Deputy, J1 for each service could be moved under the USJFCOM J1 until Title 10 can be changed to reflect the new joint environment. Their function would include management oversight of service specific assignments until DOD becomes a more joint force. Eliminating redundant service command and control, personnel managers and other resources as a result of consolidation could be returned to DOD to increase operational capabilities.

Although each of the services are revising how they perform human resource management through internal measures, integrating the four service systems into one DOD joint system could result in better management and execution of DOD human resources. As such, the final recommendation is for the DOD Transformation Office to research the feasibility of consolidating the services Human Resource Systems into a DOD joint system as described above.

## **CONCERNS**

These recommendations may appear drastic and challenging to implement because service chiefs will be reluctant to give up their Title 10 force provider role to a joint agency, cultural differences among the services are difficult to overcome, and the current service human resource systems appear to work.

Goldwater-Nichols forced the services to increase jointness with favorable results in the operations arena. The 9/11 Commission findings and congressional pressure are forcing the national level intelligence agencies to integrate to combat global terrorism. Having a joint human resource agency as the force provider could enhance managing the force as DOD becomes more joint. A joint human resource system could ease migration across the services to fill critical positions, allow recruiting and retention managers with more placement options,

streamline personnel actions in joint operations and still provide oversight of the system by the service chiefs in their Joint Chiefs of Staff role.

Historically, each service operates based on their service specific culture and this fact will remain constant. The real issue is not changing service culture but limiting its impact on common documents and practices across the services. For instance, cultural influence for evaluations and promotions can be resolved through leader education, board guidance and requirements (Air Force pilot competes against the same, Navy Line Officer against same, etc). The key is adopting standardized forms and practices which joint human resource managers and service leaders can utilize as tools in managing the force.

Therefore, even though the current service human resource systems are functional, could they be more efficient if combined into one integrated DOD system so we can train as we fight? Would DOD be as joint and effective if not for Congress mandating increased integration within DOD?

## **CONCLUSION**

Our senior government officials demonstrate it is necessary to transform DOD to meet the management challenges of this century and beyond. Changes being worked will improve how DOD manages the total mix of military, civilians and contractors required in accomplishing DOD's global mission. However, additional work is required to ensure the right management practices are in effect as DOD develops the National Security Personnel System, creates and implements DIMHRs, increases the use of contractors, and is forced to reduce the number of military members working outside the operations arena. Implementation of these recommendations will assist DOD in becoming more capable in the human resource arena and will result in developing a joint human resource system needed to support our national military strategy.

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<sup>2</sup> COL Ken McCready, DOD Transformation Office, telephone interview by author, 22 December 2004.

<sup>3</sup> International Institute for Strategic Studies, "Military Balance -Capabilities and Trends," available from <<http://www3.oup.co.uk/milbal/current/>>; Internet; accessed 6 Dec 2004. 23.

<sup>4</sup> Donald H. Rumsfeld, "Prepared Statement on National Security Personnel System," 4 June 2003; available from <[http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi\\_mOPAH/is\\_2003\\_june\\_4/ai\\_104438418](http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_mOPAH/is_2003_june_4/ai_104438418)>; Internet; accessed 31 August 2004.

<sup>5</sup> Henry H. Shelton, *Joint Publication 0-2* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Joint Staff, 10 July 2001), II-13.

<sup>6</sup> Rumsfeld, 1.

<sup>7</sup> Sue Carlson, Andrew Marasia, and James L. Mairs, *The 9/11 Commission Report* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc, 2004), 399-427.

<sup>8</sup> Ibid.

<sup>9</sup> George W. Bush, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington, D.C.: The White House, September 2002), 29-30.

<sup>10</sup> Michael Wynne, "The Opportunities and Challenges of Change," Remarks by Acting Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics at AFCEA TechNet International Conference, 13 May 2004, 1-3.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid., 1.

<sup>12</sup> Military Balance, 262.

<sup>13</sup> Rumsfeld, 1.

<sup>14</sup> Military Balance, 262.

<sup>15</sup> Tom Philpott, "The Army's Challenge," *Military Officer*, November 2004, 63.

<sup>16</sup> James R. Locher III, "Has It Worked? The Goldwater-Nichols Reorganization Act," available from <<http://www.nwc.navy.mil/press/Review/2001/Autum/art5-aul.htm>>; Internet; accessed 21 October 2004, 9.

<sup>17</sup> Ibid., 14.

<sup>18</sup> Clark A. Murdock, *Beyond Goldwater-Nichols – Defense Reform for a New Strategic Era* (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, March 2004), 8.

<sup>19</sup> Ibid., 6.

<sup>20</sup> Ibid., 19.

<sup>21</sup> Don M. Snider, "Jointness, Defense Transformation: A Battle the U.S. Cannot Afford to Lose," *Parameters* (Autumn 2003); 20.

<sup>22</sup> Ibid., 21-28.

<sup>23</sup> R.L. Brownlee and Peter J. Schoemaker, *U.S. Army 2003 Transformation Road Map* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Army, 1 November 2003), IX-XV.

<sup>24</sup> James G. Roche, Dr. and John P. Jumper, *The USAF Transformation Flight Plan FY03-07* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Air Force, 2003), v, 36, 42.

<sup>25</sup> Sandra I. Erwin, "Technical Skills Shortage Hurts Pentagon's Bottom Line," *National Defense Magazine* (September 2004); 1.

<sup>26</sup> Gordon R. England, Vern Clark, and Michael W. Hagee, *Naval Transformation Roadmap 2003: Assured Access & Power Projection from the Sea* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Navy, 2003), 1-4, 81-84.

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<sup>28</sup> Rumsfeld, 1.

<sup>29</sup> General Accounting Office, *Human Capital: Building on the Current Momentum to Transform the Federal Government* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. General Accounting Office, 20 July 2004), 1-2.

<sup>30</sup> Rumsfeld, 2.

<sup>31</sup> General Accounting Office, *Human Capital: DOD's Civilian Personnel Strategic Management and the Proposed National Security Personnel System* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. General Accounting Office, 12 May 2003), 1-3.

<sup>32</sup> Rumsfeld, 1.

<sup>33</sup> Mollie Ziegler, "Countdown to Change: DOD Personnel overhaul Effort Seeks Staff Buy-in," *Federal Times* (6 September 2004), 2.

<sup>34</sup> General Accounting Office, *DOD Civilian Personnel: Comprehensive Strategic Workforce Plans Needed* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. General Accounting Office, June 2004), 21-22.

<sup>35</sup> Ibid., 19.

<sup>36</sup> Michael McPeak and Sandra N. Ellis, "Managing Contractors in Joint Operations: Filling the Gaps in Doctrine," March/April 2004; available from <[http://www.almc.army.mil/alog/issues/MarApr04/Managing\\_Contractors.htm](http://www.almc.army.mil/alog/issues/MarApr04/Managing_Contractors.htm)>; Internet; accessed 2 September 2004, 1.

<sup>37</sup> General Accounting Office Report Abstract, *Military Operations: DOD's Extensive Use of Logistics Support Contracts requires Strengthening Oversight*, GAO-04-854, 19 July 2004; available from <<http://www.gao.gov/docsearch/abstract.php?rptno=GAO-04-854>>; Internet; accessed 26 September 2004, 1.

<sup>38</sup> McPeak, 4-7.

<sup>39</sup> DCMA, "About DCMA," available from <<http://www.dcma.mil/about.htm>>; Internet; accessed 28 October 2004, 1.

<sup>40</sup> Henry H. Shelton, *Joint Publication 0-2* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, 10 July 2001), II-13.

<sup>41</sup> Edgar M. Johnson, Dr., "Introducing Innovation and Risk: Implications of Transforming the Culture of DOD," briefing slides, Institute for Defense Analyses, 21-22 October 2003.

<sup>42</sup> COL Patterson, "Army War College Military Personnel Elective," briefing slides, Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College, 25 February 2005.

<sup>43</sup> Marines Manpower and Reserve Affairs Webpage, "Officer Development Handbook," available from <[https://lnweb1.manpower.usmc.mil/manpower/mi/mra\\_ofct.nsf/mmoa-4/officer+develop](https://lnweb1.manpower.usmc.mil/manpower/mi/mra_ofct.nsf/mmoa-4/officer+develop)>; Internet; accessed 1 November 2004, 1-2.

<sup>44</sup> Defense Integrated Military Human Resources System (DIMHRS) Homepage, "DIMHRS (Per/Pay) Background," available from <<http://dimhrs.mil/leftmenubar/about/background>>; Internet; accessed 2 September 2004. 1.

<sup>45</sup> *Ibid.*, 1.



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