CHINA’S DRIVE TO GREAT POWER
STATUS AND THE EVOLUTION OF
FUTURE ASIAN SECURITY ALIGNMENTS

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See attached.
China embarked upon the path of economic modernization in 1978. Since then, China’s GDP has grown approximately 10-fold. While China’s leaders concentrated on development of the economy, science and technology, and agriculture, commensurate resources were not allotted for modernization of PLA. Special care was taken to ensure that the reform process did not derail. This was done by creating a peaceful external environment and managing internal tensions, thereby relegating modernization of PLA thus far. China has presently reached a stage of economic development where substantial resources can be allotted for modernization of armed forces. China’s strategic interests lie in Asia-Pacific, Central Asia and South-West Asia. In the future, an economically and militarily resurgent China is likely to exert considerable influence on the security situation in Asia and the rest of the world.

This SRP will examine China’s strategic environment and interests, likely course of military modernization to achieve great power status and its effects, and measures for engaging China in order to maintain stability in Asia, with particular reference to the role of US, Japan, Russia, Korea, ASEAN and India.
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China has always fascinated the Indian strategic community. The development of China into a powerful modern state will be of great significance to the future balance of power in Asia and the rest of the world. My desire to learn more about China and its drive towards great-power status led me to select this topic for my SRP. When I discussed the matter with Dr Andrew Scobell, he readily agreed to be the Project Advisor. He has researched and written extensively on China, and is one of the leading experts on China. I could not have got a better qualified Project Advisor for the subject and I am grateful to him for having accepted my request.

I would also like to thank COL David Smith, my sponsor at US Army War College, for his valuable suggestions in organizing the contents of the SRP in a cohesive sequence. I am also grateful to the efficient staff of the US Army War College Library, for their help in obtaining the relevant research material and in organizing the paper.
China's GDP has quadrupled since the modernization drive was instituted in 1978. Its rate of growth continues at more than 8% per year. China has embarked upon ambitious modernization drives in economy, agriculture, science and technology and defense. Significant improvements in China’s capabilities for power projection and for waging limited hi-tech warfare can be expected with the enhancement of air and naval battle-space denial capabilities, acquisition of space and information warfare capabilities and further enhancement of nuclear and ballistic missile capabilities.

China's strategic interests lie in the Asia-Pacific, South-West Asia and Central Asia. China’s aspirations in Asia-Pacific and the Indian Ocean region often conflict with the interests of USA, Japan and India. Chinese leaders and strategists view the United States as the greatest threat to world peace, as well as to China’s own national security and foreign policy goals.1 Chinese strategists assess the future roles of Japan and India in the international security environment mainly as future rivals of China, based on a belief in the hegemonic strategies and the military power that Japan and India will use to back up their plans.2 Since the 1980s, China has adopted a mixed policy of containment and engagement towards India.3 A majority of Indian strategists perceive China as a long-term threat.4

AIM

The aim of this paper is to analyze China’s strategic environment and interests, likely course of military modernization to achieve great power status and its effects, and measures for engaging China in order to maintain stability in Asia, with particular reference to the role of US, Japan, Russia, Korea, ASEAN and India.

AGENDA

The following issues will be analyzed:

• Global environment and trends affecting China.
• China’s national purpose, interests and grand strategic vision.
• China's national security strategy.
• China’s military expenditures.
• China’s military modernization and effects on US forces in Asia-Pacific.
• Options available to the international community for countering/engaging China.
• Role of India in the future security of Asia.
GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT AND TRENDS AFFECTING CHINA

Asia-Pacific. China views US forward posture in the Asia-Pacific as inimical to its emergence as the dominating power in the region. US support to Taiwan is perceived as an effort to undermine Chinese sovereignty. Unification with Taiwan continues to be a core national security objective of the PRC. In the post cold-war era, China considers the necessity to balance US-China-Japan triangular relations as the most important factor in maintaining stability and peace in the region. China is aware that South-East Asian countries have adopted a combination of economic engagement with strategic hesitation, when it comes to dealing with China as a rising power. China desires to ensure that South-East Asia as a region will not be aligned with an external or regional power unfriendly to China. As such, Beijing is prepared to adopt a strategy of reaching out to Southeast Asian countries, bringing them into its embrace, and making them come to terms with China’s leadership in Asia. Despite some differences, China is likely to continue its support to the communist regime in North Korea. A unified and democratic Korea will be perceived as furthering the strategic encirclement of communist China.

Central Asian Republics. In June 2001, China, Russia and four Central Asian Republics (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tadzhikistan, with Uzbekistan joining subsequently), established the Shanghai Co-operation Organization (SCO) for the promotion of peace, stability and economic ties. China views SCO as an instrument for promotion of security relationship, with the aim of keeping other outside powers away from the region. “Maintaining regional security” was to be the top aim of SCO.

South Asia. China views India as an emerging rival to be strategically contained. China has cultivated security relationships with Pakistan and Bangladesh. China has established an electronic surveillance facility at Coco Island, an island north of Andamans belonging to Myanmar, in the Bay of Bengal. It has built a road access from Hunan to Yangon Port in Myanmar and improved the port. It is constructing a naval base at Gwador, along the Makran coast of Pakistan, indicating interest in the Indian Ocean.

Russia. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, China does not see Russia as a potential rival. China has cultivated good relations with Russia, in order to obtain technology for advanced weapon systems. The two countries share considerable interests, but the relationship between them could be far more accurately described as a marriage of convenience, at worst as a latent geopolitical fault-line in Eurasia. Russia is likely to exercise prudence in its relationship with China, since Russia would not like to play second fiddle to China and many Russian strategists perceive a long-term threat to the Russian far-east from China.
CHINA’S NATIONAL PURPOSE

National purpose can be defined as the enduring beliefs, ethics and values of a geographically delineated people. While assessing China’s national purpose, care needs to be exercised to exclude the transient beliefs and values of the current national leadership and identify the enduring beliefs, ethics and values of the population. Consequently, China’s enduring beliefs, ethics and values can be identified as:

**Sovereignty.** Chinese view sovereignty to be of utmost importance in order to conduct affairs of the state in an unhindered manner and in their best interests. Hence, China would resist all outside attempts to impose domestic changes, whether these be in the fields of human rights, democratization or in policies for integration of outlying provinces.

**Unity of the Motherland.** Throughout their history, Hans have accepted central leadership and never revolted against the rulers. Even violent changes in dynasties or monarchs have been accepted by the people as ordained by destiny. To the vast majority of the Chinese population (Hans), the unity of China is sacrosanct. Whatever be the political dispensation, full power of the state can be expected to be applied to achieve and maintain unity. All forms of “terrorism, separatism and extremism” which arise are dealt with an iron hand. While the Chinese government prefers peaceful reunification of Taiwan, it will not hesitate to use force in case Taiwan declares independence.\(^1\) It will also keep options for a forced reunification in case an opportunity arises. Conflict over Taiwan could occur through miscalculation or result from a deliberate decision by China’s leaders or Taiwan’s leaders.\(^2\)

**Economic Prosperity.** The desire to achieve economic prosperity is all pervasive and would propel China to carve out spheres of economic influence. This will be especially so once the Chinese economy grows further and competition ensues with other developed and developing nations.

**Military Strength.** The Chinese consider incursions by foreign powers in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and the more than 1000 treaties and agreements imposed on them as unequal and humiliating.\(^3\) With the unprecedented expansion of the economy, the Chinese now view Asia and the global arena as their areas of interest. Possession of adequate military power becomes crucial in order to extend effective influence and to protect economic and security interests.

**Exploitation of Science and Technology.** Rapid advancement in science and technology is essential in order to achieve both economic and military potential. China realizes the importance of critical advanced technologies for information, space and the ocean dominance.
NATIONAL INTERESTS

While assessing the national interests of China, both short-term and long-term interests must be analyzed. Replacing communist leaders with democratic leaders is unlikely to rein in China’s drive towards super-power status. China’s vital interests, both in the short and long terms, are:

- Safeguard the sovereignty, unity, integrity and rule by the Communist Party.
- Attain unification of Taiwan, preferably through peaceful means.
- Ensure a stable and secure environment for unhindered economic growth and emerge as one of the leading economies of the world.
- Maintain a peaceful external environment for achieving national development: cultivate neighbors, and solve territorial disputes peacefully.
- Attain super power status: the Chinese see the current state of unipolar world as unsustainable and see the emergence of a multi-polar world as inevitable.
- Contribute rightful share to international peace and stability: create spheres of influence, through economic and security cooperation.

STRATEGIC REALITIES OF CHINA

Chinese Geographical Discomfort. China is viewed suspiciously by many of its neighbors. China’s border disputes with its neighboring countries, past conflicts with neighbors in which China has openly demonstrated militarism and the possibility of future Chinese economic domination and military adventurism have all contributed to the mistrust. Historically, unlike other imperial powers, China has not created a zone of influence outside its borders. However the sheer momentum of a rapidly expanding economy would propel China to carve out spheres of influence in ASEAN region, South Asia, Central Asian Republics and West Asia. This quest would result in future economic and military competition between other contending states and China. To China’s strategic discomfort, it has powerful neighbors like Russia, Japan, Korea, Vietnam and India. These nations, collectively or independently, are capable of challenging the Chinese quest for supremacy.

Tactical Gains since September 11 Terrorist Attacks. The GWOT conferred some tactical gains on China in its relationship with the US, which include a common enemy (terrorism), muted criticism of Beijing’s “strike hard” policy against separatists, religious cults and political dissidents, and proliferation activities.
Strategic Losses since September 11 Terrorist Attacks. The US-led war on terrorism led to strategic encirclement of China, through establishment of US bases in South Asia, Afghanistan, Central Asian Republics, and the Middle-east.

CHINA’S GRAND STRATEGIC VISION

China’s grand strategic vision is to attain super-power status, reduce the influence of USA in Asia-Pacific and emerge as one of the leading power centers in the world.

CHINA’S NATIONAL OBJECTIVES (ENDS)

Considering the strategic realities, China’s likely national objectives are:

• Emerge as the leading economy of the world at the earliest possible date.
• Emerge as the leading military power in Asia and as one of the great powers in the mid-term.
• Emerge as a super power in the long-term.
• Attain international stature and respect, spread influence amongst the comity of nations and counter the influence of inimical powers.
• Ensure national unity, internal stability and continuation of Communist rule.

NATIONAL POLICY (WAYS)

Re-ordering Priority of Modernizations. While embarking upon the four modernizations in the fields of economy, agriculture, science and technology and defense, Chinese leadership wisely relegated modernization of the armed forces to a later date and gave priority to fulfilling the aspirations of the masses by achieving rapid economic development. Special emphasis was laid to manage tensions with neighboring countries and to ensure that the development process did not derail. With the Chinese economy attaining critical mass, it can be expected that priorities are being re-ordered and adequate resources allotted for military modernization.

Integration of the Motherland and Managing Democratic Aspirations. So far, special emphasis has been paid to integrating outlying provinces peacefully. Use of force was done as an exception. As development spreads, social tensions and demands for democratization are likely to increase. The Chinese Communist Party has been devolving greater powers and democratizing at local levels. As pressures for democratization increase, the communist party is likely to evolve as a “socialist, monolithic, democratic party”. The strategy to preserve single-party rule would involve economic integration of the nation, coupled with un-hesitating use of military means to tame errand sections of the populace.
**Evolve Economic and Security Alliances.** China is diversifying foreign trade and proportionately reducing dependence on trade with the US. The EU is likely to emerge as the largest trading partner in 2005, surpassing trade with the US. Trade with Japan, ASEAN, Russia, India and the Middle-East is projected to rise significantly, thus reducing the effects of any future trade war with the US. China is forging significant arms relationship with Russia and is making all-out efforts to obtain arms technology from the EU.

**Curtail Influence of USA, Japan and India.** China is likely to adopt measures to reduce the effects of the strategic losses as a consequence of US presence in Afghanistan, Pakistan, West-Asia and the Central Asian Republics. Attempt will be made to reinforce military and economic ties with traditional allies, and improve diplomatic and security relations with Afghanistan, Central Asian Republics, West-Asia and ASEAN. Concerted efforts are likely to be made to improve the ability of the PLA Navy to operate effectively in Pacific and Indian Oceans. Attempt will be made to cement security relationship with Russia, by allaying Russian fears of long term Chinese potential to destabilize the Russian Far-East.

**NATIONAL POWER (MEANS)**

China is likely to employ a combination of means to achieve the stated ends:

**Economic Means.** Continue economic reforms, diversify trade, ensure development of hinterland and allocate adequate resources for military modernization.

**Intelligence Means.** Build up intelligence capabilities including enhancement of space based assets to forestall moves by adversaries.

**Diplomatic Means.** Allay fears of neighboring countries of Chinese intentions, underplay border disputes as part of the larger game, and carve out spheres of influence in ASEAN, South Asia, Central Asian Republics, and Indian Ocean littoral states. Also cultivate EU and Russia to counter possible economic and technological sanctions by the US.

**Military Means.** Modernize PLA to achieve strategic deterrence against the US, achieve ability to operate unhindered in the Pacific and Indian Oceans, and attain unification of Taiwan by force, if necessary.

**Informational Means.** Carry out an effective psychological warfare campaign to allay suspicion of Chinese intentions amongst neighbors (five principles of peaceful co-existence) and to counter a possible US led containment.
NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGIC APPRAISAL

Weaknesses of Chinese Armed Forces. Chinese Armed Forces, though numerically the largest in the world, are technologically inferior to the armed forces of US, Japan, Russia and India. The major weaknesses are:

- C4I, Info Warfare and capabilities for domination of space are currently limited.
- Weak nuclear deterrent, with only two SSBNs, old vintage strategic bombers and limited long range nuclear missiles.
- Army lacks air and land mobility.
- Air Force relies upon old vintage aircrafts, though more modern aircrafts like SU-27s and SU-30s are being inducted.
- Navy lacks aircraft carriers, modern fleet and submarines.
- Nuclear deterrent against the US would be substantially eroded once the latter deploys missile defenses. This would be especially so, if the US chooses to deploy missile defenses forward in Asia.

Likely Chinese National Security Strategy. A viable Chinese National Security Strategy would aim to achieve the following:

- Emerge as one of the dominant economic powers in the world at the earliest, diversify economic interaction and trade, and reduce the vulnerabilities of future sanctions and technology denials by the US.
- Achieve military deterrence against the US, especially in a Taiwan scenario, within the next 15 to 20 years, without derailing economic reforms.
- Once the above are achieved, allot adequate resources for military transformation, emerging as a super-power, by 2040-2050.

Likely National Military Strategy.

- Increasing the effectiveness of nuclear deterrent by replacing liquid-propellant ballistic missiles with mobile solid-propellant missiles which ensure better survivability, reliability and maintenance and developing LACMs (Land Attack Cruise Missiles) for theater and strategic missions. Induct more SLBMs, modern strategic bombers and land based long range missiles like DF-31 and DF-41.
- Increase military space capabilities across the board to include reconnaissance, navigation, communications, meteorology, small satellite technology and manned space. Negate US missile defenses by measures like saturation, decoys in MIRVs, EW and land-based ASAT weapons.
• Modernize selective elements like C4I and information warfare capabilities.
• Develop aerial refueling, airborne early warning, electronic countermeasure and ground attack capabilities, as well as induct new generation air-superiority fighter aircraft.
• Improve ground-force mobility, air defense, all weather fighting capability and Special Forces.
• Increase strategic airlift and raise well trained airborne forces.
• Build or procure aircraft carriers and develop capability to deploy two effective fleets in Pacific and Indian Oceans, with reserves. Develop capability to carry out sustained naval operations, anti-submarine warfare, ship-borne air defense, and amphibious warfare capabilities.
• Establish forward presence with bases at Gwador and Rangoon.
• Modernize (transform) selected army units, with capability to fight high-tech war.
• Build up capabilities to support the modernized force.
• Prune the remaining army, maintaining sufficient strength for internal security duties and guarding the borders.
• Avoid confrontation till the above capabilities are achieved. If circumstances in Taiwan Strait necessitate employment of military force, then rely upon sea denial to deter US forces and conclude operations rapidly against Taiwan.

ANALYSIS OF CHINA’S MILITARY EXPENDITURES

China’s military spending has been steadily rising as a percentage in double digits since 1990. The official figures do not include major expenditures incurred on R&D, foreign weapons purchases, funding received from provincial and local governments and other central government departments, direct allocation to defense industries, and revenues from commercial ventures undertaken by PLA. The US DoD estimates that, counting the large off budget financing, the Chinese defense budget for 2003 could vary between $50 billion to $70 billion. 20 In March 2004, China announced a real increase of 11.6 percent ($2.6 billion) in its official 2004 defense budget of $25 billion. With the hidden accruals to the defense budget, the actual expenditure is likely to be in the region of $75 billion. Considering the present trends, US DoD estimates that China’s annual defense spending could increase in real terms three-four folds by 2025. 21
China’s 2002 Defense White Paper provides a breakdown of the official budget as personnel expenses (33 percent), maintenance (34 percent) and cost of equipment (32 percent). Considering the cost of procurement of equipment for China from indigenous sources, USSR, Ukraine and other former East-European Countries, if the Chinese maintain a 10 percent annual increase in defense spending, then by the end of the decade, PLA could possess:

- 200 SU-27 and SU-30 fighters.
- 20 relatively new surface combatants.
- 12 relatively new diesel submarines, one new nuclear powered attack submarine and one new nuclear powered missile submarine.
- 1000 tactical ballistic missiles (DF-11 and DF-15).
- Adequate antiship and land-attack cruise missiles.
- Some F-10 fighters, DF-31 ICBMs and JL-2 SLBMs.

The aim of military modernization in the next stage (mid-term), would be to achieve deterrence against US military involvement against China. During the period from 2011 to 2020, emphasis is likely to be laid on induction of force multipliers like information warfare systems, ISR systems including aerial and space based platforms, reorganization of the PLA Navy to achieve a true blue-water capability to include induction of aircraft carriers, improvement of amphibious capability, and modernization of the PLA Airforce.
An all out arms build up to challenge US supremacy would involve substantial increase in the defense budget outlays to finance modernization of the defense-industrial base in China, large procurements from foreign sources and build up to permanently project power in the Pacific and Indian Oceans. Such a step, which would eventually be inevitable, will occur after full development of the Chinese economy and reducing the overwhelming dependence on the US for foreign trade. Such a military build up could commence around 2020 onwards.

CHINA’S MILITARY MODERNIZATION

EFFECTS OF STRATEGY AND DOCTRINE ON CHINA’S MILITARY MODERNIZATION

Chinese military analysts have carried out extensive study of US and allied operations since Operation DESERT STORM and discerned the necessity of modernizing the PLA to win “local wars under modern high-tech conditions.” The modernization envisions seeking precision-strike munitions, modern command and control systems and state of the art ISR platforms. The PLA views these components as significant force multipliers and as centers of gravity that if denied, degraded or destroyed, could greatly hinder a modern enemy’s capabilities to wage war.  

NUCLEAR FORCES MODERNIZATION

Beijing’s nuclear strategy relies on deterrence: convincing potential enemies that enough of China’s strategic weapons would survive an attack to inflict unacceptable damage on the aggressor in a retaliatory strike. A nuclear triad exists, consisting of ICBMs, submarine launched ballistic missiles and air deliverable weapons. China currently has about 20 ICBMs (CSS-4) capable of targeting the US. This force is expected to increase to about 30 by 2005 and 60 by 2010. China is currently developing two new ICBMs, namely DF-31 and DF-41, expected to be introduced into service by 2005 and 2010 respectively. Both these missiles are solid propellant, mobile and have MIRV capabilities. DF-31 has a range of 8000 km and DF-41 has a range of 12000 km. A solid-propellant, submarine launched ballistic missile, the JL-2, is to be deployed on a new ballistic missile submarine under development. Solid propellant, road-mobile, CSS-5 MRBMs are expected to supplement liquid-propellant CSS-2 IRBMs of the Second Artillery.

NAVAL FORCES MODERNIZATION

The PLAN’s maritime mission has currently evolved from coastal defense into “active offshore defense,” which is probably an interim strategy till true blue-water capability is
achieved. To meet the requirements of modernization, China has undertaken construction programs of surface combatants, submarines and amphibious ships:

**Carrier Program.** PLAN had bought two decommissioned carriers- Australian “Melbourne” and Russian “Kiev,” to reverse engineer an indigenous carrier. There have been some reports of purchase of ex Russian carrier “Varyag.” It can be surmised that efforts are on to indigenously build or purchase aircraft carriers, in the not too distant future.

**Destroyers.** China has purchased two SOVREMENNYY Class destroyers from Russia with two more on order. These are effective multipurpose ships capable of antiship, AAW, and ASW operations and are armed with 8 SS-N-22 supersonic antiship cruise missiles, 48 SA-N-7 SAMs and 1 Ka-27 ASW helicopter. China has also commenced production of four new larger more capable destroyers incorporating vertically launched missile systems, possibly the domestic HQ-9 SAM.

**Submarines.** China is likely to have five SSBNs by 2015. In addition to the existing one Type O92 Xia Class SSBN, four Type O94 SSBNs are expected to be constructed by then. The first of Type O94 Class, armed with JL-2 Missiles, is expected to join the navy in 2005. China presently has five HAN Class SSNs. Two Type 93 SSNs are under construction with Russian assistance. China has also purchased four Russian Kilo Class Attack Submarines (SSNs), probably armed with wake-homing torpedoes, which are difficult to detect.

**Amphibious Forces.** The amphibious lift capability of PLA is presently insufficient to project force much beyond China’s shores. Enhancement of the lift capability revolves around the construction of Yuting LSTs and Yuhai LSMs and a sizeable amphibious operation can possibly be undertaken after five more years of construction. Ground forces in Nanjing and Guangzhou Military Regions, that have a potential mission against Taiwan, have been receiving modern amphibious Type 63 Tanks and APCs and conducting training.

**AIR FORCE MODERNIZATION**

By 2020, the size of China’s air forces would shrink from the current 5300 combat aircraft to slightly more than 2200 aircrafts. With the shift from quantity to quality, avionics, beyond visual combat capability, C4I technology and integrated air-defense system are likely to improve considerably. Airlift capability is likely to be enhanced from two brigades to one division with procurement of heavy-lift aircraft like AN-124. PLAAF is likely to induct AWACs, IL-78 and Y-8 air to air refuelers. A stealth fighter, XXJ, equivalent to the US F-22 is likely to be inducted by 2015. A fully integrated AD system and an anti missile system based on S-300 is likely to be in place by 2010.
GROUND FORCE MODERNIZATION

The airlift for China’s rapid reaction forces (RRF) is provided with integral Air Transport Division, having IL-76, Y-7 and Y-8 transport aircrafts. Due to limited airlift capability, only one division can be airlifted within 48 hours. This capability is expected to be doubled by 2015.

Since the mid 1980s, China has twice downsized its military by a total of 1.5 million. In September 2003, the Chinese government decided to further reduce 200,000 troops by the end of 2005 to maintain the size of the PLA at 2.3 million.\textsuperscript{29} The army is supported by a large reserve militia force and PAP. Due to the large strength of the army, modernization is being done selectively in respect of Special Forces, and induction of better small arms (Type 87 Assault Rifles), anti-tank weapons (Type-70-1 Portable RLs and Red Arrow-8 ATGMs), main battle tanks (Type-96 and 98), APCs (BMP-3s), artillery equipment and UAVs (W-50 and ASN-206).

INDUCTION OF ADVANCED TECHNOLOGIES

China is modernizing its capabilities in the fields of space, counter space operations, C4 and ISR, information operations and electronic warfare.\textsuperscript{30} In the field of space, besides launching its first manned space mission in 2003, remote sensing satellites, geosynchronous orbit military communications satellite, a new type of film based imagery satellite and a prototype low earth orbit COMSAT have been launched. China is likely to deploy advanced imagery, reconnaissance, radar; ocean surveillance, ELINT, SIGINT and data relay satellites. China is reported to have developed lasers to blind sensors on low earth satellites and “parasitic microsatellites” which are micro (10 to 100 kgs) and nano satellites (up to 10 kgs) used as ASAT weapons.

China is developing a joint battle management system, housed in hardened shelters, which the entire PLA will use for strategic and tactical purposes. In order to improve ISR capabilities, procurement of AWACs, UAVs, over the horizon radars and space based reconnaissance systems have been accorded priority. Information operations have been given priority and targeting enemy systems have been stressed in available writings. Research and development of electronic warfare equipment is being undertaken by both military and civilian institutions.

EFFECTS OF CHINESE MILITARY MODERNIZATION ON US FORCES

Currently, the US is the predominant maritime power in Asia-Pacific while China remains the predominant continental power. However, China’s power projection capabilities are limited due to weaknesses of its navy and air force. On modernization in the near-term as envisaged,
adequate portion of the PLA is likely to be converted into a force capable of winning “local wars under modern high-tech conditions.” The balance of power of Chinese conventional forces against Taiwan would be transformed in China’s favor. It would also confer ability on China to undertake operations for forcible merger of Taiwan, if speed and surprise are achieved and US intervention avoided. Once Taiwanese forces are overwhelmed with speed, China can hope to get adequate local support for its actions. Likelihood of US intervention would exist only if the build up for the invasion is correctly discerned or else the invasion, while achieving surprise, gets stalemated after being launched. China can be expected to use nuclear threat to deter US forces in such an eventuality. For the threat to be effective in such a scenario, China would possibly have to take measures to counter US missile defenses. Measures like overwhelming, decoys, MIRVs and ASAT weapons have been debated by the strategic community and are probably being researched.

OPTIONS AVAILABLE TO THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY FOR COUNTERING/ENGAGING CHINA

Some analysts are of the view that the emergence of China as a super-power cannot be stopped and it can only be delayed at best. Emergence of China as an economic power is a foregone conclusion. The issue arises whether China can be groomed to be a benign military power. Some recommended measures are:

Socializing China into Global and Regional Groupings. Similar to induction into the WTO, China can be incorporated into the existing regional and global structures, like ASEAN+3, six nation talks on North Korea, GWOT and an Asian collective security regime. Whether this would satisfy future Chinese aspirations or not, is a moot point. Strategic engagement of China through military-to-military dialogues, joint exercises and institution of confidence building measures might persuade China to join a collective Asian security system.

Technology Denial. A multinational effort involving the US, EU and Russia can be organized to deny military and dual-use technology to China, in case deemed necessary. This would require considerable persuasion by the US since some nations concerned do not see China as a threat and may be guided by commercial motives.

Strategic Encirclement. A strategic encirclement of China, incorporating all or some of the concerned nations like the US, Japan, South Korea, Vietnam, India and Russia would become feasible in case China emerges into a hegemonic power and exerts military pressure to resolve disputes. Deployment of ballistic missile defense and beefing up conventional capabilities by these nations would counter Chinese capabilities to a great extent.
Monitoring Chinese Build Up. Constant monitoring of Chinese military build up would enable timely analysis, based on which reactions could be planned. Significant aspects that would need monitoring are:

- Improvement of C4ISR capabilities to include satellites, airborne early warning systems and command and control aircrafts.
- Installation of integrated missile defense system and development of ASAT weapons.
- Reorganization of military regions, reduction of manpower and improvement of mobility to include mechanization and heliborne capability.
- Enhancement of strategic mobility to include airlift, airborne forces and Special Forces.
- Acquisition/building of aircraft carriers, nuclear submarines and SLBMs.
- Reorganization of navy into naval fleets capable of force projection in Pacific and Indian Oceans.
- Enhancement of marine forces and amphibious capability.
- Procurement of aerial refueling, long range fighter aircrafts, beyond visual range anti-aircraft missiles and air launched cruise missiles.
- Development of fifth generation fighter aircrafts.
- Development and deployment of ICBMs capable of targeting continental US.
- Production and deployment of large number medium/short range ballistic missiles and cruise missiles to strike at regional targets like Taiwan and other neighboring countries.

ROLE OF INDIA IN THE FUTURE SECURITY OF ASIA

GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT OF INDIA

India is strategically located in South Asia with the southern peninsula jutting into the Indian Ocean, dominating trade routes. With a large land-mass of 3.1 million square kilometers and population of over 1 billion people, India is emerging as a fast developing economy with strong democratic credentials. The Indian Ocean is important to India since 97% of its foreign trade and 70% of its oil requirements pass through the ocean. India has taken active part in collective security of sea-lanes in the Indian Ocean.

CHINESE STRATEGY FOR CONTAINMENT OF INDIA

Encirclement by Creation of Alignments. China has developed extremely close strategic relationship with Pakistan and signed a treaty of friendship with Bangladesh. China has been supplying military hardware to Pakistan and has number of tie-ups for co-production of
sophisticated military equipments like aircrafts, ships and tanks, besides actively assisting in nuclear and missile fields.\textsuperscript{32} China has provided Bangladesh a variety of military equipment including aircrafts, ships and tanks.

**Nuclear Targeting.** All major Indian cities are covered by Chinese missiles deployed in Tibet, Xinjiang and Yunnan.

**Development of Capability to Launch Significant Forces across Tibet.** China has more than doubled its capacity to launch conventional forces across Tibet in the recent past. This has been achieved by building infrastructure such as roads along the border, oil pipeline from Gormo to Lhasa and depots holding stocks.

**Diplomatic Containment.** China has endeavored to contain India diplomatically within the confines of South Asia.\textsuperscript{33} India’s legitimate efforts to cultivate good relations with ASEAN, Central Asian Republics, Japan and South Korea have been viewed with suspicion by China.

**Encouragement to Inimical Internal Forces.** China had supported insurgent movements in north-east India since 1950s, though overt support is not being extended presently. The Maoist insurgency in Nepal is a major concern for India’s security. Underground Indian naxalite movements derive moral sustenance from revolutionary thoughts of Mao-Tse Tung and hope to eventually liberate areas from Nepal to Central India.

**INDIA’S NATIONAL OBJECTIVES (ENDS RELEVANT TO CHINA)**

While it is to be hoped that future Sino-Indian relations would develop to enhance peace and security in Asia, a prudent Indian policy would have to cater for national objectives (ends) relevant to China as follows:

- Prevent India’s strategic encirclement.
- Curtail China’s assistance to Pakistan in nuclear and missile fields.
- Counter China’s efforts to build naval presence in Indian Ocean through bases in Pakistan (Gwador Port) and Myanmar (development of Yangon Port).
- Reduce China’s influence in internal politics of India.
- Maintain capability to pursue national interests in the probability of conflict with China over vital interests.

**STRATEGIC CONCEPTS (WAYS)**

The ways to achieve India’s national objectives (ends) would have to be through a combination of economic, military, diplomatic and informational tools:
• Build up national strength, both economic and military.
• Create suitable political and security alignments.
• Create public awareness to neutralize Chinese influence in India's internal politics.
• Effective diplomacy to curtail Chinese efforts at strategic encirclement of India.
• Reduce tensions and suspicions in South Asia, resolve disputes with neighbors and foster economic development of South Asia.

A number of options are available to achieve the ends as follows:

Option1: Soft-line Policy. Build up on the current improvement in trade and cultural relations with China, open land access and trading posts along Indo-Tibet border, resolve border dispute through give and take (accept the present status-quo by recognizing Chinese occupation of Aksai Chin in return for formal Chinese recognition of India's claim to Arunachal Pradesh in the east).

Option2: Mid-line Policy. Cultivate good relations with USA, Japan, ASEAN, Korea, Russia and EU, achieve economic progress, improve the atmospherics with China like trade and cultural relations, and hope that China will become part of an Asian Collective Security System. It will be hoped that the border dispute will be resolved amicably in the distant future due to overall improvement in Sino-Indian relations.

Option3: Hard-line Policy. Counter China's strategic encirclement of India, building up national strength, forge security relations with USA, Japan, ASEAN and neighboring countries, and prevent future domination of sea-lanes in Indian Ocean by Chinese naval forces.

FEASIBILITY/ACCEPTABILITY/SUITABILITY ASSESSMENT

Option 1 does not address India's concerns about China's expansion into Indian Ocean, which reinforces the Chinese strategic encirclement of India from one more flank. In Option 2, solution to the border dispute is postponed indefinitely; while China's participation in the collective security of sea-lanes in Indian Ocean would depend on its future strategic aspirations. Option 3 is the hardest option politically and militarily for India. It caters for foiling Chinese designs in case China emerges as a hegemonic power exerting military pressure on India. It would foster cooperation between USA and India for which many incentives exist. 

The USA and India have the following common interests:

• Promoting liberalism, political moderation, fight against religious fundamentalism and ethno-nationalism.
• Promotion of secular democracy and market economy in Asia.
• Elimination of terrorism.
- China’s stable policies and external orientation.
- Stability in Pakistan, Afghanistan and the Persian Gulf States.

A VIABLE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY FOR INDIA (MEANS)

A viable national security strategy for India would have to cater for neutralization of Chinese strategy of encirclement of India and building up national strength by the following:

- Continue economic reforms and allocate adequate resources for national security.
- Build up credible nuclear deterrence against China.
- Maintain qualitative edge over Chinese Air Force deployable in Tibet.
- Acquire ability to carry out effective surveillance over Tibet.
- Maintain adequate army to foil a high threat attack across Tibet.
- Build up navy to foil Chinese threat in Indian Ocean.
- Reduce Chinese influence over militant organizations in India, by education, and spread of development.
- Forge alliance with USA, Japan, South Korea, Vietnam and Russia to contain China, if it emerges as a hegemonic great power.
- Stabilize relations with neighbors, reduce tensions, and institute confidence building measures.

CONCLUSION

While formulating a grand strategy to deal with China of the future, it would be prudent to analyze Chinese capabilities dispassionately. While it should be hoped that China would emerge into a benign power, potential for militarism should be closely monitored. The course adopted by the Chinese leadership would dictate reactions by concerned nations. The reactions of affected powers would need to be resilient to cater for emergence of China as a benign power or as a hegemon.

WORD COUNT=5956
ENDNOTES


8 Ibid.


11 Li Jijun, 6.


13 Li Jijun, 4.


15 Li Jijun, 8.

16 Mohan Malik, Dragon on Terrorism: Assessing China’s Tactical Gains and Strategic Losses Post September 11 (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 2002), 16-46. Due to the global war on terrorism launched by USA and its allies, China gained tactical and transitory benefits. Terrorism provided a common enemy requiring cooperation between the US and China. Jiang Lingfei, a Chinese analyst, noted that the conflict
between the US and China was “no longer the most important confrontation in the world” as “three forces- national separatism, religious extremism, and terrorism- have become the focus of international strife.” Greater certainty in Sino-US relations would facilitate domestic stability in China and sustain its high economic growth. Given the Chinese economy’s growing dependence on oil imports, Beijing also shares Washington’s interest in ensuring unimpeded oil supplies. Should major oil producing countries in the Middle East and Central Asia fall victim to radical Islamic fundamentalism, such a development would potentially undermine China’s economic development. Beijing interpreted the resumption of Sino-US consultations as an acknowledgement of the limitations of US unilaterism. Another major dividend was the muted criticism of Beijing’s “strike hard” campaign against separatists, religious cults, and political dissidents. Beijing’s search for allies to counter US global hegemony and its Asian rivals (India and Japan) had led China into dangerous liaisons with proliferators of WMD like North Korea, Pakistan and Iraq. Cooperation in the war on terrorism was supposed to enhance China’s image as a responsible, rational and constructive player, and a good international citizen.

17 Ibid, 23-46. The US led war on terrorism developed with potentially disastrous consequences for China’s core strategic interests. The war in Afghanistan did not get bogged down as predicted by Chinese analysts. In fact, it led to strategic encirclement of China through establishment of US military presence in South Asia, Afghanistan, Central Asian Republics and the Middle East. Serious Sino-US differences persisted over Taiwan, WMD proliferation, missile defense, human rights and religious freedom. Sharp differences have arisen over broadening of the war on terrorism. General Francis Taylor, the US special envoy on counter-terrorism, went to the extent of turning down demands by Chinese officials for repatriation of Uighurs captured in Afghanistan, and stated that Muslims in Xinjiang have legitimate economic and social issues that need political solutions, not counter-terrorism. China is today in a situation where it can only hope for the success of the US led GWOT, since any setback would adversely affect China’s unity by boosting separatism in Xinjiang.


19 Ibid.


21 Ibid.


26 Ibid.

27 Ibid.

28 Ibid.


BIBLIOGRAPHY


