TRANSPORTING GOVERNMENT AGENCIES ON DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AIRCRAFT

GRADUATE RESEARCH PROJECT

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Abstract

The paper examines how the Department of Defense transports other government agencies during times of crisis. Non-DOD agencies such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Fairfax County Urban Search and Rescue Team (USRT) rely exclusively on DOD aircraft to rapidly deploy to the scene of a disaster. The DOD must work closely with these agencies to better prepare them for transport on military aircraft.

The bombings of the American embassies in Tanzania and Kenya in August of 1998 highlighted the need for better coordination between the Department of the Defense and other non-DOD agencies when moving to a disaster site. This paper contains a summary of Operation Resolute Response, the rapid deployment of the FBI and USRT to East Africa in the wake of the 1998 American Embassy bombings. The paper also examines the changes that have taken place within the FBI, USRT, and DOD to better respond to the next crisis.

When government agencies become actively involved in advanced planning with the Department of Defense, the likelihood of a successful deployment is increased. Changes made within a government agency will also improve its ability to rapidly deploy on DOD aircraft.
I. Introduction

On August 7th, 1998 in a terrorist attack aimed at the United States, the American Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania were bombed during morning business hours. Over 200 were killed (including twelve U.S. citizens) and nearly 5000 were injured in the two attacks. Back in the United States, the FBI and the Fairfax County Urban Search and Rescue Team (USRT) were immediately alerted and told to deploy to the bomb scene as soon as possible. The Department of Defense (DOD) worked in conjunction with the FBI and USRT to coordinate transportation from the U.S. to East Africa. What followed was a series of communication breakdowns among all three agencies that led to substantial delays in deploying to the bomb scenes. Operation Resolute Response, the official name of the operation, came under intense scrutiny by Admiral William Crowe in his Report of the Accountability Review Boards on the Embassy Bombings in Nairobi and Dar Es Salaam. Admiral Crowe states,

The US response to the August bombings was resourceful and often heroic. However, in the absence of significant training and contingency planning to deal with mass casualties and major destruction from terrorist bombs, the response was occasionally chaotic and marred by a host of planning and logistical failures, especially in the area of military transportation. The Foreign Emergency Support Teams (FESTs) arrived in Nairobi and Dar Es Salaam about 40 hours after the bombings, having experienced delays of 13 hours. There was disjointed liaison between the State Department, as the lead agency, and the Defense Department, FBI and other agencies. (6:6)

It was obvious that the system for transporting the FBI and the USRT to an international disaster scene needed improvement.
Within the last ten years the United States has become the preferred target of terrorists worldwide. The PanAm bombing over Lockerbie, Scotland in 1988, and the Khobar Towers bombing in 1996 illustrate the reality that the U.S. has been, and will continue to be, the target of international terrorism. The FBI has a mandate to investigate all overseas acts of terrorism committed against the United States; key to solving these crimes is getting to the scene as quickly as possible. After the Crowe report, the FBI and other government agencies determined that they had to work more closely with the DOD to rapidly deploy to a disaster area.

**Background**

The United States has always been the target of international terrorism, but in the last 15 years, acts of terror against U.S. interests have increased dramatically. According to the FBI, there is a trend in the international terrorist community towards more scale attacks against a maximum number of people (2:2). International terrorist Osama Bin Laden has stated publicly that his goal is to attack U.S. interest both at home and abroad. FBI Director Louis Freeh, speaking before the Senate Judiciary Committee in 1998, stated that “The bombing of the World Trade Center in February 1993, and the recent tragedies in East Africa, demonstrate that our global presence make Americans a fast, and often all-too-easy, target for opportunists who are willing to shed the blood of innocents for their causes” (2:2).

The FBI’s involvement in overseas terrorist attacks has also seen an increase in recent years. In the 15 years since President Reagan designated the FBI as the lead agency for countering terrorism in the United States, Congress and the Executive Branch
have taken steps to enhance the Federal Government’s counter terrorism capabilities. The FBI’s counter terrorism responsibilities were further expanded in 1984 and 1986, when Congress passed laws permitting the Bureau to exercise Federal jurisdiction overseas when a U.S. National is murdered, assaulted, or taken hostage by terrorists, or when certain U.S interest are attacked. Since the mid 1980s, the FBI has investigated more than 350 extraterritorial cases (2:3). As witnessed in the Oklahoma city bombing, the sooner the FBI can move to the scene of an attack, the more able it is to gather the right kind of evidence to eventually catch and convict the terrorists.

Even more time critical to potential survivors is the response time of the Urban Search and Rescue Team (USRT), from Fairfax County, Virginia, also known as VA-TF1. The USRT has a 62-person Task Force available for National and International missions on a moment’s’ notice. There are approximately 130-members on the Task Force, which include Fire Fighters and Paramedics from the Fairfax County Fire and Rescue Department and a variety of highly trained civilians. Doctors trained in emergency medicine, Canine Handlers, Structural Engineers, Communication experts and Heavy Equipment operators are among the specialists that make up the Task Force (13). The USRT puts a high priority on moving to the scene of an accident as quickly as possible. The sooner the team arrives on scene, the more lives it can save.

**Problem Statement**

The U.S. military has always had a policy of Global Engagement. We are in the business of rapidly deploying troops and equipment to hotspots around the world at a moment’s notice. Unfortunately, the DOD finds itself in a position of rapidly deploying
different government agencies that are not schooled in military airlift operations. While the Department of Defense is not the only organization with transport aircraft, it is the only agency that has the ability to transport outsize cargo on short notice. Accepting the fact that the DOD will be working with agencies like the FBI and USRT means that these non-DOD agencies must develop plans to better prepare for rapid deployment.

**Research Question**

Since the East Africa bombings, the U.S. has identified a shortfall in how we move non-DOD assets to the scene of a disaster. This project first examines what exactly went wrong in August of 1998 when the Fairfax County Urban Search and Rescue Team (USRT) and the FBI tried to deploy to Tanzania and Kenya. The discussion then examines how the DOD and other agencies have worked together to improve the process. Finally, this study examines how the lessons learned from Operation Resolute Response apply to other government agencies that may have to work with the Department of Defense in the future. This study focuses on the following five research questions:

1. How could the FBI/USRT deployment process be improved?
2. What were the initiatives put forth by the DOD to improve communication between the various agencies?
3. How has the FBI changed its organizational structure to better respond to future attacks?
4. How has the Fairfax County Urban Search and Rescue Team improved its readiness to travel on DoD aircraft?
5. How can the lessons learned after Operation Resolute Response be applied to other government agencies that may deploy on DOD aircraft in the future?

**Overview of Subsequent Chapters**

Chapter II provides an in-depth look at Operation Resolute Response, the DOD response to the East Africa bombings. It will identify shortcomings with the operation that were addressed by the Crowe Commission and several investigations. This is important because this particular operation caused the U.S. government to critically examine the process by which the FBI and the USRT are transported in the event of an emergency.

Chapter III discusses several initiatives put forth by the DOD to address this problem. It includes information dealing with the Interagency Work Group put together after Operation Resolute Response and the Memorandum of Understanding signed by the various agencies involved.

Chapter IV addresses initiatives taken by the FBI to facilitate smoother operations with the DOD. Chapter V examines operations after Resolute Response to see how the FBI and USRT have adjusted their procedures after the East Africa bombings.

And finally, Chapter VI contains a summary and conclusions.
II. Operation Resolute Response

Fairfax County Urban Search and Rescue Team

When the bombs exploded in Tanzania and Kenya at 1535 and 1540 (EDT) respectively, 10 aircraft (5 C-141s, 4 KC135s, 1 KC-10) were immediately placed on alert. These aircraft were immediately made available for emergency medical evacuations. Two C141s based at Ramstein AB, Germany were used to transport 22 injured personnel from Tanzania to a U.S. Army Hospital in Germany immediately after the bombing (4). Subsequent support missions did not go as smoothly.

A myriad of agencies are involved in requesting a DOD aircraft in support of operations outside the Department of Defense. The channel by which the request is made is dependent on the users and the government agencies under which they work. In the case of the Urban Search and Rescue Team (USRT), the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) plays a major role in making the initial request. OFDA is the office within the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) responsible for providing non-food, humanitarian assistance in response to international crises and disasters (7). The OFDA determined the bomb damage was extensive enough to justify deployment of the Fairfax County USRT. The USRT then informed the OFDA of their load requirement for operating in East Africa. OFDA then contacted the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) and transmitted the request. This agency supports US national security and foreign policy objectives and promotes security relationships with friendly foreign governments and allies through security and humanitarian assistance (7).
It is the DSCA’s responsibility to formally ask the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) for military airlift. Having received the message, the OSD gave its approval of airlift support for the USRT at 1745L on 7 August. A Joint Staff message from the Logistics Readiness Center (LRC) at the Pentagon was then transmitted to U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) at 1905L, approximately three and a half hours after the initial explosions. USTRANSCOM then coordinated with Air Mobility Command (AMC) and the Tanker Airlift Control Center (TACC) for an aircraft to transport the cargo and personnel.

The initial tasking from OFDA was for 54,000 lbs. of cargo and 64 personnel. Based on these numbers, the TACC tasked a C-5 out of Dover AFB, Delaware that was scheduled to depart for Europe that evening. The C-5 was downloaded, readied, and dispatched to Andrews AFB, arriving at 0245L the morning of the 8th of August. When the aircraft arrived to pick up its load, the crew discovered that the USRT had 67,000 lbs. of additional cargo. A second USRT mission was needed to transport a tractor and trailer combination needed for operations in Africa. Unfortunately, the USRT did not pass this information to OFDA during the initial mission set up and had no way of contacting USTRANSCOM directly to update the load information. The first C-5, mission #5703, departed Andrews at 0415L for Nairobi with 64 passengers and 30,000 lbs. of cargo (8:2).

The TACC was able to locate a second C-5 in the system and directed it to land at Andrews. This second C-5, mission #5706, arrived at 0715L to pick up the additional tractor and trailer (4:3). It departed at 1223L on the 8th, departing with the USRT 21 hours after the initial explosions in East Africa.
According to an after action report, AMC made some heroic efforts to keep this mission moving, to include coordinating air refueling on short notice. Two KC-135s from Mildenhall were identified to provide refueling support. Unfortunately, the #2 tanker could not offload fuel. The C-5 aircrew thought it would have to divert to Sigonella for fuel. The aircrew, TACC, and CENTCOM were able to find a KC-10 to refuel the C-5 over the Red Sea. In the end, the aircrew filed a crew duty waiver to fly in excess of 24 hours to transport the USRT to Nairobi (2). Despite these efforts by the aircrews, the USRT deployment still received negative press reviews because of the delays at Andrews AFB.

The AMC after action report concluded that the initial requirement was not properly defined by the USRT and there were no procedures in place to update load information and pass it along to USTRANSCOM, and the TACC.

FBI

The process by which the FBI asks for military airlift is more streamlined than that used by the USRT. The director of the FBI writes a letter directly to the Office of the Secretary of Defense requesting airlift. It then follows the same path as the other requests: J4/LRC, USTRANSCOM then eventually down to the TACC.

The FBI movement was marked by great confusion from the beginning of the deployment. In the formal request letter to the OSD, dated 7 Aug 98, then acting Director of the FBI, Thomas J. Pickard stated, “The FBI requests military airlift for the following personnel and equipment from McGuire AFB, NJ to Nairobi, Kenya: 60 agents carrying hand weapons, 1 x crate of fragmentation @ 330 lbs/crate and
dimensions of: 28 in. x 34 in x 41 in (h).” Pickard requested more airlift for personnel and equipment from McGuire AFB to Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania. The initial request was for 100 agents total and approximately 7000 lbs. of cargo to be transported to the two Africa locations. The letter specifically states that “This equipment includes no hazardous material” (19).

The requirement changed several times after the initial request in not only the size of the cargo, but the pick up location as well. After a great deal of debate, Andrews AFB, not McGuire, was finally decided on as the pick-up location (11). This was only the start of what was to become a frustrating deployment for the FBI and the DOD.

According to a mission summary log, the FBI was having a difficult time determining the cargo it needed to transport on the first aircraft. The difficulty stemmed from the fact that this was the first time the FBI had set up a laboratory at an overseas location—without prior knowledge or in depth information about the area. Consequently, there was a delay while the FBI decided exactly what would be needed for its overseas evidence collection operation. Requirements were finally defined 15 hours after they initially requested DOD airlift support. The Joint Staff/LRC then tasked USTRANSCOM to set up airlift support for a load consisting of 60 passengers and approximately 40,000 lbs. AMC then tasked a C-141 aircraft against the requirement. Unfortunately, there was more than 40,000 lbs. of cargo, which required the crews and aerial port personnel to conduct “on scene” load reconfiguration, hazardous cargo certification, and coordination of an enroute refueling stop (3).

In summary, the FBI arrived with more cargo than was validated to move on this one mission. Loads were not ready for onload and hazardous cargo was not properly
documented. Consequently, the first mission was delayed and AMC had to schedule a second aircraft to pick up the additional cargo. The first mission (#5704) departed 30 minutes late from Andrews AFB at 0658L on the 8th of August. AMC immediately identified a second C-141 to pick up the remaining cargo (8:2).

Mission #5705, the second of the two FBI missions, was a C-141 that had been on alert status. This mission was set up specifically to pick up the additional cargo from #5704. According to the mission log, “User showed up with approximately 32,000 lbs. of extra cargo that had not been included in the cargo weight validated for the first FBI mission. Aircraft arrived at Andrews AFB at 08/1058L. Unfortunately, the passengers were 1.5 hours late showing up at Andrews AFB. Their FBI Ops Center passed an incorrect show time. The aircraft finally took off 1 hour and 41 minutes late” (8:5).

Not all of the blame for late arrivals to the disaster scene can be placed on the FBI. AMC also had its share of bad luck over the course of the FBI deployment. The subsequent eight FBI support missions experienced delays due to maintenance or weather. All ten FBI support missions experienced late takeoffs (21).

**Summary**

Both the USRT and FBI experienced delays with military airlift in the critical hours following the terrorist attack in Kenya and Tanzania. Most of the delays can be attributed to a lack of communication and training from both inside and outside the DOD. The moments after an attack are always confusing because of the lack of known details about the disaster scene, but it is painfully obvious that most of the delays experienced by
the USRT and FBI with the Department of Defense might have been avoided if all three parties had been better prepared.

The Crowe Report states, “Some of the logistical and coordination problems with the US Air Force, for example, could have been alleviated if clear instructions had been provided and better liaison established in advance through designated points of contact. Better crisis management training and contingency planning seem imperative if the Department of State is to handle mass casualties and destruction emergencies in a more expeditious and professional manner” (6:5).

The following chapters will explore how these three agencies (USRT, FBI and DOD) have responded to the criticisms in the wake of Operation Resolute Response.
III. DOD Response

Movements Interagency Working Group

Operation Resolute Response demonstrated that the FBI and the USRT were not familiar with the military transportation system, lacked pre-planned loads, did not articulate movement requirements and/or priorities, and made too many last minute changes. Additionally, there seemed a need for more effective liaison at all levels.

A successful deployment depends on a variety of factors such as detailed planning and close coordination. In recognition of this fact and a desire to improve the deployment process, the Joint Staff’s Logistics Directorate, headed by LTG Mike McDuffie, founded the Movements Interagency Work Group in late August, 1998, in association with the Joint Staff’s Operation Directorate, OSD (Special Operation/Low-Intensity Conflict), and USTRANSCOM (1:2).

The Movements IWG has benefited from the active participation of key federal agencies with an anticipated need to respond rapidly to humanitarian or law enforcement crises, to include the FBI, OFDA, USAID, and DSCA (1:13).

The IWG has been the focal point for the DOD effort to try to correct the problems cited in the Crowe Report. The Interagency Working Group has used a five-pronged approach to increase communication and improve the deployment process. The five areas emphasized by the IWG are Education, Affiliation Training, Advanced Planning, Team Building and a Memorandum of Understanding.
Education

The Movements IWG established the following corrective actions:

- **On-Site Familiarization and Briefings (14 Oct 98 at Scott AFB):** IWG members toured TRANSCOM facilities and were familiarized with airlift command and control, airlift scheduling, and planning factors.

- **Mission Planning Assessment (15 Oct 98 at Scott AFB):** J4 and TRANSCOM personnel assessed the most effective means to schedule and track missions.

- **DOD / FBI Deployment Scenarios (12 Nov 98 at Washington FBI Field Office):** Work was done to begin developing likely scenarios requiring DOD airlift, to include identifying required equipment and the concept of deployment.

- **Airlift Operations Orientation (13 Nov 98 at Pentagon):** Key agency transportation executors received a 1-day course on Air Mobility Operations from TRANSCOM and AMC instructors.

- **Leadership Orientations/Briefings to DC Agencies (Nov 98 at Agency Locations):** To familiarize decision-makers with the DOD airlift system, executive-level briefings have been and will continue to be provided by J4 and TRANSCOM personnel to key agency leaders, to include the Deputy Director of the FBI.

- **Hands-On Load Training (Mar 99 at Scott AFB):** AMC Affiliation Training is conducted at Scott AFB on a regular basis to give detailed hands-on training to load planners. The curriculum includes a 2-Day Equipment Preparation course, which covers how to properly prepare cargo for airlift, and a 6-day Loadplanners Course which is geared towards the deployment specialist of the various agencies. After completing this course the FBI/USRT representative will be fully qualified to load AMC aircraft. The Affiliation training also includes a 2-day course on Hazardous Materials (HAZMAT) that will teach FBI/USRT representative how to document HAZMAT. Some delays experienced by the FBI during Operation Resolute Response were caused by improperly manifested hazardous material. At the completion of this course the FBI/USRT representative should be able to document HAZMAT in advance, instead of at the time of deployment (1:4).
**Affiliation Training**

Affiliation Training is key to the deployment process, because it teaches the users of military airlift about equipment preparation and load planning. If the user knows how to prepare cargo and personnel for military transport, the deployment should run more smoothly.

The AMC Affiliation Program is designed to develop a mutual understanding of air mobility requirements and capabilities and to promote an informed, professional, and cooperative management environment for DOD users of military airlift and its providers. With the military draw down came a drastic decrease in the number of support forces AMC has available to prepare loads for transport. This fact has placed increased responsibilities on the airlift users to prepare their own loads for movement.

The AMC Affiliation Program was devised to increase management awareness and involvement, provide technical information, quality assistance, and feedback to airlift customers. The liaison established at all working levels promotes this concept through staff visits, formal classroom training, and joint participation in mobility exercises (23:1).

The Affiliation Program not only helps the user prepare cargo, but helps identify airlift requirements and potential problem areas that could hinder a smooth deployment. The Program is directed toward one goal: to teach DOD airlift users how to plan, prepare, and deploy by air quickly, efficiently, and safely, with minimal Air Force assistance.

Training is conducted at several bases around the United States, by both active duty and Reserve units. Affiliation teams are located at Dyess AFB TX, Little Rock AFB AR, and Travis AFB CA. FBI field offices in Los Angeles, New York, Washington and Miami also conduct training with aerial ports in Pt. Mugu NAS CA, McGuire AFB NJ,
Andrews AFB MD and Homestead AFB FL respectively. The teams consist of trained load handlers that can conduct the training either at the base or at the FBI field office (24).

The Affiliation Program has had limited success due to the delays in qualifying FBI personnel. The FBI sent its first members through AMC’s annual affiliation training starting in April of 2000. This training is targeted toward members of the FBI Rapid Deployment Teams (to be discussed in Chapter III). The goal is to qualify at least one permanent member of each Rapid Deployment Team who can be present during planning phases and at the Aerial Port of Embarkation at the onset of operations (17). The FBI would like key personnel to complete both the Annual Affiliation Training and the Hazardous Materials Course by the summer of 2000. Once this training is complete, the FBI and the DOD will move one step closer to improving the deployment process.

**Advanced Planning**

Advanced Planning is an integral part of military deployment. When a unit is told to deploy, the wings can tailor cargo “packages” depending on the situation at the conflict site. The DOD would like the FBI and USRT to incorporate that same level of detailed planning when they prepare to deploy. The Movements Interagency Working Group has helped the FBI and USRT develop pre-existing plans in anticipation of a deployment requirement. The IWG has helped these agencies by developing deployment scenarios and preparing load plans. The IWG has encouraged the FBI and the USRT to take a building-block approach by determining a “base case” deployment package consisting of the personnel and equipment most likely to deploy. The DOD hopes that
these agencies may eventually progress to the point where their assets can be loaded in movement systems such as JOPES that will automate and expedite the deployment process (1:3).

The FBI has made significant progress in its development of a concept of operations and concept of deployment since Operation Resolute Response. These concepts have enhanced the FBI’s ability to define its airlift requirements and establish preplanned loads. According to a recent FBI report, preplanned loads resulted in minimal mission creep and last minute changes to airlift requirements when FBI forensic experts deployed to Kosovo after Operation Allied Force (14). While this was not a rapid deployment, it is a positive sign that the Interagency Working Group has been effective.

The USRT has also made great strides in the area of prepackaged loads. In its warehouse in Fairfax County, the USRT has a 58,000 cargo load that can be uploaded on a truck and driven to Dover AFB within 6.5 hours. The USRT can also alert and process 70 members of the team within two hours of notification (26). The USRT is also in the process of tailoring loads for different contingencies. It hopes eventually to have different “packages” for hurricane and earthquake relief, as well as terrorist bombings. These different scenarios would require smaller aircraft than the C-5 that is currently used for all USRT deployments.

**Team Building**

Knowing the person at the other end of the phone and becoming familiar with key players in another agency is key to the deployment process. Team building is, in many ways, the most important by-product of the Movements IWG. By attending meetings,
establishing POC listings, and familiarizing themselves with key personnel in the deployment process, agencies represented in the Movements IWG improve their ability to rapidly deploy. The Movements IWG has worked to identify key points of contact in each agency to coordinate airlift support, an effort that simplifies the process and helps agency deployment planners. Additionally, the key airlift user and provider liaison officers have been identified and trained. For example, the Joint Staff has identified three officers from the Logistics Readiness Center to work in the FBI headquarters during future terrorist and/or WMD incidents (22).

**Memorandum of Understanding**

Understanding and streamlining procedures is another key aspect of the deployment process in which the Movements IWG has achieved modest success. Much effort has been expended analyzing all elements of the deployment process and, where necessary, writing and staffing Memorandums of Understanding between airlift users and providers in this particular case, the FBI and DOD.

The initial version of the MOU between the FBI and DOD was drafted soon after the East Africa bombings in 1998. It clarifies the responsibilities of each agency involved in the deployment process and clearly states what is expected of them in the event of a disaster. According to a recent draft of the MOU, its purpose is to “prescribe both immediate response and follow-on procedures for the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to use in requesting and obtaining military airlift support for rapid response to acts of terrorism worldwide” (9:1). Under paragraph 6, Target Timelines, the MOU states, “The agreed DOD/FBI target is to have the first aircraft loaded and airborne
within not more than 18 hours after OSD receipt of a written airlift support request from the FBI. This target allows the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the Joint Staff (JS) and USTRANSCOM to validate and assign the mission. When possible, USTRANSCOM will use in-system selects or available alert aircraft to reduce response time” (9:3). How will the DOD and the FBI work towards the common goal of the 18 hour response time? The subsequent paragraphs in the agreement spell out exactly what is expected from both agencies in the event of a disaster. An effort was made to include language specifically addressing Aerial Ports of Embarkation (APOE) for the FBI when a rapid deployment is needed. “In order to avoid exceeding aircrew duty-day limitations, and thereby maximize potential flying distances, the movement of FBI passengers and cargo to designated APOEs within the Continental United States (CONUS) is an important consideration when executing airlift missions” (9:3). The MOU further states that, “JS/LRC and the FBI must rapidly reach agreement as to which APOE cargo will be marshaled prior to the positioning of aircraft. Strategic airlift ports, such as McGuire, Dover, Travis, Charleston and McChord Air Force Bases offer the greatest flexibility for successful mission execution” (9:3). As stated in Chapter II, one of the factors contributing to the confusion during Operation Resolute Response was the lack of a pre-designated APOE. This issue remains a sticking point between the two agencies.

The FBI would like to truck its equipment and personnel to Andrews AFB, MD while the DOD would prefer that the FBI drive to Dover AFB, DE to cut down on the time it takes to position an aircraft off station. The time to drive from Washington D.C. to Andrews AFB is approximately 30 minutes, while the drive time to Dover AFB is 2.5 hours. The extra drive time to Dover AFB would significantly reduce the DOD response
time because the aircraft is already located at the base. The FBI and the DOD will have to resolve this issue before they can move forward in improving the deployment process. As of this writing, the Memorandum of Understanding is yet to be signed.

Summary

The Interagency Working Group is an important step towards improving the deployment process for the FBI and USRT. This DOD initiative has improved communication among the agencies and therefore increased the likelihood of a successful rapid deployment in the future. The FBI’s participation in AMC affiliation training and their willingness to work with the DOD on advanced planning have enhanced their ability to react to the next disaster. The signing of the MOU will be a significant step towards clarifying the responsibilities of each agency with regard to military transport.

The Fairfax County Urban Search and Rescue Team has also made great strides in the areas of Team Building and Advanced Planning. Liaison officers from the Logistics Readiness Center have been identified for the USRT and have been used for recent contingencies in Turkey and Taiwan. The Fairfax County USRT has also prepared “prepackaged” cargo that would be ready to deploy at a moment’s notice. These improvements to the USRT deployment process have been directly attributed to its involvement in the IWG (26).
IV. FBI Response

Before the East Africa bombings the FBI had no standard procedures for transporting personnel to overseas disaster sites. When the Department of State requested the presents of the FBI in Kenya and Tanzania, it contacted FBI headquarters in Washington DC. FBI headquarters then contacted its field offices in New York and Washington to notify its personnel of the impending deployment. The FBI then contacted the DOD to coordinate military airlift. According to FBI sources, the initial request for airlift was based on an inaccurate assessment of what equipment was needed at the disaster site (11). Once more information was made available as to the extent of the damage, the FBI increased the size of the cargo requirement until it could no longer fit in the requested C-5. Although the FBI knew the cargo load had increased, the means to update this information with AMC did not exist. The FBI admits to a severe lack of communication between the field offices and FBI Headquarters as well as between the FBI and the DOD. The lack of preplanned loads exacerbated the confusion initially because there were too many inputs concerning the load and equipment that was to be taken (12). All of these factors contributed to a less than impressive deployment on the part of the FBI.

Several fundamental changes were made within the FBI to correct these shortfalls. Some of the changes include the establishment of five Rapid Deployment Teams (RDT) designed to deploy to specific geographic areas around the world as well as the creation of a Single Integrated Operations Center (SIOC) to communicate with field units and outside agencies (10).
**Rapid Deployment Teams**

The creation of 5 Rapid Deployment Teams in New York, Los Angeles, Miami and two in Washington DC has facilitated better response times for the FBI. These RDTs were created to respond quickly to any variety of disasters and are comprised of a command element, support specialists, case agents, investigators, evidence response technicians, communications specialists, logisticians, security detail, laboratory equipment, and medical personnel (10).

**Critical Incident Response Group**

As the predominant IWG user of DOD airlift, the FBI’s Critical Incident Response Group (CIRG) based in Quantico, VA has made significant progress in its developments of a concept of operations and concept of deployment. The CIRG was established in 1994 after the Branch Davidian fire in Waco, Texas. The FBI wanted a single organization that could respond to a range of possible emergencies to include terrorist acts, hijacking, and hostage situations (11). The CIRG, based in Quantico, Virginia, was activated in 1995 and included four major branches: Special Operations, Terrorism, Hostage Situations, and Violent Crimes. A fifth branch, called the Rapid Deployment Logistics Unit (RDLU), was added in the fall of 1998 after the East Africa bombings.

These concepts have enhanced the FBI’s ability to define its airlift requirements and establish preplanned loads. The RDLU is the focal point for the mobilization and deployment of the Rapid Deployment Team (RDT) personnel and equipment. It is the centralized logistical and administrative planning center for the RDT’s and includes
several functions such as transportation (commercial), load preparation (movement and planners), training and equipment, medical units, and administration (diplomatic clearances, etc). The RDLU coordinates with FBI field offices in Miami, New York, Los Angeles, and Washington to better prepare each office for transportation on military aircraft.

**Single Integrated Operations Center (SIOC)**

The FBI has also made some fundamental changes in how it intends to deploy in the future. One significant improvement is the creation of the Single Integrated Operations Center in Washington D.C.

In the event of a crisis, the RDLU will dispatch a Mission Planning Team (MPT) from Quantico, VA to the FBI Headquarters in Washington D.C. The MPT has five main components that include a:

1) Command Element- Coordinates Strategic and Operational planning
2) Logistical Element- Coordinates Supply, Medical, and Technical requirements
3) Tactical Element- Coordinates rotation and equipment taskings
4) Negotiations Element- Coordinates resources
5) Aviation Element- Coordinates Transportation to include DOD and Commercial

Once the Mission Planning Team arrives in Washington it becomes part of the Single Integrated Operations Center (SIOC). The SIOC is the FBI’s command and control center that becomes activated specifically for contingency operations. Once activated, the SIOC becomes the single point of contact for all questions concerning an
FBI deployment. The Mission Planning Team within the SIOC will then task the various field offices with the personnel and equipment needed for the crisis. In addition to having the Mission Planning Team, the SIOC also includes Liaison Officers from the Logistics Readiness Center in the Pentagon that will help with airlift coordination once an Aerial Port of Embarkation (APOE) is established. This system is a vast improvement over the process that was used during Operation RESOLUTE RESPONSE, because all coordination will be done through the SIOC and communication between the agencies will be enhanced (11).

Crisis Advance Team (CAT)

Before the deployment of the RDTs, the FBI plans on sending a smaller Crisis Advance Team (CAT) to the scene of a disaster. This will be a six-person team consisting of an OSC, an investigator, a communications specialist, security, logistician, and a laboratory technician. The CAT’s goal is to embark within four hours to the crisis site on an FBI-owned Gulfstream V aircraft. Their main function will be to start making arrangements for the arrival of the main RDT body by addressing housing, food, communications and command post setup (10). Presently, the Gulfstream V is in the FBI’s budget request but has not received funding.

Three Tiered Response

At the onset of an incident, the FBI will react with a three-tiered response. The first tier consists of legal attaches in the region reacting with on site reports of the requirements. Their goal is to secure a good communications systems (telephone,
facsimile and computers) and prepare for the arrival of the C.A.T. Tier two consists of the deployment of the Crisis Advance Team from Washington DC. The third tier consists of the deployment of the RDT (10). As stated earlier, the RDT is a task-oriented body designed to conduct a complete investigation.

**Memorandum of Understanding**

In addition to the organizational changes, the FBI has also participated directly in the drafting of the Memorandum of Understanding with the DOD. Paragraph 7 section 1 states that the FBI will

In cooperation with the JCS/LRC and USTRANSCOM, develop preplanned response packages for use as a baseline in initial airlift requests. These packages should incorporate aircraft load plans. (9:4)

The establishment of the rapid deployment teams is a direct response to this portion of the MOU. Paragraph 7, section 2 states that the FBI shall:

Maintain a cadre of trained personnel knowledgeable of hazardous cargo requirements and documentation. These personnel will also be familiar with load planning configurations for potential scenarios requiring military airlift. (9:4)

The affiliation training conducted at USTRANSCOM fills this requirement to maintain a cadre of qualified personnel. The FBI has recently sent its first members through the basic level course. Paragraph 4 states the FBI will also:

Establish a single point of contact (POC) for all transportation requirements. The JCS/LRC and the FBI POC will work closely during the entire movements phase to reduce any possibility of redundant or miscommunicated taskings. (9:5)
The LRC Liaison officers assigned to the FBI during the movements phase have helped to clarify requirements during recent non-time critical deployments (11).

The organizational changes made within the FBI have better prepared it for future deployments, however, the FBI still has room for improvement. Drafting an MOU was seen as a positive step, but it has yet to be signed because there are several key issues where the FBI and DOD do not agree. One such issue is the pre-designation of an Aerial Port of Embarkation. The DOD would prefer that the FBI drive to Dover AFB from Washington D.C., while the FBI would rather go to Andrews AFB. Driving the FBI equipment to Dover AFB would greatly decrease DOD response times.

**DOD Response Times**

The MOU being drawn up between the FBI and the DOD state that “The combined DOD/FBI goal is to have the first aircraft loaded and airborne within 18 hours after receipt of a defined airlift requirement from the FBI” (9:5). While this is an ambitious target, it allows OSD, the Joint Staff and USTRANSCOM to validate and assign the mission within the first 3 hours of notification. It also allows the assigned airlift squadron 15 hours to identify a crew, put them on crew rest, plan the mission, obtain diplomatic clearances, and load FBI cargo.

This scenario involves many assumptions about the airlift system at the time of the request. The JCS Airlift priority system was designed to prioritize missions so that schedulers and mission directors would be able to assign a finite number aircraft based on user need. The 1A1 priority, combat support, is the highest priority while a 3B3, scheduled channel missions, receive the lowest priority. Missions in support of a
contingency like the East Africa bombings would receive a priority of 1B1 which could only be out prioritized by combat support or Presidential airlift. Under normal circumstances, aircraft should be available with a 1B1 priority but crew availability is also another major assumption. If there is no crew on alert status, the mission must allow time for a preflight of the aircraft, crew rest, and flight time to the pick up base.

Another factor in determining whether a mission can deploy smoothly is diplomatic clearances. This involves not only clearances to the country of destination but overflight clearances of nations that do not allow hazardous material to traverse their airspace. AMC policy states clearly that aircrews will not take off on a mission until all diplomatic clearances for the flight have been resolved (16:15).

Conditions at the destination airfield also have to be resolved such as the availability of Material Handling Equipment (MHE). Equipment may be loaded onto an aircraft, but may not be able to be offloaded if the proper forklifts and cargo loaders are not available at the destination airfield. Operating hours are also a determining factor when aircrews are planning a mission. Many third world countries do not have the navigational aids needed for instrument approaches at night or in bad weather. Takeoff times for missions going into these airfields may have to be adjusted to allow a landing in day Visual Flight Rules (VFR) conditions (16:18).

These factors have to be taken into consideration when planning a mission for a short notice deployment. USTRANSCOM has considered three different scenarios when determining how long it would take an aircraft to be “wheels up” in the event of a major contingency.
The first scenario involves putting an aircrew into crewrest immediately after notification and having the aircraft fly from home station (probably McGuire or Dover AFB) to Andrews AFB where the crew would pick up the FBI or the Fairfax county USRT. This scenario, shown in Figure 1 below, would take 22 hours from initial notification to “wheels up.”

<table>
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<tr>
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<th>Flight to Andrews</th>
<th>Landing/Load</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>12 hrs</td>
<td>3.5 hrs</td>
<td>1 hr</td>
<td>4.25 hrs</td>
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</table>

**Response Time: 22 hours**

Figure 1. Response Time: Scenario #1

The second scenario involves the user bringing personnel and equipment to an AMC hub to load the airplane directly. This scenario also assumes that there is no alert crew available and no available aircraft in the airlift system to be diverted into the Aerial Port of Embarkation. This would save at least 9 hours from scenario 1 because the aircraft could be uploaded while the aircrew is resting for the mission. As shown in Figure 2, the aircrew could be wheels up in as little as 13 hours.
The third scenario involves AMC using an alert aircraft and crew to support a contingency movement. USAF alert crews are scattered throughout the United States and are ready to provide strategic airlift 24 hours a day, seven days a week. The crews are in perpetual crew rest so they can launch within an hour of notification. Using an alert aircraft has the added advantage of loading immediately and departing as soon as the aircrew is finished planning the mission. This scenario would also involve the user bringing the equipment to the AMC hub and loading upon arrival. As shown in Figure 3, this last scenario could take anywhere from 7 to 13 hours before the aircraft is airborne.

1) FBI brings equip. to AMC hub
2) No pick off alerts crews
3) No “In System Select”
4) Aircraft preflighted and loaded by another aircrew

**Response Time: 13 hours**

Figure 2. Response Time: Scenario #2
USTRANSCOM has suggested that the FBI become a part of the alert pool system that AMC currently utilizes. The alert pool is made up of several different aircraft strategically located throughout the United States to support Special Operations within the DOD. To participate in the alert pool, the FBI would have to pay an annual fee of $10 million (22). According to Special Agent James Doolin, the FBI is not willing to pay this fee and will rely on “in system” aircraft available at the time of deployment (12).
V. After Resolute Response

Fairfax County Urban Search and Rescue

The DOD and the Urban Search and Rescue Team have had several opportunities since the East Africa bombings to work together on rapid deployments. On the 16\textsuperscript{th} of August, 1999, an earthquake measuring 6.7 on the Richter scale struck south of Istanbul, Turkey, killing almost 5000 people and leaving over 100,000 people homeless (5). The Fairfax County Urban Search and Rescue Team was alerted and told to deploy a 70-person team including technicians, cave-in experts, physician, paramedics, logisticians, and command and control personnel (18:2). By all accounts the deployment was a success. According to an after action report, the changes initiated by the Interagency Working Group greatly enhanced the deployment with regard to Aerial Port of Embarkation (APOE), customer requirements, and use of liaison officers.

The designated APOE for Operation Resolute Response was Andrews AFB because of the proximity to the USRT. After the IWG was established, it was decided that Dover AFB would be the APOE for future deployments of the Urban Search and Rescue Team. The initial aircraft scheduled to transport the USRT experienced maintenance problems. By using Dover AFB as its APOE the challenge to identify and source a different aircraft was minimized. There was an immediate tail swap of aircraft, delaying the scheduled departure of the USRT by only one hour. According to the after action report, “If this maintenance problem had occurred at Andrews AFB, the delay in the departure would have been significantly longer ranging between 12-24 hours” (3:13).

For Operation Resolute Response the USRT had to communicate its load requirements through a myriad of different agencies including the LRC, TRANSCOM
and the TACC. During the IWG it was decided that each non-DOD agency would be put in direct contact with the Air Terminal Operations Center (ATOC) at the APOE. The after action report states that “It is essential for the ATOC to have direct contact with the customer during the initial planning phase of deployment. During the rapid planning process some details are commonly overlooked. Direct contact with the customer provides a more accurate exchange of information” (18:3). Details such as in-flight meals, comfort pallet, and special dog handling requirements were effectively coordinated through direct contact, thereby enhancing the ATOC’s ability to respond to the USRT’s requirements. Additionally, some simple requirements were met such as: where cargo is delivered for aircraft on-load, where passengers report for boarding, and a 24-hour phone number with a primary POC at Dover. The LRC’s ability to facilitate and monitor the exchange between the Urban Search and Rescue Team and ATOC reduced frustration and enhanced the USRT’s movement to the APOE (18:5).

The after action report from the USRT deployment to Istanbul, Turkey, also highlighted the effectiveness of having a DOD liaison officer working with the USRT. The report states

A critical link was the establishment of an LRC Liaison Officer (LNO) at the Fairfax USRT Operations Center. Face to face communication enhanced coordination of details during the pre-deployment phase. An established network of primary contacts at critical locations Fairfax USRT, OFDA, J4/LRC, TRANSCOM, AMC and Dover AFB-ATOC, DE allowed for the rapid coordination of changing requirements. Moreover, the LRC representative provides a non-tangible benefit in the communication cycle. A DOD LNO can more quickly and effectively relay the non-DOD customer’s requirements to supporting DOD organizations than the customer can through their own communication channels.
**Recommendation:** Continue the use of an LRC Liaison to Fairfax and deploy on site ASAP after the decision to deploy is made. (18:5)

The USRT Battalion Chief, Mike Tamillow, in a letter to Major General Brooks of the Joint Staff, emphasizes the strides the USRT have made in improving the deployment process since the East Africa bombings. Chief Tamillow states, “Our goal is to be in country and on site within the first 24 hours of the impact of the event, if possible. We have streamlined our mobilization process so that we now consistently activate, assemble and process 80+ personnel and the 58,000 lb. of equipment cache in approximately 4-5 hours. We can transport all elements to Dover AFB within another 2.5 hours” (25:1).

The USRT is constantly trying to find new ways to deploy effectively and is committed to fostering good communication with the DOD. Chief Tamillow ends his letter by saying, “We are still very interested in exploring any possible actions/changes that may lead to a shortened time table for aircraft/crew availability and takeoff. We will be working with LRC and TRANSCOM in the future to address these issues and ensure a close collaboration between our organizations” (25:2).

**FBI**

While the USRT has had at least two real-life deployments since the creation of the Interagency Working Group, the FBI has yet to deploy in a time critical situation similar to that experienced in East Africa. There have been two instances since Resolute Response where the FBI has deployed overseas. Both of these deployments were of a
non-time critical nature to Kosovo after Operation Allied Force. The FBI flew forensic experts into the Former Yugoslavia on AMC aircraft with no major problems (10). The real test however, will come when the FBI must rapidly deploy to an overseas location in a crisis situation.
VI. Conclusion

The embassy bombings in Tanzania and Kenya in August of 1998 were a wake up call for how the Department of Defense moves critical non-DOD assets. The FBI and the Fairfax County Urban Search and Rescue Team experienced a myriad of problems when deploying to the bomb locations on USAF aircraft.

After action reports cited a lack of communication and coordination among the agencies as causes for the delays. Since this event, the DOD, FBI, and USRT have made great strides in improving the process by which they deploy to disaster locations. This research paper examines what each organization did to improve their readiness and what lessons can be gleaned by other organizations that may deploy on DOD aircraft. My research questions are restated in sequence 1 to 5 and are followed with research findings for each:

1. How can the FBI/USRT deployment process be improved?

With the establishment of the Movements Interagency Working Group in November of 1998, the DOD, FBI and USRT took an important step towards improving the deployment process. Through regularly scheduled meetings, affiliation training, liaison officers, and advanced planning these three agencies have improved the coordination that is necessary for successful deployments. Although much work has been done in the almost two years since the embassy bombings, there still room for improvement. The DOD and FBI agree on a majority of issues contained in their Memorandum of Understanding but have been unable to resolve several key issues.
Once agreement is reached on the remaining issues, the MOU should prove to be a major step towards improving the coordination between the FBI and DOD.

2. **What are the initiatives put forth by the DOD to improve communication between the various agencies?**

   Besides establishing the Movements Interagency Working Group, the DOD has spearheaded the liaison officer program with the FBI and USRT. This program has proven to be successful for the USRT in several recent contingencies. The Logistics Readiness Center liaison officers helped coordinate airlift and kept the USRT informed throughout the deployments. Physically located at the USRT command and control center, the liaison officer was able to clarify any conflicting messages received from the DOD. This has been a vast improvement over what occurred during Resolute Response.

3. **How has the FBI changed its organizational structure to better respond to future attacks?**

   With the establishment of five Rapid Deployment Teams and the use of the Single Integrated Operations Center at FBI Headquarters, the FBI has improved its readiness to rapidly deploy. The creation of the Rapid Deployment Logistics Unit has also focused the FBI’s efforts to move to a disaster site. With its active participation in the Movements IWG and the internal changes it has made to its organization, the FBI has shown its commitment towards improving the coordination and communication with the DOD. A signed Memorandum of Understanding between the FBI and DOD will go further in improving the coordination between the two agencies.
4. **How has the Fairfax County Urban Search and Rescue Team improved its readiness to travel on DOD aircraft?**

Since the East Africa bombings the USRT has greatly improved its ability to mobilize and deploy. The Fairfax County Urban Search and Rescue Team has already begun to reap the benefits of participating in the Movements IWG. Earthquakes in Turkey and Taiwan in the fall of 1999 prompted the USRT to deploy on short notice. Both deployments occurred without incident due, in part, to improvements made within its organization.

Since August of 1998, the USRT has decreased the time to process their personnel and has established pre-packaged loads at their headquarters in Virginia that can be driven to Dover AFB within 6.5 hours (26). The USRT was loaded on a C-5 within 12 hours of being alerted for both the Taiwanese and Turkish earthquakes. The use of DOD liaison officers at the USRT command and control center in Fairfax County, VA also increased communication between the two agencies, which led to smoother deployments. The ease of these two operations illustrates how much the USRT has improved its deployment process since Operation Resolute Response.

5. **How can the lessons learned after Operation Resolute Response be applied to other government agencies that may deploy on DOD aircraft in the future?**

With the Department of Defense becoming increasingly involved in peacetime and humanitarian efforts around the world, the possibility of other government agencies using DOD aircraft is becoming more likely. Agencies such as the International Red Cross and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) are starting to rely on the U.S. military to carry out their own missions. The efforts put forth by the DOD, FBI
and USRT in the aftermath of Operation Resolute Response can be beneficial to other agencies that will likely deploy on DOD aircraft.

The primary lessons learned that would apply to any user of military transport are:

1) Users should develop and foster good communication with the Department of Defense through the use of liaison officers and participation in working groups.

2) Users should understand that advanced planning is crucial to a successful deployment.

3) Users should learn, in advance, how to prepare cargo for transport on military aircraft.

The Crowe report cited a lack of communication as the primary cause of delays during Operation Resolute Response. The Movements IWG had many facets, but its overarching goal was to increase the communication among the agencies to improve the deployment process. To an outside agency the Department of Defense may seem complex and confusing. In order to carry out its mission the DOD has many regulations and procedures it must follow. Non-DOD agencies deploying on military aircraft should not be expected to know all of the procedures that govern day to day military operations. This is where participation in a working group becomes crucial. In the Movements IWG, users learned what factors affect the DODs ability to transport their equipment. Once a government agency understands the rules under which the DOD operates, it can better prepare for future deployments.

The use of liaison officers (LO) can also greatly improve the communication between government agencies and the Department of Defense. Having an LRC liaison officer present at the Fairfax County command and control center substantially improved
the coordination during recent USRT deployments to Taiwan and Turkey. Non-DOD agencies should request a DOD liaison officer if there is any possibility of deploying on military aircraft.

Advanced planning is an integral part of a successful rapid deployment. This includes not only equipment an agency intends to take to a crisis, but where and when they intend to meet the DOD airlift. After working with the Movements IWG, the USRT designated Dover AFB as its pick up point because of aircraft availability. This decision has significantly reduced its response time to a disaster. Deciding on a pre-designated pick up point with the DOD can substantially increase the speed at which any government agency moves to a crisis scene.

Moving large amounts of equipment and personnel rapidly to a contingency is an integral part of U.S. military doctrine. The DOD trains its people to prepare cargo and personnel for rapid deployment. While the U.S. military is well versed in these types of operations, other government agencies may not be. The affiliation training offered by the DOD provides an opportunity for government agencies to learn how to prepare their personnel and equipment for military transport. Users are taught a variety of skills including, how to manifest hazardous materials and how to palletize their cargo. This pays dividends at the time of a deployment because the cargo is available to load upon arrival at the Aerial Port of Embarkation. Government agencies should take full advantage of this affiliation training if they have any intentions of deploying on military aircraft.
The DOD, FBI and USRT learned many lessons during the two years that followed the embassy bombings in East Africa. Other government agencies can use the experiences of these three agencies to better prepare for their own deployments.

The efforts of the Movements Interagency Working Group and the organizational changes that have taken place within the USRT, FBI, and DOD have made the United States better prepared to respond to future attacks or disasters.
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Vita

Major Angel A. Diaz was in Brooklyn, New York. He is a 1987 graduate of the United States Air Force Academy where he received a Bachelor of Science degree in General Engineering. He received a Masters of the Arts in Human Resources Development from Webster University, Little Rock, Arkansas in 1994. He was commissioned on 29 May 1987.

After completing undergraduate pilot training in 1988, Major Diaz was assigned to Little Rock AFB, Arkansas where he flew as an evaluator pilot in both operational and training squadrons. In 1995 he served as the C-130 exchange officer to the Spanish Air Force where he performed instructor pilot duties. In 1997 he was assigned to the Tanker Airlift Control Center, Scott AFB, IL as an Exercise/Contingency Director. He is a senior pilot with over 3,100 hours of flying time.

In June 1999, he entered the Advanced Study of Air Mobility program at the Air Mobility Warfare Center, Fort Dix, New Jersey, sponsored by the Air Mobility Command and the Air Force Institute of Technology. Following graduation, Major Diaz will attend the College of Naval Command and Staff in Newport, Rhode Island.
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**ABSTRACT (Maximum 250 Words)**

The paper examines how the Department of Defense transports government agencies during times of crisis. Non-DOD agencies, such as the FBI and the Fairfax County Urban Search & Rescue Team (USRT), rely exclusively on DOD aircraft to rapidly deploy to the scene of a disaster. The DOD must work closely with these agencies to better prepare them for transport on military aircraft.

The bombings of the American embassies in Tanzania and Kenya in August of 1998 highlighted the need for better coordination between the Department of the Defense and other non-DOD agencies when enabling to a disaster site. This paper contains a summary of Operation Resolute Support, the rapid deployment of the FBI and USRT to East Africa in the wake of the 1998 American Embassy bombings. The paper also examines the changes that have taken place within the FBI, USRT, and DOD to better respond to the next crises.

When government agencies become actively involved in advanced planning with the Department of Defense the likelihood of a successful deployment is increased. Changes made within a government agency will also improve its ability to rapidly deploy on DOD aircraft.

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