A Briefing and Associated Essays

presented at the

Indian Navy’s
International Fleet Review 2001

Mumbai, India 16 FEBRUARY 2001

Special Report
of the

NewRuleSets.Project

Dr. Thomas P.M. Barnett

March 2001
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Alternative Global Futures and Asian Security

A Briefing and Associated Essays*

presented at the
Indian Navy’s International Fleet Review 2001

Dr. Thomas P.M. Barnett

MARCH 2001

Decision Strategies Department

Please contact Dr. Thomas P.M. Barnett (401.841.4053 or barnettt@nwc.navy.mil) for any further information on the study or to provide feedback on this publication

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The following briefing was presented by Dr. Barnett at Mumbai on the occasion of the Indian Navy’s first ever International Fleet Review (15-19 February 2001) in a talk entitled, “Alternative Global Futures and Changing Definitions of Asia’s Security.” In the audience were flag admirals from 30 navies, including 16 Chiefs of Naval Operations/Chiefs of Naval Staffs.¹

This presentation was based on four articles Dr. Barnett has authored (or co-authored) for the Proceedings of the U.S. Naval Institute over the past two years:


These four articles are included in their entirety following the slides. All of the articles are copyrighted by the U.S. Naval Institute, and are reprinted here with the institute’s permission.

Dr. Barnett’s presentation also included several slides from his recent Naval War College report, Asian Energy Futures: Decision Event Report I of the NewRuleSets.Project (August 2000). This report is found @ www.nwc.navy.mil/newrulesets/AEFreport.htm.

¹ CNOs/CNS included Australia, India, Iraq, Israel, Kenya, Malaysia, Maldives, Morocco, New Zealand, Oman, Qatar, Russia, Singapore, South Africa, Sri Lanka and UK. The U.S. Navy was represented by the Commander-in-Chief, 7th Fleet.
The 20th Century in 60 seconds

New Era, New Rule Set?

Old Rule Set?
Systemic Stress

Emerging
Globally-Networked
“New Economy”

Globalization II

New Rule Set?

Globalization I

1910s 1920s 1930s 1940s 1950s 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s beyond

Why the Pentagon has trouble recognizing the future

1. All we can plan for is complete uncertainty!
2. U.S. is doing more with less!
3. U.S. cannot handle all these simultaneous crises!
4. Speed is everything in crisis response!
5. China is the new Soviet Union!
6. Technology proliferation is out of control!
7. Transnational actors are taking over the world!
8. World is swamped with failed states!
9. Soviet Bloc’s collapse unleashed chaos!
10. There are far more conflicts and crises now!

Top-10 List of Post-Cold War Myths
The fracturing of the global security market

Waltz’s *Man, The State and War* (1954)

- Third Image: International System
- Second Image: Nation-States
- First Image: Human Nature

Discerning the Causality of War

While pol-mil experts frantically scan the horizon for enemies, settling for devious, “asymmetrical” ones, most of the world’s violence and “threats” are down here.

But most of system’s power and competition are up here . . .

Waltz Updated for Globalization Era

Read the report @ <http://www.nwc.navy.mil/newrulesets/AEFreport.htm>
The Future According to Me

System crises --> Virtual conflicts

Davos Man v. Seattle Man

Fewer Wars... Glocalization

Civil conflicts --> Virtual crises

STATE-ON-STATE CONFLICTS

70's Cold War Containment Arc
(Vietnam, Carter Doctrine, Match Sovs in Med)

Soviets Invade Afghanistan Downshift Iranian Revolution

80's Mideast Concentration
(Israel v. Arab terror, Israel v. PLO/Lebanon, Iran v. Iraq)

Soviets Invade Afghanistan

80’s Mideast Concentration

90's Scattered Mini-containments
(Iraq, Somalia, Bosnia, Haiti, Kosovo)

FAILING STATES

Downshifting US Navy Responses

Read the report @ http://www.nwc.navy.mil/newrulesets/AEFreport.htm

Read the article @ http://www.nwc.navy.mil/newrulesets/7DeadlySins.htm
Pathways to alternative global futures

Contact the author @ <barnett@nwc.navy.mil> for a copy of this Center for Naval Analyses report.
Deus Ex America

One history of the 1990s

New World Order?

Bush I

PERSIAN
GULF
WAR

One history of the 1990s

North

South

A New Model?

Read the article @ <http://www.nwc.navy.mil/newrulesets/ForceStructureWillChange.htm>
New World Order?

Read the article @ <http://www.nwc.navy.mil/newrulesets/ForceStructureWillChange.htm>

One history of the 1990s

Post-Cold War Realeconomik

Clinton II

Bush I

What of Bush III?

Clinton III

INDIVIDUAL

STATE

SYSTEM

COLOMBIA

SERBIA

BOSNIA KOSOVO

PLO

ISRAEL

IRAQ

PAK

CHINA TAIWAN

KOREA

REALECONOMIK

Read the article @ <http://www.nwc.navy.mil/newrulesets/ForceStructureWillChange.htm>
Energy is the key variable

Energy Consumption 1997 & 2020

Source: US Dept. of Energy

Read the report @ <http://www.nwc.navy.mil/newrulesets/AEreport.htm>
Asian Energy Trajectory: Decalogue

0 Global energy market has the necessary resources
1 But no stability, no market
2 No growth, no stability
3 No resources, no growth
4 No infrastructure, no resources
5 No money, no infrastructure
6 No rules, no money
7 No security, no rules
8 No Leviathan, no security
9 No U.S. Navy, no Leviathan—*but US Navy alone cannot adequately fill this role*

Read the report @ <http://www.nwc.navy.mil/newrulesets/AEFreport.htm>
Kto kovo? (Who gets whom?)

Kto Kovo? Who Gets Whom?

- Mideast/Central Asia and S/E/SE Asia draw closer over energy—*who gets left behind*?
- European Union/NAFTA and Asia draw closer over trade and investment—*who gets left behind*?
- Security issues are the big problem for each; but security also creates opportunity for firm rules
- Uncertainty: *Which regional powers deliver this security?*
- Dependent variable: key Asian security enablers *will* attract needed investment and energy
- Question: How do China & India *stand & deliver*?

See the entire brief @ <http://www.nwc.navy.mil/newrulesets/Indian%20Navy%20presentation.htm>
## China as Globalization Test Case

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See the entire brief @ [http://www.nwc.navy.mil/newrulesets/Indian%20Navy%20presentation.htm](http://www.nwc.navy.mil/newrulesets/Indian%20Navy%20presentation.htm)

## India as Globalization Test Case

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See the entire brief @ [http://www.nwc.navy.mil/newrulesets/Indian%20Navy%20presentation.htm](http://www.nwc.navy.mil/newrulesets/Indian%20Navy%20presentation.htm)
What the world needs now . . .

Naval analogy: back to the future?

Dept of Navy
Network Enabling Force

Dept of War
Held-in-reserve Combat Force

Dept of Defense
On-alert Combat Force

Dept of Defense
Dept of Network Security

Dept of Global Deterrence

Pre-Cold War  Cold War  Post-Cold War

Read the article @ <http://www.nwc.navy.mil/newrulesets/LifeAfterDODth.htm>
The Seven Deadly Sins of Network-Centric Warfare

by

Thomas P.M. Barnett

Most of us read Vice Admiral Art Cebrowski's seminal 1998 Proceedings article on network-centric warfare (NCW), and if some detected a confidence too bold, that is only to be expected. Visions of the future invariably rankle, especially when they seem inevitable. Quoting Liddell Hart, "The only thing harder than getting a new idea into the military is getting an old one out," Admiral Cebrowski and coauthor John Garstka threw down the gauntlet and dared anyone to prove them wrong.

Would that I could, but the best I can muster is a devil's advocate take on what I see as network-centric warfare's seven deadly sins. Note that I don't say "mortal sins." As with any transgression, penance can be made.

1. Lust

NCW Longs for an Enemy Worthy of Its Technological Prowess

If absence makes the heart grow fonder, network-centric warfare is in for a lot of heartbreak, because I doubt we will ever encounter an enemy to match its grand assumptions regarding a revolution in military affairs. The United States currently spends more on its information technology than all but a couple of great powers spend on their entire militaries. In a world where rogue nations typically spend around $5 billion a year on defense, NCW is a path down which only the U.S. military can tread.

Meanwhile, our relatively rich allies fret about keeping up, wondering aloud about a day when they won't be able even to communicate with us. These states barely can afford the shrinking force structures they now possess, and if network-centric warfare demands the tremendous pre-conflict investments in data processing that I suspect it does, then the future of coalition warfare looks bleak indeed. Not only will our allies have little to contribute to this come-as-you-are party, they won't even be able to track the course of the "conversation."

As for potential peer competitors, forget about it—and I am not just talking money. I am a great believer in the "QWERTY effect," by which technological pathways are locked in by market victories of one standard over another. No one would argue against the notion that the United States is QWERTY Central, or that our military feeds off that creativity. So the reality facing, any potential enemy is that he either has to get in line behind our QWERTY dominance or satisfy himself with chintzy knockoffs from our far-distant past.
So when Iran gets itself some North Korean missile technology, let's remember that it is only a poor copy of old Chinese technology, which is a poor copy of old Soviet technology, which is a poor derivative of old Nazi-era German technology—and, as everyone knows, our German scientists were better than their German scientists! This is why proliferation is always a lot slower than suggested by too many hyperbolic experts.

Once you get past the potential peer competitors, you are entering the universe of smaller, rogue enemies that many security experts claim will be able to adapt all this information technology into a plethora of brilliant asymmetric responses—the Radio Shack scenario. Frankly, it stretches my imagination to the limit to conjure up seriously destabilizing threats from resource-poor, small states, unless we let our lust for a bygone era distort our preparations for a far different future.

2. Sloth

NCW Slows the U.S. Military's Adaptation to a MOOTW World

Military operations other than war (MOOTWs) are the closest thing to a sure-bet future the U.S. military faces right now, and network-centric warfare does not yet answer that mail. Beyond the affordability issues, there is the larger question of what "networked" should mean for the U.S. military: Wiring-up among ourselves? Or wiring ourselves up more to the world outside?

This is not an esoteric question for naval forces, because I see a future in which the establishment of, and support to, information networks is the crucial U.S. naval product delivered overseas to internal crises, where confusion, complexity, and chaos are the norm. We are far more likely to be called on to be the deliverers of clarity and context than sowers of blindness and vertigo, and we are far more likely to be asked to settle down all sides in a conflict than to decimate one particular side. This is where NCW's "lock-out" phraseology misleads: we will be interested in opening up pathways to resolution, not closing down pathways of conflict. That reality speaks to non-lethal approaches, reversible effects, and keeping open the channels of communication.

Increasingly, naval forces will be called on to serve as a "node connector," rather than a "node destroyer." I am talking not only about bringing crisis-involved regions back on line, but also about the military acting as Network Central for the wide array of U.S. and international agencies that populate any U.S.-led response to complex humanitarian emergencies. Just as important as our ability to talk among ourselves during, the generation and coordination of large-scale violence will be our ability to generate and coordinate the conversations of many outsiders in the prevention of small-scale violence.

Correctly focused, network-centric warfare would allow the U.S. military to come into any crisis situation and establish an information umbrella to boost the transparency of everyone's actions. Incorrectly focused, it might hamstring us along the lines of the Vietnam War. In sum, NCW's quest for information dominance is self-limiting in an era that will see the U.S. military far less involved in network wars than in mucking around
where the network is not.

3. Avarice

NCW Favors the Many and Cheap; the U.S. Military Prefers the Few and Costly

Many experts rightly claim that network-centric warfare is nothing new as far as the U.S. Navy is concerned. By its nature, our worldwide, blue-water Navy always has been a networking environment. Of all the major services, it should find the onset of NCW least discombobulating. But it is no secret to anyone who has followed Navy force structure decision making this decade that we consistently have sacrificed ship numbers to technology, even as we decry the resulting stress on operational tempo and global presence.

What we are ending up with is a Navy poorly situated for an NCW era in which the network's crucial strength is its flexibility to degrade gracefully. Some point out that cruise missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles are good fixes because they allow surface combatants to operate in a standoff mode. But the future fleet cannot consist of a dozen huge platforms sitting in the middle of the ocean remotely directing operations because we as a country cannot risk losing any of these hyper-tech behemoths. NCW's bottom line must be that no node can be worth more than the connectivity it provides.

Because we are far more likely to encounter targets of influence operating in the "few and cheap" paradigm, what we should bring to the table are "the many" as opposed to "the costly." Why? The few-and-costly approach puts us in no-win situations, where our entry into crises is self-limited by our tendency—and our opponent's knowledge of that tendency—to treat the loss of any significant network node as grounds for one of two equally bad pathways: escalation or withdrawal. Because our interests typically are limited, escalation usually is the last thing we want. But because the world values our Leviathan-like role as global force of first response and last resort, a pattern of withdrawals over relatively small losses costs us dearly over the long run. A superpower navy too valuable to risk force structure losses is not one worth having. Does that mean we risk more lives? Only if we insist that the U.S. Navy primarily is about projecting destructive power ashore.

4. Pride

NCW's Lock-Out Strategies Resurrect Old Myths about Strategic Bombing

Ever since Giulio Douhet's *Command of the Air* (1921), we have heard that massed effects against an enemy's centers of gravity can lead swiftly to bloodless victory. And every war since then has seen this theory's vigorous application and subsequent refutation. Yet the notion persists and now finds new life in network-centric's "lock-out"
strategy. Whether NCW's proponents admit it or not, what lies at the core of this strategy is the spurious notion that punishment equals control.

Can we, by destroying our enemy's information technology "village," somehow save it? I think not.

First, one man's information warfare is another man's international terrorism. If any hostile power tried even a smidgen of what we propose to do en masse via NCW, we would be hurling all sorts of war crimes accusations. The collateral damage associated with this "information technology decapitation" strategy simply is too complex to control from afar. Who dies? Society's weakest and most vulnerable. Unless we are talking total war or some antiseptic battlefield out in the middle of nowhere, we need to own up to the reality that such massed effects are closer to weapons of mass destruction than we care to admit.

Second, our bomb-damage assessment capabilities are nowhere near capable enough to measure the massed effects of NCW's souped-up brand of information warfare. Some assume that the smaller a society's information technology quotient, the greater our ability to understand the impact of information warfare. But in my mind, less information technology equals greater social capacity for low-tech work-arounds that either negate or complicate information warfare immeasurably.

Third, while bowing to complexity theory, NCW adherents toss it out the window once they rhapsodize about lock-out strategies. Somehow, our mastery of our enemy's complexity will translate into a capacity to steer his actions down one path or another, despite the fact that NCW's game plan includes large amounts of irreversible impact. What we may well end up with in some blossoming conflict is a "dialogue of the deaf" that precludes effective communication with the other side concerning conflict resolution or—more important—avoidance of unnecessary escalation. And when that happens, we may wonder which side really had its pathways locked out.

Fourth, NCW is guilty of mirror imaging: we theorize about our own information technology vulnerability and then assume it is the same for others. In reality, our distributed society is far stronger than we realize. In truth, is there any other country in the world where you would prefer to live through a natural disaster? As for less-advanced countries, our arrogant assumptions about their limited work-around capacity say more about us than about them.

Fifth, to the extent that network-centric's immense capabilities can be harnessed to a lock-out strategy, the military needs to relate better to the universe of relevant data and subject-matter experts outside the usual realm of political-military thinking. We do not possess the decision-assessment tools at this point to steer an opponent via information dominance.
5. Anger

NCW's Speed-of-Command Philosophy Can Push Us into Shooting First and Asking Questions Later

The unspoken assumption concerning speed of command seems to be that because we receive and process data faster, we have to act on it faster. Not surprisingly, this virtuous circle can turn vicious rather quickly if commanders allow themselves to become slaves to their own computers, which essentially are dumb machines that count incredibly fast. Rushing to bad judgment is the danger.

Most worrisome are network-centric’s assumptions concerning getting inside the enemy’s decision loop. This makes sense as a goal, but the real focus should be on what we do once inside, not just on the blind pursuit of faster response times. Why? We always are talking about potential enemies with less advanced information technology architectures, so the potential for miscommunication and misperception is huge. We may find ourselves acting so rapidly within our enemy’s decision loop that we largely are prompting and responding to our own signals, which our beleaguered target cannot process. In short, we could end up like Pavlov’s dog, ringing his own bell and wondering why he’s salivating so much.

It takes two to tango, so, yes, we want sufficient speed of command to get inside our opponent’s decision loop, but too much speed turns what we hope is a stimulus-response interaction into a self-stimulating frenzy. The potential irony is telling:

- We rapidly fire signals to a target of influence, who does not pick them up, in part because of the strategic blindness we have inflicted on him.
- Our target’s lack of response is interpreted as signifying "X" intent.
- We respond to perceived intent "X" with signal "Y," which also is missed by our target, who, perhaps, is just getting a grip on earlier signals.
- Our target's response "Z" seems incomprehensible, or we assume it is a rejection of sorts to our previous signals.
- Before you know it, we are way beyond "Z" and into some uncharted territory, but we are making incredible time!

The networked organization’s great advantage is that the processing and distribution of data are sped up considerably. What this should translate into is increased time for analysis and contemplation of appropriate response, not a knee-jerk ratcheting down of response time. The goal is not to shorten our decision-making loop, but to lengthen it, and, by doing so, improve it. Otherwise, all we are doing is generating two suboptimal decisions to his one.

Now, some will declare that the enemy's decision loop is being shortened by his increasingly rapid incorporation of information technology into his command-and-control architecture. But this Chicken Little approach misleads: yes, he will improve his decision-loop timelines constantly, and so should we. But the point is not to engage in
some never-ending speed race with our own worst-case fears, but rather to concentrate NCW on how best to exploit the delta between our loop time and his. Speed is not the essence here, only the means to an end. Forget that and you might as well be acting in anger.

6. Envy

NCW Covets the Business World's Self-Synchronization

There is no defense establishment more concerned with everyone singing off the same sheet of music than the U.S. military. Why? No military in the world seeks to decentralize crucial decision-making power as much. It is both our calling card and our greatest weapon—our operational flexibility. So if any military will adapt itself to NCW's ambitious goal of self-synchronization, it will be us, though we are not likely to reach the ideal state of affairs desired by network-centric warfare, which I believe seeks a dangerous slimming down of the observe-orient-decide-act (OODA) loop.

The implied goal of self-synchronization is that information technology will facilitate such a rapid movement of information as to obviate the time requirements of the "00" portion, allowing commanders to exploit speed of command. But in my mind, NCW's capacity to collapse timelines for the processing of operational data should lengthen the observe and orient portions of the loop, not encourage their virtual disappearance by outsourcing that cognitive function to silicon units. During the Cold War, a sort of "DADA loop" was forced on the U.S. military by certain bolt-from-the-blue warfighting scenarios involving the Soviet Union. But I am hard-pressed to envision post-Cold War scenarios where the U.S. military should be encouraged to deemphasize the rational thinking that must periodically interrupt whatever courses of action our commanders in the field are empowered to pursue.

NCW's envy for the business world's market-responsive notion of self-synchronization is understandable, for there are few things in this world as complex as a major military operation. But this envy is misplaced; we create governments to deal precisely with those thorny aspects of social life that we do not trust private firms to manage under the ultimate self-synchronizing motivation known as profit seeking. And among the thorniest aspects are those we reserve for the military, entrusted as it is with the assets that generate big violence.

In addition, the crisis scenarios the U.S. military faces grow ever more ambiguous as far as U.S. national interests are concerned. Other than a rerun of Desert Storm, I don't see any crises where the United States would be well served by its military focusing on self-synchronization. A MOOTW world should encourage greater externally focused networking. So even if the U.S. military could achieve self-synchronization, neither the likely scenarios nor the partners we engage in them are well suited to this slam-bang approach. In fact, in many MOOTW scenarios, it is the military that should use its mighty information technology power to generate the "00" portion of the decision loop for others who ultimately will take the lead in deciding and acting.
7. Gluttony

NCW's Common Operating Picture Could Lead to Information Overload

The term "common operating picture" is apt for network-centric's vision of all players at all levels working off the same mental model. There is little doubt that computer-mediated visual presentations will shape much of the commander's perception of operational realities. That, in and of itself, is not new.

What is new is the potential for inundating all participants with an ever-increasing flow of data masquerading as information because it has been slickly packaged within the common operating picture. The danger lies in the picture's collapsing all participants' perceptions of what is tactical versus operational versus strategic, and, by doing so, creating strong incentives for all to engage in information overload in an attempt to maintain their bearings in this overly ambitious big picture. In sum, I am concerned that the push for speed of command and self-synchronization will drive all participants to an over-reliance on the common operating picture as a shared reality that is neither shared nor real.

The common operating picture cannot really be shared in the sense that ownership will remain a top-down affair. What is scary about NCW's ambition is the strain it may put on commanders at various levels to integrate the commander's intent from all other commanders and not just up the chain of command. NCW promises to flatten hierarchies, but the grave nature of military operations may push too many commanders into becoming control freaks, fed by an almost unlimited data flow. In the end, the quest for sharing may prove more disintegrating than integrating.

The infusion of information technology into hierarchical organizations typically reduces the traditional asymmetries of information that define superior-subordinate relationships. Taken in this light, the common operating picture is an attempt by military leaders to retain the high ground of command prerogative—a sort of nonstop internal spin control by commanders on what is necessarily a constantly breaking story among all participants, given their access to information that previously remained under the near-exclusive purview of superior officers.

That gets me to the question of the common operating picture's "realness," for it suggests that the picture will be less a raw representation of operational reality than a command-manipulated virtual reality. At worst, I envisage command staff engaging in a heavy-handed enforcement of commander's intent, all in the name of shaping and protecting the common operating picture.

The temptation of information gluttony always will be with NCW. Salvation lies in the concept of information sufficiency by level of command.
I seek not to praise network-centric warfare, nor to bury it. To the extent that NCW marries the military to a networking paradigm, it moves America's defense establishment toward a future I view as inevitable. However, focusing NCW on the application of large-scale violence, or past wars, is a mistake—especially for naval forces. On a global scale, both organized violence and defense spending have migrated below the level of nation-states. For our military to remain relevant, it must reach out to that subnational environment. Networking is the answer, but it needs to be focused outwardly. This was the natural role of naval forces in U.S. history. It can be again, but only if the Navy frees itself from its Pacific War past and pointless competition with the Air Force in power projection.

1 QWERTY refers to the first six letters on the upper left of the typewriter keyboard. This layout was adopted late in the 19th century to minimize jamming of mechanical striking arms. It quickly became the universal standard and remains so to this day, despite being less efficient than other designs.

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The relevance of DoD has declined steadily since the end of the Cold War. Coming to grips with its passing won't be easy, but the Navy is working through the five stages of grief and toward a future in cyberspace.

First the unpleasant truth: the Department of Defense's *raison d'être* died with the Cold War. No one likes to talk about it, but that's what happened. Created in the National Security Act of 1947, the DoD is wholly a creature of what eventually became the United States' hair-trigger during the nuclear standoff with the Soviet Union. Prior to that, we basically stuck to the Constitution's mandate to "provide and maintain a Navy" on a constant basis and to "raise and support Armies" as the situation demanded.

The Cold War's odd combination of nonwar (we never fought the Soviets) and nonpeace (we constantly mixed it up in proxy conflicts and arms races) forced the merging of our republic's two historically distinct security roles:

- Maintain and protect our economic networks with the outside world
- Defend against direct threats to our national territory.

The two functions became one in the Cold War strategy known as containment, when we decided to extend our sense of territorial integrity to the entire Free World, thus subordinating economic rationales to security imperatives.¹

But that strategy died with the start of the globalization era. Now, security rationales are subordinate to economic imperatives. So why haven't we seen, as Joseph Nye might say, the "return of history" in the U.S. national security establishment?² Why haven't we repealed the 1947 National Security Act and thrown away this outmoded unification of two defense concepts that constantly compete against one another—to the detriment of both?

I'm not saying jointness is a bad idea. I'm saying it's the *worst possible idea*, precisely because it papers over the huge functional cleavages that logically separate the Army and Navy, leaving the Air Force to its own sad form of service schizophrenia.³

But I'm getting ahead of myself. If we are going to come to grips with this death in the family, we will need to go through all the phases Elisabeth Kubler-Ross laid out in her seminal book, *On Death and Dying*:
• Denial and isolation
• Anger
• Bargaining
• Depression
• Acceptance (followed by Hope). 4

The good news is that we've spent most of the 1990s flailing away at the first three; we're beginning to see symptoms of the fourth (depression, otherwise known as the shipbuilding and conversion account); and acceptance (e.g., the Secretary of the Navy's search for a "transformation strategy") seems just around the corner. And hope? That's the Evernet part—a back-to-the-future outcome that represents the Navy's salvation and return to its historical roots.

But before we jump ahead, let's review the purgatory that was the 1990s.

**Denial & Isolation**

For this part, I'll use Kenneth Waltz's "three images" framework from his influential 1954 study, *Man, the State and War*, in which he investigated the causes behind interstate war across three distinct levels (see Figure 1): 5

• Individual
• State
• International system. 6

In the Cold War, things were fairly straightforward, as both the international system (through blocs) and individuals (through ideologies) were kept in strict subordination to the state-centered superpower conflict. So when the Pentagon looked abroad, all it saw was "us" and "them" states, with that pesky nonaligned gang in between. The focus on states remains to this day. I call it the "Willie Sutton effect," after the famous bandit who, when asked why he robbed banks, replied, "Because that's where the money is." Nation-states have long served as the preeminent collection point (i.e., taxes) for collective security efforts (militaries), but that has begun to change.

The United States has not yet adjusted its state-centered defense policy to account for the two biggest security trends of the globalization era:

• Power and competition have shifted upward, from the state to the system (in the form of the global economy, culture, and communications grid).

• Violence and defense spending (e.g., small arms races, private security firms) have shifted downward, from the state to the individual.
Worldwide state defense spending and arms transfers are down dramatically from their 1987 Cold War peaks, leaving the DoD in denial about its growing disintermediation from the global security environment—in other words, its almost complete irrelevancy to the rising market of system perturbations (e.g., financial crises) and its perceived impotence in responding to the booming market of civil strife. Meanwhile, other international and private organizations increasingly step in to provide the same sort of ground-floor chaos containment that was DoD's bread and butter during the Cold War.

Nothing signals DoD's growing isolation more than its continued insistence on focusing so much planning on the so-called rogues, who, when stacked on top of each other, don't amount to a hill of beans in this strategic environment of rapid globalization. And yet, what is the hot security topic as the new millennium dawns? National missile defense, of course!

So where can a military fit in this new global environment, where almost all the important crises are either too global or too local for most states to tackle with military force? In a world featuring both integrating globalization and dis-integrating localization, the great challenge facing governments is fostering compromises between the two, otherwise known as glocalization—adapting the local to the global in ways that improve the former's living standards. Naturally, this can be fairly contentious, with many societies resisting what Thomas Friedman calls "revolution from beyond."
In short, glocalization is the containment of the globalization era—sort of a dot.communism, love it or leave it. If you have a hard time thinking of how DoD fits into a U.S. foreign policy focused on promoting this nebulous concept, then you're beginning to move into . . .

**Anger**

The best example of post-Cold War anger comes from the Department of the Navy, which became so mad after its "poor showing" in the Persian Gulf War that it immediately struck out in search of a post-Cold War vision. With the Soviet blue-water navy speeding toward the dustbin of history, it was Desert Storms for as far as the eye could see. Right?

Many of us "best and brightest" were thinking exactly that when we assembled in late 1991 for the Naval Force Capabilities Planning Effort, which eventually begat "... From the Sea." Faced with a system-level security environment in which the United States reigned supreme and a subnational one in which it seemed like all hell (i.e., ethnic bloodletting) was breaking loose, most of the assembled officers expressed disgust for the dilemma the Department of the Navy faced—namely, with sea control a given, it was either "influence events ashore" or wait for a peer competitor.

Not surprisingly, we chose the former and quickly replaced the Soviets with the best enemy we could get our hands on at the time—the Air Force. Given that Washington's way of using the Air Force for crisis response (bomb first, talk later) correlates best to the mini-Hitler type exemplified by Saddam Hussein and Slobodan Milosevic, the bureaucratic stage was set for a decade-long Navy-Air Force face-off on who could deliver the most crushing blow the fastest—or at least a sexy PowerPoint briefing "proving" the same.

The problem with our choice? Over the course of the 1990s, it became clear that "bolt from the blue" regional crises were hardly the norm. The large majority of DoD's crisis-response activity involved Somalia, Haiti, and the Balkans (not to mention the Saddam sequels), and not only weren't they bolts from the blue, not a single one involved an enemy of stature. Our one encounter with a "near peer" (China over Taiwan) was mere shadow boxing—a virtual conflict befitting a virtual age.

So, after redirecting itself to battling serious hegemons, the Navy spent the entire decade doing almost anything but. Meanwhile, the Marines chased their particular vision of the "three block war," and both Army and Air Force reconfigured to accommodate their increasingly robust military operations other than war (MOOTW) market shares.³

In short, the 1990s have left the Navy in a post-DoDth limbo: it buys one navy (high-tech, which drives down numbers) while operating another (global presence force, which needs big numbers).³ By trying to cover both bets while competing with the Air Force on
rapid response, the Navy has channeled its post-Cold War anger into a negotiating stance on force structure it cannot sustain, which gets us to . . .

**Bargaining**

The contours of the Navy's bargaining are best captured by Hank Gaffney's notion of the "Three-Way Stretch," which basically states that the U.S. military, and the Navy in particular, is killing itself trying to cover all three slices of DoD's now highly fragmented market. Unable to move beyond DoD's functional demise, the Navy ends up replicating its death spiral, and to me, that's throwing the baby out with the bathwater.

Using Waltz's three levels as touchstones, I paraphrase Gaffney as follows:

- **On the system level,** the Navy works hard to maintain its high-tech edge against would-be peer competitors capable of generating global instabilities. This is the future force of "silver bullets" and networked technologies, featuring deep strike and emphasizing speed. It is your basic research-and-development Navy, and it's very expensive.

- **On the state level,** the Navy struggles to maintain its bread-and-butter warfighting edge against would-be rogues capable of triggering regional instabilities. This is the surge force full of sealift and blue-green power projection, featuring anti-access stratagems and emphasizing inevitability. It's your Navy held to the two-major-theater-war standard, and it takes a lot of care and feeding.

- **On the individual level,** the Navy labors mightily to maintain its operational edge against a world of so-called transnational actors capable of instigating all manner of civil strife and nefarious activities. This is the presence force of many platforms and MOOTW skills, featuring military-to-military ties and emphasizing operations tempo. It's your see-the-world Navy, and it wears out faster than you think.

If all that sound like too much, it is. The Navy's stretch not only leaves the institution increasingly exhausted but also drives its never-ending search for a grand unifying theory that will somehow result in a high-tech navy of robust projection capabilities and manned by a smaller, smarter workforce that is easier to retain. Network-centric warfare is the theory *du jour*, but it will never go the distance so long as it aspires to be all things to all threats.

Just tracking the title inflation of the Department of Navy's white paper gives you all the macrostrategic data you need to make the case on overreach:

- **First it was just** "... From the Sea," which seemed simple enough. We'd be a power-projection navy that influenced events ashore.

- **Then it ballooned into"Forward ... From the Sea," lest anyone think we weren't still the be-everywhere-all-the-time navy.
• Now we pump up the volume still more to "Power and Influence . . . From the Sea," just to make it clear that we'll remain hypertech, too.

But as any psychologist will tell you, the Superman Syndrome leads to overload, then to breakdown, and finally to . . .

**Depression**

It is depressing to be a sailor today—and DoD has the polling data to prove it. Maritime service is simply too draining, too demanding, and not enough fun. Worst yet, we are not attracting—much less keeping—the best and the brightest needed to bring network-centric warfare to reality.

A key reason it is becoming so hard to attract new talent to the Navy is that young people increasingly perceive it as a career cul-de-sac. They want to be part of something that's growing toward a brighter future, and they just don't see one in the works for the Navy. And they're right.

Eventually, the Navy will succumb to the strain of the three-way stretch, and when it does, it will be forced into the same box it climbed into in " . . . From the Sea"—a state-focused crisis-response strategy. What's wrong with that? Plenty.

Harkening back to Waltz's three levels, power and competition migrate upward from the state to the system, and violence and defense spending migrate down to the level of the individual. This pushes the nation-state more into the role of a relationship and information broker and away from the industrial era's resource and power brokering, signaling the advent of what Richard Rosecrance calls the "virtual state." Or, as Thomas Friedman says, globalization isn't about bigger or smaller government but about better government.

But no matter how you describe it, future conflicts won't be concentrated at the level of nation states but rather at the supranational and subnational levels, where globalization and localization collide. Sure, some Lenin-after-next may figure out how to turn all that individual anger at the system into political revolution, and yes, the information age is likely to spawn the Next Ideology, just as the Industrial Age did—but these new political movements won't concentrate their strategies at the nation-state level but rather will aim above (international organizations seeking new rule sets for the global economy) or below (microstate collections of individuals looking to drop out and go it alone).

So what happens to the Navy and its sister services? You'll see a clear division of labor emerge, with each given its own corner of DoD's highly fragmenting market:

• The Air Force becomes the future high-tech force that rules air, space, and cyberspace and plays "system administrator" to the global security environment.
• The Navy and Marine Corps become the classic surge crisis-response force that separates belligerents in state-on-state war and punishes would-be hegemons who break the rules.

• The Army becomes the boots-on-the-ground, day-to-day, low-tech presence force that works in those offline regions where backward types still fight over little bits of land.

Sound okay?

Not by my way of thinking, for I see the Air Force's market as booming, the one on which the U.S. government focuses a lot of attention trying to keep virtual systemic crises—usually triggered by financial tumults—from blossoming into real conflicts among states. In comparison, although the Army's market probably won't grow, it is historically stable. Globally there have been a good three to four dozen conflicts every year since World War II that generate 1,000 or more casualties. And while these conflicts are real, U.S. interests tend to be virtual, affording us the flexibility to choose the ones we want to deal with (e.g., Bosnia and Kosovo) and to turn a blind eye to those we don't (e.g., Rwanda and the Congo).

Meanwhile, the Navy and Marines' market will slowly dry up. The early 20th century's high volume of state-on-state warfare will not carry over into the 21st. Nuclear weapons ended great power-versus-great power warfare back in 1945, and as John Keegan predicts, the future belongs far more to civil strife than traditional war.

But there is hope, especially once you move toward . . .

Acceptance

Security in the future will a lot broader than anything a one-stop DoD can provide. The signs are all around us:

• The biggest system instability of the 1990s—the global financial crisis of 1997-98—showed who is really in charge of deterring international chaos: the Department of the Treasury, the Federal Reserve, and the International Monetary Fund.

• The Y2K Problem, described as the biggest global management challenge since World War II, saw DoD play a minor supporting role to corporate turnaround specialist John Koskinen's star turn, signaling a new era in government-industry cooperation on computer security.

• The G-7 expands to G-8 and now to G-20, leaving the United Nations, NATO, and the rest of the politico-military alliance system in its wake while demonstrating the supremacy of economics in creating summit opportunities today (transforming arms control into the "Waldo" of the international scene).
In general, more and more of DoD's assumed "lesser includeds" (terrorism, computer hacking, electronic warfare) are being reclassified by an increasingly net-aware Washington as global law enforcement areas, with the relevant federal agencies aggressively building networks of international cooperation, buttressed by a worldwide explosion in private security firms. Increasingly, when one scans the international security environment's to-do list, DoD looks like a cyber-age dinosaur.

I see merit in the efforts of the Secretary of the Navy and others to plot out a "transformation strategy," but transform to what? Too much of what I see coming out of the Pentagon today seems hopelessly focused on future high-tech shootouts among trade-bloc-toting hyperpowers. I'll hold open the possibility that Globalization II (1946 and counting) could disintegrate in ways similar to Globalization I (1870-1929), but we need a game plan that covers both the mother-of-all-global-financial-meltdowns scenario and the far greater likelihood that it is the international security environment itself that is being revolutionized and not merely DoD's increasingly irrelevant tool kit.

Better yet, we need two separate game plans. Accept that notion—and with it the functional demise of DoD—and the Department of the Navy finally moves out from the Cold War's shadow and into the light of the globalization era. We are going to have to make the break sometime, so why not talk about it openly and plan ahead?

The Coming Evernet

The planet is undergoing a broad economic transformation that is loosely described as the rise of the New Economy. This jarring makeover of virtually every business model we hold dear is exemplified by the astonishingly global spread of the Internet and e-commerce. But that is just the tip of the iceberg in DoD's path, for whenever economics changes, politics must follow.

The defining achievement of the New Economy in the globalization era will be the Evernet, a downstream expression of today's Internet, which most of us still access almost exclusively through bulky desktop personal computers anywhere from a few minutes to several hours each day. Over the next ten or so years, this notion of being "online" versus "offline" will completely disappear, because of:

- The computing industry moving to molecular-based computer circuitry
- The breaking up of the desktop computer's functions into a myriad of tiny gadgetry that humans will wear or have embedded throughout their living spaces and work environments—and ultimately even their bodies via nanotechnology
- The maturation of ultra wideband wireless technologies that link all of these sensors, gadgets, satellites, computers, and grids
- The continued development and extension of the earth-based portion of the Global Information Infrastructure (GII), especially the so-called last mile
• The coming revolution in near-space (earth-to-moon) information infrastructure—quadrupling of satellites by 2010, then vast waves of nano/picosatellites—that provide real-time wireless coverage across the entire planet

• The migration of vast portions of human commerce, social, educational, religious and political activity to the Internet and World Wide Web, which come to encompass all current personal and mass communication media.¹⁹

In other words, we go from today's limited-access Internet to an Evernet with which we will remain in a state of constant connectivity. We will progress from a day-to-day reality in which we must choose to go online to one in which we must choose to go offline. This is not some distant fantasy world. Almost all the technology we need for the Evernet exists today. It mostly is just a matter of achieving connectivity.

The rise of the Evernet will be humanity's greatest achievement to date and will be universally recognized as our most valued planetary asset or collective good. Downtime, or loss of connectivity, becomes the standard, time-sensitive definition of a national security crisis, and protection of the Evernet becomes the preeminent security task of governments around the world. Ruling elites will rise and fall based on their security policies toward, and the political record on, the care and feeding of the Evernet, whose health will be treated by mass media as having the same broad human interest and import as the weather (inevitably eclipsing even that).

Eventually, the Evernet and the Pentagon will collide, with the most likely trigger being some electronic Pearl Harbor, where DoD is unmasked as almost completely irrelevant to the international security environment at hand.²⁰

The result? DoD will be broken into two separate organizations:

• The Department of Global Deterrence (DGD), to focus on preventing and, if necessary, fighting large-scale conventional and/or weapons-of-mass-destruction-enhanced warfare among nation-states

• The Department of Network Security (DNS), to focus on maintaining the United States' vast electronic and commercial connectivity with the outside world, including protection and large-scale emergency reconstitution of the Evernet, and to perform all the standard crisis-response activity short of war (with a ballooning portfolio in medical).

In effect, we will split DoD into a warfighting force (DGD) and a global emergency-response force (DNS), with the latter aspiring to as much global collaboration as possible (ultimately disintermediating the United Nations) and the former to virtually none. To put it another way, DGD is deterrence; DNS is assurance.

Who gets the "kids" in this divorce?

DGD includes:

• U.S. Army (ground & armored)
- U.S. Air Force (combat)
- U.S. Navy (strategic)

DNS includes:
- U.S. Army (airborne)
- U.S. Air Force (mobility and space)
- U.S. Marine Corps
- U.S. Navy (rest)
- Air/Army National Guards.

DNS also picks up the U.S. Coast Guard, U.S. Agency for International Development, U.S. Information Agency, U.S. Customs, and a host of other specialized units from other federal agencies (e.g., Justice, Treasury).

DNS will discard the traditional notion of military service separate from civilian life. For most personnel, it will adopt a consultancy model, whereby the agency rents career time versus buying entire lifetimes (essentially the National Guard model). DNS's officer corps will remain career managers, but with frequent real-world tours of duty in technology, industrial, and business fields. This organization will be networked in the extreme, because networks will be what it is all about. This means no separate legal system and the end to posse comitatus restrictions.

**New Rules for a New Navy**

This vision of the future probably will strike many as far too revolutionary, and much of what I describe is admittedly beyond the current bureaucratic purview of a Secretary of Defense, Chief of Naval Operations, or Commandant of the Marine Corps. Nonetheless, there are steps the Department of the Navy can take to position itself for what lies ahead:

1. Focus on conflict paradigms favoring the many and the cheap over the few and the costly.
2. Focus network-centric warfare on crisis prevention and termination, leaving high-end conflict to others.
3. Reach out to and build cooperation with all federal agencies that provide system- and individual-level security services; use military-to-military programs to do the same abroad.
4. Accept that external information-technology networking is more important than internal networking (no LAN is an island).
5. Get involved in global information infrastructure security efforts in every way possible.
6. Get involved in space control in every way possible.

7. Go as lean as possible on sea control, freeing resources for space and cyberspace.

8. Rethink aircraft carriers and attack subs into cyber-age motherships, but everything else is up for grabs.23

9. Recast naval information warfare to focus more on generating and reconstituting networks than on taking them down.

10. Don't indulge the naval strategic community, for they must eventually leave the nest.

Hope for the Afterlife

When Encarta first appeared on the scene a few years ago, Encyclopedia Britannica blithely brushed off the notion that this upstart could ever threaten its position as the preeminent marketer of English-language reference compilations. After all, Encyclopedia Britannica was the industry standard—the best seller of hard-copy reference material marketed directly to households.

At first, Encyclopedia Britannica simply could not imagine being disintermediated from its customer base, because it simply could not reimagine themselves as anything but the seller of hard copies. Today, Encyclopedia Britannica is on the web, practically giving away the same information for which it previously charged so much. Apparently, they finally reimagined themselves into some new and different—perhaps just in time.

So ask yourself, Department of the Navy, what is it that you really do? Are you just ships and sea control? Can you remember life before DoD? Can you imagine a sweet hereafter? And what you would do once you got there?

The Navy's new holy trinity is sea, space, cyberspace. I suggest we all start worshipping today.

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Force Structure Will Change

by

Thomas P.M. Barnett and Henry H. Gaffney, Jr.

Each service stands to win—or lose—depending on what national security visions the new administration embraces. System visions favor air forces; nation-state visions favor naval forces; subnational visions favor ground forces.

In January 1993, we wrote an article in Proceedings about the election-year debate on foreign policy and its implications for U.S. Navy force structure planning.1 The piece later was cited as one of the journal’s best during its 125th anniversary celebration. Emboldened by such recognition, we decided to update our analysis to see what the Clinton years have accomplished in shaping the major arguments about what sort of crises and enemies we should focus on—and plan U.S. force structure around.

This endeavor might strike some as quixotic (Clinton had no foreign policy and the world is thus a mess!), but we think the debate has faded into an inertia favoring the status quo of incremental modernization, albeit more by trial and error than by grand strategy. In addition, we think this election’s non-debate on foreign policy demonstrates just how comfortable the public has become with a consensus that the United States is neither the global policeman nor a 911 force—that the U.S. military rather should be a selective enforcer of “mini-containment strategies” against regional troublemakers.

What does that mean for force structure planning?

- Despite calls for full-speed ahead on a revolution in military affairs (RMA), the “creeping incrementalism” approach to modernization is not going away soon.

- The defense budget definitely has a floor, and a yet-to-be-determined ceiling not far above it, and this means stable service shares, which also means each service “transforms” within its own resources.

- The Navy and Marine Corps keep the general course established back in 1992 in “...From the Sea”—a warfighting-focused, forward-deployed swarming force that sacrifices some numbers and technology to maintain its day-to-day readiness for quick crisis response.
Incrementalism In the Defense of Force Structure Is No Vice

Wistful Cold War memories have left many U.S. military experts and strategists yearning to continue technological revolutions. They are alarmed by what has happened in the world in the 1990s, sensing great international disorder combined with confusion in U.S. foreign policy. The real history is far more benign:

- Bush and his wise men ably wage the Persian Gulf War, leading many to hail a new form of high-tech war. The administration’s real accomplishments, however, are forming the coalition that fought the war and masterfully riding along with the Soviet Bloc’s dissolution. The New World Order really is about the North’s advanced countries cooperating in new ways, with the losers of the world relabeled as “rogues.” Bush and Cheney start the proportional, incremental shrinkage of the Cold War force, and Desert Storm buttresses the Powell Doctrine’s “overwhelming force” concept. Then Somalia beckons . . . .

- Clinton I interprets Bush’s New World Order too expansively, and plunges into humanitarian interventions where our national interests seem nil. Instead of focusing on defense relations with allies, his administration plays ambulance to the Third World, turning the doctrinal spotlight on military operations other than war. Aspin tries to set a floor on force structure in the Bottom-Up Review, but the maintenance costs associated with Cold War readiness standards create a squeeze, especially on procurement.

- Clinton II backs off from the Southern Strategy. So it is a reluctant “yes” to the Balkans but a quiet “no” to Africa. The Defense Department refocuses on the fault lines between North and South, and, by playing firewall, settles down to a series of mini-containments that necklace the planet—Cold Warrior reborn as Rogue Warrior. Aspin’s force levels nearly are reaffirmed in the Quadrennial Defense Review, and the rising costs of sustaining that military squeeze both modernization and force structure.

Across all three periods, each service seeks to adapt itself to the changing security market, though largely through repackaging its product in new “expeditionary” wrappers. But through it all, each buys—in ever-smaller numbers—those platforms and systems deemed essential to a “full-service” force, meaning one simultaneously:

- Warfighting oriented (ready for two major theater wars)

- Globally engaged and military-operations-other-than-war capable

- High-tech.

As the decade ends, the Pentagon budget features:

- A fairly static top line, as the deficit is cured and surpluses arrive
• Rock-solid service shares

• Continued force structure shrinkage as platform prices and support costs rise.

In short, despite the hullabaloo about “the” RMA, the supposed brilliance of those “asymmetrical warriors,” and something called network-centric operations, incrementalism still rules force planning. In addition, if you ask the services what their number one priority is, it’s always personnel and their care. What might be the alternatives? We see three competing national security visions, each with a geostrategic focus that favors one service marginally over time.

I. It’s the Great Powers, Stupid!

Those who view the world more as a complex system of security relationships focus on:

• How the advanced countries get along

• Number of “poles” in play (uni-, bi-, or multipolar)

• Whether Russia and China really can be brought into this playpen.

Geostrategists worry about the big pieces and let everything else fall in line. Sure, the G-7 runs the economic side of the house, but presidents must lead in these all-important dyad relationships, and they think Clinton played “trade president” to distraction. This is the cry of George W. Bush’s “Vulcans,” where everything old is to be renewed again—except arms control. Pointing to proliferation of missile technology that clearly bears the imprint of our old Communist foes, they call for national missile defense, promising (wink, nudge) to protect allies as well.

This camp sees the main foreign policy task of the next decade being the processing of Russia and China into the great power fold on our terms—meaning they learn to play by our rules. Once the North is in order, the South should fall in line, especially since the rogues would not have anyone of consequence to supply them in their nefarious activities. However, there is a danger in getting too explicit with Moscow and Beijing about “acceptable behavior.” While ostensibly trying to consolidate the community of advanced countries, we may end up casting Russia and China into the gap as globalization’s bad boys.

II. Mind the Gap!

Those who view the world more as an economic system focus on:

• Troublemakers (rogues) who challenge the status quo

• Regional balances of power that might disrupt economic flows
• Other regional disruptions that affect the global economy (e.g., a failing Indonesia)

These risk analysts treat every region with sensitivity for its unique vulnerabilities but calculate U.S. interests primarily along financial lines. Some countries count in the globally networked economy and others do not. Instability involving the former must be contained, but that involving the latter can be routinely ignored or treated with palliative measures.

This is the réaleconomik of the second Clinton administration after Somalia. A successor Gore administration probably would take the same approach. In this vision, rogues are something for the military to take care of while the rest of the government attends to domestic and international economic affairs. Countries that disregard markets, such as Iraq and Serbia, will always represent either potential economic disruptions or something to be contained. So when it comes to missile schemes, there is more support for theater defense than national defense.

This camp sees the main foreign policy task of the next decade being the effective management of the economic and technological gaps dividing North and South. You keep the North’s economic expansion on track by making sure nothing—and no one—in the South messes it up. When situations down there get really ugly, you do what you have to, but you avoid serious involvement unless key economic fault lines are involved. This group also will agonize more about human tragedies in failing states, but they will use U.S. military forces only as catalysts to mobilize other nations’ forces.

**III. Leave No Failed State Behind!**

Those who view the world as a collection of “tribes” focus on:

• Rising anti-Westernism and the specter of “clashing civilizations,” with key disruptive agents being terrorists and drug traffickers

• Commodity-dependent economies withering away in globalization’s harshly competitive environment

• Societies under siege from destructive transnational forces (e.g., narcotics, AIDS, pollution, climate change).

These social activists believe that the United States needs to care far more about the world’s “backward” economies, where most of the planet’s births and violent deaths will occur. Forget your pork barrel Star Wars, and shift funds to something more useful!

It is the cry of Seattle Man, and it finds occasional, if sometimes ironic resonance in the campaigns of Pat Buchanan and Ralph Nader. Antiglobalization types feel pain erupting all over the world from predatory free-trade practices that expose Old Economy sheep to New Economy wolves. They have seen the enemy and “they is us!”—the International Monetary Fund, World Bank, and World Trade Organization. This unlikely coalition
sees the adaptation of the global to the local—not vice versa—as the next's decade's main foreign policy task. The South needs help now, and if it does not get it, it will bring its pain to us—one way or another. Slowing down globalization’s march also will give much-needed breathing space to the New Economy’s “losers” in the North (e.g., low-tech labor).

**Three Visions, Three Militaries**

So to sum up the three competing political visions, either the United States concentrates on:

- The North’s advanced-power relationships—system-level vision
- The troubled “arc of instability” between North and South—the unruly nation-state level vision
- The South’s chronic pain—subnational-level vision.

Admittedly, these are ideal representations that, while reflecting the general thrusts of various elite groups in the United States, offer few firm predictions as to how any one administration would behave once in office. Anyway, reality usually occupies the mushy middle, where ideal types are rarely to be found. The base case always is continued incrementalism. Still, it is useful to track how such visions would logically skew force structures to favor one service over another, for it is through such what-iffing that we learn to be careful—lest we get what we wish for.

**System visions favor air forces.** The system vision employs the longest, over-the-horizon perspective. It is concerned with maintaining the United States’ high-tech lead, and that emphasis naturally favors the Air Force as the Future Force. This approach merges air, space, and cyberspace into a seamless whole, with the operational paradigm being that of system administrator—less warfighting Leviathan and more air traffic controller. Interventions increasingly are virtualized: we enable or manipulate the combat expectations of others (both allies and foes), but go out of our way to avoid real in-theater presence. This is the Kosovo air campaign taken to its logical extreme, with force structure planning emphasizing effects-based weapons, stand-off delivery, and networking capabilities.

In this vision, the United States seeks a future of niched advanced-country militaries that play “spokes” to our “hub” (i.e., we worry about major security disruptions and they take the lead on local ones). The information umbrella replaces the nuclear one, and a Northern Hemispheric Security Zone finally realizes the Vancouver-to-Vladivostok dream of the Baker-Shevardnadze era. Once joined in interlocking fashion, the North’s countries (United States, other NATO, Japan, Russia, and eventually China and maybe even India) effectively criminalize warfare in the South, policing all such outbreaks as
simply “illegal” in the globalized economy. This is the mergers and acquisition approach to international security—we effectively buy out our competition over time.

**Nation-state visions favor naval forces.** The nation-state vision addresses the actual and potential messes created by an Iraq or other unruly state at the North-South boundary, along which much of the advanced world’s lines of communication lie. It is concerned with maintaining the United States’ capacity to project power rapidly around the world, possibly in a unilateral fashion. That emphasis naturally favors the Navy and Marine Corps as the Response Force. This approach blends responses to rogue states and their putative antiaccess/asymmetrical strategies into a littoral strategy, with the operational paradigm being that of the SWAT team. Coalitions serve as window-dressing during conflicts, but later as an important source of stay-behind, on-the-ground, peace enforcers. Interventions are increasingly routinized and drawn out into lengthy, sequential containment operations.

This is the Iraqi containment process taken to its logical extreme, with force structure planning emphasizing platform survivability, the capacity for loitering and constant surveillance, and the day-to-day application of discrete force at will—thus to contain any and all challengers to the North’s growing Zone of Peace. Meanwhile, the South’s Zone of Conflict is largely tolerated because it lies outside the pale of globalization’s New Economy. In the lexicon of Thomas Friedman, the United States concentrates on making sure the “Lexus” world keeps functioning smoothly, applying military power in those few areas of the “Olive Tree” world where local instability might cross the gap. This is the outsourcing approach to international security—we do what we do best (high-end, rapid power projection) and then subcontract follow-on operations to local firms.

**Subnational visions favor ground forces.** The subnational vision has the shortest and most real-time perspective of never-ending messes that lie outside the community of advanced countries. It is concerned almost exclusively with keeping the violence “over there,” while adopting the emergency room credo of “treat ’em and street ’em.” There is no sense of eventual rehabilitation, just a desire to stay on top of the flow by keeping sufficient numbers of boots on the ground, an emphasis that naturally favors the Army and National Guard as the Constabulary Forces. This approach merges military operations other than war, cooperation with nongovernmental organizations and private voluntary organizations, and U.N.-sponsored peacekeeping coalitions into one big sloppy whole. All interventions are quagmires on some level, because we always are treating chronic cases. This is the Haiti humanitarian operation taken to its logical extreme, with force improvements emphasizing logistics, infrastructure restoration capacity, and nonlethal technologies.

In this vision, the United States seeks to prevent a future known as The Coming Chaos, where the South’s bad neighborhoods simply swell beyond capacity and eventually pour into the North’s great gated community. Some inevitabilities along this path are:

- The development of regional police forces leading to an eventual global one, probably sponsored by the advanced nations cooperating in the United Nations
• The increasing use of mercenaries or contract military personnel in peacekeeping operations

• The evolution of U.S. ground forces toward greater reliance on reserves.

This is the privatization or divestiture approach to international security: we effectively spin off the military-operations-other-than-war portfolio from the Defense Department, with the Army’s constabulary forces as catalysts for multinational interventions that limit our involvement.

**What Really Matters to Key Constituents**

How does the United States choose among these alternatives, if it decides to choose at all? We have talked mostly about the services, because they have to build and manage the forces, but there are many other players: the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), unified commanders, the defense industry, Congress, and the American public. Practically none of these voices, however, is really engaged in the outside (i.e., economic) world or thinks in grand strategic terms. They are fundamentally domestic or inwardly looking constituents.

Across the Clinton years, OSD has been scared away from having a focused strategic outlook. Thus, it has let all strategies bloom in a crowded seedbed, with none emerging to full stature. In addition, OSD suffers from an internal clash between the acquisition types, who—in cahoots with defense industry—want all the great new technologies, and the bean counters, who struggle with the services in balancing programs under the flattened top line. In all, OSD is torn among all three visions.

The unified commanders have been searching for a post-Cold War role. Recently they have begun presenting engagement in a diplomatic vein to justify maintenance of last year’s forces. The problem is, they don’t know whether to engage more with new states or with old friends. Distant from Washington, they cling to the past—stridently asking to keep the forces they used to have. They are torn between the national and subnational visions, not quite knowing which gives them a better play in the game.

For defense industries, survival is most important. Yet they fight for a limited pot. They still are the source of innovation in technology, so they naturally favor the system vision.

The Hill thinks about people, bases, and the defense industry—all domestic concerns. As deliberative bodies of elected representatives, they do not have “strategic vision.” They repeatedly make clear that “perfect readiness is never having to use the forces overseas.” They are constrained between the administration’s budget submission and their own budget committees. If they had a choice, they would buy the system vision, for it means high technology and no messy international involvements. The marginal upward changes they make to budgets are mostly in this direction, when they are not otherwise concerned with military pay and benefits.
The public is relatively indifferent to these debates. They are torn between pride in technology and humanitarian concerns about the South. This leaves them relatively indifferent to the state-level, mind-the-gap, vision.

**What This Suggests for Naval Force Structure Planning**

The defense community concerned with these debates is a very narrow group, not well connected to the public—and they are split in all three directions. There is a great opportunity for leadership to clarify direction, but at the same time, there is no clear pressure from the external environment as to what the choice might be. We know there are constraints that, until broken, mean all strategies cannot be serviced. These constraints include:

- The top-line defense budget—the prospective (and dubious) federal surpluses all have been allocated by the candidates, with very little additional for defense

- The legacy forces and the personnel that operate them—one of the United States’ great strengths, but a force that constrains innovation and change

- Presence commitments abroad—for the time being, the United States will station nearly 100,000 military personnel in both Europe and East Asia, with maybe 25,000 containing Iraq

- Service shares—in the absence of clear strategic choice, they remain the same.

As noted, the domestic drivers currently are stronger than the international ones. Oddly enough, the domestic constituents do not line up strongly on the vision favoring naval forces, even though they enjoy a slight advantage in budget shares.

Naval forces, then, will end up hedging against several strategies—within the cited constraints. They cannot afford the forces they have right now, much less to recapitalize them at the pace and to the extent they want. They may well have to give up a little on both input (less of the most advanced technology) and output (more shrinkage in force structure), but this still leaves them in a great position to support the mind-the-gap vision as the United States’ premier Response Force.

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Top Ten Post-Cold War Myths

by

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As a mobile, sea-based containment force, the U.S. Navy will continue to play an important role in the nation's foreign policy, but its missions will mirror the clustered responses in Iraq and Yugoslavia, not the obsolete two-major-theater-war standard.

As we begin a new presidential administration, it is time to look over the recent past to see what we have learned about this new era of globalization. Americans entered the Clinton administration with a lot of hope about an outside world where so many positives had emerged with the end of the Cold War. The United States was the sole military superpower; what could go wrong?

Depending on whom you listen to, either a lot or not too much. Those experts who focus on the global economy see plenty to celebrate, but most who track international security see lots of threatening chaos in the world. How can these views be so different? Are there no connections between global economics and security? How can the former flourish if the latter is deteriorating?

We’ll say it up front: we don’t think international security has worsened over the past eight years. Instead, we think too many political-military analysts—in an attempt to justify the retention of Cold War forces—have let their vision be clouded by a plethora of post-Cold War myths, the biggest of which is the two-major-theater-war (2-MTW) standard. It was the best strategy placeholder then-Secretary of Defense Les Aspin could come up with to put a floor on force structure, but 2-MTW doesn’t capture the reality of the globalization era, the migration of conflict to the failing states outside that globalization, and the continued technological advances U.S. forces are introducing, which no other country pursues. In short, it is not connected to the world at all.

In our decades-long hair-trigger standoff with the Soviets, U.S. strategists became addicted to “vertical” scenarios, meaning surprise situations that unfold with lightning speed in a specific strategic environment that is, by and large, static. By static, we mean all potential participants are expected to come as they are. No one is really changed by the scenario, and no evolution is possible in their response. In this poker game, we expected everyone to play the single hand in question straight up: no bluffing, no hedging, and no changes of heart. In essence, we had to assume the two main players were rational actors. The only thing that seemed to change in this static picture was the
race to add better technology. We always feared the Soviets had gotten there first, or were about to—a fear we subsequently transferred to the rogues.

This approach made sense in the Cold War, when we had to make certain gross assumptions about how both Soviet Bloc forces and our NATO allies would behave at the outbreak of World War III, but it just does not apply in the globalization era. If the last eight years have taught us anything, it is that political-military scenarios in the post-Cold War era will unfold “horizontally.” Situations will evolve over time with few clear-cut turning points, typically lapsing into a cyclical pattern that nonetheless features dramatic differences with each go-around. Think of our dealings with Saddam Hussein and Slobodan Milosevic and you’ll get the picture.

In horizontal scenarios, everything—and everyone—is free to evolve over time, meaning positions change, allies come and go, and definitions of the “real situation” abound. In this strategic environment, sizing and preparing one’s forces according to vertical scenarios isn’t just inappropriate; it is dangerous. It fosters a confidence in packaged solutions employing packaged forces armed with packaged assumptions—the 2-MTW standard in a nutshell—so that anything else you do with the forces reduces your readiness for those 2 MTWs.

Both the 2-MTW standard and the high-tech wannabes, with their nostalgia for “imminent” Soviet breakthroughs, suffer from slavish adherence to a collection of myths concerning the post-Cold War era. If we are ever going to move beyond their vertical scenarios to a better understanding of where the military fits in the globalization era, these myths must be punctured and discarded. Our top ten list of myths is:

10. There are far more conflicts and crises in the world after the Cold War!

The number inflation on this one is unreal: suddenly every terrorist shoot-out and ten-person liberation movement is a “low intensity conflict.” When we count the significant conflicts and crises of the 1990s and compare them to those of the 1980s, however, we don’t find the stunning increase some analysts do. In the 1980s, we see one system-threatening conflict (the Iran-Iraq War), and in the 1990s we see two (Desert Storm, the Congo War—the latter a stretch). In the 1980s, we count 6 significant state-based conflicts and 24 internal conflicts, compared to 7 and 28, respectively, in the 1990s. In sum, we’re looking at an overall increase of 6 cases, or fewer than one a year. Worth worrying about? Yes, since internal warfare these days involves failing states and generates lots of refugees. But a new world disorder? Hardly.

What political-military analysts should recognize in globalization is a remaking of the international economic order that rewards the most fit and devastates the least ready—in the same society. In advanced countries, the resulting conflict will be mostly political, but in some developing societies, these horizontal tensions will turn bloody in scattered instances. If you’re looking for a defining conflict, check out Indonesia’s disintegration following the Asian economic crisis.
9. The Soviet Bloc's collapse unleashed chaos!

The myth is that, with the stabilizing hand of the Soviets removed, conflicts have bloomed across the globe. This issue needs to be divided into its constituent parts: Soviet support to the Third World, Eastern Europe, and the former Soviet republics. In every instance the balance of the news is positive.

Looking at the old Third World, we view the collapse of Soviet assistance as an absolute good. Central America is certainly quieter for its absence, as is southern Africa as a whole, though Angola still burns. In the Middle East, Yemen is reunified, Qaddafi has stopped playing the Arab bad boy (for now), and the PLO lost Moscow's support. Granted, Soviet arms beneficiary Iraq reached a use-it-or-lose-it moment in 1990, and went for broke, but the same cannot be said for Syria. Afghanistan still stinks as a place to live, and Vietnam still goes its own way, but in sum, it's a pretty good deal for global order.

Some people insist on calling Eastern Europe a security vacuum, but the balance is very positive, with the obvious exception of the former Yugoslavia. But if Gorbachev had come to us 15 years ago and said he could arrange for the collapse of the Warsaw Pact, the peaceful reunification of Germany, and the absorption of several former satellite states into NATO, but the cost would be a bloody civil war in Yugoslavia... well, you get the idea. Moreover, Balkan experts will tell you that Yugoslavia's demise had nothing to do with the fall of the Soviets. It was a disaster waiting to happen once Tito passed away.

Finally, when looking at the former Soviet republics, we are sobered by events in Chechnya, the rest of the Caucasus, and Tajikistan, but still view the overall evolution as far more conflict free than anyone could have expected. Remember when we feared Russian invasions of the Baltic republics? Or Ukraine’s imminent *Anschluss* with Moscow? Or a wave of radical Islamic fundamentalism sweeping the “Stans?” (Okay, we are still watching that one.) Best yet, whatever violence has occurred here has been left to the Russians to figure out—unlike the Balkans.

8. We are swamped with failed states!

“Failed states” is another label that’s bandied about far too loosely. Reading some reports, you’d think they were spreading like wildfire across the planet. But there always have been failed states; we just never called them that. Instead, we used to call the Somozas and Siad Barrés “valued friend” and “trusted ally,” even as we helped to prop up their flimsy dictatorships. The Russians had a fancier phrase, “countries of socialist orientation,” but that was just Sovietese for flimsy communist dictatorships.

What defines a failed state in the globalization era is its failure to attract foreign investment. When none appears, or the leaderships steals it, the same feeble government that somehow muddled through the Cold War with superpower (or French) help now simply collapses. In the early 1990s, when the United States led what became U.N.-
sanctioned interventions into Somalia and Haiti, there was optimistic talk of a new model—namely, the United Nations serving as midwife to these tortured societies’ slippery transition to stable economies and government. But the ill-supported United Nations proved a poor substitute for a superpower propping up a government with arms and military training.

Of the 36 countries in which internal conflicts occurred across the 1990s, the United States decided—after much angst—to intervene in only four: Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo. So why did the decade seem so chock-full of U.S. interventions? Those four situations accounted for about half of all naval responses overseas and the bulk of the ship days involved in such operations. To put it bluntly, advanced countries can safely ignore failed states (except maybe Indonesia), until “those damned Seattle people,” with their silly “values,” embarrass them.

7. Transnational actors are taking over the world!

This bugaboo must also be disaggregated to make sense of it. Starting with terrorists, the hype ignores historical data. According to the State Department’s annual report on terrorism, the phenomenon peaked in the second half of the 1980s, when it averaged 630 international attacks a year. Then the Soviet Bloc’s support system disappeared and so did much of the terrorism. Since 1989 terrorists have averaged 382 attacks per year—a 40% drop.

Drug cartels and Mafia syndicates do not seek to disrupt global economic or political stability, but merely to generate profits. In effect, they desire macrostability within and among nation-states in order to create and exploit microinstabilities—i.e., illegal markets. These criminals are not interested in destabilizing or capturing political institutions, but in influencing them for their own ends. Granted, Colombia represents an odd turn, as the Marxist guerrillas there are now dependent on drug proceeds. But in general, the drug kingpins prefer to stay out of politics.

The same could be said for illegal aliens, who are looking for economic opportunity. Too rapid a migration can destabilize, but immigration is far from out of control in developed countries: seven out of eight immigrants now settled there arrived legally. As for refugees displaced by conflicts, they are by-products of local chaos, and their "transnational" effects largely are limited to the next country over.

Finally, you have to wonder about the tendency of some national security strategists to lump transnational corporations (TNCs) in with this motley crew. TNCs not only represent the future of the global economy, they also account for the bulk of our 401ks. Anyway, it is a myth that TNCs act with indifference to their birth nations: every one has a home base, and almost all members of their boards come from that home. But the big point to remember is that TNCs invest overwhelmingly in countries where there is firm rule of law.
6. Technology proliferation is out of control!

This myth is sold in two sizes: rogue states and asymmetrical warriors. The funny thing is, in both instances, everyone usually ends up talking about the same sorry list of old Soviet-client survivors.

With the rogues, the biggest concern is that they are either buying or selling nuclear and missile technology. We also worry about them developing chemical and biological weapons, but that is not really high-tech anymore (nor have they made any of it work). Then again, their missiles aren’t state of the art either, as everything passed around this gang tends to use old Soviet technology.

Now, many of the “new security” types will try to sell you on the notion that missile proliferation is rampant among unspecified “potential adversaries” (their fear mongering would dissolve if they had to say who), but they’re really stretching here. Over the past decade more countries have just said no than yes.

Again, it is the four rogues who are proliferating (Libya, Iraq, Iran, and North Korea), and none is really doing very well at it. This quartet lives off of three suppliers who are in it for the bucks—Russia, China, and North Korea. U.S. diplomats are all over the three suppliers to join the civilized world of functioning economies, leaving it to the Pentagon to keep the pressure on the rogues. That does not sound like an out-of-control problem to us.

The “asymmetrical warriors” or “potential adversaries” are implied to exist in vast numbers, although few, if any, have ever been spotted in the wild. Nonetheless, we are told that all they need nowadays is a credit card and Internet access and voila—almost any dangerous technology can be picked up on e-Bay! This is the “silver bullet” concept taken to extremes: these warriors are presumed to deftly deny our access to conflicts by negating our high-tech advantage with their Radio Shack stuff. Meanwhile, we spend on military research and development alone more than what the rogues spend on their entire militaries.

5. China is the new Soviet Union!

China is not the Soviet Union. It remains a communist-governed country and retains major elements of a command economy, it mostly decollectivized its agriculture two decades ago and now sports a massive private sector. This mixed economy makes it unlikely that China will undertake anything like the single-minded military-industrial effort the Soviets made. Moreover, its defense technology is primitive and there are no signs it is embarking on anything like the Soviets’ high-level, concentrated scientific efforts.

China never presumed to offer an alternative world system and has no satellites, although it wants Taiwan back. Other than that myopic focus, it is fair to say that its relations with other Asian states are still evolving. China doesn’t aspire to conquer its neighbors and doesn’t pretend to spread communism, but it still worries about Western nations.
encroaching from the sea, as they did in the 19th century.

We kid ourselves when we cast China as this century’s Soviet menace. China desperately needs our direct investment for its skyrocketing energy requirements and our market for its low-tech exports.

4. Speed is everything in crisis response!

This concept is ingrained in our psyche because of our Cold War fears and the experience of Desert Shield. We have become addicted to speed of response because we are a reactive nation and have a long way to travel to any conflict. But here is where the world’s sole military superpower may be underestimating its power.

First, as the world’s Leviathan, what we bring to the table is not so much speed as the inevitability of our punishing power. The speed demons will counter that we have to rush in precisely because our foe will deny us the access we need to bring all that power to bear. This is an argument that strings a lot of little fears together into one big phobia:

- The Air Force fears we will be denied access to bases by cowed allies—an improbable scenario if we’re coming to defend them.
- The Marines fear we will have no choice but to perform forcible-entry amphibious landings because we don’t have any allies at all—cowering or not (tell that to the South Koreans).
- The Navy fears it won’t be able to operate in the close-in littoral in a timely manner and without losses, and will thus lose out to . . . the U.S. Air Force.

Two underlying realities render this debate moot: First, we are living in an age of horizontal scenarios where nothing really comes out of the blue anymore. If we don’t see the crisis coming, it is because we choose not to pay attention. Second, other than the unlikely cases involving extensive direct attacks on the United States, we are stuck with only surprise attacks by Iraq and North Korea (even China issued the required Notices to Mariners before testing missiles over Taiwanese waters in 1996). Sure, there could be other surprises, but none so system threatening.

Simply put, outside of Iraq or North Korea, administrations no longer have the writ to commit this country to large-scale violence without some sort of debate. The Cold War featured stand-offs with the Soviets (e.g., Berlin, Cuba) where the President was pretty much on his own, but those days—and that dire strategic environment—are long gone.

3. We cannot handle all these simultaneous crises!

At first glance, the Navy looks mighty busy across the 1990s, meaning three to five simultaneous naval responses across multiple theaters for much of the decade. Look deeper and you see a different picture: lengthy strings of sequential operations clustered around just Iraq, Somalia, Haiti, and Yugoslavia. Using traditional counting methods,
these four situations account for roughly half of all naval responses in the decade. Almost all the rest were noncombatant evacuations or responses to natural disasters, except for brief shows of force off Taiwan and Korea.

How we interpret the strategic environment determines how we prepare to meet its challenges, and clearly, these “response clusters” represent serious change. During the Cold War we contained the Soviet Union along the entire breadth of Eurasia, concentrating our permanently stationed forces at such key points as the Fulda Gap and the Korean demilitarized zone. Meanwhile, the U.S. Navy balanced the Soviet Navy in the Mediterranean, Gulf, and Western Pacific. But the bipolar age, with its unified containment strategy, yielded to a more scattered and shifting sort of containment in the 1990s. In effect, we think the Somalia, Yugoslavia, Haiti and Iraq represent a new response category: drawn-out minicontainments designed to stabilize individuals regions.

2. We are doing more with less!

Just talking naval forces, ship numbers are down over the 1990s, while responses to situations—measured in the traditional manner—are up. Behind all this numerology (e.g., a noncombatant evacuation operation counts as much as a Desert Storm), however, lurks a persistent myth: naval forces are therefore grossly underfunded and suffering serious operational strain. Analysts pushing this argument are simply barking up the wrong tree.

Most of the stress on naval forces comes from the Persian Gulf and our near continuous operations there since 1979. The Pacific, meanwhile, has been quiet—in terms of responses to situations—for the last quarter century. Both the Mediterranean and the Caribbean were reasonably busy in the 1990s, but like the Gulf, the bulk of the activity involved one lengthy situation each (Yugoslavia and Haiti). The numerologists see response totals as way up, but in reality the Navy spent the 1990s focused on just those four big situations. And it was not alone: Navy-only responses dropped from 74% in the 1970s to 35% in the 1990s, the rest being joint or combined.

Amazingly, despite being tied down in the Gulf and working the rest of the world with fewer ships, the U.S. Navy is breaking neither operational nor personnel tempo. All of the responses are being conducted by regularly deploying ships (Desert Storm is the great exception). Ship schedules are definitely disrupted and some port calls missed. Speed of advance for some transits has been accelerated, but turnaround ratios for carriers have lengthened. In sum, we have not needed to deploy ships ahead of schedule, nor are we short a carrier when we really need one.

In sum, the U.S. military is handling the current response load with dexterity, with the exception of high-demand/low-density assets (e.g., Navy EA-6Bs, Army civil affairs specialists). But that particular problem only highlights the illogic of centering all our strategic planning on the abstraction known as the 2-MTW standard.
1. All we can plan for is complete uncertainty!

Trying to capture global change by looking at U.S. military history is like looking through the wrong end of a telescope: our interventions are but a thin slice of a much larger reality, most of which is wrapped up in globalization. Moreover, the military deals mostly with the seamy underbelly of an otherwise pretty good world, which gives it a peculiar perspective. The biggest global events of the past eight years were the explosive rise of the Internet and international financial flows, the Asian economic crisis, and last year’s Y2K drill, none of which involved the defense community in any significant way. Instead, the military got stuck largely with watching the store on Iraq, Somalia, Haiti, and Yugoslavia—the losers of the world.

Some like to describe the 1990s as a time of chaos, identifying uncertainty as our new foe. Many take the Clinton administration to task for merely reacting to events and having no coherent foreign policy, as if that were different from previous administrations. But anyone who lived through the tense and constant confrontations with the Soviet Union should be grateful for this sort of “uncertainty.”

When we look over these years, we detect a clear routinization of what used to be legitimately described as crisis response, not some growth of uncertainty. For the Navy, its presence in the Gulf has become routine. Its drug patrols has become routine. Its presence in the Western Pacific is stabilizing as far as everyone but the Chinese are concerned, but this has practically nothing to do with “responses” since the end of the Vietnam War—thus it is routine. Even last decade’s clustered responses in the eastern Mediterranean assumed a familiar routine, dragging on for years until Milosevic finally fell. As for Africa, we have seen this nation and its leadership shy away, passing up lots of opportunities to intervene.

But was there any grand strategy that linked together all these choices? Not really. And maybe that’s what irks us political-military strategists most: as this circus parade known as globalization winds it ways around the planet, the military is mostly left to clean up what the elephants of the advanced world would just as soon leave behind and forget. As such, we think it is relatively easy to predict what the U.S. military will be called upon to do over the next ten years: several of these minicontainments plus the usual scattering of minor responses.

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Moving Naval Strategic Planning Beyond Mythology

The world is not a more dangerous place after the Cold War. Chaos, it turns out, is not as fungible as we once thought, and uncertainty, like all politics, is local. But adjusting to this brave new world does not necessarily equate to a reduced role for the military in U.S. foreign policy, especially naval forces. Rather, it means we now have a broader and more flexible basis on which to plan. The new national military strategy clearly lies somewhere between our recent extremes—neither matching the Soviet Union nor policing the Soviet-less world.
Finding that middle ground means moving away from the abstractions embodied in the 2-MTW standard. Simply put, we have gathered enough data points across the 1990s to plot out this decade’s navy, if not the navy after next:

- It is a naval force that lives in, and deals with, the present world, one that is always likely to afford the United States several opportunities for lengthy, minicontainment operations. We will not address all of them, but pick and choose as we see fit, with the key determining factor being that situation’s potential disruption of the global economy.

- This force is comfortable with uncertainty, because these response clusters will come and go, meaning multiple operational centers of gravity that shift with time.

- This force plays an important, if largely background role in enabling globalization’s continued advance, especially in developing Asia, by embodying the closest thing the world has to a true Leviathan—the undeterrable, always familiar military giant.

- This navy lacks any real peers and hence can confidently plan for the future, which means staying just enough ahead on technology to discourage the rest of the world from trying to keep up.

- Above all, this naval service should take good care of its ships, aircraft and people, without using them up and exhausting itself. Outside the Persian Gulf, the world does not need it that much, and when it does, we will have warning time.

The Navy has moved far enough beyond the Cold War to understand its “new” role in international stability. If it seems familiar, it is because the base of our operations has remained essentially unchanged, even as the superstructure of the Cold War’s bipolarity came and went. The U.S. Navy works the watery seam that both divides and links the planet’s northern and southern economic zones. As these huge civilizations and individual societies bump against one another in the tectonic inevitability that is economic globalization, U.S. naval forces will play an important stabilizing role within this country’s overall foreign policy—that of a mobile, sea-based containment force. Response clusters such as Iraq and Yugoslavia will remain a stubborn facet of the future international security environment, representing the essence of the naval forces’ mission. As such, it is time to end our dependency on abstract planning measures such as the 2-MTW standard, come to grips with the world as we have come to know it, and do right by our sailors and Marines.

\(^1\)The 1980s conflicts (31) are Guatemala, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Panama, Colombia, Peru, Grenada, Falklands, Northern Ireland, Poland, Turkey-Kurds, Nagorno-Karabakh, Western Sahara, Libya, Sudan, Chad, Ethiopia, Uganda, Angola, Mozambique, Lebanon, Syria, Israel, Iran-Iraq, Sri Lanka, Burma, Afghanistan, Kashmir, Cambodia, Philippines, and China-Vietnam. The 1990s conflicts (37) are Mexico (Chiapas), Guatemala, El Salvador, Colombia, Peru-Ecuador, Peru, Haiti, Northern Ireland, Former Yugoslavia, Turkey-Kurds, Georgia, Chechnya, Nagorno-Karabakh, Algeria, Chad, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Liberia, Zaire, Somalia, Ethiopia-Eritrea, Burundi, Rwanda, Angola, Mozambique, Lebanon-Israel, Yemen,
Iraq, Tajikistan, Sri Lanka, Afghanistan, Kashmir, Cambodia, Burma, China-Taiwan, Indonesia, and East Timor.

Somalia accounted for seven responses, Haiti for six, Bosnia/Kosovo for 12 and Iraq for 13. That’s 38 total, or almost half of the decade’s total of 81 naval responses.

Find this report at <www.state.gov/www/global/terrorism/1999report>.


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