Defense Science Board
2004 Summer Study

on

Transition to and from Hostilities

December 2004

Office of the Under Secretary of Defense
for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics
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This report is a product of the Defense Science Board (DSB).

The DSB is a federal advisory committee established to provide independent advice to the secretary of defense. Statements, opinions, conclusions, and recommendations in this report do not necessarily represent the official position of the Department of Defense.

This report is UNCLASSIFIED.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR ACQUISITION, TECHNOLOGY, AND LOGISTICS

SUBJECT: Report of the Defense Science Board 2004 Summer Study on Transition to and from Hostilities

I am pleased to forward the final report of the Defense Science Board 2004 Summer Study on Transition to and from Hostilities. The report makes recommendations for enhancing U.S. effectiveness across the spectrum of activities from peacetime through stabilization and reconstruction.

The task force vision for enhancing U.S. effectiveness in the transition to and from hostilities has two dimensions.

- The first dimension is management discipline. The management discipline used by the military services to plan and prepare for combat operations must be extended to peacetime activities, to stabilization and reconstruction operations, and to intelligence—not only in DOD, but across the government.

- The second dimension is building and maintaining certain fundamental capabilities, now lacking, that are critical to success in stabilization and reconstruction. These capabilities are stabilization and reconstruction; strategic communication; knowledge, understanding, and intelligence; and identification, location, and tracking for asymmetric warfare.

I endorse all of the recommendations of the task force and encourage you to review their report.

William Schneider, Jr.
Chairman
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MEMORANDUM TO THE CHAIRMAN, DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD

SUBJECT: Report of the Defense Science Board 2004 Summer Study on Transition to and from Hostilities

It is clear from recent experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq that the United States will encounter significant challenges in its future stabilization and reconstruction efforts. Successfully meeting these challenges will require effective planning and preparations in the years before the outbreak of hostilities, as well as employing capabilities in the period following hostilities that are not traditional to U.S. armed forces.

Our study has highlighted the fact that stabilization and reconstruction operations typically last for 5 to 8 years, significantly longer than typical combat operations. Moreover, since the end of the Cold War, the United States has begun stabilization and reconstruction operations every 18 to 24 months. That frequency, coupled with the length of these operations, means the requirements for skilled personnel in support of these operations is significant. Moreover while technological advances can contribute to U.S. capabilities, we do not expect them to make a material reduction in the time needed for stabilization and reconstruction or the requirement for in-country manpower.

These realities had an important influence on our vision for enhancing U.S. effectiveness across the spectrum of activities from peacetime through stabilization and reconstruction. Our vision has two dimensions.

The first dimension is management discipline. We have great respect for the military services’ approach to management. This discipline, now focused on combat, must be extended to peacetime activities, to stabilization and reconstruction operations, and to intelligence—not only in DOD but across the government. Thus, a new coordination and integration mechanism is needed. We envision the creation of Contingency Planning and Integration Task Forces—full-time, sustained activities, established by the President or National Security Council, for countries where the risk of U.S. intervention is high. The task forces would direct a robust planning process and would be staffed by individuals, from all involved agencies, who have genuine, deep expertise in the countries and in needed functional areas.
As part of the planning process, the regional combatant commanders need to maintain and develop a portfolio of contingency operational campaign plans that span peacetime, war, stabilization, and reconstruction. These plans need to be supported by a complementary set of contingency intelligence campaign plans, prepared by the intelligence organizations.

The second dimension is building and maintaining certain fundamental capabilities, now lacking, that are critical to success in stabilization and reconstruction. While management discipline is essential, it will not, in and of itself, be effective. It must be coupled with certain fundamental capabilities that are critical to preparing for and executing stabilization and reconstruction operations. These capabilities include the following:

- **Stabilization and reconstruction capabilities.** Stabilization and reconstruction missions must become a core competency of both the Departments of Defense and State. The military services need to reshape and rebalance their forces to provide a stabilization and reconstruction capability. Complementing these activities, the Department of State needs to develop, maintain, and execute a portfolio of plans and capabilities for the civilian roles in reconstruction operations. Both departments need substantially more resources, both people and funds, to fulfil their proper roles.

- **Strategic communication.** The United States needs a revolution in strategic communication that is rooted in strong leadership from the top and supported by an orchestrated blend of public and private sector components. A unifying presidential vision and broad bipartisan Congressional support are critical. The President should establish a permanent organizational structure within the National Security Council to oversee the effort. That structure should include a Deputy National Security Advisor for Strategic Communication, a Strategic Communication Committee, and an independent, nonprofit, nonpartisan Center for Strategic Communication.

- **Knowledge, understanding, and intelligence for the 21st century.** Knowledge of culture and language along with intelligence collection that is better focused for stabilization and reconstruction operations are critical for success in achieving U.S. political and military objectives. A new approach is needed that will establish systematic ways to access and coordinate the vast amount of knowledge both within and outside DOD. Critical elements include improving the ability of the regional combatant commanders to access country and area expertise that can inform planning for operations; intelligence reform that
allows analysis to drive collection and fosters a more integrated community; and clearer requirements and enhanced resources for the development of language skills.

- **Identification, location, and tracking for asymmetric warfare.** Current U.S. intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities are inadequate for many tasks that emerge in asymmetric warfare. More intimate, terrestrial, 21st-century ISR is required, composed of elements like tagging, tracking, and locating capabilities. A “Manhattan Project” of scale, intensity, and focus is needed to ensure adequate attention and resources are devoted to developing these capabilities.

Urgent action is called for, as the nation is likely to engage in additional stabilization and reconstruction operations before the recommendations in this study can be fully implemented and, as a result, will do so unprepared. We urge greater than usual speed in implementing the recommendations of our study. The nation’s security demands it.

Craig I Fields, Co-chair

Philip A. Odeen, Co-chair
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

U.S. military expeditions to Afghanistan and Iraq are unlikely to be the last such excursions. America’s armed forces are extremely capable of projecting force and achieving conventional military victory. Yet success in achieving U.S. political goals involves not only military success but also success in the stabilization and reconstruction operations that follow hostilities. Furthermore, orchestration of all instruments of U.S. power in peacetime might obviate the need for many military excursions to achieve political objectives; or, failing that, at least better prepare us to achieve political objectives during stabilization and reconstruction operations.

It is clear from our recent experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq that the United States must expect to encounter significant challenges in its future stabilization and reconstruction efforts—efforts that seek to ensure stability, democracy, human rights, and a productive economy in a nation of concern. Achieving these ends will require effective planning and preparations in the years before the outbreak of hostilities, as well as employment, in the period following hostilities, of capabilities that are not traditional to U.S. armed forces.

The Defense Science Board (DSB) was asked to consider the transition to and from hostilities in order to enhance U.S. effectiveness across this spectrum of activities from peacetime through stabilization and reconstruction. More specifically we considered what activities should be undertaken in peacetime with the objective of avoiding large-scale hostilities by better orchestrating all the instruments of U.S. power. And, failing in that aim, what activities should be undertaken in peacetime to be more successful in the stabilization and reconstruction operations that commonly follow large-scale hostilities—operations critical for achieving U.S. political goals, not “just” military goals.

We considered the period ranging from peacetime, through large-scale hostilities, through stabilization and then reconstruction as a continuum, with none of these activities having a clear beginning or end. While our “inside the Beltway” perspective tends to focus on “those in charge”—that is, the decision makers—as well as planners...
and intelligence personnel involved in transition to and from hostilities, the fact is that most of the required human resources are involved in combat and, even more so, in stabilization and reconstruction. Since the end of the cold war the United States has begun new stabilization and reconstruction operations every 18 to 24 months. Since each operation typically lasts for five to eight years, cumulative requirements for human resources can add up to three to five times what are needed for a single operation.

Thus, the need for skilled personnel stationed abroad in support of stabilization and reconstruction activities is indeed significant—a “growth industry,” and an expensive one. Active duty U.S. armed forces cannot and should not meet all of these requirements. Personnel from other federal agencies, reserve forces, contractors, U.S. allies and coalition partners, and indigenous personnel can help; but how the full requirement, especially for stabilization, can be met with current resources and capabilities is not clear. Moreover, while technological advances can contribute to U.S. stabilization and reconstruction capabilities, we do not expect them to make a material reduction in either the time needed for stabilization and reconstruction or the requirement for in-country manpower.

Given these realities, how can the United States be more effective in meeting the challenges of the transition to and from hostilities, challenges which require better planning, new capabilities, and more personnel with a wider range of skills? Our vision for enhancing U.S. effectiveness in the transition to and from hostilities has two dimensions.

The first dimension is management discipline. We have great respect for the military services’ approach to management—covering the full gamut of personnel selection, training, and promotion; planning, budgeting, and resource allocation; education, exercises, games, modeling, and rehearsal; performance and readiness measurement; and development of doctrine. We believe this management discipline, now focused on combat operations, must be extended to peacetime activities, to stabilization and reconstruction operations, and to intelligence—not only in DOD, but across the government. Making use of this management discipline, which has been so effective in the employment of U.S. military capabilities, could result
in greater confidence in the intelligence, information, knowledge, and understanding that is needed for stabilization and reconstruction efforts to succeed.

The second dimension is building and maintaining certain fundamental capabilities, now lacking, that are critical to success in stabilization and reconstruction. While management discipline is essential, it will not, in and of itself, be effective. It must be coupled with certain fundamental capabilities that are critical to preparing for and executing stabilization and reconstruction operations. These capabilities include stabilization and reconstruction capabilities; strategic communication; knowledge, understanding, and intelligence; and identification, location, and tracking for asymmetric warfare. These capabilities, without the management schema, would lack orchestration and be employed ineffectively; the management schema without the capabilities would be impotent.

**Direction, Planning, and Oversight**

We believe a new coordination and integration mechanism is needed to bring management discipline to the continuum of peacetime, combat, and stabilization and reconstruction operations. For countries where the risk of U.S. intervention is high—termed “ripe and important” in this report—the president or National Security Council (NSC) would direct the initiation of a robust planning process. The elements of that process must include:

- **Contingency planning and integration task forces.** Full-time activities that could continue for months or years; staffed by individuals, from all involved agencies, who have genuine, deep expertise in the countries of interest and in needed functional areas.

- **Joint interagency task forces.** Composed of senior government executives and military officers who operate in the particular country or area of interest; created to ensure coordination and integration of the activities of all U.S. players “in-country.”

- **A national center for contingency support.** A federally funded research and development center with
Executive Summary

country and functional expertise that would support the contingency planning and integration task forces and the joint interagency task forces. The center would augment skills and expertise of the government task forces, provide a broad range of in-depth capability, support the planning process, and provide the necessary continuity.

- A focal point at each regional combatant command for stabilization and reconstruction planning and execution. The most likely candidate is the combined/joint forces land component commander.

The process should be codified in a presidential directive. While this pangovernment process is put in place, DOD should move swiftly to address its own role in that process and to strengthen its capabilities, which in the interim would provide tremendous benefit to the nation. In addition, DOD should actively support the development of core competencies in planning in other departments and agencies—principally the Department of State.

Stabilization and Reconstruction Capabilities

DOD and the Department of State need to make stabilization and reconstruction (S&R) missions one of their core competencies. Success in these missions depends upon a stronger partnership and closer working relationship between the two departments. Moreover, both departments need to augment their existing capabilities for stabilization and reconstruction.

DOD has not yet embraced S&R operations as an explicit mission with the same seriousness as combat operations. This mind-set must be changed, insofar as S&R operations can consume resources as large as those consumed by major combat operations, and for much longer periods of time. Stabilization and reconstruction operations are not a lesser-included task of a combat mission, but a separate and distinct mission with unique requirements for equipment and training. Thus, S&R requirements should become a major driver for the future force. We recommend a number of actions that will help to bring the appropriate attention to stabilization and reconstruction operations.
- The Army should be designated as executive agent for stabilization and reconstruction.
- S&R operational plans should be fully integrated with combatant commander operational plans for combat, not be treated as an annex or “afterthought” to those plans.
- The Army and the Marine Corps should develop modules, below the brigade level, of S&R capabilities to facilitate task organization; and should exercise and experiment with them to determine where combinations of these capabilities can enhance U.S. effectiveness in stability operations. Though developing modules is an important step, it will not, in and of itself, ensure effective stabilization operations.
- The Army should accelerate its restructuring of Army Reserve and National Guard forces with an emphasis on modular capability for the stabilization mission.
- Stabilization and reconstruction should become a core competency of general purpose forces through training, leader development, doctrine development, and other tools DOD applies to serious missions.
  - The service secretaries and Joint Chiefs of Staff should integrate stabilization and reconstruction operations into the services’ professional military education programs. The service schools and joint military colleges and universities curriculum should include understanding of cultural, regional, ideological, and economic concerns. Participation by students from other agencies and departments should be increased.
  - S&R operations should also be integrated into premier training events and exercises at every level.
Joint Forces Command should further develop, publish, and refine joint doctrine for stability and reconstruction operations.

- The Director, Defense Research and Engineering (DDR&E) and the service acquisition executives need to set up a process for more rapid and coherent exploitation of service and departmental science and technology programs; in addition, investments are needed in force-multiplying technologies such as language translation devices and rapid training.

- “Money is ammunition” in S&R operations. DOD needs to provide resources, and the authority, responsibility, and accountability to disburse those resources, in support of stability operations.

We believe the aforementioned changes are needed in DOD. However, it is not clear that even the resources and capabilities we envision will suffice if the nation continues to maintain the current pace of stabilization operations. History indicates that stabilization of societies that are relatively ordered, without ambitious goals, may require 5 troops per 1000 indigenous people; while stabilization of disordered societies, with ambitious goals involving lasting cultural change, may require 20 troops per 1000 indigenous people. That need, with the cumulative requirement to maintain human resources for three to five overlapping stabilization operations as noted above, presents a formidable challenge.

Furthermore, to be fully effective the United States will need to have some of its people continuously abroad for years, so they become familiar with the local scene and the indigenous people come to trust them as individuals—tours of duty that we imagine to be far longer than traditional assignments today.

A solution that may be most achievable in the near term is for DOD to develop a modest stabilization capability that is of sufficient size to achieve ambitious objectives in small countries, regions, or areas, and of sufficient excellence to achieve modest objectives elsewhere. Decisions to embark on stabilization operations—how often, of what magnitude, and with what ambition for outcomes—
would then be considered in light of the capability of this force. If the force is not adequate for the strategy, it would need to be expanded.

Once military forces are able to reduce violence and establish a secure environment in a country or region, it creates a window of opportunity during which political and economic changes—reconstruction—can take place, thereby allowing a society to move from conflict to peace and democracy. The capacity to promote political and economic reform exists in many civil agencies in the U.S. government, in international organizations, in nongovernmental and private voluntary organizations, and in other governments—strands that need to be integrated based upon a common vision and coordinated strategy. The locus for this reconstruction integration should be the Department of State. State will need a robust capability to

- Develop, maintain, and execute a portfolio of detailed and adaptable plans and capabilities for the civilian roles in reconstruction operations
- Prepare, deploy, and lead the civil components of reconstruction missions
- Incorporate international and nongovernmental capabilities in planning and execution

The Department of State will need substantially more resources, both people and funds, to fulfill its proper role in stabilization and reconstruction operations. State will require access to additional funding—either through a contingency fund or the flexibility to reprogram funding from other sources for S&R purposes. Support for the Lugar-Biden bill is also important, and it should be formally endorsed by the secretary of defense.¹ DOD’s extensive expertise in crisis and in deliberate planning can be used to “kick start” State’s new office of stabilization and reconstruction. But eventually, State will require a cadre of people—we estimate at least 250—who have expertise in

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1. Commonly referred to as the Lugar-Biden bill, The Civilian Management Reconstruction and Stabilization Act of 2004 (S. 2127) provides for the development of an expert civilian response capability to carry out stabilization and reconstruction activities. The bill’s proposals include a $100 million contingency fund to enable rapid response, the establishment of an office within the Department of State to coordinate civilian resources, a civilian Response Readiness Corps, a Response Readiness Reserve, and various education, training, and exercise programs.
S&R operations and who are committed to planning and preparing for future operations, as well as conducting ongoing ones.

**STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION**

Strategic communication—which encompasses public affairs, public diplomacy, international broadcasting, information operations, and special activities—is vital to America’s national security and foreign policy. Over the past few decades, the strategic communication environment and requirements have changed considerably as a result of many influences. Some of the most important of these influences are a rise in anti-American attitudes around the world; the use of terrorism as a framework for national security issues; and the volatility of Islamic internal and external struggles over values, identity, and change.

Furthermore, strategic communication is affected by changes in the information environment—global transparency created by satellite TV (and thus fast-breaking news) as well as a host of other inexpensive and widely available information technologies (cellphones, wireless handhelds, high-resolution commercial space imaging, e-mail) and information saturation. These factors give even greater importance to the credibility, reputation, and “brands” of information providers, including governmental ones.

Since September 11, 2001, the United States has taken steps to improve strategic communication; the Coalition Information Center created in the White House, high-ranking officials devoting personal time to advocating policies and shaping perceptions, international broadcasting, and embedded media are examples. But these steps are not sufficient. The U.S. government needs a strategic communication capability that is planned and directed in the nation’s interest. Missing today are strong leadership, strategic direction, adequate coordination, effective research, sufficient resources, adequate exploitation of commercial capabilities, and a culture of measurement and evaluation. *America needs a revolution in strategic communication rooted in strong leadership from the top and supported by an orchestrated blend of public and private sector components.* These are the tenets that underlie the following recommendations.
A unifying presidential vision and broad bipartisan congressional support are critical. The president should issue a directive to strengthen the U.S. government’s ability to understand global public opinion, to advise on the strategic communication implications of policy making, and to communicate with global audiences; coordinate all components of strategic communication; and provide a foundation for new legislation on its planning, coordination, conduct, and funding.

The president should establish a permanent organizational structure within the National Security Council to oversee the effort. That structure should include the following:

- *Deputy national security advisor for strategic communication*. This individual would serve as the president’s principal advisor on all matters relating to strategic communication.

- *Strategic communication committee (SCC) within the National Security Council*. Chaired by the deputy national security advisor for strategic communication and with a membership drawn from the under secretary rank, this committee should develop an overarching strategic framework for strategic communication including “brand identity,” themes, messages, and budget priorities; and should direct and coordinate interagency programs to maintain focus, consistency, and continuity.

- *Independent, nonprofit, nonpartisan center for strategic communication*. This congressionally mandated and funded center would serve as a source of independent, objective expertise to support the NSC and SCC. The center should provide information and analysis; develop and monitor the effectiveness of themes, messages, products, and programs; determine target audiences; subcontract to the commercial sector for products and programs; and foster cross-cultural exchanges of ideas, people, and information.
Changes are needed in the Departments of both State and Defense to increase visibility and funding of strategic communication. Within State, the under secretary of state for public diplomacy and public affairs should become both policy advisor and manager for strategic communication. One important responsibility of this office is to work with Congress to develop needed legislation and ensure adequate funding. In DOD, the under secretary of defense for policy should serve as the department’s focal point for strategic communication. In both departments, a substantial—threefold—increase in resources is necessary to support public diplomacy and strategic communication activities.

**Knowledge, Understanding, and Intelligence for the 21st Century**

The knowledge required to be effective in conducting stabilization and reconstruction operations is different from the military knowledge required to prevail during hostilities, but no less important. Knowledge of a nation’s security interests and external relations; armed forces; the local political scene; internal social, cultural, and economic conditions; security; and social and economic well-being are as important to stability operations as the knowledge of the enemy order of battle is during hostilities. We need to treat learning knowledge of culture and developing language skills as seriously as we treat learning combat skills: both are needed for success in achieving U.S. political and military objectives.

But collecting, compiling, and sustaining cultural knowledge of this sort, as well as developing linguistic competency in a wide array of languages, requires an effort and attention span that is far longer than the short-term focus that is typical of those who use and collect information and intelligence today. The collection, analysis, and integration must be conducted far in advance of DOD’s need. Much of the information is unclassified and available from open, albeit sometimes obscure, sources. A new approach is needed that will establish systematic ways to access and coordinate the vast amount of knowledge available both within and outside DOD. Our principal recommendations for developing such an approach follow.
The combatant commanders urgently need to develop intelligence plans as a required element of their adaptive planning process. These plans must be realistic plans for satisfying information needs for peacetime, combat, and stabilization and reconstruction (including support to other departments and agencies) and should be built using the same kind of tools useful for traditional preconflict and conflict planning. The plans should be tested and evaluated for readiness through red teaming, exercises, and games. The development of these "intelligence campaign plans" will provide a disciplined process for planners and operators to specify what knowledge they need to achieve their objectives, and for their intelligence organizations to assess whether they possess or can provide that knowledge.

There is a considerable body of country and area expertise that could be available to DOD and the regional combatant commanders to assist in planning for operations. The previously recommended national center for contingency support can play an important role in accessing the information and coordinating its availability. In addition, we also recommend the following:

- The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) provide resources to the regional combatant commanders to establish offices for regional expertise outreach—to support country and regional planning and operations, to provide continuity, identify experts, and build relationships with outside experts and organizations.

- To increase the number of competent area experts, the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness (OUSD [P&R]) lead a process to set requirements and develop career paths for foreign area officers and a new cadre of enlisted area specialists, a process based on a more formal, structured definition of requirements by the combatant commanders. The Army’s Foreign Area Officer program provides a good model.

- The military services improve the regional and cultural studies curricula in the joint professional military education system as well as in online...
regional and cultural self-study instruction, in order to broaden cultural knowledge and awareness.

*Intelligence reform is essential, but the focus of this reform must shift from rearranging organizational boxes to the substantive problems that need attention.* In general, the intelligence community should organize and integrate its analytic resources around problems—national and tactical, domestic and foreign—with analysis driving collection. The community must begin to operate more as an integrated community rather than a set of independent disciplines, with a community-wide vision for recruiting, hiring, and training. Some of the specific actions needed include the following:

- Create a human resource coordination office charged with the responsibility to develop a comprehensive, enterprise-wide human resource strategy for planning, management, and deployment of personnel—a strategy that will serve as the basis for optimizing the allocation of resources against critical problems
- Adopt a new counterintelligence and security paradigm that puts the analyst in the role of determining the balance between need-to-share and need-to-know—a paradigm that will enable the community to enlarge its “circle of trust” from which to draw information and skills
- Improve the integration between networks and data architectures across the intelligence community to facilitate robust enterprise-wide collaboration
- Harmonize special operations forces, covert action, and intelligence—a task that is essential for success in asymmetric warfare; and ensure that sufficient capabilities in these specialized areas are developed
- Accelerate the Defense Human Intelligence (HUMINT) reinvention and ensure that there are enough personnel assigned in countries ripe and important and sustained for a sufficient number of years in advance of the nation’s need
Language skills are a key enabler of country and area knowledge. Today, DOD lacks sufficient personnel with the languages and skills that are required for countries ripe and important. A language transformation team is examining this concern, has identified problems with the overall program, and is developing a transformation roadmap. This team is doing good work, but without specific tasking and firm oversight, it is unlikely that the initiatives being identified will be successfully executed or resourced. We believe that metrics, such as those described below, are needed to track execution, assess progress and status, and determine future needs.

- OSD direct the establishment of specific language and regional specialist requirements across DOD, involving the combatant commanders, the military services, and Joint Forces Command; and resource these requirements in annual budget submissions.
- Include attainment of language requirements in service and joint readiness reporting systems
- Develop a more comprehensive system—a language readiness index—for identifying, testing, tracking, and accessing personnel with language skills

Finally, open sources of information can provide much of the information needed to support peacetime needs and stabilization and reconstruction. Open source information can be used to develop a broad range of products needed for stabilization and reconstruction operations—such as genealogical trees, electricity generation and grids, cultural materials in support of strategic communication plans, and background information for noncombatant evacuation operations. To establish and sustain a robust and coherent open source program, the under secretary of defense for intelligence should appoint the Defense Intelligence Agency as executive agent. In addition, the enterprise-wide data architecture for the intelligence community needs to be designed to support and exploit linkages provided by open source information.
IDENTIFICATION, LOCATION, AND TRACKING IN ASYMMETRIC WARFARE

U.S. military forces currently have a superb capability for finding and tracking conventional war targets, such as weapons and military facilities. However, these intelligence assets are not well suited for finding, identifying, and tracking unconventional war targets, such as individuals and insurgent or terrorist groups that operate by blending in with the local population. The challenges associated with tracking unconventional targets are dramatically different from those faced in conventional warfare, where relatively few civilians are intermixed with enemy forces and military forces employ distinctive uniforms, transport systems, and combat equipment.

Unconventional targets of interest include people, things, and activities that are broad in scope and diversity. The basic approach to identifying, locating, and tracking such targets must be expansive in terms of capturing intelligence and developing databases. By casting a large net, it should be possible, through analysis systems, to detect trends and patterns in otherwise disparate data. A variety of available and emerging technologies can be brought to bear to identify objects or people of interest from surveillance data and to verify a specific individual’s identification. Available or emerging technologies include biometrics, tags, object recognition, and identification tokens. However, further development of sensors and databases is needed to overcome the shortcomings of conventional intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance systems.

We believe an integrated, coherent approach is required in order to develop identification, tagging, tracking, and locating (ID/TTL) capabilities that will give U.S. military forces the same advantage finding targets in asymmetric warfare that it has in conventional warfare. Although much good work is going on today, it is disjointed across disconnected activities, organizations, and interests. What is needed is a discipline—not “just” a set of excellent programs—focused on the overall ID/TTL challenge.

We recommend that the secretary of defense, along with the new head of the intelligence community, establish a “Manhattan Project”-like program for ID/TTL. We believe the establishment of such a program will
involve creating a new organization that will provide an overall technical approach; the systems and technology to implement the approach; the analysis techniques that will turn sensor data into useful ID/TTL information; the field operations that will employ, utilize, and support the hardware and software that will be produced; and feedback to DOD leadership on the impact of related policy decisions and directives on the creation of a robust ID/TTL capability.

**Final Thoughts**

Several leitmotifs have pervaded our study:

- Certain critical capabilities require preparation years in advance—the United States cannot succeed at the last minute.
- Coordination, the traditional interagency currency in the government, is necessary but insufficient for effective orchestration and success.
- Shortchanging fundamental capabilities and preparation actually raises costs—significantly.
- Continuous, vigilant attention and action is the best way to be poised to face global surprise.

Urgent action is called for. If the U.S. government were to implement the recommendations of this study over the next five years, it would have done so in a remarkably short period of time. Yet, during that same period, the nation could engage in two or three new stabilization commitments—as has been the pace since the end of the cold war—and would do so unprepared. Many of the recommendations put forth in this study can be implemented now. The sooner the government departments and agencies start on long-lead items, the sooner the nation will be ready. We urge greater than usual speed in implementing the recommendations of our study. The nation’s security demands it.
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION

I. Introduction

After Afghanistan, after Iraq, how can we better prepare in peacetime:

- to avoid large-scale hostilities?
- for stabilization and reconstruction, should hostilities occur?
- to achieve both our political and military goals?

Every year the Defense Science Board (DSB), a senior advisory body for the secretary of defense, undertakes a few large-scale studies, often referred to as the summer studies, on matters of national importance.

This year, we conducted just one summer study. In light of the actions underway in Afghanistan and Iraq, we were asked to consider the U.S. involvement in transition to and from hostilities.2

More specifically, we considered what activities should be undertaken in peacetime with the objective of avoiding large-scale hostilities by better orchestrating all the instruments of U.S. power. And, failing that avoidance, what activities should be undertaken in peacetime so as to be more successful in the stabilization and

2. Appendix A contains the complete terms of reference for the DSB 2004 summer study.
reconstruction operations that commonly follow large-scale hostilities—operations critical for achieving U.S. political goals, not "just" military goals.

This study has not been a "lessons learned" review of past activities, such as intelligence activities preceding September 11, 2001; U.S. operations in Afghanistan or Iraq; the losing track of key individuals like Osama bin Laden or, for a while, Saddam Hussein; or the mystery of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction. There have been a number of such studies, and we saw little reason to repeat their efforts; however, they have informed our study.

We have not focused on improving U.S. combat capabilities or force structure: our perception is that we overmatch most military opponents we are likely to face. And while there is always room for improvement, the United States’ military capabilities are not the limiting factor in achieving its political goals.

While greater success in addressing failed and failing states, through superior preparation and capabilities both in peacetime and for stabilization and reconstruction operations, will doubtless impede terrorism, this has not been a study on counterterrorism. Such a study would need to address important topics outside our scope, such as domestic law enforcement and homeland security in general.

Finally, we did not consider the doctrine of preemption, with the concomitant need for exquisite intelligence. In light of the potential dangers of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and the difficulty of attributing a WMD attack, particularly given enemies who cannot be easily identified or located so as to be deterred, we understand why this doctrine would become a matter of national focus.
Our study has been organized in the six panels shown in the figure above. The timeliness and potency of the summer study assignment attracted the pro bono attention and efforts of a large, outstanding, and au courant cadre of executives, who collectively had over a millennium of recent senior-level government experience.\(^3\)

Further, a number of senior administration officials took part in the study as integral participants, officials from not only the Department of Defense but also the Department of State, Department of Homeland Security, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the intelligence community.

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3. Appendix B contains the task force membership.
Although the guidance for our study did not focus on any one particular possible future conflict, we thought it important to consider a range of specific possible future conflicts, to focus our thinking, keep us honest, and serve as a "sanity check" or "litmus test" for our findings and recommendations. However, we appreciated that future world events and conflicts may be a surprise, and so our recommendations are aimed at broad capabilities, not at specific scenarios.

We organized our projections of future conflicts along two dimensions: the likelihood of deploying U.S. forces and the strategic importance of the conflict to the United States. With regard to probability, we are not saying that any individual example is "likely" over the next 5 or 10 years, but rather that at least some of the examples are "likely" to occur over that time scale. If a large number of American lives might be lost, we deemed the potential conflict "important," while acknowledging other compelling rationales for ascribing significance, such as the vulnerability of U.S. allies.
While this study has not been exclusively focused on militant Islam—which we distinguish from fundamentalist Islam—a number of potential future conflicts may involve militant Muslim factions. In many instances, Islamic militants consider attacks on America to be intrinsically intertwined with their more local goals, such as destroying existing regimes or forcing Western “infidels” from Islamic lands.

In considering this simplistic organization of potential future conflicts, our judgment has been that we are better poised—particularly in intelligence terms—for conflicts that may be likely but less important and for conflicts that may be important but less likely than we are for conflicts that are both likely and important.
We considered the period ranging from peacetime, through large-scale hostilities, through stabilization, and then reconstruction operations as a continuum. Preparations and actions in peacetime might avert large-scale hostilities; and, failing that, preparations in peacetime are the critical determinants of not only U.S. military success in large-scale hostilities—success which is likely—but also its success in stabilization and reconstruction. Without success in the aftermath of large-scale hostilities the United States will not achieve its political goals—the reason for going to war in the first place; and success in the aftermath follows from success in preparation before hostilities.

While we refer to “peacetime,” “hostilities,” “stabilization,” and “reconstruction,” it is worth emphasizing that none of these concepts has a precise definition, and none of these activities has a clear beginning or end.

Although the topic of our summer study explicitly refers to hostilities, many of the same challenges discussed here will arise in circumstances wherein there are no large-scale hostilities, such as the
collapse of a failing state, and the United States is called upon to engage in stabilization and reconstruction operations.

Note that we believe that more people are needed in-theater for stabilization and reconstruction operations than for combat operations.
The United States is typically more confident and competent in combat operations than in stabilization and reconstruction operations. We believe there are particular reasons for this outcome.

The U.S. military services have an approach to executive management that has evolved over decades, covering the full gamut of personnel selection and promotion; training, education, exercises, games, modeling and simulation; planning; budgeting and resource allocation; performance and readiness measurement; development of doctrine; and so on. This formidable management capability is currently focused on combat operations, not on intelligence activities, on stabilization and reconstruction activities, or on peacetime initiatives across the government.

Further, the military services have and embrace a tradition of “someone in charge” during combat operations. That clarity of lines of responsibility, authority, and accountability that is indispensable for success in combat operations, has not yet been achieved in stabilization and reconstruction operations.
Finally, the military services have learned—sometimes through bitter experience—that shortchanging combat capability is much more expensive than providing the needed resources in the first place. However, this lesson has yet to be learned in the context of stabilization and reconstruction operations.
Just as the United States has been taught, and we hope has learned, lessons from its experiences to date in Afghanistan, Iraq, and earlier instances involving stabilization and reconstruction, it should assume that potential future adversaries have also been taught and have learned lessons.

We received reports from the intelligence community regarding the lessons that may have been learned by potential future adversaries, both large and small.4 While the United States cannot have limitless confidence that states will do what they say, a pattern emerged.

Many of the nation’s potential future adversaries would probably not face U.S. military forces in direct combat, but instead would prefer to delay and avoid confrontation as long as possible. If confrontation were unavoidable, these adversaries would likely conserve and husband their military resources—equipment,

4. A complete list of the presentations received by the task force can be found in appendix C.
installations, materiel, and personnel—for the time after the United States departed, declaring victory, so as to then be prepared and equipped to again pursue their foreign and domestic policies, which might include preying on their neighbors or even on segments of their own population.

During the cold war, U.S. nuclear forces served as a strategic deterrent. During the first half of the 21st century, large-scale conventional forces may, as well, serve as a strategic deterrent—with operations conducted by special forces and by stabilization and reconstruction forces. While it is too soon to be firm in this conclusion, it has implications for force structure, acquisition and inventory policy, and much more.
It has become a truism that providing safety, security, and stability is a prerequisite for reconstruction and for achieving U.S. political goals. When daily life in a country is largely shaped by violence of a magnitude that cannot be managed by indigenous police and security forces, progress is difficult.

While that is true, it does not follow that reconstruction activities cannot and should not begin until safety has been achieved. In fact, many elements of reconstruction are necessary precursors to achieving stabilization, elements such as providing essential public services, providing sufficient jobs to instill a sense of well-being and self-worth, and so on. Stabilization operations and reconstruction operations are intrinsically intertwined.

Choosing the priority and sequence of U.S. objectives, acknowledging that not everything is equally important or urgent, and noting that in other cultures certain social and attitudinal change may take decades, all require explicit management decision making and planning in the years before stabilization and reconstruction operations might be undertaken in a region. We cannot “have it all”
or at least not all at once, all immediately, or all at an affordable cost. Providing a management approach for defining the sequencing, priority, and achievability of U.S. objectives has been an integral part of this study, and will be presented in the chapters of this report that follow.
“Inside the Beltway,” there is a natural tendency to focus on the decision makers—“who’s in charge?”—and the planners and intelligence personnel involved in the transition to and from hostilities or to and from stabilization and reconstruction. This perspective loses sight of the fact that most of the human resources required for such transitions will be directly involved in combat and, by a large margin, even more so in stabilization and reconstruction.

In fact, if, as has been the case since the end of the cold war, the United States becomes involved in a new and additional stabilization and reconstruction operation every two years, and if, as history has shown, it typically takes five to eight years to disengage from a stabilization and reconstruction activity—and sometimes longer—there is an accumulating need for skilled personnel stationed abroad: stabilization and reconstruction is a “growth industry.”

Fortunately, with some reasonable assumptions, that growth does not continue to infinite proportions; but it does grow to require three to five times more personnel than does a single stabilization and reconstruction operation. It’s expensive.
We have asked whether all of those hundreds of thousands of required skilled people need to be active duty forces. The reserve forces are a source of manpower, but it is difficult to ask individuals with civilian careers to engage, on short notice, in stabilization and reconstruction operations somewhere around the world for perhaps five to eight years, with no specific end date; and if foreign tours are short with frequent rotation, U.S. personnel abroad will always be inexperienced.

Contractors can also provide personnel, but while there seems to be a continuing need for stabilization and reconstruction, it is an unpredictable need, and it is difficult to keep hundreds of thousands of skilled personnel on a private sector payroll “on contingency” — or, if they are engaged in commercial work, to free them on short notice for national security assignments.

The United Nations (UN), the United States’ allies, and its coalition partners can play a role. But there will always be uncertainty, no matter how close the relationship, regarding whether allies and partners are aligned with U.S. foreign policy objectives. In light of national sovereignty, will they actually be available when the nation needs them? Further, building and sustaining stabilization and reconstruction capability is expensive not only during deployment but also for exercises, training, education, and mission rehearsal in peacetime: the United States is prepared to spend considerably more on national security affairs than are other countries.

The indigenous capabilities of countries play an essential role: after all, the United States will eventually end stabilization and reconstruction operations in a country and would prefer to do so as swiftly as is prudent. It may be difficult, however, to greatly speed the stand-up of indigenous capabilities. Inevitably insurgents have an arsenal of techniques available to delay or complicate the handover. For example, the United States might provide superior force protection for its own personnel; but it is not practical to protect all the indigenous personnel and their families, and thus they may be vulnerable to attacks from insurgents. Furthermore, in many places indigenous forces have traditions that are not respectful of rule of law, of human rights, or of other American values. The United States will not want to support indigenous forces, in the course of
stabilization and reconstruction, which subjugate the people, and changing culture takes a long time.

These issues taken together present a conundrum that is discussed further in this report; but in preview we have not found a perfect solution.
Some have believed, or hoped, that the technological and conceptual advances underlying so-called military transformation can reduce the time and personnel needed for stabilization and reconstruction. After all, the nation has experienced spectacular advances in the effectiveness and efficiency of its combat capabilities.

Unfortunately, we do not find that is the case. The DSB reviewed many excellent technology programs, each of which contributes to U.S. stabilization and reconstruction capabilities. Taken together, however, we see and anticipate no material diminution in either the time needed for stabilization and reconstruction or the requirements for in-country manpower.

This conclusion is not meant to suggest that new technologies should not be pursued, as, for example, better force protection for U.S. troops is essential; but these new technologies will not solve the fundamental conundrum.

**Implications for Force Structure**

- **The force sizing construct used since World War II needs to be changed**
  - A smaller force may be needed to defeat opponents than that needed for stabilization and reconstruction (S&R) operations
  - Technology has not had the same leverage in stabilization and reconstruction that it has in conflict
  - Warfighting transformation is not likely to save manpower needed for stabilization and reconstruction

- **The implication for force structure is significant**
  - Tomorrow’s force (active and reserve components) needs a much stronger set of capabilities directed toward stabilization and reconstruction, particularly knowledge of culture
Our concern about the cost of stabilization and reconstruction operations is supported by the U.S. experience since the end of the cold war. Taken together, the United States has spent much more on stabilization and reconstruction than on large-scale combat. Some people feel that Afghanistan and Iraq are “special cases” that should be separated from the rest of the data—a conclusion that the DSB does not accept. But even if they are not included, the nation has still spent as much on stabilization and reconstruction as on all combat operations over the past decade and a half.\(^5\)

In presenting this observation, it is important to remember that the DOD cost-accounting system is imperfect, and that it is not always easy to tell when combat ends and stabilization and reconstruction begin. Regardless, the overall pattern is clear, and consistent with our perception of the cost of achieving stated U.S. foreign policy political objectives.

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\(^5\) Additional cost data, supporting the figure above, and data sources are included in appendix D.
The historical perspective panel of this task force did a thorough job analyzing many of the most prominent stabilization and reconstruction activities undertaken over the last two millennia. The main body of their results will be a new and unique book on the topic.\textsuperscript{6}

While it is possible, and in fact irresistible, to argue about whether planning and execution were well handled or poorly handled in individual situations, a compelling message from history is that lessons taught are not necessarily the same as lessons learned. The above chart presents the success—or lack thereof—of key planning and execution elements in a variety of historical case studies dealing with stabilization and reconstruction operations. Gray represents success; black failure. White indicates gaps in the historical record. The pattern suggests a less than impressive record—one that has not improved with time and historical experience. It is apparent that “lessons taught” are not necessarily “lessons learned.”

\textsuperscript{6} A paper summarizing the findings of the historical perspectives panel will also be included in Volume 2 of this report (forthcoming).
Two modern examples, however, do stand out: stabilization and reconstruction operations in Germany following World War II and in Panama following Operation JUST CAUSE.

In the case of the former, U.S. and British policy makers kept the precedent of Germany’s behavior after the First World War firmly in mind. Thus, planning for stabilization and reconstruction operations began at least two years before the war ended. Within this framework, the policy of “unconditional surrender” made good sense. This time defeat would be brought directly to the doorstep of the German people. Postwar plans aimed at ensuring that the German economy would be integrated into the wider European economy.

Operation JUST CAUSE, the American invasion of Panama in 1989, provides an illustrative example of how not to approach stabilization and reconstruction operations. Virtually every aspect of reestablishing a coherent Panamanian government was bungled. The fact that this operation occurred fourteen years before Operation IRAQI FREEDOM is not an encouraging sign of the U.S. ability to learn even from the recent past.

One overarching lesson from history is that the quality, quantity, and kind of preparation in peacetime determines—before it even starts—success in stabilization and reconstruction. If an operation starts badly, it is difficult to recover.
These quotes from senior military leaders integral to U.S. operations in Panama a decade ago are telling. One of our most senior retired military participants in this study was centrally involved in Panama, and he told us that he did not even know there was a stabilization and reconstruction plan for Panama—a plan called Blind Logic—until his participation in this study.
Not only have there been myriad studies following from U.S. military expeditions in Afghanistan and Iraq, there are myriad government initiatives and programs reflecting lessons learned, not only taught. We applaud these efforts. Our recommendations are intended as additions to, not substitutions for, the excellent work underway.

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<tr>
<th>Current DOD and U.S. Government Initiatives</th>
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<tr>
<td>• Revision to April 2003 Security Cooperation Guidance</td>
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<td>• Update to Quadrennial Defense Review 2001 Defense Strategy</td>
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<td>• March 2004 Strategic Planning Guidance includes stabilization</td>
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<td>• Revision of 2002 Contingency Planning Guidance includes stabilization</td>
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<td>• Army Campaign Plan for modularity, stabilization</td>
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<td>• Global Peace Operations Initiative</td>
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<td>• Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization</td>
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<td>• Security, Transition, And Reconstruction Operations Joint Operating Concept</td>
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<td>• Horizontal integration of intelligence</td>
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<td>• Intelligence campaign planning</td>
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<td>• Defense human intelligence (HUMINT) reform</td>
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<td>• Defense language transformation</td>
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<td>• New concept for persistent surveillance</td>
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<td>• National Defense Education Act language provision</td>
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We have the greatest respect for the management discipline that has evolved in the military services. That management discipline—including personnel selection, training, and promotion; planning, budgeting, and resource allocation; exercising, simulation, modeling, gaming, and rehearsal; red teaming, readiness measurement, and performance evaluation—is unique in the federal government. We would like to see that management discipline, now focused on combat, extended to peacetime activities, to stabilization and reconstruction operations, and to intelligence—not only in DOD, but across the government.

Employing that management discipline will lead to significantly greater effectiveness in employing capabilities such as special operations, covert action, counterinsurgency, and strategic communication, like media, in peacetime; as well as to vast improvement in stabilization and reconstruction operations should such eventuate.

Employing that management discipline will define the realistic costs and time scale for accomplishing U.S. political objectives, not
just military objectives, and thus better inform the nation’s leaders as they consider political alternatives. Employing that management discipline will clarify and highlight whether U.S. objectives can be achieved, as well as the priority and sequencing that makes sense.

Employing that management discipline will also lead to greater confidence that the intelligence, information, knowledge, and understanding that is needed to succeed will actually be available when it is needed—or highlight if it will not—and with the accuracy and precision that is demanded for making not only military decisions but also political decisions.

While we believe that such a management schema is essential, it will not, in and of itself, be effective insofar as the nation lacks in certain fundamental capabilities that are critical to preparing for and executing stabilization and reconstruction operations. These capabilities include

- Stabilization and reconstruction capabilities
- Strategic communication
- Knowledge, understanding, and intelligence relating to stabilization and reconstruction
- Identification, location, and tracking for asymmetric warfare

We did not think that any one of these capabilities was of such low priority it should be dropped from our study, nor did we identify a fifth capability of sufficiently high priority that we thought it should be added to our study. These capabilities, without the management schema, would be without orchestration and ineffectively employed; the management schema without the capabilities would be impotent.
The Vision: Some Questions

- **How can we make our foreign policy affordable?**
  - Stabilization and reconstruction is expensive, but the alternative is more expensive.
  - How can we engender public support for an adequate military capability?
  - How can we better balance our combat capability and an adequate stabilization capability?
  - How can we engage the UN and/or allies in stabilization, but not be dependent?
  - How can we pay for intelligence “readiness” around the globe?

Addressing the issues central to this study has surfaced a number of fundamental, and difficult, questions that the nation must address. Some of these questions are about affordability of stated and apparent U.S. foreign policy. The United States is a wealthy nation that can probably afford to do what it wants to do in realizing its foreign policy goals; but, it has to also ask if it has the will to make the investment.
The study raised other questions that focus on national culture and character. The United States is unexcelled in unity of purpose in responding to emergencies and crises and, in doing so, is largely both principled and charitable. However, the nation is not known for its patience, persistence, and internal conformity; all qualities that may be needed in abundance for achieving some of its foreign policy political—not military—objectives.

The rest of this report describes, in further detail, the vision of the study. Chapter 2 proposes a pangovernment management schema that basically extends the aforementioned military service’s management discipline from combat to peacetime activities, stabilization and reconstruction, and intelligence. Chapters 3 through 6 describe and recommend four capabilities that we think are most critical in support of the management schema. The final chapter summarizes our key recommendations.
The figure above presents an overview of the coordination and planning mechanism that we recommend. For countries where U.S. interests are very important and the risk of U.S. intervention is high (termed here as "ripe and important"), the president or National Security Council (NSC) would direct the initiation of a robust planning process—to resolve issues without use of military forces, or, if the United States intervenes, for the stabilization and reconstruction (S&R) period. Two key elements of this process are

- Contingency planning and integration task forces. Full-time task forces that could continue for months or years—with staffs composed of individuals having genuine and deep expertise in the country and working full time to avert or handle a crisis.
− Task force membership would include representation from all involved agencies: DOD plus relevant civil agencies and departments.

− The task force would develop realistic objectives and strategic plans which would be exercised, tested, and red teamed; and which would be supported by more detailed “component” plans, e.g., as prepared by the regional combatant commanders on behalf of DOD. Stabilization and reconstruction plans must be tightly integrated with operational plans for combat.

− The strategic plans and the detailed component plans will require, in turn, the support of intelligence, information, knowledge, and understanding. To that end the intelligence community would be responsible for composing and executing realistic supporting intelligence campaign plans.

• A national center for contingency support (NCCS). A federally funded research and development center (FFRDC), with various country and functional expertise, to support the contingency planning task forces.

While there may be inevitable delay before this management schema is in operation on a pangovernment basis, DOD could move swiftly to address its role and strengthen its capabilities, which in the interim would provide tremendous benefit to the nation.
Challenges such as those faced by the United States in the Balkans, Iraq, and Afghanistan require the effective involvement of many parts of the U.S. government and the use of its many tools to achieve the nation’s goals.

The involvement of many players requires effective central direction, clear objectives, careful well-vetted planning, and continued integration and coordination. The president or NSC must provide this leadership and direction. To orchestrate the planning and to provide continued integration and coordination, we recommend establishing cross-government contingency planning and integration task forces.

This government-wide planning and integration task forces would report to the NSC. The decision to start a task force and the appointment of a task force leader would be made by the president or NSC. We expect that a number of task forces would operate at any time—ranging from as few as 2 or 3 to as many as 8 to 10.

<table>
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<th>Provide Effective Government-Wide Direction</th>
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<tr>
<td>• Coherent U.S. government-wide direction is needed to deal with “ripe and important” countries/regions</td>
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<td>• Overall direction/coordination provided by the President and National Security Council (NSC)</td>
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<td>- As significant issues emerge, the President and NSC determine whether to focus government-wide attention</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Presidential/NSC decision would trigger aggressive interagency planning and actions</td>
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<tr>
<td>- For peacetime, combat operations, and stabilization and reconstruction</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Cross-government Contingency Planning and Integration Task Forces to orchestrate the planning of extended campaigns utilizing multiple instruments of national power</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Several task forces would be operating simultaneously</td>
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<td>- Leadership of the task forces will be determined by the President/NSC</td>
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This chart illustrates the type of consideration that would be involved in a decision to establish a task force. This notional presentation suggests that a threshold would likely be established, based on both the potential for military involvement in a country or region and the importance of that country or region to U.S. interests. Those countries or regions, represented by individual circles, that meet the threshold, would be candidates for a task force.

The shading in the figure above shows the region in which the crisis areas are located and the size of the circle suggests the logarithm of the magnitude of likely stabilization and reconstruction efforts. In this notional example four to eight task force planning efforts might be undertaken.
A presidential directive would be an effective mechanism through which to spell out this recommended planning process and to ensure that the roles and responsibilities of the various participating agencies are understood. A small permanent cadre within the NSC would provide valuable continuity and expertise given the long-term nature of these potential contingencies. While difficult to carry out, such a cadre could usefully bridge changes in administrations.
This figure elaborates on the chart shown at the beginning of this chapter. It shows the key role played by the regional combatant commands (RCC).

In addition to forming a contingency planning and integration task force for countries “ripe and important,” we also propose creating a complementary joint interagency task force (JITF) to be composed of the leaders of the various departments and agencies that operate in the particular country or area of interest—the ambassador, station chief, U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) chief, and other field chiefs, for example. The JITF would ensure coordination and integration of all U.S. players in the country—something often not done well today. These players would provide significant input to the contingency task force planning effort and support the country team as necessary.

The JITF would be augmented as needed by DOD personnel and would be supported by the national center for contingency support.
The effectiveness of this proposed government planning process would be greatly enhanced by a robust FFRDC-type organization that would

- Augment the skills and experience of the government task force members
- Provide a range of in-depth capability
- Support the planning activities of the participating agencies

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**National Center for Contingency Support**

- **National Center for Contingency Support**—an FFRDC organized, managed, and focused to provide broad expertise and support for the Contingency Planning and Integration Task Forces
  - Enable rapid start up and sustainment of Task Forces
  - Standing core staff with a standing presence with customers
  - Standing set of consultant agreements for rapid assembly of needed expertise
- **Should provide six types of capability**
  - Cultural and regional expertise
  - Functional knowledge, such as utilities, transportation, and banking
  - Support, to include administration, logistics, and communication
  - Deployable personnel contracted to enter a crisis or combat zone
  - Red teaming and exercise scenarios
  - Technological expertise
- **Also would provide planning support for Departments and Regional Combatant Commanders**
Each RCC will need a focal point for stabilization and reconstruction planning and execution. The logical choice for this activity during on-going operations is the combined/joint forces land component commander (C/JFLCC). The C/JFLCC would be the key leader overseeing planning and operational execution. When security is well established the C/JFLCC would support the Department of State or other authority that has the lead. During peacetime or when a C/JFLCC has not been designated, the Army Forces Commander will be the RCC’s focal point for stabilization and reconstruction activities.

To support the efforts of the C/JFLCC, solid intelligence and information operations support will be needed.

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**Role of Regional Combatant Commanders for Stabilization Operations**

- **Regional Combatant Commander** should designate the **Combined/ Joint Forces Land Component Commander** (C/JFLCC) as the Joint Commander for stabilization and initial reconstruction operations during on-going operations *.
- The C/JFLCC would be responsible for the detailed planning, exercises, and execution of stabilization operations
  - To ensure appropriate focus, the C/JFLCC staff should include a stabilization element
  - Planning for stabilization operations would occur in parallel with and be fully integrated into the Regional Combatant Commanders operations plan and coordinated with DOS
- The stabilization mission will require specific intelligence and information operations support
- When security permits, responsibility for various functions (e.g., law enforcement) is transferred to the State Department and/or international or indigenous authorities
  - The stability commander would then provide support for the country team

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* During peacetime or when a C/JFLCC has not been designated, the Army Forces Commander (ARFOR) will fulfill this responsibility.
The U.S. military services have evolved the most refined management schema and discipline in the federal government. Operational planning is an area where the military has particularly well-developed processes and deep experience. There are a number of key elements that contribute to the success of the U.S. military’s management capability, as listed in the chart above.

While there are excellent executives throughout the government, by far the greatest and deepest “bench strength” of personnel skilled and experienced in executive management is in the military services.
While the military has deep experience in operational planning and execution, other parts of the U.S. government seldom demonstrate comparable management discipline, and plans are often poorly prepared. Their ability to prepare and validate plans is not comparable to that of the U.S. military. Even when seemingly sound plans are prepared, the failure to test and challenge them makes success problematic.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>DOD Should Support the Development of Core Competencies in Planning in Other Departments and Agencies</strong></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• <strong>Create an integrated Foreign Service Institute/National Defense University program to teach officials at all levels integrated planning skills</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>• <strong>Export DOD’s competencies in crisis and deliberate planning</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>- Assign a staff of ten experienced DOD planners (led by flag level senior) to the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) in DOS</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Provide models, training, education, red teaming, worst case analyses, war gaming</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• <strong>NGOs, coalition partners, and international organizations should participate—as appropriate—with Regional Combatant Commanders in drafting contingency plans</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• <strong>Use the existing DOD Center for Excellence in Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance to engage NGOs and to participate, as appropriate, in Regional Combatant Commander contingency planning</strong></td>
</tr>
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</table>

The DOD should assist other departments and agencies in developing solid planning and management skills. The Department of State is the most critical candidate, but other agencies need assistance as well. In addition, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), coalition partners, and other international organizations should be brought into the planning process whenever possible.
CHAPTER 3. STABILIZATION AND RECONSTRUCTION CAPABILITIES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>S&amp;R Operations Need to Become Core Competencies at both DOD and DOS</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• U.S. government needs a strong DOS to lead nonmilitary aspects of S&amp;R and to partner with DOD to plan and execute these operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• DOD and DOS will need an extraordinarily close working relationship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Both Departments need to augment their capabilities</td>
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</table>

The Department of State (DOS), like the Department of Defense, has not traditionally regarded S&R missions as a core competency. Following a decade during which the United States launched and led six major nation-building missions, each more ambitious than the last, both agencies need to recognize that the S&R mission is inescapable, its importance irrefutable, and closer cooperation between the two departments is essential.7

Success in S&R operations depends upon a strong partnership between the civil and military, between DOD and State. Civil

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7. A more detailed discussion of stabilization and reconstruction capabilities is in volume 2 of this report (forthcoming).
agencies of the U.S. government often work abroad under official State oversight, although in practice on a day-to-day basis they may operate quite independently. U.S. military forces do not operate under command of an ambassador, nor do embassies take instructions from the local military commander, but the two must operate in tandem, alternating in supported or supporting roles as the situation may require. Success requires that plans be integrated and capabilities exercised. At present neither occurs with any regularity.

Genuine DOD-State partnership in S&R will require adjustments on both sides. DOD will need to share aspects of its operational planning—something the U.S. military has long been reluctant to do. State will need to develop a capacity for operational planning it currently does not possess.

State will also need to develop a more robust capacity to execute such plans. State’s overseas operations are managed through its regional bureaus, much as DOD’s are through the regional combatant commanders. The proposed Department of State office for stabilization and reconstruction, the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS), will work closely with the regional bureaus to develop plans. It will also perform a function analogous to the Joint Forces Command, building a pool of expertise upon which the regional bureaus can call and creating a global doctrine for the civil aspects of such operations.

8. This office was initially named the Office of Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations (OSRO)
Both the State Department and the Defense Department need to augment their existing capabilities for stabilization and reconstruction planning and operations.

The graphic above provides a list of criteria required for successful stabilization and an assessment of present capabilities in DOD and DOS. As both departments augment their capabilities, the efficacy of the improvements must be judged by these criteria.

The criteria are challenging, but must be met if the United States is to be effective in stabilization and reconstruction. Plans and programs should be assessed to ensure that there are sufficient quantity, quality, and kind of skills for supporting multiple concurrent stabilization and reconstruction operations, including adequate knowledge of different cultures and languages. Personnel must have sufficient continuity in-country, with sufficiently long tours and infrequent rotation, to ensure that they are conversant with the local scene. Robust training, exercising, rehearsal, and experimentation regimes are needed to develop and maintain competencies and to rapidly incorporate lessons into future operations.
The U.S. government requires a strong and adequately resourced State Department to lead nonmilitary aspects of S&R and partner with the Defense Department to plan and execute these operations. DOS and DOD will require extraordinarily close working relationships to successfully accomplish these crucial tasks—relationships that do not today exist.
The Rand Corporation conducted detailed studies of decades of prior conflicts to identify the numbers of forces that have been required to provide stabilization in specific countries. Our summer study reviewed its findings and examined additional historic cases.

Stabilization operations can be very labor intensive. The size and composition of the force needed is highly situation-dependent, as the figure above indicates. The analysis of U.S. experience shows that the resources and forces required for S&R operations are a function of U.S. strategic objectives on one hand, and the complexities of the target environment on the other hand.

The United States will sometimes have ambitious goals for transforming a society in a conflicted environment. Those goals may well demand 20 troops per 1000 inhabitants — whether U.S. military and government civilians, U.S. civilian contractors, UN, allies, coalition partners, or indigenous constabulary — working for five to eight years. Given that we may have three to five stabilization and reconstruction activities underway concurrently, it is clear that very substantial resources are needed to accomplish national objectives.
S&R operations are complex and chaotic. Reconstruction calls for a myriad of competencies: humanitarian assistance, public health, infrastructure, economic development, rule of law, civil administration, and media. Combat, counterinsurgency, stabilization, and the beginnings of reconstruction can occur simultaneously, often in the same area. The broad range of DOD capabilities required for stability operations are reflected in the above list, which is organized into four categories: security, communication, humanitarian capabilities, and area expertise.

Security forces must be large enough to maintain order; capable of training indigenous forces; and have a robust intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capability down to the small-unit level.

Stability forces need the means and expertise to communicate with the civil population in order to explain themselves and quell panic and rumors. They should also have the ability to conduct both offensive and defensive information operations.
Stability forces need to be able to attend to humanitarian concerns and make initial infrastructure repairs and deal with civil emergencies and related government issues. These activities require not only coalition forces, but also the ability to quickly hire and pay for local labor.

We recognize that stability forces are not likely to have as many linguists as they need, but some reasonable quantity of trained linguists is essential. In addition, troops involved in stability operations should have a reasonable degree of awareness of and sensitivity to the local culture.
### DOD Stabilization Capability

- Stabilization and reconstruction are not afforded the same level of attention and quantification as other force planning framework missions
- Stabilization operations can be as resource intensive as major combat operations and last much longer

**Recommendations**

- S&R plans and policy warrant attention and support at the Secretary of Defense level
- Treat stabilization as an explicit mission in DOD force planning and not as a lesser included case
- Direct the Army to appoint a senior officer as the advocate for stabilization and reconstruction capabilities

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Our study found that DOD has not yet embraced stabilization and reconstruction operations as an explicit mission with the same seriousness as combat operations—though its attention to such operations has certainly increased over the past year, given the circumstances in Iraq. The challenge is to sustain the focus, apply the lessons, and institutionalize the training, organizational, doctrinal, leader development and other changes that will better prepare U.S. troops when they are called on again to perform S&R missions.

Sustained attention is needed because S&R operations can consume resources as fast as and for much longer than major combat operations. Moreover, because of their intense interagency requirements, S&R operations can consume the attention of senior policy makers even more than do major combat operations. Therefore, an effective interagency process should be of great interest in DOD.

_S&R operations should be given more weight in planning and programming the future force, and appropriate objectives and metrics should be established._ S&R operations are not adequately accounted for in
DOD’s current force planning framework, which is driven by objectives of rapid response, swift defeat, and decisive wins. The desired time for these operations is measured in days and weeks. These objectives need to be complemented by a set of objectives and metrics appropriate to S&R operations, where the time will likely be measured in years.

The Army is moving in the right direction with its current initiatives: instituting modularity; restructuring the force to increase military police, civil affairs, psychological operations, and other capabilities needed for S&R operations; and rebalancing capabilities between the active and reserve components. The Army should appoint a senior officer advocate to ensure that S&R operations receive the same consideration for resources as other, more traditional, mission areas. S&R operations will also benefit if the Army can define modules of S&R capabilities well below the brigade level.
The current draft *Joint Operational Concept for Stability Operations* published by Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) is a good baseline document. If JFCOM taps into the wealth of recent experience from Afghanistan and Iraq it will be able to publish usable joint doctrine quickly. This doctrine will be constantly evolving, informed by the latest experiences of servicemen and servicewomen in theaters of operation.

In addition, we believe that JFCOM should incorporate more explicitly the contributions of the Navy and the Air Force as this doctrine is developed.
CHAPTER 3

The critical capabilities necessary for successful stability operations come from a wide variety of units at multiple levels in the military services. Some of these units, such as military police, are traditionally organized into brigades and battalions for operations.

Other critical capabilities are seldom assigned at the brigade and battalion levels. They typically reside at the highest operational level of the Army or outside of the Army in the various defense agencies. Their members do not typically train with brigades and battalions, whose commanders are not likely to be familiar with the capabilities of these special units or their support requirements.

We recommend that the Army be designated as executive agent for S&R and that it, in conjunction with JFCOM and the Marine Corps, develop modules of stabilization capabilities, and exercise and experiment with them in order to determine where combinations of these capabilities can enhance U.S. effectiveness in stability operations.

The Army’s initiative to create modular brigades is an important step, but modularity itself will not ensure effective stabilization.
operations. Modularity provides for the aggregation and deployment of current capabilities; but if the military services do not have, in total, enough capabilities, or the right capabilities, they will not be able to meet S&R requirements.
DOD Stabilization Capability: Tailoring for Mission

- Elements of our forces are not adequately prepared for stabilization/reconstruction missions
  - Some units will require different training and equipment when assigned an S&R mission
  - Though significant change is planned, reserve and guard forces are still largely focused on old missions

Recommendaion

- Department of the Army should accelerate the restructuring of Army guard and reserve forces with emphasis on modular capability for the stabilization mission

Stabilization operations are not a lesser-included task of a combat mission, but a separate and distinct mission with unique requirements for equipment and training.

As elements of the Army Reserve and National Guard are restructured, these unique requirements should be recognized and the necessary steps taken to ensure that these units are prepared to conduct stabilization operations immediately upon deployment.

As stated above, the quantity of trained personnel with the right skills is a key to success. With regard to the guard and reserves there is an additional critical issue. Effective stabilization requires continuity in-country with long and often unpredictable length tours (perhaps five to eight years, as previously mentioned), so that personnel in-country are experienced in local matters, and so the indigenous people can know and trust U.S. personnel. This requirement is often at odds with maintaining civilian careers and is longer than traditional active duty tours. Thus, it may be that traditional active duty or reserve forces cannot fill the requirement. A new career path or service, perhaps in the Army, composed of people
willing and able to serve abroad for years (and with career incentives and progression commensurate with that commitment) may need to be established.
The secretary of defense and the military services should task the service schools and joint military colleges and universities to develop programs of studies and expertise in stabilization and reconstruction issues including the understanding of cultural, regional, ideological, and economic differences which, in significant measure, cause the very conflicts the United States wishes to ameliorate.

DOD has a robust culture of planning and nurtures that culture with resources, time, and excellent people. In that regard, DOD is unique in the U.S. government. We believe that DOD should introduce S&R operations into its service schools and war colleges, but this alone is not enough. We recommend that DOD partner with the Foreign Service Institute to create a program at the National Defense University to teach integrated planning skills as well as increase the number of students from other departments and agencies enrolled in service and joint educational institutions.
The length of S&R operations allows the military services to insert new technologies and new capabilities in ways that are not available in the brief period of intense combat that precedes S&R. The Director, Defense Research and Engineering (DDR&E) should work with the services, service laboratories, and departmental science and technology (S&T) organizations to find ways to accomplish more and faster technology insertions.

We also note that S&R operations have not received a high priority for S&T investment. We believe this should change. There are technologies, such as language translation devices, that have force-multiplying possibilities in S&R. The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) and the services should seek out the most promising of these technologies and invest in them.

With this said, and despite the excellent ongoing S&T efforts—such as those aimed at improving force protection for U.S. troops—we believe that technology is not the key determinant of success in S&R operations and will not be the “force multiplier” that is has been for combat operations.
At the end of combat operations in Iraq, commanders were provided money that was confiscated from the former Iraqi government. They used this money to finance local projects and boost local economies throughout the country. When this confiscated money was spent, there was a substantial delay before appropriated funds were made available. Even then, the bureaucracy made it difficult for commanders to spend the money rapidly and flexibly (without the risk of censure).

The Iraqi experience makes it very clear that “money is ammunition” in stabilization and reconstruction operations. The secretary of defense should move aggressively to gain the support of the Congress and related government agencies to design a program whereby money can be made available for commanders at the tactical level to support stability operations.

We recognize the utility of the Commanders Emergency Response Fund, and urge that steps be taken to liberalize the rules governing its use and provide training in the proper disbursement of its resources. We strongly believe that commanders in the field can be entrusted with these funds when given proper guidance and common-sense regulations.
This deployment “snapshot” of the Army reinforces our belief that the conduct of stabilization operations must become a core competency of U.S. general purpose forces. Such operations are manpower intensive, long lasting, and difficult. Their effective execution will require a substantial investment in time and materiel.
When we match the existing and projected force structure with the current and projected need for stabilization forces we see an enduring shortfall in both total numbers of people and their ability to sustain the continuity of stabilization efforts. The options to mitigate this shortfall are limited: the military services can add more people at substantial expense; the services can convert combat forces to stabilization and reconstruction capabilities; the United States can rely more heavily on others, such as the UN, allies, or coalition partners, when they are aligned with U.S. objectives; and/or the United States can decrease the number, size, or ambition of its stabilization and reconstruction efforts.

Though some mitigation may be possible through the application of emerging technologies, the United States may find itself unable to sustain future stabilization operations if the current pace of emerging missions continues at the rate it has since the end of the cold war. A solution that may be most effective and achievable is to develop a modest stabilization capability that is of sufficient size to achieve ambitious objectives in small countries, regions, or areas and of
sufficient excellence to achieve modest objectives elsewhere. Decisions to embark on stabilization operations—how often, of what magnitude, and with what ambition for outcomes—would then be considered in light of the capability of this force. If the force were not adequate for the strategy, it would need to be expanded.
By establishing a secure environment, military forces open a window of opportunity during which political and economic changes can take place, thereby allowing a society to move from conflict to peace and democracy. The civil elements of an S&R mission must promote such changes. It is police, judges, civil administrators, and technical advisors who help build new institutions for security, rule of law, governance, civil society, free press, and political parties. If these civil capacities are not carefully planned, prepared, deployed, and employed in a timely fashion, then the window opened by the military intervention eventually will close, possibly leaving the situation no better than before.

The capacity to promote political and economic reform exists in many civil agencies of the U.S. government, in international organizations, in nongovernmental organizations, and in other governments. Someone needs to mold these many strands into a coherent pattern, based upon a common vision and a coordinated strategy. The locus for this integration should be the Department of State, the only U.S. agency that maintains connections to all the other essential actors.
There is a hierarchy of tasks that need to be performed in any nation-building operation. First is security—demobilizing former combatants, rebuilding police, and establishing a justice system, for example. Next is basic governance, public administration, and public services—garbage, water, schools, power, and other such services. Third are macroeconomic and regulatory functions—establishment of a stable currency, resumption of commerce. The fourth is political reform—free press, civil society, political parties, and elections. Finally, there is traditional economic development, to include heavy infrastructure.

Iraq is the only nation-building operation since 1945 in which the United States has had to actually govern the society that it is seeking to move from conflict to peace and democracy. More often a weak but legitimate indigenous government (such as in Afghanistan) or an international administration (such as in Kosovo) is in place. In such circumstances the United States has concentrated on those areas where it has a comparative advantage or a special interest, in particular on the security sector and political reforms. The U.S.
government often leaves infrastructure projects to the World Bank and other donors, recognizing that benefits from infrastructure spending will normally take years to realize. The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) also contributes to this long-term effort.

Nevertheless, further occasions like Iraq may arise wherein the United States must assume responsibility for the full range of government functions. Even as U.S. policy should seek to share such burdens more broadly, U.S. planners must look to the possibility that the United States might again have to assume such responsibilities.
Stabilization and reconstruction plans should be made by those who will execute them. This objective is hard to achieve at the Department of State, where senior officials tend to be fully engaged with day-to-day operations and diplomatic issues. These officials have few resources available or devoted to serious planning (in contrast to DOD’s regional combatant commanders), and State’s policy planning staff inevitably tends to focus on current issues. The leadership is occupied seeking to avoid the contingencies for which such planning is intended. State’s new office for stabilization & reconstruction should provide a locus for individuals who have the time and expertise to engage in such planning, and a link to the policy makers who will ultimately have to implement the plans.

In DOD the locus for such planning is the regional combatant commanders. It will be essential to create two-way links, which do not currently exist, between State and these regional commands.

We urge the Department of State to carefully review the current draft DOD operational concept for stabilization and reconstruction and use it as a model to produce complementary documents for the

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### Essential Ingredients For DOS Success

- A rich discourse between senior government officials setting objectives (ends) and those developing and executing the plan (means)
- Those responsible for executing the plan at DOS have the lead role in developing the plan
- Those responsible for developing/executing the plan have control over the resources needed to execute it
  - Must also have the authority to select key people
- The plans and planning assumptions are continually challenged using red teaming and other means and exercised with COCOM/JTF
- DOS needs the equivalent of an operational concept/doctrine for reconstruction, for itself and other civilian agencies
- DOS is empowered for reconstruction with sufficient funds and spending flexibility comparable to that provided
  - To State for assistance to the countries of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union
  - To FEMA through access to emergency funds (Stafford Act)
DOS. With DOS in the lead, other federal agencies will be able to produce usable guidance for S&R operations.

As noted, State will also require access to additional funding if it is to be able to mobilize its own capabilities, and those of other civil agencies, on short notice. Funding requires either a contingency fund, along the lines of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) model, or the flexibility to reprogram funding from other sources for S&R purposes. Ideally, all funding for the civil aspects of such missions should be provided through a single flexible channel, such as that provided by Congress for assistance to Central and Eastern Europe and the states of the former Soviet Union.
It is clear that the Department of State needs substantially more resources, both people and funds, if it is to fulfill its proper role in stabilization and reconstruction operations.

The secretary of defense is in a position to help State by publicly giving his support to passage of the Lugar-Biden bill. Similarly, DOD support of the proposed office of stabilization and reconstruction in State, with a commitment to work collaboratively with that organization, would send a clear message to those in and out of government that the Defense Department is committed to work with DOS on these crucial issues.

Further, DOD’s extensive capabilities in responding to crisis and in deliberate planning could help kick-start the office of the Coordinator for Stabilization and Reconstruction (S/CRS) if 10 or more experts, along with an experienced senior leader, were assigned to State to bring to that organization the intellectual capital and best practices developed over years within the Defense Department.
Planning for stabilization and reconstruction operations, to be effective, must occur prior to actual conflict. Since State and Defense will be both supported and supporting “commanders,” it is important that collaboration between State and Defense begin early, prior to formalization of plans. It is in this early process that assumptions can be challenged and strategic objectives can be refined to more closely match U.S. capabilities. Both the secretary of state and the secretary of defense should work to create these links and integration throughout planning processes for S&R.
State will require a cadre of people with experience in S&R operations who are committed to planning and preparing for future operations, as well as conducting ongoing ones. To handle this range of activities will require at least 250 positions. Some might be seconded from other agencies, but most will need to be full-time State employees.

Secretary Powell has agreed to provide S/CRS with 25 positions funded with the department’s current resources, but made clear that further increases in staff will depend upon additional congressional funding and authorization. The administration should request and Congress should authorize and appropriate the necessary positions and funding.

While State and the Congress have pointed the way in creating S/CRS and introducing the Lugar-Biden bill, these efforts will need to be given more substantial and concrete support to include providing the necessary positions, contingency funding, and authority to reprogram existing funding to S&R purposes expeditiously.

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### DOS Reconstruction Capability: Resources

- Providing effective operational-level reconstruction planning will require people and money, as well as flexibility to operate during intense crises and conflict
- The level of preparation for civilian reconstruction plans should approach that of DOD’s operational plans
- Achieving this level of detail cannot be accomplished by a handful of people
- We estimate that ~250 people are required to
  - Develop, keep current, exercise a portfolio of ~five plans
  - Coordinate and integrate complementary efforts of other government agencies
  - Serve as the core of an execution task force of one of these operations
- The numbers do not include the planners for communications, lift, logistics, administration, and other support needs—some of which DOD must provide
The Lugar-Biden Bill is a good starting point, but does not provide enough resources either for staff for the State Department or to fund participation by other government agencies in supporting State’s contingency planning and operations.

State is creating the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization within the department. The creation of this office is an important step that should be supported by DOD and other departments with lessons learned, experienced people, and collaborative planning and exercising of contingency plans.

The very slow pace of spending funds appropriated by the Congress for reconstruction in Iraq illustrates the need to provide better, much more flexible contracting procedures. State and USAID must take the lead to strengthen these processes and put in place contingency contracts that can be activated on short notice.

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**DOS Reconstruction Capability: Resources (cont.)**

**Recommendations**

- The Administration should seek and Congress should appropriate proposed funding in Lugar-Biden ($180 million)
- Additional funding, people, and authorities must also be provided
  - DOS should be provided adequate funds/staffing for a ~250 person capability
  - DOD and other departments should provide personnel and other forms of support to S/CRS
  - DOS should seek and Congress should provide more authority for DOS to move funds across accounts for S&R purposes
- Strengthened contracting capability, including in-place contracts for immediate response, must be provided
Chapter 4. Strategic Communication

What is Strategic Communication?

- Engage global audiences in support of national security goals and objectives
  - Understand global audiences and cultures
  - Engage in a dialogue of ideas
  - Advise on public opinion implications of policy
  - Develop, establish, and communicate strategies and themes

- Includes
  - Public Affairs
  - Public Diplomacy
  - International Broadcasting
  - Information Operations
  - Special Activities

Strategic communication is vital to America’s national security and foreign policy. Although recent attention to its value has been driven by the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, strategic communication describes a variety of instruments that have been used by governments for generations to understand global attitudes and cultures; engage in a dialogue of ideas between people and institutions; advise policy makers, diplomats, and military leaders on the public opinion implications of policy choices; and influence attitudes and behavior through communications strategies.

Strategic communication can be understood to embrace five core instruments: public diplomacy, public affairs, international broadcasting, information operations, and special activities. Only the
first three instruments and one element of the fourth are discussed in this study.

Public diplomacy is distinguished from traditional diplomatic interactions between governments. Public diplomacy seeks, through the exchange of people and ideas, to build lasting relationships and receptivity to a nation’s culture, values, and policies. It seeks also to influence attitudes and mobilize publics in ways that support policies and national interests. The time horizons for public diplomacy range from decades to news cycles. In an age of global media, the Internet revolution, and powerful nonstate actors—an age in which almost everything governments do and say is understood through the mediating filters of news programs, culture, memory, and language—no major strategy, policy, or diplomatic initiative can succeed without public support. Fulbright scholarships, youth exchanges, embassy press briefings, official websites in foreign language versions, and televised interviews with ambassadors and military commanders are examples of public diplomacy.

The term “public affairs” is used by the Departments of State and Defense to denote communication activities intended primarily to inform and influence U.S. media and the American people. The White House, the NSC, U.S. government departments and agencies, and military commands all have public affairs staffs. These staffs focus on domestic media, but their advocacy activities also reach allies and adversaries around the world. Distinctions between public affairs and public diplomacy continue to shape doctrine, resource allocations, and organization charts. But public diplomacy and public affairs practitioners employ similar tools and methods; the audiences of each are both global and local. The conceptual distinction between the two is losing validity in the world of global media, global audiences, and porous borders.

International broadcasting services are funded by governments to transmit news, information, public affairs programs, and entertainment to global audiences via AM/FM and shortwave radio, satellite television, and Web-based systems. Voice of America, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, and the Radio Sawa and Al Hurra Arabic language radio and television services are examples of U.S. international broadcasting.
Information operations is a term used by the Department of Defense to include computer network operations (computer network attack and defense), electronic warfare, operational security, military deception, and psychological operations (PSYOPs). This report will discuss only open PSYOPs—military activities that use selected information to influence the attitudes and behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals in support of military and national security objectives.
The strategic communication environment has changed considerably over the past decades as a result of many influences, the most important of which are discussed here.

ANTI-AMERICAN ATTITUDES

Opinion surveys conducted by Zogby International, the Pew Research Center, and the Department of State Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) reveal widespread animosity toward the United States and its policies. A year and a half after going to war in Iraq, Arab and Muslim anger has intensified. Data from Zogby International in July 2004, for example, show that the United States is viewed unfavorably by overwhelming majorities in Egypt (98 percent), Saudi Arabia (94 percent), Morocco (88 percent), and Jordan (78 percent). The war has increased mistrust of America in Europe, weakened support for the war on terrorism, and undermined U.S. credibility worldwide. Media commentary is consistent with polling data. In a State Department (INR) survey of editorials and op-ed
pieces in 72 countries, 82.5 percent of these commentaries were negative, and only 17.5 percent positive.

**PERCEPTIONS OF PUBLIC DIPLOMACY IN CRISIS**

Since the Defense Science Board’s October 2001 study on managed information dissemination, more than 15 private sector and congressional reports have examined public diplomacy. There is consensus in these reports that U.S. public diplomacy is in crisis. Missing are strong leadership, strategic direction, adequate coordination, sufficient resources, and a culture of measurement and evaluation. America’s image problem, many suggest, is linked to perceptions of the United States as arrogant, hypocritical, and self-indulgent.

For some, the case for strategic communication is not self-evident. “Why can’t CNN, Fox, or CNBC do it?” Commercial media are selective in ways that serve news and business interests first. And few politicians, corporations, or advocacy groups are content to leave their political campaigns, business objectives, and policy agendas to improvisation or the media. The U.S. government needs a strategic communication capability that is planned and directed in the nation’s interests.

**TERRORISM AS A NATIONAL SECURITY FRAME**

The events of September 11, 2001, were a catalyst in creating a new way to think about national security. Terrorism replaced the cold war as a national security meta narrative. Yet, as during the cold war the world faces many complex issues and problems: failing states, nonproliferation, the HIV/AIDS pandemic, and economic globalization. Strategic communication must be capable of addressing all of these issues. The war on terrorism frame also obscures what the Muslim world sees as a history-shaking movement of Islamic restoration.

**VOLATILE ISLAM**

Islam’s internal and external struggle is over values, identity, and change. Analysts differ on the causes and consequences of the
struggle. But there is widespread agreement that Islamic terrorist networks are symptomatic of a broader transformation within Islam and a continuation of the 20th-century conflict between tolerance and totalitarianism. Islam’s crisis must be understood as a contest of ideas and engaged accordingly. Islam’s struggle raises key issues for strategic communication that include the following:

- The contest of ideas is taking place not just in Arab and other Islamic countries but in the cities and villages of Europe, Asia, Africa, and the Western Hemisphere.
- More sophisticated influence and attitude segmentation models are needed.
- Strategists face difficult trade-offs in determining which option will be most effective.
An entire generation of children has been influenced—through pictures, media, families, friends, and even political leaders—by attitudes that are antithetical to U.S. values. Today’s youth are not immune to the rise in anti-American attitudes and the anti-American messages that result. It will take decades to overcome these influences, which as the next few pages explain, are becoming stronger, not weaker.
## Arab Attitudes Toward the United States

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COUNTRY</th>
<th>APRIL 2002 (Favorable/Unfavorable)</th>
<th>JUNE 2004 (Favorable/Unfavorable)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>38/61</td>
<td>11/88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>12/87</td>
<td>4/94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>34/61</td>
<td>15/78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>26/70</td>
<td>20/69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UAE</td>
<td>11/87</td>
<td>14/73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>15/76</td>
<td>2/98</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Impressions of America 2004: How Arabs View America, How Arabs Learn about America, a six nation survey conducted by Zogby International, July 2004
Note: Data show the percentage of individuals polled.

## Arab Attitudes Toward U.S. Values, Products, and Policies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>MOROCCO (Fav/Unfav)</th>
<th>SAUDI ARABIA (Fav/Unfav)</th>
<th>JORDAN (Fav/Unfav)</th>
<th>LEBANON (Fav/Unfav)</th>
<th>UAE (Fav/Unfav)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Science/Technology</td>
<td>90/8</td>
<td>48/51</td>
<td>83/13</td>
<td>52/46</td>
<td>84/12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freedom/Democracy</td>
<td>53/41</td>
<td>39/60</td>
<td>57/40</td>
<td>41/56</td>
<td>39/53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People</td>
<td>59/29</td>
<td>28/64</td>
<td>52/39</td>
<td>39/58</td>
<td>46/35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Movies/TV</td>
<td>60/37</td>
<td>35/60</td>
<td>56/41</td>
<td>30/66</td>
<td>54/43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Products</td>
<td>73/24</td>
<td>37/59</td>
<td>61/35</td>
<td>39/57</td>
<td>63/34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>61/16</td>
<td>12/74</td>
<td>59/29</td>
<td>38/54</td>
<td>63/23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy toward Arabs</td>
<td>4/90</td>
<td>4/85</td>
<td>8/89</td>
<td>5/86</td>
<td>7/87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy towards Palestinians</td>
<td>3/93</td>
<td>3/95</td>
<td>7/89</td>
<td>4/90</td>
<td>5/90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy on Terrorism</td>
<td>13/82</td>
<td>2/96</td>
<td>21/75</td>
<td>10/64</td>
<td>9/84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq Policy</td>
<td>1/98</td>
<td>1/97</td>
<td>2/78</td>
<td>4/93</td>
<td>4/91</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Impressions of America 2004: How Arabs View America, How Arabs Learn about America, a six nation survey conducted by Zogby International, July 2004
Note: Data show the percentage of individuals polled.
The United States should not underestimate the magnitude of the problem it faces. A June 2004 Zogby poll of Arab opinion shows that support for the United States is miniscule. The first of the two charts above shows, moreover, a significant and continuing deterioration of support for the United States, as compared to already low levels of support in 2002. Muslims broadly, not simply Arabs, see American policies as inimical, American rhetoric about freedom and democracy as hypocritical, and American actions as deeply threatening. Clearly, the bottom chart shows that while Arabs do not necessarily hate U.S. values, they hate U.S. policies.

But the bottom chart also suggests an even more worrisome dimension in terms of negative attitudes. A 2002 poll—asking the same questions—showed even more favorable attitudes toward U.S. culture and its values two years ago. Thus it seems that in two years the Jihadi message—which strongly attacks American values as well as its policies—is appealing to more moderate and nonviolent Muslims. This in turn implies that negative opinion of the United States has not yet bottomed out, but is in fact continuing to worsen dynamically. Here, however, the negative movement is now qualitative rather than quantitative, meaning that regular Muslims are moving from “soft opposition” toward “hard opposition.” In Saudi Arabia, for example, a large majority believes that the United States seeks to “weaken” and “dominate” Islam itself—in other words, Americans have become the enemy. It is noteworthy that opinion is at its hardest against America in precisely those places ruled by (what Muslims call) “apostates” and tyrants—the tyrants we support. This should give us pause.
Global Transparency

Al Jazeera, CNN, and other television networks dominate discussion of the information and media environment. But a host of information technologies—in addition to satellite TV—are creating greater global transparency: cellphones, wireless handhelds, videophones, camcorders, digital cameras, lightweight fly-away packages, email, blogs, high resolution commercial space imaging, and so on. Many are cheap; costs are declining.

These technologies have consequences for all three stakeholders in strategic communication: governments, media, and publics. Policy makers, diplomats, and military leaders face more breaking news from more places in a reactive mode. Journalists rely less on “institutionally based news” — official sources and press conferences. Publics—NGOs, image activists, soldiers with digital cameras—can drive perceptions and policies with pictures and stories.
Transparency creates threats and opportunities—and changes in the strategy-tactics dynamic. Tactical events can instantly become strategic problems (digital cameras in Abu Ghraib). On the other hand, transparency can show strategic threats more clearly and enhance the capacity to undercut an opponent’s political will and ability to mislead (embedded media in Iraq).

Transparency is only one element in a global environment characterized also by faster rates of change, shorter reaction times, asymmetry, interconnectivity, decentralization, disintermediation, declining communication costs, content-transport disconnects, multiple channels, more narrowcasting, Internet penetration at rates exceeding earlier technologies, greater volumes of information in less time, pervasive feelings of saturation, short news and memory cycles, digital divides, and interactive tensions between fragmenting consequences of conflict and integrative effects of cooperation.

PARADOX OF PLENTY

Information saturation means saturation of attention, not information, which can become a scarce resource. Power flows to credible messengers. Credibility matters. What's around information is critical. Reputations count. Brands are important. Editors, filters, and cue givers are influential. Fifty years ago political struggles were about the ability to control and transmit scarce information. Today, political struggles are about the creation and destruction of credibility.
Strategic communication was a high priority in the months immediately after September 11, 2001. Public statements by U.S. political leaders made clear that war on terrorists with global reach was not a war against Islam. Messages were tailored to global audiences as well as audiences at home. America’s political leaders, diplomats, and military leaders understood that a counterterrorism strategy could not succeed without effective, coordinated strategic communication.

National security agencies initiated networks and crisis response teams. The White House created a Coalition Information Centers (CICs) network linking Washington, London, and Islamabad. The CICs deployed language-qualified public affairs experts to respond to breaking news, Taliban and al Qaeda claims, and regional events. They did so within news cycles—not hours and days later during business hours in Western capitals.

### Promising Early Initiatives (Afghanistan)

Strategic communication initiatives were highest priority in first months after September 11, 2001. Public statements by U.S. leaders made clear war on terrorists with global reach was not war against Islam. Messages tailored for global as well as national audiences. America’s political leaders, diplomats, and military leaders understood that counterterrorism strategy could not succeed without effective, coordinated strategic communication.

**Coalition Information Centers (CICs)**—Washington/London/Islamabad
- State’s 24/7 public diplomacy coordination group
- DOD gives high priority to strategic communication planning and use
- NSC’s Counter Terrorism Information Policy Coordination Committee (CIC)

**Tactical message coordination (Office of Global Communications [OGC]), personal messaging by leaders**

**U.S. broadcasting, Radio Sawa, Al Hurra**
- Supporters cite market share, space in dominant media, U.S. voice in Arab world
- Critics question Sawa’s music format, Al Hurra’s limitation as state-owned network
- Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG) lacks strong investment in Internet-based broadcasting

**Embedded media, acclaimed by government and media**

**Early post 9/11 initiatives not sustained, personal communication by leaders not matched with effort to build tools and institutions**
In October 2001, the State Department established an unprecedented 24 hour-a-day, 7 day-a-week public diplomacy coordination group in its operations center with links to the White House, Defense Department, U.S. embassies, and U.S. combatant commands. The NSC created the Counter Terrorism Information Strategy Policy Coordinating Committee. The Defense Department gave high priority to strategic communications planning. White House officials, cabinet secretaries, and military leaders appeared regularly on Al Jazeera and other global media outlets. Shaping the message personally became part of the daily routine of America’s top political and military leaders.

TACTICAL COMMUNICATION
The president, the national security advisor, the secretaries of defense and state, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and other senior military commanders continue to devote extraordinary amounts of personal time to advocating policies and shaping perceptions at home and abroad.

U.S. INTERNATIONAL BROADCASTING
U.S. government broadcasting in the Middle East is changing—driven by events in the region, narrowcasting tendencies in mass-audience broadcasting, congressional pressures, policies of the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG), and a BBG marketing strategy that draws on research and emphasizes targeted programming. While significant efforts have been undertaken to reach Middle East markets through TV and satellite radio programming, critics suggest that what is missing is a strong investment in Internet-based broadcasting. They agree too that audience research and independent evaluation will enable firm conclusions on the long-term value of these strategic communication initiatives to U.S. interests.

EMBEDDED MEDIA POLICY
The Defense Department’s policy of embedding journalists in Iraq has won broad support in government and the media. Reporting
from embedded media during the spring of 2003 reduced the potential for Iraqi disinformation (e.g., on civilian casualties) that could have undermined political support in the United States and in other countries. From the media’s perspective, journalists gained unusual access, opportunities to challenge headquarters briefings, and a better understanding of the military.

*The promise of these early efforts did not lead to transformation of instruments and institutions.*
Post 9/11 Strategic Limitations

- U.S. strategic requirement (NSS, 2002)—“different and more comprehensive approach to public information” —ignored, marginal impact
- Strategic direction—NSC and cabinet departments
  - No Presidential directive since PDD 68 (1999)
  - State—short tenure, long gaps (Beers, Tutwiler), Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy vacant 2 years
  - DOD—Office of Strategic Influence (OSI) misunderstood, poorly implemented, dissolved
- Interagency process—dysfunctional OGC & NSC PCC process
- Planning & implementation
  - DOS (International Information Programs) constrained by lack of tasking authority and small staff/budget
- Opinion/media research—insufficient, disconnected capabilities
- Technology—promise of Internet, digital convergence unrealized
- Resources—inadequate, skewed priorities, stove-piped planning process

NSS 2002

The president’s National Security Strategy (NSS) urged “a different and more comprehensive approach to public information.” Two years later, U.S. strategic communication lacks sustained presidential direction, effective interagency coordination, optimal private sector partnerships, and adequate resources. Commitment by top leaders has not matched needed changes in organizations or a dysfunctional interagency process.

STRATEGIC DIRECTION

There has been no presidential directive on strategic communication since April 30, 1999. Short appointments and long vacancies occurred in the State Department’s Office of the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs. The Department of Defense created an Office of Strategic Influence, which the secretary of defense dissolved, stating that the “office has clearly been so damaged that it is pretty clear to me that it could not function effectively.”
**INTERAGENCY COORDINATION**

The White House Office of Global Communications (OGC) does not engage in strategic direction, coordination, and evaluation. The NSC established a Strategic Communication Policy Coordinating Committee (NSC/PCC), which met only several times. The committee has marginal impact and has not met for more than a year. The OGC and NSC/PCC have overlapping authorities and have been ineffective in carrying out intended responsibilities relating to strategic communication.

**PLANNING AND IMPLEMENTATION**

In 1999, Presidential Decision Directive 68 authorized a “dedicated staff in State” to serve as a secretariat for the interagency coordinating group established by the directive. This secretariat remained in the department, but its interagency support is constrained by its location within a departmental bureau, lack of tasking and contracting authorities, a small staff and budget, inadequate State Department messaging technologies, limited evaluation capabilities, and insufficient attention from State and Defense Department leaders.

**OPINION/MEDIA RESEARCH**

U.S. strategic communication is limited by insufficient and decentralized research capabilities. Research findings are not used sufficiently in policy formulation and policy advocacy. Policy makers, diplomats and military leaders often do not appreciate that “listening” and influence analysis are critical prerequisites to effective communications strategies. Funding is woefully inadequate.

**TECHNOLOGY**

The Departments of State and Defense and the combatant commands have made modest progress in leveraging the potential of the Internet. The impact of digital convergence is only beginning to be understood by political and military leaders. U.S. strategic communication has not evolved in ways that coordinate and leverage the potential of Internet-centric information dissemination.
RESOURCES

Annual spending for State Department information programs and U.S. international broadcasting is approximately $1.2 billion—one-quarter of 1 percent of the military budget. Political leaders need to determine whether this strategic communication budget is adequate to U.S. national security strategy and to global war on terrorism viewed as a struggle about ideas.
U.S. strategic communication must be transformed. America’s negative image in world opinion and diminished ability to persuade are consequences of factors other than failure to implement communications strategies. Interests collide. Leadership counts. Policies matter. Mistakes dismay friends and provide enemies with unintentional assistance. Strategic communication is not the problem, but it is a problem.

Strategic communication is a vital component of U.S. national security. It is in crisis, and it must be transformed with strength of purpose that matches the nation’s commitment to diplomacy, defense, intelligence, law enforcement, and homeland security. Presidential leadership and the bipartisan political will of Congress are essential. Collaboration between government and the private sector on an unprecedented scale is imperative.

To succeed, it is critical to understand that the United States is engaged in a generational and global struggle about ideas, not a war between the West and Islam. It is more than a war against the tactics of terrorism. We must think in terms of global networks, both

### A New Vision for Strategic Communication

- Understanding the problem in friendly, failing, and failed states—who are they, what do they believe?
- Focus on the entire global array of U.S. foreign policy interest; assume decades of effort
- Develop a “brand,” credibility, authority, and audience in peacetime—it is too late in crisis, war, or thereafter
- Decide whom to address, what message to communicate, what media to employ
- Close the loop—poll, poll, poll—and swiftly adapt

Can we do as well as the UK government-funded and globally respected BBC World Service . . . or even better?
governmental and nongovernmental. If we continue to concentrate primarily on states ("getting it right" in Iraq, managing the next state conflict better), America will fail.

Strategic communication requires a sophisticated method that maps perceptions and influence networks, identifies policy priorities, formulates objectives, focuses on "doable tasks," develops themes and messages, employs relevant channels, leverages new strategic and tactical dynamics, and monitors success.

This approach will build on in-depth knowledge of other cultures and factors that motivate human behavior. It will adapt techniques of skillful political campaigning, even as it avoids slogans, quick fixes, and mind-sets of winners and losers. It will search out credible messengers and create message authority. It will seek to persuade within news cycles, weeks, and months. It will engage in a respectful dialogue of ideas that begins with listening and assumes decades of sustained effort. Just as important, through evaluation and feedback, it will enable political leaders and policy makers to make informed decisions on changes in strategy, policies, messages, and choices among instruments of statecraft.

The United States needs to move beyond outdated concepts, stale structural models, and institutionally based labels. Public diplomacy, public affairs, PSYOPs, and open military information operations must be coordinated and energized.

There is no reason why the United States cannot sustain an activity analogous to the UK government-funded BBC World Service, which has tremendous credibility around the world and serves as an instrument to promote truthful news and British values. Building up that credibility — building up that "brand" — requires a decade or two of persistence.
A unifying vision of strategic communication starts with presidential direction. Only White House leadership, with support from cabinet secretaries and Congress, can bring about the sweeping reforms that are required.

Nothing shapes U.S. policies and global perceptions of U.S. foreign and national security objectives more powerfully than the president’s statements and actions, and those of senior officials. Interests, not public opinion, should drive policies. But opinions must be taken into account when policy options are considered and implemented. At a minimum, the United States should not be surprised by public reactions to policy choices.

Policies will not succeed unless they are communicated to global and domestic audiences in ways that are credible and allow them to make informed, independent judgments. Words, in tone and substance, should avoid offence where possible; messages should seek to reduce, not increase, perceptions of arrogance, opportunism,
and double standards. These objectives mean officials must take full advantage of powerful tools to measure attitudes, understand cultures, and assess influence structures—not occasionally but as an iterative process. Policies and strategic communication cannot be separated.

Swift and sustained presidential direction is also required to connect strategy to structure. Presidents, with bipartisan support in Congress, have carried out policy and organizational initiatives that have shaped U.S. national security for two generations. Today, the nation faces challenges of similar magnitude, made more formidable by a world where geography, military power, and time to react are no longer sufficient to ensure U.S. security. Strategic communication requires changes different in kind but similar in scale to the National Security Act of 1947 and the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986.

**Government-Private Sector Partnership**

Finding new ways to harness the flexibility and creative imagination of the private sector will be central to successful strategic communication in the 21st century. The commercial sector has a dominant competitive edge in multi-media production, opinion and media surveys, information technologies, program evaluation, and measuring the influence of communications. Academic and research communities offer vast untapped resources for education, training, area and language expertise, planning, and consultative services.

Collaboration between government and the private sector that leverage the considerable benefits of private sector thinking and skills should be strongly encouraged. Independent analysis is required in a wide range of fields: cultures and values, international intellectual engagement, communications studies, and applied science. Teamwork among civilian agencies and military services will be necessary to draw effectively on universities, professional skills of NGOs, and imagination of the media production industry. Appropriate controls and risk assessment will be needed. For all their strengths, private organizations represent particular interests. Investments in strategic communication must be grounded in the public interest as determined by appropriate executive branch and congressional authorities.
Presidential efforts to plan and coordinate U.S. strategic communication since World War II have employed White House and cabinet department models. Presidents typically have used the National Security Council or the Department of State. Each has advantages and disadvantages. Neither has been consistently successful.

The NSC’s presidential imprint gives it more clout with line departments and agencies. The NSC “thinks” in interagency terms, and it is more suited to dealing with civilian-military and interagency rivalries. On the other hand, the NSC is susceptible to the pressures of election cycles. Its staff has less continuity. The NSC normally is not operational, and it has weak tasking authority. The NSC’s strategic communication senior advisors and policy planning committees come and go. Two presidential directives, often cited as models to emulate (Presidential Decision Directive 68, President Clinton; National Security Decision Directive 77, President Reagan) contained elegant formal authorities but proved weak in sustained impact.
Cabinet departments, in contrast, have greater continuity, operating budgets, and contract authority. On balance they are less susceptible to the demands of election cycles. However, cabinet departments properly advance their own interests and tend not to "think" in interagency terms. The State Department currently delegates interagency strategic communication coordination to an under secretary, with minimal planning and staff support at the bureau level. Under secretaries rarely advise presidents directly and are less able to deal with interagency turf battles than is the NSC.

The U.S. Information Agency (USIA) was an independent executive branch agency from 1953 until it was merged with the Department of State in 1999. USIA’s core competencies were information dissemination and management of educational and cultural exchanges overseas. Until the Broadcasting Act of 1994, U.S. international broadcasting services were independent grantees (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty) and linked organizationally, albeit tenuously, to USIA (Voice of America). USIA was flexible and responsive. USIA’s mission and critical mass gave it a level of strength in the execution of public diplomacy that so far has eluded the Department of State.

USIA seldom developed communications strategies or coordinated interagency activities at the strategic level, however, despite statutory advisory responsibilities. USIA’s directors, by law, reported directly to and served as the "principal advisor to the president, the National Security Council, and the secretary of state." Some USIA directors were occasionally invited to attend NSC meetings; some were not. The degree of occasional participation almost always depended on personal relations between a president and a director.

The White House Office of Global Communications “coordinates strategic communications with global audiences” and “advises on the strategic direction and themes that United States government agencies use to reach foreign audiences.” Despite sweeping authority calling for the OGC to develop strategies for formulating messages, assess methods and strategies, coordinate temporary teams of communicators, and encourage state-of-the art media and technology, the OGC evolved into a second-tier organization devoted principally to tactical public affairs coordination. The OGC does not engage in strategic direction, coordination, and evaluation.
For sixty years, strategic communication planning and coordination has been ephemeral and usually treated with indifference. The United States can no longer afford a repetitious pattern of hollow authorities, ineffectual committees, and stifling turf battles in strategic communication.

The White House Office of Global Communications and an NSC/PCC now have formal authorities relating to strategic communication coordination. Their practical influence is marginal at best, nonexistent at worst. Their authorities should be rescinded. Given ample evidence that traditional NSC and cabinet models have not worked, these entities should be replaced with new structures, grounded in legislation, that address 21st-century realities.

America needs a revolution in strategic communication rooted in
- Presidential direction reinforced and made permanent with bipartisan congressional funding and support and the backing of cabinet secretaries and agency heads who will build strong cooperative institutional capabilities
- Direction, planning, and coordination led by a new statutory deputy national security advisor and an interagency strategic communication committee
- Support from an orchestrated blend of public and private sector components dedicated to addressing critical challenges and providing operational support through an independent, nonprofit, and nonpartisan center for global strategic communication

There is no such thing as a “perfect” planning and coordinating structure. The success or failure of new structures ultimately will be determined by the skill and integrity of the people involved. But substance and structure are integrally related. Good organizations help shape good outcomes.
A unifying presidential vision and broad bipartisan congressional support are the critical starting points in transforming America’s strategic communication. Only presidential direction and the focused actions of congressional leaders can create the political will needed to build the long-term strategic communication capabilities America needs. Incremental changes to structures designed generations ago are not the answer. The nation needs a new vision, new structures, and new congressional authorities. Leadership from the top must drive widespread understanding that 21st-century foreign and national security policies will fail unless interlinked with strategic communication.

We recommend a presidential directive that will

- Strengthen the U.S. government’s ability to understand global public opinion, advise on the strategic implications of policy making, and communicate with global audiences
- Coordinate all components of strategic communication including public diplomacy, public affairs, international broadcasting, and military information operations
- Provide a foundation for new legislation on the planning, coordination, conduct, and funding of strategic communication

**NSC Structure Grounded in Legislation**

To achieve these goals the president should establish a permanent strategic communication structure within the National Security Council and work with Congress to create legislation and funding for the following, to be discussed further below:

- Deputy national security advisor for strategic communication
- Strategic communication committee within the National Security Council
- Independent, nonprofit, nonpartisan center for strategic communication
CHAPTER 4

Recommendations (cont.)

- **Strategic Communication Committee**
  - Chaired by NSC Deputy for Strategic Communication
  - Members: Under Secretary rank, from State, DOD, DHS, Justice, OMB, President’s Chief of Staff, White House Communications Director, CIA, CJCS, USAID, and BBG
  - Develop overarching strategic framework, “brand identity,” themes, messages, and budget priorities
  - Direct and coordinate interagency programs to maintain focus, consistency, and continuity

- **Center for Strategic Communication**
  - Congressionally mandated and funded. Core funding line within DOS budget with task order project funding from government departments and agencies
  - Independent, nonprofit, nonpartisan (FFRDC-like) with an independent advisory board
  - Program and project direction and coordination provided by SCC

NSC STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION COMMITTEE

The president should appoint a deputy national security advisor for strategic communication, who should chair a strategic communication committee (SCC). The NSC deputy advisor should be equivalent in rank to a deputy head of a cabinet department and report to the national security advisor and to the National Security Council. This NSC deputy would also serve as the president’s principal advisor on all matters relating to strategic communication. This advisor should be a highly experienced individual with a close relationship to the president, superb political communication skills, the stature to work at the highest levels of government, sensitivity to the cultures of civilian and military departments of government, and strong ties to the private sector.

The SCC’s members should have the equivalent of under secretary rank and be designated by the secretaries of State, Defense, and Homeland Security; the attorney general; the chief of staff to the president; the director of the Office of Management and Budget; the White House communications director; the director of central
intelligence; the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; the director of
the Agency for International Development; and the chairman of the
Broadcasting Board of Governors.

Unlike previous coordinating mechanisms with nominal
authority, this strategic communication committee should have the
authority to assign responsibilities and plan the work of departments
and agencies in the areas of public diplomacy, public affairs, and
military information operations; concur in strategic communication
personnel choices; shape strategic communication budget priorities;
and provide program and project direction to the new center for
strategic communication.

**CENTER FOR STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION**

We recommend that the president work with Congress to create
legislation and funding for an independent, nonprofit, and
nonpartisan center for strategic communication to support the
National Security Council and the departments and organizations
represented on its strategic communication committee. The center
should be a hybrid organization modeled on federally funded
research and development centers, such as the Rand Corporation and
the National Endowment for Democracy. It should be a tax-exempt
private 501(c)(3) corporation that would receive an annual
appropriation approved by Congress as part of the Department of
State budget.
The NSC’s deputy national security advisor for strategic communication and the members of the strategic communication committee should provide program and project direction to the center. The center for strategic communication should be governed by an independent nonpartisan board of directors that would include distinguished Americans drawn from relevant professions and members of Congress appointed on a bipartisan basis. The NSC’s deputy national security advisor for strategic communication should be an ex officio member of the board. The board of directors should appoint the center’s director and ensure mission coherence and quality of performance.

The center should be guided by three purposes.

- Provide information and analysis, on a regular basis, to civilian and military decision makers on issues vital to U.S. national security, including global public opinion; the role of culture, values, and religion in shaping human behavior; media trends and influences on audiences; information
technologies; and the implications of all-source intelligence assessments. Provide nondepartmental, nonpolitical advice that will sharpen their judgment and provide a basis for informed choices

- Develop mandated and self-initiated plans, themes, products, and programs for the creation and implementation of U.S. communications strategies that embrace diplomatic opportunities and respond to national security threats

- Support government strategic communications through services, provided on a cost-recovery basis, that mobilize nongovernmental initiatives; foster cross-cultural exchanges of ideas, people, and information; maintain knowledge management systems, language and skills inventories, and procedures to recruit private sector experts for short-term assignments; deploy temporary communications teams; augment planning, recruitment, and training; and continually monitor and evaluate effectiveness
The center should receive core funding that supports steady-state operations through a congressional line item in the Department of State’s annual appropriation. Funds appropriated to the center should be placed in a revolving fund in the U.S. Treasury without fiscal year limitation.

The center’s core funding would support basic operations (staff and administration), information and analysis (polling, media research, cultural studies), maintenance of databases and skills inventories, and self-initiated projects and programs. We estimate that at least $100 million would be necessary to sustain the center’s core mission and operations. An additional $150 million is recommended for projects and programs the center would develop through contracts with the commercial and academic sectors as directed by the NSC’s deputy advisor for strategic communication. Additional funding for projects and programs would be provided through contracts and task orders from the strategic communication committee’s departments and agencies.
The center’s success will depend on its ability to serve as a central source of independent, objective expertise safeguarded from special pleadings of organizational interests. It must employ structures and methods that are agile, adaptable, and cutting edge; that are multidisciplinary and fuse capabilities from a variety of sources; and that respect past gains as they lay a strong foundation for the future. Also essential are longer term independent analyses that help refocus and reassess policy and strategic communication initiatives as well as regular, critical feedback to key decision makers based on polling and research—something that is often overlooked.
The center would perform functions in seven critical areas. Product and program examples are outlined below:

- **Themes and messages**
  - Respect for human dignity and individual rights
  - Individual education and economic opportunity
  - Personal freedom, safety, and mobility

- **Products**
  - Children’s T.V. series (Arabic Sesame Street)
  - Underwrite distribution and production of selected foreign films
  - Video and interactive games; popular music
  - Web communications including BLOGs, chat rooms, and emags

- **Programs**
  - Training and exchange programs for foreign journalists
  - Underwrite selected foreign media production
  - Establish data bases and conferences for third party validators and supporters
  - Design and wage country specific campaigns to support themes and messages and de-legitimize extremism and terrorism
communicate strategic themes and messages to appropriate target audiences. Broad themes and messages would include respect for human dignity and individual rights; for individual education and economic opportunity; and for personal freedom, safety, and mobility. Examples of products would be a children’s TV series (Arabic Sesame Street); video and interactive games; support for the distribution and production of selected foreign films; and Web communications including blogs, chat rooms, and electronic journals. Programs might include training and exchanging journalists; providing support for selected foreign television documentaries; maintaining databases of third-party validators and supporters for conferences; and designing and implementing country and regional campaigns to support themes and messages and delegitimize extremism and terrorism.

Note that we expect the products to include entertainment. Strategic communication products must be embraced as part of daily life for the people with whom the United States wants to communicate. One way to do that is to include entertainment in the portfolio. It is not possible to capture the attention of individuals and achieve credibility in the days, weeks, or even months just before a crisis: audience share has to be achieved and sustained years in advance.

- Mobilization of nongovernmental initiatives including temporary communication teams, coalition building partnerships, and deployment of language-qualified global messengers.
- Continually monitoring and evaluation of the effectiveness, efficiency, and message continuity as an input for adapting themes, products, and programs as directed by the chair of the strategic communication committee and its members.
Public diplomacy in the Department of State is carried out by the secretary of state, the deputy secretary, officials and diplomats throughout the department, American ambassadors, and officers in U.S. embassies around the world. In today’s world, public diplomacy is not only the core function of a few specialists. It should be in the position description of every Department of State officer engaged in the conduct of diplomacy.

Organizationally, public diplomacy is the responsibility of the under secretary of state for public diplomacy and public affairs; the Bureaus of International Information Programs, Educational and Cultural Affairs, and Public Affairs; public diplomacy offices in State’s regional and functional bureaus; the Office of Foreign Opinion Research in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research; and all U.S. missions abroad. In 1999, the U.S. Information Agency was abolished. Its functions, other than international broadcasting, were distributed among these State elements.

Redefine the role and responsibilities of the under secretary of state for public diplomacy and public affairs. The role of the under secretary must reflect the reality that public diplomacy is a function of both policy

### Department of State Recommendations

- **Redefine role and responsibility of Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy & Public Affairs (PD/PA) to be both policy advisor and manager for strategic communication**
  - Serve as DOS principal on NSC/SCC
  - Create adequate staff for policy advice, program direction and evaluation
  - Direct foreign opinion and media research
  - Establish International Information Programs as a Bureau led by an Assistant Secretary

- **Ensure all foreign policy initiatives have a strategic communication component**
  - Require that policy directives have public diplomacy component approved by Under Secretary for PD/PA

- **Triple current resources (personnel & funding) for public diplomacy under control of Under Secretary for PD/PA**
formulation and policy implementation. Today, neither function is adequately served. The under secretary must have a mandate to act as

- Advisor to the secretary of state, the department, and chiefs of mission on the public diplomacy implications of foreign policy
- Manager for public diplomacy within the Department of State
- The secretary’s principal representative on the U.S. government’s highest-level interagency strategic communication direction and planning body

To fulfill this mandate, the under secretary must have adequate staff and resources for policy advice, program direction, and evaluation.

Ensure that all foreign policy initiatives have a public diplomacy component. All major foreign policy directives should have a public diplomacy component approved by the under secretary for public diplomacy and public affairs. Policy makers should be much more conscious of public diplomacy’s value to effective policies. In turn, public diplomacy officers should be much more informed about policies and the relevance of policy priorities to successful public diplomacy programs.

Triple resources (personnel and funding) for the Department of State’s public diplomacy activities (information programs, educational and cultural exchanges, embassy activities, and opinion research) and place them under the direction of the under secretary of state for public diplomacy and public affairs. The department’s current funding for public diplomacy (approximately $600 million) is substantially less in real terms than public diplomacy budgets during the cold war. When combined with the BBG’s international broadcasting budget (also approximately $600 million), the public diplomacy budget totals $1.2 billion. The department’s public diplomacy funding should be increased to $1.8 billion, resulting in a total public diplomacy budget of $2.4 billion. In addition, the BBG has requested increases in funding to support their programs. We support increased BBG funding, especially for Web-based broadcasting services and those radio and television services where research and program reviews demonstrate significant audiences for news and public affairs programming.
Core funding for the center for strategic communication should be appropriated within the budget of the Department of State. As a nonprofit, tax-exempt corporation, most of the center’s project and program funds will flow from cost-recovery contracts and task orders from the U.S. government agencies who are members of the strategic communication committee. However, the Congress should appropriate funds to the Department of State to enable the department to provide an annual grant to the center for its core operations.

There are existing models for this type of funding arrangement in public diplomacy. Funding for the National Endowment for Democracy, a nonprofit corporation, derives from an annual grant based on appropriations to the Department of State. Similarly, funding for U.S. international broadcasting’s nonprofit corporations—Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Radio Free Asia, and Al Hurra—is received in the form of grants based on appropriations to the Broadcasting Board of Governors.

Ensure that all foreign policy initiatives have a public diplomacy component. All major foreign policy directives should have a public

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<th>Department of State Recommendations (cont.)</th>
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<tr>
<td>• Funds for Center for Strategic Communications should be appropriated within the budget of the DOS</td>
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<td>• Redefine relationship of Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy &amp; Public Affairs within DOS to improve coherence of public diplomacy planning and implementation</td>
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<td>- Require Under Secretary’s approval on senior public diplomacy assignments</td>
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<td>- Require Under Secretary for PD/PA review for public diplomacy office director and Public Affairs Officer performance ratings</td>
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<td>- Public diplomacy office directors should be Deputy Assistant Secretary or Senior Advisor to the Assistant Secretary</td>
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<td>- Officers promoted to Chief of Mission and Senior Foreign Service level should have served in public diplomacy or relevant interagency assignment</td>
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diplomacy component approved by the under secretary for public diplomacy and public affairs. A principal goal in merging USIA into the department was integrating public diplomacy into policy-making and policy-implementation processes. Some progress has been made. However, substantial changes in the department’s organizational culture are still necessary. Policy makers should be much more conscious of public diplomacy’s value to effective policies. In turn, public diplomacy officers should be much more informed about policies and the relevance of policy priorities to successful public diplomacy programs.

Public diplomacy considerations in the formulation of all major policies should include

- Shaping themes and messages and choosing means of delivery to ensure that priorities are clear, overall themes are established, messages are consistent, and resources are used effectively
- Identifying communication tools that will most effectively reach intended targets with the specific messages indicated by the policy
- Using the results of public opinion polling and media analyses to influence specific policies and issues
- Analyzing the potential impact of policies on public attitudes, strongly held personal convictions, and divergent interests
- Understanding what constitutes “message authority,” the implications of cross-cultural communication, and how messages are “heard” in different cultural environments
- Determining the nature, extent, and limitations of public influence on official decision making in a given environment
- Evaluating results and providing short-term and long-term feedback to policy makers and public diplomacy program officers
We recommend that the under secretary of defense for policy should act as the Department of Defense focal point for strategic communication and serve as the department’s principal on the National Security Council’s strategic communication committee. The under secretary for policy should coordinate strategic communication activities with the assistant secretary of defense for public affairs and the under secretary of defense for intelligence. The under secretary of defense for policy should extend the role and responsibility of the assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs to act as the department’s focal point for military support of public diplomacy and create a new deputy assistant secretary to coordinate all activities associated with military support for public diplomacy and provide adequate staff for policy advice, program direction, and evaluation.

We recommend that the under secretary of defense for policy and the Joint Chiefs of Staff ensure that all military plans and operations have appropriate strategic communication components, ensure collaboration with the Department of State’s diplomatic missions and with theater security cooperation plans, and extend U.S. Strategic

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<td>USD(P) should act as DOD’s focal point for strategic communication and serve as the DOD principal on the NSC/SCC</td>
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<td>- Coordinate strategic communication activities with ASD(PA) and USD(I).</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Extend the role and responsibility of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs to act as DOD’s focal point for military support of public diplomacy.</td>
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<td>- Create new DASD within ISA to coordinate all activities associated with military support for public diplomacy. Provide adequate staff for policy advice, program direction, evaluation</td>
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<td>USD(P) and JCS ensure all military plans and operations have the appropriate strategic communication components</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Ensure collaboration with DOS diplomatic missions within theater security cooperation plans</td>
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<td>- Extend STRATCOM IO responsibilities under the Unified Command Plan to include military support to public diplomacy</td>
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<td>Increase funding for DOD support for strategic communication</td>
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<td>- Triple current resources (personnel &amp; funding) available to Regional Combatant Commanders for military support to public diplomacy</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Regional Combatant Commanders should utilize the Center for Strategic Communications for program and project development</td>
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<td>- Reallocate information operations funding to support STRATCOM’s expanded strategic communication programs</td>
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Command’s and U.S. Southern Command’s information operations responsibilities to include military support for public diplomacy. The department should triple current resources (personnel and funding) available to combatant commanders for military support to public diplomacy and reallocate information operations funding to support U.S. Strategic Command’s expanded strategic communication programs.
CHAPTER 5. KNOWLEDGE, UNDERSTANDING, AND INTELLIGENCE FOR THE 21ST CENTURY

Many Changes are Needed

- The problem space is different from that of the Cold War
  - Focus must be on root causes, not just remediation—know the enemy, not just his capabilities
  - Granularity is finer than nation-state
  - Problems are, at once, transnational and regional
  - Targets may be people, rather than installations and materiel

The 21st-century security context differs noticeably from that of the previous fifty-plus years. From the end of the Second World War until the Soviet Union exited the world stage, the instruments of U.S. power—diplomatic and military—focused on nation states and were guided by a relatively simple, two-sided conflict.

As former director of central intelligence Jim Woolsey expressed, we had slain the dragon and then found ourselves knee-deep in snakes. The critical security issues facing the United States today are no longer defined by the geopolitical boundaries of nation states. Critical issues are transnational, and their granularity is considerably finer.

The “problem space,” worldwide, is effectively more complex, and this situation is especially true within the scope of the present
study: transitions to and from conflict. While the problems that propel the United States into conflict necessarily have international scope, preparing for and shaping the “battlefield” before the conflict, and stabilizing and reconstructing it afterwards, devolve to the most local of undertakings.

Mastering the minutiae sufficiently in advance, and compiling and sustaining cultural knowledge and linguistic competencies, require an effort and an attention span that have heretofore eluded those who make U.S. policy, those who plan and conduct military operations, and the intelligence community. Nonetheless, the choices in light of current shortfalls in knowledge and related capabilities are stark:

- Put in the effort and sustain it to ensure success
- Place oneself at the mercy of “rented” knowledge
- Fail in the attempted undertaking
- Undertake only operations in areas where one has sufficient knowledge

Only the first option is wholly acceptable. There is a considerable role for outsourcing the accretion and organization of needed knowledge, but its proper direction and use will require that the government, itself, maintain considerable capability. Failing in this undertaking, or even constraining those operations in which the United States should be involved, is equally objectionable.

Nevertheless, history gives the nation low grades on its ability to amass and keep current all necessary knowledge. Furthermore, the paucity of language skills has been remarked on frequently, producing a flurry of activity, but no enduring solution.

To be successful, one injunction we must obey is to keep our eye on the long ball. While there are still, and always will be, immediate crises whose very immediacy largely defines their importance, intelligence must look beyond the immediate—just as it must look beyond the obvious. Intelligence must never lose sight of the strategic, even as it services the tactical. The intelligence community must lengthen its time horizon.

Something new is needed.
The knowledge required to be effective in achieving U.S. objectives without conflict or in conducting stabilization and reconstruction is different from the military knowledge required to successfully prevail during hostilities.

This type of knowledge has not always been thought of as a military requirement or commander’s critical information requirement. For S&R operations, military commanders have relied on knowledge generated by others rather than generating required information and intelligence requirements. This approach needs to change.

The information requirements during peacetime and stabilization and reconstruction are as important as knowledge of enemy order of battle or war-fighting capabilities during hostilities. DOD’s focus, which will continue in the future to be driven by overall “mission accomplishment,” will still include prevailing in combat, but will necessarily be much broader.
Listed in this figure are some of the more important categories of required knowledge necessary to support this continuum of operations.

Importantly, much of the knowledge required during the peacetime efforts to achieve U.S. objectives without hostilities is also important through post-hostility stabilization and reconstruction. In general, the knowledge requirements for stabilization and reconstruction operations are much larger and more detailed than those for combat operations, and will take more extensive efforts to collect and analyze.
This illustration, though complex in appearance, is in fact oversimplified. In part, it illustrates the previously made point that geopolitical boundaries do not define today’s strategic issues—many issues can abound within a single state or region or transcend them. Furthermore, some tribal, religious, and family issues are important knowledge and contribute to better understanding.

Ethnicities and ideologies are fractal-like, with the curious characteristic that they become more potent as they are broken down into smaller units. Cultures and languages become more cohesive as they disassociate into subcultures and dialects. As with politics, all transnational issues are local, in effect.

The U.S. intelligence community, never overendowed with linguistic skills nor overburdened with cultural appreciation, must come to grips with the world illustrated here: tribes and tribal areas, regional cultures, and low-density languages.
Regional combatant commanders currently assess their knowledge in many areas as inadequate for effective operations in peacetime and for stability and reconstruction operations. These are the most common categories of self-assessed deficiencies:

- Societal/cultural/tribal knowledge
- Knowledge of economy
- Knowledge of infrastructure
- Knowledge about evolving threats
- Language capabilities
- Experts

We present these self-assessments by the combatant commands under the headings of “peacetime” and “stabilization and reconstruction” operations.

We do not depict their evaluations with more specificity because there was not an objective criterion across all combatant commands. The status of their knowledge base may depend upon the availability
of a few experts, in some cases the evaluation for a specific country may be sensitive, and knowledge may be adequate for some countries in a large region but not for others. For example, in the European Command area of responsibility, most areas of inadequate knowledge were in sub-Saharan Africa.

Suffice it to say that almost across the board, combatant commanders felt they needed more knowledge for every country in their area of responsibility in order to be most effective in peacetime and during stabilization and reconstruction.

The J-5 of one combatant command put it to us very succinctly: “For each of my high-priority countries, I need a good foreign area officer, a civilian staff member who has been working the country for years, and an experienced special operator.” Few combatant command staffs have that depth of expertise.
It is our assessment that while many combatant commanders feel that their knowledge is inadequate in specific categories, there is a vast amount of knowledge available within the DOD, across the U.S. government, and from other sources, which should be made accessible.

At the center, this slide depicts the core knowledge of the military services, both the active and reserve component. The sources of this knowledge include the following:

- Officer, and some enlisted, area specialists
- Knowledge and experience developed through coalition operations, theater engagement programs, exchange programs, and state and National Guard country partnership programs
- Knowledge and experience gained through interaction during foreign military sales, international military education programs, and transfer of excess defense articles
Military retirees

In addition, there is a network of civilian DOD personnel and activities that possess considerable knowledge. Examples of these sources include:

- The regional centers for security studies
- The Center of Excellence for Humanitarian Assistance & Disaster Relief in Honolulu, Hawaii
- Experienced DOD civilian employees
- Retired DOD civilian employees

DOD can also draw from knowledge and experience across the entire U.S. government—from other government agencies and departments like State, Commerce, Treasury, Justice, and the intelligence community beyond the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), as well as the retirees of these departments and agencies.

There are considerable additional knowledge bases and resources outside the government: academic institutions, think tanks, FFRDCs, nongovernmental organizations, private voluntary organizations, international business firms, private associations, and recent immigrants.

Finally, there are the resources and knowledge of the governments and military forces of allies, friendly foreign governments, and coalition partners.

The intelligence community—its operators, planners, and policy makers—are both sources and consumers of knowledge, understanding, and intelligence.

Different organizations in DOD take advantage of these resources to different degrees. However, there is NO systematic way to access or coordinate information from all of these sources.
The organizing themes shown in this figure underlie the specific recommendations that follow in this section.

The objective of all activity by the staffs of policy makers, planners, operators, and intelligence officers is not to develop good databases, but to enable superior decision making by leaders and commanders. In the future, U.S. forces will be sent more and more frequently into unfamiliar terrain on complex missions. Leaders and commanders must be informed by regional experts and intelligence officers about not only what threat their forces will face, but also the quality of available knowledge, so that margins can be allowed for uncertainty and backup plans can be formulated.

For that dialogue between leaders and commanders and their staffs to be fruitful, the leaders and commanders at all levels need to be knowledgeable themselves as to what questions to ask, how to interpret the answers, and how to gauge the depth of knowledge behind the answers they are being given. Only educated consumers—decision makers—at all levels can take advantage of the knowledge of their staffs.
The mechanism for connecting military decision makers to their staffs should be intelligence campaign plans. As will be described later in the report, these plans provide a disciplined process for the planners and operators to specify what knowledge they need to achieve their objectives, and for their intelligence organizations to assess whether they possess or can provide that knowledge. This planning process is followed in all other areas of military and business activity, yet it is lacking in the intelligence process.

The recommendations that follow in this chapter are organized under the following key enablers:

- How to increase the country and area expertise of officers and enlisted personnel outside the intelligence community—operators and planners—and how to increase their access to outside expertise

- What an intelligence campaign plan should be

- How to reform the current intelligence community so that it can provide the performance that will be necessary for future success

- How to increase the language skills within and available to the Department of Defense

- How to improve the use of open source materials, which can provide much of the data needed for stabilization and reconstruction operations
As noted previously, there is a considerable body of knowledge that could be available to the DOD and the regional combatant commanders to assist in planning for both operations that seek to achieve U.S. national security objectives without conflict (to include building and executing theater security cooperation plans) and stability and reconstruction operations.

We recommend accessing and coordinating the availability of information to support detailed planning for activities before and after hostilities by establishing the previously mentioned national center for contingency support in Washington DC, as well as smaller offices at each regional combatant command. These offices would facilitate access to specific functional, regional, and country expertise and leverage all sources of knowledge for planning and coordination.

These offices would provide long-term continuity, identify experts, and create access to and relations with outside experts and organizations. These offices would also facilitate the involvement of resources from outside DOD in operational planning, exercises, and conferences.

Recommendation: Increase Country/Area Expertise

- OSD should provide resources (totaling about $10 million/year) to Regional Combatant Commanders to establish offices for regional expertise outreach to support country and regional planning and operations
  - Staff with people knowledgeable about priority countries
  - Maintain close working relations with country teams, regional centers, U.S. and foreign academia, think tanks, business organizations, peacekeeping centers, other centers of expertise (e.g., PACOM COE for HA/DR)
  - Access and maintain data bases of experts, coordinate required clearances
  - Involve experts in ongoing activities—planning, exercises, conferences
  - Coordinate with National Center for Contingency Support
With OSD assistance, we envision that the national center and combatant commander offices could develop flexible and responsive procedures enabling OSD to use experts and resources outside DOD as intermittent government employees, as is done by FEMA under its Stafford Act authorities.

Working relationships with experts and organizations outside of DOD will be established and updated contact information maintained. Issuing security clearances to appropriate outside experts, to facilitate their participation in planning and exercises and to enable quick access during contingencies, should be considered.

Most importantly, these coordination and support offices would establish a systematic way to access and coordinate all sources of knowledge potentially available to DOD.
The Army foreign area officer (FAO) program is the best such program in any service. Only the Army requires and commits the resources to provide three to four years of language training, developmental in-country experience assignments, and related graduate education. Only the Army manages foreign area officers as a community, ensuring comparable promotion opportunity and career management across that community. A similar Air Force FAO program is still in its nascent stage, and the Navy, while having some area subspecialists, does not have a comprehensive, effective program. While all services may produce some competent area experts, no program is on par with the Army’s in terms of structure, requirements, and the development of effective area specialists. Only the small U.S. Marine Corps program has some similar requirements.

All service programs can be improved by a more formal, structured, and forward-looking definition of requirements by the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and combatant commanders, overseen by OSD and implemented by the services. The other services can adopt the essential elements of the Army’s program. The

**Recommendation: Increase Country/Area Expertise (cont.)**

- **OSD(P&R) lead a process (USD[I] and USD[P] assist) to set requirements for foreign area officers and enlisted specialists based upon COCOM inputs of future military needs by geographic region**
- **All Services maintain robust Foreign Area Officer (FAO) and Enlisted Regional Specialist Programs to satisfy new requirements**
  - Enhance use of specialty pay to maintain and improve language proficiency
  - Develop language proficient personnel with operational skills for service in deploying units
  - Consider long-term assignments to maintain proficiency
- **OSD(P&R) direct Regional Combatant Commanders and Services to review billets for increased use of enlisted personnel in advisory, staff, and operational billets requiring language and country/area knowledge**
definition of requirements must be led by the joint command structure in order to project requirements into the future rather than filling today’s billets, to assess the results of the service programs, and to ensure the assignment of competent officers in key billets.

We believe there is also significant potential for the development and employment of enlisted regional specialists. Often the overall professional career path development and distribution challenges are easier to overcome for enlisted personnel than for officers. Longer-term assignments allow more time to develop and maintain proficiency.

For both officer and enlisted personnel, there should be career paths that develop language and cultural experience along with the staff and operational experience needed when serving in deployed units and on regional combatant commander staffs.
The joint professional military education system offers significant opportunity to inculcate regional and cultural knowledge and awareness into the officer corps.

It will never be possible to provide all deploying personnel with 3/3 language skills, or to provide them in advance with in-depth regional and cultural expertise about the area to which they are deploying. All officers can, however, be educated in the importance

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<td><strong>• OSD(P&amp;R) direct the Chairman of the JMEC (Joint Military Education Council) to improve regional and cultural studies curricula in Command and Staff Colleges</strong></td>
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<td>- More emphasis on future requirements</td>
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<td>- Case studies of recent real world coalition planning and operations in the application of regional and country knowledge</td>
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<td>- Include regional and cultural studies in specialized joint operational planner curricula</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>• OSD(P&amp;R) direct the development of online regional/cultural self study instruction</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>• OSD(P&amp;R) establish foreign language requirement for service academies and ROTC units</strong></td>
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9. The Interagency Language Roundtable sets foreign language proficiency standards in listening, reading, and speaking. A 3/3 rating defines proficiency in listening and reading comprehension as follows: a level 3 in listening is an ability to understand all speech in a standard dialect (such as conversations, telephone calls, radio broadcasts, oral reports, public addresses, and technical discussion in his/her professional field); a level 3 in reading comprehension is an ability to read authentic prose on a variety of unfamiliar subjects (such as news stories, routine correspondence, material in his/her professional field). Proficiency ratings range from level 0 to level 5, with level 5 being equivalent to a well-educative native. Definitions for ratings in all areas can be found in the Defense Language Transformation Report on Building Capabilities: Managing Language and Regional Expertise in the Combatant Commands, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, July 2004.
of regional and cultural issues. Even if not trained for the area of deployment, which may not yet be anticipated, an in-depth appreciation of cultural issues in one region will make them more sensitive to similar issues in other regions.

Additionally, online regional and cultural self-study instruction can and should be developed, allowing personnel to readily receive some level of regional and cultural instruction prior to deployment.

Finally, the inclusion of a foreign language requirement in the curricula of the service academies and ROTC will encourage broader cultural understanding even if the language proficiency attained is not directly applicable to future requirements and perishes with time.
Planning and intelligence requirements for conflict with some potential adversaries are robust and well-accepted processes; but the planning and intelligence requirements for peacetime and stabilization and reconstruction activities are nearly nonexistent.

An essential part of the combatant commanders’ tool set is not merely the planning and capability to win the war fight, but also the capability to achieve regional strategic national objectives in peacetime or after a conflict. Therefore, support for the combatant commanders’ planning, spanning peacetime, combat, and stabilization and reconstruction, must occur across the intelligence community and in coordination with other U.S. agencies and departments, starting immediately.

Plans should be built relying on the same kind of tools useful for traditional preconflict and conflict planning, adapted to the objectives of peacetime and stabilization and reconstruction operations. For example, plans for stabilization and reconstruction operations (and the assumptions that undergird such plans) should be tested and evaluated using exercises, games, and predictive models to the extent possible.

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**Recommendation: Embrace Management Discipline—Intelligence Campaign Plans**

- The Combatant Commanders develop intelligence plans as a required element of their adaptive planning process
  - Intelligence campaign plans should
    - Go beyond list of requirements
    - Include realistic collection and exploitation plans for timely delivery of actionable information
    - Include metrics that support “readiness” evaluation
    - Allow for use in coalition and NGO/PVO environment
- These intelligence plans should cover and integrate all phases, including pre- and post-conflict through stabilization and reconstruction to “strategic success”
  - By definition this will include support to DOS and all other departments and agencies
- These intelligence plans should be red-teamed, exercised and evaluated for readiness

If the intelligence plans are not executable, then the operational plans are not either.
available. The stabilization and reconstruction forces should be armed with management tools necessary to guide execution of the plan.

The combatant commanders should develop intelligence plans—not just intelligence requirements, but realistic plans for fulfilling those requirements—as an essential element of their adaptive planning process, covering and integrating activities from peacetime through stabilization and reconstruction to “strategic success.” By definition, the plans will include support to the Department of State and all other departments and agencies of the U.S. government active within the combatant commander’s area of operation.

This planning process will be iterative. It will involve a range of intelligence community resources and require policy adaptations to be made by affected U.S. government agencies. For example, the impact of operations upon a nation’s food supply, electrical grid, and communications infrastructure will be of substantial interest to a range of U.S. government agencies, with whom the combatant commander will consult.

Like the broader plans, these intelligence plans should be red teamed, exercised and evaluated for readiness. The validity of assumptions needs to be probed and tested. This testing does not occur today. It must become an integral part of the development of intelligence plans in particular and the larger planning process in general.

While responsibility for the development of these plans rests with the combatant commanders, the secretary of defense should establish the above requirements, including elevating the importance of integrated planning from peacetime through stabilization and reconstruction, and expressly including credible, coordinated planning for the satisfaction of intelligence requirements for all aspects of the plans.
### Intelligence Reform: U.S. Intelligence Must Change

- Organize around tasks—"problem-centric" in response to Campaign Plans—and be analysis driven
- Human resource planning, deployment and management should be enterprise wide*
- Balance need to share vis-à-vis need to know...rethink security and counterintelligence paradigms
- Network and data architecture must be done enterprise wide*
- Accelerate Defense HUMINT improvements
- Fund within programmed resources?

*The "enterprise" includes U.S. government, commercial and academic, partners, and indigenous personnel.

This figure outlines the most important tasks of reforming the intelligence community. The recommendations relating to each of these tasks will be discussed in more detail on the following pages.
### Intelligence Reform: Focus on the Real Problem

- **Secretary of Defense should restructure the debate about reorganization in the IC to focus on analysis**
  - Director, Central Intelligence/National Intelligence Director should integrate and concentrate analytic assets around problems*
    - One issue, one place …physical or virtual
    - National and tactical, domestic and foreign
    - Community-wide analytic “boot camp” and advanced schools (analysts born joint)
  - Analysis should drive collection
    - Target development needs to be an institutionalized discipline—formal multi-INT collection strategies
  - Analysis should drive classification

*Alleviates problems associated with surge

An attractive avenue for OSD constructive engagement would be to restructure the intelligence reform debate and place the focus not on rearranging organizational boxes, but on the substantive problems that call out for attention. The 9/11 Commission points to a failure on the part of the intelligence community in creativity and imagination, largely in its analysis; yet its recommendations are all about reorganization of bureaucracies. OSD should endeavor to uplift and redirect the public dialogue, and should consider organizing, not the institutions, but the “business” processes that surround the substantive problems—beginning with the consumer’s problems and working back to the analyst and thence to collection.

That is, the intelligence community should “task organize” and become more “problem-centric.” It should consider congregating and integrating all its analytic resources around problems and mass their effect, rather than squander that effect in individual analytic enclaves constrained by their respective stovepipes. If a managed competition of ideas and analyses is desired, it should be achieved by design, not by happenstance.
The problem set for the intelligence community includes national and tactical, domestic and foreign problems.

To be successful, U.S. intelligence must operate more as a broad community than a set of principalities. This goal will not be accomplished by changing the name of the titular head of the U.S. intelligence community. It can only be accomplished when strong leadership sets the vision—and the example; adjusts the incentives; and monitors the outcomes. Only then will the rank and file internalize the sense of true community. There are, of course, some practical steps that could be taken to improve the chances of success.

The intelligence community could institute a “boot camp” for new hires, with common training, an inculcation of common virtues, and a common vision. The community workforce would—in the argot of its military colleagues—be “born joint.” It could achieve a common esprit that cuts across stovepipes and establishes networks that would similarly break down cultural barriers. This philosophy could be reinforced in common advanced schools and perfected by required cross tours—a constant “exchange of hostages,” as it were.

And, while a common personnel system may be a bridge too far, the community could ensure that effectively identical incentives were presented to the different segments of the community workforce. It should extend this notion of commonality even further upstream to the tasks of recruiting and hiring personnel. Human resource planning, management, and execution should be conducted “enterprise wide.”

Analysis should drive collection. Ultimately, intelligence should be an integral part of the combatant commander’s adaptive planning process, which should, of course, strive to achieve a plan for strategic success and embrace the spectrum of missions before, during, and after conflict.

Intelligence campaign plans that complement operational plans—not today’s intelligence support plans, which are mere laundry lists of requirements—should be developed, exercised, and assessed for readiness. If the intelligence plans are not executable, neither are their parent plans.
A new vision is to jettison the concept of data “ownership,” substituting instead the concept of data “stewardship”—recognizing that the individual organizational components of the intelligence community—or the “stovepipes”—have data for the purpose of applying it to national security problems.

A newer formulation holds that just as analysis should drive collection, analysts should play the dominant role in classification, representing as they do the consumers of the information. This idea is worth exploring.

If a national intelligence director (NID) is put in place, who has principal deputies for substance and business processes, respectively, it may be useful to be more explicit as to the derivation of classification authority and have it deliberately flow from the NID through his principal deputy for substance, and thence to the analyst as interlocutor for the consumer, rather than through process to the stovepipes.
One of the greatest challenges facing the intelligence community is how to allocate a finite pool of intelligence resources against an ever-growing list of intelligence requirements. This problem cannot be solved only with the procurement of additional intelligence resources. Indeed, what is required is a comprehensive human resource strategy to optimize the allocation of current and future intelligence resources against the critical problems facing the nation.

This observation is not intended to disclaim the fact that, for some intelligence needs, there are simply not enough assets in the community to support DOD’s intelligence activities and operations. This shortfall is exacerbated by the fact that intelligence assets often take years to develop and deploy, and are accessed from many sources and subsets of the community. The right overall mix of military, civilian, contractor, and reserve assets that the community needs to correct this shortfall can be acquired and developed through a comprehensive and integrated human resource asset strategy.

To this end the secretary of defense and the director of central intelligence (DCI) (or the national intelligence director) must create

**Intelligence Reform: Invest in Human Resources**

- **Human resource planning, management and deployment should be done enterprise-wide and include military services and civilian agencies, and the defense-commercial sector.**
  - Create an IC Human Resource Coordination Office
  - Convoke all IC human resource principals, and representatives of contractor “partners,” including “big DOD” and service observers
  - Produce a joint personnel management plan for FY2006 and beyond
    - Common recruitment, streamlined IPA and detailing procedures, and universal “boot camp” and advanced schools—all personnel are “born joint”
    - Coordinate as required with OSD(P&R) Area-Country Knowledge Initiatives
  - Issue Secretary of Defense and Director of Central Intelligence Directives (DCID) “implementers” within 90 days of receipt of “plan”
    - Implementation for industry in subsequent contract awards

**Transition to and from Hostilities**
an intelligence community human resource coordination office
empowered with the authority to create this strategy and translate it
into a manageable, enterprise-wide plan. This ambitious program
would also match community-wide personnel policies to the known
technology trends to optimize future capability. It would help shape
a better mix of human and machine tools and calibrate the right
quantity and mix of civilian, military, and contractor personnel.

It is essential that for this task the human resource coordination
office include representation by all human resource principals across
the intelligence community, including as well their contractor
partners, the "big DOD" and service providers. Their full
participation is essential in order to define the aggregate market
supply from all sources. This approach helps provide the basis for
ture planning, as it goes beyond simply inventorying the demand by
capability. The challenge of managing aggregate demand for these
additional resources will be great. There will be other U.S.
government, and even DOD, entities competing for the same human
resource. The office must aggregate and monitor this demand, and
avoid bidding against itself for skills beyond what the market will
bear over time.

It is essential that all new personnel brought into the intelligence
community under the current expansion are born joint, avoiding the
traditional initial stovepipe acculturation. This goal can be best
accomplished with a community-wide universal boot camp and
subsequent mid-level and advanced schooling that is owned and
operated above the stovepipe level. This approach, in conjunction
with a joint detailed development requirement for all in the
community, will enable the community to begin to reap the true
synergies of "jointness."

The office should produce a joint personnel management plan for
fiscal year 2006 and beyond. The plan’s mileposts would include
implementers issued by the secretary of defense and director of
central intelligence within 90 days of receipt of the plan. The industry
portion of the plan will be implemented through contract
mechanisms to be included in new awards and competitive bids.
For too long the intelligence community has overrelied on an impoverished security and counterintelligence model. It has relied almost exclusively on personnel vetting and “clearance.” Now, the community finds itself a victim of its own system.

As the community tries to enlarge its “circle of trust” in accordance with 21st-century realities and include “pickup” partners, state and local first responders, and individuals of questionable background but essential skill, such as linguists, the system is stymied.

Acquiring clearances takes next to forever, in cases where they can actually be granted. Often, there is not adequate access to conduct background investigations. As often, when the investigations can be conducted, some disqualification is found. Yet the need for people persists.

Even amongst the anointed, the community has trouble sharing information because of a classification system that overemphasizes protection of secrets, sources, and methods and is not sufficiently

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**Intelligence Reform: Adopt New Counterintelligence and Security Paradigm**

- **Analyst**—as consumer’s interlocutor—plays pivotal role in balancing need to share vs. need to know
  - Adjust policy framework, provide training, and create a dynamic process
- **Institute “Red Team J-2”**
  - Know what the adversary could have learned
  - Anticipate how he might adapt
- **Reduce over-reliance on background and vetting**
- **Reinvigorate operational security discipline and capability**
- **USD(I) take the lead**
sympathetic to the needs of the consumers. In fact, determinations of need-to-know versus need-to-share might best be taken from the stovepiped collectors and entrusted to those analysts who are interlocutors to the customers.

Placing the analyst at the fulcrum of classification determinations will require adjusting the policy framework, training analysts and consumers, and instituting a classification process that is more dynamic than at present.

The benefits are legion, however.

A related security and counterintelligence problem involves understanding what the adversary knows about the United States, how he sees it, and how he might adapt to what he may have learned about it. Combatant commanders would be well served by a "red cell," or a "red team J-2," at their joint intelligence and analytic centers.

Combatant commanders also need to appreciate more and practice better "operational security." Operational security includes traditional measures of communications security and operational security to defeat satellite reconnaissance (SATRAN). The U.S. military, with no peer competitor, may have come to feel that it is unimportant to attend to the annoying, distracting, practice of operational security. In this era of asymmetric adversaries, however, there are new threats that must be dealt with.

Finally, we return to the issue of personnel security as the bedrock. For instance, depending upon circumstances, the following might be selectively substituted

- Close supervision
- Use of multiple, redundant sources

Executed appropriately and well, these and other measures can allow the intelligence community to gainfully employ less-than-fully-vetted individuals who possess needed skills and knowledge.
The intelligence community now has an information architecture organized along stovepipes that reflect individual disciplines, creating barriers to integrated information exchange. While DOD has an enterprise-wide architecture for communications, the intelligence community needs to develop one that spans the breadth of its own enterprise but, at the same time, is in harmony with, and able to interface into, the DOD architecture.

The NID and the secretary of defense should together assure that the intelligence community’s chief information officer (CIO) better integrates data and network architectures to support robust enterprise-wide collaboration.10

This approach is not about new information technology investments; it is about ensuring that the systems that are acquired can operate within a horizontally integrated data environment

10. It is gratifying to see that the intelligence community, which had shorn itself of the CIO function, has recently recovered it.
together with implementing protocols and policies that can be used across the entire community.

The solution is not simply a matter of network integration and portals. Rather it involves developing a data architecture that includes a consistent schema for indexing and tagging data, common data standards and formats, as well as “new data” alerts. With such an architecture it would be possible for DOD and its sister civilian agencies to access shared databases of people, things, and issues, including not only foreign data, but domestic data as well. The entire intelligence community would be able to search, retrieve, and share information more efficiently and quickly.

While appropriate security policies are always important and necessary, it is critical that such policies not overly impede the collaborative process across the community. Ideally, the exchange of information would occur not merely across the enterprise horizontally, but vertically, from collector to analyst to consumer.

For example, while there are already substantial collaborative data-sharing efforts among some intelligence agencies, such efforts must be extended horizontally and vertically, to enable intelligence customers to become involved in the production process at the earliest point at which data is useful—that is, the earliest point at which they, themselves, can add value to the data.

The goal is to make the data exchange process an integral component of the community’s basic architecture and not merely an ad hoc graft onto existing structures and processes. Ideally this community-wide collaborative structure will yield communities of interest that link experts into virtual teams. In some cases, these communities will include academics, think tanks, and other experts who will be permitted to interact with community experts in unclassified spaces—challenging each other’s assumptions, drawing upon open source information, and building a broader perspective.
The likelihood of asymmetric warfare and transnational or subnational adversaries emphasizes the need to harmonize intelligence operations (including covert action) with the activities of special operations forces (SOF).

To defeat its adversaries, the United States must improve, and more importantly meld, the activities of its intelligence agencies and its special operations forces. If this can be successfully accomplished, our adversaries — whether states or their transnational surrogates — will no longer be able to operate with impunity in places beyond U.S. operational reach.

We have entered an era in which many of the traditional components of U.S. power are difficult to use — particularly in peacetime and stabilization and reconstruction situations. The reasons for this circumstance are manifold:

- Many of the nation’s major weapons of warfare are difficult to bring to bear — and require extensive deployment to become totally effective.

### Intelligence Reform: SOF and Specialized Capabilities

- USD(P) and USD(I) harmonize SOF, covert action and intelligence
  - Of particular value in transitions associated with the pre- and post-conflict periods
  - Jointly plan and exercise all pre- and post-conflict intelligence activities
  - All parties able to align and operate title 10 to title 50 activities seamlessly and flexibly in the field (including shift of command)
  - Strong, joint, common oversight

- USD(I) accelerate Defense HUMINT reinvention—ensure harmonization with CIA
The effects of these weapons are often too indiscriminate to support the range of situations encountered in peacetime and in stabilization and reconstruction operations.

The targets of interest during peacetime and stabilization and reconstruction operations are highly granular, which increases targeting difficulties.

The public information cycle for peacetime and during stabilization and reconstruction tends to be faster than the intelligence cycle—one’s adversary can use events, even attacks on point targets, to his own advantage. The information disadvantage is made more acute when there are no assets in place to provide objective “ground truth.”

These factors demand new capabilities that can provide needed information, while also providing operational wherewithal. In short, an exceptional blend of intelligence and special operations capabilities is needed—postured in critical places and harmonized to perform operations across the spectrum of conflict.

This harmonization cannot be achieved without careful attention to detail. A robust joint, interagency program where peacetime and stabilization and reconstruction intelligence activities and special operations can be exercised is an operational imperative.

The future will require U.S. forces to conduct intelligence and special operations worldwide on short notice. U.S. forces must be postured to take advantage of fleeting intelligence and to perform both title 10 and title 50 activities seamlessly and flexibly in the field. U.S. forces must be able to work as a team, shifting operational command between agencies should events or policies require such a shift. U.S. forces must also be able to integrate their activities with the nation’s law enforcement capabilities when rendition is the preferred option.

Finally, these activities must be conducted within the guidelines of strong and common oversight. It is the activities themselves, not
the flow of authorities, which determine the need for and nature of oversight.

In addition to harmonizing capabilities, it is critical that the nation have sufficient capabilities in total. In particular, it is essential to have a sufficient number of skilled and experienced personnel in the field in countries ripe and important, and for sufficient periods of time. This requirement cannot be met just before a crisis if U.S. personnel are to be well connected locally and understand the situation thoroughly. More resources are needed in the field than are now available. They must be emplaced as soon as possible to be ready and productive when called upon. To that end the transformation of the Defense Human Intelligence (HUMINT) Service, which is going in the right direction, needs to be substantially accelerated.
It sometimes seems as if operations in the government are like those in real estate, where the top three priorities are location, location, and location. For the bureaucracy, it often seems as if the three top priorities are resources, resources, resources.

While this task force remains somewhat divided on the topic, we are willing to consider abandoning the steady drumbeat for more resources. The U.S. intelligence community has experienced significant growth in the past few years. The intelligence budget, which remains classified in general and in its specifics, reportedly has grown faster than any other federal budget sector.

The counterpoint is that the growth during this administration merely redresses the cuts of the previous administration. Still, the budget amounts to a tidy sum.

We believe it is possible to manage changes needed in the intelligence community within the current budgetary allotment. Indeed, the community probably can accomplish these changes within ceiling with some qualifications, to include the following:

**Intelligence Reform: Funding**

- **Intelligence recommendations will have to be achieved within current resources** … can be, if:
  - The current program of record is sustained, 2006–2010
    - NFIP may need to roll in some supplemental funding
  - Cold War–vintage capabilities are replaced by 21st century systems
  - Congress provides expanded reprogramming and management authority for the NID
  - Advanced technology is rapidly adopted
    - Knowledge systems
    - Persistent sensors

*2000–2005 intelligence funding has grown faster than any other federal budget sector*
- The current program of record is sustained between 2006 and 2010.
- Even if the current program is sustained there may be the need to roll supplemental funding into the base program.
- Vintage cold war systems are replaced by 21st-century systems and the community can recover (locally) all the resources that were earmarked for that legacy system.
- Congress provides less constrained reprogramming authorities.
- The acquisition of technology and its insertion is made less cumbersome than it is today.
- Knowledge systems generally are acquired, as are persistent sensor system(s).
Languages are a key enabler of country and area knowledge. Our assessment is that DOD lacks sufficient personnel with languages and skills required.

The importance of language skill resources is recognized by OSD, and the Strategic Planning Guidance directs the development of a language transformation roadmap to transform language capabilities within the DOD.

The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness (OUSD[P&R]) has established a language transformation team, and they are developing a language transformation roadmap to be delivered to the deputy secretary of defense by September 30, 2004.

What the OSD language transformation team has found so far is that DOD does not have an effective foreign language oversight program.

- There is no systematic requirements determination process.
- There is no comprehensive and accurate database of DOD personnel with language skills.

Languages—A Key Enabler

• Language Assessment: Quantity and skill shortages in many high-priority countries
• Strategic Planning Guidance FY06-11 requires the development of a Defense Language Roadmap to transform language capabilities within the DOD
• A Defense Language Transformation Team was established to research issues, develop proposals, and inform policy
• The team found that DOD does not have an effective foreign language oversight program
  - No systematic requirements determination
  - No comprehensive and accurate database of DOD personnel with language skills.
This figure shows historical DOD language inventories (in selected languages) from 1985 through 2004 and the percentage change over that period. It is important to note that these numbers reflect both individuals that have taken the Defense Language Proficiency Test (DLPT) and those whose proficiency is self-assessed. These numbers are therefore on the high side.

Many of these personnel did not get all of their language training through the Department of Defense; some may be highly proficient immigrant native-language “heritage” speakers, while others learned the language to varying degrees of proficiency while in school.

While DOD has considerably increased the number of Arabic and Chinese speakers over the past five years, it is noteworthy that the number of French, German, and Russian speakers is still high. While one could argue that French is widely spoken and hence useful in accomplishing U.S. global objectives, or that knowledge of Russian is a precursor to learning other languages, such as Chechnian, it is nevertheless apparent that there is something wrong.
We have been assured that the current requirements generation system for the Defense Language Institute is being refined to more accurately reflect current language requirements. What we are concerned with is further refining the language training requirements system to anticipate tomorrow's requirements.
The DOD language transformation team has looked at a number of initiatives to improve the department’s language resources and readiness. Many of its initiatives are still in the development phase. This report recommends special emphasis on the points listed in the figure above. The devil is in the implementation details. In particular, levels of security clearance access and personnel investigation requirements will determine the speed and effectiveness with which these initiatives can be implemented. Additionally, there are service career development, distribution, and resource issues that may affect implementation.

The OSD team appears to have done some very good work. However, it will be important to establish metrics to measure the progress and effectiveness of these initiatives and to task execution and oversight responsibility. It is our opinion that without specific tasking and firm oversight, it is unlikely that these initiatives will be successfully carried out and resourced for execution.

The report of the language transformation team is due to the deputy secretary of defense on September 30, 2004.
It is vital that measurable actions be required to ensure execution of the initiatives OSD has already undertaken and the additional actions that this study recommends. These metrics will allow leadership to assess progress, status, and future needs. To ensure execution, it is also important that these initiatives have visibility in the competition for resources. Visibility is essential to ensure that the resources allocated for language programs are not used for other priorities of more immediate importance to service personnel planners.
Open sources can provide much of the information required to support peacetime needs and stabilization and reconstruction operations. They could be utilized to better effect, however. It is almost always the case that, because anyone can do open source analysis, no one really does it. Or, at least no one does it really well.

The definition of “open source” — or open source intelligence (OSINT) — can encompass more or less, depending on who writes the definition. At root, open source, in the context of foreign intelligence, refers to the exploitation of foreign media, both print and electronic, and more recently digital. Beyond foreign media, open source can be said to include “gray literature” and Internet chat rooms, as well as information from experts in academe and industry. Gray literature refers to specialized publications provided to or for “affinity groups” — publications such as stock holders’ reports and technical brochures.

Open sources can make their contribution directly to intelligence products and/or as the context in which classified information becomes understandable. They can also serve as the launch pad for
clandestine operations. Especially valuable are value-added, commercially prepared collections of information such as Janes’ All the World’s this and that, or Lloyd’s Shipping Registry.

The extent to which open sources contribute to intelligence and intelligence products has long been the source of urban legend. The famous spy master Allen Dulles allowed as how open sources would answer some 80 percent of policy makers’ questions. Dulles’s calculus, however, included consular reporting, which is not normally included today.

Some number of years ago, experts studied the relative contributions of the various collection disciplines—signals, imagery, technical collection, embassy reporting, and open source—to current intelligence products. The results are sketchily depicted on the accompanying graph, which plots the contributions as a function of their relative costs.

Open sources were found to make a major contribution, comparable to human intelligence (HUMINT) and consular reporting, while costing noticeably less. There is every reason to expect that for the compendium of information required both for peacetime and for stabilization and reconstruction operations, the relative contribution of open source intelligence would be even greater.
Recommendations: Open Source

- **USD(I) designate DIA as Executive Agent for oversight, planning and (most) direct execution**
  - Separately budget so that it does not compete with “core business” of the Executive Agent
  - Fund for the central procurement resolution of intellectual property rights
  - Consider “industrial funding” model for open-source-analytic and other value-added products; Executive Agent would qualify the vendors
- **Fund demonstrations of linking and e-business paradigms on Intellink TS and S**
- **Change the lanes in the road so that every single source agency produces two-source integrated product …e.g., SIGINT and open source, or geo-spatial and open source**
- **Design the enterprise-wide data architecture to support and exploit linkages provided by open source**

To establish and sustain a robust and coherent open source program, the under secretary of defense for intelligence (USD[I]) should appoint the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) as executive agent. Information is the stock and trade of intelligence; and within the Department of Defense, DIA is the logical candidate to serve as executive agent.

The open source executive agent should be resourced accordingly, in a separate program which must not be forced to compete with any core business area of the executive agent. The program should contain resources to procure intellectual property rights, enterprise-wide. Otherwise, while unclassified, such copyrighted materials could not be shared—paradoxical, when it is so difficult to share classified information. For “value-added” products, an industrial funding model might be appropriate. The executive agent should qualify the vendors and assure quality.

Open sources can provide a Rosetta stone to link together pieces of classified information and to marry classified information with consumers who would benefit from it. If an open source specimen is
related to, say, a signals intelligence (SIGINT) product and to an imagery intelligence (IMINT) product, then that SIGINT and IMINT product are necessarily related. (Can horizontal integration be so simple?) If a consumer has an interest in an open source specimen, and if that open source specimen is related to an intelligence product, then that user has an interest in that intelligence product.

Thus, several paradigms for getting the right information into the right hands can operate:

- **Requirements by example:**
  - “I am interested in this piece of open source, show me other intelligence products like it.”
  - “If you are interested in this piece of open source, can I show you other intelligence products like it?”

- **The Great Collaborator**
  - “You and I are both interested in this piece of open source: let’s talk.”
  - “You two are interested in this piece of open source, why don’t you two talk?”

The executive agent should fund and execute advanced concept technology demonstrations to explore such linking to and through open sources.

Separately, the USD(I) should reexamine why today’s single-source agencies should not each produce a “two-source” integrated product that draws from both classified and open source materials. Concurrently, the intelligence community’s chief information officer should design the enterprise-wide data architecture to support and exploit linkages provided by open source.

Open source materials can be categorized as either “primary” or “value-added,” the former being the feedstock for the latter. Value-added products are generally created for a particular purpose and bring exogenous information, modeling, and analysis to bear on the primary materials.
Value-added products are frequently compendiums of information, and can be as simple a compilation as the telephone book. The value added, beyond the simple assemblage, is the organization and indexing, in this case. At the other end of the spectrum are multivolume works of nonfiction where the commentary can exceed, by far, the primary input, much like the Talmud.

The value-added open source products required for peacetime populate a long laundry list of information requirements not much different from the intelligence that the services use on a day-to-day basis. These products are the things that the intelligence community has lumped under the feckless slogan: “know something of intelligence value about everything and everyplace.”

The requirements for stabilization and reconstruction can be better isolated and more easily distinguished. A sample of such products, listed below, offers a sense of the possible and a measure of the diversity.

- **Genealogical trees.** It is important to know the network surrounding “high-value targets” and other persons of importance in stabilization and reconstruction. The family structure is an important segment of that network, especially in countries where intervention is judged to be likely.

- **Electricity generation and grid studies.** Of interest are maps and city plans, annotated with as much infrastructure and demographic information as possible. The electrical generating and distribution infrastructure is an obvious example.

- **Polls and focus groups.** In the effort to support U.S. strategic communication programs and public diplomacy, it is important to know the audience, their attitudes, susceptibility to change in those attitudes, and, in the event, the changed attitudes that did result.

- **Cultural materials in support of strategic communication plans.** Another aspect of knowing the audience is
surmising how, based on their group identity, they will respond to certain stimuli—a clinical definition of culture.

- **Background information for noncombatant evacuation operations.** Every ambassador, in coordination with the combatant commander in whose area of responsibility the country is represented, has plans for the emergency evacuation of noncombatants. These individuals include U.S. and foreign national personnel in the mission, and American citizens in-country. These plans are founded on considerable information that can be openly acquired.
U.S. military forces currently have a superb capability for finding and tracking conventional war targets, such as weapons and military facilities. However, these intelligence assets have a poor capability for finding, identifying, and tracking unconventional war targets, such as individuals and insurgent or terrorist groups that operate by blending in with the larger society.
Identifying and tracking unconventional targets is difficult for a variety of reasons. For one, these unconventional targets are generally few in number, and they typically include individuals, weapons, and the activities associated with them. Individuals do not wear military uniforms and they mingle with much larger numbers of civilians. Their housing, clothing, transport (cars and commercial trucks), and communications are derived from those employed by surrounding civilians.

Enemy installations look like (or may actually be) civilian installations that are very undesirable targets (such as schools, mosques, hospitals, and factories). The equipment and materials used to fabricate unconventional weapons, such as improvised explosive devices or weapons of mass destruction (chemical, biological, or nuclear), also have civilian applications in areas such as biotechnology, chemical engineering, food processing, and energy production.

Together, these factors make it extremely difficult to find, identify, and track unconventional targets of interest. As will be discussed
later in this chapter, the difficulty is furthered by the relatively low density of such targets, ranging from perhaps one in ten thousand to as little as one in a million indigenous persons. Thus, the challenges associated with tracking unconventional targets are dramatically different from those faced in conventional warfare, where relatively few civilians are intermixed with enemy forces and military forces employ distinctive uniforms, transport systems, and combat equipment.

In the remainder of this chapter we will discuss, in more detail, the following aspects of this very difficult challenge:

- The types of targets of interest
- Available or emerging technologies that might be relevant
- An organizational proposal aimed specifically at solving the problem of detecting insurgencies
In the discussion above, we indicated that the list of entities to be identified, located, and tracked includes both “people” (friend, enemy, and those of uncertain affinity) and “things” (contraband, vehicles, and supplies, for example). However, we believe that efforts to deal with these unconventional threats will be best organized if “activities” are specifically added to this list. As with people and things, the examination of relevant activities introduces the challenge of identifying enemy activities that are buried in a vast background of nonhostile activities with similar observables.

**Integration**

Further complicating the broad scope and diversity of this challenge is the realization that the candidate people, things, and activities that DOD screens will likely not be either all good or all bad, nor static in their character or relationship to the United States. The basic approach must, therefore, be expansive in capturing intelligence target sets and developing relevant databases.

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### Example Targets of Interest

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PEOPLE</th>
<th>THINGS</th>
<th>ACTIVITIES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Adversary leaders and sympathizers</td>
<td>Nuclear weapon facilities, materials, and components</td>
<td>Travel and communications of potential interest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nuclear weapons experts</td>
<td>High explosives</td>
<td>Recruiting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Explosive experts</td>
<td>Precision machinery</td>
<td>Financial transactions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Networks, groups and organizations of interest</td>
<td>Pharmaceutical plants and houses</td>
<td>Internet activity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financers of terrorism</td>
<td>Specialized instruments and consumables</td>
<td>Pathogen genome sequencing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Previously identified person</td>
<td>Pathogens and seed stocks</td>
<td>Organizational activity and meetings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subject matter experts (professionals, graduate students)</td>
<td>Vehicles</td>
<td>Shipment of sensitive materials</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Integration is essential*
Correlation and tracking systems must be located inside a controlled/stored data environment and employ advances in technology.

Analysis systems should be constructed to detect and alert analysts to changes in the character, state, and implied threat. By casting a large net, it should be possible to detect trends and patterns that would elude spot checking and, thus, create an understanding of total processes through integration of dissimilar data. For example, a truck bomb may be reduced, for purposes of identification, to an individual driver, a vehicle, and a shipping container. Each of these elements has a separate history, and separately, they may have been innocuous, presenting no cause for alarm. However, forensic information regarding previous sponsorship, associations, and point of origin may be gleaned by following each of these identity elements, even to a point before they were integrated into a single weapon and assumed a hostile character for the first time.
In our analysis, we divide the problem of “identification” into two parts:

- The identification of objects or people from surveillance data
- The verification of a specific individual’s identification given a set of credentials and/or biometric information

In addition to analysts conventionally screening surveillance data, several technologies are maturing that can be applied to the first part of the problem. Automatic target recognition technologies have become mature enough to use for the detection of classic military targets (tanks, etc.) in both overhead visible and infrared imagery. Similar technologies are under development for the detection of personnel and/or other smaller, militarily significant objects from video and multispectral imagery. Acoustic and seismic signal processing techniques have been developed for classification of a variety of sources (e.g., vehicles passing unattended ground sensors). A variety of radiological, chemical, and biological sensors exist or are
under development. Significant challenges remain in the development of sensors that simultaneously achieve the desired sensitivity, selectivity, and operational robustness. There will also be significant challenges in the design and operation of integrated networks of these sensors.

In addition, a variety of biometric techniques are becoming available for the specific identification of a particular individual. These techniques include fingerprints, palm prints, iris scans, DNA, face recognition, voice recognition, and gait recognition. Each of these techniques has advantages and disadvantages in terms of false-positive and false-negative rates, specificity, and the inconvenience and/or delay associated with its application.

For real-time identification applications, such as checkpoint screening, it is possible that a combination of at least two of these techniques will be required to achieve the desired performance. For checkpoint screening, iris scans or fingerprint scans combined with face recognition are currently viewed as offering a reasonably effective compromise among speed, accuracy, ease of implementation, and cost. Smart ID cards that can store biometric data are readily available commercially. Although the potential use of such cards in the United States has raised privacy concerns, their ability to establish identity rapidly and assist in the creation of order in a postwar or postdisaster society could be quite powerful.

The surveillance of people, things, and activities required to populate the databases needed for identification, location, and tracking will require a persistence beyond that typical of many of today’s intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) sensors. Furthermore, because many contraband items (e.g., high explosives and hand-held weapons) have small signatures, they will be very difficult to detect without sensors that are in very close proximity. For example, a car with a bomb in it, a truck with weapons components in the back, or a person with a bomb strapped to his or her body would be nearly impossible to differentiate from the surrounding environment with a long-range sensor of any kind. However, the population of databases with relevant historical information, and the application of evidence-correlating and backtracking algorithms, may someday shift the burden of this
detection from a close-range ISR system to an evidentiary reasoning system that detects the target through past observations of people, things, and activities.

The shortcomings of conventional ISR systems to locate and track people and things of interest are of critical importance and can be enhanced with the introduction of tags. Tagging individuals and material can provide a powerful new tool for locating these modern threats. A tag is defined as something that is attached to the item to be located and/or tracked, which increases its ability to be detected or its probability of identification by a surveillance system suitably tuned to the tag. Tags can be either active (such as radio-emitting tags) or passive (such as radio frequency identification [RFID] tags). Passive tags can also be chemical (such as infrared fluorescent) or biological in nature. The technologies required for tagging and associated surveillance represent a very important area for research and technology development.

Today, concepts and visions of operational systems that could perform these tasks are all that exist, since many sensor and analysis concepts are still in their infancy. A variety of technologies support the processes of identifying, locating, and tracking people, things, and activities. The maturity and usefulness of these technologies vary considerably.
The task of identifying and tracking people, things, and activities in hostile, highly cluttered environments is extremely difficult. Given the broad array of potential “targets” and the wide assortment of individual technologies that may have to be brought to bear, an integrated, coherent approach is required, specifically focused on the identification, tagging, tracking, and locating (ID/TTL) problem.

Unfortunately, although much good work is going on today, it is currently disjointed and poorly coordinated across activities, organizations, and interests. What is needed is the creation of a discipline—not “just” a set of excellent programs—focused on the overall ID/TTL problem. The way to achieve the needed focus is to establish an organization whose sole responsibility is to provide leadership, integration, coordination, and clarity of purpose.

The primary task for this organization is to provide the “glue” that binds together the overall technical approach; the systems and technology to implement the approach; the analysis techniques that will turn sensor data into useful ID/TTL information; and the field operations that will employ, utilize, and support the hardware and
software that will be produced. In some cases, the organization will provide a leadership role, such as in the creation of an integrated overall ID/TTL structure; the development of the required technologies; the research, development, and production of the needed sensor and processing systems; the establishment of standards; the development of the data and analysis structure and techniques that will be applied to the collected data; and the developmental test and evaluation that will prove the efficacy of the techniques and equipment and provide feedback to the developers and producers.

The organization will also play important supporting roles, to provide the necessary connection between the technical and the operational worlds. Issues such as concepts of operation; tactics, techniques, and procedures development; operator training; and the way in which field operations are conducted are primary responsibilities of user organizations, but must be considered against what is possible or practical operationally and what is effective technically. The supporting role played by this ID/TTL organization will provide those needed technical inputs.

All of the concepts and solutions provided by the organization must be subject to red teaming if they are to be robust in terms of both technical and tactical countermeasures. We believe that formal red teaming should be performed by an independent organization, but clearly much of the effort, and the incorporation of lessons learned, will be the responsibility of the ID/TTL organization. This responsibility must be planned for and must become a clear component of the organizational culture.

Lastly, there will be a number of policy issues associated with the creation of a robust ID/TTL capability. The organization must play a major role in providing feedback to the leadership in the Office of the Secretary of Defense on the impact of alternative policy directions on the development of an ID/TTL capability and in determining how to best adapt to the policy directives that are eventually established.
The DSB examined a number of organizational approaches to the establishment of an ID/TTL entity. In the end, the task force decided that this recommendation is so all-encompassing that it transcends adding an assignment to an existing organization or even coming to a conclusion about beginning a new organization. Instead, we recommended that the secretary of defense, himself, along with the new head of the intelligence community, jointly compose a course of action. We believe that this action will involve beginning a new organization, and whether that organization reports to the secretary of defense or the head of intelligence is a matter for them to decide. We see this recommendation as much more than a new focus; it has strong parallels to founding a new mission-oriented agency.

However it might eventually be constituted, the task of the organization would be to develop the capability for U.S. military forces to detect, identify, and track individuals and objects such that the United States can achieve the same advantage finding targets in asymmetric warfare that it currently has in conventional warfare.

**Recommendation:**

**Establish “Manhattan Project”-Like Program for TTL**

- **Vision**
  - Locate, identify, and track people, things, and activities—in an environment of one in a million—to give the United States the same advantage in asymmetric warfare it has today in conventional warfare

- **Structure requires that CIA, Defense, Justice, and Homeland Security**
  - Agree this is an urgent national security requirement
  - Agree on centralized management to conduct research, acquire systems, implement architecture, manage operations, and integrate results
  - Agree on funding, legal, ethical, and jurisdictional issues
  - Agree on executive responsibility
  - Acknowledge this function as a Presidential priority

*The global war on terrorism cannot be won without a “Manhattan Project”-like TTL program. Cost is not the issue; failure in the global war on terrorism is the real question.*
Cold war collection systems are inadequate to obtain the information required in the transition to and from hostilities. Immediate and sustained leadership is required to develop intrusive, close in, networked systems, with an operational focus sufficient to introduce these systems to the user community in the near term. The development of these capabilities (e.g., targeting, tracking, and locating systems) requires sufficient funding so that ideas, not dollars, become the limiting resource. System scope must include science and technology, architecture design, standards development, system development, red teaming, operational lessons learned, analysis and correlation of databases, training, and maintenance across the many different user communities, both governmental and nongovernmental, that will need such capabilities. This focus will not happen without strong and committed leadership from the secretary of defense.
CHAPTER 7. SUMMARY AND KEY RECOMMENDATIONS

Some Important Issues Not Thoroughly Addressed

- **Enlisting allies and coalition partners**
  - For peacetime planning and practicing
  - With very different resources and skills

- **Building a more capable government, not just a more capable DOD**
  - Congressional attention is aligned by department, not by pan-government functions like stabilization
  - Most departments and agencies are not set up to respond to unanticipated demands with supplemental funding

- **Describing the process of employing all instruments of U.S. power to support the prevention of conflict as well as the conflict and post-conflict period**

- **Harmonizing homeland security with overseas missions**

Although the scope of our study was broad, there were important subjects we did not address, or we addressed only superficially as the above figure shows.

It is particularly worth highlighting that, despite good intentions, the structure and operation of the Congress, with its numerous committees and staff, is poorly structured to address the kind of foreign policy challenges and requirements we have addressed in this study. Transforming the executive branch without also transforming the Congress will likely prove ineffective, or at least frustrating. We have recommended procedural change rather than irksome reorganization as the way to improve functioning in the executive branch, and we believe that the same principle might apply to the Congress.
Certain leitmotifs have pervaded our study:

- Certain critical capabilities require preparation years in advance — the United States cannot succeed at the last minute.
- Coordination, the traditional interagency currency in the government, is necessary but insufficient for orchestration and success.
- Shortchanging fundamental capabilities and preparation actually raises costs — significantly.
- Continuous, vigilant attention and action is the best way to be poised to face global surprise.
Mr. Secretary, we respectfully recommend . . .

. . . that you use your authority to . . .

- Direct the regional combatant commanders to maintain a portfolio of contingency operational campaign plans
  - Spanning peacetime, war, stabilization and reconstruction
  - For countries ripe and important
- In support of these plans
  - Direct your intelligence organs to maintain a portfolio of contingency intelligence campaign plans
  - Direct the Services to reshape and rebalance their forces to provide a stabilization and reconstruction capability, meeting as well as possible the criteria we have proposed for an effective S&R capability
  - Direct OSD, the Joint Staff, and the Services to make language and cultural capability part of the normal readiness assessment and requirements process

We strongly urge the secretary of defense to use his authorities to direct the regional combatant commanders to broaden the aperture of their disciplined planning process to encompass not only combat, as now, but the peacetime employment of military instruments as well as the department’s capabilities for stabilization and emergency reconstruction.

For that expanded planning activity to have meaning, the secretary should instruct his intelligence organs to maintain, and execute, a portfolio of concomitant intelligence campaign plans supporting the aforementioned regional combatant commanders’ operations plans.

Executing the stabilization and reconstruction operational elements of campaign plans will require vastly expanded and improved stabilization and emergency reconstitution capabilities, and we ask the secretary to instruct the services to ensure those capabilities are available to the regional combatant commanders. In planning for the provision of those capabilities, the services need to
perform quantitative analysis of their likely expected needs with at least the same veracity as they do for combat force structure.

The secretary should also direct the services to take skills in languages and cultures as seriously as they take skills in combat; otherwise the nation may win the war but will surely “lose the peace.”
Mr. Secretary, we respectfully recommend . . .

. . . that you use your authority to . . .

- Accelerate the transformation of the Defense HUMINT Service to provide sustained coverage
- Direct DIA to revitalize our collection, analysis, and use of open source information
- Direct your intelligence organs to substantially improve all-source analysis
  - Address the gamut of selection and recruitment, training, equipping, and rewarding all-source analysts
  - Expand the role of senior analysts so as to shape collection and classification
  - Perform analysis in a problem-centered manner
  - Ensure that analysts are “born joint” so that analysis is aligned with intelligence questions rather than organizational divisions
- Ensure adequate attention and resources are devoted to close-in, terrestrial sensing, tagging, and tracking so as to find the targets most important in asymmetric warfare

The foundation of the aforementioned planning, and operational execution, is intelligence, information, knowledge, and understanding.

The secretary should accelerate the ongoing transformation of the Defense HUMINT Service, with particular attention to ensuring that the nation has the global coverage and sustained foreign presence that is needed in regions ripe and important. This is a long-lead item: if the department does not lay the HUMINT groundwork years in advance, and sustain its attention and presence, the United States will not be prepared.

Much of the needed information and knowledge can be found in unclassified sources, although we acknowledge it may take a lot of work to find and organize it. The pursuit, exploration, and exploitation of open sources have taken a back seat to learning secrets. While we in no way denigrate the importance of the latter, we ask the secretary to instruct DIA to establish a vital and active effort focused on using open sources to provide information on cultures,
infrastructure, genealogy, religions, economics, politics, and the like in regions, areas, and states deemed ripe and important.

All-source analysis can transform raw intelligence, data, and information into knowledge and understanding. Analysis is not just an art form, but also a craft and engineering discipline demanding specific attentiveness to recruiting individuals with the right skills and mental capacities, providing adequate and continuing training, providing feedback and assessment, equipping with the right computer tools, and ensuring incentives to promote creativity and insulation from group pressure. We ask the secretary to direct all of his intelligence organs to jointly enhance all-source analysis.

Finally, in light of the actual enemies, weapons, materiel, installations, tactics, and strategies the United States faces in dealing with failing and failed states, U.S. ISR capabilities, brilliant though they are, are inadequate to the task, insofar as they were developed for cold war purposes. More intimate, terrestrial, 21st-century ISR is required, composed of elements like tagging, tracking, and locating capabilities. A “Manhattan Project” in scale, intensity, and focus is required to transform the nation’s portfolio of tagging, tracking, and locating programs into an institutionalized discipline to serve the United States for decades to come. We ask the secretary to instigate that development swiftly; again, this is a long-lead item demanding preparation years in advance of need.
In addition to strengthening capabilities within the Department of Defense, we urge the secretary to use his considerable influence to propel needed changes that span the government’s agencies and departments or that are centered on cabinet departments other than Defense. We identify three areas where the secretary’s effort could have considerable impact.

The secretary can accelerate the institutionalization of an effective pangovernment strategic planning and integration process for addressing issues in countries ripe and important; but need not wait to institute DOD’s own improvements in planning, stabilization, strategic communication, and intelligence.

The secretary should lend his support to the efforts of other departments and agencies as they undergo transformation, particularly in their approach to instituting management discipline for contingency planning and for maintaining contingency capabilities.

Finally, the secretary should urge the establishment of an effective national strategic communication capability and lend DOD’s resources and capabilities to this effort, as appropriate.
### Urgent Action is Called For

- If everything we recommend is implemented over the next five years . . .
- But we continue our current policy of undertaking military expeditions every two years . . .
- We will begin two more stabilization operations without sufficient preparation or resources . . .
- And anything started wrong tends to continue wrong

*We can implement many of the recommendations now.*

*The sooner we start on the long-lead items, the sooner we will be ready.*

In any large organization things change slowly. If our recommendations were to be implemented in DOD and across the executive branch in, say, five years, it would be an unprecedented display of speed and urgency. However, if the nation continues its habit of engaging in new and additional stabilization and reconstruction operations every two years, during that period the United States will begin two new commitments—unprepared. And something started wrong tends to stay wrong.

We urge greater than usual speed in implementing the recommendations in our study.
Appendix A. Terms of Reference
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MEMORANDUM FOR CHAIRMAN, DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD

SUBJECT: Terms of Reference - Defense Science Board 2004 Summer Study on the Transition to and from Hostilities

You are requested to form a Defense Science Board (DSB) Task Force addressing the Transition to and from Hostilities.

Our military expeditions to Afghanistan and Iraq are unlikely to be the last such excursion in the global war on terrorism. We may need to support an ally under attack by terrorists determined to replace the legitimate government; we may need to effect change in the governance of a country that is blatantly sustaining support for terrorism; or we may need to assist an ally who is unable to govern areas of their own country – where terrorists may recruit, train and plan without interference by the legitimate government.

Our armed forces are extremely capable of projecting force and achieving conventional military victory. However, we have learned that sustainment of military success must be accompanied by concomitant location of enemy leaders, location of weapons including WMD, interruption of terrorist’s finances, and interdiction of couriers providing communication so as to truly progress in the global war on terrorism. These latter challenges cannot be ensured during hostilities unless there has been effective intelligence preparation of the battlespace in the years – not weeks or months – preceding hostilities.

Furthermore, we have and will encounter significant challenges following conventional military success as we seek to ensure stability, democracy, human rights and a productive economy. Achieving these ends would be facilitated by successful shaping activities in the years before the outbreak of hostilities, as well as exploiting the capabilities not traditional to our armed forces in the period following hostilities.

To enhance the effectiveness across this spectrum of pre- and post-conflict issues, the 2004 Summer Study shall focus on the following issues:

1. Understanding and shaping the environment: the gathering of long-lead intelligence and effective preparation of the battlespace — in the absence of an immediate threat — requires diligence, foresight and preparation.
Long-lead intelligence preparation of the battlespace will involve terrestrial sensing, tagging and tracking in concert with HUMINT, SIGINT, and open sources; and the application of sophisticated means of data tracking in cyberspace. Are there gaps in our technology? How can we assess our 'intelligence readiness', as we now assess our military readiness, in selected regions where hostilities may occur?

Shaping is extremely complicated, requires significant cultural understanding and a long attention span, well in advance of hostilities.

The handoff from long-term shaping efforts to shorter term DoD interests can significantly impact the intensity of hostilities and its aftermath.

- Likewise, the post-hostility environment is likely to be affected significantly by details of the war prosecution such as collateral damage and treatment of combatants and civilians alike.

How can our capabilities in shaping, language and cultural understanding be enhanced by technology?

2. Force protection during transition: Increasingly, US military forces rely more on speed and mobility than hardening to achieve their objectives. In the transition to the post hostilities phase, forces become much more stationary, and become easier targets for residual resistance. What technologies, and tactics, techniques, and procedures can provide force protection during transformation from maneuver warfare to peace keeping operations such as a garrison force charged with establishing order?

3. Disarmament and destruction of munitions stocks: The deposed regime may leave behind many dangerous devices; e.g. conventional munitions and WMD, and other legacies. What capabilities are needed to address disposal, as well as environmental and security issues associated with these unwanted devices?

4. Intelligence exploitation in the aftermath: Rapid, decisive battlespace victory can produce a rich vein of captured documents, materiel, and human sources, but their exploitation, today, is personnel-intensive and requires good language skills coupled with substantive and cultural understanding. What approaches can more swiftly and economically process said collection?

5. Stabilizing the civilian population: There will be inevitable need to address problems of refugees and displaced persons, mortuary assistance, food
supply, housing and health care. DoD will likely be charged with these challenges: what preparation, training and technology can be applied to facilitate these elements of infrastructure?

6. Re-establishing the rule of law: One important step in establishing order is the need to reconstitute a constabulary force. Improvements are needed in our methods for vetting applicants, tracking them and their behavior, and avoiding friendly fire incidents between them and our own forces. Improved technologies are desirable for their selection, training, and interoperability with US forces. Furthermore, the use of precision munitions results in much less damage to the enemy's military infrastructure and armed forces. Therefore, the post-hostility phase will likely face large numbers of motivated individuals with military training who view the US as an enemy. Are there techniques and technologies which can identify those who will or will not present an insurgency threat in the post hostilities phase? Can something be done in the pre-hostility phase which will minimize or even eliminate post-hostility phase insurgency and terrorism problems?

7. Rapid rebuilding of basic infrastructure: This requires reliable communications and interim power and potable water sources. How rapidly can these be inserted? Might there be opportunity for establishing subsequent monitoring capabilities?

After the initial effort, it is critical to put in place the infrastructure, economic enablers, and a political/legal structure to establish a successful post-war economy, a representative and democratic government, and a stable social structure. What can and should DoD do to further these goals? What other agencies, international organizations and non-governmental organizations should be involved? How should DoD work with them?

In responding to the above challenges, it must be recognized that transitioning to and from hostilities requires such a wide range of capabilities that many are not integral to the Department of Defense (DoD). It is important to manage the transitions in such a way that those capabilities are exploited fully despite organizational boundaries. Sound capability management requires DoD to identify those capabilities resident within other US government agencies, those inherent within DoD and those needing development by the DoD or others. Where the capabilities are external to DoD, provision for their transfer to DoD control if appropriate should be pre-arranged and tested in joint exercises.

This study will be co-sponsored by me as the Under Secretary of Defense (AT&L), Under Secretary of Defense (Policy), and Under Secretary of Defense
(Intelligence). Dr. Craig Fields and Mr. Phil Odeen will serve as co-Chairmen. Dr. Jerry McGinn and COL Kevin McLaughlin will serve as co-Executive Secretaries. LTC Scott Dolgoff, USA, will serve as the Defense Science Board Secretariat Representative.

The Task Force will operate in accordance with the provisions of P.L. 92-463, the "Federal Advisory Committee Act," and DoD Directive 5105.4, the "DoD Federal Advisory Committee Management Program." It is not anticipated that this Task Force will need to go into any "particular matters" within the meaning of section 208 of Title 18, U.S. Code, nor will it cause any member to be placed in the position of acting as procurement official.

Michael W. Wynne
Acting
### APPENDIX B. TASK FORCE MEMBERSHIP

#### CO-CHAIRMEN

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Affiliation</th>
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</table>
| Dr. Craig Fields | *Current*: Corporate Director  
                 | *Former*: Director, DARPA                                                  |
| Mr. Phil Odeen   | *Current*: Chairman, Reynolds and Reynolds  
                 | *Former*: Chairman, TRW Inc.                                              |

#### INTEGRATION

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<tr>
<th>Name</th>
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| Dr. Ted Gold     | *Current*: Chief Technology Officer, Science Application International Corporation, Transformation, Test, Training and Logistics Group  
                 | *Former*: Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Chemical Warfare & Biological Defense Matters |
| Dr. George Heilmeier | *Current*: Chairman Emeritus, Telcordia Technologies  
                     | *Former*: Director, DARPA; Senior Vice President and Chief Technical Officer, Texas Instruments |
| Mr. Larry Lynn   | *Current*: Private Consultant  
                 | *Former*: Director, DARPA                                                  |
| Dr. Joe Markowitz | *Current*: Private Consultant                                              |
                             | *Former*: Deputy Commander-in-Chief, U.S. European Command               |

#### Government Advisors

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<td>Mr. Jim Simon</td>
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## Historical Perspective

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<td>Dr. Bill Howard, Co-chair</td>
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<td>Senior Vice President and Director of Research and Development, Motorola, Inc.</td>
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<td>Mr. Norman Polmar</td>
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<td>Gen Mike Williams, USMC (Ret)</td>
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<td>Dr. Jerry McGinn</td>
<td>Special Assistant to the Principal Deputy, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy</td>
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## Intelligence

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<td>and Senior Managing Director of Bear,</td>
<td>and Capital Markets Division, Salomon Brothers, Inc.</td>
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<td>Former: Senior Vice President and Senior</td>
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<td>Partner, National Security Client Service</td>
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<td>Team, Booz Allen Hamilton</td>
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### Government Advisors

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<td>Ms. Maureen Baginski</td>
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<td>Mr. Patrick Neary</td>
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<td>Mr. Robert Tomes</td>
<td>Deputy Chief of the New Concepts Division, Persistent Surveillance Office, InnoVision Directorate; National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency</td>
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<td>Ms. Barbara Woods</td>
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### Tagging and Tracking

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<th>Name</th>
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| Dr. Delores Etter, Co-chair | Current: Professor, Electrical Engineering Department, Distinguished Chair in Science and Technology, United States Naval Academy  
Former: Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Science and Technology |
| Mr. Jeff Harris, Co-chair | Current: Vice President, Managing Director for Lockheed Martin Horizontal Integration of Situational Awareness Systems  
Former: Director, National Reconnaissance Office |
| Dr. Melissa Choi       | Current: Technical Staff, Advanced System Concepts Group at the MIT Lincoln Laboratory             |
| Dr. Matt Ganz          | Current: President and CEO, HRL Laboratories, LLC                                                  |
| Mr. Bill Gravell       | Current: Director, Information Assurance and Critical Infrastructure Protection and Director, Identity Program Office, Northrop Grumman Mission Systems  
Former: Chief of the Joint Staff Information Warfare/Information Assurance Division (J6K) |
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<td>MajGen Ken Israel, USAF (Ret)</td>
<td>Vice-President, Architecture Development,</td>
<td>Assistant Deputy Under Secretary Of Defense, Airborne</td>
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<td>Lockheed Martin Management and Data Systems</td>
<td>Reconnaissance</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dr. Ron Kerber</td>
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<td>Deputy Secretary of Defense (Research &amp; Advanced</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dr. Robert Lucky</td>
<td>Private Consultant</td>
<td>Corporate Vice President of Applied Research at Telcordia</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mr. Peter Marino</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mr. Walter Morrow</td>
<td>Director Emeritus, MIT Lincoln Laboratories</td>
<td>Director, MIT Lincoln Laboratories</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dr. Bill Mularie</td>
<td>CEO, Telework Consortium Inc.</td>
<td>Deputy Director of the National Imagery and Mapping</td>
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<td>Agency (NIMA) for Systems and Technology</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dr. Anna Marie Skalka</td>
<td>Senior Vice President, Fox Chase Cancer</td>
<td>Head, Department of Molecular Oncology, Roche Institute</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Cancer Center</td>
<td>of Molecular Biology</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mr. Robert Stein</td>
<td>Private Consultant</td>
<td>Corporate Vice President of the Raytheon Company;</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>managed Raytheon’s Electronic Systems (ES) Advanced</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dr. John Treichler</td>
<td>Chief Technical Officer, Applied Signal</td>
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<td>Technology, Inc.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mr. Fred Turco</td>
<td>Private Consultant</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Government Advisors**

- LtCol Mike Briggs, USMC: Marine Corps Warfighting Lab
- Dr. Thomas Carson: National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency
- Col Susan Dabrowski, USAF: United States Strategic Command
- Mr. Jeff Dunn: Co-Chair, Biometric Consortium
- CDR Craig Haynes, USN: Joint Staff
- Dr. Cliff Hull: Laboratory for Physical Sciences
## Task Force Membership

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position/Division/Organization</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Col Peter Kicza, Jr., USAF</td>
<td>Space and National Systems Division, AF/XOIRN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COL Judith Lemire, USA</td>
<td>U.S. Training and Doctrine Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Douglas J. Richardson</td>
<td>United States Southern Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Bob Winokur</td>
<td>FORCEnet/Oceanographer of the Navy (N61T)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Benjamin Wong</td>
<td>SIO S&amp;T MCIA</td>
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## Strategic Communication

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position/Institution</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Vince Vitto, Chairman</td>
<td>Current: President and Chief Executive Officer, The Charles Stark Draper Laboratory, Inc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Anita Jones</td>
<td>Current: Lawrence R. Quarles Professor of Engineering and Applied Science, University of Virginia; Professor of Computer Science, School of Engineering and Applied Science Former: Director of Defense Research &amp; Engineering</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Bran Ferren</td>
<td>Current: Co-Chairman and Chief Creative Officer, Applied Minds, Inc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Bruce Gregory</td>
<td>Current: Director and Research Professor, Public Diplomacy Institute, George Washington University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Dan Kuehl</td>
<td>Current: Professor and Director, Information Resources Management College, National Defense University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Joe Markowitz</td>
<td>Current: Private Consultant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. David Morey</td>
<td>Current: Founder, President, and CEO of DMG, Inc.; Partner in Core Strategy Group; Author of “The Underdog Advantage,” published in June 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Robert Nesbit</td>
<td>Current: Senior Vice President and General Manager, Center for Integrated Intelligence Systems, The MITRE Corporation Former: RCA, GE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Michael Vlahos</td>
<td>Current: Director, Security Studies Program, The Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies Former: Director, Center for the Study of Foreign Affairs, U.S. Department of State</td>
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## Government Advisors
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Organization</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Mark Ellis</td>
<td>Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Joel Fischman</td>
<td>Department of State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. David Jakubek</td>
<td>Office of the Director, Defense Research and Engineering</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Chris Lamb</td>
<td>National Defense University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. John Matheny</td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Lloyd Neighbors</td>
<td>Department of State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. William Parker</td>
<td>Department of State</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mr. Robert Reilly</td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
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**COUNTRY/AREA EXPERTISE**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
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</table>
| ADM Denny Blair, USN,(Ret), Co-chair | Current: President of the Institute for Defense Analyses  
Former: Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Command |
| RADM Steven Smith, USN (Ret), Co-chair | Current: President and Chief Executive Officer, Intellibridge Corporation  
Former: Senior Military Assistant to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy |
| ADM Steve Abbott, USN (Ret) | Current: President and Chief Executive Officer, Navy Marine Corps Relief Society  
Former: Deputy Commander-in-Chief, U.S. European Command |
| AMB Tim Carney            | Current: Private Consultant  
Former: Ambassador to Sudan and Haiti |
| AMB James Dobbins         | Current: Director, International Security and Defense Policy Center, RAND  
Former: Special Envoy to Afghanistan, Kosovo, Bosnia, Haiti, and Somalia; Assistant Secretary of State for Europe |
| Dr. Doug Garthoff         | Current: Adjunct Professorial Lecturer on Intelligence and U.S. Foreign Policy |
| Dr. John Hanley           | Current: Deputy Director of the Joint Advanced Warfighting Program, Institute for Defense Analyses  
Former: Deputy Director for the Chief of Naval Operations Strategic Studies Group (CNO SSG) |
### Task Force Membership

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Don Latham</td>
<td>Private Consultant</td>
<td>Assistant Secretary of Defense and Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAPT Jim Giblin, USN</td>
<td></td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dr. Paul Johnson</td>
<td></td>
<td>Director of the Center for the Study of Intelligence</td>
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<tr>
<td>Government Advisors</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dr. Janet Ballantyne</td>
<td>Group Vice President International, Abt Associates</td>
<td>Foreign Service Officer, U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), rank of career minister</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Joseph Braddock</td>
<td>Potomac Institute</td>
<td>Founder, Corporate Officer, and Director, BDM International</td>
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<td>AMB James Dobbins</td>
<td>Director, International Security and Defense Policy Center, RAND</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Ted Gold</td>
<td>Chief Technology Officer, Science Application International Corporation, Transformation, Test, Training and Logistic Group</td>
<td>Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Chemical Warfare &amp; Biological Defense Matters</td>
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### Post-Conflict Activities

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<tr>
<th>Name</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Larry Wright, Co-chair</td>
<td>Private Consultant</td>
<td>Senior Vice President and Senior Partner, National Security Client Service Team, Booz Allen Hamilton</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gen Mike Williams, USMC, (Ret), Co-chair</td>
<td>Senior Fellow, Logistic Management Institute</td>
<td>Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dr. Janet Ballantyne</td>
<td>Group Vice President International, Abt Associates</td>
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<td>Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Chemical Warfare &amp; Biological Defense Matters</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Dr. George Heilmeier | Current: Chairman Emeritus, Telcordia Technologies  
Former: Director, DARPA; Senior Vice President and Chief Technical Officer, Texas Instruments |
| Mr. Noel Koch | Current: President and CEO, International Security Management, Inc.  
Former: Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs |
| ADM Joe Lopez, USN (Ret) | Current: President, Information Manufacturing Corporation (IMC)  
Former: Commander-in-Chief U.S. Naval Forces Europe and Allied Forces Southern Europe |
| Dr. Joe Markowitz | Current: Private Consultant |
| Dr. Susan Marquis | Current: Vice President, Resource Management, LMI  
Former: Assistant Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Resources, Requirements and Assessments) (N8B) |
| Ms. Judith Miller | Current: Partner, Williams & Connolly LLP  
Former: General Counsel, Department of Defense |
| Prof Harvey Sapolsky | Current: Professor of Public Policy and Organization, Massachusetts Institute of Technology; Director of the MIT Security Studies Program |
| Mr. Rich Wilhelm | Current: Vice President, Global Resilience, Booz Allen Hamilton  
Former: Senior Policy Advisor to Vice President Gore |

**Government Advisors**

| Dr. Jerry McGinn | Special Assistant to the Principal Deputy, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy |
| Dr. Stewart Patrick | Department of State |
| Mr. Michael Shama | HQ, Army Corps of Engineers |
| Mr. Ross Wherry | U.S. Agency for International Development |
| Ms. Tamara DiGregorio | Booz Allen Hamilton |
## Executive Secretaries

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Name</th>
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<tr>
<td>Dr. Jerry McGinn</td>
<td>Special Assistant to the Principal Deputy, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAPT Mike Lilienthal, MSC, USN</td>
<td>Special Assistant to the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Science &amp; Technology)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mr. RC Porter</td>
<td>Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence</td>
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## DSB Representatives

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<tr>
<th>Name</th>
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<tr>
<td>LTC Scott Dolgoff, USA</td>
<td>Defense Science Board</td>
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<td>LtCol Dave Robertson, USAF</td>
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<td>CDR Dave Waugh, USN</td>
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## Staff

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<tr>
<td>Ms. Michelle Ashley</td>
<td>Science Applications International Corp</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ms. Barbara Bicksler</td>
<td>Strategic Analysis, Inc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ms. Nicole Coene</td>
<td>Science Applications International Corp</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ms. Dianna Conty</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ms. Julie Evans</td>
<td>Strategic Analysis, Inc.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mr. Kevin Gates</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mr. Brad Smith</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ms. Stacie Smith</td>
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## APPENDIX C. PRESENTATIONS TO THE TASK FORCE

### Plenary Sessions

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<tr>
<th>Presenter</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dr. John Hamre, Ms. Michele Flournoy, and Mr. Rick Barton, CSIS</td>
<td>Play to Win. The Final Report of the Bipartisan Commission on Post-Conflict Reconstruction</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dr. Hans Binnendijk, Dr. Stuart Johnson, NDU</td>
<td>Transforming Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMB James Dobbins, RAND</td>
<td>The American Role in Nation Building from Germany to Iraq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hon. Thomas O’Connell, ASD (SO/LIC)</td>
<td>Post-Conflict Perspectives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Paul Mayberry, DUSD (Readiness)</td>
<td>Defense Readiness Reporting System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Matt Mclean and Dr. Michele Malvesti (NSC), Bill Schofield (Department of State), Marc Powe and COL Dan Pike (OUSD (Policy)), and LtCol Fritz Barth (Joint Staff J-5)</td>
<td>East African Counter Terrorism Initiative (EACTI)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gen James McCarthy, USAF (Ret)</td>
<td>Lessons Learned from Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ms. Michelle Flournoy, CSIS</td>
<td>Beyond Goldwater Nichols Study</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Dan Flynn</td>
<td>Adversary Strategies for Countering U.S. Military Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hon. Doug Feith, USD (P)</td>
<td>Post-Conflict Perspectives</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dr. David Kay; former UN Inspector for WMD</td>
<td>Searching for Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) in Iraq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Frederick Kagan</td>
<td>Preparing for Post-Conflict during Operational Planning</td>
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<tr>
<td>LTG Jay Garner, USA (Ret.)</td>
<td>Lessons Learned from Iraq</td>
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<tr>
<td>Senator Lugar</td>
<td>Discussion</td>
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<tr>
<td>General Tony Zinni, USMC (Ret)</td>
<td>Pre and Post Conflict</td>
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<td>Lt.Col Locky</td>
<td>J-8</td>
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<td>AMB Thomas Pickering</td>
<td>Pre and Post Conflict</td>
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<tr>
<td>BG Robert Cone</td>
<td>OIF Post-Major Combat Lessons Learned</td>
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<td>AMB W. Robert Pearson</td>
<td>Pre and Post Conflict</td>
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</table>
Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz | Pre and Post Conflict

**INTELLIGENCE**

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<tr>
<td>RDML Murrett</td>
<td>JCS J2 OIF Lessons Learned</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mr. Dave Oliver</td>
<td>Iraq Experience and Thoughts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Bob Grenier</td>
<td>How Can IC Improve Posture with Fundamentalist Islam?</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mr. Angel Rabasa, RAND Corp.</td>
<td>“Muslim World After September 11”</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dr. John Hamre, CSIS</td>
<td>Discussion</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dr. Ron Sega, DDR&amp;E</td>
<td>Iraq Trip and Initiatives</td>
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<td>Col (P) Votel</td>
<td>4th ID Experience</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dr. Lin Wells, Acting ASD (NII)</td>
<td>Discussion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Marty Petersen</td>
<td>TOR Countries’ Capabilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. David Hurry, NSA</td>
<td>National Security Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ms. Lynn Schnurr</td>
<td>Intelligence Community Information Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ms. Helen Noyes, NGA</td>
<td>NGA</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ms. Renee Meyer, NSA</td>
<td>National Security Agency’s Language Strategy</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mr. Mark Lowenthal</td>
<td>NSPD 26 and Modifications</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mr. J.C. Hyde, NRO</td>
<td>Thor’s Hammer</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ms. Laura Voelker, COL Vince Stewart</td>
<td>Intel Remodeling / HUMINT Reform, Intel Campaign Planning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADM Albert Calland</td>
<td>Discussion</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mr. Leo Delany</td>
<td>All Source Analysis Support to Prep / Reconstruction to OIF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. John Gore</td>
<td>Infrastructure Analysis Available</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mr. Jeff Rapp</td>
<td>DOCEX AAR</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mr. Bill Cave, SAIC</td>
<td>Post-Conflict Planning Challenges</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Thomas Behling</td>
<td>Horizontal Integration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Lon Hamann</td>
<td>Geospatial Knowledge Base – Korea (GIBK) Prototype</td>
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**TAGGING AND TRACKING**

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<tr>
<th>Name</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Gerard Kiernan</td>
<td>A Department of Energy Perspective</td>
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## Appendix C

### Transition to and From Hostilities

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Speaker/Presenter</th>
<th>Title/Subject</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Darrell G. Herd</td>
<td>Challenges in Jungle Environments (Columbia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Jerry Walsh</td>
<td>Agency Operational Approach</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maj Len Mackie, USAF Joint Personnel Recovery Agency</td>
<td>Recovering Personnel in Denied Areas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Hriar Cabayan (Joint Staff) / Dr. Charles Perkins [ODUSD (ASC)]</td>
<td>Joint Staff Efforts/Discussion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Jeff Dunn</td>
<td>Agency Perspective</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Tony Cantu</td>
<td>Summary of Secret Service technical and Operational Approach to identification</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LtCol Blackwood-SOCOM</td>
<td>Identification requirements for Intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Stephen Griggs-DARPA ATO</td>
<td>Dynamic Optical Tags</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Frank Patten-DARPA ATO</td>
<td>Three Technologies for threat Identification</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Estevez DUSD(SIC)</td>
<td>Summary of recent OSD decisions mandating the use of RFID technology in military logistics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Tim Grayson-DARPA TTO</td>
<td>Advanced Beacons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. John Ewen</td>
<td>Tracking and Locating Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trip to NSA</td>
<td>Briefings and tour of NSA programs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Valerie Browning -DARPA DSO</td>
<td>Power Systems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trip to National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA)</td>
<td>TTL briefings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Jonathan Phillips- NIST</td>
<td>Face Recognition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. David Wennergren, John Woodward, Mary Dixon, Gil Nolte</td>
<td>Biometrics, Smart Cards, PKI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maj Scott Kunkel, USAF- Joint Forces Intelligence Command</td>
<td>Identification Technologies of the Future</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ms. Ruth Willis- NRL</td>
<td>Predictive Analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Bennett Hart, AT, Chief Technology Group; Chuck Walker, Division Chief and Marty Lindenmayer, Division Chief</td>
<td>Discussion of Current agency Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Ron Sega – DDR&amp;E</td>
<td>Discussion on issues of TTL people and material of interest</td>
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## Presentations to the Task Force

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Presenter(s)</th>
<th>Topic</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LCDR Job Price, USN</td>
<td>Discussion on programs related to TTL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Travis Farris</td>
<td>DOS Perspective</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ms. Carol Haave- OUSD (I)</td>
<td>Discussion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Dennis Polla- DARPA</td>
<td>Proposed tagging technology program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trip to SOCOM</td>
<td>Briefings on NightFist, TTL and S&amp;T Programs</td>
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### Strategic Communications

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Presenter(s)</th>
<th>Topic</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Rob Tappan, Director, Strategic Communications, Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) in Iraq</td>
<td>The CPA’s role and mission and issues of media monitoring and analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Barry Fulton, Director, Public Diplomacy Institute and Research Professor, GWU</td>
<td>Strategies for Public Diplomacy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Jeff Jones, Senior Director, Strategic Communications and Information, NSC</td>
<td>Organizational Structure and Challenges of Public Diplomacy</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mr. Jim Wilkinson, Deputy National Secretary Advisor for Communications</td>
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<td>Mr. Paul Hanley, Director, Strategic Communications, Office of the CJCS</td>
<td>Progress within DoD toward more effective Public Diplomacy</td>
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<td>Mr. Frank Ward, Ms. Betsy Whitaker, and Mr. Sam Wunder; Department of State</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Mr. Tom O’Connell, Assistant Secretary of Defense (SO/LIC)</td>
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<td>“Relationship between ideas and people in the global Salafi jihad that we are facing”</td>
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<td>Mark Helmke, Professional Staffer, Senate Foreign Relations Committee</td>
<td>Discussion</td>
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<td>Mr. James Farwell, Consultant, DoD (SO/LIC)</td>
<td>Strategic messages in political communications: an analysis of Usama Bin Laden’s and al-Qa’ida’s strategic messages and political techniques used to communicate these messages</td>
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<td>Seth Cropsey, Director, International Broadcast Bureau</td>
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<td>Mike Vlahos, Johns Hopkins University, Dan Kuehl, National Defense University, and David Morey, DMG, Inc.</td>
<td>Identify Problems</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mouafac Harb, Network News Director, Al Hurra Network</td>
<td>Discussion</td>
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<td>Ambassador Robert Hutchings, Chairman of the National Intelligence Council (NIC); Mr. Craig Gralley, the NIC Director for Strategic Plans and Outreach; Dr. Paul Pillar, National Intelligence Officer for the Near East and South Asia; MajGen (Ret) John Landry, National Intelligence Officer for Military Issues; Mr. Norm Schindler on the Balkans Task Force Retrospective; and Mr. Bill Nolte on Maintaining IC Analytic Expertise.</td>
<td>National Intelligence Council: Available Area and Regional Expertise</td>
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Ambassador Pamela Bridgewater, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs; Mr. John O’Keefe, Office Director for Career Development and Assignment; Mr. Donald Keyser, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Bureau of East Asian Affairs; Ms. Elena Kim-Mitchell, Director, Office of Policy, Plans, and Analysis, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs; Mr. Torkel Patterson, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for South Asian Affairs; Mr. Charlie Ries, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs; Mr. Robert Scher, Policy/Planning Staff; Mr. Kevin Whitaker, Office of Cuban Affairs; Ambassador W. Robert Pearson, Director General of the Foreign Service and Director of Human Resources; Katherine H. Peterson, Director, Foreign Service Institute (FSI); and Mr. Lawrence Baer, Dean, FSI School of Professional and Area Studies

U.S. State Department: Regional and Area Expertise, U.S. Foreign Service Program, and U.S. Foreign Service Institute

**Post Conflict Activities**

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<td>Mr. Dave Oliver</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ms. Janet Ballantyne</td>
<td>USAID role in stabilization and reconstruction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Discussion/Topic</td>
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<td>Mr. Jim Bishop</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Mr. Anthony Cordesman</td>
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<td>Mr. Pat Patterson-DOS</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ms. Jane Lute – (Assistance Secretary-General for Mission Support in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations of the UN (Military))</td>
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<td>Prof Francis Fukuyama</td>
<td>Discussion on Post Conflict</td>
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APPENDIX D. THE COST OF WINNING THE PEACE: SUPPORTING INFORMATION

This appendix provides supplemental data on the incremental costs to the Department of Defense for both combat and stabilization and reconstruction operations. Incremental costs are defined as costs to DOD in excess of normal peacetime operating expenses, which includes, for example, pay to National Guardsmen and reservists called onto active duty; and fuel, maintenance, and munitions costs in excess of what is normally budgeted for annual training and exercises.

For the operations summarized below, most incremental costs have been paid for out of supplemental funds. Some incremental costs were paid through the Overseas Contingency Operations Transfer Fund established by Congress in fiscal year 1997. As of fiscal year 2002, Southwest Asia and Balkans operations were included in the annual DOD budget as ongoing operations.

As of May 2004, the fiscal year 2004 incremental costs for operations in Iraq and Afghanistan are as follows:11

- Operation Iraqi Freedom: $4.9 billion per month
- Operation Enduring Freedom (Afghanistan): $0.78 billion per month

On the following pages, tables D-1 and D-2 detail incremental cost estimates for major combat operations and for stabilization and peace keeping operations, respectively. Table D-3 contains sources for all cost data.

## Table D-1. Incremental Costs of Major Combat Operations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OPERATION</th>
<th>INCREMENTAL COSTS (BILLIONS OF FY04 DOLLARS)</th>
<th>NOTES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Persian Gulf War (1991)</td>
<td>$6.4</td>
<td>Total cost was $84 billion, but only $6.4 billion was paid by U.S. taxpayers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>Operations for Bosnia from FY 1992-1995 could be argued as preparations for potential combat operations. With the signing of the Dayton Accord in November 1995, Bosnia operations were then clearly of a peacekeeping/enforcement nature</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kosovo</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>Air war, Operation Noble Anvil, $2.1 billion, plus additional $2.4 billion for munitions and unit readiness restoration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>Estimated from September 2001 through March 2002. Preparations began shortly after September 11, 2001 attack; combat operations in Afghanistan officially initiated on October 7, 2001; last large-scale operation was Operation Anaconda in March 2002.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>21.0</td>
<td>Estimated from January through May 2003 (presidential declaration of end of major combat operations). Based on DOD Comptroller monthly obligation figures</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TOTAL** | **$41.0** |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OPERATION</th>
<th>INCREMENTAL COSTS (BILLIONS OF CONSTANT FY04 DOLLARS)</th>
<th>NOTES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>$72.40</td>
<td>Does not include $21 billion in major combat operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>34.90</td>
<td>Does not include $7.9 billion in major combat operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kosovo</td>
<td>5.90</td>
<td>Does not include $4.5 billion in major combat operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia</td>
<td>15.00</td>
<td>Does not include $1 billion in preparation for combat operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>1.30</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>1.95</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>$148.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ORGANIZATION</td>
<td>DATA PROVIDED</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------------------</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| DOD Comptroller                       | • Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) — Afghanistan/Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). Iraq FY04 incremental cost monthly burn rates as of May 2004  
• OIF monthly incremental cost obligations (Jan–May 2003)  
• Incremental costs for Southwest Asia, Bosnia, Kosovo  
• National defense budget estimates for FY 2004 dated March 2003, Table 5-6. Department of Defense Deflators—BA, used to convert current year dollars to constant dollars                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       |
• Haiti and Somalia incremental costs. CRS Report for Congress, Military Contingency Funding for Bosnia, Southwest Asia, and Other Operations: Questions and Answers, Nina Serafino, updated 29 March 1999  
• Kosovo incremental costs. CRS Table on Incremental Costs of DOD Contingency Operations, FY 1991–FY 2005, Stephen Daggett  
## APPENDIX E. GLOSSARY

### ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

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<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BBG</td>
<td>Broadcasting Board of Governors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C/JFLCC</td>
<td>Combined/Joint Forces Land Component Commander</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIC</td>
<td>Coalition Information Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIO</td>
<td>Chief Information Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DARPA</td>
<td>Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDR&amp;E</td>
<td>Director, Defense Research and Engineering</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIA</td>
<td>Defense Intelligence Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DLPT</td>
<td>Defense Language Proficiency Test</td>
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<tr>
<td>DOS</td>
<td>Department of State</td>
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<tr>
<td>DSB</td>
<td>Defense Science Board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAO</td>
<td>Foreign Area Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FEMA</td>
<td>Federal Emergency Management Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FFRDC</td>
<td>Federally Funded Research and Development Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HUMINT</td>
<td>Human Intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ID/TTL</td>
<td>Identification/Tagging, Tracking, and Locating</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMINT</td>
<td>Imagery Intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INR</td>
<td>Bureau of Intelligence and Research [Department of State]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISR</td>
<td>Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JFCOM</td>
<td>Joint Forces Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JTIF</td>
<td>Joint Interagency Task Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCCS</td>
<td>National Center for Contingency Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGA</td>
<td>National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Nongovernment Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NID</td>
<td>National Intelligence Director</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSC</td>
<td>National Security Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSC/PCC</td>
<td>National Security Council/Policy Coordinating Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSS</td>
<td>National Security Strategy</td>
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<tr>
<td>OEF</td>
<td>Operation Enduring Freedom</td>
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<tr>
<td>OGC</td>
<td>Office of Global Communication [White House]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Definition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
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<tr>
<td>OIF</td>
<td>Operation Iraqi Freedom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSD</td>
<td>Office of the Secretary of Defense</td>
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<tr>
<td>OSINT</td>
<td>Open Source Intelligence</td>
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<tr>
<td>OSRO</td>
<td>Office of Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>OUSD (P&amp;R)</td>
<td>Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness</td>
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<td>PSYOP</td>
<td>Psychological Operation</td>
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<tr>
<td>PVO</td>
<td>Private Voluntary Organization</td>
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<td>RCC</td>
<td>Regional Combatant Command</td>
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<td>RFID</td>
<td>Radio Frequency Identification</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S/CRS</td>
<td>Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S&amp;R</td>
<td>Stabilization and Reconstruction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S&amp;T</td>
<td>Science and Technology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCC</td>
<td>Strategic Communication Committee</td>
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<td>SIGINT</td>
<td>Signals Intelligence</td>
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<tr>
<td>SOF</td>
<td>Special Operations Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>U.S. Agency for International Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USD (I)</td>
<td>Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USIA</td>
<td>U.S. Information Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>WMD</td>
<td>Weapons of Mass Destruction</td>
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