Joint Capabilities for Post-Conflict Operations

A Monograph

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AY 03-04

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**Joint capabilities for post-conflict operations**

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14. ABSTRACT
Victory is determined not only by what happens during a period of conflict but also by what happens after the fighting ends, during post-conflict operations. This monograph examines what joint military capabilities are required for post-conflict operations in order to achieve the desired end state. Post-conflict operations consist of a complex and challenging set of tasks involving the military as well as other government agencies and multinational partners. Understanding the nature and dynamics of post-conflict operations is a prerequisite for determining those tasks. In many regards the factors that affect post-conflict operations differ significantly from those that influence conflict. Those factors translate into specific post-conflict tasks and functions. The capabilities that lead to success during conflict are not necessarily the same as those required for success during the post-conflict period. This capabilities gap represents deficiencies across the spectrum of DOTMLP-F (Doctrine, Organizations, Training, Material, Leader development, Personnel and Facilities). A historical perspective provides valuable insight into understanding the nature and dynamics of post-conflict operations. The lessons learned from previous involvement in specific post-conflict operations are essential for developing considerations that apply to most post-conflict operations. This monograph analyzes Operation ECLIPSE (post-World War II occupation of Germany) and the European Recovery Program (Marshall Plan), Operations BLACKLIST and the post-World War II reconstruction of Japan, Operation JUST CAUSE (Panama), Operation DESERT STORM (Kuwait and Iraq), Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY (Haiti), and operations in the Balkans region. Post-conflict functions and tasks derived from historical analysis provide a basis for comparison against current capabilities and help determine future requirements. Detailed examination of present doctrine and organization concludes that the United States military does not have the proper capabilities to successfully conduct post-conflict operations. DOTMLP-F provides an effective construct for addressing capabilities shortfalls and integrating material and nonmaterial factors. This monograph recommends specific changes in DOTMLP-F that can be easily translated into programming guidance and plans of action for implementation by the Services.

15. SUBJECT TERMS

16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:

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<th>a. REPORT</th>
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17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT
1

18. NUMBER OF PAGES
73

19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON

Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98)
Prescribed by ANSI Std Z39-18
ABSTRACT

JOINT CAPABILITIES FOR POST-CONFLICT OPERATIONS

by COLONEL Bruce J. Reider, United States Army, 54 pages.

Victory is determined not only by what happens during a period of conflict but also by what happens after the fighting ends, during post-conflict operations. This monograph examines what joint military capabilities are required for post-conflict operations in order to achieve the desired end state.

Post-conflict operations consist of a complex and challenging set of tasks involving the military as well as other government agencies and multinational partners. Understanding the nature and dynamics of post-conflict operations is a prerequisite for determining those tasks. In many regards the factors that affect post-conflict operations differ significantly from those that influence conflict. Those factors translate into specific post-conflict tasks and functions. The capabilities that lead to success during conflict are not necessarily the same as those required for success during the post-conflict period. This capabilities gap represents deficiencies across the spectrum of DOTMLP-F (Doctrine, Organizations, Training, Material, Leader development, Personnel and Facilities).

A historical perspective provides valuable insight into understanding the nature and dynamics of post-conflict operations. The lessons learned from previous involvement in specific post-conflict operations are essential for developing considerations that apply to most post-conflict operations. This monograph analyzes Operation ECLIPSE (post-World War II occupation of Germany) and the European Recovery Program (Marshall Plan), Operations BLACKLIST and the post-World War II reconstruction of Japan, Operation JUST CAUSE (Panama), Operation DESERT STORM (Kuwait and Iraq), Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY (Haiti), and operations in the Balkans region.

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BIBLIOGRAPHY
I. INTRODUCTION

American post-conflict operations in Afghanistan and Iraq are receiving a great deal of attention and criticism throughout the world. In both cases, there was never a question regarding the expected outcome of combat operations. However, the results of post-conflict operations in both Iraq and Afghanistan are in doubt. What is the problem? What prevents the world’s only superpower from extending success on the battlefield into the post-conflict period in order to achieve our nation’s political objectives? Part of the answer may lie in the complexity of post-conflict operations. Several authors have suggested that post-conflict operations may be the most challenging missions the United States military will face in the future. Another part of the answer may be a function of not having the right capabilities to include doctrine, organizations, training, material (equipment), leaders, personnel, and facilities (supporting infrastructure).

This monograph provides an in-depth study of post-conflict operations and makes recommendations for the development of future joint military capabilities to ensure success after the fight. It addresses a number of issues with regard to post-conflict operations. Specifically, what are the nature and dynamics of post-conflict operations? What factors most significantly affect the outcome of post-conflict operations and how do they translate into tasks and functions? What capabilities currently exist in the United States military for conducting post-conflict operations and where are the deficiencies? The answers to those questions will result in a set of recommended changes and improvements in joint DOTMLP-F (Doctrine, Organizations, Training, Material, Leader Development, Personnel, and Facilities) for successful post-conflict operations.

The research methodology involved five steps. The first step was to conduct historical analysis of selected United States military operations since World War II that involved a significant post-conflict phase. A historical perspective was necessary to understand the nature and dynamics of post-conflict operations and to evaluate lessons learned in order to identify the most significant factors affecting the outcome. The following military operations were analyzed: Operation ECLIPSE (post-World War II occupation of Germany) and the European Recovery
Program (Marshall Plan), Operation BLACKLIST and the post-World War II reconstruction of Japan, Operation JUST CAUSE (Panama), Operation DESERT STORM (Kuwait and Iraq), Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY (Haiti), and operations in the Balkans region.

The second step was to evaluate the historical lessons learned in order to determine which lessons were common to most post-conflict operations. The result was a set of considerations for planning and conducting post-conflict operations.

The third step was to identify specific functions and tasks required to successfully conduct post-conflict operations. This step provided the connectivity between past events, present capabilities and future requirements. Post-conflict functions and tasks were derived from past events, provided the basis for comparison against present capabilities, and shaped the determination of future requirements.

The fourth step was to review and analyze military doctrine and organizations to ascertain existing U.S. military capabilities with regard to post-conflict operations. This step evaluated current and past doctrine and compared the results against the post-conflict functions and tasks previously identified in order to discover capability shortfalls for conducting post-conflict operations. The War Department published FM 27-5, United States Army and Navy Manual of Military Government and Civil Affairs, on 22 December 1943 to provide doctrinal guidance for the administration of civil government after World War II. FM 27-5 is obsolete. Today, the closest approximations to FM 27-5 are Joint Publication 3-57, Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Operations, and FM 41-10, Civil Affairs Operations. While FM 27-5 focused primarily on post-conflict operations, Joint Publication 3-57 and FM 41-10 are mainly oriented on supporting operations during conflict.

The fifth step was to determine shortfalls and to recommend solutions in the areas of joint DOTMLP-F for improving the ability of the United States military to conduct post-conflict operations. DOTMLP-F provided an excellent construct for integrating the various components of effective military organizations. Material and non-material factors were considered in an overarching manner to paint a clear and compelling argument that can be used to obtain military
resources. The specific recommendations provided in this monograph can be easily translated into programming guidance and plans of action for implementation by the Services.

II. International Relations and Foreign Policy

In their classic book, *Systematic Political Geography*, Martin Ira Glassner and Harm J. de Blij wrote, “the state has become in the past two centuries the dominant form of political organization in the world and is likely to remain so for some time to come.”¹ International relations refer to the interaction between states while foreign policy describes the process states use for conducting affairs with other states. A basic understanding of international relations and foreign policy is a prerequisite for comprehending the nature and complexity of post-conflict operations. This section establishes an overarching framework of terms and definitions that relate to international relations, foreign policy, and post-conflict operations.

A logical place to start is with the state itself. A state is defined primarily by four criteria: territory, population, an effective government, and the capacity to conduct relations with other states.² Two additional characteristics add a further degree of granularity to the term state. The first is sovereignty. Sovereignty is the independent power a state exercises over its population without being constrained by laws originating outside its territory or external control. The second characteristic is recognition. According to Glassner and de Blij, a state “must be recognized as such by a significant portion of the international community, the existing states.”³


Choosing to go to war or intervene in the affairs of another state is a political decision. American decision makers primarily base that decision on national interests. Strategic success depends on three components: ends (objectives), ways (concepts), and means (resources). The overall goal when planning post-conflict operations is to establish an achievable end-state based on clear objectives. End-state is a vision of the desired situation at the end of post-conflict operations. William Flavin’s article in the military journal, *Parameters*, added another aspect to the definition of end state; it must be “both politically acceptable and militarily attainable.” Military planners translate the conditions that political leaders want to exist at the end of a conflict into military objectives and plan backward to synchronize the operation. Translating general political guidance into specific military objectives is difficult and reaching consensus may be problematic. Decision-makers will often debate and modify the end-state and post-conflict objectives even while military operations are on-going. A discernible end-state is likely to evolve incrementally. Producing a general rather than specific end-state is a more realistic goal when post-conflict operations are expected to last several years.

The ultimate goal of any U.S. intervention is to promote democracy. Democracy is defined as a representative government where the people do not live in fear. Democratic states are vital to international security. In an article adapted from her book, *Democracy by Force*, Karin von Hippel, a civil affairs officer for the United Nations Mission in Kosovo, stated, “the promotion of democracy is based on the assumption that democracies rarely go to war with each other and that an increase in the number of democracies would therefore imply, and indeed encourage, a more secure and peaceful world.”

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Democracy, however, is not always a realistic goal. Some states have a low probability for success. States lacking social homogeneity, i.e., various ethnic groups without a common identity; no history of constitutional rule; and a low level of economic development are not likely to become democracies without considerable long-term investment and assistance. The likelihood of establishing freedom and democratic rule is only one criterion for intervention. The United States may become involved in other situations for purely humanitarian reasons. In these cases, U.S. decision makers should limit the objectives of intervention and establish realistic expectations for an end-state.

Quasi-states are entities that exist legally but hardly function as states because they cannot effectively control their territory. Many quasi-states collapse and become failed states. Failed states are an economic burden on the international community; they serve as refuge for terrorists and criminals; and they threaten regional stability. Additionally, the United States may become involved in failed states for humanitarian reasons, to prevent the killing of innocent people and to feed the population. All are reasons of concern to the United States. Failed states are a reality that cannot be wished away.

Reaching the end-state signals a return to normalization and self-sufficiency. Normalization is defined as a condition when: extraordinary outside intervention is no longer needed; the process of governance and economic activity largely function on a self-determined and self-sustaining basis; and internal and external relations are conducted according to generally accepted norms of behavior. Normalization does not occur immediately after conflict. Two

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examples illustrate how end-state and normalization are interrelated concepts. Following World War II, General Douglas MacArthur envisioned the end-state of a “democratic, prosperous Japan that had renounced war as an instrument of national policy.” It took approximately seven years after hostilities ceased to achieve General MacArthur’s end-state and even longer to reach normalization. More recently, the Bush Administration described the end-state for Operation IRAQI FREEDOM as a free and democratic Iraq with a legitimate government where the people no longer live in fear. In Iraq the end-state is nowhere in sight and normalization may be years away. These two examples remind us that post-conflict operations are equally as important as combat operations in achieving the end-state and normalization.

The World Bank has used the term “post-conflict reconstruction” since 1995. The World Bank defines post-conflict reconstruction in terms of “rebuilding the socioeconomic framework of society” and the “reconstruction of enabling conditions for a functioning peacetime society [to include] the framework of governance and rule of law.” John J. Hamre and retired General Gordon R. Sullivan, former United States Army Chief of Staff, expanded the World Bank definition of post-conflict reconstruction to encompass the elements of justice and reconciliation and, most importantly, security. Mr. Hamre and General Sullivan then developed a model for post-conflict reconstruction based on what they describe as the “four pillars”: security, social and economic well-being, justice and reconciliation, and governance and participation.

According to a Military Review article by Lieutenant Colonel Michael R. Rampy, U.S. Army, “post-conflict activities are “integrated political, economic, socio-psychological, and

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13 Ibid., 91-92.
military activities that support conflict termination and national security objectives.”

LTC Rampy goes on to state that “post-conflict activities must flow logically from conflict termination as an integral part of strategic and operational design.”

William Flavin adds, “conflict termination is the formal end of fighting, not the end of conflict.”

Finally, FM 3-0, the U.S. Army’s capstone doctrine for military operations, defines conflict termination as the point at which the principal means of conflict shifts from the use of force to other means of persuasion.

The United States has three reasons for conducting post-conflict operations. First, it will always be in our national interest. Second, we are legally bound by international law to provide for the immediate humanitarian needs of the indigenous population. International law dictates that an occupying force maintain of law and order, provide food and shelter, handle displaced persons, provide health care and services, and reestablish public education.

Third, we also have a moral obligation to take care of the people whose land we occupy.

The United States has been conducting post-conflict operations since World War II. We have a finite set of historical examples to analyze and draw lessons from. The next section analyzes six specific historical examples of U.S. involvement in post-conflict operations in order to learn and understand their various lessons. The first historical example and, ironically, the most successful post-conflict operation involving the United States occurred in Germany following World War II.

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15 Ibid., 54.


III. HISTORICAL EXAMPLES

Germany

The United States military first began planning for post-conflict operations in Germany in May 1943. Planners received no strategic planning or policy guidance due to a lack of political consensus on the role of the military in what was considered civil affairs. The initial plan tasked the military primarily with disarming German troops. By July 1944 the plan had expanded beyond disarmament to include using occupation forces to handle displaced persons and Allied prisoners of war, control German prisoners, enforce martial law, dispose of captured war material, and coordinate movement and transportation. The plan that finally emerged was given the codename ECLIPSE in October 1944.19

An interesting aspect of Operation ECLIPSE was how policy guidance was promulgated. The military did not receive its first significant planning guidance until April 1944 when Combined Chiefs of Staff Directive 551 (CCS/551) vested in the Supreme Commander the authority and responsibility for governing occupied Germany.\textsuperscript{20} The U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff published JCS 1067 in October 1944, providing further policy and guidance for the occupation of Germany.\textsuperscript{21} According to General Lucius Clay, JCS 1067 “gave the military government staffs their long-awaited basic statement of policy for the posthostilities period.”\textsuperscript{22} The intent of the Allies was to occupy Germany and initially impose a military government. Eventually General Clay became the Military Governor of the American Zone of Occupation.

Operation ECLIPSE was a two-phase plan. Phase I envisioned a rapid movement “to secure especially important strategic areas deep inside Germany.”\textsuperscript{23} In Phase II, the Allies intended to solidify control of occupied areas and accomplish the objectives of the operation: “disarmament of German forces, enforcement of surrender terms, establishment of law and order, and redistribution of Allied forces into designated national zones of occupation.”\textsuperscript{24} The military expected post-conflict reconstruction activities to begin while combat operations were still ongoing. Operation ECLIPSE and Operation OVERLORD, the Allied invasion of Europe, overlapped one another.

General Eisenhower, the Supreme Allied Commander, had responsibility for deciding when to declare “A-Day” to initiate Operation ECLIPSE. However, the plan had not established criteria for General Eisenhower to decide when to declare the start of Operation ECLIPSE. The

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{20} Ibid., 15.
\item \textsuperscript{21} Ibid., 17.
\item \textsuperscript{22} Ibid., 18.
\item \textsuperscript{23} Ibid., 22.
\item \textsuperscript{24} Ibid.
\end{itemize}
fact that there was no universal German surrender further exacerbated the problem. The piecemeal surrender of local German units led General Eisenhower to eventually delegate authority for initiating Operation ECLIPSE to subordinate field commanders. The overall conduct of the occupation and subsequent post-conflict operations succeeded largely due to the accuracy with which planners anticipated the situation and identified corresponding military requirements.

Operation ECLIPSE and the post-conflict reconstruction of Germany provided set of fundamental lessons for planning and executing similar missions in the future. Major Kenneth O. McCreedy analyzed Operation ECLIPSE in a 1995 monograph prepared for the United States Army School of Advanced Military Studies. Major McCreedy’s overall conclusion was “that it may be erroneous to treat post-conflict operations as sequential to the terminal military campaign. War termination and post-conflict operations will likely be executed concurrently with military operations and should form an integral part of the campaign plan.”

Major McCreedy based his overall conclusion on five supporting ideas. First, “post-conflict planning demands a significant investment of scarce staff resources early in the war in order to sufficiently anticipate and meet the requirements of peace.” Second, “in order to ensure synchronization of effort and consonance of intent, war termination and post-conflict planning should form an element of the campaign plan/operational plan.” Third, “effective war termination and post-conflict plans require the participation of all staff sections.” Fourth, “a

25 Ibid., 30.
26 Ibid., 39.
27 Ibid., Abstract.
28 Ibid., 41.
29 Ibid.
30 Ibid., 42.
clear statement of end state from the NCA (National Command Authority) aids planning, but is neither imperative nor likely. Definition of end state is likely to be an evolutionary process, subject to the fortunes of war, internal politics, and coalition diplomacy.”

Fifth, “post-conflict operations are, by definition, an operation other than war (OOTW).”

Meanwhile, on the other side of the world the United States government was conducting similar post-conflict reconstruction operations in Japan. The approach differed slightly but the level of effort and the results were similarly successful.

**Japan**

The Japanese surrendered unconditionally in mid-August 1945. The economic impact of the war and the destruction caused by the firebombing of Tokyo and the atomic bombs dropped on Nagasaki and Hiroshima left the country in ruins and the will of the population broken.

Japan was devastated and it was obvious that recovery depended on long-term U.S. involvement and support. General Douglas MacArthur as pro-consul was responsible for post-conflict operations to include reconstruction and rebuilding the Japanese economy. General MacArthur’s vision of a “democratic, prosperous Japan that had renounced war as an instrument of national policy clearly set the tone for the occupation.” Shortly after MacArthur arrived in Tokyo, the U.S. released its official “post-surrender” policy directing precisely what laws and institutions the Japanese had to abolish.

31 Ibid., 43.

32 Ibid. (According to current U.S. Army doctrine, OOTW is no longer valid terminology, having been replaced by the phrase “stability and support operations” or SASO.)

On October 11, 1945 General MacArthur issued a statement calling for rapid implementation of democratization in five fundamental areas: emancipation of women, unionization of labor, liberalization of education, establishment of a judicial system that protected people’s rights, and democratization of economic institutions. Within six months after Japan’s surrender, General MacArthur presided over an efficient military government in Tokyo. Policies aimed at achieving ‘demilitarization and democratization’ were well underway. In February 1946, unhappy with the progress of the conservative Japanese government toward instituting reforms, General MacArthur directed his staff to write a charter to guide the reform process and to oversee its adoption by the national parliament.\(^{34}\)

The American occupation of Japan ended in April 1952, after approximately six years and eight months. The long-term commitment of the United States government probably had the single greatest impact on successful post-conflict operations in Japan. The U.S. resolved to stay the course until Japan was well on its way to social, economic, and political recovery. The occupation of Japan provided a set of important lessons for future post-conflict operations.

The first lesson is that full and total support of the indigenous population can accelerate the return to normalcy and greatly enhance the process of rebuilding and reconstruction. The Americans leveraged Japanese cooperation and participation in order to reduce the number of U.S. forces required to accomplish the goals of post-conflict operations.

The next lesson is that the end-state of any occupation and post-conflict operation should focus on self-sufficiency. The basic policy in Japan encouraged the people to rely on themselves for the recovery effort. Reforms were aimed at empowering the entire Japanese population, particularly the workers. The Japanese financial conglomerations or Zaibatsu were broken up and the laborers were given powers to organize themselves, strike, and bargain collectively. This was a powerful incentive that hastened economic recovery in Japan.

The third lesson is that international legitimacy is desirable in every post-conflict operation. The international community viewed the occupation of Japan as legitimate both morally and legally. International support allowed the United States to dictate the terms and conditions of post-conflict operations without a lengthy debate and without having to defend their policies.

The fourth lesson is that a homogeneous culture can simplify the process. Japan was essentially a homogeneous population. The United States did not have to worry about satisfying different factions and ethnic groups. This eliminated one of the factors that often complicate post-conflict operations.

The final lesson is that multilateral operations are preferable to unilateral operations. Although the U.S. occupation of Japan was unilateral in execution it was conducted with multilateral support.  

Following World War II the United States became embroiled in a Cold War with the Soviet Union that eventually ended with the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of Communism. During this time the United States was involved in limited wars on the Korean Peninsula and in Southeast Asia, neither of which resulted in significant post-conflict operations. The next conflict with a significant post-conflict phase involving U.S. military forces did not occur until the invasion of Panama.

**Panama**

In late 1989 relations between Panama and the United States deteriorated as a result of a series of actions and threats by Panamanian dictator General Manuel Noreiga. Noreiga overturned recent Panamanian election results and threatened the security of the Panama Canal as

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well as the safety of American citizens living in Panama. On December 20, 1989 U.S. military forces launched an intervention into Panama to protect American citizens living there, secure the Panama Canal, depose Noreiga, and establish a stable environment for the newly elected government. Operation JUST CAUSE was the code-name given to the U.S. intervention in Panama.

Operation JUST CAUSE focused on a number of limited objectives. Those objectives included seizing a number of strategic locations and defeating the Panama Defense Force (PDF) and paramilitary Dignity Battalions. U.S. forces rapidly accomplished their objectives and Noreiga surrendered to U.S. authorities on January 3, 1990. Operation JUST CAUSE officially ended on January 16, 1990. Combat operations ceased and Operation PROMOTE LIBERTY, post-conflict operations, began.

When combat operations ended Panama City was in shambles and the country was in a state of turmoil. The most immediate need was to establish a secure and stable situation for post-conflict reconstruction. The PDF had ceased to exist and the only law enforcement authority in the country was the United States military. While the U.S. military established security throughout Panama it began a simultaneous effort to create a new civilian police force. Eventually the Panamanian government decided to establish a reconstituted police force using former PDF members. Senior officers and personnel accused of crimes were retired or suspended.36

Dr. Conrad C. Crane of the U.S. Army War College wrote a paper for the Strategic Studies Institute in which he examined U.S. Army roles and missions in smaller-scale contingency operations.36

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operations during the 1990s. Dr. Crane concluded that “due to a focus on conducting a decisive operation and not a complete campaign, the aftermath of Panama did not go smoothly. Planning for the stabilization phase, Operation PROMOTE LIBERTY was far from complete when hostilities began. Missions and responsibilities were vague, and planners failed to adequately appreciate the effects of combat operations and overthrowing a regime.”

A 1991 U.S. Army Special Warfare Center and School symposium on civil affairs operations made a similar assessment. The symposium proceedings stated, “the biggest problem in Panama was not the management of the invasion, but managing the efforts afterward to put that country back together.”

Although the United States eventually achieved its political objectives in Panama, the operation yielded another set of key lessons regarding future post-conflict operations. First, the United States government must understand that a decision to intervene in the affairs of another state also includes taking responsibility for the second and third order effects of that intervention. It must identify key near, mid, and long-term objectives to achieve the desired end-state and resource those objectives in a timely manner. Additionally, all U.S. government agencies must be held accountable for discharging their responsibilities and, ultimately, achieving their assigned objectives. Second, unity of command is critical. Someone must be in charge of post-conflict

37 Conrad C. Crane, *Landpower and Crises: Army Roles and Missions in Smaller-Scale Contingencies During the 1990s* (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, 2001), 16.

operations in general and, specifically, civil-military actions. Third, the cultural and political aspects of the situation must be considered during planning and execution. Fourth, coordination with legitimate authorities in the “target” state will often provide the most expedient results. Unilateral U.S. operations are usually counterproductive.  

Following Panama it was not long before U.S. military forces were again involved in combat operations. This time the location was the Middle East. The war in Kuwait and Iraq provided the United States with another series of lessons for post-conflict operations.

**Operation DESERT STORM**

The genesis of OPERATION DESERT STORM dates back to July 18, 1990, when Iraq’s President Saddam Hussein accused oil-rich Kuwait of driving-down the price of crude oil and reasserted Iraq’s claim to oil in a disputed border area inside Kuwait. Hussein saw Kuwait as a means for Iraq to recover from financial difficulties resulting from its eight-year war with Iran and as a way for Iraq to overcome the disadvantages of being virtually landlocked. When Iraq invaded Kuwait on August 2, 1990 the United States swiftly responded with a massive deployment of troops. The crisis came to a head in early 1991. A U.S.-led multinational coalition conducted a five-week air campaign from January 17 to February 24, 1991. The air campaign was followed by a brief ground offensive that began on February 24 and ended on

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41 Ibid.
February 28, 1991 with the capitulation of the Iraqi Army and the liberation of Kuwait. The surprisingly swift victory was an overwhelming success.

The victory achieved in Operation DESERT STORM was followed by the most significant post-conflict operation undertaken since the rebuilding and reconstruction of Germany and Japan after World War II. However, without adequate planning, the coalition was largely unprepared to extend its battlefield success into the post-conflict period. According to Dr. John T. Fishel, “the principal failure in (post-conflict) planning was the inability to achieve a real unity of planning effort until very late in the process.” 42 No less than six different U.S. governmental and military organizations at various levels were involved in planning post-conflict operations.

Overall, United States Central Command (USCENTCOM) was responsible for planning civil-military operations across the theater. USCENTCOM subsequently designated its Army component command (ARCENT) as executive agent for civil affairs (CA) planning and operations. USCENTCOM failed to retain any formal responsibility for planning CA operations. At the same time, ARCENT lacked trained personnel on its staff to properly plan CA operations. The result was a delay in the development of effective plans for civil affairs operations. 43

ARCENT created a provisional organization, Task Force (TF) Freedom, to provide “short-term restoration of emergency services for Kuwait City in conjunction with the Kuwait Task


43 Ibid., 20.
Force at the request of the Kuwaiti government.” TF Freedom consisted of engineer, signal, military police, explosives ordnance disposal (EOD), logistic support, medical, and civil affairs. The core of TF Freedom was a Combined Civil Affairs Task Force. TF Freedom provided restoration of emergency services until it was stood down on April 30, 1991 and replaced with the Kuwait Emergency Recovery Office (KERO). KERO was primarily an engineering effort focused on infrastructure restoration and rebuilding. 

In early 1991, the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) designated the Army as the executive agent for DOD assistance during the reconstruction of Kuwait and established the Defense Reconstruction Assistance Office (DRAO) to control DOD elements involved in reconstruction. DRAO’s primary mission was “...to assist the (U.S.) government in managing the restoration of necessary civil infrastructure and emergency services.”

In addition to USCENTCOM, ARCENT, TF Freedom, KERO, and DRAO, a sixth organization was formed to deal specifically with Kuwaiti government ministries. The Kuwaiti Task Force (KTF) stood up in Washington and produced its own civil affairs annex that focused on seven essential areas: food, water, medical care, sanitation, transportation,

44 Ibid., 41.


telecommunications and electric power.\textsuperscript{47} The KTF organized itself into five teams – Public Security and Safety, Human Resources, Infrastructure, Public Services, and Commercial Matters – to deal with the twenty-five different functional areas for reconstruction.\textsuperscript{48}

The friction that resulted from a combination of poor prior planning and no unity of command/effort was eventually overcome as each organization found its niche but hard lessons had already been relearned. Besides demonstrating the importance of integrated prior planning and unity of command/effort, post-conflict operations following Operation DESERT STORM provided a number of other key lessons. First, the victor in any conflict has certain legal responsibilities toward the population of a defeated state. According to international law, these responsibilities relate to providing basic functions and services in a liberated or occupied state. Second, the experiences of post-World War II occupations of Germany and Japan provide a solid foundation for planning and executing post-conflict operations and structuring U.S. military organizations to perform civil administration functions. Third, the United States needs to develop organizations that can conduct post-conflict operations in a joint, combined and interagency environment. Fourth, adequate resources are a critical component of any successful post-conflict strategy.\textsuperscript{49}

\textsuperscript{47} Ibid., 23-24.


The third crisis of the 1990s that involving U.S military forces occurred in Haiti. A coup by Haitian Lieutenant General Raoul Cedras led to the ouster of Haiti’s President Jean-Bertrand Aristide and plunged the country into chaos. Haitians attempting to flee the violence caused the U.S. to become involved to prevent a crisis. The resulting intervention yielded another set of lessons for the United States regarding post-conflict operations.

**Haiti**

Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY was a U.S.-led, multinational intervention to restore the legitimate, democratically elected government of Haiti. Additional objectives were to establish a secure environment for the resumption and function of democratic processes; to disarm and dismantle the tools of repression; and to help create a new police force and judicial system.  

The operation began on September 19, 1994 with the deployment of a U.S.-led multinational force. The operation was originally planned as a forced invasion but it became a permissive entry operation after General Raoul Cedras, head of the ruling military junta, agreed to step down. Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY officially ended on March 31, 1995 when it was replaced by the United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH).

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The plan for post-conflict operations was created by an ad hoc interagency organization known as the Haiti Planning Group. They developed a detailed “Interagency Checklist for Restoration of Essential Services.” “The lead agency for all major functional areas was the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), with DOD support, mostly from Army units, in reestablishing public administration, conducting elections, restoring information services, assisting the Department of Justice with setting up and running a police force, disaster preparedness and response, running airports, and caring for refugees.”

While Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY can probably be labeled a success; Haiti has yet to achieve the lofty ideals of a truly democratic state. Haiti’s failure to show significant progress toward democratization and economic stability is further proof that without long-term U.S. involvement and support, a successful end-state is unlikely.

The most important lesson of this relatively minor intervention is that understanding the nature of the crisis is critically important for determining post-conflict mission requirements. Haiti was not an armed, warrior society. The population was primarily poor, unarmed civilians terrorized by a group of government-sponsored thugs. Therefore, the primary task of the intervention and post-conflict operations became removing the illegal government and eliminating the armed gangs.

52 Conrad C. Crane, *Landpower and Crises: Army Roles and Missions in Smaller-Scale Contingencies During the 1990s* (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, 2001), 20.

The Haiti experience also provided several other valuable lessons for future post-conflict operations. The first lesson is the need to integrate all elements of national power to achieve the desired end-state. The second lesson is that unrealistic early exit strategies and hasty departure deadlines diminish the prospects for success. The end-state cannot be arbitrarily developed; it must be tied to the needs of the situation. According to a RAND Corporation study on post-conflict operations, “short departure deadlines are incompatible with nation-building.” When no form of government exists one must be constructed before any steps can be taken to establish functioning democratic and economic institutions.

The third lesson is the imperative to synchronize military and civilian operations, particularly in stability and support operations. Finally, Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY demonstrated the need for a national and international constabulary-like force to perform the functions of law enforcement. A potential security vacuum developed when the corrupt Haitian Army and national police force were disbanded following the intervention. In this case, regular U.S. and international military forces

54 Ibid., 5.


56 Ibid.

were available and immediately filled the void. Although this solution may be acceptable for 
short-term operations, it should be viewed as temporary and suboptimal. Ideally, a more 
permanent approach would be to handover law enforcement to a constabulary-like force until a 
new indigenous police force can be organized and trained.

The United Nations eventually assumed responsibility for operations in Haiti. The next 
operation involved another multinational organization. This time the organization was the North 
Atlantic Treaty Alliance or NATO and the location was the Federal People’s Republic of 
Yugoslavia. The result was yet another set of lessons learned for post-conflict operations.

**The Balkans (Bosnia and Kosovo)**

Operations in the Balkans differ from the other historical examples presented so far. The 
interventions in Bosnia and Kosovo were NATO operations and both resulted in the 
establishment of peacekeeping forces that are still in place, SFOR (Stabilization Force) in Bosnia 
and KFOR (Kosovo Force) in Kosovo.

The Balkans is yet another case study that illustrates the importance of understanding the 
nature of the crisis and its impact not only on combat operations but also on post-conflict 
operations. The Communist system established after World War II coupled with the iron rule of 
Yugoslavian Prime Minister Marshall Tito kept a tight lid on simmering tensions between three 
etnic groups: Serbs, Croats, and Muslims. Those tensions began to boil over following Tito’s 
death in 1980, finally erupting after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Warsaw 
Pact. The Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia started to fragment when Croatia and 
Slovenia proclaimed their independence in 1991. Violence and open fighting between ethnic 
groups soon followed. Finally, the United Nations (U.N.) brokered a cease-fire and established a 
multinational peacekeeping force in Croatia during January 1993. The U.N. Protection Force, 
known by the acronym UNPROFOR, was unable to stop the fighting which started again when 
the weather improved in April, 1994. That same month, NATO got involved by flying combat 
patrols over Bosnia to enforce U.N. sanctions. Mounting civilian atrocities eventually led NATO 
to start conducting air strikes against Serb forces and other targets in April 1994. Ethnic violence
continued throughout the rest of 1994 and most of 1995. During that period a number of U.N. declared civilian safe havens or enclaves were attacked by the various factions. NATO responded with major air strikes against the Serbian military. The result was an agreement by the Bosnia Serbs to resume negotiations toward a peaceful solution. They authorized Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic to speak for them. Finally, a cease-fire went into effect on October 12, 1995. In the meantime, U.S. Special Envoy Richard Holbrooke organized peace talks at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base near Dayton, Ohio. The negotiations began on November 1, 1995 and by November 21 an agreement was reached. All parties signed the Dayton Accords on December 14, 1995 and NATO created an initial peacekeeping force known as IFOR to implement the provisions of the treaty, assure compliance, and maintain the peace.

The signing of the Dayton Accords did not end violence in the Balkans. On March 24, 1999 NATO forces initiated a 78-day air campaign against Serbia in an effort to force the Serbian government to end human rights abuses against the ethnic Albanian population living in Kosovo. Operation ALLIED FORCE led to the withdrawal of Serbian Army and paramilitary forces from Kosovo and the establishment of another NATO peacekeeping force in the region, KFOR.58

The following are lessons learned from the U.S. experience in the Balkans. First, elections are an important benchmark for measuring progress toward democracy. Second, organized crime can emerge as a major impediment to stability. Third, neighboring states can negatively influence post-conflict reconstruction efforts. Fourth, successful reconstruction in poor, ethnically-divided states requires a substantial long-term investment. Ethnically fragmented states lack a common national identity and the interests of various factions can be at odds with the purpose of the intervention and the ultimate objectives of post-conflict reconstruction. Fifth, coalition

operations and international burden-sharing can be compatible with unity of command and effective U.S. leadership. Sixth, a lack of international consensus regarding the end-state can hinder the democratic process. Seventh, credible expatriates can facilitate policy and decision-making when effective institutions of governance are nonexistent or weak. Finally, large-scale assistance can rapidly restore economic growth when coupled with effective financial institutions.

The previous six historical examples each provided a unique set of lessons specific to the circumstances of the particular situation. The next section provides a synthesis of the various lessons in order to determine which ones are common to most if not all post-conflict operations.

IV. LESSONS LEARNED

A holistic analysis of the lessons from past U.S. post-conflict experiences indicated that certain “considerations” are common to most situations. The lessons described in this section are the most important considerations for post-conflict operations. They are the foundation for future post-conflict operations as well as potential changes in DOTMLP-F.

There is a strong link between economic growth and political stability. The United States government first recognized the link between economic growth and political stability after World War II. The result was the Marshall Plan. The United States determined that only long-term growth could provide stability in Europe and stop the endless process of stop-gap relief-based assistance. Earlier ad hoc attempts to provide assistance had little effect on European recovery. The Marshall Plan focused on increasing agricultural production and industrial output, restoring budgets and finances, establishing sound currencies, and stimulating international trade.60 The plan was a concerted, coherent approach with a definite purpose. One of the key features of the Marshall Plan was the involvement of the beneficiaries throughout the entire process to include planning and preparing the proposal.61 This is a lesson that applies to any post-conflict reconstruction effort.

Combat operations and governance are integral components of war. In her Parameters article on military governance, Nadia Schadlow stated that “U.S. civilian leaders have always been reluctant to give the military control over governance tasks, which are fundamentally


61 Ibid., 26-28.
political in nature.” Civilian leaders historically supported the military’s leadership over governance operations largely because they had no other options. They accepted the fact that the military was the only government agency with the capability to effectively conduct post-conflict operations. The logical solution was to assign direct responsibility to the military for implementing and supervising reconstruction operations in the aftermath of conflict. That is exactly what happened in Germany and Japan following World War II. President Franklin D. Roosevelt designated the U.S. Army as the lead government agency responsible for post-conflict reconstruction. President Roosevelt based that decision partly on his perception of the U.S. Army’s ability to deliver “prompt results” and partly on Secretary of State James Byrnes acknowledgment that the State Department did not have the capacity to run an occupation.

Tactical combat personnel, not specialized civil affairs forces, usually end up conducting governance operations. The nature of governance operations extends well beyond the capabilities of civil affairs forces. Successful governance requires tactical troops working in conjunction with civil affairs personnel to perform tasks such as organizing and supervising local elections and rebuilding police forces. Army personnel remained on the ground overseeing the political transitions that were essential to the consolidation of victory in virtually all the U.S. Army’s major contingencies. According to Nadia Schadlow “U.S. Army officers have directly supervised the creation of new governments in many defeated states” while “Army personnel,


63 Ibid., 88-91.

64 Ibid., 87.
under the theater commander’s operational control supervised and implemented political and economic reconstruction."\textsuperscript{65}

\textbf{Planning for termination and post-conflict operations should begin as early as possible.} Shortly after the fall of Baghdad during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM criticism and frustration intensified over the chaos created by the swift end of combat operations. The United States government was accused of failing to adequately plan and prepare for post-conflict operations.\textsuperscript{66} This criticism may not have been entirely justified; the Department of Defense had a plan for “Phase IV” reconstruction and rebuilding activities. Unfortunately it appears the plan was not as robust as the plan for decisive combat operations.

The military is partially to blame for its reluctance to accept responsibility for what it has always considered a civilian problem. Post-conflict operations are often messy, long drawn out affairs characterized by “mission creep” that tends to sap the military’s resources and adversely affect readiness for what it views as its primary mission; to fight and win our nation’s wars. The military’s hesitation to embrace post-conflict operations is a result of the hard lessons it learned in quagmires like Vietnam and Somalia. In both cases, the military eventually withdrew in defeat and humiliation after becoming entangled in conflict without the political will to win. However, political leaders shoulder the preponderance of responsibility by often failing to give adequate guidance, define the end state, and properly resource the military for conflict termination and post-conflict operations.

World War II demonstrated the importance of early planning for post-conflict operations. Planning for post-conflict operations for World War II began in 1943. By the time the war in

\textsuperscript{65} Ibid.

Europe ended the military had a detailed plan for post-conflict operations and the occupation of Germany. As pointed out earlier, the success of Operation ECLIPSE was due in large part to early planning. Planners were able to anticipate and prepare for almost every situation that occurred after the war.?67

The purpose of campaign planning is to develop an integrated strategy for achieving the objectives of an operation and reaching the end-state. Post-conflict operations should be an element of that strategy and therefore planned in conjunction with and to the same level of detail as combat operations. The lesson here is to plan for post-conflict operations when planning for intervention.

Post-conflict operations should be an interagency effort. Joint, interagency and multinational (JIM) describes the modern American way of war. Joint refers to operations conducted by employing the collective capabilities of the Army, Navy, Marine Corps and the Air Force. The interagency piece simply means that operations will involve all agencies of the United States government, not just the Department of Defense. The multinational aspect leverages the political and military advantages that other nations bring to the fight. However, the United States government does not always practice what it preaches, particularly during post-conflict operations. As an example there was no interagency plan and no clear idea about what termination or the post-conflict scenario would look like leading up to Operation ENDURING FREEDOM in Afghanistan.68 On the positive side, joint military operations are constantly improving as professional military personnel realize and embrace the synergistic affect of the

67 Conrad C. Crane, Landpower and Crises: Army Roles and Missions in Smaller-Scale Contingencies During the 1990s (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, 2001), 25.

68 Ibid., 101.
joint “fist” versus the service “fingers.” Similarly, the importance of coalition operations has become increasingly apparent. Combined training and operations are now the norm rather than the exception. Unfortunately, the Department of Defense seems to coordinate better with our allies than it does with other U.S. government agencies. Interagency cooperation is fairly good in the field where dedicated individuals focus on accomplishing the mission. At higher levels the interagency process is usually preoccupied waging turf battles with one another over resources rather than fighting the enemy. Interagency operations are not new phenomena. William Flavin emphasized the importance of interagency cooperation in an article published in Parameters in which he stated, “the inability to develop a viable end state is often the product of a lack of unity of effort in interagency planning.”

A recent study identified 135 tasks that must be accomplished to build and sustain a state. At least 68 of those tasks are beyond the range of military capabilities and must be performed by other government agencies. Interagency involvement in post-conflict operations is not only important, it is essential.

Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 56, “Managing Complex Contingency Operations,” was an attempt to force better interagency coordination during peace operations and foreign humanitarian assistance operations. However, PDD 56 had little if any effect on improving interagency participation in post-conflict operations since it explicitly excludes operations involving armed conflict. Even without new legislation or further executive guidance, planners need to understand that post-conflict operations are inherently interagency in nature.

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Define achievable end-state based on clear objectives. Measures of effectiveness (MOE) serve as a means for commanders to evaluate progress toward achieving the desired end-state. They provide a baseline of indicators for how well the military is accomplishing its mission. MOE may be qualitative or quantitative standards for measuring results. Joint Publication 3-57, *Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Operations*, provides useful guidelines for developing MOE. According to those guidelines, MOE should be appropriate, mission-related, measurable, numerically reasonable, sensitive, and useful. Effective MOE for post-conflict operations could include the number of attacks on friendly forces, the status of local elections and progress toward a representative government, or the amount of humanitarian aid distributed.

The U.S. Army War College developed a synchronization matrix for post-conflict operations. A “synch matrix” is an effective tool to link ends, ways and means. The horizontal axis of a synch matrix is usually a time line or a series of critical events that need to be synchronized. The vertical axis lists available or anticipated capabilities and resources. Cross-referencing the two axes against each other enables planners to synchronize capabilities and events. The result is a post-conflict synchronization matrix that can help integrate every aspect of post-conflict operations from other government agencies to nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to private voluntary organizations (PVOs) to civil-military functions in a coordinated manner. It also serves as a method for tracking progress toward achieving the desired end state. The U.S. military institutionalized the post-conflict synchronization matrix into doctrine when it published Joint Publication 3-57 in 2001.

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Understanding the nature of the crisis is as important for post-conflict operations as it is for combat operations. Accurate intelligence is crucial in determining the conditions that must exist for the conflict to terminate and post-conflict efforts to succeed. It is essential to define the existing political conditions and the situation. Planners should consider prior democratic experience, level of economic development, and social homogeneity as well as the factors that precipitated the crisis to begin with. They need to perform a detailed analysis of the justice system, social and economic infrastructure, method of governance, and the security situation in order to accurately determine how to capitalize on successful combat operations in the post-conflict period. The intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) model is a useful methodology for gathering information during post-conflict operations. Post-conflict IPB identifies threat courses of action and leads to a recommended set of commander’s critical information requirements (CCIR). CCIR outlines the commander’s priorities for intelligence collection. The staff uses the CCIR to develop a collection plan which focuses intelligence assets to confirm or deny a particular course of action. Post-conflict operations rely extensively on human intelligence. The technical systems used extensively during combat operations have limited utility when trying to assess the attitude of the indigenous population.

Post-conflict operations involve all elements of national power. One of the most important objectives of post-conflict operations is achieving unity of effort across the diplomatic, informational, military, and economic elements of national power. The elements of national power are complimentary components of the overall strategy for post-conflict success. Although

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73 Ibid., 101-102.

74 Ibid., 97.
each element of national power is unique and contributes in a particular way, their collective synergy produces the most effective results. The diplomatic element of national power may be used to garner international support. Diplomacy may also be the preferred approach when dealing with the indigenous leadership. The informational element of nation power ensures U.S. intentions are understood at home and abroad. During post-conflict operations the target of the information campaign will most likely shift in priority from the enemy’s political and military leadership to the indigenous population. An effective information campaign for post-conflict operations will focus on earning the trust and confidence of the people while simultaneously acting to counter hostile propaganda. The predominant element of national power during the initial stages of post-conflict operations will be the military. The primary role of the military will be to create a secure and stable environment. The military element of national power will become less significant as the post-conflict operations progresses toward achieving the end state. Two of the major activities of post-conflict operations, rebuilding and reconstruction, depend extensively on the economic element of national power. The availability of financial support and capital will have a direct impact on success or failure as well as the duration of the operation.

Unity of effort and command are essential during post-conflict operations. The United States Army published its principles of war shortly after World War I. According to FM 3-0, the principles of war are the “enduring bedrock of Army doctrine.”75 Unity of command is one of the nine principles of war. FM 3-0 describes unity of command as “unity of effort under one responsible commander.”76 The military occupation of Japan after World War II is the preeminent example of unity of command during post-conflict operations. As the Supreme Commander, General MacArthur supervised every aspect of the rebuilding and reconstruction.


76 Ibid., 4-14.
effort. History indicates that, more often than not, the principle of unity of effort and unity of command is violated during post-conflict operations. When this happens the operation lacks focus and is characterized by confusion and chaos. Post-conflict operations to rebuild Kuwait after Operations DESERT STORM involved six different organizations. Each organization had its own mission and plans for how to accomplish its mission but there was no unity of effort or unity of command. Although ultimately successful, post-conflict operations would have been more efficient if there had been a single commander to synchronize and coordinate the effort. Unity of effort and unity of command are just as important in post-conflict operations as they are during combat operations.

**Post-conflict operations will primarily involve the military initially.** The military commander on the ground is immediately responsible both morally and legally for the security of conquered and liberated territory and the safety of the civilian population who live there. The commander retains responsibility until relieved of it or until responsibility is transferred to another agency, international organization, or the indigenous government.77

In the interim, the military will have to provide services which are normally the responsibility of government. Consider the example of Panama after Operation JUST CAUSE. The defeat and dismantling of the PDF left Panama without a structure for law enforcement. Law enforcement is critical in order to establish a secure and stable environment for other post-conflict operations. The U.S. military became the law enforcement authority in Panama until a new police force was formed.78

Others contributing factors can affect the level of military involvement. First, the military is the only government agency with the resources and the organizational skills to make an

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immediate impact during post-conflict operations. Second, the initial period of post-conflict operations will often be nothing more than an extension of combat operations. Finally, the military will often be the only organization with a presence on the ground. By default the military will have the lead for post-conflict operations until they can affect a smooth transition to civilian control.

The transition/handover from military to civilian authority has historically been a problem. One of the greatest challenges American military forces faced during previous post-conflict operations has been the handover to civilian agencies. There is no definitive historical data to indicate when the military should transition its post-conflict responsibilities to civilian control; it depends on the situation. The problem is not when transition should occur but how it should occur. Perhaps the best approach is to treat the transfer like a battle-handover between military units. This would involve a period of overlapping operations, the exchange of information and liaison personnel and the establishment of specific criteria to ensure a smooth and effective turnover. One author described this approach as a “rolling transfer” of authority.

The sooner U.S. civilian and international organizations assume responsibility from the military


for post-conflict operations the less likely the potential for regional backlash of a perceived 
American military occupation.  

**A multilateral approach works best.** According to a *Foreign Policy* article by Minxin Pei on U.S. nation-building experiences, “if the United States insists on going it alone, history suggests it will fail.” Although the unilateral approach to post-conflict operations is more direct than the multilateral approach; unilateral efforts are also more likely to be unsuccessful. The success or failure of the unilateral approach seems to depend on the type of indigenous government created. U.S. surrogates or those that depend heavily on American economic support often lack political legitimacy and domestic support. They rarely become durable democratic institutions and often resort to repression and violence to retain power.  

The multilateral approach to post-conflict operations involves other participants in addition to the United States. There are several major advantages in choosing a multilateral approach over a unilateral approach. First, the international community usually views multilateral post-conflict operations as being more legitimate than unilateral operations. Second, the multilateral approach is less expensive for all participants and provides a greater degree of burden/cost sharing. Third, the multilateral approach can produce a more thorough transformation and greater reconciliation than the unilateral approach. The major disadvantage of the multilateral approach is that coordination and consensus among the participants can be problematic.

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The decision whether to use the unilateral approach or the multilateral approach will depend on many factors. Ultimately, however, the decision will correlate to the level of national interest and the degree of risk involved. Succinctly stated by Minxin Pei, “multilateralism manages risk, unilateralism invites it.” The greater the national interest the less willing decision-makers may be to accept the increased risk of failure associated with unilateral operations. Sometimes the United States may not have a choice. The unilateral approach might be the only option when timing is critical or multinational support isn’t forthcoming. In those cases, the U.S. needs to recognize the risks involved and take steps to mitigate them.

**Level of effort (time, money, and troops) is the biggest determinant of success.** Time is the first aspect of level of effort. Successful post-conflict operations require a long-term commitment. Five to seven years seems to be the minimum period of time to achieve lasting results. When the political will does not support a long-term commitment an option is to develop “forcing functions” to accelerate the process and reduce the length of time required to achieve success. Once developed, planners will have to carefully integrate those functions into the overall plan and tie them to specific measures of effectiveness. Ideally, however, post-conflict operations should focus on an end state not an “end date.” In a report published by the RAND Corporation, James Dobbins wrote, “the record suggests that although staying long does not guarantee success, leaving early assures failure.”

The second aspect of level of effort is money. Post-conflict operations are expensive. For example, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) estimated in its “Vision for Post-Conflict Iraq” that a “Marshall Plan” for Iraq would cost $75 billion over six years.
Troops are the third aspect of level of effort. The number of troops required for post-conflict operations is roughly proportional to the size of the indigenous population. Experiences in Northern Ireland, Malaysia, Bosnia, and Kosovo have shown that approximately twenty security personnel (military troops and police) are required for every one thousand inhabitants.86 Troop requirements for Operation IRAQI FREEDOM post-conflict operations were a source of friction between military and civilian leaders. General Eric Shinseki, Army Chief of Staff, testified before the Senate in February 2003 that post-conflict operations would require several thousand troops. Two days later, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz told the House Budget Committee those figures were “wildly off the mark.” Wolfowitz went on to say “It’s hard to conceive that it would take more forces to provide stability in post-Saddam Iraq than it would to conduct the war itself and to secure the surrender of Saddam’s security forces and his army…hard to imagine.”87 However, based on the number of troops historically required for success, General Shinseki’s numbers were probably accurate.

There is a direct correlation between troop requirements and the duration of post-conflict operations. The military would have to rotate its troops to support a long-term commitment to post-conflict operations. Six months has become the standard length of deployments without significantly affecting morale and unit readiness. Additionally, most militaries try to limit the time between deployments to 24 months. The result is the so-called “rule of five,” i.e., five troops are required for every one troop deployed. If that level of effort is not feasible or sustainable, deployments must be extended or the period of time between deployments shortened.88


87 War After the War (New Yorker) 6.

A secure and stable environment is paramount. The most immediate task of post-conflict operations is to establish a secure and stable environment. Security is the foundation for reconstruction. Economic development and growth, social well-being, justice and reconciliation, and governance depend on security. Until a secure and stable environment is established, reconstruction cannot begin in earnest.

The objective of the initial phase of post-conflict operations is to stabilize the situation through the implementation of security measures. Early post-conflict security operations are usually directly related to combat and are predominantly a military activity. During the initial period of post-conflict operations the focus is on protecting human rights and maintaining law and order. Specific security tasks include: control of belligerents, territorial security, protection of the populace, key individuals, critical infrastructure and institutions, reform/reconstruction of indigenous security institutions, and regional security.

Creating a safe and secure environment involves developing legitimate, self-sufficient, and effective security institutions. A security gap/vacuum will exist until indigenous security institutions are able to provide security within generally accepted norms of behavior. Occasionally the existing indigenous security institutions must be dismantled in order to build a legitimate organization. This is especially true if the former regime used the existing security apparatus to repress the population.

The situation in Panama after Operation JUST CAUSE is a case in point. The United States faced a dual security challenge in Panama. The first challenge was to restore law and order after defeating the PDF. Initially U.S. military forces performed this function. The second challenge was to develop a long-term solution by creating a viable, legitimate indigenous security force. There were two primary options for solving this problem. One option was to recruit,

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organize, train, and equip an entirely new Panamanian police force. This option was deemed unsatisfactory. The process of building a new Panamanian police force from scratch was considered too lengthy and it failed to address what to do with approximately 13,000 former PDF. The second option was to organize a new Panamanian police force using former members of the PDF. The disadvantage of this option was that many Panamanians viewed the PDF as “an unacceptable vestige”\(^\text{90}\) of the Noreiga regime. Eventually option two was selected but senior leaders and former PDF accused of criminal activity were retired or dismissed.

Demobilization, disarmament and reintegration (DDR) is a vital task for establishing a secure and stable environment. Initially the primary task of military occupation forces in Europe was disarmament of German troops.\(^\text{91}\) The success of disarmament programs (weapons turn-in and buy-back) is a valuable metric for evaluating progress toward stability.

Minimum levels of security are essential for safeguarding humanitarian relief supplies and protecting aid workers and protect minorities. Endangering their safety undermines reconstruction. The number of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) is another indicator of the state of the security environment.

**Neighboring states do have an impact on success, good or bad.** The need for a secure and stable environment extends beyond national boundaries. Post-conflict operations also need to consider external security requirements. Neighboring states can either contribute to success or they can undermine the overall effort.

Friendly adjacent or regional states can help establish legitimacy during post-conflict operations. They can exert a positive influence on the situation and help build trust. Good

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neighbors can also provide troops and other resources to reduce the burden on the United States and the international community. Every attempt should be made to gain their support.

Hostile or belligerent neighbors can jeopardize post-conflict operations and threaten long-term stability. Bad neighbors create external security requirements. The establishment of a military force is often how a state opts to meet its external security requirements. The United States will usually play a role in training and validating the readiness of the indigenous military force. Post-conflict operations are never finished until the state possesses the capability to provide for its own security from external threats.

Post-conflict operations may begin while combat operations are ongoing. This was exactly what happened in Europe during World War II. The Allies initiated Operation ECLIPSE and began post-conflict operations while they were still executing Operation OVERLORD and conducting combat operations. By definition, post-conflict operations occur after a period of fighting but reality dictates otherwise. NGOs and PVOs often begin providing humanitarian aid before the termination of hostilities. Even when an armistice or surrender is affected violence can continue making the situation unstable and unsafe. The transition from conducting combat operations to post-conflict operations is typically a challenge. The situation may require military forces to continue offensive and defensive combat operations according to one set of rules of engagement (ROE) while executing stability and support operations under a different set of ROE. Retired U.S. Marine Corps General Charles Krulak best described this situation as the “three block war.” On one block friendly forces may be conducting humanitarian operations. On the next block they may encounter sporadic armed resistance. The third block may involve intensive fighting against a determined opponent. Distinguishing friend from foe is particularly difficult when the enemy reverts to guerilla warfare and insurgent tactics. Good intelligence is vital during the transition period.

Information operations (IO) are an integral feature of successful post-conflict operations. A well-designed information operation can significantly increase the probability of success during post-conflict operations. The same principles are used to plan and conduct post-
conflict information operations as those used for combat operations. The information operations process involves identifying the target audience(s), crafting the message(s), delivering the message(s), and assessing the results.

Information operations depend on good intelligence. According to retired U.S. Marine Corps General Anthony Zinni, former Commander, U.S. Central Command, the focus of the intelligence effort during post-conflict operations should be on “cultural intelligence.” The purpose of cultural intelligence is to develop an understanding of how a society functions. This information will enable IO planners to select the proper audience, create an appropriate message, determine the most effective means to deliver that message, and accurately and efficiently assess results. The proper audience will usually include anyone who can influence the behavior of the indigenous population. Those persons may be religious leaders, tribal elders, or warlords. Appropriate messages may range from basic public information to messages aimed at establishing legitimacy and building trust. Some message themes may produce unintended consequences. Multiple delivery means help ensure the audience receives the message. Different audiences will rely on different sources for news. Assessing the effectiveness of the message depends on understanding and interpreting the response of the intended audience. Cultural intelligence can provide this information and form the basis for post-conflict information operations.

The IO campaign during post-conflict operations will be multi-faceted. Information operations during post-conflict operations will not just focus on leaders; it will include the indigenous population, neighboring countries, and the international community.

The Allied occupation of Germany provides an excellent example to show how information operations can support post-conflict operations. The Allies created Information Control Units (ICUs) to ensure the German population understood the terms of the surrender and the rules and

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regulations the Allies established to ensure compliance. The ICUs also formed a news and information service to combat rumors, false reports, and negative information. ICUs also had a mission with regard to military occupation forces. ICUs helped disseminate the theater policy forbidding fraternization as well as the standards of conduct for relations with the German people outlined in the *Handbook Governing Policy and Procedures for the Military Occupation of Germany* published by Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces (SHAEF) in 1944. 

Information operations conducted by the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) and its successor, the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM post-conflict operations are an example to illustrate the negative consequences of a poorly conceived IO plan. A Presidential Directive established ORHA on January 30, 2003 to plan, coordinate, and direct the post-conflict reconstruction and humanitarian assistance effort. In February 2003, retired U.S. Army Lieutenant General Jay Garner was appointed as Director, ORHA. In terms of information operations, LTG Garner “formed an ‘indigenous media group’ to reinvent Iraqi television, radio, and newspapers.” U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld replaced LTG Garner with L. Paul Bremer, a veteran diplomat, in April 2003 and ORHA became CPA. Mr. Bremer used the Iraqi Media Network to broadcast his weekly messages to the Iraqi people. The Iraqi Media Network also played a mixture of CPA public information announcements and Arab music videos. For many Iraqis this programming was so reminiscent of television under the former regime that they tuned to Al-Jazeera and Iranian broadcasts instead.

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95 War After the War (New Yorker) 6.
Post-conflict operations will involve NGOs, PVOs, and coalition partners as well as other members of the international community. The complexity of post-conflict operations necessitates the involvement of a variety of organizations. The security aspect can include multinational military and paramilitary forces. The other aspects (economic development and social well-being, governance and participation, and justice and reconciliation) of post-conflict operations often require assistance from international organizations such as the United Nations and the World Bank. The United States Agency for International Development and other government agencies will conduct assessments and coordinate U.S. support efforts. Contractors from the private commercial sector will be present to rebuild infrastructure damaged or destroyed during combat operations. NGOs and PVOs also contribute by providing humanitarian relief supplies to help the population recover.

**Rapid transfer of authority/responsibility to the host-nation is important.** Involving the indigenous population early in post-conflict operations can yield a number of positive benefits leading to rapid recovery and long-term stability. Participation encourages ownership and self-sufficiency while acting to counter fears of extended occupation and imperialism. Involving the indigenous population reduces the need for external support and discourages reliance on outsiders. Transferring authority and responsibility to the indigenous population also enhances international and regional legitimacy. The occupation and reconstruction of Japan was successful mainly due to the programs that General MacArthur implemented for Japanese participation during post-conflict operations.

**Future operations will be short on combat and long on post-conflict activities if we want lasting stability.** Today’s American military forces enjoy unparalleled technological and qualitative advantages over potential adversaries. Those advantages will result in rapid victory on future battlefields and lead to disorder and chaos after the fight. In short order U.S. military
forces will no longer be waging war. Instead they will be engaged in security, governance, and humanitarian assistance tasks that will require years instead of weeks to accomplish.\textsuperscript{96}

The lessons learned described in this section are not only valuable considerations for planning and conducting future post-conflict operations but also they provide a point of departure for identifying what functions and tasks must be performed. The next section defines the functions and tasks necessary to accomplish post-conflict objectives in order to achieve the desired end-state.

V. POST-CONFLICT FUNCTIONS AND TASKS

Post-conflict operations consist of four distinct processes or “pillars” as some authors describe them. The four pillars of post-conflict operations are: security, social and economic well-being, justice and reconciliation, and governance and participation. The four pillars model provides a framework for grouping post-conflict functions and supporting tasks. Supporting tasks can be derived by analyzing the lessons of previous post-conflict operations.

The Association of the United States Army (AUSA) and the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) jointly published a document in May 2002 entitled *Post-Conflict Reconstruction Task Framework*. The AUSA/CSIS publication overlaid the four pillars model against three conceptual phases of post-conflict operations (initial response, transformation, and fostering sustainability) to produce a task framework.

The U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute published a similar study, *Reconstructing Iraq: Insights, Challenges, and Missions for Military Forces in a Post-Conflict Scenario*, in May 2003. The Strategic Studies Institute identified 135 tasks required to build and sustain a viable Iraqi state. They rated each task as “essential, critical, or important” and organized them into 21 categories according to their post-conflict function. The result was a phased-array matrix of post-conflict tasks. Although this study produced a detailed list of post-conflict tasks, the tasks all fall into one of the categories of the four pillars model.

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Security is the first pillar of post-conflict operations. Security provides a safe and secure environment to successfully conduct the functions and tasks of the other pillars.

**Security**

According to Mr. Hamre and General Sullivan “security addresses all aspects of public safety, in particular, creating a safe and secure environment and developing legitimate and effective security institutions.” Security helps prevent a resurgence of fighting, deters recalcitrant combatants and criminals, and provides a degree of protection from threats such as landmines, unexploded ordnance and improvised explosive devices. Security partly depends on having sufficient numbers of troops available. A large, visible military presence on the ground can stabilize the situation. The primary function of military forces in the aftermath of combat operations is to establish and maintain a safe and secure environment. Initial security operations will most likely resemble combat and involve offensive and defensive operations. As the situation stabilizes, the nature of the nature of the security tasks will focus on developing integrated indigenous forces and institutions for internal and external security. Foreign internal defense operations may be required to assist indigenous security forces if armed resistance continues or an insurgency develops. Military forces could resume combat operations if the situation deteriorates. Shifting back and forth between combat operations and stability operations is a challenge. As pointed out by Dr. Conrad C. Crane and Dr. W. Andrew Terrill in their paper


about Operation IRAQI FREEDOM post-conflict reconstruction operations, “unlike warfighting, force is often the last resort of the occupation soldier.”

Successful security operations also depend on robust intelligence and information operations which, of course, involve the military. Other specific security tasks include disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration; border security and movement control (checkpoints and patrols); enforcing ceasefires, peace agreements, terms of surrender, and treaties; protecting the populace; and protecting key individuals and critical infrastructure.

Security is also necessary to create a safe and stable environment for humanitarian relief workers from NGOs, PVOs and OGAs. Their participation and contributions to post-conflict operations are vital therefore their security is of paramount importance.

Security operations facilitate the transition from combat to reconstruction. Establishing a secure and stable environment creates the conditions for post-conflict reconstruction to begin. Successful reconstruction promotes better security. According to a Third World Quarterly article written by Roger Mc Ginty, “reconstruction and security are mutually reinforcing.”

The creation of a safe and secure environment is the first pillar of post-conflict operations. The next pillar involves the establishment of a system for justice and reconciliation.

**Justice and Reconciliation**

As defined by Mr. Hamre and General Sullivan, “justice and reconciliation addresses the need to deal with past abuses through formal and informal mechanisms for resolving grievances arising from conflict and to create an impartial and accountable legal system for the future, in particular, creating an effective law enforcement apparatus, an open judicial system, fair laws,

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and a humane corrections system.”104 Following a period of violent conflict, the judicial systems of failed states often lie in ruin. Stable democracies must be rooted in the rule-of-law. Building rule-of-law institutions must begin as soon as the fighting stops. The first step toward establishing a system for justice and reconciliation is to break the cycle of impunity for those who commit criminal acts of violence. Justice and reconciliation involves lawyers, judges, and corrections experts working in secure areas to ensure that interim criminal code is in place, that courts can function in a rudimentary way, and that detention facilities are provided. Until a justice and reconciliation system is established a lawless void will exist and inhibit the democratic process. U.S. military forces other than military police are not normally trained or equipped to perform law enforcement functions. Addressing criminal activity and the rule-of-law requires a force that is structured, equipped, and trained to perform the tasks. According to a Parameters article by Major Kimberly C. Field and Robert M. Perito, “an intervention force for stability operations should consist of four elements: robust military forces; police constabulary forces; civil police officers; and lawyers, judges, and penal system experts.”105

The use of constabulary forces is a consideration when sufficient military police forces are not available. This was the approach the military used in Germany after World War II. The U.S. military created the United States Constabulary in January 1946 to fill the law and order gap until a professional German police force could be trained. A school was established to train soldiers on constabulary duties ranging from law enforcement to military governance tasks. The plan was to train a constabulary force of some 38,000 personnel based on a figure of one constabulary soldier per 450 Germans. The constabulary force was organized into three brigades and equipped

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with jeeps, armored cars and some tanks to provide the mobility necessary to respond to civil unrest.\textsuperscript{106}

The military plays a critical role in justice and reconciliation by providing military police and constabulary forces to serve as an interim law enforcement capability until security forces can create a safe and stable environment for indigenous civilian authorities to operate. Justice and reconciliation is an essential function of post-conflict operations and establishing rule-of-law supports the next pillar of post-conflict reconstruction operations, social and economic well-being.

**Social and Economic Well-Being**

Social and economic well-being is the third pillar of post-conflict reconstruction operations. Referring again to Mr. Hamre and General Sullivan, “social and economic well-being addresses fundamental social and economic needs, in particular, providing emergency relief, restoring essential services to the population in areas such as health and education, laying the foundation for a viable economy, and initiating an inclusive and sustainable development program.”\textsuperscript{107} In other words, social and economic well-being provides for the immediate needs of the indigenous population and creates the conditions for long-term development. The military performs a variety of tasks in support of this essential function. Social and economic well-being tasks involve the following areas: handling refugees and internally displaced persons, food distribution, public health, emergency shelter, education, economic assistance, physical infrastructure, banking and finance, and humanitarian de-mining and mine awareness training.\textsuperscript{108}


The reconstruction of Kuwait is an example of how the military supports social and economic well-being. Following Operation DESERT STORM, the Kuwaiti Task Force identified seven services it deemed as essential: food, water, medical care, sanitation, transportation, telecommunications, and electric power. The KTF consisted primarily of U.S. military civil-affairs units that interfaced with the Kuwaiti government ministries to provide emergency restoration of essential services to the population. Emergency restoration is the process of returning public health and safety to minimally acceptable standards until the indigenous government is capable of caring for its people. Once the situation is stabilized military civic action programs can assist indigenous military forces to help the local population through actions which contribute to social and economic well-being.

Social and economic well-being can significantly enhance the democratic process. When the indigenous population is safe, secure and self-sustaining they are more likely to participate in government. Appropriately, the fourth pillar of post-conflict reconstruction operations is governance and participation.

**Governance and Participation**

Governance is the process of providing civil administration of an occupied or liberated area. According to Mr. Hamre and General Sullivan, “governance and participation addresses the need to create legitimate, effective political and administrative institutions and participatory processes, in particular, establishing a representative constitutional structure, strengthening public-sector management and administration, and ensuring the active participation of civil

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society in the formation of the country’s government and its policies.”¹¹⁰ Historically, U.S. civilian leaders have always been reluctant to give the military control over governance which is fundamentally political in nature.¹¹¹

The U.S. Army began developing doctrine and training for potential military governments in the early 1940s.¹¹² Following World War II “civilian leaders supported the Army’s leadership over governance operations largely because of lack of alternatives. Political leaders realized that the Army was the only agency capable of accomplishing reconstruction in the midst of and aftermath of combat.”¹¹³ As a result, General Douglas MacArthur was named proconsul during the occupation of Japan and assigned responsibility for governance until political reconstruction was complete. The situation in Germany was similar where the Allies imposed a military government. General Lucius Clay became the Military Governor of the American Zone of Occupation.¹¹⁴ Both of these operations were directed entirely by the military, with civilian agencies playing a subordinate role.

The role of the military in governance and participation represents one of the most important shifts in U.S. policy regarding post-conflict operations. There has been a gradual reduction in the level of military control over governance and participation since World War II.¹¹⁵


That trend was reversed during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM when the Department of Defense was given responsibility for all aspects of post-conflict operations in Iraq. DOD created the Office of Reconstruction and Humantitarian Assistance and appointed a retired military general officer to coordinate reconstruction efforts. When ORHA was re-designated the Coalition Provisional Authority a civilian with extensive diplomatic experience was put in charge. This occurred despite the fact that some experts suggested using the World War II model and establishing a military government run by an active military officer.

The military’s primary role in governance and participation is to facilitate the creation of a democratic government. A recent RAND Corporation report on post-conflict operations concluded that the planning and conduct of democratic elections is central to the process of democraticization. Case studies suggest the desirability of holding local elections first. This provides an opportunity for new local leaders to emerge and gain experience and for political parties to build a new support base.\textsuperscript{116} Additional tasks the military may perform include forming a transitional government and helping to draft a national constitution. Whenever possible the indigenous bureaucracy should perform routine governmental tasks.

The four pillars provide a framework of functions and tasks for post-conflict reconstruction operations. The pillars are mutually reinforcing. No one pillar is more important than the other three. Ideally, the functions and tasks contained in the four pillars should occur simultaneously instead of sequentially as the situation dictates. The next section examines past and current doctrine and how well the military is organized to perform the post-conflict reconstruction functions and tasks described above.

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VI. DOCTRINAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS

Doctrinal Analysis

This section analyzes current joint and service military doctrine for the primary purpose of identifying strengths and weaknesses. The secondary purpose of this section is to identify doctrinal voids that may require the development of new doctrine.

The U.S. military did not have a doctrine for post-conflict operations until the War Department published Field Manual (FM) 27-5 on 30 July 1940. A little over two years later they published change one to FM 27-5. It is not clear how much impact this manual had on planning the occupations of Germany and Japan. On 22 December 1943, the War Department published a new version of FM 27-5 entitled *The United States Army and Navy Manual of Military Government and Civil Affairs*. This version of FM 27-5 superseded the older manual and served as the basis for conducting post-conflict operations after World War II. FM 27-5 was divided into seven sections: I - General; II - Civil Affairs Responsibilities; III - Organization of Military Government, IV - Personnel, V - Planning, VI - Proclamations, Orders, Ordinances, and Instructions; and VII - Military Commissions, Provost Courts, and Claims. This 86-page document described in detail how to establish and operate a military government in an occupied territory. FM 27-5 appears to be an excellent source of information regarding post-conflict operations. No comparable manual exits in current military doctrine.

The military published Joint Publication 3-07, *Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War*, on 16 June 1995. General John M. Shalikashvili, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, noted inside the front cover, “our military profession is increasingly changing its focus
(from warfighting) to a complex array of military operations – other than war.” According to Joint Publication 3-07, military operations other than war or MOOTW “encompass the use of military capabilities across the range of military operations short of war. These military actions can be applied to complement any combination of the other instruments of national power and occur before, during, and after war.” Joint Publication 3-07 was intended to supplement the military’s capstone manual for joint operations, Joint Publication 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations.* Joint Publication 3-07 is significant more for what it represents than for the information it contains. Joint Publication 3-07 represents the military’s acknowledgment of a need for doctrine to cover operations other than warfighting. Overall, Joint Publication 3-07 does an excellent job translating historical lessons into general doctrinal terms but it lacks the substance to be of any real value for planning and conducting post-conflict operations.

Joint Publication 3-57, *Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Operations,* was published in 2001. It supports Joint Publication 3-0 and provides doctrine specifically related to civil-military operations. Joint Publication 3-57 contains broad doctrinal guidance along with detailed information on planning and executing civil-military operations. Overall, Joint Publication 3-57 is an outstanding document but it only applies to one aspect of post-conflict operations.

United States Army doctrine for post-conflict operations is organized along the same lines as joint doctrine. The Army’s capstone manual for operations is FM 3-0, *Operations.* The current version of FM 3-0 was published in June 2001. Chapter 6, Conducting Full Spectrum Operations, briefly discusses post-conflict operations in conjunction with conflict termination. “A period of postconflict activities exists between the end of a conflict and redeployment of the last U.S. soldier…Army forces conduct stability operations and support operations to sustain the

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118 Ibid., GL-3. (MOOTW is the joint term for what U.S. Army doctrine calls Stability and Support Operations.)
results achieved by the campaign. These operations ensure that the threat does not resurrect itself and that the conditions that generated the conflict do not recur. Postconflict stability operations and support operations – conducted by Army forces – transform temporary battlefield successes into lasting strategic results.”\(^{119}\) It appears that the Army considers post-conflict operations as more a form of stability and support operations (SASO) than combat operations (offense and defense).

The U.S. Army published a doctrinal manual for SASO in February 2003. FM 3-07, *Stability Operations and Support Operations*, is the Army’s version of Joint Publication 3-07. The Army uses the term SASO while the joint community uses the term MOOTW to describe those military activities that are not combat operations. According to the Army definition, stability operations “promote and protect US national interests by influencing the threat, political, and information dimensions of the operational environment through a combination of peacetime developmental, cooperative activities and coercive actions in response to crisis.”\(^{120}\) Support operations “employ Army forces to assist civil authorities, foreign or domestic, as they prepare for or respond to crisis and relieve suffering.”\(^{121}\) Doctrinally speaking, there are ten different types of stability operations and two kinds of support operations.

FM 3-07 discusses each stability operation and support operation in varying degrees of detail. FM 3-07 also contains information related to SASO and post-conflict operations. There are appendices that discuss interagency operations, the law in SASO, rules of engagement, refugees and displaced persons, the characteristics of insurgencies, and negotiations. FM 3-07 does not address post-conflict operations.


\(^{121}\) Ibid.
The U.S. Army also has a doctrinal manual for civil-military operations. FM 41-10, *Civil Affairs Operations*, was published in February 2000 to provide detailed doctrine for civil-military operations. FM 41-10 is a very good document for planning and conducting civil-military activities in support of combat operations. It has limited utility for the broader range of post-conflict operations.

The evidence and analysis are conclusive; the U.S. military does not have an overarching doctrine for planning and conducting post-conflict operations. Fareed Zakaria noted this deficiency in an article he wrote for *Newsweek* magazine in which he described the U.S. military as being “untouchable at war but clumsy at peace.”

**Organizational Analysis**

There are no units in the U.S. military specifically organized to conduct post-conflict operations. The United States could not afford that degree of specialization; the monetary cost would be prohibitive. The force was designed and built to operate across the range of military operations. United States Army doctrine uses the term “full-spectrum operations” to describe the range of military operations. Full-spectrum operations include offense, defense, stability, and support operations. While the contribution provided by some units may be greater during a particular aspect of military operations; every organization is capable of performing its mission during war and military operations other than war.

In November 2003, the National Defense University published a comprehensive study of post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction operations. The basic thesis of the study states that “post-conflict operations require specialized forces that are just as ready to deploy as combat forces.” According to the authors, post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction operations

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require five core capabilities: civil affairs, engineers, military police, psychological operations, and medical. Everything else is classified as either a support or combat capability.\textsuperscript{124} The authors designed a hypothetical model organization for post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction operations. They also developed two illustrative scenarios to guide force sizing and to serve as means for comparison against current military structure. Their analysis concluded that the military needs to rebalance its active component and reserve component forces. Too many essential capabilities for post-conflict operations reside in the reserve component. They also suggested the military needs to develop additional capabilities in several critical skills: medical, intelligence, engineer, mortuary affairs, air traffic control, and military police.\textsuperscript{125}

This monograph does not endorse creating separate forces dedicated specifically to post-conflict operations. Specialized forces are expensive. A better solution is for the military to eliminate or reduce some types of forces and reconfigure the force to achieve a better balance between the active component and reserve component in some capabilities. The military should also study ways to make its forces more agile and adaptable. The next section discusses additional recommendations across the spectrum of DOTMLP-F for improving joint capabilities to conduct post-conflict operations.

**VII. CAPABILITY SHORTFALLS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS**

This section identifies shortfalls and makes recommendations for improving joint U.S. military capabilities to conduct post-conflict operations. This section is organized according to the DOTMLP-F framework. The first area addressed is doctrine; the cornerstone of military operations.

\textsuperscript{124} Ibid., 73-74.

\textsuperscript{125} Ibid., 77.
**Doctrine**

The purpose of doctrine is to provide guidance for conducting operations and to serve as a common language for ensuring effective coordination among military forces. The United States military does not have an overarching doctrine for post-conflict operations. Joint and service doctrine both fail to address the scope of functions and tasks that must be performed to achieve success during post-conflict operations. The first step in correcting this deficiency is for the United States military to immediately update its capstone doctrinal manuals, Joint Publication 3-0 and FM 3-0, and related supporting manuals, Joint Publication 3-07 and FM 3-07, to incorporate additional information regarding post-conflict operations. The second step is to develop separate doctrinal publications that contain detailed information for conducting post-conflict operations. The new manuals should integrate the lessons learned described in section IV of this monograph and be organized along lines of FM 27-5.

One of the lessons learned from post-conflict operations is the importance of information operations. Although a detailed study of information operations was beyond the prevue of this monograph it was apparent that current doctrine is inadequate and the U.S. military needs to initiate a bottom-up review of information operations doctrine to ensure it supports the contemporary operating environment.

Interagency operations are another area of doctrine that must be fixed. Modern military operations and particularly post-conflict operations involve other government agencies. Capabilities such as intelligence and diplomacy are resident in government agencies other than the Department of Defense yet they are essential for successful post-conflict operations. To improve its ability to work with other government agencies the U.S. military should take the necessary steps to ensure interagency operations are integrated into its doctrine.

**Organizations**

The U.S. military is comprised of various organizations of different capabilities spread throughout the active and reserve component. Post-conflict operations require unique capabilities such as civil affairs forces that are found primarily in the reserve component. To better meet the
demands of post-conflict operations the U.S. military should consider restructuring the force to achieve a better balance between the active component and the reserve component. Specifically, high demand capabilities should be transferred to the active component and low demand capabilities transferred to the reserve component.

The nature of modern military operations has made some capabilities obsolete. The U.S. military cannot afford to retain capabilities such as air defense artillery that it does not need. By eliminating legacy capabilities that are no longer required the U.S. military could use the spaces to increase the number of forces in high demand specialties and improve its overall capability for conducting post-conflict operations.

Intelligence is vital to every aspect of successful military operations including the post-conflict phase. The nature of post-conflict operations requires a greater understanding of the attitudes and intentions of the indigenous population. Therefore post-conflict operations rely more on human intelligence than platforms and other technical means of gathering information. Overhauling military intelligence to place more emphasis on human intelligence and transferring technical intelligence requirements to other government agencies will enhance the U.S. military’s ability to conduct post-conflict operations. The impact of that recommendation will require completely changing the military’s approach to intelligence operations across the entire spectrum of DOTMLP-F.

Security is one of the four pillars of post-conflict operations. Every time the U.S. military conducts post-conflict operations its faces a dilemma regarding the role of combat forces in maintaining security after the fight. Combat forces are an excellent initial security capability but they are neither trained nor equipped to perform long-term law enforcement and other security functions. An alternative solution is to create a constabulary capability within the U.S. military or as a separate paramilitary organization within the U.S. government. Constabulary forces would provide an interim security capability to bridge the gap between the conclusion of combat operations and the establishment of indigenous security institutions.
An organizational recommendation for improving information operations is to establish information operations units at the corps and echelon above corps level. They would possess the full range of IO capabilities and have a similar role to that of the ICUs formed in Europe after World War II.

**Training**

Every type of military operations requires training and post-conflict operations are no exception. The U.S. military expends tremendous resources to prepare units for combat operations but does not make the same level of investment to prepare them for post-conflict operations. Even the tools to help commanders prepare their units to conduct post-conflict operations are limited. The proposed recommendations would improve training and enhance preparation for military units participating in post-conflict operations. First, develop exportable training programs that could be used to rapidly train units and individuals for post-conflict tasks outside of their area of expertise. Second, develop “how-to” guides for demilitarization, demobilization and reintegration operations. Third, expand the use of commercial contractors to train indigenous security forces (police and military). Fourth, incorporate post-conflict operations into combat training center scenarios. Include occupation force operations and liaison with NGOs, PVOs, OGAs, and coalition partners and focus on small unit operations and ambiguous situations with restrictive rules of engagement.

**Material**

Material is that aspect of DOTMLP-F that deals primarily with equipment and technological solutions. Certain enabling technologies can contribute toward improving the U.S. military’s ability to conduct post-conflict operations. A recurring lesson learned from post-conflict operations is the importance of planning. A worthwhile investment for the U.S. military would be to develop collaboration and synchronization tools that can be used to plan for post-conflict operations and assess progress during execution using metrics that gather information from a range of sources. Along those same lines, the U.S. military should also create models and simulations that can be used for post-conflict training and rehearsals. There are a number of other
technologies the U.S. military should pursue that are worthy of consideration for application during post-conflict operations. These include technologies for detecting improvised explosive devices (IEDs), security devices to stop vehicles, non-lethal weapons, language translation devices, sensors, tags and surveillance devices.

**Leader Development**

Military organizations rely on strong leaders who understand the nature of post-conflict operations. The following recommendations are aimed at developing leaders who can perform effectively in the dynamic environment that post-conflict operations present. The first recommendation is to restructure professional military education with the objective of changing the mindset and culture for how the military handles post-conflict operations. The second recommendation is to institute mandatory cultural awareness and language training for leaders throughout their career. The third recommendation is to develop courses that improve interpersonal relations, negotiating skills, and communications. The third recommendation is to expand the use of historical case studies in professional military education and other leader development programs to include post-conflict operations. The fourth recommendation is to incorporate civics classes into professional military education to improve the understanding of how to establish and sustain basic democratic processes.

**Personnel**

The success or failure of post-conflict operations depends on quality well-trained and prepared personnel who possess the right skills. The post-conflict environment involves interacting with the indigenous population. The U.S. military could improve its ability in this area by recruiting more multicultural personnel. Language skills are a critical capability for post-conflict operations. Another recommendation is to recruit and train linguists and develop a pool of low-density civilian linguists who can be hired on a contingency basis.

**Facilities**

Facilities are the final component of DOTMLP-F. The U.S. military does not have facilities dedicated exclusively to improving its ability to conduct post-conflict operations nor
does it necessarily need such facilities. What can be done is expand the capacity of existing facilities such as the Combat Training Centers and simulation centers to incorporate post-conflict operations.

In conclusion, post-conflict operations are integral to achieving the end-state of any military operation. Since its success in Germany and Japan after World War II the United States military has generally performed poorly when the fighting ended. The reasons for this lackluster record are many, ranging from a failure to consider the lessons of past experiences to shortcomings across the spectrum of DOTMLP-F. The military cannot afford to look the other way and expect someone else to take over when combat operations are over. If recent experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan are any indication the military will continue to play a vital role in post-conflict operations.

This monograph holistically examined the problem and challenges of post-conflict operations. It began with a brief discussion of international affairs and foreign policy to establish a frame of reference and define key terminology. The historical analysis section examined Operation ECLIPSE, Operation BLACKLIST, Operation JUST CAUSE, Operation DESERT STORM, Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY and operations in the Balkans. Those experiences provided a set of lessons common to every post-conflict operation. The monograph continued with a discussion of post-conflict functions and tasks organized according to the four pillars model of security, justice and reconciliation, social and economic well-being, and governance and participation. The next step analyzed current doctrine and organizations as they related to military capabilities to conduct post-conflict operations. The result was set of DOTMLP-F recommendations for improving the military’s post-conflict operations capability.

Now is the time for action. None of the problems are too hard to fix and none of the recommendations are too difficult to implement. In the words of the former Army Chief of Staff,
retired General Gordon R. Sullivan, “the United States cannot afford to wait until the next crisis to build its postconflict reconstruction capabilities.”

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