Post Conflict Operations
A Critical Analysis of US Army Force Structure Requirements

A Monograph
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The study concludes that US Army force structure is inconsistent with US strategic policies, is not based upon nor informed by practical lessons of the past, and does not strike a balance among the suite of capabilities necessary to conduct full spectrum operations. Numerous steps must be taken in order to give the US Army the capability to adequately conduct post conflict operations and therefore achieve and sustain national policy objectives. Although joint doctrine addresses post conflict operations, it does not offer the clarity needed concerning operational terminology. Post conflict operations terms must be clarified and defined at the joint level. After addressing the challenges within joint doctrine, the Army should reexamine those requisite PCO decision support mechanisms. Finally, reorganizing the US Army’s force structure provides the required capabilities to bridge the gap between military led combat operations and civilian led nation building operations. This reorganization must rebalance forces among the active, guard, and reserve structures and create a post conflict joint command organization. These steps will help to ensure that the US Army is able to not only win our nation’s wars but also to win the peace following those wars.
Abstract


The end of the Cold War, combined with the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks, produced drastic changes in the strategic and operational environments. The changed environments have likewise resulted in cascading effects beginning with the US national policies, down through its security strategy and military strategy, and ultimately affecting its military force structure. Recent US Army experiences in post conflict operations, however, suggest that US military forces are ill prepared to adequately conduct the myriad of post conflict operations necessary to ensure that the political objectives of the conflict are achieved and sustained. Failure to achieve and sustain the political objectives of a conflict raises the question of whether US Army force structure is adequate to conduct post conflict operations. In other words, is the US Army structured to not only win our nation’s wars but also to win the peace following those wars. Therefore the primary question of this study is: Does the current US Army force structure provide the requisite capabilities to conduct post conflict operations? The answer to this question carries significant impacts not only for US national policies in general but also for the successful conduct of the Global War on Terrorism in particular.

This study uses a methodology that starts by introducing the thesis that US Army operational requirements over the next ten years will require changes in the US Army force structure with regards to size, active and reserve balance, and capabilities mix. The criteria to judge this thesis include consistency, historical basis, and balance. Consistency is defined as the US Army force structure being consistent with US strategic policies. The second criteria, historical basis, is defined as the US Army force structure being based upon and informed by practical lessons of the past. The final criteria, balance, is defined as the US Army force structure striking a balance among the suite of capabilities necessary to conduct full spectrum operations. Next, the strategic policies of the United States, including the National Security Strategy, the National Strategy to Combat Terrorism, the Quadrennial Defense Review, the United Stated Code Title 10, and the Army Modernization Plan are analyzed to determine their implications on US Army force structure. The third chapter analyzes the impact of an operational environment on US Army capabilities and the historical US experience in post conflict operations. Finally, the requirements and capabilities of the US Army with regards to post conflict operations are determined.

The study concludes that US Army force structure is inconsistent with US strategic policies, is not based upon nor informed by practical lessons of the past, and does not strike a balance among the suite of capabilities necessary to conduct full spectrum operations. Numerous steps must be taken in order to give the US Army the capability to adequately conduct post conflict operations and therefore achieve and sustain national policy objectives. Although joint doctrine addresses post conflict operations, it does not offer the clarity needed concerning operational terminology. Post conflict operations terms must be clarified and defined at the joint level. After addressing the challenges within joint doctrine, the Army should reexamine those requisite PCO decision support mechanisms. Finally, reorganizing the US Army’s force structure provides the required capabilities to bridge the gap between military led combat operations and civilian led nation building operations. This reorganization must rebalance forces among the active, guard, and reserve structures and create a post conflict joint command organization. These steps will help to ensure that the US Army is able to not only win our nation’s wars but also to win the peace following those wars.
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Chapter One: Introduction

He who writes on strategy and tactics should force himself to teach an exclusive national strategy and tactics – which are the only ones liable to benefit the nation for whom he is writing.\(^1\)

Situation

Several trends have appeared in post conflict operations since the end of the Cold War in 1991. The number and frequency of nation building operations conducted by the United States (US) military has increased significantly to the point where the US military has conducted nation-building operations within a foreign state roughly once every three years since 1989.\(^2\) In addition, the initiation of the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) has seen two major wars, and their accompanying post conflict operations, within a span of 18 months.\(^3\) Finally, the number and frequency of peacekeeping operations conducted by the United Nations (UN) has increased significantly.\(^4\) The recent trend towards increased frequency of military operations other than war (MOOTW) in general and post conflict operations in particular combined with the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) suggests that the trend of increased number of post conflict operations will continue for the near future. The increased trend of post conflict operations will have a significant impact upon US strategic force planning. Meanwhile, Donald H. Rumsfeld, the Secretary of Defense, used the US Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) of 2001 to announce a major change in the Department of Defense’s (DoD) strategic framework for strategic force

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\(^3\) Donald Rumsfeld, *Global War on Terrorism Internal Memorandum* (Washington, DC: Donald Rumsfeld, 16 OCT 2003), 1. Mr. Rumsfeld suggests that the Global War on Terrorism began on 11 SEP 2001. He mentions what he believes is the progress to date of military operations against Al Qaida in general and in Afghanistan and Iraq in particular.

planning. The framework moved the country from a threat-based, country-specific approach to a non-country-specific continuum of capabilities. The change of a strategic planning framework has created many questions concerning the planning and use of military forces throughout the world. For example, new planning methodologies to support the capabilities-based planning approach (CBP) are not yet refined. In addition, the top-level policy goals of “Defeat, Deny, Diminish, and Defend (4D)” and “Assure, Dissuade, Deter, and Defeat (ADDD)” outlined in the 2003 National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (NSCT) and the 2001 QDR respectively imply post-conflict operations but provide little guidance for the conduct of those operations. Finally, the capabilities and force structure needed to support post-conflict operations seem to be lacking within the United States force structure.

Based upon this evidence, a reasonable hypothesis is that US Army operational requirements over the next 10 years will require changes in the US Army force structure with regards to size, active and reserve balance, and capabilities mix. The proof or disproof of this hypothesis requires several questions to be answered. Does the current US Army force structure provide the requisite capabilities to conduct post-conflict operations? What strategic policies during the past four years provide guidance regarding force structure in post-conflict operations? What impact does an operational environment have on US Army force structure? Finally, what are the requirements and capabilities of the US Army with regard to post-conflict operations? The purpose of this study, therefore, is to provide an answer to these questions and to provide a recommendation to the future force structure requirements of the US Army. This answer will

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8 Thom Shanker, “New Chief Sets Out To Redesign A Stretched-Thin Army,” *New York Times*, 28 JAN 2004. Numerous articles in the *Early Bird* have commented upon the perceived need to trim units such as field artillery and air defense artillery units and reassign soldiers to military police, civil affairs, and
provide a small piece to the larger question of how to conduct CBP at the strategic level. The question of force structure for post conflict operations will have significant impacts for US military forces both now and in the future in light of both the world trends observed over the past decade and the current world situation.

**Methodology**

The methodology for this study is based upon the national strategic direction outlined in Joint Publication 3-0 *Doctrine for Joint Operations* and reproduced in Appendix A. The framework states that national policies shape and orient the national strategy. The national strategy, in turn, shapes the military strategy. The military strategy, meanwhile, entails “the art and science of distributing and applying military power to attain national objectives in peace and war.”

The structure consists of four parts in order to evaluate the force structure required for post conflict operations. First, strategic level policies concerning post conflict operations are analyzed to describe and define the National Command Authority’s (NCA) expectations of the US Army. Next, the Contemporary Operating Environment (COE) and the US Army’s historical experience in post conflict operations are analyzed in order to determine both the expected enemy threat and the nature of that threat in post conflict operations over the near future. Third, the requirements and capabilities of the US Army force structure are analyzed to determine any shortfalls in capability. Finally, the last section provides conclusions and recommendations for the Army force structure to support post conflict operations.

**Criteria**

The criteria are based upon John Schmitt’s guidelines for the development and assessment of future joint operational concepts. Mr. Schmitt, a former Marine Corps captain who

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now works for the Defense Adaptive Red Team (DART) argues, “all concepts are based upon certain beliefs about war, and the validity of a concept depends on the soundness of those beliefs.” He defines a future joint operational concept as “the articulation in broad terms of an envisioned multi-service practice of military art and science at the operational level of war within some future timeframe and defined set of parameters.” The concept, therefore, is a conception of how military power would be brought to bear within a given context. The hypothesis of this study is that US Army operational requirements over the next 10 years will require changes in the US Army force structure with regard to size, active and reserve balance, and force mix. The hypothesis therefore falls within Mr. Schmitt’s definition with the exception of multi service practice. It follows that the criteria to test the hypothesis should include the principles articulated by Mr. Schmitt that underlie a credible future operational concept. These criteria include consistency, historical basis, and balance. The definitions of the criteria include:

Consistency: Is the US Army force structure consistent with US strategic policies?
Historical basis: Is the US Army force structure based upon and informed by practical lessons of the past?
Balance: Does US Army force structure strike a balance among the suite of capabilities necessary to conduct full spectrum operations?

Assumptions, Limitations, Delimitations

Three assumptions regarding US Army size, AC/RC balance, and force mix were necessary to facilitate the forward progress of the study. First, the current Army force structure of 1,035,000 personnel is assumed to increase by 30,000 over the near future on a temporary basis. Second, the percentage distribution among the active, National Guard, and Reserve structure is assumed to be changeable. Finally, the force mix within the active, National Guard, and Reserve structure is assumed to be changeable.

The analysis is limited to a study of US Army force structure only. Consideration of a joint force for post conflict operations is important but is beyond the scope of this monograph. Strategic and tactical level forces and force structure are also considered but the focus is at the operational level of war. The focus will be the portfolio of military capabilities needed by the US Army to support post conflict operations. The study, however, will not recommend how to achieve the recommended force structure for post conflict operations. Nor will it recommend how best to position this force structure to achieve the speed of deployment that the NCA currently desires.

Definitions

Several terms regarding post conflict operations are used interchangeably and imprecisely. This has created confusion in understanding exactly what type of operation is being discussed and the requirements for successful completion of the operation. For example, post conflict operations, nation building, occupation, and stabilization and reconstruction (S&R) are not defined in Joint Publication 1-02 Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms although MOOTW, peace building, peace enforcement, peacekeeping, and peacemaking are defined. This is despite the fact that the undefined terms mentioned above have been used to describe the same or similar phenomenon and that the defined terms are all related although they are differentiated by key concepts. Most of the terms, however, relate to some form of post conflict operation. James Dobbins of the RAND Corporation has defined nation building as “the use of armed force in the aftermath of a conflict to underpin an enduring transition to democracy.”13 This is the definition for post conflict operations that will be used for this study.

The other key concepts that must be defined are those associated with Rapid Decisive Operations (RDO). RDO is a concept being developed by the Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) for future joint operations.\textsuperscript{14} It describes the military element of an effects-based campaign against the broader backdrop of all instruments of national power being applied to reach US goals and protect vital US national interest. A rapid decisive operation is designed to integrate knowledge, command and control, and operations to achieve the desired political and military objectives. These tenets are shown in Appendix I. In preparing for and conducting a rapid decisive operation, the military acts in concert with and leverages the other instruments of national power to understand and reduce the adversary’s critical capabilities and coherence. The US and its allies asymmetrically engage the adversary from directions and in dimensions against which he has no effective counter, dictating the terms and tempo of the operation. The adversary, suffering from loss of coherence and operational capabilities and unable to achieve his objectives, ceases actions that are against US interests.\textsuperscript{15}

Rapid and decisive, however, must further be defined to fully understand this concept. The RDO concept defines rapid as “accomplishing the objectives of the campaign with speed and timing that is superior, absolutely and relatively, to the speed of the adversary.”\textsuperscript{16} Decisive, meanwhile, is defined as “imposing our will on the enemy by breaking his coherence and defeating his will and ability to fight.”\textsuperscript{17} Effects Based Operations (EBO) is a concept related to RDO that seeks to “make the linkage between the effects it wishes to impose on the adversary and the specific actions needed to achieve those effects explicit in the military decision-making

\textsuperscript{14} United States Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM), Toward a Joint Warfighting Concept: Rapid Decisive Operations, (Norfolk, VA: J9 Joint Futures Lab, 18 JULY 2002), iii.
\textsuperscript{15} USJFCOM, Toward a Joint Warfighting Concept: Rapid Decisive Operations, 9.
\textsuperscript{16} USJFCOM, Toward a Joint Warfighting Concept: Rapid Decisive Operations, 10.
\textsuperscript{17} USJFCOM, Toward a Joint Warfighting Concept: Rapid Decisive Operations, 11.
and command process.”\textsuperscript{18} Chapter four will analyze these concepts in terms of their implications for post conflict operations.

\textsuperscript{18} USJFCOM, \textit{Effects Based Operations Concept Primer} (Norfolk, VA: J9 Joint Futures Lab, JULY 2003), 1.
Chapter Two: Strategic Policies

The highest type of strategy – sometimes called grand strategy – is that which so integrates the policies and armaments of the nation that resort to war is either rendered unnecessary or is undertaken with the maximum chance of victory.\(^{19}\)

Introduction

The national strategic direction of the United States Government (USG) is determined by its national interests and values as expressed in its national policies.\(^{20}\) Appendix A shows the process of how American leaders transform national policies into national capabilities and plans. Therefore, any evaluation of future military capabilities must first consider past and present strategic level policies. Specifically, what strategic policies over the past four years provide guidance regarding US Army force structure in general and for post conflict operations in particular? Do these policies require the US Army to conduct post conflict operations? What requirements regarding post conflict operations are placed on the Department of Defense in general and the Department of the Army in particular? The relevant policies are contained within the 2002 National Security Strategy (NSS), the 2003 National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (NSCT), the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), the United States Code (USC) Title 10, and the 2003 Army Modernization Plan (AMP). These documents are general in nature, as in the case of the NSS, NSCT, and QDR, but they are also specific in nature, as in the case of the Title 10 requirements and the AMP. The guidance, taken as a collective framework, serves as the start point for this evaluation and as the main data points for evaluation of the consistency criteria.


\(^{20}\)Joint Chiefs of Staff. *Joint Publication 3-0 Doctrine for Joint Operations*, I-5.
2002 National Security Strategy

The 2002 NSS outlines eight strategic goals of the United States Government.\textsuperscript{21} Only three of the goals, however, directly or indirectly influence the development of required military capabilities in post conflict operations. The three goals include the defeat of global terrorism, the threat of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and the transformation of America’s security institutions.

The NSS views the primary threat to the United States to be attacks from terrorist networks on the US homeland.\textsuperscript{22} The defeat of this threat requires the GWOT to be “fought on many fronts over an extended period of time.”\textsuperscript{23} The document outlines a few key tenets required to defeat global terrorism but the 2003 NSCT details the tenets with greater specificity. The first priority in the defeat of global terrorism is to disrupt and destroy terrorist organizations of global reach and attack their leadership by “direct and continuous action using all the elements of national and international power” by either multilateral or unilateral means.\textsuperscript{24} The NSS also advocates preemptive action, if necessary, to attain this goal.\textsuperscript{25}

There is a linkage in the NSS, meanwhile, between the strategy to defeat the threat of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and the strategy to defeat of global terrorism. The NSS states that a small number of rogue states, “are determined to acquire weapons of mass destruction” and “sponsor terrorism around the globe.”\textsuperscript{26} The strategy to defeat the threat of WMD, like the strategy to defeat global terrorism, includes possible preemptive action and the

\textsuperscript{21} Office of the President, \textit{The National Security Strategy of the United States of America} (Washington, DC: The White House, SEP 2002), 1-2. The goals delineated in the NSS include: 1. Champion aspirations for human dignity; 2. Strengthen alliances to defeat global terrorism and work to prevent attacks against us and our friends; 3. Work with others to defuse regional conflicts; 4. Prevent our enemies from threatening us, our allies, and our friends, with weapons of mass destruction; 5. Ignite a new era of global economic growth through free markets and free trade; 6. Expand the circle of development by opening societies and building the infrastructure of democracy; 7. Develop agendas for cooperative action with other main centers of global power; and 8. Transform America’s national security institutions to meet the challenges and opportunities of the twenty-first century.

\textsuperscript{22} Office of the President, \textit{The National Security Strategy of the United States of America}, 5, 30.

\textsuperscript{23} Office of the President, \textit{The National Security Strategy of the United States of America}, 5.


\textsuperscript{26} Office of the President, \textit{The National Security Strategy of the United States of America}, 14.
ability of the armed forces to conduct “rapid and precise operations to achieve decisive results” in order to eliminate specific threats.\textsuperscript{27} It also includes “innovation in the use of military forces.”\textsuperscript{28}

Finally, the NSS calls for the transformation of America’s national security institutions in order to meet the security requirements of a new era. The military’s highest priority during this transformation is to defend the US through the means of assurance, dissuasion, deterrence, and defeat (ADDDef).\textsuperscript{29} The NSS also calls for a transition from a threat-based force to a capabilities based force. This capabilities based force must provide a “broad portfolio of military capabilities” and give the President a “wider range of military options.”\textsuperscript{30} Military capabilities beyond specified intelligence requirements, however, are not discussed.

The NSS, therefore, provides critical guidance for the development of military capabilities. The defeat of global terrorism, the threat of WMD, and the transformation of America’s security institutions, will require an extended commitment, a strategic preemptive capability, full spectrum military operations, rapid decisive operations, and a capabilities based force. This guidance, however, is general in nature and requires more clarification to be of use to the military planner. The extended nature of the conflict, combined with possible preemptive and unilateral action, means the US military must have the capability to quickly conduct operations over a long period of time without reliance upon the military capabilities of other nations. For example, the US commitment to Central and South Asia includes an implicit commitment to nation building in Afghanistan and to preserving stability throughout the region.\textsuperscript{31} Meanwhile, the implication of a preemptive strategy to disarm states developing WMD, if carried through, implies new and very demanding military requirements.\textsuperscript{32}

\begin{itemize}
\item\textsuperscript{27} Office of the President, \textit{The National Security Strategy of the United States of America}, 16.
\item\textsuperscript{28} Office of the President, \textit{The National Security Strategy of the United States of America}, 16.
\item\textsuperscript{29} Office of the President, \textit{The National Security Strategy of the United States of America}, 29.
\item\textsuperscript{30} Office of the President, \textit{The National Security Strategy of the United States of America}, 30.
\item\textsuperscript{31} Lynn E. Davis and Jeremy Shapiro, \textit{The U.S. Army and the New National Security Strategy} (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2003), 11.
\item\textsuperscript{32} Lynn E. Davis and Jeremy Shapiro, \textit{The U.S. Army and the New National Security Strategy}, 14.
\end{itemize}
2003 National Strategy for Combating Terrorism

The NSCT describes the nature of the threat, the strategic intent, and the goals of the GWOT. The strategic intent of the GWOT is to “stop terrorist attacks against the US and its allies and ultimately to create an international environment inhospitable to terrorists and all those who support them.”\(^{33}\) The strategy envisioned by the NSCT involves direct and continuous action against terrorist groups to achieve a cumulative destructive effect.\(^{34}\) The terrorist threat portrayed by the NSCT is different from previous threats in that the terrorist organization is a flexible, transnational network structure, enabled by modern technology and characterized by loose inter-connectivity both within and between groups.\(^{35}\) The defeat of this threat will require a 4D strategy and is encapsulated in the four goals of the strategy.\(^{36}\)

Appendix C outlines the goals of the NSCT and their embedded objectives in more detail. The main points of concern for this study are the defeat and deny goals, which involve a significant military component. The defeat goal includes the destruction of terrorists and their organizations. One of the three pillars of this objective is the use of decisive military power. Since 11 September 2001, the US and its allies have achieved this destruction through a variety of military means to include precision strike, Special Forces action, and full-scale military invasion.\(^{37}\) In the cases of Afghanistan and Iraq, military action has ultimately resulted in significant post conflict operations in order to underpin an enduring transition to democracy. The deny goal, meanwhile, envisions different, although complementary, ends than the defeat goal.

\(^{34}\) Office of the President, *National Strategy For Combating Terrorism*, 2.
\(^{36}\) Office of the President, *National Strategy For Combating Terrorism*, 11-12. The 4D strategy to defeat terrorism includes: Defeat terrorists and their organizations; Deny sponsorship, support, and sanctuary to terrorists; Diminish the underlying conditions that terrorists seek to exploit; and Defend US citizens and interests at home and abroad.
\(^{37}\) Six suspected al-Qaida terrorists were killed in Yemen by a Hellfire missile fired from a Predator UAV on 4 NOV 2002. Meanwhile, Special Forces units spearheaded the American attack in Afghanistan in OCT 2001 following the 11 SEP 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States. Finally, conventional forces conducted an invasion of Iraq on 17 MAR 2003 in order to change the Iraqi regime and to destroy any WMD.
The denial of sanctuary to terrorists includes four key objectives: the end of the state sponsorship of terrorism, the compelling of unwilling states, the interdiction and disruption of material support for terrorists, and the elimination of terrorist sanctuaries and havens. Specified means to achieve these objectives in the NSCT include the positioning of forces and assets to interdict terrorist traffic. The four objectives, while separate and distinct, can be achieved through common means. One of these means is the use of post conflict operations in order to facilitate an enduring transition to democracy. Finally, the Department of Defense (DoD) is charged to develop plans that “address the denial” of terrorist sanctuaries.\textsuperscript{38}

The US Army faces two broad challenges posed by the GWOT. The first challenge is the implications of increased long-term commitments and the second challenge is the enhancement of SOF / light infantry capabilities and expanding expeditionary capabilities.\textsuperscript{39} The first noted challenge impacts upon post conflict operations due to the likely increases in tempo, strains on low density / high demand specialties and units, and expanded overseas support requirements.\textsuperscript{40} Long term commitments also implies a requirement for near continuous operations at various levels and will entail the extensive use of American ground forces in a wide variety of missions.\textsuperscript{41} The extent to which the US will try to influence or shape the general global security environment will also require the US military to be used for peacekeeping, stability, and security cooperation activities around the world.\textsuperscript{42} The second noted challenge implies that ground forces will play an instrumental role in the war on terrorism.\textsuperscript{43} This role will cover the full spectrum of war and will diversify over time. An equally demanding pace and duration will match the diversity of the

\textsuperscript{38} Office of the President, \textit{National Strategy For Combating Terrorism}, 22.
\textsuperscript{39} Lynn E. Davis and Jeremy Shapiro, \textit{The US Army and the New National Security Strategy}, 43.
\textsuperscript{40} Lynn E. Davis and Jeremy Shapiro, \textit{The US Army and the New National Security Strategy}, 43.
\textsuperscript{43} Lynn E. Davis and Jeremy Shapiro, \textit{The U.S. Army and the New National Security Strategy}, 55.
operations. Due to the various aspects of the GWOT, the Army’s greatest asset in the war will be
the diversity of its forces.  

The 2002 NSS and the 2003 NSCT form the core of the national security strategy of the
United States. The guidance contained in these documents address how the United States will
apply the four instruments of national power (diplomatic, information, military, and economic) to
address the problem of national security. More guidance, however, is required to focus upon the
specific question of how the military instrument of national power will be applied to the problem.
The 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review helps to answer this question.

**2001 Quadrennial Defense Review**

announced a major change in force planning for strategic forces. It also restored the physical
defense of the United States as the Department of Defense’s (DoD) primary mission. This
mission consists of preventing future terrorist attacks on the United States and also minimizing
the consequences should they occur. The old defense strategy focused upon a threat based
country specific approach. The new defense strategy, however, focuses upon attaining a non-
threat specific continuum of capabilities ranging from minimal force to nuclear weapons. The
QDR describes a changed global security environment but the trends are inadequate to provide
guidance for the new planning methodology of capabilities-based planning approach (CBP).
The CBP approach does, however, include four key goals “that will guide the development of US

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49 US DoD, *Quadrennial Defense Review Report*, 3-10. The trends identified by the QDR include: diminishing protection afforded by geographic distance; regional security developments; increasing challenges and threats emanating from the territories of weak and failing states; diffusion of power and military capabilities to non-state actors; developing and sustaining regional security arrangements; increasing diversity in the sources and unpredictability of the locations of conflict; rapid advancement of military technologies; increasing proliferation of CBRNE weapons and ballistic missiles; emergence of new arenas of military competition; and increasing potential for miscalculation and surprise.
forces and capabilities, their deployment and use. The goals of CBP include: assure, dissuade, deter, and defeat (ADDD).

Seven strategic tenets support the four defense policy goals. Of these seven tenets, four tenets are key to the issue of post conflict force structure. They include: CBP, management of risks, a broad portfolio of military capabilities and transformation of defense. The CBP requires an understanding of the United States’ security needs and a definition of our potential requirements. A critical requirement of the United States is operational flexibility. Operational flexibility is the ability of forces to rapidly perform a wide variety of tasks in a multitude of locations and environments around the world. The management of risks, meanwhile, requires hard decisions on where to apply scarce resources. Next, the broad portfolio of military capabilities requires an understanding of where current gaps in capabilities exist. Finally the transformation of our defense structure rests on four pillars. All of these issues are discussed further in chapter four. The second pillar of defense structure transformation, experimenting with new approaches to warfare, is key for the purposes of this study and is discussed in detail in chapter four.

The management of risks is a central element of the overall DoD defense strategy due to the scarcity of resources and the infeasibility of providing capabilities to address every requirement. The new risk framework includes four dimensions of risk: force management, risk management, capability management, and transformation management.

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50 US DoD, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, III.
51 US DoD, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, IV.
53 Lynn E. Davis and Jeremy Shapiro, The U.S. Army and the New National Security Strategy, 16. The broad outlines of the Bush administration national military strategy, derived from various sources, include: operational flexibility, power projection, operational freedom and coalition support, homeland security, and transformation.
55 US DoD, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, 32. These four pillars include: 1. Strengthening joint operations through standing joint task force headquarters; 2. Experimenting with new approaches to warfare, operational concepts and capabilities, and organizational constructs; 3. Exploiting US intelligence advantages; and 4. Developing transformational capabilities.
operational, future challenges, and institutional.\textsuperscript{56} The operational dimension, the ability to achieve military objectives in a near term conflict or other contingency, is the most important in terms of post conflict operations. The United States has been very successful in recent years at winning our wars but winning the peace after the war has been far more elusive. Enduring transitions to peace and stability were unsuccessful in Somalia and in Haiti.\textsuperscript{57} Other post conflict efforts in Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq are ongoing and it is too soon to measure their ultimate success. The QDR asserts that the mitigation of risk will not be accomplished with additional force structure but rather through assessing changes in capabilities, concepts of operations, and organizational designs.\textsuperscript{58} Additionally, the measurement of operational risk considers both the missions that forces were designed to accomplish and those that they are currently assigned to conduct.\textsuperscript{59} These will be key considerations and discussion points in chapter four.

Finally, the QDR describes a “1-4-2-1” approach to defining operational goals and acceptable risk. This approach is to defend the homeland (1), deter forward in four areas of the world (4) to provide assurance, be prepared to swiftly defeat attacks in two of these areas (2), and to win decisively in one of these areas (1).\textsuperscript{60} The decisive victory mentioned here includes the “ability to occupy terrain or set the conditions for a regime change if so directed.”\textsuperscript{61} The inclusion of kinetic and non-kinetic non-nuclear capabilities to address strategic challenges is allowing strategic capabilities to become one component of a spectrum of potential strategic responses rather than a separate level of capability.\textsuperscript{62}

United States Code (USC) Title 10 Requirements

The term “Title 10 Authority” comes from Title 10 of the USC, which sets out the statutory authorities and responsibilities, including command and control, for the various military departments.\textsuperscript{63} The term, however, has no legal or doctrinal significance. Rather, it is a slang term used to describe the multitude of authorities and responsibilities required in a joint operation or task force.\textsuperscript{64} Sections 161-165 of Title 10 provide the authorities and responsibilities of the commands and forces assigned to the various unified and specified commanders. As a general rule, the individual military departments are responsible for the administration and support of forces assigned by them to the combatant commands.\textsuperscript{65} The difficult part of determining requirements resulting from Title 10 authority is that there exists no centralized or detailed list of what specified tasks make up Title 10 authority for the Army. A partial list of tasks compiled by this author is shown in Appendix D. A complete list of required tasks for the Army would be the focus of a study by itself.

The Army provides logistics support as part of the Army Logistics Support to Other Services (ALSOS), as well as its Executive Agent Responsibilities (AER).\textsuperscript{66} This is in response to directives from DoD, combatant commanders, and interservice agreements in the case of ALSOS and in response to orders of the President, the Secretary of Defense, and Congress in the case of AER. ALSOS and AER are key considerations to determine requirements of the Army and therefore the capabilities the Army must provide in a post conflict environment. Executive agent responsibilities and activities assigned to the secretary of a military department may serve

\textsuperscript{63} United States Code Annotated, Title 10 (2003).

\textsuperscript{64} United States Army Europe (USAREUR) Information Paper, Title 10 Authority, ADCON, and Force Protection (Europe: 21\textsuperscript{st} Theater Support Command Admin and Civil Law Division, date unknown), 1; available from www.21tsc.army.mil/Aerja/AdLaw/FS%20-%20Title%2010.htm; Internet; accessed 7 JAN 2004.

\textsuperscript{65} USAREUR Information Paper, Title 10 Authority, ADCON, and Force Protection, 1.

\textsuperscript{66} Paul Wolfowitz, DoDD 5101.1 DoD Executive Agent (Washington, DC: DoD, 3 SEP 2002). The directive defines an Executive Agent as the head of a DoD Component to whom the Secretary of Defense or the Deputy Secretary of Defense has assigned specific responsibilities, functions, and authorities to provide defined levels of support for operational missions, or administrative or other designated activities that involve two or more of the DoD Components.

A key DoD Directive (DoDD) that provides specific guidance in regards to post conflict operations is DoDD 5100.1. The function of the Department of Defense is to maintain and employ Armed Forces to achieve three goals. These goals include: the support and defense of the Constitution, ensuring the security of the United States, and advancing the national policies and interests of the United States. The Army, meanwhile, is responsible “for the preparation of land forces necessary for the effective prosecution of war and military operations short of war.” Two of the ten primary functions of the Army are to “defeat enemy land forces and to seize, occupy, and defend land areas” and to “provide forces for the occupation of territories abroad, including initial establishment of military government pending transfer of this responsibility to other authority.” The second function directly impacts upon post conflict operations. The execution and successful completion of these two functions is a specific point of discussion in chapter four under Rapid Decisive Operations (RDO).

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68 Mr. Ed Blesi, *Information Briefing Army Logistics Support to Other Services (ALSOS) and Executive Agent Responsibilities (AER)* (Washington DC: DCS Logistics, 12 JAN 2001), slide 5.


70 Paul Wolfowitz, DoDD 5100.1, 4.

71 Paul Wolfowitz, DoDD 5100.1, 16.

72 Paul Wolfowitz, DoDD 5100.1, 17. The other eight primary functions of the Army include organizing, training, equipping, and providing forces for: appropriate air and missile defense and space operations; joint amphibious, airborne, and space operations; special operations; supporting other forces; psychological operations; operations on land; operating land lines of communication; and the operation of the Panama Canal and authorized civil works programs.

73 The Directive also states that all military departments are responsible for, and have the authority necessary to conduct, all affairs of their respective Departments, including the following: recruiting, organizing, supplying, equipping, training, servicing, mobilizing, demobilizing, administering, maintaining, and construct / outfit / repair military equipment. The organization and equipping of the Army in regards to post conflict operations is the primary concern of this study.
2003 Army Modernization Plan (AMP)

The 2003 AMP describes the Army’s Modernization and Investment Strategies (MIS). The MIS are the means of implementing the Army’s strategic vision for transforming the force. The ultimate purpose is “a fully capable force that will deliver future readiness at every point on the possible range of military operations.” The AMP states that the Army’s most unique and important core competency is the capability for sustained land dominance across the range of military operations and spectrum of conflict. As the USC Title 10 portion discussed, all military departments play a role in military operations but only the US Army is specifically designated to be responsible for sustained land operations.

The Army is taking a phased approach to developing and fielding capabilities over time. The problem, however, is that the focus of the capabilities is on the combat arms rather than the combat support (CS) or combat service support (CSS) arms. The new tactical paradigm of “See First, Understand First, Act First, and Finish Decisively” is flawed in that the current and envisioned Army forces are capable of finishing decisively tactically but are incapable of finishing decisively at the operational or strategic levels due to deficiencies during post conflict operations.

Three major aspects of the Army transformation plan include the redesign of the Army, the reinvestment of efficiencies, and the rebalancing of the Army among the active and reserve forces. The Army National Guard Restructuring Initiative (AGRI) introduced the

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78 Twenty pages of the Army Modernization Plan are devoted to Army Transformation. Sixteen of these pages are devoted to the transformation in general and to combat units in particular. One page is devoted to logistics transformation and one page is devoted to industrial base modernization. The entire section, however, does not talk about the transformation of CS or CSS units at all.
Multifunctional Division (MFD) as a bridge to the Objective Force for the RC forces. The AGRI is a concept to convert heavy ARNG divisions into lighter formations more relevant to the new Army strategy. Multi-Component Units (MCUs), meanwhile, combine personnel and / or equipment from more than one component on a single authorization document. MCUs have unity of command and control and are based on mission requirements, unique component capabilities and limitations, and efficiencies gained. Finally, the ARNG Division Redesign Study (ADRS) is a concept to convert noncritical ARNG combat forces to CS / CSS forces required to support the Army’s war fighting requirements. The National Guard, therefore, is already looking at various redesigns of current divisional structures to support post conflict operations.

**Conclusion**

The strategic policies delineated by the preceding documents provide the framework for identifying the needs, requirements, and capabilities required of the United States Army in post conflict operations. Some of the policies infer that the US Army should be able to conduct post conflict operations but implementing documents, such as DoD Directive 5100.1 specifically state that the US Army will provide forces to “seize, occupy, and defend land areas” and “provide forces for the occupation of territories abroad.” No other service within the Department of Defense is specifically tasked to provide this sort of capability although the other services may have units that are useful in post conflict operations.

The strategic policies provide general required capabilities for post conflict operations. For example, the NSS’ goals for the defeat of global terrorism, the threat of WMD, and the transformation of America’s security institutions will require extended commitments, a strategic preemptive capability, full spectrum military operations, rapid decisive operations, and a capabilities based force. The NSCT’s call for the defeat of terrorists and their organizations along

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with the denial of sanctuary to terrorists will require plans to address the denial of terrorist
sanctuaries and the development of a military nation building capability. The QDR, meanwhile,
requires a capabilities based planning approach, the management of risks, a broad portfolio of
military capabilities, and a transformation of America’s defense. Next, Title 10 authorizes a
plethora of requirements for the Army that must be considered. Finally, the AMP states that three
major aspects of the Army transformation plan include the redesign of the Army, the
reinvestment of efficiencies, and the rebalancing of the Army among the active and reserve
forces.

Each of these documents provides a piece of the puzzle that must be included in the
analysis. The general capabilities mentioned above, however, include numerous secondary and
tertiary actions that must be undertaken in order to provide the broad overarching capability. For
example, extended commitments will require redundant forces in order to allow for a rotation of
forces. Full spectrum military operations will require specialized forces to operate in a portion of
the spectrum, generalized forces able to over the entire spectrum, or a combination of both.
Finally, the management of risks must take into account a possible lack of capability in post
conflict operations and the ramifications of that risk. Each of these issues will be addressed later
in the study. The next chapter will provide analysis of the impact of the operational environment
on US Army force structure.

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85 Paul Wolfowitz, DoDD 5100.1, 70.
Chapter Three: The Operational Environment

What experience and history teach is this – that peoples and governments never have learned anything from history or acted on principles derived from it.\textsuperscript{86}

Introduction

The School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) advocates a curriculum integrating the three areas of theory, history, and doctrine. In the same way, an analysis of the military’s post conflict operations capability should consist of the three areas of a contemporary analysis, a historical analysis, and an appreciation of current capabilities. Chapter two provided a contemporary analysis of strategic policies while chapter four will provide an appreciation of current capabilities. Chapter three provides a historical and environmental analysis required to provide context and depth to the post conflict operations problem. The question to be answered here is “What impact does an operational environment have on US Army force structure.” Four questions must be answered to derive a conclusion to this question. What is the impact of the environment on the United States’ strategic policies? How does this environment impact US Army capability? What are the required US Army capabilities that can be deduced from historical trends? And what is the operational environment that can be expected in future post conflict operations? The information in this chapter serves as the main evidence for the historical basis criteria.

Impact of the Environment on Strategic Policies

Chapter two showed that the environment has a dramatic impact upon the United States’ strategic policies. Several changes were made to the most recent versions of the examined documents as a direct result of the changed strategic and operational environments. For example, the 1998 NSS listed a variety of threats to the United States such as transnational threats, terrorism, international crime, and drug trafficking but it did not state a primary threat to the

\textsuperscript{86} COL Robert Debs Heinl, Jr. Dictionary of Military and Naval Quotations, 310. Quotation is from Hegel, The Philosophy of History, 1827.
The 2002 version of the NSS, meanwhile, explicitly stated that the perceived primary threat to the United States was attacks from terrorist networks on the US homeland. As a result, the NSCT was written in 2003 to provide more clarity as to how the United States would address the terrorist threat. A comparable document to the NSCT did not exist prior to 2003. Meanwhile, the 2001 QDR announced a major change in force planning for strategic forces as a direct result of the changed strategic environment from the Cold War bipolar world to the post Cold War multipolar world. Finally, the focus of the AMP changed to provide “a fully capable force that will deliver future readiness at every point on the possible range of military operations.” The genesis of the changes in each of these strategic policies was the changed strategic and operational environment.

**Operational Environment Impact on US Army Capability**

The operational environment is comprised of eleven critical variables that are defined in Appendix E. The eleven critical variables pose significant impacts upon US Army capability in post conflict operations. For the physical environment, less complex and open environments favor US standoff technology. US enemies will therefore seek to use complex terrain and urban environments to diminish US capabilities. As far as the nature and stability of the state, a state that must commit significant resources to maintain internal control is more of a threat in post conflict operations. The sociological demographics of a population, meanwhile, provide significant complexity to military operations. The regional and global relationships of a potential threat serve to define the scale of military operations. Military capability is becoming the most complex variable due to hybridization of technology. Most potential opponents feel that

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90 DA, *Army Modernization Plan*, iii.
91 Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence (DCSINT)-Threats, *White Paper: Capturing the Operational Environment* (Fort Leavenworth: DCSINT-Threats, 2 FEB 2000), 9.
information operations are their most productive asymmetric avenue.\textsuperscript{93} Advanced technology, meanwhile, can level the playing field both symmetrically and asymmetrically. External organizations are growing in influence, power, and willingness to become involved in post conflict operations. The US strategic center of gravity is viewed by most countries as our national will.\textsuperscript{94} Time is always a critical factor as is shown by the current US operations in Iraq. Finally, economics represent a nation’s ability to conduct sustained operations or to purchase military capabilities.\textsuperscript{95}

A historical analysis of the operational environment encountered during four previous post conflict operations is shown in Appendix G. Analysis of the eleven variables of the operational environment in these four operations means that the environment will have drastic impacts upon US Army capability during post conflict operations. Post conflict operations are normally conducted in countries with complex terrain or urban environments. This terrain increases the level of difficulty encountered by US military forces and stresses most units’ organic communication capabilities due to increased assigned areas of operation. The nature of the state for a post conflict operation is some combination of failed state, state remnant, or strong man dominated. This means the US forces must be able to fill the governmental gap until the state itself can again provide such capabilities as security, justice / reconciliation, social / economic well being, and governance / participation.\textsuperscript{96} The military capabilities encountered during post conflict operations can range from regular military to paramilitary to militias. US military forces must therefore be capable of combat operations if the need arises. The technology within the state may vary but it most likely will be damaged or even destroyed. This will inhibit the required economic development necessary for transition of power. Information capability may be limited in the state but it still can be used to exploit US mistakes and failures or to impact

\textsuperscript{93} DCSINT-Threats, \textit{White Paper: Capturing the Operational Environment}, 10
\textsuperscript{94} DCSINT-Threats, \textit{White Paper: Capturing the Operational Environment}, 7.
\textsuperscript{95} DCSINT-Threats, \textit{White Paper: Capturing the Operational Environment}, 10
US political decision making at home.\textsuperscript{97} External organization can be expected to be numerous and can help fill gaps in US military capability. Finally, time is a driving factor in decision making and operations. The level of complexity arising out of post conflict operations will stress both organization and individuals. A conclusion from this analysis is that a portion of the US Army capability must be structured to be able to operate in the operational environment most likely seen in post conflict operations.

**Historical Trends**

Dr. Richard Stewart, a historian at the Center for Military History, conducted a study of 20\textsuperscript{th} Century US occupations prior to the initiation for Operation Iraqi Freedom in order to develop numerical considerations that might apply to occupation forces.\textsuperscript{98} The study is important because occupational operations are a subset of post conflict operations. His sample included sixteen operations spread broadly through the 20\textsuperscript{th} Century.\textsuperscript{99} Some key conclusions from his study include a proposed decision making concept, military to population ratios, and restoration timelines.

First, Dr. Stewart recommended a decision-making concept resembling a “three legged stool” consisting of historical analysis, contemporary analysis, and an appreciation of current capabilities to determine occupation force requirements.\textsuperscript{100} Second, historical analysis showed that the manpower required for an occupation force depends upon the scope of the mission, the


\textsuperscript{97} DA, *Army Modernization Plan*, 9.

\textsuperscript{98} Dr. Richard Stewart has been Chief of the Histories Division at the Center of Military History since 1998. He obtained his Ph.D. from Yale University in 1986 and spent three years at the Center for Army Lessons Learned as their first historian. He went on to be the Command Historian at the US Army Special Operations Command for eight years. He is retired as a Colonel in Military Intelligence from the United States Army Reserve after 30 years of commissioned service. He has deployed to numerous theaters of operation as a combat historian.

\textsuperscript{99} The sixteen operations in the study included: the Philippines (1898-1946); Haiti, Nicaragua, and the Dominican Republic (in the 1920s and 1930s); Germany (after both World War I and World War II), Italy, Austria, Japan, and South Korea (after World War II); Grenada (1983); and Bosnia, Kosovo, Haiti, Kuwait, and Northern Iraq (in the 1990s). Some of the operations were occupations proper and others sufficiently resembled occupations to be useful for the purposes of the study.
demographics of a country, the socio-economic conditions, and the strategic circumstances of the occupation. The scope of the mission included such missions as occupation, law and order, and nation building. The demographics of a country is important because a modern demographic pyramid features relatively equivalent age cohorts through people in their sixties while a traditional demographic pyramid features much greater proportions of young people. Socio-economic conditions, meanwhile, affect the amount and quality of host nation resources that are available for a post conflict operation. Finally, the strategic circumstances surrounding an occupation impact the amount and type of international cooperation for that mission. The determination of a required post conflict capability within the Army must therefore consider this operational environment. The operational environment in a post conflict operation is the focus of the next section. Third, Dr. Stewart concludes that successful occupations take time and resources and that the most essential task is public security.

Some other key conclusions from Dr. Stewart’s study include force ratios, basic services, and essential tasks. Dr. Stewart determined that a military to population ratio of about 0.5% or one soldier per 200 civilians was a good rule of thumb. James T. Quinlivan provides further analysis of the force requirements in stability operations, rather than occupation operations, which suggests that this rule of thumb is low. In addition, Dr. Stewart determined that the restoration of basic services to include but not limited to public order, food, water/sanitation, electricity, local

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103 Dr. Richard Stewart, *Occupations: Then and Now*, slide 10.
104 James T. Quinlivan, “Force Requirements in Stability Operations,” *Parameters*, Winter 1995, pp. 59-69. Mr. Quinlivan argues that two demographic revolutions: dramatic growth in the populations of troubled states and the movement of a considerable portion of that population to the cities, combined with the decline in the size of American military forces, have resulted in a situation where the US military would be strained to provide a stabilizing force unilaterally at even modest per capita force ratios. The implications of this are that very few states have populations so small that they could be stabilized with modest sized forces and that a number of states have populations so large that they are simply not candidates for stabilization by external forces.
government, and economic recovery took many months and sometimes years. These conclusions are important to determine military requirements and therefore capabilities for the Army.

Dr. Stewart’s conclusions regarding occupations agree with the conclusions of a RAND study concerning America’s role in nation building. The RAND study examined eight nation building operations ranging from Germany in 1945 to Iraq in 2003. The study used five measures of inputs including military presence, police presence, total economic assistance, per capita economic assistance, and external assistance as a percentage of GDP along with four measures of outcomes including number of post conflict US military deaths, time to first elections after conflict, return of refugees and IDPs, and growth in per capita GDP.

The study came to many conclusions regarding nation building operations. The most important conclusion was that the US experience in the occupation of Germany and Japan showed that democracy is transferable, societies can transform themselves, and that major transformations can endure. The study also determined that the most important determinant of the successes mentioned above, among the controllable factors, is the level of effort – measured in time, manpower, and money. In terms of time, the enforcement of an enduring transition to democracy required five years minimum. Staying long did not ensure success in the case studies but leaving early did ensure failure. There was also determined to be an inverse

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105 Dr. Richard Stewart, Occupations: Then and Now, slide 12.
107 The RAND study analyzed eight nation-building missions from 1945 through 2003. The eight missions included: Germany, Japan, Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq. The authors derived specific conclusions from each individual mission along with general trends from all of the nation-building missions.
108 RAND Corporation, America’s Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq, 149.
109 RAND Corporation, America’s Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq, xiii.
110 RAND Corporation, America’s Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq, 165.
111 RAND Corporation, America’s Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq, 166.
112 RAND Corporation, America’s Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq, 164.
correlation between the size of the stabilization force and the level of risk.\textsuperscript{113} Finally, it can take a year or more to build up and deploy a civilian police force once combat has ended.\textsuperscript{114} This delay can create a short-term vacuum of law and order and can increase the pressure on states to use their military forces to maintain internal security.\textsuperscript{115} This phenomenon is discussed further in chapter four.

The task of post conflict reconstruction is complex because of the myriad of variables present in each individual case. A framework can be constructed, however, which delineates most of the options that must be considered. A joint project of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and the Association of the United States Army (AUSA) created such a framework in May 2002.\textsuperscript{116} The framework is organized into three conceptual phases, defined as initial response, transformation, and fostering sustainability. The goal during initial response is to establish a safe and secure environment, the goal during transformation is to develop legitimate and stable institutions, while the goal during fostering sustainability is to consolidate indigenous capacity.\textsuperscript{117} The framework tasks themselves, meanwhile, are organized around four distinct issue areas: security, justice / reconciliation, social / economic well being, and governance / participation.\textsuperscript{118} These tasks provide a framework for determining requirements in chapter four.

The Army’s efforts over the past 10 years to meet the full spectrum of demands placed on it involved the creation of tactical, hybrid, tailored forces.\textsuperscript{119} Thomas McNaugher, in his article, presents a more full development of the demands of full spectrum operations and the Army’s

\textsuperscript{113} RAND Corporation, America’s Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq, 165.
\textsuperscript{114} RAND Corporation, America’s Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq, 151.
\textsuperscript{115} RAND Corporation, America’s Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq, 152.
\textsuperscript{116} Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and Association of the United States Army (AUSA), Post-Conflict Reconstruction Task Framework (Washington, DC: CSIS and AUSA, May 2002). The study presents the range of tasks often encountered when rebuilding a country in the wake of violent conflict. As such, it is intended to provide a framework to help identify shortfalls and gaps in the reconstruction process and capabilities. Therefore, it provides a starting point for considering what needs to be accomplished in most post conflict operations.
\textsuperscript{117} CSIS and AUSA, Post-Conflict Reconstruction Task Framework, 4.
\textsuperscript{118} CSIS and AUSA, Post-Conflict Reconstruction Task Framework, 3.
\textsuperscript{119} Lynn E. Davis and Jeremy Shapiro, The U.S. Army and the New National Security Strategy, 298.
response to them.\textsuperscript{120} McNaugher argues that MOOTW challenge a unit’s war fighting command and control in at least three ways: increased span of control, increased range of operation, and new duties and skills.\textsuperscript{121} He also argues that MOOTW presents unique problems to training, leader development, and force structure balance.\textsuperscript{122} Units sent to Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan pulled needed capabilities from throughout the Army force structure.\textsuperscript{123} Tactical task organization, however, is very different from operational task organization. Division level headquarters, once considered tactical level organizations, are now increasingly used as operational level headquarters. The command and control challenges noted by McNaugher are only amplified when division headquarters, rather than corps headquarters, are used in this manner.

Priorities are different in combat than they are in MOOTW. For example, in successful counter insurgency, politics is primary and force is secondary.\textsuperscript{124} This prioritization is reversed from conventional war. In addition, the type of force and the type of political action used in combat as compared to MOOTW is key. For example, in Iraq, Anthony Cordesman argues that intelligence, skilled cadres of expert troops, area and language specialists, mixed with constant civic action and political warfare, and not increased numbers, are required to win in Iraq.\textsuperscript{125} This means that a very different force is required to win during post conflict operations than are required to win during combat operations.

A Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) review of the lessons of the Iraq war concluded that the Coalition’s success in joint warfare was not matched by its success in

\textsuperscript{121} Thomas L. McNaugher, “The Army and Operations Other Than War,” 158.
\textsuperscript{122} Thomas L. McNaugher, “The Army and Operations Other Than War,” 160.
\textsuperscript{123} RAND Corporation, \textit{America’s Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq}.
conflict termination, peacemaking, and in transitioning to nation building.\textsuperscript{126} This observation, however, was not unique to Iraq. Planners and US Army leaders historically have focused almost exclusively on winning major wars and not on keeping the peace.\textsuperscript{127} While many of the problems were beyond the control of US and coalition forces, many problems were caused by the failure of the US and its allies to provide adequate security, prevent looting, and take immediate action to ensure continuity of government.\textsuperscript{128} Several reasons for failure at the field and tactical levels were mentioned in the study.\textsuperscript{129} The report concludes that there is no “new way of war” without successful conflict termination, peacemaking, and nation building.\textsuperscript{130}

**Contemporary Operational Environment (COE)**

Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) defines COE as “a generalized dynamic assessment of ‘any’ adversary’s strategies, capabilities, and TTP that may be used to engage US forces. A catalog of reasonable, feasible and credible enemies in conjunction with the significant non-military environmental variables to challenge unit training objectives and drive leader development.”\textsuperscript{131} The COE, therefore, is a reasoned look at the situation US forces face now and the likely situation US forces will face in the near future.

TRADOC meant the COE as a means to portray a composite of potential adversaries in order to facilitate the training of US forces and leaders.\textsuperscript{132} This intent, however, does not diminish the utility of COE as a framework to analyze past operational environments and

\begin{footnotesize}
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  \item \textsuperscript{127} Conrad C. Crane, *Landpower and Crises: Army Roles and Missions in Smaller Scale Contingencies During The 1990s* (US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, JAN 2001), 26.
  \item \textsuperscript{128} Anthony H. Cordesman, *The Lessons of the Iraq War: Executive Summary*, 87.
  \item \textsuperscript{129} Anthony H. Cordesman, *The Lessons of the Iraq War: Executive Summary*, 91-92. Some of the reasons mentioned for tactical failure include: lack of an effective structure to manage the peacemaking and nation building effort in the field, failure to organize effective interagency cooperation in the field, lack of civil-military coordination, looting and criminal activity were not seen as major problems initially, military commanders did not seem to understand the importance of peacemaking and nation building, and a lack of jointness in phase four operations.
  \item \textsuperscript{130} Anthony H. Cordesman, *The Lessons of the Iraq War: Executive Summary*, 93.
  \item \textsuperscript{131} COL (R) Gary Phillips, *Contemporary Operational Environment Briefing* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: TRADOC DCSINT Threat Support Directorate, 25 NOV 2003), slide 7.
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therefore to predict future trends in future operational environments. This prediction is necessary in order to develop a full spectrum, capabilities based force able to operate within that environment.

The office of the Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence (ADCSINT)-Threats Support Directorate argues there are eleven critical variables that define the nature of the operational environments in which US military activities may occur. The critical variables of the COE include: physical environment, nature/stability of the state, military capabilities, technology, information, external organizations, sociological demographics, regional / global relationships, national will, time, and economics. ADCSINT further argues that soldiers and leaders must be aware of the variables representing the “conditions, circumstances, and influences” that affect military operations. The variables, therefore, provide a means to understand any operating environment from an Army external perspective.

The Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) argues that we can expect potential adversaries to adapt their methods of fighting and use a combination of various principles. These principles are discussed more thoroughly later in conjunction with the RDO analysis and in Appendix I.

Conclusion

The strategic and operational environments have a dramatic impact upon the US strategic policy. The numerous changes in the strategic environment directly produced changes in US strategic guidance. Corresponding changes in the operational environment have also resulted in

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132 Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL), *CALL Handbook 03-3: The Contemporary Operational Environment (COE)* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: CALL, 2003), 1.
135 Center for Army Lessons Learned, *CALL Handbook 03-3 The Contemporary Operational Environment (COE) Handbook* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: CALL, 2003), pg 5. The principles delineated by CALL include: control access into the region, change the nature of the conflict, employ operational shielding, control tempo, neutralize technological overmatch, cause politically unacceptable casualties, and allow no sanctuary.
drastic impacts upon how and when US military forces are used. The environment, therefore, is
the driving element in US national strategic direction. Appendix A shows how the national
policies, national security, and military capabilities are interrelated within the national strategic
direction of the United States.

The operational environment of post conflict operations impacts US Army capabilities in
a variety of ways. Complex terrain will stress organic unit capabilities, failed states will require
military capabilities to provide necessary functions, fractured societies will require rebuilding,
regional alliances will require a coalition point of view, military capabilities will either need to be
neutralized or rebuilt, external organizations can and may desire a role within the operation, time
will be a driving factor, and the operation will require a sustained commitment over time to
succeed.

The operational environment that can be expected in a future post conflict operation is
shown in the AMP, page eight, figure three. The physical environment will consist of complex
terrain and urban environments. Nation states where military operations will occur can expect to
be failed states with fractured public institutions. The internal society will be fractured and there
will be regional involvement along with international interest in the country. The military
capabilities of the country will include modernized industrial age forces. The technology within
the country will be hybridized. The media will be heavily involved within the country along with
numerous non governmental organizations (NGOs), private volunteer organizations (PVOs), and
criminal and supra-national organizations. The national will of the country will not be a strategic
center of gravity and time will initially favor the enemy. Finally, the economics of the situation
will support sustained operations.

Historical trends show that post conflict operations are very complex because of the
myriad of variables present in each case. General observations, however, can be made from the
several case studies. Four issue areas in post conflict operations include: security, justice /
reconciliation, social / economic well being, and governance / participation. The primary area,
however, and the area requiring initial and sustained emphasis is security. All other issues flow from the successful establishment of security. The most important determinant of success in the four issue areas is the level of effort provided by a country measured in terms of time, manpower, and money. The capabilities required to achieve success in the four issue areas within the described operational environment is the focus of the next chapter.
Chapter Four: Requirements and Capabilities

All concepts are based upon certain beliefs about war, and the validity of the concept depends upon the soundness of those beliefs.\textsuperscript{136}

Introduction

In chapter two, the USG strategic policies analysis provided some benchmarks for future U.S. Army mission requirements. Chapter three, meanwhile, analyzed the impact of an operational environment on US Army force structure. Chapter four will now evaluate the requirements and capabilities of the US Army with regard to post conflict operations. By analyzing five tertiary questions, an evidentiary base is established with a range of answers to the question of future Army requirements and capabilities. These questions include: What is required by the US Army in post conflict operations? What capabilities does the US Army currently possess to conduct post conflict operations? What difference, if any, exists between requirements and capabilities? What will be the impact of future operating concepts on US Army post conflict operations? And, what will be the impact of a successful US Army transformation on post conflict operations? The answers to these questions serve as the basis for the balance criteria.

Needs and Requirements

The U.S. Army seeks to be a “full spectrum force… dominant across a range of missions.”\textsuperscript{137} Thomas L. McNaugher argues that the Army is likely to face three broad choices to implement this vision in regards to MOOTW. These choices include: continue to embrace MOOTW in the manner and extent as the 1990s, withdraw from competition for this particular professional jurisdiction, or to seek more fundamental adjustment to the Army’s organization and training to better confront full spectrum missions.\textsuperscript{138} A fundamental adjustment to the Army’s


\textsuperscript{138} Thomas L. McNaugher, “The Army and Operations Other Than War,” 174.
organization, however, would require an understanding of the current structure of the Army and how it has been used in past operations.

Figures 1, 2, and 3 in Appendix L portray the changed operational environment that US forces face in military operations.\(^{139}\) Military operations from World War II to the early 1990s were characterized by long periods to plan for combat, relatively long periods to build up a large number of forces, and were followed by a long war. This was the case for World War II, Korea, and Vietnam. For example, the planning for Operation Overlord in World War II took over two years, the operation involved over 38 divisions and 551 air squadrons, and the resulting military operations took over 11 months to complete.\(^{140}\) The buildup for Operation Desert Shield, meanwhile, involved five allied corps, far fewer air squadrons and took six months to complete although combat operations under Operation Desert Storm took only 36 days.\(^{141}\)

The large number of forces combined with the extended duration of the war allowed for both the planning of post conflict operations and the placement of the necessary forces on the ground to conduct the post conflict operations. Operation Eclipse in Germany after World War II is an excellent example of this.\(^{142}\) The large number of forces and the extended duration began to change in the late 1990s where the emphasis was on a relatively short buildup of a small number of forces followed by a short war. This phenomenon is shown in figure two of Appendix L. The short time available to plan combat operations, combined with the short buildup time and the smaller available forces had the dual effect of decreasing the available time for planning post

\(^{139}\) Hans Binnendijk and Stuart Johnson, *Transforming for Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations* (National Defense University: Center for Technology and National Security Policy, 12 NOV 2003), 6-7. Figures are from Mr. Binnendijk and Mr. Johnson’s work but have been changed slightly to illustrate points this author believes were not emphasized in their work.


conflict operations along with decreasing the number and type of forces available for post conflict operations.

The combined decrease in planning time and forces available created a capabilities gap where the available forces were too few and of the wrong type to conduct post conflict operations. Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan and in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) in Iraq both provide excellent examples of this phenomenon.

A key point not directly derived from the preceding figures is the major differences between major combat operations and post conflict operations and the corresponding differences in the ends, ways, and means necessary to achieve victory in each phase.\textsuperscript{143} Military forces during major combat operations are focused upon the military and the leadership of a country. The ends, ways, and means during major combat operations are relatively certain. The ends are normally well defined and provide a central point of focus from top to bottom across the diplomatic, information, military, and economic (DIME) spectrum. The ways, meanwhile, are normally the result of coherent plans that are detailed, resourced, and rehearsed at all levels. Finally, the means are available and optimized. This has not been the case, however, in recent post conflict operations.

Post conflict operations do not focus upon the military or the leadership of a country but rather focus upon the population of a country. The change in focus combined with a relative uncertainty in the ends, ways, and means required to achieve victory are compounded by the long-term nature of the problem at hand. The ends are less concrete than those seen during major combat operations. The ways, meanwhile, are normally the result of emerging plans that are not as detailed, resourced, or rehearsed. Finally, the means are not as readily available or optimized.

\textsuperscript{143} Much of the discussion in this section was adapted from an information operations briefing given by LTC Charles Eassa to the SAMS 2004 class on 17 December 2003. LTC Eassa is a career field artillery officer who has served as TRADOC IO Proponent Chief, a corps plans officer, and 3\textsuperscript{rd} Army CG aide de camp. LTC Eassa’s presentation concerned information operations in major combat operations versus stability operations. The trinity of military, leadership, and population along with the ends, ways, means methodology are his work. Adaptation of this work for this study belongs to the author.
since different capabilities are now required for post major combat operations than were required for major combat operations. Analysis of these different capabilities, however, requires that they be described and delineated. The problems noted above will only become worse if new operating concepts are implemented as envisioned.

Dr. Steven Metz argues that the general characteristics of SASO units include: compatibility with other government agencies, NGOs, and coalition partners; skilled trainers and “doers”; capable of staying in the field for years at a time; combine a “velvet glove and poison fangs”; and capable of sustained autonomous operations in brigade sized units. Some post conflict operations, such as nation building and peacekeeping, require personnel on the ground and the skills or aptitudes needed for these operations are not much beyond what they have today. Other post conflict operations such as those involving WMD, urban terrain, or guerillas however, required special skills and tactics. The bottom line, however, is that post conflict operations require units that are able to perform the tasks outlined in the CSIS and AUSA study Post Conflict Reconstruction. Regular combat units can perform some tasks but specialized units are required to perform other tasks. Some of the tasks requiring specialized units include: protection of the populace, clearance of unexploded ordnance, establishment of law enforcement and judicial system, community rebuilding, management of refugees, and the reestablishment of investment.

Current Capabilities
The current capabilities of the US Army are partly described through the number and type of units available within the Army inventory. Some of the units are shown in Appendix H.

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144 Dr. Steven Metz, “Improving Army Capabilities for Stabilization and Support Operations” (Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, JAN 2004), slide 6.
147 CSIS and AUSA, Post Conflict Reconstruction, 4-20.
Several aspects of the Army’s current force structure raise concerns among defense experts.\(^{148}\) Chief among these concerns is the excess of combat forces. For example, there are almost 360,000 soldiers assigned to combat units with slightly more than half assigned to the active component. The Total Army Analysis (TAA) of 2003, however, assumed that only 30,000 of the 175,000 combat forces in the reserves would fight in either of the two major regional conflicts planned at the time.\(^{149}\) This forecast seems prescient in light of the fact 100,000 reservists and active duty soldiers are being retrained in the Army’s biggest restructuring in 50 years.\(^{150}\) This restructuring is taking soldiers like tank operators and artillerymen are being retrained to be military police officers, civil affairs experts, and intelligence analysts. The restructuring is taking place to fill positions the Pentagon needs for long term stabilizing operations. The 2003 TAA also concluded that the service required an additional 58,000 support troops to support its mission.\(^{151}\) Another concern with the Army’s current structure is that 70% percent of the soldiers in Army support units belong to the National Guard or Reserve.\(^{152}\) This distribution of support capability severely delays capability deployment times and carries large political ramifications for the call up of reserve forces. This information combined with Appendix H provides the data for a few conclusions. These conclusions are the focus of the next section.

**Capability Gap**

The analysis of the previous two sections combined with the myriad of anecdotal data available from various news sources suggests that a capability gap exists for the US Army in terms of ability to properly conduct post conflict operations. The capability gap is illustrated in figure two in Appendix L. The current emphasis of US military operations is on a fast buildup of small forces who then conduct a relatively short conflict. Operation Iraqi Freedom is an excellent


example of this methodology. The problem arises, however, when there are too few forces available to conduct the numerous tasks required of a post conflict force before a civilian lead is established to conduct the follow on nation building operation.

The lack of capability to conduct required post conflict operations missions is evidenced by the numerous articles concerning force structure changes seen in the national media over the past nine months. For example, the Secretary of Defense, Donald H. Rumsfeld, identified the real problem facing US military forces is not “the size of the military components but rather how forces have been managed and the mix of capabilities at our disposal.”153 In other words, the problem is that we have too few forces with the skill sets that are in high demand and too many forces with skills that are not in high demand.154 In addition, the changes planned under Army Chief of Staff General Peter Schoomaker’s Active-Component (AC) / Reserve Component (RC) Balance focus area will mean more civil affairs, military police, transportation, and port operations forces and fewer artillery, air defense artillery, and ordnance forces.155 A need was also identified shortly after September 11th, 2001 to increase the numbers of Special Forces along with military police and civil affairs.156

The current capabilities of the US Army, therefore, are not aligned with the current missions being assigned to it by the NCA. The size of the Army is inadequate as evidenced by the addition of 30,000 troops to the Army force structure.157 The active and reserve balance is inadequate as evidenced by the 2003 TAA and by General Schoomaker’s AC / RC Balance focus area. Finally, the capabilities mix within the US Army is inadequate as evidenced by the tasks required for post conflict operations compared with the units required to perform those tasks as

152 Congressional Budget Office, An Analysis of the Army’s Force Structure: Summary, 10.
156 Joe Burlas, “Changes Planned in Active, Reserve Balance” Fort Leavenworth Lamp (Fort Leavenworth, KS: 19 FEB 2004), page 1.
shown in Appendix H. The lack of capability to conduct required post conflict operations may be worsened if some future operating concepts are implemented and resourced.

**Future Operating Concepts**

Various parts of the DoD are working to develop war fighting concepts for the next decade. Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) has developed Joint Operational Warfighting (JOW) as a framework for discovery and debate in developing these war fighting concepts. The concepts developed within this framework are Rapid Decisive Operations (RDO) and Effects Based Operations (EBO). The RDO concept describes how a joint force commander, acting in concert with other instruments of national power, can determine and employ the right force in a focused, nonlinear campaign to achieve desired political and military outcomes. The successful implementation of RDO, however, will have negative impacts upon the ability of operational level commanders to conduct post conflict missions. The differences between the old doctrine of decisive force and the new concept of RDO are shown in Appendix J and the negative impacts on post conflict missions can be inferred from these differences. The smaller force size in RDO will mean that fewer forces will be available at the conclusion of combat operations to conduct post combat missions. Additionally, less time will be available to emplace post conflict forces since speed is essential to the successful conduct of RDO. Finally, the control of the adversary’s will in terms of objective and use of force may mean that control of the adversary’s will is temporary unless the gains are quickly consolidated and translated into enduring changes for the advantage of friendly forces. The successful implementation of future operating concepts will therefore require the addition of post conflict forces to fill the gap between major combat operations and nation building missions as shown in figure three.

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Based upon the capabilities gap shown in the previous two sections and the introduction of RDO, there is a need to change the model shown in figures 1 and 2 in Appendix L to the model shown in figure 3 in Appendix L. A military strategy of rapid victory requires planning for and execution of combat and post conflict operations to be simultaneous rather than sequential.\textsuperscript{160} In addition, this planning must be interagency, joint, combined, and undertaken well in advance.\textsuperscript{161} The required capability is a force that is able to conduct the missions required within a post conflict mission. The types of missions to be performed in this type of environment can be deduced from the various sources already discussed in chapters two and three. Specifically, the work done by CSIS and AUSA in May 2002 provides a detailed framework of the various tasks that must normally be accomplished in post conflict reconstruction.\textsuperscript{162} Both the CSIS study and Dr. Stewart’s historical analysis argue that the most essential post conflict task is public security since everything else flows from this.\textsuperscript{163} Public security, however, initially starts with the numbers of US forces on the ground but in the long run relies upon the establishment of a local host nation police force and constabulary army.\textsuperscript{164}

Conrad Crane argues the Army must be trained and structured to execute some degree of nation building during the stabilization phase of smaller scale contingencies (SSCs).\textsuperscript{165} He also provides six other recommendations to better prepare the Army to successfully accomplish its missions in both major theater wars (MTWs) and SSCs.\textsuperscript{166} In another report for Iraq specifically, Mr. Crane reaches three conclusions with regard to nation building which are footnoted below.\textsuperscript{167}

\textsuperscript{160} Dr. Steven Metz, “Improving Army Capabilities for Stabilization and Support Operations,” slide 4.
\textsuperscript{161} Dr. Steven Metz, “Improving Army Capabilities for Stabilization and Support Operations,” slide 4.
\textsuperscript{162} Post Conflict Reconstruction (Washington, D.C.: CSIS and AUSA, MAY 2002), 4-20.
\textsuperscript{163} Dr. Richard W. Stewart, Occupations: Then and Now, slide 14.
\textsuperscript{164} Dr. Richard W. Stewart, Occupations: Then and Now, slide 14.
\textsuperscript{165} Conrad C. Crane, Landpower and Crises: Army Roles and Missions in Smaller Scale Contingencies During The 1990s, 35-36. Conrad Crane is a member of SSI who has 26 years of military service including 9 years as Professor of History at the US Military Academy. He holds a B.S. from the USMA along with an M.A. and Ph.D. form Stanford University.
\textsuperscript{166} These recommendations include: create truly multi-capable units structured, trained and committed to both winning MTWs and handling SSCs; increase the ability of units at all levels to train for,
US Army Transformation

The vision for the transformation of the US Army has changed from the term of Army Chief of Staff General Eric Shinseki to the term of Schoomaker. Several key tenets, however, are common between the two visions. For example, both Chiefs envisioned a future force that would be more capable of rapid strategic response and tactical dominance across the full spectrum of military operations. Both Chiefs also envisioned a transformed force that would be more relevant to the Department of Defense. The key difference between the two visions is that General Shinseki envisioned a more delayed transformation while General Schoomaker is pursuing a faster transformation. A key weakness inherent in both visions is that they focus on the transformation of maneuver forces with a relatively lesser emphasis upon the transformation of CS and CSS forces. The current AMP, for example, talks about a phased approach to developing and fielding capabilities over time but the only capabilities that are discussed are combat as opposed to combat support and combat service support capabilities. Another fault with both visions is that they seek to modularize the combat forces when the Army’s greatest asset in the GWOT will be the diversity of its forces.

Conclusion

Post conflict operations require US Army forces that are able to provide support in four areas: security, justice / reconciliation, social / economic well being, and governance / participation. This support must be planned simultaneous to the planning for combat operations

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167 Conrad C. Crane and W. Andrew Terrill, *Reconstructing Iraq: Insights, Challenges, and Missions For Military Forces in a Post Conflict Scenario* (Carlisle, PA: SSI, FEB 2003), 1. The three conclusions are: a successful occupation of Iraq will require must detailed interagency planning, many forces, multi-year military commitment, and a national commitment to nation building; recent American experiences with post conflict operations have generally featured poor planning and problems with relevant military force structure; and military forces in Iraq will be severely taxed in military police, civil affairs, engineer, and transportation units, in addition to possible severe security difficulties.


and must be able to be executed directly after or even simultaneously to combat operations. The current and future methods of US warfare will allow for no other course of action. The forces required to properly conduct post conflict operations, however, are very different from the forces required to conduct combat operations. The ends, ways, and means of combat versus post conflict are very different. Some of the unit requirements for post conflict operations, therefore, include but are not limited to: military police, civil affairs, engineers, PSYOP, and medical units.\textsuperscript{171}

Some of the current capabilities of the US Army to conduct post conflict operations is shown in Appendix H. The capabilities gap between combat operations and post conflict operations is evidenced through numerous articles and comments from the Chief of Staff of the Army himself. The retraining of field artillery personnel to perform military police duties for the GWOT is but one manifestation of this capabilities gap.

Future operating concepts such as RDO and EBO, meanwhile, will only exacerbate the problem described above because of their focus upon combat operations to the detriment of full spectrum operations. This is despite their advertised label of being applicable to full spectrum operations.

Finally, the transformation of US Army forces will also negatively impact upon the ability of the US Army to conduct post conflict operations due to their focus upon combat forces rather than combat support and combat service support forces. The desired transformation to modular combat units will decrease the diversity required to perform a wide variety of missions across the full spectrum of conflict. Strategic policies combined with historical experience shows that the US Army must have some sort of post conflict capability. The 1990s methodology of ad hoc organizations will not be sufficient for post conflict operations in the GWOT.

\textsuperscript{170} Lynn E. Davis and Jeremy Shapiro, \textit{The U.S. Army and the New National Security Strategy}, 57.
\textsuperscript{171} Hans Binnendijk and Stuart Johnson, \textit{Transforming for Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations}, 73.
Chapter Five: Conclusions and Recommendations

“It’s best not to devote large amounts of resources to attempting to predict the future for organizational design. It is better to design an organization that can accommodate a number of possible futures.”\(^{172}\)

Introduction

The key debate surrounding force structure and post conflict operations is whether post conflict operations should be a “lesser included contingency” for units focused on war fighting or should the Army develop units designed specifically to conduct them.\(^{173}\) The debate, however, is hampered by imprecise terminology, institutional predilections, and a lack of variety of options in the debate. The debate, however, does not need to be in the form of an either or question. A third option between these two poles may be available. This third option is to establish division level headquarters specifically focused upon post conflict operations and place already established units under this division’s command and control. Several things must be improved or fixed, however, for this to be implemented. The improvements and fixes are the focus of this final chapter.

Conclusions

The US Army force structure is inadequate for post conflict operations in terms of the three criteria established at the beginning of the study. The criteria included consistency, historical basis, and balance. The definitions of the criteria, as a review, were:

- **Consistency**: Is the US Army force structure consistent with US strategic policies?
- **Historical basis**: Is the US Army force structure based upon and informed by practical lessons of the past?
- **Balance**: Does US Army force structure strike a balance among the suite of capabilities necessary to conduct full spectrum operations?

\(^{173}\) Dr. Steven Metz, “Improving Army Capabilities for Stabilization and Support Operations,” slide 5.
The analysis from chapters two and four showed that the current force structure of the US Army is inconsistent with US strategic policies. The obtainment of the goals of the NSS will require extended commitments, a strategic preemptive capability, full spectrum military operations, rapid decisive operations, and a capabilities based force. The retraining of military personnel, extensive mobilizations of reserve forces, and unprecedented personnel operational tempo, however, proves that the force structure does not meet the requirements. Strains on low density / high demand specialties and units are well documented during the GWOT. Finally, increased long-term commitments have expanded overseas support requirements. The support requirements are documented under Title 10 authority yet are unaddressed in the AMP.

The analysis from chapter three showed that the current force structure of the US Army is not based upon nor informed by practical lessons of the past. The Army’s efforts over the past ten years to meet the full spectrum of demands placed on it involved the creation of tactical, hybrid, tailored forces. This solution amounted to a short-term fix as opposed to a long-term solution. The changed environment after 1991 and 2001 had a significant impact upon strategic policies but not necessarily upon force structure to properly support those policies. There is a wealth of historical data from the past century concerning post conflict operations yet little evidence to suggest that the US Army has learned from this data. Operation Iraqi Freedom and the numerous criticisms of its post conflict conduct are an example of this. The challenges of post conflict operations are similar to yet very distinct from combat operations in terms of command and control, training, leader development, and force structure balance.

The analysis from chapter four shows that the current force structure of the US Army does not strike a balance among the suite of capabilities necessary to conduct full spectrum operations. A “capabilities gap” exists between the end of combat operations and the beginning of nation building operations at operational level. Current doctrine calls for combat commands to

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turn to post conflict operations after combat operations are complete. 175 This methodology worked in the past but does not work any more due to the smaller number of forces available and due to the emphasis upon rapid completion of combat operations. Stability tasks have also become much more critical than in the past due to a variety of factors including the importance of international support, the rapidity of global communications, and the emphasis on defeat of a military rather than defeat of a nation and its people. Post conflict operations must now be planned concurrent with combat operations and be executed nearly simultaneously with them. The doctrine concerning post conflict operations must also be much more clearly developed in terms of ends, ways, and means in order to achieve the strategic political victory that is being sought. Currently, the ends for post conflict operations are ill defined; the ways are ambiguous, inadequately resourced, and unrehearsed; and the means are unavailable or sub optimized. The problem for the means is not a serious lack of the required skills for post conflict missions but that those skills reside in units that are scattered throughout the force. 176

Other conclusions are evident in addition to the conclusions derived from the three criteria. The terminologies used to refer to post conflict operations are often changed and confusing. Part of the reason for this is changing political preferences over time and part of the reason is a lack of specificity of the terms themselves. For example, the German and Japanese operations were occupations; the Somalian, Haitian, and Bosnian operations were peacekeeping or peace enforcement operations; and the Afghani and Iraqi operations were stabilization and reconstruction. Contributing to this problem is the fact that some of the terms are undefined in DoD doctrine. 177 The intent in most of the reviewed case studies was to use military force to

175 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-0 Doctrine for Joint Operations, V-5.
177 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 1-02 DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 10 JUNE 1998).
underpin a process of democratization.\(^{178}\) Meanwhile, success in the operations was defined as the ability to promote an enduring transfer of democratic institutions.\(^{179}\)

Various sources argue that the new strategic environment calls for more diversity and specialization in Army capabilities, not less.\(^{180}\) The US Army transformation, however, envisions a modular force that is more homogenized than specialized. This modularity may decrease the ability of US Army forces to conduct full spectrum operations and not increase it. Finally, the UJTL does not currently reflect the execution of many post conflict tasks despite their recurring execution by military forces in numerous past operations and despite their proven importance to overall mission success in facilitating an enduring transition to democracy.

**Recommendations**

There needs to be a doctrinal clarification, classification, and definition of key post conflict terms such as occupation, peacekeeping, peace enforcement, nation building, and stabilization / reconstruction to reduce ambiguity. This doctrinal definition should be conducted at the joint level and mirrored at the Army level.

Different decision making tools are required for post conflict operations since major combat operations focus on the military and leadership of a country while post conflict operations focus on the population of a country. One possible tool is a three legged decision making tool that consists of a historical analysis, a contemporary analysis, and a capabilities analysis. This model works at both the operational level to plan for a specific mission and at the strategic level in determining required capabilities. This tool will also assist in ensuring that ends are properly identified; ways are detailed, resourced, and rehearsed; and means are readily available and optimized to operate in a post conflict environment.

\(^{179}\) RAND Corporation, *America’s Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq*, 2.
From a national perspective, the winning of wars by the US military is not good enough. The US government must have the capability to consolidate the gains from war into long-term strategic endstates. In other words, the US government must also be able to win the peace. The ability to win the peace after combat operations cease is much larger than the US Army or even the US military. As the sole military department responsible for long-term land operations, however, the US Army must take the lead in developing a capability to win the peace in a joint, interagency, and combined environment. The guidance examined in chapter two shows that post conflict operations will be a key component of national strategy in the years to come. The history and environment examined in chapter three shows that post conflict operations have been a historical weakness for both the US government and the US military. Finally, the discussion in chapter four shows the capability gap that currently exists between the conduct of combat operations and the turnover to civilian authority in order to conduct nation-building operations. This capability gap can, and must, be filled by the US Army. Dr. Steven Metz and Dr. Conrad Crane of the Strategic Studies Institute, Mr. Hans Binnendijk and Mr. Stuart Johnson of the National Defense University, and Mr. James Dobbins of the RAND Corporation have conducted studies on similar issues and have reached similar conclusions. The documentation and summarization of these authors are found throughout this study.

One way the United States Army can fill this capability gap is to create a post conflict joint command organization. Bruce Pirnie, a RAND consultant, argues that the Army should create command entities for MOOTW comparable to the Marine air-ground task force. The creation of this organization addresses two key transformational imperatives: the integration of planning and the placement of required forces concurrent with enemy collapse. Army Chief of Staff General Dennis Reimer proposed a similar concept in 1997 when he endorsed the creation

\begin{footnotes}
  \footnotetext[181]{Lynn E. Davis and Jeremy Shapiro, eds, \textit{The U.S. Army and the New National Security Strategy}, 298.}
  \footnotetext[182]{Hans Binnendijk and Stuart Johnson, \textit{Transforming for Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations}, 57.}
\end{footnotes}
of a “strike force” which lacked any permanently assigned combat units but was specifically
designed to absorb various functional components depending upon the mission it was given. The creation of this type of organization would also address some of the other problems historically experienced during post conflict operations. These problems have included: increased span of control, increased range of operation, and new duties and skills. The creation of a post conflict joint command organization could be modeled on the engineer group organization. The engineer group is a flexible organization designed to quickly integrate disparate organizations into an effective whole through various means such as communications gear, experienced staff members, and focused training.

The US Army force structure must therefore be changed in terms of size, active and reserve balance, and capabilities mix in order to fulfill the operational requirements expected of it over the next ten years. Post conflict operations are just as important, if not more important, than the combat operations that precede them. The steps recommended above will help to ensure that the US Army is able to not only win our nation’s wars but also to win the peace following those wars.

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Appendix A: National Strategic Direction

National Interests & Values

National Policies

National Security Strategy

National Policy Statements

National Military Strategy

Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan

Theater Strategy

Plans

Appendix B: Range of Military Operations

Interim RANGE OF MILITARY OPERATIONS

WAR
- NUCLEAR WARFARE
- CONVENTIONAL WARFARE
- FORCIBLE ENTRY; STRIKES; RAIDS
- NONCONVENTIONAL WARFARE
- INFORMATION OPERATIONS
- NONCOMBATANT EVACUATION OPERATIONS; RECOVERY OPERATIONS
- LINE OF COMMUNICATIONS PROTECTION
- COMBATISTORY

HOMELAND SECURITY
- NATIONAL LAND DEFENSE; NATIONAL MARITIME DEFENSE; NATIONAL AIR AND SPACE DEFENSE; CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION
- CIVIL SUPPORT: CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT; MILITARY SUPPORT TO CIVIL AUTHORITY; MILITARY ASSISTANCE FOR CIVIL DISTURBANCES
- DOD SUPPORT TO COUNTER DRUGOPS
- FOREIGN CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT; FOREIGN HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE
- COUNTERPROLIFERATION
- SANCTION ENFORCEMENT
- SUPPORT TO COUNTERINSURGENCY; SUPPORT TO INSURGENCY
- FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION OPERATIONS
- PEACE ENFORCEMENT
- SHOW OF FORCE
- PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

SECURITY COOPERATION ACTIVITIES
- SECURITY ASSISTANCE; FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE; HUMAN & CIV. ASSIST
- ARMS CONTROL; MILITARY CONTACTS
- MULTI-NATIONAL EX, TR, ED

MOOTW Involved Use/Threat of Force

MOOTW Not Involved Use/Threat of Force

NORMAL AND ROUTINE MILITARY ACTIVITIES

Appendix C: National Strategy for Combating Terrorism Goals & Objectives

Defeat Terrorists and Their Organizations
- Identify terrorists and terrorist organizations
- Locate terrorists and their organizations
- Destroy terrorists and their organizations
  - Expand law enforcement effort
  - Focus decisive military power and specialized intelligence resources to defeat terrorist networks
  - Eliminate sources of terrorist financing

Deny Sponsorship, Support, and Sanctuary to Terrorists
- End the state sponsorship of terrorism
- Establish and maintain an international standard of accountability with regard to combating terrorism
- Strengthen and sustain the international effort to fight terrorism
  - Working with willing and able states
  - Enabling weak states
  - Persuading reluctant states
  - Compelling unwilling states
- Interdict and disrupt material support for terrorists
- Eliminate terrorist sanctuaries and havens

Diminish the Underlying Conditions that Terrorists Seek to Exploit
- Partner with the international community to strengthen weak states and prevent the (re)emergence of terrorism
- Win the war of ideas

Defend US Citizens and Interests at Home and Abroad
- Implement the National Strategy for Homeland Security
- Attain domain awareness
- Enhance measures to ensure the integrity, reliability, and availability of critical physical and information based infrastructures at home and abroad
- Integrate measures to protect US citizens abroad
- Ensure an integrated incident management capability

# Appendix D: Army Title 10 Responsibilities

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<td>Military Postal Operations</td>
<td>DoDD 4525.6</td>
<td>5 MAY 1980</td>
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<tr>
<td>DoD Enemy POW &amp; Detainee Program</td>
<td>DoDD 2310.1</td>
<td>18 AUG 1994</td>
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<td>Single Manager for Conven Ammo</td>
<td>DoDD 5160.65</td>
<td>8 MAR 1995</td>
<td>EAR</td>
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<tr>
<td>Locomotive Management</td>
<td>DoDD 4500.9</td>
<td></td>
<td>EAR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contracting Support</td>
<td>Oplan 5027-96</td>
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<tr>
<td>Single Integrated Med Log Manager</td>
<td>Joint Pub 4-02</td>
<td>26 APR 1995</td>
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<tr>
<td>Manage All Specified DoD Noncombatants Repatriation Needs</td>
<td>DoDD 3025.14</td>
<td>5 NOV 1990</td>
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<tr>
<td>Common User Land Transportation</td>
<td>DoDD 4500.9</td>
<td>29 DEC 1993</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Responsible for Theater Common Item Support (Class I, II, III, IV(B), IX)</td>
<td>Oplan 1003-96</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Op Common User Ocean Terminals</td>
<td>DoDD 4500.9</td>
<td>29 DEC 1993</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Med Spt for EPWs, CI and Detainees</td>
<td>OPLAN 5027-96</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Provide CA Qualified Personnel</td>
<td>DoDD 2000.13</td>
<td>27 JUNE 1994</td>
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<td>DS Water Spt EPWs, Refugees &amp; DPs</td>
<td>AR 700-136</td>
<td>1 APR 1993</td>
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<td>DoD Small Arms</td>
<td>DoDD 4000.25-M</td>
<td></td>
<td>EAR</td>
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<tr>
<td>Automated Info Technology</td>
<td>USD(LOG) Memo</td>
<td>6 NOV 1995</td>
<td>EAR</td>
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<tr>
<td>Management of Overland Petro Spt</td>
<td>DoDD 4140.25</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Inland Class I Support</td>
<td>WEAR</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Common User Land Transportation</td>
<td>WEAR</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Customs Inspection Program</td>
<td>WEAR</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power Generation Equipment and Systems</td>
<td>WEAR</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disposal of Explosives / Munitions</td>
<td>WEAR</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Troop Construction</td>
<td>WEAR</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical Evacuation on Battlefield</td>
<td>WEAR</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Ed Blesi, *Information Briefing Army Logistics Support to Other Services (ALSOS) and Executive Agent Responsibilities (AER)* (Washington, DC: DCS Logistics, 12 JAN 2001) and Battle Command Training Program Operations Group Delta *Planning Operational Logistics* Briefing, slides 18,19.
Appendix E: Operational Environment Variables

**Physical Environment:** The primary factors defining the environment are the elements of terrain, weather, and environmental conditions. The physical environment considers circumstances and conditions surrounding and influencing an actor.

**Nature and Stability of the State:** An actor’s internal cohesiveness and effectiveness with respect to population, economic structures, political stability (leadership concerns or the challenges to the leadership), legitimacy, open participation in governmental processes, goals and agendas. Also considers the state’s ability to weather difficulties, endure fluctuations, and resolve internal strife to maintain stability and support, both domestically and internationally.

**Sociological Demographics:** The trends and impact of an actor’s vital statistics and the cultural/ethnic makeup of a given region. Important dimensions include migration trends, population profiles (aging, youth bulge), and level/rate of urbanization, fertility rates, overall standards of living, and cohesiveness of ethnic/religious groups.

**Regional/Global Relationships:** Include political, economic, military, religious, or cultural mergers and/or partnerships.

**Military Capabilities:** The ability of an actor to field combat forces, equip, and train them for war, and leverage them in the administration of diplomacy or policies domestically, regionally, or globally through power projection.

**Technology:** Refers to the body of knowledge available to a culture that applies science to industrial and commercial objectives, and it also reflects the equipment and technology that an actor or entity could import.

**Information:** The act of informing, or the state of being informed, coupled with the knowledge derived from study, experiences, observing events, or instruction. Also considers the access, use, manipulation, distribution, and reliance on information-based systems by the population of an actor into civil/military capabilities.

**External Organizations:** This variable attempts to capture the significance of the presence of external organizations (NGOs and PVOs) on the operational environment.

**National Will:** Encompasses a unification of values, morals, and effort between the population, the leadership or government, and the military.

**Time:** Time is one of, if not the, most significant planning factors driving decision-making.

**Economics:** The relationship of the actor relative to the development, production, and management and distribution of material wealth, finance, or the necessities of life.

Appendix F: Contemporary Operational Environment (COE)  
Premises and Implications

1. US will have no peer competitors until 2020 or beyond.
   • Lack of a monolithic threat to focus DTOLMS
   • Prediction less important than organizational flexibility
   • Generalized training outcomes – tasks the same, conditions vary
2. Nations will continue to field armed forces and use these forces as a tool to pursue national interests.
   • Force on force conflict is not a “thing of the past”
3. Pursuit of national interests may cause US intervention either unilaterally or as a coalition partner with or without United Nations mandate.
   • US involvement in world may require the US Army to deploy to places not in any OPLAN or CONPLAN
4. Nations who believe that the US will act counter to their national interests will develop diplomatic and military plans for managing US intervention.
   • Sophisticated Information Warfare
   • Anti-access strategies – preclusion and exclusion
   • Hardened C2, stockpiled supplies, fortified areas
   • Extensive denial and deception activities
   • Study of US strategies, tactics, techniques, and procedures
5. Nations will modernize their armed forces within the constraints of their economy but in ways that may negate US overmatch.
   • Large scale purchase of air defense and anti-tank systems
   • Counter-precision guided munitions equipment
   • C4ISR system attack – multi-dimensional
   • Weapons of mass effects
   • Unconventional weapons delivery systems
   • Human factors to overcome technology overmatches (militia)
6. Non-state actors will play an important role in any regional conflict.
   • Proliferation of NGO/IOs
   • Transnational organizations – business, criminal, religious
   • The Media – ubiquitous presence “Unblinking eye”
7. All combat operations will be significantly affected by a number of variables in the environment beyond simply military forces.
   • Sociological demographics – ethnicity, religion, race
   • Civilians on the battlefield
   • Nature of the state – failed / autocratic / secular / religious
   • US National Will as embodied in Rules of Engagement and resources
   • Time
   • Economics of war for all sides

## Appendix G: Generalized Comparison of Operational Environment Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Principally Desert</td>
<td>Tropical, Semiarid, Rough and Mountainous</td>
<td>Rural, Mountainous</td>
<td>Urbanized, Desert</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nature of the State</td>
<td>Failed State Warlord Dominated</td>
<td>Military Dictatorship</td>
<td>Failed State</td>
<td>State Remnants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sociological Demographics</td>
<td>Nomadic, Sunni Muslim dominate</td>
<td>Black, Roman Catholic and Voodoo</td>
<td>Tribal, Religion Dominate</td>
<td>Tribal, Mixed Secular / Religious</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Capabilities</td>
<td>Heavily Armed Militias</td>
<td>Inadequate Regular Military</td>
<td>Paramilitary – “Minute Man”</td>
<td>Paramilitary mil equipped</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional / Global Relationships</td>
<td>Former international relations</td>
<td>Former International Relations</td>
<td>Taliban Insular, Regional Only</td>
<td>Former International Relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technology</td>
<td>Industrial sector destroyed, service sector growing</td>
<td>Light Industrial Sector</td>
<td>Home Grown</td>
<td>1960s military, pockets of niche tech</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information</td>
<td>Infrastructure destroyed by civil war</td>
<td>Some infrastructure, Media,</td>
<td>Little Infrastructure, Word of Mouth, Less Media</td>
<td>Some infrastructure and access, media</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External Organizations</td>
<td>UNOSOM I&amp;II, UNITAF, NGOs</td>
<td>Coalition, NGOs, MNF, UNMIH</td>
<td>Coalition, 40+ NGOs</td>
<td>UN, 80+ NGOs, International community, CPA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Will</td>
<td>None, factional fighting predominate</td>
<td>Political Violence, 1990 Free and Fair Election</td>
<td>Tribe “well being” – Status</td>
<td>US ROE, Iraq “nationalism”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time</td>
<td>Time available initially but interest decline over time</td>
<td>Short Departure Deadlines and Exit Strategies</td>
<td>Nation building from scratch – time intense</td>
<td>Occupier vs. liberator – time is an issue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economics</td>
<td>Livestock Agriculture</td>
<td>Small Scale Subsistence Farming</td>
<td>Poppies and Agriculture</td>
<td>Oil</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Sources: COL (R) Gary Phillips, *Contemporary Operational Environment Briefing* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: TRADOC DCSINT-Threat Support Directorate, 25 NOV 2003), slide 8 and author’s research.
## Appendix H: Army Unit Inventory For Post Conflict Operations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type Unit</th>
<th>Active</th>
<th>National Guard</th>
<th>Reserve</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Core Post Conflict Units</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Affairs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battalions</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brigades</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Engineer Groups / Brigades</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>MP Brigades</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSYOPS Groups</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical Brigades</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Support and Services Units</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Theater Support Commands</td>
<td>3</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Corps Support Group/Command</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Transportation Groups/Commands</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Quartermaster Groups</td>
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<td>Signal Brigades/Commands</td>
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<td>Explosive Ordnance Groups</td>
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<tr>
<td>Aviation Brigades (Lift)</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Combat Units</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Combat Divisions</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8</td>
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<tr>
<td>Infantry Stryker Brigades</td>
<td>1 (5 proposed)</td>
<td>(1 proposed)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Separate Combat Brigades</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>17</td>
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<td>Hvy/Lt Armored Cavalry Regiments</td>
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<tr>
<td>Artillery Brigades (155mm, MLRS)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>17</td>
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<tr>
<td>Attack Aviation</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Air Defense Brigades</td>
<td>5</td>
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<tr>
<td>MI Brigades</td>
<td>3</td>
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## Appendix I: Elements of RDO Versus Warfighting in the COE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RDO</th>
<th>War fighting in the COE Principles</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Knowledge</td>
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<tr>
<td>Operational Net Assessment</td>
<td>Neutralize technological overmatch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Common Relevant Operational Picture</td>
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<tr>
<td>Joint Intelligence, Surveillance, &amp; Recon</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Command and Control</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standing Joint Force Headquarters</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint Interactive Planning</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interagency Operations</td>
<td>Change the nature of the conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multinational Operations</td>
<td>Change the nature of the conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effects Based Operations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominant Maneuver</td>
<td>Control tempo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Precision Engagement</td>
<td>Employ operational shielding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information Operations</td>
<td>Neutralize technological overmatch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operational Enablers</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assured Access</td>
<td>Control access into the region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rapid Force Deployment</td>
<td>Allow no sanctuary, control tempo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agile Sustainment Operations</td>
<td>Control tempo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Full Dimensional Protection</td>
<td>Cause politically unacceptable casualties</td>
</tr>
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</table>

### Appendix J: Key Differences between RDO and Decisive Force

#### Key Differences between New and Old Doctrine

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Elements</th>
<th>Rapid Dominance (New Doctrine)</th>
<th>Decisive Force (Old Doctrine)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Objective</td>
<td>Control the adversary’s will, perceptions, and understanding</td>
<td>Prevail militarily and decisively against a set of opposing capabilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Use of Force</td>
<td>Control the adversary’s will, perceptions, and understanding and literally make an adversary impotent to act or react</td>
<td>Unquestioned ability to prevail militarily over an opponent’s forces and based against the adversary’s capabilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Force Size</td>
<td>Could be smaller than opposition, but with decisive edge in technology, training, and technique</td>
<td>Large, highly trained, and well equipped; materially overwhelming</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scope</td>
<td>All encompassing</td>
<td>Force against force and supporting capability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speed</td>
<td>Essential</td>
<td>Desirable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Casualties</td>
<td>Could be relatively few on both sides</td>
<td>Potentially higher on both sides</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technique</td>
<td>Paralyze, shock, unnerve, deny, destroy</td>
<td>Systematic destruction of military capability; attrition applicable in some situations</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Appendix K: US Joint Warfare in the 20th and 21st Centuries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OF WAR</td>
<td></td>
<td>20th CENTURY</td>
<td>21st CENTURY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* Violent clash of opposing wills</td>
<td>* Impose will upon an adversary</td>
<td>Service-Based Maneuver Warfare</td>
<td>Joint Expeditionary Warfare</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>* Politics by another means</td>
<td>Interagency Coordination</td>
<td>Integrated Agency Actions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>* A better peace</td>
<td>Synchronized &amp; Integrated Military Forces</td>
<td>Self-Synchronized &amp; Integrated Military Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OF CRISIS RESOLUTION</td>
<td>Affect the conditions or consequences of the crisis, consistent with US national interests</td>
<td>Information-Based Operations</td>
<td>Situation Knowledge-Based Operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>Deteriorating situations:</td>
<td>Precise Force Application</td>
<td>Firepower Provides the Effects of Manoeuvred Forces</td>
<td>Knowledge, Maneuver and Precision Engagement. Provide the Effect of Manoeuvred Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* Involving natural or manmade catastrophe</td>
<td>Engagement-Centric</td>
<td>Continuous Pressure</td>
<td>Target Effects-Aware</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* Leading to potential humanitarian, societal or nation-state instability</td>
<td>Sequential and Segmented Operations</td>
<td>Measurements, Distributed, &amp; Parallel Operations</td>
<td>Effects-Centric</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* Leading to increased likelihood of conflict</td>
<td>Network-Centric &amp; Distribution-Based Log</td>
<td>Primary Linear</td>
<td>Non-Contiguous Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US Homeland Perceived Secure</td>
<td>Combat Focus</td>
<td>US Homeland Threatened</td>
<td>Strategic Deterrence as Homeland Defense</td>
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<tr>
<td>US Homeland Threatened</td>
<td>Threat-Based</td>
<td>Proactive / Preemptive Homeland Security</td>
<td>Permanent / Preemptive Homeland Security</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Appendix L: Post Conflict Operations Construct

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