

**Mastering the Transition:
Corps or Division to Joint Task Force**

**A Monograph
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14. ABSTRACT This monograph examines the transitions an Army corps or division planning staff must undergo when required to form a Joint Task Force (JTF). These transitions, one organizational and one focused on the planning process, prevent the build-up of operational momentum as forces transition from peacetime to wartime missions. These transitions occur in the initial phases of a deployment and are critical because JTFs attempts to build momentum by planning the deployment of forces and subsequent operations. This monograph examines the joint, Army, and Marine Corps doctrine to determine the organizational requirements, planning responsibilities, and guidelines for the orders production process. The research revealed that the joint and service doctrine fail to achieve simplicity because of differences in organizational structure and a lack clarity in assigning responsibilities for planning. The doctrine also lacks consistency, defining differently the standards used to establish responsibility for plans, future operations and current operations. The monograph uses Operation Restore Hope, as an historical example of the transition from service staff to joint task force. The monograph concludes that the permanent establishment of a planning directorate within the corps and division staffs, modeled around that of a joint staff, would allow the planners to focus on deployment and operations planning and thus build operational momentum.					
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ABSTRACT

Mastering the Transition: Corps or Division to Joint Task Force by Major John R. Toth, United States Army, 45 pages.

On numerous occasions in the past several decades, Army corps and divisions have transitioned into joint task forces (JTF) in response to crisis situations. This trend will continue in the future. This transition from corps or division staff forces the planning staff to undergo two changes, one organizational and one focused on the planning process. The initial phases of a deployment are critical because this is the stage when a JTF attempts to build momentum in both planning the deployment of forces and subsequent operations. The more time corps or division headquarters spend on the two transitions mentioned above, the less time they have available for initial deployment and operations planning, thus jeopardizing the buildup of operational momentum and ultimately success. The purpose of this monograph is to prove that the permanent establishment of a planning directorate within the corps and division staffs, modeled around that of a joint staff, would allow the planners to focus on deployment and operations planning and thus build operational momentum. This would also facilitate training the staff, ensure efficient planning during transition from a corps or division to JTF, and lead to greater success in all phases of an operation.

This monograph examines the joint, Army, and Marine Corps doctrine to determine the organizational requirements, planning responsibilities, and guidelines for the orders production process. It uses simplicity and clearly defined authorities, roles and relationships, as defined by JP 0-2, as the criteria to assess the doctrine. The research revealed that the joint and service doctrine does not to achieve simplicity because of differences in organizational structure and a lack clarity in assigning responsibilities for planning. The doctrine also lacks consistency, each defining differently the standards used to establish responsibility for plans, future operations and current operations. The monograph determines that the Marine Corps model for organization of the planning staff using two planning organizations is superior because it achieves the greatest level of simplicity. The monograph uses Operation Restore Hope, executed by I MEF, as JTF Somalia, as an historical example of the transition from service staff to joint task force.

As the Army attempts to develop a more expeditionary force, capable of responding to incidents anywhere in the world, it must master the transitions it will undergo as it responds. Mastering these transitions will enable the JTF to gain and maintain operational momentum and ensure the success of its operations. The planning organizations within the staff are the key to setting the conditions for successful transitions. The permanent establishment of a planning directorate within the corps and division staffs would allow the planners to focus on deployment and operations planning and build momentum, rather than waste time reorganizing and developing planning procedures. Additionally, the military must revise the joint and service doctrine so that it clearly defines, within the text, organizational charts, and the models provided, who is responsible for plans and who is responsible for future operations and how to assign those responsibilities, using one standard.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

FIGURES	ii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS.....	iii
INTRODUCTION.....	1
LITERATURE REVIEW	7
Summary	8
DOCTRINE	9
Joint Staff Doctrine	10
Summary	16
Army Doctrine	17
Summary	21
Marine Corps Doctrine	22
Summary	25
Overall Summary	26
APPLICATION.....	28
JTF Somalia in Operation RESTORE HOPE	28
Summary	34
CONCLUSIONS and RECOMMENDATIONS.....	36
Conclusions.....	36
Recommendations	39
BIBLIOGRAPHY	42

FIGURES

Figure 1 Typical Joint Task Force Staff Organization	10
Figure 2 Typical Joint Task Force J-3 Organization	11
Figure 3 Typical Joint Task Force J-5 Organization	12
Figure 4 Execution Phase Crisis Action Planning.....	15
Figure 5 Typical Corps and Division Staff Organization (modified)	18
Figure 6 Corps Tactical Operations Center	19
Figure 7 MEF Command Element.....	23

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INTRODUCTION

Transitions – going from offense to defense and back again, projecting power through airheads and beachheads, transitioning from peacekeeping to warfighting and back again – sap operational momentum. Mastering transitions is key to winning decisively. Forces that can do so provide strategic flexibility to the National Command Authorities, who need as many options as possible in a crisis.

Department of the Army, United States Army WHITE PAPER:
Concepts for the OBJECTIVE FORCE

Since September 11, 2001, the Army has conducted several joint operations that involved Army units employed as a Joint Task Force (JTF): Operations ENDURING FREEDOM (JTF Mountain and JTF 180), IRAQI FREEDOM (JTF 7), and peace support operations in Liberia (JTF Liberia).¹ The corps and division headquarters involved transitioned from a corps or division staff into a joint task force staff before these operations began. This transition to a JTF forced the planning staffs to undergo two changes, one organizational and one focused on the planning process. The organizational change required the planning staff to change its structure from a single directorate responsible for planning, the G-3, into two, the J-3 and J-5, possibly necessitating an adjustment of the responsibilities for planning. Due to this organizational transition, the corps or division planning staffs were also required to transition their planning process, changing from planning within one directorate (G-3) to planning between two (J-3 and J-5), increasing the complexity of the orders production process. Similar to the transitions described by the Objective Force White Paper, these organizational and procedural transitions could potentially “sap operational momentum” from the corps or division as it goes from peacetime to wartime mission.²

¹ The author worked in Headquarters, Department of the Army during OEF; a student at the Command and General Staff College during OIF; and a student at the School for Advanced Military Studies during JTF Liberia. Discussions about these operations occurred as part of these assignments.

² United States Army, *United States Army WHITE PAPER: Concepts for the OBJECTIVE FORCE*, Internet, Accessed at <http://www.army.mil/features/whitepaper/objectiveforcewhitepaper.pdf>. 4.

It is likely that corps and division staffs will be required to undergo these transitions again in future operations. A survey conducted in 1994 concluded that between 1989 and 1994, the United States military conducted approximately 23 contingency operations involving the formation of a Joint Task Force to execute the orders of the National Command Authority (NCA).³ These 23 operations, as well as Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, and the operation in Liberia, provide some insights into the operations I believe we are likely to execute in the future. First, these future operations will likely require the transformation of a corps or division into a JTF to conduct joint operations. Of the 23 JTFs that were established using an Army headquarters as the foundation of the JTF, over half utilized a corps or division headquarters.⁴ Second, I expect that they will occur with little notice and require the use of crisis action planning (CAP) in a time-constrained environment. As the 1994 survey showed, half of the surveyed operations were short notice situations in which the staff had limited time between notification and execution⁵. “Many JTFs are stood up to respond to international crises that require quick reaction, the first 16-72 hours being critical to planning.”⁶ Unfortunately, time is a critical resource during CAP, and as General Ridgeway remarked, “time is the most vital factor in his [the commander’s] planning.”⁷ The staffs had to undergo these changes at a critical stage of the operation for the planners.

This initial period and the corresponding premium on time are critical because this is the stage when a JTF would attempt to build momentum in planning the deployment and subsequent

³ George Stewart, Scott Fabbri, and Adam Seigel, *JTF Operations since 1983*, (Alexandria, VA. Center for Naval Analyses, 1994).

⁴ *Ibid.*, 3.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 14.

⁶ Lt Col. Susan J. Flores, “JTFs: Some Practical Implications,” *Joint Forces Quarterly*, Spring 1995, 111.

⁷ Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication (JP) 5-0, *Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations*, (Washington, D.C., 1995), I-1.

operations. Operational momentum is defined as “overall progress of a campaign or major operation over time; it is the product of the speed of advance and mass; the higher the speed and the larger the forces, the higher the momentum of a campaign as a whole.”⁸ The planning directorate has the responsibility to coordinate the initial deployment of forces and plan the operations they will conduct.⁹ If this initial planning is inadequate, the unit may fail to deploy forces with the speed and the mass necessary to achieve sufficient momentum and ultimately, success. The more time corps or division headquarters spend on the two transitions mentioned above, reorganizing and establishing planning procedures, the less time it will have available for the initial deployment and operations planning, jeopardizing the buildup of momentum and ultimately success.

Several potential issues can occur during these transitions. The Battle Command Training Program Operations Group Delta identified that JTF staffs must improve their “delineation of tasks and manning between Current Operations, Plans, and Future Operations.”¹⁰ The lack of time and sense of urgency may increase friction experienced by the planning staff on a JTF. The time constrained, crisis environment may not be the optimal time to effectively address these issues. “Again, because of the immediacy of the operations, the personnel had little opportunity to fully adjust to new procedures. In summary, these changes in structure and/or the presence of augmentees had a detrimental effect on staff coordination.”¹¹ This transition may also prevent the staff from building momentum in the early stages of an operation.

⁸ Milan N. Vego, *OPERATIONAL WARFARE*, (Newport, The United States Naval War College, 2000), 643.

⁹ Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 5-00.2, *Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures*, (Washington, D.C., 1999), IX-2-3.

¹⁰ United States Army, Battle Command Training Program, OPSGRP Delta, “02 Joint Perceptions” Accessed through Army Knowledge Online

¹¹ Katherine McGrady, *The Joint Task Force in Operation Restore Hope*, (Alexandria, VA., Center for Naval Analysis, 1994), 137.

There are several solutions to these problems. Although corps and division staffs are neither organized nor trained to function as a JTF, they are capable of acting as a JTF with augmentation.¹² This augmentation may take time to arrive while the staff attempts to transition and conduct planning.¹³ This may increase the possibility that the staff will fail to build momentum at the beginning of the planning process.

The permanent establishment of a planning directorate within the corps and division staffs, modeled around that of a J-5 Plans directorate and J-35 Future Operations (OPS) cell of a joint staff, would allow the planners to focus on deployment and operations planning and build momentum, rather than waste precious time in reorganizing and developing planning procedures. This would also facilitate training of the staff; ensure efficient planning during transition from a corps or division to JTF, and lead to greater success in all phases of an operation. Given the likelihood of an Army corps or division acting as a JTF and the lack of time available to transition, it is imperative that their planning staffs be organized and trained to effectively transition from a corps or division to a JTF, and to process orders from planning to execution seamlessly.

The research question of this monograph is: Should the Army create two planning organizations, similar to the J-5 Plans and J-35 Future Operations of a joint staff, within the corps and division staff? The hypothesis is that the establishment of a planning cell within the corps and division staff, modeled on joint doctrine, would achieve the following:

1. Eliminate the need to reorganize the planning staff during the initial stages of planning.

¹² United States Army, Field Manual (FM) 100-7, *Decisive Force: The Army in Theater Operations*, (Washington, D.C., 1995), 6-8.

¹³ LTC Patrick O. Carpenter, *The Decisive Edge: SETAF as a Standing JTF*, (Newport: Naval War College, 1999), 8.

2. Enable the planning staff to focus on deployment and operational planning rather than reorganizing and establishing planning procedures.

3. Facilitate training the planning staff to function as a JTF staff and transition orders from planning to execution.

In order to highlight the importance of having clearly defined responsibilities, Joint Pub 0-2, *Unified Action Armed Forces*, outlines the command and control tenants that strengthen unity of effort. The first of these is clearly defined authorities, roles and relationships.¹⁴ “It is essential for the JFC [Joint Force Commander] to ensure that subordinate commanders, staff principles, and leaders of C2 [Command and Control] nodes (e.g., information operations cell, joint movement center) understand their authorities, their role in decision making and controlling, and their relationships with others.”¹⁵ Additionally JP 0-2 stresses the principle of simplicity in organizing for joint command and control and defines it as “Unity of command must be maintained and unity of effort fostered through an unambiguous chain of command, well defined command relationships, and clear delineation of responsibilities and authorities.”¹⁶ These apply not only to command relationships, but also to staff relationships, and they are the criteria I will use to analyze the staff organizations and planning processes.

I will limit the scope of this monograph in the following manner. First, I will focus on analyzing the transitions that occur on a corps or division planning staff during crisis action planning in a time-constrained environment. I am assuming that given more time, fewer issues would occur in transitioning from an Army to a joint task force staff and many of the issues I will address would not be factors contributing to success or failure. Secondly, I did not consider the

¹⁴ Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 0-2, *Unified Action Armed Forces*, (Washington, D.C., 2001), III-14.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Ibid., III-17.

type of operation (combat, stability, support, humanitarian, etc) when examining examples of JTFs because the military decision making process remains constant regardless of the type of operation.¹⁷ Finally, I will focus on the Army and Marine Corps as a JTF although the Air Force and Navy also fill that role. For clarification, I will use the term “directorates” to describe the staff element responsible for the major function of command operations (e.g., J-3) in joint doctrine or broad fields of interest (e.g., G-4) in Army doctrine. Within these directorates, organizations with specific areas of focus will be termed “cells” such as the “future operations cell” or “plans cell”.

Chapter Two will review the literature associated with the research questions. Chapter Three will begin by examining joint doctrine with respect to the organizational structure, responsibilities it assigns for planning within a joint staff, as well as the orders planning and production sequence. Then I will examine the Army doctrine with respect to the same variables and determine if it is consistent with the requirements set forth in the joint doctrine. Finally, I will explore the Marine Corps doctrine and determine how it compares to the joint and Army doctrine.

Chapter Four will examine an operation in which a Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF)(Army corps level organizational equivalent) transitioned to a JTF and planned for operations in a time-constrained environment. Operation RESTORE HOPE, conducted by I Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF) in response to a humanitarian crisis in Somalia will form the basis to examine the organizational and procedural transitions that occur when a unit is designated a JTF. Chapter Five will provide an answer to the research question and provide possible recommended solutions to the issues identified throughout the paper.

¹⁷ United States Army, Field Manual 5-0, *Army Planning and Orders Production - Final Draft*, (Washington, D.C., 2002), iii.

LITERATURE REVIEW

This chapter will review some of the literature used in writing this paper. Operation RESTORE HOPE was unique in that it was one of the first instances in which the United States executed operations other than war (OOTW) following the collapse of the Soviet Union and it represents a model for future United States involvement around the world. Additionally this was truly a crisis situation in which the organizations had little time to prepare before executing operations.

Both the Army and the Marine Corps conducted studies following Operation RESTORE HOPE in an effort to develop useful lessons to apply to future operations. Because this operation involved one of the first instances of operations other than war, much of these documents focus on that aspect of the operation. Due to the time sensitive nature of the crisis, both devoted some space to the examination of the planning process of the headquarters staff in a situation requiring CAP. In addition, these documents focused heavily on the joint nature of the operation and the requirement for I MEF to transition to a JTF. The Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) published its *Operation Restore Hope Lessons Learned Report* in 1993. This report focused mostly on the 10th Mountain Division's role as the Army force (ARFOR) to I MEF. This document provides some useful insights into the impact that a JTF staff has on its subordinate unit's planning efforts. Additionally this report introduces the concept of the Critical Decision Window of Opportunity, a period, at the beginning of the planning cycle, when decisions that effect the deployment of the force must be made and can shape the outcome of the operation.¹⁸ The Marine Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC) published its *Collection and*

¹⁸ United States Army, Center for Army Lessons Learned, *Operation Restore Hope Lessons Learned Report*, (Fort Leavenworth, KS., 1993), 1-24.

Lessons Learned Project: Operation Restore Hope report the same year. This document focused more on the MEF executing operations as a JTF and it provides an understanding of the issues faced by the MEF in planning and executing operations as a JTF. Kenneth Allard's *Somalia: Lessons Learned* provides a good overview of the operation but focuses mostly on the OOTW nature of the operation and very little on the details of planning.

Two people studied the planning aspects of Operation RESTORE HOPE extensively. Katherine McGrady produced a study of this operation for the Center for Naval Analyses entitled *The Joint task Force in Operation Restore Hope*. This work focused on the first 60 days of the operation and devoted much of the report to the aspect of converting a MEF headquarters into a JTF. She details many of the issues this transition causes with the staff as well as the impacts on the planning process. Written in 1996, *A Leap Into the Dark: Crisis Action Planning for Operation RESTORE HOPE* by Christopher Baggott focuses on the time-constrained environment under which CAP occurred for JTF Somalia. His monograph provides a good description of the environment in which the MEF staff was required to plan, and the impacts of lack of time and information had on planning for OOTW.

Summary

There is no shortage of literature concerning Operation RESTORE HOPE or the use of an Army corps or division as a JTF. However, very little of it focuses exclusively on the planning functions that exist within the JTF staff or the Service staff that is required to perform those functions as a JTF. The publications reviewed above do provide useful insights into the impacts of transitioning from a Service staff to a JTF. Chapter Three covers the Joint, Army, and Marine Corps doctrine concerning the formation of a JTF, the planning process, and the transition of orders from planning to execution.

DOCTRINE

JTF RESTORE HOPE employed the normal Marine staff organization to form the JTF headquarters, which is roughly that specified in Joint Pub 5-00.2. However, the functions of each staff section were not closely defined. Differences on staff functions exist between Joint Pub 5-00.2 and FMFM 3-1. These differences created some confusion regarding staff functions.

USMC, Operation Restore Hope Collection and Lessons Learned Project Report

The DOD dictionary of Military Terms defines doctrine as “fundamental principles by which the military forces or elements thereof guide their actions in support of national objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgment in application.”¹⁹ Joint doctrine is the primary guide we use to organize for and conduct joint operations. As an Army planning staff transitions to a JTF staff, they would look to joint doctrine as a guide, to identify organizational requirements and responsibilities within that organization, just as they do for the planning process. “The Army staff planners develop JTF and ARFOR plans in each functional area, using JPs 5-00.1 and 5-00.2 as guides.”²⁰ The clearer the doctrine and the more consistent it is between joint and service manuals, the easier the transitions should be. In Chapter 3, I will examine joint doctrine to understand the organizational requirements, planning responsibilities, and guidelines for the orders production process. Then I will use simplicity and clearly defined authorities, roles and relationships, as defined by JP 0-2, as the criteria to assess the doctrine. I will then examine the Army and Marine Corps doctrine to determine if it is consistent with the joint doctrine. This section attempts to answer the following questions in regard to Joint, Army, and Marine Corps doctrine: How should the planning staff be organized? What are the duties and responsibilities

¹⁹ Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 1-02, *DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, (Washington, D.C., 2001), 165.

²⁰ FM 100-7, *Decisive Force*, 6-11.

of the planning staff? What is the process to facilitate orders production and the transition of orders from planning to execution?

Joint Staff Doctrine

The capstone doctrinal publication JP 0-2, *Unified Action Armed Forces*, bases the organization of the JTF staff on the major functions of command. “The general or joint staff group is made up of staff directorates corresponding to the major function of command, such as personnel, intelligence, operations, logistics, plans and C4 [command, control, communications, and computers] systems.”²¹ This divides the operations and planning functions between the J-3 for operations and the J-5 for plans and thus becomes the basis for organizing the planning functions required of any organization that must assume duties as a JTF.

JP 5-00.2, *Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures* further refines the organizational structure by providing a “typical” joint staff organization chart, including models with the J-3 as the operations directorate and the J-5 as the plans directorate (see Figure 1). This clearly establishes the J-3 and the J-5 as two separate organizations, focused on two separate and distinct functions to fulfill on the staff.




Figure 1 Typical Joint Task Force Staff Organization²²

²¹ JP 0-2, *Unified Action Armed Forces*, V-14.

²² JP 5-00.2, *Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures*, II-3.

The doctrine goes on to provide more definition to these two organizations by building an organizational chart for each. This is important because the structure of the organization, as depicted in the charts, defines responsibility. “Design of the *basic structure* involves such central issues as how the work of the organization will be divided and assigned among positions, groups, departments, divisions, etc., and how the coordination necessary to accomplish the total organizational objectives will be achieved.”²³ An examination of the organizational chart for the J-3 reveals a plans cell, as well as many others (see Figure 2). However, while the publication outlines the duties and responsibilities for several of the other cells and centers depicted, it fails to specify the duties and responsibilities for the plans cell.




Figure 2 Typical Joint Task Force J-3 Organization²⁴

²³ Gene W. Dalton and others, eds., *Organizational Structure and Design*, (Homewood: Richard D. Irwin, Inc, 1970), 1.

²⁴ JP 5-00.2, *Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures*, VII-2.

The organization chart for the J-5 reveals a much more streamlined organization. However, like the J-3 organization chart, the J-5 chart also contains a plans cell (see Figure 3). By creating two directorates, J-3 Operations and J-5 Plans, both with a plans cells depicted on their organizational chart, it implies that both directorates have the responsibility to plan and this creates ambiguity regarding the planning process. The distinctness of the two organizations, built into the overall JTF organizational chart, is lost when examining the charts for each directorate. In order to clarify the duties and responsibilities of each directorate for planning, it is necessary to examine the text of the doctrine.




Figure 3 Typical Joint Task Force J-5 Organization²⁵

JP 0-2 does articulate the responsibilities of the J-3 stating that the J-3 “assists the commander in the discharge of assigned responsibility for the direction and control of operations beginning with the planning and follow-through until specific operations are completed.”²⁶ In this capacity the J-3 “plans, coordinates, and integrates operations.”²⁷ Then, JP 0-2 outlines the general responsibilities for the J-5. “The J-5 assists the commander in long range or future

²⁵ Ibid., XI-2.

²⁶ JP 0-2, *Unified Action Armed Forces*, V-15.

²⁷ Ibid.

planning, preparation of campaign and joint operation plans and associated estimates of the situation”²⁸ Again, the doctrine seems to assign responsibility for planning to two organizations within a JTF staff, reinforcing the ambiguity established in the organizational charts. JP 0-2 does attempt to resolve this problem by stating that when the staff includes both a J-3 and J-5, the J-5 is responsible for long range or future planning.²⁹ However, JP 0-2 does not define long-range or future planning and, by not doing so, it fails to clarify the ambiguity it created and thus violates the very command and control tenant (clearly defined authorities, roles, and relationships) it established. Having created this ambiguity in the capstone doctrine, it is up to the subordinate doctrine to answer the question of who is responsible for what part of planning.

JP 5-00.2, *Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures*, assigns the responsibilities of the J-3 with respect to planning:

- Assists in the development of joint plans
- Monitor current operational status of friendly forces and conduct operations planning
- Conduct analysis and coordination of future operations (branches) during the execution phase
- Assists in the preparation of plans relating to current operations³⁰

JP 5-00.2 assigns responsibility for the following planning tasks to the J-5:

- As operations are executed, the J-5 will prepare OPLANs [Operations Plans] or OPORDs [Operations Orders] as directed in support of future operations
- Conduct analysis and coordination of future operations (generally 72 hours and beyond) during the execution phase
- Provide assistance to the J-3 in the preparation of orders³¹

Comparing the responsibilities outlined above, both the J-3 and the J-5 have responsibility to “conduct analysis and coordination of future operations.” Future operations are

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ JP 5-00.2, *Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures*, VII-2 to VII-4.

³¹ Ibid., IX-2 to IX-3.

defined for the J-3 as “branches” or “the contingency options built into the base plan.”³² For the J-5, future operations are defined as “generally 72 hours and beyond.”³³ These definitions do little to clarify the situation because branches to the base plan could occur at any time, including beyond 72 hours.

In order to facilitate the coordination of the planning staff, JP 5-00.2 recommends forming a Joint Planning Group (JPG) to facilitate planning during the CAP process.³⁴ “Its purposes are to conduct CAP, be the focal point for OPORD development, perform future planning, and accomplish other tasks as directed.”³⁵ The JPG, a cell within the J-5, comprises members of the staff brought together for the purpose of planning operations.³⁶ It does not specify the relationship of the J-3 and J-5 within the JPG but does recognize the importance of the relationship between the two, specifically mentioning the interaction between them when discussing the JPG. “Furthermore, it must be made clear how the JPG and staff sections (especially the J-3 and J-5) will interact during planning and once operations commence”³⁷ The JPG may create more issues for the staff during the transition from corps or division to JTF by adding another organization and potential process to be considered.

JP 5-00.2 provides a model that addresses three areas: organization, responsibilities, and planning process during CAP. The model organizes the JTF staff for planning into three directorates or cells: the J-3 Current OPS Cell, J-5 Plans Directorate, and the J-35 Future OPS Cell. According to the model, the J-5 Plans should focus beyond 96 hours and be responsible for planning the next phase of operations or sequels. The J-35 Future OPS focuses on the period from

³² JP 1-02, *DOD Dictionary*, 71.

³³ JP 5-00.2, *Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures*, IX-3.


³⁴ *Ibid.*, IX-6.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, IX-7.

³⁶ *Ibid.*

³⁷ *Ibid.*

24-96 hours and has responsibility to plan branches to the base plan. The J-3 Current OPS focuses on the next 24 hours and has responsibility for execution of current operations. Each cell also has responsibility to produce products as part of the process.



* Modified from JP 5-00.2

Figure 4 Execution Phase Crisis Action Planning³⁸

This same model also provides a process for the orders production during the execution phase of an operation. In this model, once the OPORD or OPLAN is published, the J-5 Plans begins production of sequels to the base plan while the J-35 begins to plan branches to the base plan. The J-3 Current OPS cell would be responsible for overseeing the execution of the plan.³⁹ According to the model, the military decision-making process (MDMP) products pass from the J-5 Plans to the J-35 Future OPS and from the J-35 Future OPS to the J-3 Current OPS cell using

³⁸ JP 5-00.2, *Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures*, IX-14.

³⁹ Ibid.

“cartoon storyboard” and planner explanation. The doctrine makes it seem as if this transition of planning products between the different organizations responsible for the process requires little more than a slide and briefing. It is possible that this will not be enough to maintain continuity concerning the commander’s intent, course of action, or the elements of operational design.

Ultimately this model adds some clarification to the ambiguity but due to the overall inconsistency in the doctrine, it remains unclear as to who has ultimate responsibility for what part of planning.

Summary

The joint doctrine attempts to define responsibilities for the planning staff, however, neither the figures nor the text of the doctrine is clear. The doctrine assigns responsibility for planning to two organizations, both in the proposed organizational structure and in the text, but without sufficient fidelity to make it clear who is responsible for the different parts of the planning process. The model designed to explain the execution phase of CAP (see Figure 4) uses two standards to assign responsibility: time (e.g. beyond 96 hours) and events (e.g. phases). This creates confusion because these two standards are not mutually exclusive. The result is that the planner must determine which is the most effective method to assign the responsibility and then how to implement it. Additionally the model implies that orders pass from the J-5 Plans through the J-35 Future OPS to the J-3 Current OPS, each cell being responsible for producing its own planning products. But the CJCSM 3500.05A, *Joint Task Force Headquarters Master Training Guide*, makes no mention of the J-35 Future OPS section when it covers transitioning plans (i.e. hand off).⁴⁰ In fact, it makes no mention of a future operations cell at all with regard to the J-3

⁴⁰ Joint Chiefs of Staff, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual (CJCSM) 3500.05A, *Joint Task Force Headquarters Master Training Guide*, (Washington, D.C., 2003), 3-I-121.

OPS or the J-5 Plans. It does mention a “J-3 Current Plans Section” when discussing the Joint Operations Center, but that term is not found in JP 5-00.2.⁴¹ All these ambiguities in the joint doctrine may confuse the process when a staff is trying to determine the requirements for organization, responsibilities, and process during the initial stages of the planning process.

Army Doctrine

Having examined the joint doctrine, I will now examine the doctrine for Army corps and divisions and compare it to the organization and responsibilities for planning established by the joint doctrine. According to Field Manual (FM) 6-0, *Mission Command*, the basis for the Army staff organization is broad fields of interest. “Regardless of mission, every Army staff has common broad fields of interest that determine how the commander divides his duties and responsibilities.”⁴² These broad fields of interest include personnel; intelligence; operations and training; logistics; civil-military operations; command, control, communications, and computer operations; information operations; and resource management.⁴³ While in a garrison environment, the corps and division staffs organize according to these broad fields of interest (see Figure 5), and form a coordinating staff group that includes the G-1 (personnel) through the G-7 (information operations).⁴⁴

This basis for organization is similar to that of the joint doctrine but differs in that a joint task force staff has “plans” as one of its major functions while the Army’s broad fields of interest does not. This is important because in order for an Army corps or division to transition to a JTF staff it will have to reorganize according to the major functions of command of the joint staff and

⁴¹ Ibid., 3-I-83.

⁴² United States Army, Field Manual 6-0, *Mission Command*, (Washington, D.C., 2003), C-1.

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ Ibid.

form a plans directorate, thus devoting some effort to the organizational transition rather than deployment and operational planning and potentially failing to build momentum.




Figure 5 Typical Corps and Division Staff Organization (modified)⁴⁵

FM 6-0, *Mission Command* states that a single officer has responsibility for preparing and publishing plans and orders.⁴⁶ Accordingly, the G-3 is designated as the principle staff officer for all matters concerning operations and plans including “Preparing, coordinating, authenticating, publishing, and distributing the command SOP [standard operating procedure], plans, orders (including fragmentary orders [FRAGOs] and warning orders [WARNOs])....⁴⁷ This defines clearly who has the authority and responsibility for planning within an Army corps or division.

When acting as a JTF, corps and division headquarters transition from exercising command in a garrison environment to exercising battle command and reorganizing into command posts (CPs) to facilitate command and control. “The corps [or division] commander exercises C2 through the Army Battle Command System (ABCS) from three command posts and

⁴⁵ United States Army, Field Manual 101-5, *Staff Organization and Operations*, (Washington, D.C., 1997), 2-4.

⁴⁶ FM 6-0, *Mission Command*, D-3.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, D-15.

a command group.”⁴⁸ The main command post contains cells organized along functional lines and includes a current operation cell and a plans cell as depicted in Figure 6.⁴⁹




Figure 6 Corps Tactical Operations Center⁵⁰

Formed from within the G-3, the Current OPS cell corresponds to the joint staff’s J-35 Future OPS, having responsibility for “developing branches to the current operation,” while the plans cell corresponds to the J-5 Plans, having responsibility for planning future operations “as sequels for the current corps operation.”⁵¹ In fact, the Army doctrine on corps operations recommends the G-3 Plans cell reorganize into the J-5 Plans with augmentation from the combatant command.⁵² Unfortunately, it fails to recommend how the G-3 should reorganize within the current operations cell to address both the J-35 Future OPS requirement for planning future operations and the J-3 requirement to execute current operations. This may lead to

⁴⁸ United States Army, Field Manual 100-15, *Corps Operations*, (Washington, D.C., 1996), 4-6.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 4-9.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 4-10.

⁵² *Ibid.*, 4-26.

confusion as to the division of responsibility for planning as the corps or division staff transitions to the JTF staff.

Additionally, the organizational differences between the Army and joint staffs prevent the accomplishment of one of the Army's training priorities, that of battle focused training. This priority stipulates that an organization should train as it fights. "The priority of training in units is to train to standard on the wartime mission. Battle focus guides the planning, preparation, execution, and assessment of each organization's training program to ensure its members train as they are going to fight."⁵³ If one accepts the argument that corps and divisions will form, deploy and fight as a JTF, then the staff should train as one. Typically, however, they focus more on fighting as a JTF and less on the transition to the JTF staff and deployment of the force. Richard Abb concluded in 2000 that corps and divisions focus on the core competencies of offense and defense rather than deploying into theater or integrating into joint or multinational operations when participating in Warfighter Exercises.⁵⁴ Organizing the corps and division staffs according to the joint structure may force them to focus on the transition to and deployment of the JTF to a greater extent during training. Solving these two issues before forming a JTF may facilitate the building of momentum in the initial stages of an operation.

Unlike joint doctrine, (see Figure 5) the Army doctrine provides no model that attempts to specifically define the organization, responsibilities, and planning process that occur within the command post. Although Army doctrine does not provide models for the transition of orders from planning to execution, it does stress coordination and synchronization. "During preparation for and execution of operations, continuous coordination by the staff officer is critical. This

⁵³ United States Army, Field Manual 7-0, *Training the Force*, (Washington, D.C., 2002), 2-13.

⁵⁴ MAJ Richard Abb, *Redefining Division and Corps Competencies: Are Divisions and Corps Training to Fight Joint?*, Monograph (Leavenworth: School for Advanced Military Studies, US Army Command and General Staff College, 2000), 43.

includes coordinating vertically and horizontally to exchange information and coordinate information that may impact the staff officer's area or other functional areas."⁵⁵ Also, Army doctrine does not establish procedures for the corps or division staff to transition orders through the plans and the current operations cells during development of those orders.

Summary

When we use the criteria of clearly defined authorities, roles and relationships as well as simplicity to evaluate doctrine, we find the Army doctrine adequate. By assigning the responsibility for planning to one directorate, the G-3, the Army has created a planning structure that is both clearly defined and simple. When assigning responsibility for planning based on one standard, the planning products produced (branches and sequels), it achieves simplicity and assures a clear delineation of authority for planning. However, because Army doctrine organizes the planning function within one directorate and joint doctrine organizes it within two, the Army staff must reorganize for planning when tasked to be a joint task force. This increases the complexity of the transition because the G-3 Current OPS cell does not have an additional plans cell within it, one that would assume the function of planning future operations.⁵⁶ Thus, to create a JTF staff, the corps or division staff will have to form a future operations cell out of either the current operations or plans cells, or both. The Army doctrine fails to recommend the means to effect a smooth transition to a joint staff or how to adjust the means for transitioning products through the orders development process. Additionally the corps and division staff may not be manned or have planners trained to assume the additional planning duties. The corps or division staff must then redesign the organization, assign responsibility for planning, and develop a process for orders production, all using joint doctrine that is ambiguous and at a time when the

⁵⁵ FM 101-5, *Staff Organization and Operations*, 6-5.

⁵⁶ FM 100-15, *Corps Operations*, 4-9.

staff should be focused on deployment and operational planning rather than these issues.

Ultimately, this may cause the staff to struggle through these transitions and hinder the force from building momentum.

Marine Corps Doctrine

I will now examine the Marine Corps doctrine to determine its compatibility with the joint doctrine. The Marine Corps organizes the MEF staff (corps level) along the same functional lines as a joint staff (see Figure 7). In this organizational model, the G-3 organizes as the operations and training directorate and the G-5 organizes as the plans directorate.⁵⁷ MCWP 5-1, *Marine Corps Planning Process* defines in detail the organization of these directorates within the context of the planning process. “The Marine Corps Planning Process at the component and MEF levels is primarily conducted by three planning organizations: future plans, future operations and current operations.”⁵⁸ The future plans cell (similar to the J-5 Plans) organizes within the G-5 and the future operations cell (similar to the J-35 Future OPS) organizes within the G-3, which also has the current operations cell (similar to the J-3 Current OPS).⁵⁹ Unlike the Army doctrine, the MEF staff would not require reorganization before or during initial planning as a JTF and potential issues involving reorganization discussed in the previous section could be avoided.

⁵⁷ United States Marine Corps, Marine Corps Reference Publication (MCRP) 5-12-D, *Organization of Marine Corps Forces*, (Washington, D.C., 1998), 6-1.

⁵⁸ United States Marine Corps, Marine Corps Warfighting Publication (MCWP) 5-1, *Marine Corps Planning Process*, (Washington, D.C., 2000), C-4.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, C-4-5.




Figure 7 MEF Command Element⁶⁰

MCWP 5-1 outlines the responsibilities for each of the planning organizations listed above. The G-3 Future OPS cell, as the focal point of the planning process has responsibility for the following:

- Form the nucleus of the operational planning team
- Integrate other staff sections into the planning process
- Coordinate with the future plans and the current operations sections to integrate planning of the next battle
- Develop branches and sequels⁶¹

The G-5 Future Plans cell is responsible for the following:

- Focus beyond the immediate next battle or next phase that is being planned to provide a link between the higher headquarters and the future operations cell
- Plans the commands next mission
- Develop sequels and support relationships for the next phase
- Develop plans to ensure the force does not reach a culmination point⁶²

The current operations section receives branch plans from the future operations section and either adapts those plans or develops new ones to address a changing situation.⁶³ Although the organizational structure of the MEF staff is similar to that of the JTF staff, their

⁶⁰ MCRP 5-12-D, *Organization of Marine Corps Forces*, 6-2.

⁶¹ MCWP 5-1, *Marine Corps Planning Process*, C-5.

⁶² *Ibid.*, C-4.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, C-5.

responsibilities are somewhat different. Therefore, while the organizational structure remains the same, the responsibilities would require adjustment between the planning organizations to mirror the joint model.

One aspect of the Marine Corps doctrine that may assist the staff in this transition is the use of the operational planning team (OPT). Like the joint doctrine's JPG, the Marine Corps OPTs form around a small group of core planners within either the G-3 Future OPS and/or the G-5 Future Plans cells, who are then augmented by members from throughout the MEF staff thereby maintaining the connectivity with the MEF.⁶⁴ This may make the transition to the joint staff easier for Marine planners because their familiarity with this organization, its responsibilities, and how it assists the planning process. It may also make the organization more effective initially because they have experience using the system. The use of the OPT may enable a small group of planners to focus on planning the deployment and subsequent operation while the drawing on the expertise of the rest of the staff, even while they transition to the JTF.

Unlike Army doctrine, Marine Corps doctrine does focus on transitioning orders from planning to execution. According to Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication (MCDP) 1-0, *Marine Corps Operations*, "Transition ensures a successful shift from planning to execution. It enhances the situational awareness of those who must execute the plan, maintains the intent of the concept of operations, promotes unity of effort, and generates tempo."⁶⁵ This applies not only to transitions between units, but also between staff elements within the same headquarters. "A formal transition normally occurs on staffs with separate planning and execution teams."⁶⁶ Specifically, doctrine defines this as an internal transition because the transition occurs within the

⁶⁴ Ibid., C-6.

⁶⁵ United States Marine Corps, Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 1-0, *Marine Corps Operations*, (Washington, D.C., 2001), 6-31.

⁶⁶ Ibid.

staff as opposed to an outside element. “Transition may be internal or external in the form of briefs or drills. Internally, transition occurs between future plans or future and current operations”⁶⁷ These briefs or drills maintain the situational awareness of the entire staff and ensure that key information is passed on that enables the building of momentum generated by the planning staff. Just like the Objective Force White Paper, this doctrine recognized the transition phase as an opportunity to generate momentum or as the MCDP states “generates tempo”.⁶⁸ It recommends a process to facilitate these transitions. “Transition may be accomplished through the assignment of a plan proponent – a planner who aids the executors in interpreting and applying the plan in action – and through participation in transition briefs, drills, and a confirmation brief.”⁶⁹ This also may assist the staff as it transitions to a JTF and they try to develop processes to assist in producing orders.

Summary

The Marine Corps doctrine at the MEF level attempts to clearly define authorities, roles and relationships for planning by developing a distinct organizational structure for planning. It has the same organizational structure as the JTF staff, (See Figure 1 and 7) making a potential transition to a JTF simpler because it eliminates the need for reorganization during the planning process. It has the J-5 Plans, J-35 Future OPS, and J-3 Current OPS elements and thus is able to train as it would fight. Unlike the joint doctrine, it assigns responsibilities for planning based on only one factor, events (missions, battles or phasing) as opposed to two (time and events). However, while the division of responsibility based on a single factor, events (mission, battle, or phase) is simpler, it lacks clarity because it does not define these terms and uses them

⁶⁷ MCWP 5-1, *Marine Corps Planning Process*, 7-2.

⁶⁸ MCWP 1-0, *Marine Corps Operations*, 6-31.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*

interchangeably. This may cause uncertainty determining specifically who is responsible for which event when transitioning to a JTF. Similar to the joint doctrine, the MEF staff uses the OPT concept, potentially making the formation of the JPG easier because the staff is familiar with the organization, purpose and the procedures involved in its operation. The Marine Corps doctrine also focuses on transitioning orders from one planning cell to another, thereby having an established process in place that the staff would otherwise have develop during the transition to the JTF.

Overall Summary

Overall, the joint doctrine and that of the Services fail to achieve simplicity because the differences in organizational structures and a lack clarity in assigning responsibilities for planning. The organization of a joint task force headquarters staff is significantly different from the corresponding planning staff of an Army corps or division. These differences require the Army planning staff to undergo a significant transition before it can execute duties as a JTF staff. When looking to joint doctrine to guide the organizational transition process, the staff may find the joint doctrine ambiguous. Because the Marine Corps organizational structure is similar to that of a JTF staff, it avoids this transition and in this respect is better suited initially to act as a JTF. Each defines differently the standards used to establish responsibility for plans, future OPS and current OPS, using either time or event. This lack of clarity increases the complexity of the transition because the staff has to determine the responsibilities within the staff and how to achieve them while planning for an upcoming operation. The Marine Corps use of the OPT enables the MEF staff to train using the same process it would as a JTF and in doing so eliminates the requirement to create a new process initially. The MEF staff would be required to undergo fewer transitions as it forms a JTF staff than the Army corps or division. Transitions can potentially prevent an organization from building momentum during the deployment of forces as they spend time focused on these issues rather than on planning the deployment and subsequent

operations. However, as I discuss in the next chapter, problems still occur in an organization that is similar to the staff it is required to become.

APPLICATION

The job of the mission planner is always thankless: anticipating requirements even before a mission statement has been formalized, orchestrating literally thousands of details that cause an operation to be successful or to go at all, adjusting those details when the concept of the operation changes, and doing all of these things under time pressures that would cause breakdowns in lesser mortals.

Kenneth Allard, Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned

This chapter will review an operation conducted by a JTF that I believe is a model for future operations: Operation RESTORE HOPE, executed by I MEF (JTF Somalia). This operation occurred with little notice, required the forces involved to transform their organization into a joint task force, and required the planning staff to conduct CAP in a time-constrained environment. This chapter will review the background of the operation, discuss the situation the planners faced upon receipt of notification for the operation, and examine the possible effects these factors had on the planning and execution of the operation.

JTF Somalia in Operation RESTORE HOPE

United States involvement in Somalia began in August of 1992 with Operation PROVIDE RELIEF in an effort to avert a humanitarian crisis resulting from an ongoing civil war between native tribes. This operation, led primarily by the United States Marine Corps, focused on the delivery of relief supplies to humanitarian organizations for distribution to the starving people of Somalia. However, the security situation deteriorated as the fighting between the warring factions prevented the relief supplies from reaching their intended recipients, and the humanitarian crisis worsened. Finally, on 3 December 1992, President George Bush, backed by United Nations resolution 794, ordered the United States Central Command (CENTCOM) to execute Operation RESTORE HOPE. CENTCOM directed I Marine Expeditionary Force (I

MEF) to establish a JTF with the mission of establishing a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations.⁷⁰

The situation in which I MEF planners found themselves was a difficult one, characterized by lack of time, shortage of actionable intelligence, multiple planning requirements, vague doctrine, and a need to reorganize into a JTF. CENTCOM alerted I MEF on 20 NOV 93 when they issued the warning order (WARNORD) to begin preparations to form a JTF and respond to the crisis in Somalia.⁷¹ Due to the nature of the crisis, I MEF had little time to plan for the operation before it was time to begin movement of forces. “From receipt of initial orders, until deployment of forces, JTF Somalia had little more than seven days to plan, rehearse and coordinate joint and combined staff and command components, as well as draw in an assortment of seemingly disparate governmental and nongovernmental humanitarian organizations (NGOs).”⁷² A lack of time is one of the planning aspects that distinguish CAP from the deliberate planning and thus it adds a greater level of difficulty to tasks that have to be accomplished.⁷³ For the planners in I MEF, there was no shortage of tasks that required their attention in the short time before deployment.

The planning staff immediately began conducting mission analysis, attempting to gain an understanding of the situation and the requirements they would have to fulfill. One of the first requirements was for two of the chief planners, Colonel Wallace Gregson and Colonel Pete Dotto, to fly to CENTCOM to conduct coordination with their higher headquarters.⁷⁴ This removed two key leaders from the planning process for the first 48 hours and, as discussed

⁷⁰ COL Kenneth Allard, *Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned*, (Washington, D.C., 1995), 13-16.

⁷¹ LTC Christopher Baggott, *A Leap Into the Dark: Crisis Action Planning for Operation RESTORE HOPE, Monograph*, (Leavenworth: School of Advanced Military Studies, US Army Command and General Staff College, 1997), 14.

⁷² *Ibid.*, 3.

⁷³ JP 1-02, *DOD Dictionary*, 133.

⁷⁴ Baggott, *A Leap Into the Dark*, 14.

earlier, this phase of planning can be critical, even more so if the staff is required to organize and establish procedures for planning. Additionally, the planning staff had to gain an understanding of what the 50 coalition members brought to the JTF. “COL Dotto and his J-3 Future Planning Cell was given the formidable task of identifying each coalition partner’s military, functional, and resource capabilities and attempt to logically and systematically organize it into each HRS [humanitarian relief sectors].”⁷⁵ Another critical task was attempting to understand the situation on the ground. Unfortunately, there was a shortage of accurate information for use in mission analysis and course of action development because “the JTF could not get an accurate account of the situation from either military or other governmental intelligence sources.”⁷⁶ So, much of the time available to the MEF Staff was spent accomplishing mission analysis, and planning for the deployment of forces and the subsequent operation. Any additional requirements associated with transitioning to the JTF would take away from this effort to build momentum for the MEF.

One of the first tasks associated with this transition was identification of the standards established by the joint doctrine. In *Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned*, Kenneth Allard suggests that one role of doctrine is to “assist commanders and planners in translating joint policy and doctrine into operational decisions, especially on short notice contingency operations.”⁷⁷ He states that a helpful tool for joint planning would be JP 5-00.2 however, as discussed in the previous chapter, it has shortcomings. The MEF staff had to deal with these shortcomings as it identified the joint standards and the lack of a doctrinal model for who was responsible for what part of planning resulted in confusion. “JTF RESTORE HOPE employed the normal Marine staff organization to form the JTF headquarters, which is roughly that specified in JP 5-00.2. However, the functions of each staff section were not closely defined. Differences in staff

⁷⁵ Ibid., 24.

⁷⁶ Ibid., 20.

⁷⁷ Allard, *Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned*, 6.

functions exist between JP 5-00.2 and FMFM 3-1. These differences created some confusion regarding staff functions.”⁷⁸ Additionally, the planning staff found little doctrine available for the type of operation they were preparing to execute. “Not only was there no off-the-shelf planning document able to be modified to the existing conditions in Somalia, UNITED STATES military forces began operations in Somalia without the benefit of a standard joint peacekeeping doctrine.”⁷⁹ So, while the staff was trying to bring clarity to the situation and define its mission, one not addressed in doctrine, it also struggled with deciphering the doctrine for planning within the JTF. Nevertheless, the planning staff had to organize for and execute the planning process. The planning staff divided the tasks for planning between the J-5 Plans and the J-35 Future OPS with the J-5 Plans being responsible for the Time Phased Force Deployment and Date List (TFPDDL) and Phase 1 and the J-35 Future OPS was responsible for the rest of the plan.⁸⁰

For some directorates on the I MEF staff, this transition to a JTF headquarters had a detrimental effect on the staff’s performance. “Some sections of I MEF reorganized their peacetime structures for the JTF headquarters. Sections that underwent radical reorganization found it extremely difficult to operate under the new system.”⁸¹ While Katherine McGrady does not define “radical”, or specifically address the J-3 and J-5, it is clear that the transition had an impact on the sections of the staff that had to undergo these changes. The planning staff would have had to reorganize because of the differences in staff functions between the joint and Marine Corps doctrine identified above. Reorganizing during a crisis can pose problems and come with some cost; a possible reduced level of performance while the staff adjusts. “One factor these JTFs will have to consider is the time needed for sections that have undergone radical

⁷⁸ United States Marine Corps, *Operation Restore Hope Collection and Lessons Learned Project Report*, (Quantico, VA. 1993), 2-A-5.

⁷⁹ Baggott, *A Leap Into the Dark*, 8.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, 16.

⁸¹ McGrady, “The Joint Task Force in Operation Restore Hope”, 4.

reorganization to adjust to the new structure. If there is no lead time in the operation, reorganizing may be risky as it can seriously diminish the effectiveness of the section.”⁸² This reduction in effectiveness may increase the amount of time it takes to accomplish deployment and operational planning tasks while the staff attempts to adjust to the new organization.

The beginning of the operation, when the JTF is attempting to build momentum, is likely the most important initially because deployment decisions made at the beginning of the operation are hard to reverse. This period is important because there is a “critical decision window of opportunity” in the initial stages of an operation in which decisions made are difficult to reverse and influence the execution of the operation.⁸³ “The window of opportunity is important because it represents the transition period between planning and execution. Although the window may only be 48 to 72 hours in length and, at times may overlap with a higher headquarters’ window, the decisions made set the tone for the rest of the operation. Many of these decisions are irretrievable, or at least very hard to change.”⁸⁴ In this operation, the beginning of the operation was conducted under a severe time constraint. The staff needed to devote all its time to the planning process, not to deciphering doctrine or organizing the staff, both of which take time and can lead to reduced effectiveness.

For the ARFOR, the time used by their higher headquarters to plan directly affected the amount of time they had to conduct their planning. In the lessons learned published by CALL, the 10th Mountain Division stated that “Operation RESTORE HOPE clearly showed that strategic planners must adopt the old “two-thirds rule” of time management for operations other than war...if this rule had been applied, the ARFOR would have had 10 days instead of four to plan

⁸² Ibid., 5.

⁸³ CALL “Operation Restore Hope”, 1-24.

⁸⁴ Ibid.

prior to making deployment decisions.”⁸⁵ It is clear that the more time a higher headquarters takes to plan, the less time subordinates have in their decision window of opportunity and that can directly impact operations. “Army components deploying to Somalia missed their “window of opportunity” for critical embarkation deadlines due to tardy and inadequate planning information from the JTF headquarters. This planning process failure, on the part of the CJTF headquarters, was directly attributable to a lack of doctrine and training.”⁸⁶ These issues directly affected the actual deployment of forces to Somalia and may have prevented the build-up of momentum during the initial stages of the operation.

Several factors influenced the transition to the JTF. The first of these was the training that the staff conducted before the operation. I MEF conducted a command post exercise in the summer of 1992 in which the staff performed as a joint task force staff.⁸⁷ This enabled the staff to train as it would fight and identify issues with the doctrine, test the organization, and exercise the orders production process. Additionally, the staff would have had a better understanding of their responsibilities when they eventually transitioned to JTF Somalia. In any event, it did help the staff perform as a JTF when they received notification of the mission. “Although, the scenario for both training exercises bore little resemblance to what the military would actually encounter in Somalia, it did train the I MEF staff as a functional joint headquarters.”⁸⁸ As noted earlier, even with this prior training, the staff still struggled to transition to the joint staff. It is likely that the disruption the staff encountered would have been greater had they not conducted this training.

⁸⁵ Ibid., 1-2.

⁸⁶ Maj John Del Colliano, *A Look at Joint Task Force Headquarters What is Wrong? How Do We Fix It?*, (Newport News: The United States Naval War College, 1997), 13.

⁸⁷ Baggott, *A Leap Into the Dark*, 13.

⁸⁸ Ibid.

A second factor that influences the transition to JTF was the use of augmentees to provide the MEF with additional staff members possessing critical skills.⁸⁹ Augmentees provide additional capabilities to a component staff and enable them to function as a joint headquarters. “The intent of USCINCCENT’s augmentation was to bring in critical skills that I MEF otherwise lacked.”⁹⁰ The J-5 Plans received one third of its members from other services while the J-3 Future OPS cell received one naval officer.⁹¹ However, there are issues associated with the use of augmentees. The first is the timeliness of their arrival. They must arrive quickly enough to assist in the transition to the JTF and facilitate the development of momentum. If we use the standard established by Lt Col. Flores (see page 2), which would be within the first 16-72 hours, this would enable them to be in position to influence the critical window of opportunity. Secondly, they must integrate into the planning team. Until they do so, the core staff may spend time bringing the new arrivals up to speed with the operating procedures unique to that service staff. Likewise the staff may spend time learning the best organizational structure and planning processes from the augmentees. “In some cases, it was a matter of time before the section could adjust itself to these new members and operate effectively as a team.”⁹² Either way, the staff spends its most precious resource, time, at the beginning phase of an operation, struggling, rather than moving smoothly through the transitions.

Summary

In Operation RESTORE HOPE, I MEF was ultimately successful in averting the looming humanitarian crisis and establishing a level of security necessary to continue relief operations.⁹³

⁸⁹ Colliano, *A Look at Joint Task Force Headquarters*, 11.

⁹⁰ McGrady, *The Joint Task Force in Operation Restore Hope*, 104.

⁹¹ USMC, *Operation Restore Hope Lessons Learned*, (Quantico, 1993), Organization Appendix.

⁹² McGrady, *The Joint Task Force in Operation Restore Hope*, 136.

⁹³ Allard, *Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned*, 17.

However, this operation was not perfect; it demonstrated the complexity of transitioning to a JTF, and the challenges faced by any staff that is required to do so in a time-constrained environment. It showed the detrimental effect a change in organizational structure, adjustments to staff processes, and vague doctrine can have on a staff that has not prepared to address these changes. All of these issues may have prevented the MEF staff from taking advantage of the critical decision window of opportunity to build momentum by rapidly deploying forces.

Additionally, Operation RESTORE HOPE also demonstrated the impact that training and the use of augmentees has on a staff. The use of augmentees is a double-edged sword. While they provide needed expertise on service capabilities and joint operations, they may also cause significant disruption within the staff they are augmenting. The training that I MEF received before the operation undoubtedly benefited the staff when it became JTF Somalia but it showed that even an organization similarly staffed, familiar with joint planning procedures, and trained as a JTF will experience issues during the transition.

The I MEF staff, organized similar to and familiar with the processes of a JTF, experienced all of the issues discussed in this chapter. It is likely that an Army staff, that must change its organization and adjust its planning process, will experience these issues to a greater degree. Short of forming a standing JTF, it is possible that the Marine Corps staff structure represents the best model for organizing a service staff that expects to transition to a JTF.

CONCLUSIONS and RECOMMENDATIONS

While there is lively debate about whether the unified commands should organize “standing joint task forces,” there should now be little doubt that the organization of the headquarters for those task forces is an issue that should no longer be left to last-minute arrangements.

Kenneth Allard, *Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned*

Conclusions

This monograph has attempted to answer the question: Should the Army create two planning organizations, similar to the J-5 Plans and J-35 Future Operations of a joint staff, within the corps and division staff? The answer is yes. This would facilitate effective planning during the transition to a JTF and ensure these staffs build, rather than lose momentum during deployment and subsequent operations?

Transitions sap operational momentum. During the initial stages of an operational deployment, as a JTF attempts to build operational momentum by deploying forces rapidly, any issue that diverts attention from that effort has the potential to prevent the build-up of operational momentum. By eliminating the need to transition from an Army staff organization to a joint staff structure, the Army would eliminate a major diversion of effort away from the planning process and facilitate the build-up of momentum.

In the future, the Army will be required to provide a corps or division headquarters to plan and execute operations as a JTF. The Army is moving toward becoming a more modular and expeditionary force capable of rapidly deploying to address the needs of the Nation. General Schoomaker, Chief of Staff, U.S. Army wrote in October 2003 “the spectrum of likely operations requires that the Army adopt a joint expeditionary culture, focused on and prepared for operations

anywhere in the world.”⁹⁴ Having a planning staff structured along the lines of a joint staff would eliminate this need to reorganize the staff and adapt the planning process to the joint model. This would assist the planning staff in focusing on the deployment of forces and initial operations and increase the expeditionary nature of our forces. Additionally, it would allow the staffs to train as they would fight, leading to greater efficiency during planning.

Having examined Operation RESTORE HOPE, and identified the issues I MEF faced, it is logical to conclude that an Army corps or division staff, transitioning to a JTF and requiring a greater degree of organizational change, would experience the same issues, but with greater effect. General Byrnes, Army Training and Doctrine Command commander, remarked that “our recent operations in (Operations) Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom tell us you can’t put the team together on the ground. It has to be formed ahead of time. We learned that lesson and we relearned that lesson.”⁹⁵ It would make sense to address or eliminate these issues before, rather than during a situation similar to the one faced by I MEF, when time is short and the risk potentially greater. Addressing these issues now would eliminate several transitions that stand as impediments to building operational momentum. The place to begin addressing these issues is in Army doctrine.

Joint doctrine is ambiguous, failing to clearly articulate responsibilities for planning. There are discrepancies that exist between the organizational charts and the text of the doctrine. These discrepancies lead to confusion when a unit transitions from a service organization to a joint one. This ambiguity may be intentional. In his monograph, Lieutenant Colonel (LTC)

⁹⁴ General (GEN) Peter Schoomaker, “The Army: A Critical Member of the Joint Team Serving the Nation at War”, Army Magazine Green Book, October 2003 Internet accessed at <http://www.ausa.org/www/greenbook.nsf/0/b7cf1f1555f174fd85256db0005623ff?OpenDocument&Click=> on 15 April 2004.

⁹⁵ United States Army, Training and Doctrine Command News Service “Units of Action/Units of Employment”, Internet Accessed at http://www.tradoc.army.mil/pao/Web_specials/Leadership_of_Futures/UAUE.htm on 15 April 2004.

Christopher Gehler contends that this provides the JTF commander with options as he organizes his staff.⁹⁶ While this may be true, the doctrine still fails to show “what right looks like” and thus provides little support to a staff attempting to recommend an organizational structure to the commander.

Because Army Doctrine organizes according to broad fields of interest, it forces units to change their organizational structure and associated planning processes before assuming the duties of a JTF and thus overcomplicates the transition. Rather than simply integrating members of the other services into the staff, it must first reorganize and adjust to a different planning model. The Army doctrine lacks a model that explains the responsibilities of the planning staff and the processes involved during the transition of orders from planning to execution. This may make planners on corps and division staffs less effective during the transition to a JTF.

Of the doctrine examined for this monograph, the Marine Corps doctrine was the most complete with respect to transitioning to a JTF. It requires minimal organizational changes and having a planning process similar to that of the joint model, facilitates a smoother transition. Still, some of terms used to assign responsibilities require clarification due to their interchangeable nature and lack of doctrinal definitions.

Ultimately, the joint doctrine and that of the Army and Marine Corps lack synchronicity. They lack a common process for transitioning orders from planning to execution. Each Service established different standards for assigning responsibility for planning within that process. Additionally, the doctrinal terms developed by the Services lack commonality. Considering that the Army and Marine Corps will both have to operate in a joint environment, linked by different

⁹⁶ LTC Christopher Gehler, *Organization for Planning: The Corps-to-JTF Contingency Operation Scenario, Monograph* (Leavenworth: School of Advanced Military Studies, US Army Command and General Staff College, 2000), 41.

command relationships and in conjunction with other joint forces, they should be synchronized with respect to JTF doctrine.

Recommendations

First, the military must address the issues that exist within the doctrine with respect to transitioning from a service organization to a joint organization. As long as the joint doctrine is ambiguous, the services will experience confusion in attempting to adapt it. Using one standard, the joint doctrine must clearly define the responsibilities for planning. Once it does so, the services will have to adjust their doctrine to compliment or adapt to it.

We must continue to refine the joint doctrine with respect to responsibilities for planning and execution of the planning process. We must eliminate the redundancies within the doctrine, which cause several organizations to have responsibility for the same portion of planning. The doctrine must clearly define, within the text, organizational charts, and the models provided, who is responsible for plans and who is responsible for future operations and how to assign those responsibilities, using one standard.

Both the joint and Service doctrine must adopt and incorporate it into their doctrine Milan Vego's definition of operational momentum. As I noted in Chapter One, Dr. Vego defines operational momentum as the "overall progress of a campaign or major operation over time; it is the product of the speed of advance and mass; the higher the speed and the larger the forces, the higher the momentum of a campaign as a whole."⁹⁷ In the beginning stages of a deployment, this equates to the rapid closure (speed) of forces (mass) into an area of operations with the necessary capabilities to overwhelm an adversary. In today's environment, mass equals not only the number of personnel, but also the capabilities and combined effects of a force and its weapons

⁹⁷ Milan N. Vego, *OPERATIONAL WARFARE*, (Newport, The United States Naval War College, 2000), 643.

systems. By focusing greater attention on this concept in the joint and Service doctrine, it would highlight the importance of reducing or eliminating transitions.

The Army should consider adopting the concept of the OPG/OPT as part of its doctrine. This would facilitate the training of staffs to plan using this organization and familiarize them with the process. This would benefit not only an Army staff when it transitions to a JTF, but will also benefit other JTFs formed by other services and augmented by Army personnel. They would require less training in transitioning to the joint planning system.

As the Army moves forward in its effort to adapt to a changing operational environment, it must address the organizational structure of the staffs most likely to plan for and execute operations as a JTF. The organization likely to replace the corps and division structure is the Unit of Employment (UE), however, it is still under development. “Units of Employment (UE), typically division- and corps-like elements, are highly tailorable, higher level echelons that integrate and synchronize Army forces for full spectrum operations at the higher tactical and operational levels of war/conflict.”⁹⁸ However, if the Army maintains the current staff structure while developing these organizations, it will fail to address the issues associated with transitioning from an Army staff to a joint staff. The UE may then have problems building momentum in the anticipated full spectrum operational environment.

Additionally, if a UE deploys in support of operations as an Army Force (ARFOR), it will likely operate as part of, or for, a joint organization. UEs will “be organized, designed, and equipped to fulfill command and control (C2) functions as the Army Forces (ARFOR) Component, Joint Force Land Component Command (JFLCC), or the Joint Task Force (JTF).”⁹⁹

⁹⁸ “Unit of Employment (UE)” internet accessed at <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/army/ue.htm> on 15 April 2004

⁹⁹ United States Army, Training and Doctrine Command Pamphlet 525-3-92, *Objective Force Unit of Employment Concept Final Draft*, (Fort Monroe, VA, 2003), 6.

Therefore, no matter what C2 function a UE is required to fulfill, it will either become, or operate as part of, a joint organization. Having common organizational structures would facilitate collaborative planning through a common understanding of the planning process.

There are several areas, associated with transitioning to a JTF which require further study. The process of transitioning orders from the J-5 Plans through the J-35 Future Operations, to the J-3 Current Operations merits additional study. The following questions arise when examining the process: At what point in an operation do staffs transition orders from one planning section to the next? If the J-5 Plans publishes an OPLAN, does it pass through the J-35 for refinement, or go directly to the J-3 Current Operations for execution? For every operation that is planned by the J-5 Plans, there may be multiple branches. What mechanism will prevent the J-35 Future Operations from being over loaded with branch plans to develop? Answering these questions will further refine the planning process and speed the transition from planning to execution.

As the Army attempts to develop a more expeditionary force, capable of responding to incidents anywhere in the world, it must master the transitions it will undergo as it responds. Mastering these transitions will enable the JTF to gain and maintain operational momentum and ensure the success of its operations. The planning organizations within the staff are the key to setting the conditions for successful transitions. By addressing these issues now, the Army will ensure that the right planning organization exists within the UE the first time it responds to a crisis as a JTF.

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