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Major Jeffrey Steven Settle

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Approved by:

__________________________________ Monograph Director
Kevin C.M. Benson, COL, AR

__________________________________ Deputy Director, School of Advanced Military Studies
Robert H. Berlin, Ph.D.

__________________________________ Director, Graduate Degree Programs
Robert F. Baumann, Ph.D.
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In a time where the role of heavy mechanized units seems to play a secondary part to the rapid deployability and lightning-quick raids conducted by light forces, understanding how "shock battle" can still be waged at the operational and tactical level breathes new life into the question of how heavy forces contribute in a "Fourth Generation" conflict. The armor community has long wrestled with this question of how to best employ armored units in an irregular-type of fight and the debate has ranged from the weight of armored vehicles to the strategic and operational mobility of these systems to how much survivability is needed when engaging a threat. Agility, versatility and survivability have engaged in a three-way tug-of-war that has often confused the issue of when and where to employ heavy forces. This study examines the idea of "Generations of Warfare," the implications of shock battle within the idea of a "Western Way of War," and the differences between deterrence and coercion, to determine how armored forces are appropriate as a means to achieve coercive effects against non-state actors in Fourth Generation Warfare. Additionally, this study asserts that deterrence has limited applicability when the nation-state is taken out of the equation and must be used in conjunction with coercive effects to achieve the desired ends against non-state and transnational actors. To examine this assertion, the study presents the ends, ways, and means of armored employment by the Israeli Defense Forces in OPERATION DEFENSIVE SHIELD in 2002, specifically in the Jenin Refugee Camp, as a case study for conventional operations against a Fourth Generation opponent to achieve coercive effects. This study concludes that tanks and heavy infantry fighting vehicles do have relevance in Fourth Generation warfare, provided commanders use them wisely and with synchronized effects. Additionally, heavy forces, when employed in a complex urban situation, must be committed with detailed and effects-based planning, by immediately making clear the limitations and constraints of the use of such force. It is certain that as an instrument of the state, armored forces must rely on their inherently coercive effects against non-state or transnational actors. Armor is a powerful physical symbol of placing an adversary at risk, while proper employment can deny safe haven and access to safe havens. While not all together an efficient means for decapitation strikes against enemy leadership, armored forces have the means for punishment strikes. This package of "goods delivered" by armor creates the "shock battle" needed for coercive effects.
Abstract


In a time where the role of heavy mechanized units seems to play a secondary part to the rapid deployability and lightning-quick raids conducted by light forces, understanding how “shock battle” can still be waged at the operational and tactical level breathes new life into the question of how heavy forces contribute in a “Fourth Generation” conflict. The armor community has long wrestled with this question of how to best employ armored units in an irregular-type of fight and the debate has ranged from the weight of armored vehicles to the strategic and operational mobility of these systems to how much survivability is needed when engaging a threat. Agility, versatility and survivability have engaged in a three-way tug-of-war that has often confused the issue of when and where to employ heavy forces.

This study examines the idea of “Generations of Warfare,” the implications of shock battle within the idea of a “Western Way of War,” and the differences between deterrence and coercion, to determine how armored forces are appropriate as a means to achieve coercive effects against non-state actors in Fourth Generation Warfare. Additionally, this study asserts that deterrence has limited applicability when the nation-state is taken out of the equation and must be used in conjunction with coercive effects to achieve the desired ends against non-state and transnational actors. To examine this assertion, the study presents the ends, ways, and means of armored employment by the Israeli Defense Forces in OPERATION DEFENSIVE SHIELD in 2002, specifically in the Jenin Refugee Camp, as a case study for conventional operations against a Fourth Generation opponent to achieve coercive effects. This study concludes that tanks and heavy infantry fighting vehicles do have relevance in Fourth Generation warfare, provided commanders use them wisely and with synchronized effects. Additionally, heavy forces, when employed in a complex urban situation, must be committed with detailed and effects-based planning, by immediately making clear the limitations and constraints of the use of such force.

It is certain that as an instrument of the state, armored forces must rely on their inherently coercive effects against non-state or transnational actors. Armor is a powerful physical symbol of placing an adversary at risk, while proper employment can deny safe haven and access to safe havens. While not all together an efficient means for decapitation strikes against enemy leadership, armored forces have the means for punishment strikes. This package of “goods delivered” by armor creates the “shock battle” needed for coercive effects.
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CHAPTER ONE

Three millions of People, armed in the holy cause of liberty, and in such a country as that which we possess are invincible by any force which our enemy can send against us. Beside, Sir, we shall not fight our battles alone. There is a just God who presides over the destinies of Nations, and who will raise up friends to fight our battles for us. The battle, Sir, is not to the strong alone; it is to the vigilant, the active, the brave. Besides, Sir, we have no election. If we were base enough to desire it, it is now too late to retire from the contest. There is no retreat but in submission and slavery! ... The war is inevitable; and let it come! I repeat, Sir, let it come!  

Patrick Henry

After all that has just passed -- all the lives taken, and all the possibilities and hopes that died with them -- it is natural to wonder if America's future is one of fear. Some speak of an age of terror. I know there are struggles ahead, and dangers to face. But this country will define our times, not be defined by them.  

President George W. Bush

Introduction

The terror that gripped the United States on September 11th, 2001 sought to undo the idea that America could define the times and not be defined by them. The Prussian military theorist and analyst, Carl Von Clausewitz, recognized the need for definition of the conflict when he wrote, “The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgment that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish…the kind of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature.” President Bush asserted that the United States was at war and gave the American public a nebulous specter as an enemy. After the attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon on that dark September day, many thinkers, theorists and theologians stepped forward to provide clarity and define the enemy and the “kind of war on which (we were) embarking” to any interested armchair politician or strategist. Among these pundits one theme resonated loud and clear: this was a “different” kind of war.

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1 Patrick Henry, “The War Inevitable, March, 1775” as printed in One Hundred and One Famous Poems (Chicago: Contemporary Books Inc., 1958), 177.
In October, 1989, twelve years before the attacks of September 11th, William S. Lind sought to give definition to the varied character of warfare and did so in the manner of co-writing an article for the *Marine Corps Gazette* titled “The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation.” This article, written as the sun set on the Cold War order, defined where the world had been in terms of warfare and where it was going. It did not present itself as a new theory of war but rather it highlighted new observations as to the nature of warfare. The writers of the article recognized that there were three distinct “generations” of warfare that had developed over the centuries and they postulated that it “was about time for a fourth generation to appear.” The nature of this fourth form of warfare was vague and non-descript, however, the writers generally viewed the fourth generation as being transnational and non-linear with the overall objective to blur the distinction between war and peace to the vanishing point. The article has proven itself highly prescient of the enemy that faces the United States at the dawn of the 21st century. The factors outlined in the Lind article lay out the chessboard on which fourth generational conflicts are played and will be discussed in some detail in this study.

**Statement of the Problem**

The environment in which fourth generation war is waged and the enemy that fights it, as posited by Lind and his fellow writers, seem incongruous and without a quantifiable or observable center of gravity or decisive point. The networks and systems concocted by those who wish to fight a fourth-generation war appear to evade the way that highly structured and ordered nations such as the United States wage their wars. Writer Victor Davis Hanson argues that there is a distinct “Western way of war” and implies that American forces are not necessarily

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5 Ibid.
at a disadvantage in this new generation of warfare. Western forces rely heavily on a unique trait of warfare known as “shock battle,” and in this trait western preeminence is found. In a time where the role of heavy mechanized units seems to play a secondary part to the rapid deployability and lightning-quick raids conducted by light forces, understanding how “shock battle” can still be waged at the operational and tactical level breathes new life into the question of how heavy forces contribute in this “new” generation of warfare. The armor community has long wrestled with this question of how to best employ armored units in an irregular-type of fight and the debate has ranged from the weight of armored vehicles to the strategic and operational mobility of these systems to how much survivability is needed when engaging a threat. Agility, versatility and survivability have engaged in a three-way tug-of-war that has often confused the issue of when and where to employ heavy forces.

What is certain is that we now live in an age of warfare where decisive battle is not as cogent as it was in Napoleon’s day and one must look at how best to employ the forces at hand to defeat an enemy that fights without the benefit -- or hindrance -- of technological superiority. At first glance a foe that fights “asymmetrically” is at a marked disadvantage since he could be crushed under the weight of a technologically superior force, but when viewed through the lens of complex organization, unorthodox operations, and irregular tactics, symmetry is thereby achieved. To defeat an enemy in this generation of warfare all manner and means of a state must be employed to manipulate or control the complex environment in which a fourth-generation enemy fights. Application of pressure on various points of a complex system creates tension and

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7 The debate on these issues reached fever pitch at the time of Task Force Hawk in OPERATION ALLIED FORCE during the Kosovo War. The perceived inability of the U.S. Army to transport 24 Apache attack helicopters along with a ground security force of one Mechanized Infantry Battalion, a Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) Battery, an M1A1 Tank Company, and a heavy brigade headquarters to Tirana, Albania in a timely fashion, was seen by many people in the Pentagon, the media, and the public, as the Army being too heavy to fight. Steps were then taken by the Army Chief of Staff, Gen. Erik Shinseki to transform the army into a more deployable force capable of responding to any threat. At the Association of the United States Army Symposium 1999 when he said, "We must transform our force to meet these challenges, and we must do it faster…If you don't like change, you're going to like irrelevance even less." Shinseki’s comments were meant to inspire changing the way the Army looked at its future missions. "The Cold War was built around weight (while the) objective force will be built around speed."
compression at other points in the system, just as weights on a bridge stress the truss throughout. This bridge metaphor may also apply to armored forces in a fourth generation conflict and this work’s thesis argues that armored forces are appropriate as a means to achieve coercive effects against non-state actors in Fourth Generation Warfare.

**Organization of the Study**

This monograph essentially explores the effects two colliding systems of warfare have on one another by dissecting the issue into three parts. The first section of the study clarifies definitions and analyzes a current theory that is relevant to U.S. Army employment of heavy forces. Attention will be made to the ideas of Fourth Generation Warfare and the underlying principles of shock battle and coercion theory. Chapter two provides an understanding of the current nature of warfare and how doctrine and theory have traditionally reflected the ideas of “generations of warfare” as outlined by Lind. Hanson’s claim that there is a “western way of war” provides an outline that leads towards coercion theory as evaluation criteria to determine the appropriateness of heavy armored forces in fighting a fourth-generation operational campaign.

The second section of the monograph outlines a brief historical case study of the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) operations to quell unrest stirred by the second, and most recent, Intifada. The case study will deal primarily with the decision to use heavily armored forces in the Jenin Refugee camp and the successes, failures, and repercussions of that military action. The third chapter presents the case study of the IDF’s use of heavy armor in response to the Intifada by Palestinians with specific emphasis on the IDF’s action in the Jenin refugee camp and armor’s effectiveness compared to other battlefield operating systems. The objective of the first two sections is to codify the ideas of fourth generation warfare, shock battle, and the “Coercion Hybrid” theory, to explain how heavy armor forces play an inherently coercive role in a fourth generational conflict as illustrated by the IDF actions in the Jenin Refugee Camp.
The third section of this study, consisting of the last chapter, focuses on the current thoughts of employment for heavy armor in the U.S. Army and evaluates the application of this force juxtaposed with the weaknesses of a fourth-generation warfare opponent. Understanding how the ends, ways, and means inherent in a heavy force available to a commander prove critical to this section. Chapter four determines whether current doctrine provides a sufficient ways and means for armored forces to meet the ends necessary in a fourth generation-type conflict and evaluates the current doctrinal employment of armored forces to draws conclusions on the effectiveness of Army integration of heavy forces into a fourth generation warfare fight.

This work provides a glimpse of the operational environment at the beginning of the 21st century as outlined by the ideas of Fourth Generation warfare. In this new environment, old ideas such as shock effect maintain their relevance. However, application of such force will create second and third order effects that are, at times, difficult to predict – such is the environment of the Fourth Generation.
CHAPTER TWO

*Weapons of shock are the crushers and pincers which are held in the hands of the assailant. Shock weapons are the military instruments par excellence...They win battles.*

H. Turney-High

*A struggle of two immaterial principles could only end when the supporters of one had no more means of resistance. An opinion can be argued with: a conviction is best shot.*

T.E. Lawrence

The Generations of Warfare

At the heart of generations of conflict lie order and disorder, tactics and grand strategy. In each of the generations of warfare, order takes advantage of the weaknesses of disorder; conversely, disorder takes advantage of the weaknesses of order. Based upon the strategic aims of the conflicting parties grand strategy and tactics evolve to fit the needs of the entities that wage the war. History gives us a litany of battles and wars where tactics and grand strategy have evolved or radically transformed under the will of the commanders that fought them. Even in the earliest instances of primitive warfare, mankind has sought “organization with clear-cut command functions (to bring) success in war just as it does in economics, politics, or any other field of social endeavor.”

The pinnacle of this basic organization from primitive war manifested itself in the First Generation of Warfare that, as Lind would argue, was perfected by Napoleon.

The First Generation of Warfare maximized the battlefield use of firepower as derived from the smoothbore musket and linear and columnar tactics. Artillery played a direct fire role

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and the will and élan of the soldiers and commanders carried the day. In this generation and the
next technology drove the evolution. Second Generation Warfare exploited technology,
specifically artillery and the rifled musket, and emboldened commanders and their soldiers to
base their tactics on fire and movement. The battle was still, in essence, linear, however, the
advances in technology brought about battlefield dispersion to a point beyond the line of sight of
the commander. Tactics in the First World War provide a prime example of this generation of
war. The width and breadth of operations became immense, yet a “front line” remained in tact in
any given operational theater. Third Generation warfare sought to span the gulf between the two
generations of technology driven warfare by marrying ideas with technology and thus introduced
the theories of operational art and maneuver warfare. In this generation of warfare, broad
maneuver and deep operations drive tactical and operational stratagems.

The definitions of the first three generations of warfare show that the generations are not
so much “time” driven, as they are “mind” driven. The generations may evolve over time, but
their tenets build on one another and maintain relevance regardless of the age. Exposed to this
light, the Fourth Generation of warfare appears.

Bill Lind explains how Fourth Generation warfare assumes three distinct characteristics:

- The loss of the state’s monopoly on war and on the first loyalty of its citizens,
and the rise of non-state entities that command a people’s primary loyalty and
that wage war. These entities may be gangs, religions, business enterprises,
ideologies – the varieties are almost limitless;
- A return to the world of cultures, not merely states in conflict; and
- The manifestation of both developments – the decline of the state and the rise of
alternate, often cultural primary loyalties – not “over there,” but also here, in
America itself.

From these characteristics, we can refine the definition to reflect how the ideas of “order”
are in the eyes of the beholder. Cultural and ideological motivations reign supreme in this
generation of conflict. As the United States moves toward a foreign policy that affects nearly

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12 The definitions of each generation of warfare are expounded on with greater detail in the article, “The
Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation.” (Marine Corps Gazette, October 1989)
every corner of the globe, it will inevitably come in conflict with an opponent that seeks to leverage his immature military might with their overwhelmingly mighty culture or ideology against any American influence in “his” area in order to achieve his goals. The United States has already come into contact with these forces and has seen how Fourth Generation opponents tend to disperse their small tactical forces yet synchronize effects by de-synchronizing effort under a strong central leadership with empowered subordinates operating under the protection of transnational ambiguity. The goal of such forces is to employ tactical elements that can use a series of ordered events to create tactical and strategic disorder against their enemies.

This final generation of warfare is, in many ways, timeless. Facets of this warfare appear in every conflict of every age: The Maccabean revolt against the Greeks; The Jewish revolt against the Romans; The Protestant Reformation’s attempt to create disorder and destroy the Catholic order during the Thirty Years War; The Irish Republican Army’s attempts for an independent Northern Ireland; Al Q’aeda’s dream of a restored caliphate and release from the yoke of Western oppression. The list can go on.

**Weakness of the Fourth Generation**

In spite of the long history of this type of warfare, it has had its share of success and failure. The previous paragraph highlights some well-known “fourth generation” conflicts, and in most instances, the victors are not so obvious. However, this is far from a “clash of civilizations.” The system that has been created by Fourth Generation opponents relies on uncertainty, disorder created by effects, and greater complexity. In this last area lies the most visible weakness: “Greater complexity means more systemic seams, offering greater opportunities to those seeking to intrude and do harm.”\(^{14}\)

Disruption and an imposition of disorder on the Fourth Generation opponent’s system of operations comprise the chief weakness. How, then, can one attack and disrupt the system while

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\(^{14}\) Montgomery C. Meigs, “Unorthodox Thoughts about Asymmetric Warfare.”
protecting his own means of conducting war? At the strategic level, defeat of a Fourth Generation threat is found in the “order” and continued legitimacy of the state. This does not mean that the best means of defeating this threat is in an increase of the state’s raw power. “On the contrary, giving the state extra-constitutional powers will exacerbate the crisis of legitimacy.”15 The implications are obvious; an answer to the Fourth Generation threat is ambiguous, at best, at the geopolitical level. However, clear guidance and direction by the state, with objectives that strike at all of the threat’s systems, are mandatory in committing military forces to the correct operational theater. Recognizing the nature of the conflict allows appropriate use of forces in the appropriate areas. Too much force in the wrong area can either force a Fourth Generation foe to move their operations to another theater or merge assets and fight. Either these two ships will pass in the night or they will meet for an opportunity to attack each other’s system of warfare.

From this it follows that “not all future conflicts will be fought primarily using fourth generation tactics… It will be essential for national leaders to make an accurate analysis of the war they are about to enter. The complex mix of generations of war with their overlapping political, economic, social, military, and mass media arenas makes determining the type of war we are entering more critical than ever.”16

The United States must prepare for any contingency while all the time understanding that a Fourth Generation foe may arise while it fights a Second or Third Generation enemy. The tactics used by a “traditional” opponent can be met with mastery of traditional concepts of operational art. Enemies that leverages culture, inferior technology, their opponent’s technology, and the media to attack the seams of our own complex systems, demands that the western style of operational art be refined to meet the challenge. It takes a system to beat a system. A series of

military strikes with no common objective and serving no purpose other than to eradicate the enemy is no system at all; it is merely swatting flies.

**Constancy of Conflict**

As written earlier, the ideas of generations of conflict do not present a new theory of war, but rather seek to clarify a timeless truth. The generations are merely permutations of conflict that may evolve over the course of a campaign or operation. The Global War on Terrorism fought by the United States and its allies is inherently Fourth Generation because of the complexity of the operations and the actors that are involved. The most important factor is that the state has lost its edge in waging war\(^\text{17}\). This is not to say that the state has lost its dominance in winning battles or campaigns, or even the war itself, but rather on the *monopoly* of waging war and on the loyalty of its people.

The United States has indeed organized a powerful system to do battle, spanning from military hardware and personnel to an intricate network of communications and robust economy. The U.S. ability to wage complex warfare lies primarily in the creativity of its people, legitimacy of its lawmaking body and stability of its government. Likewise, non-traditional actors have organized into complex and adaptive systems and organizations that seek to damage or destroy their opponents’ capability to wage war across the strategic spectrum. The complexity of their organization is reinforced by the decentralization and global reach of their network. Retired Maj. Gen. Michael Hall explains that this new opponent does not rely on subjugation to a structured nation state but seeks to operate outside of the confines of that nation state using whatever means and organizations available to supply and control war. As seen in Figure 1, Hall points out that there are six major elements of this new adversary: The nation state; Criminal organizations; Nihilists; Multinational corporations; Terrorists; and Drug cartels.\(^\text{18}\) Each of these elements


\(^{18}\) Concept based on classroom slides presented by Retired Maj. Gen. Michael Hall on January 8, 2004
interacts with one another but is not necessarily interdependent. Some elements grow and overpower another or may, perhaps, take over the system as a whole and develop like-models that are subordinate to it. Figure 1 graphically depicts this system and must be viewed as fluid to fully understand a Fourth Generation opponent.

![A Fourth Generation Opponent Model](image)

**Figure 1: A Fourth Generation Opponent Model**

An internationally recognized nation-state is similarly complex and adaptive yet does not rely on agents that lie beyond the realm of international law to garner power. The nation-state tends to operate in a system that draws power from legal means such as the will of its people, legitimacy of its government, strength of its economy, and abundance of its resources, natural or refined. The Fourth Generation Opponent’s system differs from that of the nation-state in most respects, mainly because of the perceived disorder and complexity of its environment with no

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19 This picture is based on an original slide presented by Maj. Gen. Michael Hall (ret.) during a classroom discussion on 08 Jan. 2004.
obvious focus other than to sow discord and chaos and erode the stability of the nation-state. The two systems discussed are in natural competition with one another because of one’s desire for upsetting the status quo and the other for enforcing it.

As with any struggle, however, the means and methods of fighting are relevant only to the point of how one can sustain the conflict and force it to a decision. True success in warfare lies primarily in the social organizations involved and not with technology.\textsuperscript{20} The result becomes evident when two organizations become embroiled in conflict in the guise of no specific generation of warfare. When looking closely at the conflict one sees a crucible of chaos that shows very little signs of order. In the Fourth Generation this chaos becomes magnified because the “players” on the battlefield become more intertwined and dispersed based on the concepts of globalization and exacerbated by a media with worldwide influence. In the case of globalization, we find a new combination of both “clashes of civilization and the homogenization of civilizations” that underscores the impact of Fourth Generation warfare on organized nation-states.\textsuperscript{21}

As two complex and adaptive organizations compete, they use their resources and technology against one another, employing strategy and tactics to apply force to achieve the desired effects and therefore gain victory. From this it follows that at the point of conflict the human dimension is revealed in the form of three constants: physical, moral and intellectual. Based upon this inference, the whole of the human experience in war revolves around these three factors: physical coercion or destruction; the will of the people involved and their psychology in

\textsuperscript{20} Harry Holbert Turney-High, \textit{Primitive War; Its Practice and Concepts}, 257
\textsuperscript{21} Thomas L. Friedman, \textit{The Lexus and the Olive Tree}, (New York: Random House, 2000), xxi. The concept of globalization has one “overarching feature – integration. The world has become an increasingly interwoven place, and today, whether you are a company or a country, your threats and opportunities increasingly derive from who are connected to.” (pg. 8) Friedman’s concept of interconnectivity may be incorporated with M. Mitchell Waldrop’s discussion of complexity in his book by the same name. Between order and chaos lies complexity and it is in this environment that the fourth generation hides. Waldrop asserts that the edge of chaos is where the “components of a system never quite lock into place, and yet never quite dissolve into turbulence.” (\textit{Complexity}, p. 12)
the moral realm; and the intellectual capacity of the warring parties to leverage technology and information. (See Figure 2)

Figure 2: Constancy of Conflict

From this point it becomes interesting to note that where there is constancy, there is order and disorder – the “edge of chaos.” This, then, becomes both a point of departure and a focus of energy in a Fourth Generation Conflict. An attack at what is base in the conflict would therefore have ramifications throughout the entire system. When handling the question of how to deal with a Fourth Generation fight, one must ask how to disrupt, coerce, or destroy an enemy in the physical, moral, or intellectual domain. This may seem an insurmountable feat for a nation-state, such as the United States or Israel, which desires the status quo and seeks to exercise its influence by imposition of order and rule of law.

However, the United States can use its military might in ways that support the goal of disruption of the threat’s system of warfare. The ability to bring massed effects to the battlefield

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has been a way of warfare for the western world for millennia. Such overwhelming force still has utility in a Fourth Generation conflict, even under the extremely critical eye of the world media as reporting to the global audience. The western idea of “shock battle” has its place in defeating a complex system provided correct employment of assets. When analyzing the constancy of conflict and understanding that physical action, moral force and intellectual dominance are essential factors in war, the targets then begin to present themselves. Application of “shock battle” in its purest form can have good effects in all three of these constants.

**Shock Battle**

At its origins, shock battle sought victory through the destruction of enemy forces on the field of battle. The type of battle that drove the greatest military theorists of the modern age to postulate on such ideas as center of gravity and decisive point were adopted as part of Greek culture at the dawn of Western civilization. Author Victor Davis Hanson simplifies the Greek manner of fighting to its most basic form that had “always offered an effective means of concentrating warfare, and thereby killing and wounding combatants most efficiently, given the constraints of time and space.”

The purpose of clashing with an enemy using this concentrated means of warfare allowed the Greeks to settle their business decisively.

This theme of decisive battle has not been lost through the ages. Shimon Naveh studied the phenomenon extensively once he concluded that theories on operational shock revolve around ideas of the “battle of destruction (Vernichtungsschlacht).” Although it might appear barbaric and lost in a modern “civilized” age, shock effect remains a powerful tool in the warrior’s kit bag. It becomes even more important in the realm of the disorder sown on the Fourth Generation battlefield.

24 Hanson, *The Western Way of War*. (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1989), 225
Shock battle affects an opponent both physically and mentally – two fundamental aspects of the constancy of conflict. Employment of weapon systems and overwhelming force directly targets an opponent’s physical structure and mental state of being. However, it cannot be applied indiscriminately. Even for the ancient Greeks, the key was to sow disorder, both psychologically and physically. Quite often the Greeks only had to march on an enemy, and in the seconds before their advance, their enemy would experience a “sudden disintegration of unity … when men suddenly realized that they were outnumbered, exposed on the flank, or poorly deployed.” This disorder could not be sown if forces were employed haphazardly. Timing was always the key. Sun Tzu even commented, “When the strike of a hawk breaks the body of its prey, it is because of timing.”

Based on the above observations, shock battle, therefore, can be viewed as having three components: physical destructive power; mental terror; and synchronized effects or synergy. Here again we see order on the edge of chaos. This was exemplified by the following description of the clashes between the Greeks and the Persians at the time of the battle of Marathon:

Like so much of their art and literature, the Greek manner of battle was a paradox of the highest order, a deliberate attempt to harness, to modulate, and hence amplify, if not sanctify the wild human desire for violence through the stark order and discipline of the phalanx. To the Persians, who reversed these concepts – their disordered, mob-like, frightening hordes had no fondness for methodical killing – the approach of a Greek column was especially unsettling. At Marathon they thought a “destructive madness” had infected the Greek ranks as they saw them approach on the run in their heavy armor. Surely, as those outnumbered Greek hoplites crashed into their lines, the Persians must have at last understood that these men worshipped not only the god Apollo but the wild, irrational Dionysus as well.

The actual collision of men in battle may destroy an enemy, however the intent and desire to deliver fatal bows and steadfastly endure without any response or retreat, is the true

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26 Hanson, *The Western Way of War*, 161
28 Hanson, *The Western Way of War*, 16
nature of this type of battle and will plant the fear that sows disorder. The divisive strikes and simultaneity of shock battle allow a military force to mass critical force beyond an opposing system’s center of mass. In essence, shock effect can cause a physical or mental turning maneuver.

**Mental Turning Maneuvers and Relevance**

The Russians have a term for turning maneuvers that create disruption in war-fighting systems – *udar*. Mental *udar* attacks the very psyche of the people in battle and therefore directly assaults the Constants of Conflict. One must note, however, that turning maneuvers are only effective if pressure remains steady at the point of attack causing an opponent to move forces. Simultaneity and parallel attacks across the length and breadth of an enemy’s formations are sound tactics, but pressure makes things move. Quick strikes and raids when used in isolation may cause reaction but cannot be relied upon as an operational maneuver that redirects enemy force. In the Fourth Generation of warfare, pressure on the Constants of Conflict should result in the *udar* necessary to keep an opponent off balance. As western nations fight in the Fourth Generation arena, pressure can be applied through overwhelming military might, a dominating economy, and robust intelligence. All three of these areas attack what is base in war: the physical, the moral and the intellectual.

Here we see that shock battle displays its relevance once again as the legacy of classical Greek battle, not necessarily in replicated form, but rather in the *spirit* of Hellenic warfare. The objective of shock battle, in this spirit, is to use overwhelming force to “induce mental and

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29 Ibid, 9
30 Naveh, 17-18. This concept outlines the theoretical debate on Operational Shock. The Russians, at the close of the First World War began to realize that military systems could not be physically destroyed in certain instances, and Russian theoreticians began to look at alternative approaches to defeating systems effectively. This systems analysis focused on the strengths and weaknesses of a system and leads to the ideas that “operational maneuver serves as the dominant executing element.” The turning maneuver remains a valid concept, now both physically and mentally.
31 Ibid, 11.
32 Hanson, *The Western Way of War*, 225. Emphasis added.
physical paralysis” of our opponents that injects a false orientation or mental turning maneuver that prevents “adversaries from adapting to their ever-changing surroundings and cripple(s) their ability to react” to our actions.\(^\text{33}\) Head to head, classical, Greek battle, has, therefore, come of age. In the 21\(^{st}\) century, multi-dimensional effects have replaced the phalanx as the sole inducer of fear in an opponent. This gives credence to the complexity of the systems that are facing each other in the modern environment. However, face-to-face fighting with terrifying kinetic implements of war remains part of this modern phalanx of shock troops. The correct application of armored soldiers and equipment can create the pressure and shock necessary to “isolate opponents physically, mentally and morally from their external environment by destroying their view of the world, or their orientation.”\(^\text{34}\)

**Coercion and Criteria**

Here we begin to see the criteria that are essential to understanding our ends of how armored or “shock” forces may achieve coercive effects against non-state actors in Fourth Generation conflict. To understand coercive effects, one must first have a basic understanding of deterrence and how it differs from coercion. In their essence, deterrence seeks to prevent an action and coercion seeks to change an enemy’s actions.\(^\text{35}\) Western armies have historically used armored forces for freedom of maneuver and destruction. Even in a peacekeeping role, armored forces have been used as a visible sign of power and destructive capability in order for other units

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\(^{34}\) Ibid. Emphasis by author. Lieut. Col. Shanahan’s discussions of shock based operations include a recommended definition to be added into joint doctrine glossaries. His definition of **Shock-based Operations**: A holistic way of attacking an adversary’s centers of gravity, nodes, and critical vulnerabilities, designed to collapse the adversaries system into mental and physical paralysis. **Shock-based operations** isolate opponents physically, mentally, and morally from their external environment by destroying their view of the world, or their orientation. The intent is to push the enemy beyond his ability to endure, respond, or adapt to a rapidly changing tactical, operational, or strategic environment. **Shock-based operations** rely upon all instruments of national power to link NCA objectives and military strategy. The goal of military commanders at all levels of war will be to assure the U.S. and coalition forces remain inside the opponent’s decision cycle. As such, shock-based operations require both mental and physical agility throughout the battlespace.

and even the local populace to enjoy freedom of maneuver. The physical presence of heavily armored forces has long provided a deterrent effect. Understanding the constants of conflict shows one why this deterrent effect is inherent in armored forces. The mammoth display of firepower, hardened rolled steel, and near-unstoppable momentum of armored forces combine to strike fear in opponents who are not similarly armed. Simply put, the physical and moral essence of an adversary is threatened by armored forces due to their mere presence on the battlefield. However, as this monograph will show, timing and placement of armored forces in Fourth Generation Warfare have become paramount when dictating their use. Traditionally, deterrence has been associated with nation-state deployment of nuclear weapons; however, the implications have a greater reach. Two important aspects form the core of Deterrence; punishment and denial. Both of these aspects are required for effective conventional deterrence. According to FM 3-0, deterrence for the Army is understood as the ability to impose upon the “minds of potential adversaries that their actions will have unacceptable consequences.” Here we clearly see the punishment side of the deterrence coin and operations of denial are implied within this definition. However, deterrence falls short of determining what the Army must accomplish in Fourth Generation warfare. Major John Reynolds, in his 2003 monograph written at the U.S. Army’s School of Advanced Military Studies, asserts “that neither active, passive, nor retributive actions by themselves are effective in deterring asymmetrical threats; it is only when these three actions are integrated together into a single campaign plan where one can hope to deter asymmetrical threats and regain the deterrence equilibrium.” While using the backdrop of the limited irregular combat in the United States’ Civil War and the U.S. Army’s experience in Bosnia, Reynolds failed to fully analyze the transnational aspects of conflict and focused on a narrow

view of asymmetrical warfare – asymmetric means employed to preserve an existing or dying form of legitimate government. Trans-national and non-state actors remind us all that asymmetric means may be employed when there is nothing to save, but rather something to destroy. As we discussed in the beginning of this chapter, opponents in the Fourth Generation desire disorder and chaos in the hearts, minds and lands of their enemies. Deterrence has limited effects against a non-state entity without any recourse to international opinion or law, it only serves to delay action until the deterring state becomes lulled into security thereby becoming vulnerable. Deterrence in this generation of warfare, therefore, must give way to coercion. A Fourth Generation opponent must be made to change his actions.

Interestingly, the only military arm to truly delve into theories of coercion at any depth of study is the United States Air Force. The Army has, therefore, done itself a great disservice by not fully learning and integrating current thought on the four separate categories of military coercion: punishment, risk, decapitation, and denial. These four categories have been studied in regards to airpower and politics; however, they also appear operationally viable for ground forces in the prosecution of conflict in any generation of war.

In his research paper, “The Politics of Coercion,” Lt. Col. “Skip” Hinman, points out that while the four categories of military coercion separately merit much value, it remains questionable whether any single one may stand alone as an effective theory for post-Cold War conflict. Hinman suggest that there must be a “hybrid” theory of coercion that incorporates each of the existing stand-alone theories. His proposed model relates that his “three-phased hybrid approach to coercion” optimizes strengths and minimizes the weakness of existing constructs of coercion. Hinman outlines his three-phased model in the terms of coercive

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40 ibid
41 ibid, 31
airpower, but his model also presents itself as effective criteria to evaluate coercive effects in ground action. Figure 3 graphically depicts Hinman’s hybrid theory of coercion.\(^{42}\)

![Figure 3: The Coercion Hybrid](image)

Understanding the hybrid requires knowledge of the parts. As explained in the previous paragraph, coercion theory has been refined by air-power advocates; naturally, the terms and definitions in this hybrid must now be adapted to fit a land-based force. Originally, punishment-based coercion dealt with air strikes on civilian population, industry, and economic centers. The idea was to destroy a country’s infrastructure and economy so as to punish the civilian population, thereby causing capitulation.\(^{43}\) In this monograph, punishment-based coercion implies force directed against enemy support structures with the intent of destroying them. Punishment seeks to attack enemy combatants and their support structure directly by inflicting destruction and death through any legitimate, kinetic means. Punishment may mean destruction of civilian areas and is the least desired form of coercion.

\(^{42}\) ibid, 32.

\(^{43}\) ibid, 12-15.
The second category of coercion is risk-based coercion. Risk-based coercion allows forces to use the minimum amount of forces necessary to instill in the enemy a “fear of future attacks” and in turn, he would comply.\footnote{ibid. 16} This category of coercion most closely fits the land component model needed for evaluation of armored forces effectiveness in Fourth Generation warfare. Displays of power and maneuver of armored forces into critical zones of enemy occupied territory create in the enemy a dilemma by holding what he possesses at risk without actually destroying it. This, in turn, could cause him to abandon or divert any future actions.

Decapitation-based coercion remains relevant, not only as a category of coercion, but also as an operational means of disrupting and destroying enemy leadership systems. This category of coercion theory was most deeply held by John Warden. Warden posited that decapitation aims to “paralyze and incapacitate the enemy by destroying the maximum number of political leadership, communication, and selected economic targets in the minimum amount of time...The relentless shock, surprise and simultaneity of the decapitation approach will coerce the enemy leader, who fears for his life and the legitimacy of his regime, to succumb to the (coercer’s) demands.”\footnote{ibid., 19} Here we see a near-direct correlation to effects that a land-based force is capable of producing. Decapitation, therefore, seeks to isolate and destroy leadership and command and communication nodes in Fourth-Generation conflict.

The fourth, and last, category of coercion is denial. Robert Pape explains denial-based coercion in the following way:

\begin{quote}
Denial strategies target the opponent’s military ability to achieve its territorial or other political objectives, thereby compelling concessions in order to avoid futile expenditure of further resources...denial strategies make no special effort to cause suffering to the opponent’s society, only to deny the opponent hope of achieving the disputed territorial objectives. Thus, denial campaigns focus on the target’s...military strategy.\footnote{Pape, 19.}
\end{quote}
This last category needs very little modification to fit the new hybrid of coercion theory for ground forces. The military strategy of the opponent remains at risk, through a series of direct actions to deny territory, resources, and popular support.

The coercion hybrid theory as envisioned by Hinman remains applicable; only the definitions of the terms have changed. Effective military coercion, therefore, results from the cumulative effects from application of the four categories employed simultaneously and, if need be, sequentially during the conduct of a campaign.

The most critical aspect of the Coercion Hybrid is denial-based coercion. Denying the enemy use of territory, resources, and popular support must occur in every phase. In actuality, it must gradually increase by phase. The Coercion Hybrid presents an incremental approach to measuring effective military coercion. If capitulation occurs in the first phase of operations, then the coercer was effective in his actions. If the coercer fails in the first phase, he must follow through on the threat inherent in the risk-based coercion in the first phase and begin to exploit decapitation-based coercion by isolating and destroying selected leadership and command and control nodes. Risk- and denial-based coercion remains essential in the second phase as the threat of punishment against enemy support structures and civilian targets begins to escalate.

Should coercion fail under the strong mixture of risk- and denial-based coercion, the campaign will move on to the third phase and the combination of factors then becomes punishment, decapitation, and denial. At this point, the coercing nation should have retained the ability to mass effects and power to obtain maximum shock value against the enemy.\footnote{Hinman,37.} It remains important that the denial aspect of coercion retain the greatest percentage of effort throughout the three phases. The shock value of coercion comes only through an accrual of fear and destruction – risk and denial – proving that in the Fourth Generation of warfare, a key dictum of Clausewitz still rings true; “War is thus an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will.”\footnote{Clausewitz, 75.}
The next chapter delves deeper into the coercion phenomena and spotlights an analysis of the Israeli Defense Force’s reaction to the second Intifada, specifically the operational impacts of the tactical operation in the Jenin refugee camp in April of 2002 during OPERATION DEFENSIVE SHIELD. The case study measures the effectiveness of the IDF’s military coercion of terrorist groups, as defined by Hinman’s Coercion Hybrid model, to prevent further terrorist acts. This case study highlights the essential elements of this monograph: Fourth Generation warfare between a well-organized nation-state and terrorist groups with a transnational base that demands loyalty through culture and ideology; Coercion-based strategy to force an opponent to change his actions; and Operational employment of heavy armored forces to attain maximum shock effect.

The case study allows us a glimpse into the distant past and the near future. Just as in the days of ancient Greece, the spectrum of coercion, from punishment of the enemy to denial of his continued maneuver, becomes the desired end that is reached through the means of shock battle. The criteria that Hinman illustrates in his three-phase coercion model (with the four components of risk, denial, decapitation and punishment) have become, in essence, the spirit of the classical Hellenic shock battle; The “Western Way of War” meets the “Fourth Generation.”
CHAPTER THREE

In War, the subjugation of the enemy is the end, and the destruction of his fighting forces the means.\(^{49}\)

\[\text{Carl von Clausewitz}\]

And at this time it was that some of those that principally excited the people to go to war, made an assault upon a certain fortress called Masada. They took it by treachery, and slew the Romans that were there...they did now irritate the Romans to take arms against them, and invited them to make war upon them.\(^{50}\)

\[\text{Flavius Josephus}\]

Understanding the Second Intifada

To the untrained eye, the visit appeared commonplace. An Israeli political party leader goes to pay homage and worship at one of the holiest sites on earth. For the Jews it is known as the Temple Mount; the Muslims call it al-Haram al-Sharif, the Noble Sanctuary.\(^{51}\) The untrained eye cannot view history without education and cannot see hatred in intentions.

For the Jews, the Temple Mount holds the most ancient physical symbol of their religious past. There in 70 A.D. Titus and the 10th Roman Legion (\textit{Julius Caesar Legio X}) burnt the temple to the ground. The temple, raised by Solomon 1,130 years earlier, had been razed by Caesar Vespasian as he conducted operations to quash a rebellion.\(^{52}\) For Islam, the Noble Sanctuary represents the site where the Prophet Muhammad journeyed with the angel Gabriel at night from Makkah to the Al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem in the year 620 A.D. From that spot in Jerusalem, Muslims believe that the Prophet Muhammad ascended to the sixth heaven and there received the tenets of Islam.\(^{53}\) In this crucible lies the most sacred shrine for the Jews and the third most holy site in all of Islam.

\(^{49}\) Clausewitz, 637
\(^{52}\) Josephus, 239
\(^{53}\) The information gleaned from the night journey of the Prophet Mohammed was taken from various discussions with Muslim officers at the Command and General Staff Officer Course from August 2002 to
The September 28, 2000, visit by the leading member of Israel’s Likud party, Ariel Sharon, to the Temple Mount became the match in the dry tinderbox of the Middle East peace process. No single date can formally mark the official beginning of the second Intifada, or general uprising, of the Palestinians, it is generally held that the Sharon visit was the key event that turned the peace process into a “war process.”\(^5^4\) The provocation of the visit ultimately ended with violent and unprecedented bloodshed at the mosque at al-Haram al-Sharif, and rapidly spread throughout all of the Palestinian territories.\(^5^5\) The Palestinians viewed the visit as a slap in the face and a challenge to any sovereignty they still clung to in Jerusalem; The Israelis viewed the Palestinian reaction as an escalation of the crisis; and the world viewed the rising tensions as a new nightmare.

In 1987, the term *Intifada* meant something entirely different to the world. The Palestinian general uprising then meant protests, verbal but infrequent physical altercations with security forces, and sporadic acts of armed rebellion or terrorism. Peace talks remained ongoing and there was always a light at the end of the tunnel no matter how long the tunnel seemed. In the year 2000 that vision changed.

Armed uprising became the norm. Terrorism slowly became more commonplace in the Israeli way of life. The light at the end of the tunnel had dissipated and Israel’s Jewish citizens were calling for the collapse of the tunnel itself. Peace had turned to war and ploughshares had been beaten into swords.\(^5^6\) For the Palestinians, armed uprising was a reaction to Israel’s dictation of the level of violence employed in the territories.\(^5^7\) For Israel, their “values centered

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\(^{56}\) This phrase was inspired by the name of the book, *Ploughshares into Swords?* By Colin Shindler.

(on) the search for security against foreign and domestic enemies, putting an end to terrorism,”
and winning lasting security for Israel by preserving its Jewish character and sharply limiting
“any return by Palestinians to Israel proper.”

The second Intifada’s roots run deep. Sharon’s visit provided a catalyst to the tensions
brewing in the Palestinian territories, but perceptions of inequality and injustice by Israel’s
government under Prime Minister Ehud Barak laid the groundwork for Palestinian resistance and
opened the door for unconventional actors to take center stage. The transnational nature of war
began to percolate to the fore as Muslims from around the globe lent the Palestinian Authority a
sympathetic ear and money and fighters began to flow into the Palestinian territories to “correct”
the perceived inequality. Fueled by religious fervor and funding from States like Iraq and Saudi
Arabia, the Palestinians became more and more willing, “like the biblical Samson, to bring
down the temple on the Israelis and themselves.”

**Fighting the Nature of War**

The Intifada against the Israelis by the Palestinians heralded a different form of revolt and
warfare. F. Robert Hunter correctly identified that the first Intifada was different in the sense
that, a lasting peace was the prize where only “stones would symbolize the revolt. Mass political
struggle without conventional arms reflected an understanding of how to confront a military
power like Israel…The aim, of course, was to draw the attention and sympathy of world opinion
to the plight of the Palestinians, but also avoid a bloodbath that would smother the Intifada and

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58 Cordesman, *Israel versus the Palestinians: The “Second Intifada” and Asymmetric Warfare*, 45.
59 See Appendix A for a complete timeline of events in the second Intifada from 2000 to 2002. This
timeline puts many events in one common reading to help the reader appreciate the relation of tactical
violence with the strategic problem.
60 Bishara, *Palestine/Israel: Peace or Apartheid*, 31
61 From APPENDIX A. “October 21 – Arab leaders at the summit in Cairo condemn Israeli violence, but
call for pressure on Israel to support the peace process on Palestinian terms. Libya walks out. Iraq
condemns moderation. Crown Prince Abdullah of Saudi Arabia calls for $1 billion in aid to Palestinians,
and offers $250 million.” And “December 9- Iraq promises 1 billion Euros (approximately $900 million
US) in food and medical aid to the Palestinians.”
62 Bishara, *Palestine/Israel: Peace or Apartheid*, 15
bring it to a quick end.” The second Intifada would be markedly different; dominated by asymmetric battles that interact with “asymmetric values and perceptions,” convincing each side of their own legitimacy with respect to their goals and tactics, with the end result being an escalation of violence where each side is “provoked, rather than deterred, by the other side’s use of additional force.” The mantle of Fourth Generation Warfare fell heavily upon the shoulders of the Israeli Defense Forces.

William Lind’s outline of a Fourth Generation opponent fits nicely in this reality: Israel had lost its monopoly on war and the first loyalty of its citizens as non-state entities began to command the Palestinian’s primary loyalties, as evidenced by the aggressiveness of Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) in prosecuting attacks on Israeli citizens and soldiers; Differences in Arab and Jewish culture rose to replace the idea that two legitimate entities (the state of Israel and the Palestinian Authority) were in conflict; and lastly, the manifestations of both developments within the state of Israel itself as evidenced by repeated and escalatory terrorist attacks in Israel proper, not just the West Bank or Gaza. The Fourth Generation nature of the conflict is most evident in the dichotomy between the belligerents. The asymmetric nature of conflict also led to the escalation of violence between the two parties. Israel’s conventional military dominance and the Palestinian conventional weakness resulted in Palestinian attempts to restore some form of symmetry to the battlefield. Terrorism, assassination, kidnapping, and direct confrontation with Israeli forces in urban environments, became the modus operandi of the Islamic elements (Hamas, PIJ and Hezbollah) in Palestinian controlled Israel, which prosecuted war against Israel for the sake of, and in proxy for, the whole Palestinian cause.

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64 Cordesman, Israel versus the Palestinians: The “Second Intifada” and Asymmetric Warfare, 1.
65 William S. Lind, “America’s ‘War on Terrorism:’ A Grand Strategy for a Fourth Generation World.” This comparison builds upon Lind’s framework for Fourth Generation Warfare as Lind described it for the United States. Application of the framework remains relevant to Israel as they commit operational forces to suppress terrorist and insurgents in their country.
66 Two sources of information provide the necessary background for this argument of the trans-national aspect of the Palestinian reaction: Graham E. Fuller. The West Bank of Israel. (Santa Monica, CA: RAND,
Israel then faced the dilemma of the stronger entity in a Fourth Generation conflict; how does one use, or can one legitimately use, overwhelming conventional military might against an underwhelming conventional military foe with the capability to inflict tremendous damage by other means, without appearing the bully or oppressor? The IDF would have to cope with this dilemma in its response to the second Intifada and the eyes of the world would be upon its’ actions as it did so. Their actions would shock many in the world; however, they approached the problem with the keen understanding of the Constants of Conflict. If the Intifada was truly war, then it would be a human endeavor between two systems in competition with one another.

Even so, the IDF, while recognizing that war is a “two sided activity,” appears to have not paid heed to the warning of Martin Van Creveld that “(war) is also an imitative activity in which, given sufficient time, the two sides will learn from each other and tend to resemble each other. Thus he who fights the weak will himself become weak; he who by ‘fighting’ the weak behaves like a coward will end up turning into one, suffering one humiliation after another and losing the will to fight.” The response of the IDF to the Palestinian uprising would fall under close scrutiny and its effectiveness or failure would have ramifications on the future employment of heavy conventional forces in Fourth Generation Warfare.

Once the Palestinian uprising began to escalate in ferocity, Israeli ground tactics, too, became more aggressive. The IDF began to extend the scale of their operations and the length of their stays in the West Bank. The IDF slowly shifted its policies from a strategy of “containment and isolation to one of invasion, siege, and limited reoccupation.” The methods employed to accomplish this task were: isolate key Palestinian population centers; secure access roads and lines of communication; improve the security of the settlements and military

1989), 38-41; and Cordesman, Israel versus the Palestinians: The “Second Intifada” and Asymmetric Warfare, 110-137.
67 Martin Van Creveld. The Sword and the Olive. (New York: PublicAffairs. 1998), 352
69 Anthony H Cordesman. The Israeli-Palestinian War: Escalating to Nowhere, CH XII, 4.
installation in the West Bank.\(^70\) Israel’s attempt to combine military isolation with economic and counter-terrorist measures, such as freezing financial operations and transit between Palestinian areas, cutting off communications, and limiting the shipment of goods, led to the operational maneuver that would symbolize the IDF’s *modus operandi* when confronting the Palestinian’s.\(^71\)

Shimon Naveh, military theorist and former Brigadier General in the IDF, realized the IDF’s reliance on operational maneuver in its operations since its inception in 1948. Israel had come to understand:

> The striking capability (centers) on the following principles or faculties: *fragmentation* – aimed at preempting the horizontal synergy among the components of the rival system from materializing; *simultaneous action* by the elements of the friendly system along the entire physical and cognitive depth of its rival’s layout in an attempt to disrupt the hierarchical interaction among its various elements; and *momentum*, predicated on the initiation of a successive chain of tactical actions, guided by *a single aim* and *operating within* the decision-action loop of the rival system.\(^72\)

In order to make the next logical leap and see how conventional heavy forces can be deployed in an operational manner for coercive effects, one must also understand how the IDF makes a distinction between “Military Operations in Urban Terrain (MOUT)” and “Urban Warfare.” The Israelis, primarily consider MOUT a “conventional military operation to be executed in accordance with traditional military principles…The enemy in MOUT is an identifiable armed force and civilians are an ‘obstacle’ to unrestrained military actions but not determinates of the final outcome; in ‘urban warfare’ the enemy is not only the armed force but also a significant portion or perhaps the majority of the population in the urban area.”\(^73\) This distinction between the two forms of warfare is crucial when analyzing the IDF response to the Intifada.

\(^{70}\) ibid.

\(^{71}\) ibid.


\(^{73}\) APPENDIX B.
Israel’s armed forces, when confronted by the problems inherent in the complex urban environment of Palestinian and Islamist terrorists intermingling with Palestinian and Jewish civilians within the confines of the numerous small towns in the West Bank and Gaza, had at their disposal a wide and varying arsenal of resources and capabilities to include massive conventional forces, exceptional special operations forces, and, for the Middle East, unmatched intelligence sources.\(^74\) The IDF’s urban operations would, therefore, be conducted in one of three ways: Surgically, Conventionally, or Decisively.\(^75\) Anthony Cordesman likens the surgical effort as “urban warfare light,” where air or missile power strikes key targets or nodes while limited, yet quick, raids are carried out against select targets.\(^76\) Conventional symmetry puts the “fight on or near equal terms’ avoiding the use of heavy weapons” and fighting house to house until the enemy is defeated.\(^77\) The final form, decisive force, is understood by the IDF to mean “using heavy weapons and air power to smash a way (into) secure positions, destroy defended strong point, and enforce security during an occupation based on sweeps and searches.”\(^78\) All three options, when studied independently, are feasible, but in the shadow of the Intifada, where world opinion is uncertain, none are acceptable.\(^79\) All this would be difficult for the IDF for its “traditional strengths – originating in the Yishuv’s prestate military organization – had been initiative and aggressiveness in defeating larger Arab armies in short, sharp wars. Now those very qualities started turning against it in a prolonged conflict that demanded patience, professionalism, and restraint.”\(^80\)

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\(^76\) ibid.

\(^77\) ibid.

\(^78\) ibid.

\(^79\) ibid.

\(^80\) Van Creveld. The Sword and the Olive., 344.
For Israelis, world opinion did not matter much on March 27th, 2002, the first night of the Jewish Passover, when 29 Israelis were killed, and over 100 injured, in the lobby of a hotel in Netanya, when a suicide bomber blew himself up as guests sat down to the traditional Passover Seder. 81 Hamas claimed responsibility for the attack, and a spokesman was quoted by the Israeli press as saying that “the attack was timed to undermine the Beirut meeting of the Arab League.” 82 The Israeli response would be far-reaching and destructive. Their response was an operational offensive called “Operation Defensive Shield,” and it would be classic western shock battle against a Fourth Generation opponent. 83

The operation was a broad based attack that simultaneously assaulted six major Palestinian cities in an effort to root out terrorists and eliminate safe havens of Hamas, Hezbollah, and the PIJ. Operation Defensive Shield provided the synchronization between the operational maneuver that Naveh wrote about and the tactical dilemma of urban operations. The operation would target six cities, Ramallah, Bethlehem, Tulkarem, Qalqilya, Nablus and Jenin, each with strategic and operational importance, and strike them all in near-simultaneous fashion.

Operation Defensive Shield combined the surgical precision of air power and special operations raids with conventional forces deployed into urban terrain to root out terrorists in order to disrupt and destroy their architecture. 84 The IDF used all three approaches to urban warfare in some form, and their operational maneuver became their decisive force. The timeline below outlines key conventional movements during Operation Defensive Shield with added emphasis to events in Jenin:

81 Anthony Cordesman, Cordesman, *Israel versus the Palestinians: The “Second Intifada” and Asymmetric Warfare*, 35.
82 Ibid.
83 See Appendix A. The timeline for Operation Defensive Shield begins around March 30, 2002. The timeline in Appendix A helps the reader to place operational events in relation to other political events occurring in the Intifada.
• **March 29, 2002** – Israel launches ‘Operation Defensive Shield.’ Israeli forces enter Ramallah, including parts of Chairman Yasser Arafat’s compound.

• **March 31, 2002** – Over 100 Israeli tanks enter Qalqilya. Prime Minister Ariel Sharon says Israel is at war.

• **April 1, 2002** – A bulldozer and 5 Israeli tanks enter Tulkarem in the West Bank. Israeli forces enter two villages near Bethlehem.

• **April 2, 2002** – In Ramallah, Israeli tanks and helicopters attack Palestinian Preventative Security Services headquarters – this Palestinian security service had been “well-known for having stayed out of the resistance so as to implement whatever crackdown might be needed later.”

• **April 3, 2002** – Israeli tanks enter Nablus… (tanks and) troops begin to encircle the West Bank refugee camp of Jenin. Once the IDF enters Jenin, the fighting lasts nine days.

• **April 9, 2002** – In Jenin, 13 IDF soldiers are killed upon entering a booby-trapped building.

• **April 11, 2002** – In Jenin, the last Palestinian gunman surrenders to Israeli forces.

• **April 18, 2002** – In Jenin, the Israelis pull back to the edge of the city.

• **May 2, 2002** – Arafat emerges from his headquarters after the IDF ends his five-month confinement.  

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**IDF Response: Jenin as a Microcosm**

The refugee camp in Jenin had a “gruesome” reputation as the “Palestinian Suicide Capital.” Fourth Generation warriors such as Hamas, Hezbollah, and PIJ had turned the camp into a base from which terrorist attacks could be launched on Israel with bombs and weapons hand crafted within the perimeter of the camp itself. The IDF targeted Jenin immediately as a major source of terrorism and also recognized the danger of conducting operations in such restrictive urban terrain with thousands of unarmed civilians. Jenin would be attacked from the ground with a combination of conventional and unconventional forces.  

The Jenin operation began as a brigade (plus) operation to surround the Palestinian refugee camp and cut all Palestinian lines of communication with armor initially used to secure

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88 Brig. Gen. Gideon Avidor. APPENDIX C.
all routes in and out of the camp. The IDF met with strong resistance as the forces moved into
the camp on April 3, 2002.\textsuperscript{89} Tanks were positioned at the outskirts of the camp to cut lines of
communication and restrict movement into and out of the camp. The brigade commander,
Colonel Yedidia Yehuda gave the order for the tanks and infantry to move into the town around
midnight of April 2\textsuperscript{nd}.\textsuperscript{90} In the meantime, Palestinian fighters had prepared defenses for the
impending attack by setting mines and Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) in buildings and all
along the route of advance into the camp. Reports by the Israeli commanders stated that “some
bombs were huge – as much as 250lbs of explosives.”\textsuperscript{91}

Infantry and armor moved into the camp to methodically clear houses and root out
terrorists. The IDF took great care to minimize civilian casualties by broadcasting evacuation
orders over loudspeakers in Arabic and relying on tanks and infantry to clear areas as opposed to
air strikes and bombings.\textsuperscript{92} About 11,000 Palestinian civilians’s fled the one-kilometer square
camp, but a few remained behind for varying reasons.\textsuperscript{93} The presence of civilians in the camp
created greater complexity of the operation for the Israelis. Infantry and tanks worked closely
together, offering each other protection from snipers and suicide bombers.\textsuperscript{94} The integration of
Infantry and Armor and the slow moving clearing operation turned into a favorable condition for
the defender. It gave them time to organize defense and reinforce safe havens with IEDs and
snipers.\textsuperscript{95} Sometime between the 5\textsuperscript{th} and the 9\textsuperscript{th} of April, the IDF changed tactics and brought in
bulldozers to demolish houses and clear enemy resistance.\textsuperscript{96} The IDF justified the use of the
armored bulldozer since it was used to widen the narrow streets and destroy safe havens and

\textsuperscript{89} Matt Rees. “The Battle of Jenin.” Time Magazine Online. 
\textsuperscript{90} ibid.
\textsuperscript{91} ibid.
\textsuperscript{92} Report to the Secretary-General on Jenin. (Online. 
\textsuperscript{93} ibid, 15.
\textsuperscript{94} See Appendix C for Brig. Gen. Avidor’s comments.
\textsuperscript{95} ibid.
\textsuperscript{96} Report to the Secretary-General on Jenin, 16.
terrorist munitions factories. The bulldozers proved very effective against the resistance and eliminated many of the IEDs in the buildings and roadways.

Resistance crumbled in Jenin after the armored bulldozer began to destroy dwellings and armored forces poured into the camp and, according to Israeli government documents, by April 11 the camp was under IDF control with all known armed fighters eliminated either through arrest or death. The actions in Jenin had proven once again that the “course of the Israeli-Palestinian War (had) been shaped by the fact that the IDF has absolute conventional military supremacy on the land.” In the end, the IDF had lost 23 men with 75 wounded in the fighting. The numbers of Palestinian dead and wounded remain debatable. Each side claims different numbers: Human Rights Watch claims 52 dead of which only 27 were fighters; the IDF claims to have pulled 46 from the rubble, all but 3 were fighters. However, body counts do not measure a mission’s effectiveness, but the Israeli and world obsession with the numbers are telling in another way. Anthony Cordesman notes:

At present, the only purely military restraints on its use of force are a reluctance to take casualties. All of the other restraints are largely political. As a result, it is how the IDF chooses to employ force, rather than the size of its military forces, which has been the primary issue shaping the Israeli-Palestinian War. The various Palestinian factions have exploited those restraints and challenged the IDF, despite their comparative deficiencies in weapons and personnel.

The Palestinian exploitation of the restraints and challenges placed on the IDF present an interesting twist to the ability of a force to effectively apply coercion in Fourth Generation

98 Report to the Secretary-General on Jenin, 18.
99 Anthony H Cordesman. The Israeli-Palestinian War: Escalating to Nowhere CH VIII, 5
100 Information and numbers taken from a variety of sources to include: Report to the Secretary-General on Jenin, 17; and Report by the Human Rights Watch Committee on Israel, the Occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip, and the Palestinian Authority Territories. Jenin:IDF Military Operations, by Peter Bouckart, Miranda Sissons, and Johanna Bjorken.(New York: May 2002), 3.
101 Anthony H Cordesman. The Israeli-Palestinian War: Escalating to Nowhere CH VIII, 5.
warfare. In this instance, the Israeli “mailed fist” was met with “defiant resistance.” So the question becomes: “Does coercion still work?”

**Terrorism and Coercion: Jenin as a Test**

An analysis of the events in Jenin when compared to the actions of Operation Defensive Shield as a whole, show that the Israelis were truly seeking to force the Palestinians to stop supporting terrorist acts against Israel and Israeli citizens. Soldiers and equipment were not deployed into the West Bank to deter further hostile acts, but rather to coerce the Palestinian leadership and support structure into peace. The IDF deployed massive amounts of conventional forces into the West Bank; an unintentional nod to Naveh, instead of relying on Palestinian security forces or the IDF’s light infantry and special forces in a peace enforcement role. The actions throughout the West Bank smacked of major offensive and sought to validate the efficiency and effectiveness of coercion.

The actions in Jenin put Hinman’s Coercion Hybrid to the test. Armored forces, working in conjunction with light infantry and special operations forces, replaced the routine air strikes that were common in the early phases of the Intifada. Martin Van Creveld believes that the IDF had come to believe that “neither the fighter-bombers nor the tanks nor the heavy artillery (let alone warships and submarines) were of any use when it came to controlling crowds or chasing small parties of teenagers over the limestone hills of Judea or down in the valleys of the Gaza Strip refugee camps. Perhaps a small fraction of the firepower in question would have been decisive if it had been deployed during the very first days (of the Intifada) in the way Napoleon

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used a ‘whiff of grapeshot’ to disperse the mob that attacked the French National Assembly in 1795.”

   However, many Palestinians considered themselves “lucky” because they had originally expected an air strike of some sorts. A leader of the Fatah gunmen in the camp remarked that it was only when his forces “saw the Israeli’s advancing on foot that (he) decided to stay and fight.” Armored forces had set the conditions that put the civilians and fighters at risk. In the first phase of the operation, risk was used to force civilians out of the camp and cause the fighters to surrender or defend. In the case of Jenin, as stated above, the fighters defended. In this phase of the Hinman’s model, the effect was primarily on the unarmed civilians in the camp. It is therefore implied, large troop movements, in coordination with heavy armor, tend to have greater coercive effect on the unarmed or innocent. Risk becomes a motivating factor for “flight” to civilians and “fight” for the Fourth Generation warrior.

   The deployment of armor around the camp managed to cut off escape-routes, snap lines of communication, and deny reinforcement and support to the fighters in the camp. It also allowed the IDF to control refugee flow and monitor the whereabouts of the leading terrorist fighters. This, in turn, permitted the assault upon the camp that would rout the remaining resistance and purge the camp of its terrorist capabilities. Armor was therefore instrumental in the denial of on-the-ground movement of enemy forces. Jenin was in a noose, and the IDF had only to pull.

   Hinman’s first phase of coercion proved very effective against a limited, yet appropriate, target: unarmed civilians and the innocent. The primary Israeli targets (PIJ, Hamas and Hezbollah leaders) stayed and prepared to fight. By this time, the IDF’s Operations Chief, Maj. Gen. Dan Harel, knew that the fight was “going to be hard.”

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106 ibid.
107 ibid.
The second phase of Hinman’s hybrid is evident as infantry and tanks began to pour into the camp accompanied by armored bulldozers and combat engineers. Strikes against high-level terrorists within the camp were carried out and the terrorist architecture and system slowly started to collapse within the camp.\textsuperscript{108} However, Cordesman also notes that it was apparent “that such limited uses of ground forces could not defeat Hamas or the PIJ, and that ‘decapitation’ strikes had serious limits.”\textsuperscript{109} The “limits” referred to the connections between the perception of decapitation and the perception of punishment – and world opinion was on the line. The IDF had moved into the third phase of Hinman’s model unknowingly.

The most controversial of all actions in Jenin, undoubtedly, was the deployment of armored bulldozers into the center of the camp. The bulldozers role was to widen the streets and clear booby-trapped houses easing the movement of the infantry as they sought armed defenders.\textsuperscript{110} The IDF had begun the destruction of a portion of the camp that was, indeed, heavily defended, but also occupied by a few civilians as well. The question becomes, “Is this truly a punishment phase of the operation?” The answer is a qualified, “Maybe.” The issue rests in the balance between IDF intent and Palestinian perception. The perception of civilian targeting, supposed war crimes, and torture lead to the image of brutality and heavy handedness on the part of the IDF. This is punishment in its true form. On the other hand, the IDF intended to destroy all terrorist activities and disrupt their future operation through the killing or arrest of the terrorist leaders. For the IDF the target was simply a military one.

As for the coercion model, this is where it breaks down for the IDF. The actions taken thus far had a positive coercive effect. Palestinian militants and the civilians that supported them felt at risk, their movement and lines of support were denied within the camp, and the leading bomb makers and instigators were beginning to be arrested or killed. As the destruction of

\textsuperscript{109} ibid, XII,7.
\textsuperscript{110} See Appendix C for Brig. Gen. Avidor’s Comments.
civilian property and civilian casualties grew, the IDF “like armed forces caught in similar situations elsewhere, … was at risk of committing crimes by using excessive force against lightly armed or unarmed opponents.”\textsuperscript{111} It would be unfair to say that the IDF didn’t expect this scenario to arise, because also “like armed forces elsewhere, it tried to cope by developing extremely detailed rules of engagement that spelled out what the troops could and could not do.”\textsuperscript{112} The IDF’s restrictive ROE at the outset had the potential to backfire in the end. It did not leave open all three phases of the coercion model. The Palestinian militants, by their actions of fiercely engaging in urban operations, had tied the IDF’s hands. Heavy armored forces, that had such an exclusive psychological effect at the outset of the battle, now began to seem physically excessive. For some, “the destruction extended well beyond any conceivable purpose of gaining access to fighters, and was vastly disproportionate to the military objectives pursued.”\textsuperscript{113}

\textbf{The Eyes of the World: Jenin as a Warning}

After the battle, the amount of destruction was viewed through the lens of many cameras. Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, and nearly all major international and local media investigated the scene. Individual judgment of the reports is the right of the reader, however it appears that most of them highlighted the negative aspects of the IDF operation. The research was often unbalanced because Palestinian witnesses were very open with the investigators and the IDF was not as forthcoming.

It is obvious that the IDF failed to provide maximum disclosure with minimum delay in regards to the details of the operation that would have been viewed as extremely controversial and polarizing.\textsuperscript{114} The IO effect of the operation targeted the terrorist audience and unwittingly neglected the world stage. This in turn galvanized the terrorists’ cause and caused the fire of the

\textsuperscript{111} Martin Van Creveld. \textit{The Sword and the Olive}. (New York: PublicAffairs. 1998), 348
\textsuperscript{112} ibid.
\textsuperscript{113} \textit{Report by the Human Rights Watch Committee on Israel, the Occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip, and the Palestinian Authority Territories, Jenin: IDF Military Operations}, by Peter Bouckart, Miranda Sissons, and Johanna Bjorken.(New York: May 2002), 3.
\textsuperscript{114} See Appendix C. Brig. Gen. Avidor’s comments.
Intifada to remain lit. This is the effectiveness of the Fourth Generation warrior: take loss and turn it to gain. Apparent at the end of the battle in Jenin was that the “Palestinian organizations did not have a tight hierarchy (but) had strong ideological support. Each killing tended to create martyrs and lead to new groups of volunteers. In many cases, the end result was revenge rather than success in deterring and defeating the enemy, and the loss of trained leaders and cadres tended to encourage the recruitment and use of young Palestinians as suicide bombers.”

The IDF indirectly learned that Hinman’s Coercion Hybrid leads to many second and third order effects even within its three phases. Just as Hanson’s ancient Greek warriors could not totally come to expect the reaction of their enemies against the phalanx in a classic battle of shock, so the IDF too, came to expect the unexpected in trying to coerce others to do its will. The IDF had learned that the weakness of a Fourth Generation opponent might not lie within its system of physical support. This system may be attacked, disrupted, or destroyed by conventional heavy forces, but if the higher plan does not integrate these actions with cultural, ethnic, or justice considerations, the true “system” in Fourth Generation warfare is not truly under assault. In the Fourth Generation, one cannot simply separate the physical from the ideological. The final chapter expounds on these implications when employing heavy armor in Fourth Generation Warfare.

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CHAPTER FOUR

This advance of the enemy had seemed to the youth like a ruthless hunting. He began to
fume with rage and exasperation. He beat his foot upon the ground, and scowled with hate at the
swirling smoke that was approaching like a phantom flood. There was a maddening quality in
this seeming resolution of the foe to give him no rest, to give him no time to sit down and think...It
was not well to drive men into final corners; at those moments they could all develop teeth and
claws.\(^{116}\)

Stephen Crane

Everyone now awaited the decisive moment. The enemy were already drawing near with
their troops drawn up in battle line, their elephants placed in strategic positions, and their
cavalry stationed on the flanks. Maccabeus, contemplating the hosts before him, their elaborate
equipment, and the fierceness of their elephants, stretched out his hands toward heaven and
called upon the Lord who works miracles; for he knew that it is not through arms but through the
Lord’s decision that victory is won by those who deserve it.

II Maccabees 15:20-21

Conclusions: Synergy and Shock Effect

The sight and sound of rolling armor – tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, or armored
bulldozers – in an operational setting brings to bear the essence of firepower, mobility, and shock
effect. U.S. Army doctrine addresses the role of armored forces in predominately open terrain
and as part of a combined arms team. It neglects, however, any detailed treatment of how armor
should be employed in non-contiguous and restrictive operations such as found in urban warfare –
the benchmark of Fourth Generation warfare. While most armor doctrine, such as \textit{FM 17-123},
address some common procedures in urban environments, none of the operational level doctrine,
such as \textit{FM 3-0}, directly address the issue of how best to employ armor in a scenario other than
large-scale high intensity conflict.

The days of massed armored formations attacking across the deserts of Iraq or
descending upon the valleys of the Danube may not be over, but the role of armor has
metamorphosed into a more complex system of warfare. Armored forces must integrate with

lighter forces as often as possible. In a Fourth Generation conflict the initial shock of heavy forces will immediately change the tenor of most operations only if deployment of heavy armor to the area of operation is rapid. The mere presence of tanks and mechanized infantry changes the emotional and psychological environment.

It is for this very reason that the IDF understands how essential heavy armor is to modern urban combat operations. It is a fact that tanks provide “high levels of protection, psychological impact, and excellent precision target acquisition and engagement systems.”\(^\text{117}\) When juxtaposed with armor’s shortcomings such as the lack of an adequate ability to communicate with dismounted infantry and limited vulnerability to expedient flame weapons, it is no wonder that the IDF, since OPERATION DEFENSIVE SHIELD, has begun a doctrinal review to modify their training programs to focus on ‘battle teams’ of one tank and one IFV.\(^\text{118}\) For the U.S. Army, this doctrinal review must include how armor and infantry and special operations forces can best synchronize their actions to achieve the synergy required for massive and lasting effects in the complex environment of the urban battlefield. This is not to say that every time the United States engages a Fourth Generation opponent in an urban setting that tanks and infantry should ride into town with their guns blazing. The combination of all elements are required in each instance to present to the enemy the necessary feeling of risk, while denying him any support from without, coupled with the fear of decapitation or punishment. In short, the psychological effects of armor, quickly deployed to an area, are so great that they must be considered in nearly every operational instance.

In *FM3.0 (Operations)*, a great deal of print is used to describe the conduct of “Full Spectrum Operations.” In the conduct of these operations, the U.S. Army maintains that a commander must consider a number of items to include: build and maintain momentum, create

\(^{117}\) See Appendix B. Paragraph 3.g.

\(^{118}\) Ibid..
and exploit opportunities, pressure the enemy, and create “overmatch.” Language such as this speaks directly to the heart of the armor community. Momentum, pressure, and overmatch are inherent attributes of mechanized forces that promote the transition to an exploitation that denies the “enemy time to regain balance and react.” The underlying assumption, in some instances, is that armored forces are too slow to react and deploy and therefore unable to provide a timely assistance or coercive effect. With the advent of the Stryker Combat Vehicle, this assumption begins to lose its legs.

The doctrine for Stryker Brigade Team Infantry Battalion (FM 3-21.21) expounds on the necessity for full spectrum operations in conjunction with light and mechanized infantry and special operations forces. The danger, however, in relying on Stryker to meet all coercive needs is Stryker’s apparent vulnerability to IEDs and improved Rocket Propelled Grenades that might be employed in extended urban operations. This, however, is a matter for further study and lies outside of the scope of this monograph.

What is certain, however, is that armor must not be an after-thought for commanders that are embroiled in warfare that is non-contiguous and spans beyond ideological or cultural boundaries. Armored warfare exudes the essence of firepower, mobility and shock effect. In Fourth Generation warfare, tanks as part of a combined arms team, employed with multi-spectrum capabilities in mind, integrated with Special Forces and air forces, give to a commander a unique capability that combines both protection and destruction. Armor can coerce – when employed correctly. The next important, and ultimately dangerous, question then becomes, “In a war of ideology and culture, when does psychological coercion give way to the physical?”

“A Conviction is Best Shot?”

The most dangerous aspect of coercion and the employment of overwhelming firepower in Fourth Generation warfare remains the temptation by the stronger power to destroy a nuisance.

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120 Ibid, 6.11.
rather than set the conditions to foster growth of friendly ideology. Wars of ideology often lead to untold destruction more from sheer frustration than from exhaustion of means and resources. However, the answer is often complex if not elusive, testing the moral strength of a nation and its armed forces. Elimination of safe havens and the reduction of terrorist activities may occur when resource allocation tends toward construction and growth instead of destruction and death. This is the double-bind problem of the Fourth Generation. This is the problem of the Romans in Judea in the first century, the IDF in its territories, and the United States in underdeveloped countries and failed states that breed terrorism and corruption.

Operationally, coercive techniques must be the mantra, with emphasis on risk and denial. In the world of vendetta justice and martyrdom, decapitation and punishment strikes as part of a large-scale operation should be rare. Fourth Generation warfare is an extension of war between ideologies where culture becomes a critical capability and vulnerability. Shock battle is part of the western culture, but the idea that “a conviction is best shot”\textsuperscript{121} leads to a misapplication of heavy forces and firepower that could be more detrimental to the effort than desired. Armor, committed quickly to place an opponent at risk, deny room to maneuver, and even to decapitate enemy leadership, maintains its status as the superior force of choice in coercion, however, the preceding paragraphs show that armor forces should sparingly apply punishment strikes in Fourth Generation Conflict.

**Recommendation: The Doctrine of Shock**

Shock battle and coercive effects rely heavily on the psychology of opposing forces. Decisive effects from armored employment are the goal of their commitment. A review of current doctrine, notes the requirement for “decisive force” or “decisive action,”\textsuperscript{122} however, there is no written land doctrine that address how to achieve coercive effects against an enemy. Most

\textsuperscript{121} T.E. Lawrence, “The Evolution of a Revolt.”
Army doctrine pre-supposes armor’s “shock effect.” Nevertheless, the question remains; how does one plan for the employment of armor in a Fourth Generation environment to maximize the inherent shock effect of the armored system? “Effects” answer the question.

Armor doctrine must incorporate Effects Based Operations (EBO) into corps and below battle planning. It seems somewhat elementary that commanders should hope to employ assets to achieve maximum coercive effects, but a written doctrine that carefully defines and refines EBO terminology and objectives at the lower level would allow commanders to integrate armored assets into joint operations more easily. The writers of “Thinking Effect: Effects Based Methodology in Joint Operations,” understand the basic need for commanders to think in terms of second and third order effects in military operations. These effects obviously could have ramifications across the entire ‘bridge” of conflict, to include diplomatic, economic, informational, financial, and legal aspects. In the Fourth Generation, pressure on one of these points affects the whole structure. Therefore, when employing military force, destruction may not be the answer for fear of destroying another point on truss. Colonel Edward Mann, Lieutenant Colonel Gary Endersby and Thomas Searle put this fact in these words:

While recognizing that military actions usually create immediate physical effects, the focus of the EBO construct … transcends immediate physical results. Therefore, this concept does not address results in terms of destruction but in terms of outcomes that may or may not include destruction… Where destruction, attrition and annihilation are used, the real desire is often to create higher-level psychological effects.123

This monograph has shown how armor may create high-level psychological effects by giving an opponent the limited choices of either fleeing for his life, standing his ground and fighting on uneven terms, or laying down his life for his cause or ideology. U.S. tactical doctrine must be brought in line with Joint operational doctrine and integrate armor as a mechanism that connects objectives with strategies across strategic, operational, and tactical lines.

Summary: Ships Passing in the Night?

Warfare in the Fourth Generation presents itself primarily in its asymmetric form. Conventionally weaker adversaries would seem to avoid direct confrontation with heavily armored forces, however, history has shown, and as illustrated in Jenin, the tactics of a Fourth Generation fighter might lend itself to direct battle with a stronger force. Tanks and Mechanized Infantry become high value targets in Fourth Generation warfare as a weaker element attempts to galvanize the case for which they are fighting. A burning tank creates a picture of victory for the group that destroyed the vehicle.

While many thinkers, such as William Lind, might assert that armored forces in a Fourth Generation conflict are basically irrelevant, that they are merely “ships passing in the night,” Jenin has proven that these forces, when properly employed, might encourage engagement. The asymmetric fighter may not possess a numeric or technological advantage over a stronger force but they will still try to mass effects. In Jenin, Islamist elements synchronized their actions and drew the IDF into an overcrowded refugee camp. This forced the IDF to fight in a highly complex urban operation that limited the firepower and mobility of the ground and air forces and strengthened the moral justness of the Palestinian cause in the eyes of the world.

So we now come full circle to the beginning of this monograph: a commander has to establish the kind of war on which he is embarking; “neither mistaking for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature.”

Tanks and heavy infantry fighting vehicles do have relevance in Fourth Generation warfare, provided commanders use them wisely and with synchronized effects. Additionally, commanders must take care concerning the employment of the heavy forces. To paraphrase an old adage: There’s nary a slip twixt decisive force and atrocity. Heavy forces, when employed in a complex urban situation, must be committed with

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124 Clausewitz, 88.
125 Original adage is “There’s many a slip ‘twixt a cup and a lip.” Found in Poor Richard’s Almanac, by Benjamin Franklin.
detailed and effects-based planning, by immediately making clear the limitations and constraints of the use of such force.

This monograph asserts that deterrence has limited applicability when the nation-state is taken out of the equation. This is not to say that deterrence is an outmoded concept, but rather, must be used in conjunction with coercive effects to achieve the desired ends against non-state and transnational actors. Given the debate between deterrence and coercion, this concept of “Coercive Deterrence” thus presents itself as another area for further study.

However, it is certain that as an instrument of the state, armored forces must rely on their inherently coercive effects against non-state or transnational actors. Armor is a powerful physical symbol of placing an adversary at risk, while proper employment can deny safe haven and access to safe havens. While not all together an efficient means for decapitation strikes against enemy leadership, armored forces have the means for punishment strikes. This package of “goods delivered” by armor creates the “shock battle” needed for coercive effects.
APPENDIX A:
Second Intifada Chronology

Table One
The Second Intifada: A Chronology

2000

2000

- July 11 - President Clinton launches a peace summit with Palestinian Authority Chairman Yasser Arafat and Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak at Camp David. Both sides make progress in compromising on the final settlement issues, seeking to meet a September 13 deadline for a peace agreement.
- July 25 – The Camp David summit ends after 15 days without an agreement. The fate of Jerusalem and Palestinian refugees are the main obstacles. Palestinians want Arab East Jerusalem as the capital of their planned state. Israel, which seized East Jerusalem in the 1967 war, regards it as its indivisible capital.
- July 29 - Arafat begins visits to foreign states in an effort to gain support for the Palestinian position. Many Arab states support his refusal to make concessions over Jerusalem, but many Arab and Western leaders urge him not to declare a Palestinian state before reaching a peace deal with Israel.
- September 6 - Clinton fails to resolve the differences between Barak and Arafat during his separate meetings with the leaders during the UN Millennium Summit in New York.
- September 10 - The 129-member Palestinian parliament decides to delay the planned declaration of a Palestinian state, saying this will allow more time to reach a peace deal. It says it will meet to consider the matter again by November 15.
- September 13 - Israelis and Palestinians fail to meet a deadline they had agreed for reaching a peace deal.
- September 27 - An Israeli soldier is killed by a roadside bomb in Palestinian-ruled Gaza.
- September 28 - A visit by right-wing Israeli leader Ariel Sharon to the al-Aqsa mosque and the Temple Mount, a holy site in Jerusalem sacred to both Jews and Muslims, leads to major clashes between Palestinian protesters and Israeli security forces. Dozens of police and several Palestinians are injured.
- September 29 - Palestinians clash with Israeli security forces. The Israelis open fire with rubber-coated metal bullets in the al-Aqsa mosque compound in Jerusalem's walled Old City. Six Palestinians killed and close to 200 wounded.
- September 30 - Major clashes erupt in the Gaza Strip and West Bank. Fatah Hawks, Hamas, and Palestinian Islamic Jihad supporters, as well as some Palestinian Authority security personnel, join in mass violence and stone throwing against the IDF. Fourteen Palestinians killed by Israeli fire, including 12-year-old Mohammed Aldura, whose death is broadcast around the world (the IDF would first contend that his death was accidental, and later would revise its position claiming that Palestinians may have shot Mohammed Aldura for sympathy purposes). Scattered sniping by Palestinians.
- October 1 - Clashes erupt between Israeli Arabs and Jews in Umm al-Fahem and Arab-populated towns in northern Israel. Cease-fire agreed on but collapses. Twelve killed, including an Israeli border policeman who bleeds to death inside Joseph’s Tomb in West Bank city of Nablus as Palestinian gunmen keep medics away.

• October 2 - 19 are killed. Israeli Arabs protest in solidarity with Palestinians. Israelis are barred from travel in Palestinian territories.
• October 3 – There are reports of another cease-fire agreement. Clashes resume, and six are killed.
• October 4 - Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak and Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat meet U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and French President Jacques Chirac in Paris. Arafat declines to sign an agreement because of a failure to agree on terms for an international inquiry or fact-finding mission into the violence. Both sides order military forces away from flashpoints. Seven killed.
• October 5 - Arafat attends talks with Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak and US Secretary of State Madeline Albright, but Barak sees no point in going to the talks because of Arafat's refusal to sign the agreement in Paris. Israeli tanks move back from positions in West Bank. Three killed.
• October 5 - Malaysia presents a draft UN resolution condemning the violence committed by Israeli security forces. The UN Security Council adopts a modified resolution condemning Israel's "excessive use of force" against the Palestinians. The United States abstains. Barak says the Palestinians must end their wave of protests within two days or Israel will consider the peace process dead.
• October 6 - Israel seals West Bank and Gaza Strip as the Palestinians declare a ‘Day of Rage.’ Israeli troops seize a Jerusalem shrine after the Palestinians raise their flag. One killed in clash with police outside the shrine, nine die in West Bank and Gaza.
• October 7 – The UN Security Council adopts a resolution condemning Israel’s use of force against the Palestinians. Confrontations take place on the Israeli-Lebanese border and Lebanese guerrilla group Hizbollah seizes three Israeli soldiers in cross-border raid. The guerrillas used a vehicle and uniforms with fake UN markings and flags. These were most likely obtained at one of the many souvenir shops in Lebanon. Under pressure to respond, Barak issues a 48-hour ultimatum for the Palestinian to halt their assaults on Israeli military outposts and civilian settlements, threatening to direct the IDF and the security forces to use all means at their disposal to halt the violence, should the PA fail to comply.
• October 8 Israeli forces blow up two apartment buildings and a factory building in Gaza used by Palestinian gunmen. Jewish settler Hillel Lieberman is found dead in a cave near a West Bank highway. Two Palestinians and one Israeli Arab killed.
• October 9 - Secretary-General Kofi Annan and Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov travel to the region for meetings with Israeli and Palestinian officials and crisis talks with Barak and Arafat. Clashes in Jerusalem, Nazareth and Hebron continue through Yom Kippur. Barak’s 48-hour deadline is extended to avoid a prolonged armed conflict. Violence between Israeli Arabs and Jews erupts across the country. Three Palestinians killed.
• October 10 - Barak says it is too early to tell whether a slight fall in level of violence is enough to resume negotiations. A 12-year-old Palestinian boy, Mohammad al-Dura, is shot in the head in Gaza, while rioting continues in the West Bank.
• October 11 - Violence continues, as does diplomatic activity. An effigy of Barak is burned at a Palestinian march in Hebron. Israelis and Palestinians exchange gunfire in cities, villages and along West Bank highways. Three Palestinians killed.
• October 12 – a Palestinian mob kills two Israeli soldiers inside a Palestinian police station in Ramallah, and throws one of their bodies out the window in front of television cameras. Israeli helicopters rocket Palestinian targets including Yasser Arafat’s residential compound, police stations and broadcasting centers. The 12-year-old boy shot on October 10th dies.
• October 13 - Israeli security forces and Palestinians fight in sporadic clashes. Annan intensifies peace efforts, says he expects a summit in 48 hours. Palestinians staged
marches across the West Bank and Israel prevents Muslims under the age of 45 from participating in Friday prayers at Jerusalem’s al-Aqsa mosque. Efforts continue to bring Barak and Arafat together for a summit. Two Palestinians killed in clashes in Hebron, West Bank. Palestinian State Television broadcasts an inflammatory sermon instructing Palestinians: “Wherever you are, wherever you find them (Jews), kill them.”

• October 14 - Barak and Arafat agree to attend a summit meeting in Sharm el-Sheikh. Clinton says he will also attend, with Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, Annan and European Union foreign policy representative Javier Solana. Clashes in West Bank and Gaza Strip are isolated.

• October 14, - Hizbollah says it has lured an Israeli intelligence officer and reserve colonel into Lebanon and has taken him captive. Low-level violence continues in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

• October 16 - Arafat joins Barak, Clinton, President Mubarak, and King Abdullah in Jordan for a summit meeting in Sharm el-Sheikh in a bid to end the violence. Low-level violence continues in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

• October 17 - Clinton announces at the end of the summit that both sides have agreed to halt violence, set up an inquiry into its causes and explore a return to peace negotiations. The sides should "take immediate, concrete measures" to end the 19-day conflict, which has killed more than 100 people, mostly Palestinians, and endangered once promising peace negotiations. The measures include immediate statements from Arafat and Barak urging an end to violence, elimination of points of friction, redeployment of Israeli forces, an end to incitement, restoration of security cooperation between the two sides and a lifting of an Israeli closure of Palestinian towns that has kept residents confined there during the violence. But the "statement of understandings" read out by Clinton is a report on oral undertakings that officials said were not put on paper. It includes no specifics about what is supposed to happen--or in what order--leaving it uncertain whether the two struggling leaders left the summit at this Egyptian resort with the same set of expectations about what they had committed to do.

• October 18 – Neither Barak nor Arafat announces the details of his position on the agreement. Arafat has the Palestinian Authority issue statements but personally remains silence. The IDF does ease constraints on Palestinian movement, but tensions only ease moderately. Sporadic violence continues.

• October 19 – Marwan Barghouti, the head of the Fatah movement on the West Bank, says that the Fatah armed militia or Tanzim, will continue the struggle against Israel in spite of the Sharm el-Sheikh agreement.

• October 20 – Arab leaders arrive in Cairo for summit meeting. Fighting leaves as many as 10 Palestinians dead. Barak threatens to suspend the peace process. The UN General Assembly resolution condemns Israel for the “excessive use of force.” The non-binding resolution is adopted with only 92 votes in favor - an unusually low number for resolutions on the Middle East. Six countries vote “no" votes, and 46 countries abstain. Some 30 countries don’t vote at all. The resolution was the third adopted by the United Nations since the violence began on September 28th, following a similar one in the Security Council. The Israeli Foreign Ministry calls the resolution “completely one-sided,” saying it ignores the mob killing of two Israeli soldiers and the desecration of Jewish holy sites in Nablus and Jericho.

• October 21 – Arab leaders at the summit in Cairo condemn Israeli violence, but call for pressure on Israel to support the peace process on Palestinian terms. Libya walks out. Iraq condemns moderation. Crown Prince Abdullah of Saudi Arabia calls for $1 billion in aid to Palestinians, and offers $250 million. Voice of Palestine radio and television switches to simultaneous FM transmission on several frequencies, after having its primary transmitter destroyed by Israeli retaliatory
strikes following the mob killings of two Israeli soldiers, reaching an even larger audiences. These transmissions frequently show clashes between Israeli forces and Palestinian young people, as well as eulogies for Palestinians who have died fighting for the cause.

October 22 – The final statement of the Arab League condemns Israel: “The Arab leaders confirm that the Al-Aqsa Intifada erupted as a result of continuing occupation and the Israeli violation of Haram al Sharif, and the rest of the Islamic and Christian holy sites in the Palestinian land… They also affirm the Palestinian people's right to just compensation from Israel for moral, human and material losses… Arab leaders demand forming a neutral international committee in the framework of the United Nations that will report to the Security Council, and the Human Rights Committee, on the reasons and the responsibility for the dangerous deterioration in the occupied Palestinian Land, and the massacres committed by the Israeli occupying forces… They also ask that the Security Council and General Assembly take charge of providing protection for the Palestinian people under Israeli occupation, through discussing forming a force or any international presence for this purpose. … Arab Leaders affirm that Arab nations shall pursue, in accordance with international law, those responsible for these brutal practices and demand that the Security Council form an international tribunal dedicated to trying Israeli criminals of war who committed massacres against the Palestinians and the Arabs in the occupied land like the former tribunal formed for criminals of war in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia. … Arab leaders express their deep resentment and deprecation of the Israeli escalation in aggression and its provocation in a time when the region was getting ready for comprehensive and just peace, especially after the Arabs decided since the Madrid conference that a comprehensive and just peace is their option and opens the way for a final settlement. … Arab leaders affirm that a comprehensive and just peace shall not be achieved without the return of Jerusalem to Palestinian sovereignty and without granting the Palestinians legitimate rights including the founding of an independent state with Jerusalem as its capital. … And without restoring all Arab land occupied, including a full Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank and Gaza and from Golan to the borders of June 4, 1967, and the completion of the Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon to the international borders including Shabaa plantation. And without the release of Arab prisoners held in the Israeli prisons. … Arab leaders affirm that achieving durable peace and security in the region requires Israeli accession to the nuclear non-proliferation treaty. And to submit all Israeli nuclear installations to international inspection system. They stress the importance of making the Middle East free of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction.

Barak is quoted as saying at the weekly cabinet session: "We will have to take a time-out whose purpose is to reassess the peace process in response to the events of recent weeks." Barak says Israel needs a time-out from peacemaking with the Palestinians because the emergency Arab summit used what he called threatening language against Israel. “Israel totally rejects the language of threats that came out of the summit and condemns the call, folded into the decisions, for continued violence… we will have to take a time-out whose purpose is to reassess the peace process in response to the events of recent weeks " Israeli government spokesman Nachman Shai acknowledges to reporters that taking a time-out from peacemaking could bring about negotiations between Barak and right-wing opposition leader Ariel Sharon to form a national emergency government.

Arafat responds by saying that Barak's decision is no surprise and anyone blocking the Palestinian path to an independent state with Jerusalem as its capital can "go to hell." President Clinton, calls Barak to urge him "to get past the violence and ultimately get back to the peace process," Four Palestinians, including a 14-year-old, are killed in clashes with Israeli forces in the West Bank and Gaza Strip bringing the number of dead
in three weeks of bloodshed to 125, of which only eight are Israelis. Shooting takes place in the outskirts of Jerusalem, where police said at least 12 Israeli apartment buildings on West Bank territory were raked by gunfire from Beit Jalla village near Bethlehem. No one was hurt. Israeli attack helicopters fired machineguns at targets in the village in response. Israeli Army Radio says several Palestinians are wounded. Arab leaders end the summit in Cairo by calling for a war crimes tribunal to investigate Israel's handling of the crisis: "Arab states will prosecute according to international law those who caused these barbaric practices and demand that the Security Council form a special international criminal court to try Israeli war criminals." Tunisia severs its low-level diplomatic relations with Israel.

- October 23 – Israeli army imposes a blockade on Beit Jalla, a Palestinian town from which machine guns were fired Sunday night into the nearby Jerusalem neighborhood of Gilo. The army responds with machine-gun fire from tanks and infantry and missiles fired from attack helicopters. A factory in Beit Jalla was destroyed and Beit Jalla and Bethlehem were plunged into darkness. Hundreds of civilians fled from Beit Jalla and the nearby Aida refugee camp. Gilo has repeatedly come under fire from Beit Jalla. On Sunday night, Palestinian gunmen fired at streets that had not been hit before. Nobody is hurt but 16 apartments were damaged. Lt. Gen. Shaul Mofaz, the army chief of staff, says “If they make it impossible to conduct a normal life on the Israeli side I do not think we can tolerate such a situation,” Mofaz said the blockade was imposed to block the entry of armed Palestinian militants into Beit Jalla. The army said neighboring Bethlehem would not be sealed. Palestinians attacked Israeli army positions and bases in both regions. These attacks were also intended as a deterrent to future violence from the city, the Palestinians contend that there were no hostile armed forces in Beit Jalla. The Israeli army spokesman says a Palestinian shooting attack on an Israeli army position in the southern Gaza Strip was "massive." The Israelis respond with small arms and anti-tank rockets.

Syrian spokesmen attack Barak’s decision to take time out to reassess the peace process. One Syrian official says, “The peace process is in fact frozen. Barak is not a man of peace...He does not want peace and his call for a time-out is only a meaningless threat. Sharon's provocative visit to the holy Al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem which came in full coordination with Barak, and with his blessing, proves that the Israeli premier does not care about peace and that he does not care about the feelings of Arabs and Muslims.”

- October 24- Palestinian killed in Hebron, Israel claims that the man was part of the Tanzim militia, the Palestinian authority claims that he was simply a bystander. Additionally, 3 Palestinian teenagers were killed in fighting in the West Bank and Gaza.

Arafat gives Palestinian Islamic Jihad and Hamas leadership decision-making authority in the Palestinian National Authority and al-Fatah by placing them on the High Committee of the Follow-Up Intifada of Nationalist Islamic Organizations.

- October 25- Sporadic violence continues, President Clinton states that Arafat could dramatically lower the level of violence if he so chooses. Gun sales in Israel are reported to have increased threefold and weapons training courses have increased by five times in the last month. Polls in Israel reveal that most Israeli citizens believe that the army has so far showed restraints in its dealings with the Palestinian protesters.

US House of Representatives passes a resolution (365-30) of support of Israel, while condemning both the use of force by both sides and blaming the Palestinian leadership for the recent outbreak of violence.

Israel releases its rules of engagement: Tear gas and stun grenades are used first. Should these fail to disperse the protest rubber-coated metal bullets are used, which are supposed to be shot at the lower body from a distance of 25 meters or more. Live ammunition is
used in response to firebombs, shooting at the lower body and when encountering shooting and/or grenades Israeli soldiers will shoot to kill.

- October 26- The Palestinian Islamic Jihad claims credit for a suicide bombing of an Israeli Army post in Gaza killing the bomber and wounding an Israeli soldier. It was carried out on the fifth anniversary of the assignation of the group’s leader, Fathi Shiqaqi, although the PIJ claimed it was only a coincidence. The PIJ also renewed its pledge to liberate all of Palestine, not just the West Bank and Gaza, therefore their attacks would not be confined to the occupied territories in the future.

A low intensity cyber-conflict develops when Israel teenagers brag that they sabotaged the Hezbollah web site by placing Israeli flags, posting Zionist articles and having the site play the Israeli national anthem when a user logs on. Soon after the Israeli Defense Forces and the Prime Minister’s web site was crashed after being bombarded by a huge number of emails. The Knesset web site had files tampered with by hackers, possibly from Saudi Arabia.

Praising Morocco’s decision to sever ties with Israel, the Secretary General of the Arab League Arab League Ismat Abdul Miguid called on all Arab states which have relations with Israel to cut these relations. He, however, stressed that each nation had the right to make its own decisions about its foreign relations.

- October 27- Sporadic fighting continues, Hezbollah calls for more bombings like that of the PIJ bombing the previous day.

- October 28- One month anniversary of Ariel Sharon’s visit to Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif, to date 149 dead, the vast majority being Palestinian. Sporadic fighting continues with heavier fighting near Beit Jalla after Israeli forces began to take small arms fire. Israeli helicopter and armor support were called upon to suppress the fire. Talks between Ariel Sharon and Ehud Barak to form a national unity government fall apart. Recent polls in Israel demonstrate a declining popularity of both leaders, while having increased support for Benjamin Netanyahu.

- October 29- Five Palestinians are killed in on-going fighting. Israel deploys armor to the Gaza Strip. Al-Fatah urges the Palestinian people to “continue and escalate the Intifada.”

- October 30- Two Israelis are killed; both were armed civilians in the greater Jerusalem area. Several Palestinians are wounded in continuing clashes.

Israeli Defense Forces admit that lethal force may have been inappropriately used in the deaths of 2 brothers in the West Bank. The brothers may have been simply throwing rocks and Israeli rules of engagement require that there be immediate danger to military or civilian lives.

Barak’s government does not collapse, despite efforts of Ariel Sharon after the Shas party announces that it would not use its block of votes for a no-confidence vote against Barak. This leaves Barak with a minority government of 30 MPs in a 120 seat Knesset.

Israeli helicopters launch a series of strikes against al-Fatah headquarters installations. Rather than being retaliatory in nature, these were initiated to send a message to al-Fatah. These represent a change in Israeli tactics according to Deputy Defense Minister Ephraim Sneh to “more sophisticate measures” and strikes will no longer necessarily be retaliatory in nature. The air strike against the al-Fatah office in El-Bireh in the West Bank missed and hit a Palestinian home.

New more aggressive attacks are authorized for the IDF land forces, these allow specialized anti-guerilla units to operate and capture suspects in shooting incidents in Palestinian controlled areas.

- October 31-Six Palestinians die in fresh fighting in Gaza. Palestinian forces from al-Fatah and Tanzim make use of anti-tank weapons for the first time. Israel forces responded with heavy machine gun fire and by bulldozing the al-Fatah outpost with military bulldozers. Israel begins to fortify Jewish towns within Israel against possible Arab attack.
• November 1- Three Israeli soldiers are killed in fighting the West Bank near Bethlehem and Jericho, Israel begins retaliatory strikes. These damage a casino and the Palestinian training facilities in Jericho. The settlement of Gilo near Beit Jalla comes under the heaviest fire since the violence began.

    Negotiation between Shimon Peres and Yasser Arafat yields a truce despite heavy fighting. Israeli forces are to withdraw from their positions at dawn on November 2.

• November 2- A car bomb explodes in the Jerusalem marketplace killing two, the PIJ claims responsibility. This blast kills the daughter of National Religious Party leader Rabbi Yitzhak Levy. Israel tanks begin to withdraw from positions in the occupied territories.

• November 3- 2 Palestinians die amid new clashes, however, the overall number of clashes declines. The web-site of the American-Israeli Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) is hacked, 3,500 credit card numbers are stolen, this spreads the low-intensity cyber-conflict to America.

• November 4- Sporadic clashes continues. Two Palestinians die, one is a 14-year-old girl who dies due to previously sustained gunshot wounds; the other is a baby who dies of tear gas inhalation. Palestinian and Israeli leaders both announce that they are ready to meet with Clinton to end the violence.

• November 5- Al-Fatah leadership declares that the Intifada should continue and there cannot be any negotiations. Two Palestinians are killed in renewed clashes. Two Israeli settlers were killed near Ramallah.

    IDF sources report an increased targeting of settlements and IDF soldiers by Palestinian gunmen, however Arafat orders that gunmen take a reduced role in the rock-throwing segments of the uprising.

• November 6- Two Palestinians die in continuing clashes. Barak rejects Arafat's call for an international peacekeeping force.

• November 7- One Palestinian died when a fishing boat exploded near an Israeli patrol boat off of the Gaza Strip near the Egyptian-Israeli border in what IDF sources called a fumbled suicide bombing. There were no Israeli causalities.

    The Israeli government reports that that there has been a 40 percent reduction in the number clashes since the most recent truce was signed.

• November 9- Israel forces successfully killed Hussein Abayat, a local military commander in Fatah. He was believed to be responsible for 6 separate shooting incidents involving Israeli soldiers including one in which three IDF soldiers were killed. Abayat was traveling in a van in Beit Sahur when a Israeli attack helicopter destroyed the van with two Hellfire missiles. The IDF hoped that this would have a deterrent effect on other upper and mid-level Fatah officers involved in the recent violence. Two Palestinian women were killed in shrapnel from the explosion. The killing of Abayat is widely regarded as the first successful implementation of a strategy of assassinating Palestinians held responsible for having attacked or planning attacks on Israeli targets in the framework of the recent violence.

    Bill Clinton and Yasser Arafat meet in Washington DC hours after the missile strike; very little progress is made.

• November 10- Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat appeals to the United Nations Security Council to send a UN force. Four more Palestinians, an Israeli Arab and an Israeli soldier are killed in clashes.

• November 12- In Gilo a rare daylight attack against the settlement, this represents a more aggressive use of military force by the Palestinians.

    Crown Prince Abdullah of Saudi Arabia demanded that all Arab states cut off their ties with Israel and cut off ties with any nation that moves its embassy to Jerusalem. However, no unified Muslim voices seems to come from the Organization of the Islamic
Conference summit in terms of policy, but are able to generate a strong statement of condemnation.

• November 13- Four Palestinians, including the nephew of Mohammed Dahlan, the head of Preventative Security, and four Israelis die, including two female civilians. Palestinian gunmen are increasingly targeting settlers and soldiers in ambushes, moving towards a possible Lebanonization of the conflict. Israel once again shuts down non-emergency access to and from the West Bank and Gaza.

• November 15- Palestinian Independence Day, eight Palestinians are killed, the Israeli government announces that it will abandon its “policy of restraint” that it previously had towards the conflict. Yasser Arafat calls on Fatah activists to stop shooting at Israeli soldiers. Israeli helicopters attack four Fatah positions in the territories. A German citizen is killed in these attacks.

• November 17- For the first time, Arafat makes a call, via radio, for the cessation of shooting in the Palestinian controlled areas. This however, is not satisfactory to the Israeli government because it called for a ban only on weapons firing in Area A, however Areas B and C were noticeably excluded from Arafat’s ban.

• November 19- An Israeli embassy official is shot and wounded in Amman, Jordan.

• November 20- A roadside bomb in Gaza is detonated next to a school bus killing two adults and wounding five children. Omar Al-Mukhtar, the military wing of the Syrian-based Fatah Uprising claimed responsibility. Israel retaliates by launching numerous missile strikes against Fatah buildings in the West Bank and Gaza marking the heaviest bombardment to date.

• November 21- Gunfire escalates in the wake of the missile strikes and Egypt recalls its ambassador in protest to recent Israeli aggression.

• November 22- Four Palestinians which Israel claimed were Tanzim militia gunmen are ambushed by IDF infantry with mechanized support while driving in civilian vehicles. The Palestinian Authority claimed these men are not Tanzim and were in fact civilians. Jamal Abdel Razek, a Fatah officer, was among the dead. There are conflicting statements on whether or not the party was armed or attempting to run a checkpoint.

• A car bomb explodes in Hadera along a passing bus, killing two and wounding sixty. Hamas’ Ezzedin al-Qassam Brigades claimed responsibility for the bombing.

• November 23- An Israeli-Palestinian liaison office is hit by a mortar shelling killing an Israeli officer. This almost immediately results in Israel ordering all Palestinian police and security officers to leave the all liaison offices throughout the West Bank and Gaza. This temporarily ends security cooperation between the Palestinians and Israelis. In a gun battle between an Israeli patrol and Palestinian forces one Israeli and one Palestinian are killed. Ibrahim Beni Ouda, a leader of Hamas’s armed wing, Ezzedin al-Qassam, is blown up in a car in Nablus.

• November 24- Israeli-Palestinian liaison offices are re-opened after a telephone conversation between Barak and Arafat. While “cooperation” is officially resumed the situation remains tense and little to no actual cooperation is taking place. Six Palestinians, an Israeli major (the highest-ranking officer to date killed) and a Jewish settler are slain in continuing violence.

• November 26- Israeli soldiers attack a carload of Fatah members with small arms, killing all five individuals in the car; another Palestinian died of previously sustained wounds from a separate incident.

• November 27- UN rights Commissioner Mary Robinson delivers a highly critical address to the UN General Assembly condemning Israel’s excessive use of force and called for an international monitoring force. For the first time in almost 3 weeks no one on either side died.
November 28- Barak agrees to early elections after his bid to pull together a national unity government fails.

November 29- Four Palestinians are killed attempting to enter Israel, Sharon begins to make plans to run against Barak.

November 30- Barak proposes that a Palestinian state be formed in the West Bank and Gaza, but leaving the status of Jerusalem, refugees and final borders to be resolved by future negotiations over the next three years. The Palestinian Authority was quick to reject this plan, saying only a comprehensive peace plan can be successful.

December 1- On the first day of Ramadan Israel lifts its ban on Palestinians under the age of forty, praying at the Al-Asqa Mosque Complex; both sides show restraint in this sector, however violence continues elsewhere.

Mohammed Dief, a Hamas bomb maker escapes from a Palestinian jail with the help of his guards, this is not disclosed to the public until a week later.

December 2- Head of Fatah in the West Bank Marwan Barghouti, declares that the Palestinians will not stop the uprising as a condition of resumed negotiations.

December 3- Under strong pressure from the Clinton administration, Israel lifts its opposition to an inquiry panel investigating the causes of the recent violence.

December 4- Yasser Arafat is seen in public for the first time since 1994 holding his sub-machine gun. Jewish settlers blocked his route by throwing stones at his convoy and he continued to hold the weapon after the incident while reviewing troops. The settlers were detained by the IDF.

US Ambassador to Israel Martin Indyk publicly states that the continued violence in the occupied territories and Hizbullah attacks in violation of UN Security Council 425 increase the risk of a new regional war.

December 5- An Israeli embassy employee is shot and wounded while leaving a supermarket parking lot in Jordan. He was driving in an unmarked car. This is the second such incident in 3 weeks.

December 6- Fatah leader Marwan Barghouti states that negotiations should not be restarted and that the current uprising should be escalated. Also, he said that Arafat had rescinded the order not to fire from Palestinian controlled areas.

December 7- A Palestinian man is sentenced to death by a Palestinian court in Nablus for spying for Israel and assisting opposing security forces with the November 23 assassination of local Hamas leader Ibrahim Bani Oudeh.

The World Bank authorizes a 12 million dollar grant to the Palestinian Authority to offset the growing economic problems stemming from Israeli travel restrictions.

December 8- Ten people die in the worst violence since the original outbreak of violence on September 28, 2000. Three were Israeli settlers and seven were Palestinian.

December 9- Iraq promises 1 billion Euros (approximately $900 million US) in food and medical aid to the Palestinians.

December 10- Barak resigns as Prime Minister in an effort to outflank Netanyahu, as one must be a sitting member of the Knesset in order to run for Prime Minister in an early election. Polls show Netanyahu would crush Barak by an almost 2 to 1 margin in the election, if the two run against one another.

In the West Bank, Israeli soldiers kill a Palestinian man who was planting a roadside bomb. Palestinian gunmen ambush Chief Rabbi Meir Lau. The IDF convinced the rabbi to travel in an armored bus instead of his usual car, therefore the rabbi arrived at his destination unharmed.

December 11- Bill Mitchell’s probe into the causes and solutions to the recent violence begins, but is overshadowed by the drama of Israeli election policy. Israeli soldiers kill Anwar Hamran, a suspected bombing suspect for the PIJ, while waiting for a taxicab in Nablus.
• December 12- IDF infantry kills Yousef Abu Swayeh, a local Fatah leader, in front his house.

• December 13- Claiming that they were pursuing a shooting suspect, IDF forces cross into a Palestinian held sector of the Gaza Strip. They crossed only about 100 meters into Area A.

Chief of General Staff Lt.-Gen. Shaul Mofaz said on Wednesday that the IDF is carrying out intensive clandestine actions to foil attempts by Palestinian gunmen to attack Israeli civilians and soldiers in the territories.

Abbas al-Awedi, Hamas member, is shot by the IDF on streets of Hebron. He had been previously been arrested several times by both Israeli and Palestinian authorities.

• December 14- Israeli soldiers stop and shoot at a checkpoint, Hani Abu Bakr, a Hamas member after he attempted to draw a pistol.

• December 17- In a meeting with Israeli Members of Knesset (MKs), Arafat told the Israeli delegation that the Israeli military, led by Chief of Staff Shaul Mofaz, forces its agenda on Israel's politicians. Arafat accused Mofaz of having an extensive plan to flare up the situation, including assassinations, designed to eliminate any possibility of peace.

• December 19- Israeli and Palestinian officials meet in Washington DC to discuss the prospects for peace.

The UN Security Council voted against deploying UN observers to the disputed regions after only receiving 8 of the 9 votes necessary in the 15-member body, France. Namibia, Malaysia, Bangladesh, Jamaica, Tunisia, Mali, Ukraine and China all supported the resolution. Argentina, Canada, the Netherlands, Britain, Russia and the US abstained.

Benjamin Netanyahu declares that he will not seek the office of Prime Minister saying he would only run if Parliament disbanded, and parliamentary elections were held. This leaves Ariel Sharon and Shimon Peres as potential rivals to Barak in February.

• December 21- The Israeli Foreign Ministry decides not to cooperate with an international panel set up by the United Nations Human Rights Commission "to investigate Israel's human rights violations of Palestinians in the territories."

• December 22- Three Israeli soldiers are injured in a suicide bomb attack at the Mehola Junction roadside cafe in the northern Jordan Valley. The attacker, who detonated a belt of explosives strapped to him, was killed in the blast.

• December 23- Five days of discussions at Bolling Air Force Base in Washington, DC, between Israeli and Palestinian negotiators come to a close. President Clinton puts forward a comprehensive framework to resume negotiations and asks the parties to respond by December 27. The plan is said to include a fundamental trade-off between Palestinian sovereignty on the Temple Mount/Haram el-Sharif in return for giving up the demand that Palestinian refugees could return to Israel.

• December 31- Thabet Thabet, a doctor who headed Fatah in the town of Tulkarem and was director general of the Palestinian health ministry, is shot dead.

2001

• January 1- A car bomb explodes in the Israeli coastal town of Netanya, injuring 54 people, mostly lightly.

• January 2- Clinton and Arafat meet in Washington. The President presses Arafat to accept his compromise plan as a basis for continuing the talks with Israel.

• January 3- Arafat accepts Clinton’s outline for an end to the violence. U.S. mediators plan to meet with Israeli and Palestinian negotiators separately in order to refine understandings of Clinton’s ‘parameters.’

• January 7- Clinton describes the details of a ‘fair agreement’. Special Middle East Coordinator Dennis Ross is to travel to the region.
• January 8- Tens of thousands of Israelis demonstrate in Jerusalem against the city’s division.
• January 13- Arafat and Peres meet in Gaza City. Both sides say that no breakthroughs had been achieved.
• January 17- Israeli teenager Ofir Rahum is lured to Ramallah by a Palestinian woman he had previously met on the internet, and is then shot by three assailants.
• January 18- While in Cairo, Arafat extends a proposal for intensive talks to Israeli Foreign Minister Shlomo Ben-Ami.
• January 21- Palestinian and Israeli negotiators meet for a new round of talks in the Egyptian Red Sea resort of Taba.
• Barak orders the Israeli negotiators to the Taba talks back to Israel after two Israeli civilians are killed by Palestinian militants. Barak's office says there would be "no contacts at any level" between the parties' negotiators until a decision is reached to resume the talks.
• January 27- Negotiators conclude what they termed one of the most ‘profound’ rounds of peace talks ever, yet the sides remain deadlocked.
• February 6- Likud party head Ariel Sharon trounces Ehud Barak in Israeli prime ministerial elections, winning 61 percent of the vote.
• February 13- Israeli gunships kill a member of Force 17, Arafat’s personal security force. Israel claims the man, Colonel Masoud Ayad, was a leader of the Hizballah.
• February 14- Eight people are killed and 25 injured when a bus driven by a Palestinian plows into a group of soldiers and civilians waiting at a bus stop near Holon, south of Tel-Aviv.
• February 19- Mahmud el-Madani, a member of Hamas's armed wing, is shot and killed in the Balata refugee camp near Nablus.
• February 20- Under domestic political pressure, Barak withdraws from a deal he had sealed to forge a new Israeli government in alliance with Ariel Sharon, and says that he will not accept the post of defense minister in a future coalition. U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell tells Israeli and Palestinian leaders that the new U.S. administration believes they must solve their own security problems. America will help, Powell said, but it cannot substitute for the parties themselves.
• February 26- The Israeli Labor Party agrees to join a coalition government led by Ariel Sharon. Shimon Peres assumes the post of Foreign Minister, Binyamin ben-Eliezer that of Minister of Defense.
• March 1- One person is killed and nine injured when a terrorist detonates a bomb in a service taxi at the Mei Ami junction in Wadi Ara. The IDF and Israeli civilian officials discuss the possibility of reoccupying Palestinian-controlled territory.
• March 4- At a busy intersection in Netanya, a Palestinian suicide bomber kills himself and three Israelis.
• March 7- Ariel Sharon is sworn in as Israel’s new prime minister.
• March 18- Palestinians fire a mortar shell at an Israeli army base near Kibbutz Nahal Oz, adjacent to the Gaza Strip, lightly injuring one soldier. The mortar attack marks the first time Palestinian insurgents in Gaza have fired at Israeli targets located within Israel's borders. Three mortar bombs are fired at the Israel Defense Forces base.
• March 20- Colin Powell visits the Middle East for the first time as Secretary of State. He calls on both sides to end the violence.
• March 21- The Israeli army shells a Force 17 training base, killing one Palestinian officer.
• March 26- A Palestinian sniper shoots dead a 10-month-old baby girl, Shalhevet Pass, and wounds her father in the West Bank town of Hebron.
• March 27- A car bomb explodes in the Talpiot industrial/commercial zone in Jerusalem. Seven people are injured, one moderately. The Islamic Jihad claims responsibility for the attack. 28 people are injured, two seriously, in a suicide bombing directed against a
northbound No. 6 bus at the French Hill junction in Jerusalem. Hamas claims responsibility for the attack.

• March 28- In a Palestinian suicide bombing two Israeli teenagers are killed near the Palestinian city of Qalqilya. In response, Israeli helicopter gunships bombard bases and training camps of Yasir Arafat's personal security forces. It is Prime Minister Ariel Sharon's first military response since he took office three weeks ago. One member of the Force and two other Palestinians are killed.

• April 2- Mohammed Abdel Al, a military activist in Islamic Jihad, is killed when Israeli helicopters fire rockets on his car in Rafah in the southern Gaza Strip.

• April 5- Iyyad Hardan, the military leader of Islamic Jihad in Jenin, is blown up while standing in a public telephone booth in Jenin, apparently by a booby trapped telephone.

• April 6- Israeli helicopters fire rockets at Palestinian police installations north of Gaza City. At least four rockets are fired, damaging a two-story headquarters building and two other structures. Israel attacks after three mortar shells are fired from Palestinian areas in Gaza landed near Netiv Haasara, an Israeli village next to Gaza.

• April 10- Palestinians continue to fire mortar rounds at Israeli targets in the Gaza Strip and inside Israel. The shellings do not result in any casualties. Israel responds by firing antitank missiles at Palestinian police posts in Gaza. The attack on one target, a Palestinian naval post, kills a lieutenant and wounded 7 police officers; the second strike, on a police headquarters in a refugee camp, wounds 10. In contrast to recent nighttime raids, these are daylight attacks without warning on occupied buildings.

• April 11- Israelis in tanks and bulldozers enter a densely populated Gaza refugee camp in Khan Yunis before dawn and destroy buildings suspected of serving as launching pads for mortar attacks. The raid is followed by a prolonged ground battle as hundreds of armed Palestinians, summoned by mosque loudspeakers to defend the camp against an "Israeli invasion," rush into the streets. Two Palestinians are killed and two dozen wounded; no Israelis are killed. The assault on the refugee camp represents the largest and deepest Israeli ground attack into Palestinian-ruled territory since the current round of violence erupted in September.

• April 14- For the first time since Ariel Sharon took office, Israeli planes strike targets in southern Lebanon. The attack comes in retaliation for an attack staged by Hezbollah on Israeli soldiers, in which one soldier was killed.

• April 15- In response to Hezbollah attacks, including one in the previous week in which an Israeli soldier was killed. Israeli warplanes attack Syrian radar sites in Lebanon's central mountains. It is the first Israeli strike against the Syrian military in five years. One Syrian soldier is killed and four others wounded.

• April 16- Jordanian foreign minister Abdullah Khatib presents Israel with a proposal, backed by Egypt, to calm Israeli-Palestinian violence and renew peace negotiations. But he meets with a cold reaction from the Israeli leadership, who promises to study the suggestions further. The proposal seeks to set a timetable for completing the negotiations, and also calls for an end to Jewish settlement construction in the West Bank and Gaza, a pullback of Israeli troops from Palestinian towns and villages, and the lifting of Israeli's blockade of Palestinian-controlled areas. In return, it would require the Palestinians to end violence against Israelis.

Israeli Air Force warplanes attack Syrian radar installations in Dar al-Baidar in Lebanon’s central mountains. In the first Israeli strike against Syrian forces in five years, one Syrian soldier is killed and four others wounded. In an IDF statement, the military says that the attack came in response to Hizballah attacks against IDF positions on Israel’s northern border.
 Israeli military briefly seizes Beit Hanun in the northern Gaza Strip, an area under full Palestinian control, and bombard posts of Force 17. One member of the unit dies from wounds days later.

- April 17- IDF forces for the first time reoccupy territory in the Gaza Strip ceded to the Palestinian Authority under the 1993 Oslo Agreements. After first vowing to stay in the Palestinian-ruled area for as long as necessary, Prime Minister Ariel Sharon orders the troops to pull back. Yasser Arafat describes the Israeli action as an "unforgivable crime," and U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell intervenes with a rare criticism of Israel, calling the occupation "excessive and disproportionate." He demands that the government keep its promise to vacate the territory. However, Powell blames a "provocative" Palestinian mortar attack for precipitating the move. "The situation is threatening to escalate further, posing a risk of broader conflict," he says.

- April 18- Hours after Israel withdrew from a corner of the Gaza Strip, Palestinian militants renew mortar shellings of nearby Israeli settlements and military posts. No one is wounded.

- April 21- Israeli and Palestinian security chiefs meet at the Erez junction in the Gaza Strip in an effort to renew cooperation between the sides. The security officials decide to take measures to reduce the violence, and Israel commits itself to easing restrictions placed on the Palestinians. The Palestinians delegation expresses the Israeli response to its demands as insufficient.

 Israeli tanks rolled into the Palestinian-controlled town of Rafah and leveled a border police post before quickly pulling out. There were no reported injuries.

- April 22- A Palestinian suicide bomber detonates a powerful bomb at a Jerusalem bus stop, killing himself and an Israeli, and injuring 39. Hamas claims responsibility for the attack.

- April 25- Three Fatah members are killed in an unexplained explosion in the southern Gaza Strip town of Rafah.

- April 27- Israeli foreign minister Shimon Peres makes plans for meetings in Cairo and Washington to discuss the Egyptian-Jordanian proposal to revive the peace talks.

- April 28- A Fatah activist, Imad Daud Karake, 27, is shot dead while driving near Bethlehem in the West Bank

 Hassan el-Khadi, a member of Arafat's Fatah movement, who had been accused by the Israelis of taking part in the entrapment and murder of an Israeli youth, is killed in an explosion in a building in Ramallah that also killed two children.

- April 30- The Mitchell commission releases its final report and issues a strong call for an Israeli freeze on settlements and a Palestinian crackdown on terrorism as a prelude to the resumption of peace talks. The committee says the outbreak of the deadly clashes could not be attributed solely to Prime Minister Ariel Sharon's visit to the Temple Mount, nor to a preconceived effort by the Palestinian leader Yasir Arafat to unleash a bloody popular uprising.

 Two Hamas militants are killed by the explosion of a booby-trapped car in a garage in Gaza City.

- May 2- Israeli Army bulldozers backed by tanks rumble into a Palestinian refugee camp and raze several homes. One teenager is killed and 14 other Palestinians are wounded, United Nations and Palestinian officials said. The demolition in the refugee camp in Rafah is the latest example of an increasingly common tactic used by the Israeli Army in its battles with Palestinians in the Gaza Strip.

- May 5- Pope John Paul II visits Syria. Syrian President Bashar el-Asad is quoted as saying that "we see them [the Jews] attacking sacred Christian and Muslim places in Palestine. . . . They try to kill the principle of religions in the same mentality in which they betrayed Jesus Christ and in the same way with which they tried to kill the Prophet Muhammad."
May 6- Israeli soldiers enter Palestinian-controlled territory for several hours in what the IDF termed an effort to silence shooting at its positions. Israeli tank shells and gunfire kill a Palestinian fighter, Muhammad Abayat, 45, and wound 20 people, including a 5-year-old boy who is in serious condition.

May 9- Two Israeli teens, one of them also a U.S. citizen, are found bludgeoned to death in a cave in the Judean desert.

May 12- Israeli helicopters fire rockets at a car parked near the Palestinian Authority security building in Jenin, killing two people, including Moutasem Sabaa, a member of the Fatah movement. Witnesses say four helicopters flew overhead and hit the car with at least five rockets.

May 13- Israeli helicopter gunships bombard Palestinian security targets across the Gaza Strip, and naval boats strike at least eight Palestinian armored personnel carriers with rockets.

May 14- Israeli troops shoot and kill five Palestinian officers stationed at a roadblock in Beitunya, in the West Bank. The IDF says that the post served as a base for firing on Israeli bypass roads. Arafat describes the operation as a “dirty [and] immoral” killing of officers doing mundane, post-midnight guard duty while they were preparing a snack.

May 15- Israel accuses Arafat of calling for more violence on ‘Nakba (catastrophe) Day, in which Palestinians hold mass protests marking their exile after the creation of Israel in 1948. At least 120 Palestinians are wounded by Israeli gunfire.

May 16- An internal Israeli Army investigation determines that the killing of five Palestinian security men earlier this week was an error. Israeli officials says that an intelligence mistake led to the killing of the wrong five Palestinians in an ambush on Monday of a checkpoint in Beituniya in the West Bank. It was a case of "mistaken identity," according to a spokesman for Prime Minister Ariel Sharon. Israel also said to attack members of a different Palestinian security unit, Force 17, whom they held responsible for shootings from that area on an Israeli bypass road, but they did not realize that there had been a changing of the guard at the Palestinian checkpoint.

May 18- A Palestinian suicide bomber wearing an explosive vest detonates himself outside a Shopping Mall in Netanya. Five civilians are killed and over 100 wounded in the attack, for which Hamas claimed responsibility. Israel retaliates by sending F-16 fighter jets against security buildings in the West Bank and Gaza Strip for the first time since the 1967 war. At least nine Palestinians are killed and 90 wounded in fighter jet attacks on Nablus and Ramallah.

May 20- IDF tanks fire three shells at the home of Col. Jibril Rajoub, director of Palestinian security forces in the West Bank. Palestinians accuse Israel of trying to assassinate him, while the IDF denies aiming its attack personally at Mr. Rajoub, saying its troops had come under fire and responded by shelling "the precise source of the fire, which was definitely from the courtyard of Jibril Rajoub's house."

May 21- Colin Powell dispatches a senior aide, William J. Burns, to meet with Israeli and Palestinian leaders. Powell urges the Israelis and Palestinians to declare an immediate unconditional cease-fire, and issues a formal statement endorsing the recommendations of the Mitchell commission.

May 22- Israeli military officials order troops to open fire only when their lives are endangered and to otherwise "cease fire." Prime Minister Sharon says that he “proposed to our neighbors that we work together to reach an immediate cease-fire.”

May 25- 65 people are injured in a car bombing in the Hadera central bus station. The Islamic Jihad claims responsibility.

May 27- A car bomb explodes in the center of Jerusalem shortly after midnight. There are no injuries, and the PFLP claims responsibility. Another bomb explodes in the morning at the ‘Russian Compound’ neighborhood in Jerusalem. It includes several mortar shells,
some of which are propelled hundreds of meters from the site of the explosion. 30 people are injured, most suffering from shock. The Islamic Jihad claims responsibility.

Newly appointed U.S. Middle East envoy William J. Burns meets with both Yasir Arafat and Prime Minister Ariel Sharon. Mr. Sharon's office issues a statement saying Israel was "nearing the limits of its patience" with its five-day-old, self-imposed, limited cease-fire.

• May 30- A car bomb explodes outside a school in Netanya. Eight people are injured. The Islamic Jihad claims responsibility.

• June 1- 21 people are killed and 120 wounded when a suicide bomber blows himself up outside a disco on Tel Aviv’s beachfront while standing in a large group of teenagers waiting to enter the disco.

• June 2- For the first time since the latest Israeli-Palestinian violence began in late September 2000, Yasir Arafat publicly calls for an immediate and unconditional cease-fire. He condemns the suicide bombing of June 1. A senior Israeli military official says that Israel would hold off on a direct military reprisal against Palestinian Authority targets to give Arafat time to follow through. Speaking in Arabic on television in Ramallah, Arafat reads a statement drafted with German foreign minister Joschka Fischer, who had been in Tel Aviv at the time of the blast, and with UN envoy Terje Rod-Larsen. Arafat tells the cameras, "We have exerted and will now exert the utmost efforts to stop the bloodshed of our people and of the Israeli people, and to do all that is needed to achieve an immediate and unconditional, real and effective cease-fire."

• June 3- Arafat orders Palestinian security chiefs to prevent all attacks on Israeli targets from Palestinian-ruled territory. In a statement, Ariel Sharon says that "restraint is also an element of strength," while Defense Minister Binyamin Ben-Eliezer warns that his forces have their "fingers ready on the trigger." Israel’s government makes it known that a military plan of action is ready.

• June 4- On the second day of the cease-fire, Israeli leaders acknowledge that Palestinian violence had dropped significantly. Nevertheless, Israeli forces and Palestinian gunmen trade fire for hours in the Gaza Strip. Israel imposed a blockade on fuel and food shipments to Gaza and the West Bank. Germany's foreign minister, Joschka Fischer, spends an additional day in the region, talking to officials on both sides in an effort to get the cease-fire to hold.

• June 5- The Bush administration announced that it is sending the Director of Central Intelligence, George Tenet, to the Middle East to meet with leaders of Israeli and Palestinian security forces. The administration thus reverses a policy it had set when it took office.

Leaders of Hamas make it clear that they do not consider themselves bound by Arafat’s call for a ceasefire.

Appearing on Russian television, Prime Minister Ariel Sharon calls PA Chairman Arafat a ‘murderer’ and ‘pathological liar.’

• June 6- Jewish settlers fight Palestinians near a West Bank crossroads where an Israeli infant was wounded by Arab stone-throwers on June 5. Thousands of settlers gather at a rally in downtown Jerusalem, calling for Arafat’s death and condemning Prime Minister Ariel Sharon’s policy of restraint.

PA International Cooperation Minister Nabil Shaath and West Bank Preventive Security Chief Jibril Rajoub say that the Palestinian Authority does not intend to arrest members of opposition organizations such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad. Shaath is quoted saying that "the arrest of Palestinian activists is unequivocally unacceptable... We don't take orders from anyone, either the U.S. or Israel. The Palestinian Authority acts according to the interests of the Palestinian people."

• June 7- The Palestinian Authority rejects Israeli demands that it arrest dozens of Palestinian terrorist suspects. Shaath said that instead of rounding up the “usual suspects,” the PA is
willing to work with Israel on gathering information to prevent terrorist attacks. DCIA George Tenet meets separately with Sharon and Arafat.

• June 8- DCI George Tenet and Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs, William Burns, meet with Israeli and Palestinian officials. Tenet convenes a security meeting with security officials of the two sides, while Burns seeks to reopen a political dialogue.

• June 9- Israel Radio reports that security meetings between Tenet and Israeli and Palestinian officials produce a U.S. document that calls on Palestinians to arrest militants and crack down on anti-Israel attacks. The report also calls on Israel to halt attacks on Palestinian targets and to withdraw IDF forces from West Bank and Gaza Strip positions it held before the outbreak of hostilities on September 28. Israeli tank shells kill three Palestinian women near Netzarim junction.

• June 10- Eight mortar shells land near Jewish settlements in Gaza. Since Yasir Arafat called for an unconditional cease-fire on June 2, 42 mortar shells have been fired on Israeli targets.

• June 11- Imad Abu Thyab, an activist for the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, is critically wounded when a booby-trapped car he was about to enter exploded. The PIJ blames Israel for the explosion, while an IDF spokesman denies any Israeli involvement. Palestinian and Israeli security chiefs fail to agree on Tenet’s terms for a cease-fire.

• June 12- Israel unconditionally accepts DCI Tenet’s plan for ending the Israeli-Palestinian violence.

• June 13- Shortly after midnight, Yasir Arafat agreed in principle to the truce proposal, after a long meeting with DCI Tenet. Arafat gave Mr. Tenet a letter expressing his two main reservations, one concerning the timetable and the other a proposal for a "buffer zone" separating Israeli and Palestinian territory. The details of the plan were not made public, but a U.S. official said that the plan focused on resuming security cooperation, ending the violence, and restoring the situation on the ground to what existed before the conflict erupted in late September. One of Israel’s central demands, that Mr. Arafat arrest terror suspects on Israel's wanted list, was a sticking point. Palestinians had insisted that they did not want to serve as enforcers for Israel. According to Palestinian officials, and partly confirmed by Israel, DCI Tenet’s plan envisions that the two sides undertake initial measures within 48 hours of agreeing to a firm timetable sometime within a week. Israel would begin lifting restrictions on Palestinian movement by opening borders and crossing points and reducing the number of checkpoints. It would also pull IDF tanks and troops back to positions occupied before the end of September. Israel would agree to stop attacks on Palestinian Authority targets. Liaison offices in the West Bank and Gaza between Israeli and Palestinian Authority officers were to be reactivated. The Palestinians would be required to prevent firing mortar shells, shut down explosives factories, collect illegal weapons and demonstrate an effort to prevent weapon smuggling. They would agree to try to prevent incitement against Israel by the Palestinian media, and would share information with the Israelis about suspected terror attacks.

• June 14- The Israeli daily Ha’aretz published an unofficial version of the Tenet cease-fire plan.

Despite less serious violence, the IDF removes tanks from some roads near cities and villages in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Ariel Sharon says that IDF troops would not withdraw from areas where violence continued. A Palestinian informer shoots an Israeli military intelligence officer and wounds one of his bodyguards during a meeting. Col. Yehuda Edri is the highest-ranking officer killed since the violence erupted in late September 2000.
• June 16- UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan arrives in the region and holds talks with Arafat and Sharon. Annan appealed to both Palestinians and Israelis to take advantage of a crucial moment and move toward resuming peace talks.

• June 17- A Palestinian boy was shot and killed by Israeli forces during a demonstration in the Gaza Strip. Despite the killing, An Israeli military spokesman said that the number and seriousness of violent incidents during the truce dropped sharply.

• June 18- Two Israeli drivers are killed in separate incidents in the West Bank. Settler leaders and far-right cabinet members call on Prime Minister Sharon to retaliate, but Sharon says he is still abiding by the guidelines of the Tenet truce plan. After the second drive-by shooting death, the Israeli Army re-imposes a blockade on Tulkarm that it had partly lifted hours earlier. The PA’s West Bank security chief, Jibril Rajoub, pledges to work to enforce the truce. Israel, meanwhile, warned that it would reconsider the cease-fire arrangement if the Palestinians would not act to prevent the violence.

• June 20- Israeli and Palestinian leaders accuse each other of violating the cease-fire. Following a meeting of the Israeli security cabinet, Israel pledges to stick to the ceasefire, but says it would not fully lift a blockade of Palestinian towns and villages until attacks on Israelis stopped. Following the Israeli decision, Arafat responds to reporters in Ramallah that "It is an attempt to deceive international public opinion...They (the Israelis) are still firing from their tanks and machine guns and are still using internationally banned weapons, and the settlers are pursuing their crimes under the protection of the Israeli army. So their claim they are committed to a cease-fire is a lie." One Palestinian and one Israeli are killed. So far, six Palestinians and four Israelis have died since the parties agreed to a cease-fire. In light of the continuing violence and the danger that the cease-fire will collapse, Secretary of State Powell will travel to the region next week.

• June 22- Two Israeli soldiers are killed in a suicide bombing attack in the Gaza Strip. Twelve people have been killed since the cease-fire was called ten days ago. Israel warned that its patience was running out.

• June 24- Osama Jawabri, A Palestinian member of the Aksa Martyrs Brigade, a group that has claimed responsibility for the killings of Jewish settlers during the current uprising, is killed in Nablus. A telephone exploded while he was making a phone call in a public phone booth. Israel denied responsibility, while PA officials accuse Israel of violating the cease-fire.

Prime Minister Ariel Sharon meets with his British counterpart, Tony Blair, in London while on a stopover on his to the United States. In Washington, Sharon is slated to meet with U.S. President Bush.

• June 25- Prime Minister Ariel Sharon meets with U.S. President George W. Bush in Washington to discuss the situation in the Middle East. Israeli Defense Minister Ben-Eliczer's declares that he plans to dismantle 15 settlement outposts erected illegally in the West Bank.

• June 26- Bush and Sharon meet for discussions at the White House, and differ on the steps required to ease the tensions in the Middle East. Sharon insists that the Palestinians have not done enough to quell the violence, while Bush says that progress has been made. Sharon repeats his demand that Palestinian attacks must end and that the situation must be quiet for ten days before Israel will proceed with a 'cooling-off period' and confidence-building measures. The U.S. administration, in contrast, emphasized 100% effort, rather than 100% results by the Palestinians.

• June 28- U.S. Secretary of State Powell arrives in Israel and holds separate talks with Chairman Arafat in Gaza City and with Prime Minister Sharon in Jerusalem. He urges Arafat to decrease the tensions on the ground, and tells Sharon that his stated goal of total quiet was probably unachievable.
• July 2 – 3 Palestinians killed in a helicopter attack in the West Bank. Mohammed Besharat, an Islamic militant on Israel's most-wanted list, was among the three. Arafat accuses Israel of violating the June 13 cease-fire.

• July 16 - In northern Israel, in the town of Binyamina, a suicide bombing kills two Israelis at a railway station bus stop. Islamic Jihad claims responsibility.

• July 31 - Israeli helicopters fire on the Hamas office in Nablus, killing eight – two leading Hamas officials in the West Bank, and four other activists, as well as two children.

• August 9 – 15 people are killed and 88 wounded in a suicide bomb attack on a Sabarro pizzeria in central Jerusalem. Hamas claims responsibility. Israel takes hold of and closes the East Jerusalem office of the Palestinian Authority. In Ramallah, F-16s flatten a Palestinian police station. Israel retaliates in response to the bombing in Jerusalem.

• August 12 – UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan urges Israel to end its “occupation” of Palestinian Institutions in East Jerusalem.

• August 13 – In a northern suburb of Haifa, a suicide bombing in a cafe wounds 15 people – one seriously. To date, the area had escaped the worst violence of the intensifying conflict. The Islamic Jihad claims responsibility.

• August 14 – Israeli tanks enter the West Bank city of Jenin, leveling the city’s police station.

• August 15 - Israeli troops kill Palestinian militia leader Emad Abu Sneineh in Hebron, and Israeli paratroopers take up positions outside a second town in the West Bank.

• August 24 - Buildings in Palestinian-controlled sectors of Hebron were shelled by Israeli tanks and helicopter gunships. As many as five Palestinians were injured.

• August 25 – At a Gaza Strip Israeli army post, guerilla soldiers of the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine breach security and kill three Israeli soldiers. Seven other soldiers are wounded, and two of the guerilla soldiers are shot dead.

• August 26 – Security installations are destroyed in the West Bank and Gaza by Israeli F-16s and F-17s.

• August 27 – Israeli forces assassinate Mustafa Zibri, the secretary-general of the Popular-Front for the Liberation of Palestine in a suburb of Ramallah. Angry protests from Palestinians follow and Israel launches multiple incursions into the West Bank and Gaza. Israeli tanks, armored vehicles, and helicopter gunships take over “dominant positions” in the West Bank town of Beit Jalah in response to Palestinians firing at Gilo. In Gaza, before withdrawing Troops, Israeli tanks demolish eight buildings in area west of Rafah.

• August 28 – The U.S. State Department recommends that Israel withdraw from positions in Beit Jala. Earlier this week, President Bush criticized the Palestinian Authority for not doing more to combat terrorism.

• August 31 – Shooting into the Israeli town of Gilo ceases and so IDF withdraws from Beit Jala.

• Sept 9 – In northern Israel, a suicide attack leaves three dead and 36 wounded. Responsibility for the attack is claimed by Hamas. A second suicide bombing at an intersection in Beit Lid wounds another three people.

• September 12 – The IDF pushes forth into Jenin once again and sends tanks and bulldozers into Jericho.

• September 16 – Israeli tanks enter Ramallah.

• Oct 2 - In the Gaza Strip, two gunmen enter a Jewish settlement, killing two Israelis and wounding 15 others before being killed by soldiers. The gunmen were two young members of Hamas.

• Oct 3 – Israel responds by demolishing 7 Palestinian police posts in the Gaza Strip - nearby the Jewish settlement two gunmen had attacked the night before.
• Oct 4 - Before soldiers fire at and kill him, a Palestinian gunman from the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades opens fire and leaves three Israelis dead and 14 wounded at the central bus station in the northern Israeli city of Afula.

• Oct 7 - In the northern Israeli town of Beit Shean, a suicide bomber from the Islamic Jihad kills both himself and one Israeli

• Oct 17 – In east Jerusalem, Rehavam Zeevi, the right-wing Israeli tourism minister, is assassinated and the PLFP claims responsibility

• October 18 - Near Bethlehem, in Beit Sahour, a member of the Fatah Military Wing on Israel’s most wanted list, Atif Abayyat, was killed along with two other people in a car explosion. Israel issues an ultimatum to hand over Rechavam Zeevi's killers. The Palestinians reject the ultimatum. Israel prepares for the state funeral of right-wing minister Zeevi

• October 19 – In the city of Ramallah, the Palestinian Authority arrests 20 PFLP members in the West Bank and 13 in Gaza

According to Palestinian Senior negotiator Saeb Erakat, “Every effort is being exerted by the Palestinian Authority by President Arafat to bring those who killed Mr. Zeevi to justice under Palestinian law.” Erakat continued, “We need to come back to the negotiating table immediately without condition because this is the only way to save the lives of Palestinians and Israelis”

• October 18-20 – In the most extensive military operation in the occupied territories at the time, Israel deploys forces into and around Bethlehem, Beit Jala, and four other Palestinian cities

• Oct 28 - In the northern Israeli city of Hadera, two gunmen from the Islamic Jihad open fire, killing four women and wounding 31 others before being shot dead by Israeli police officers

• Nov 4 - In east Jerusalem, an Islamic Jihad gunman shoots at passengers on a bus, killing two schoolgirls and wounding 35 other before being shot dead

• November 15 – In Gaza, Israeli troops, tanks, and bulldozers enter the Khan Younis refugee camp. The Palestine Red Crescent Society reports one dead and 13 wounded. According to the IDF, the structures destroyed were suspected firing bases for mortars aimed at settlements and IDF posts in Gush Katif.

• November 24 – Two members of the militant Islamic group Hamas and a third Palestinian are killed near Nablus as an Israeli helicopter attacked the taxi they were traveling in. Israel confirms it carried out this helicopter attack

• Nov 27 - Two Israelis are killed and more than two-dozen others are wounded when two Palestinian gunmen open fire at a bus station in Afula. One gunman is from Islamic Jihad and another is from a military offshoot of Fatah

• Nov 29 – On a passenger bus in northern Israel, an Islamic Jihad suicide bomber leaves three Israelis dead and six wounded

• Dec 1 - Two suicide bombers in west Jerusalem kill 10 people and wound around 170. Hamas claims responsibility

• Dec 2 - Sixteen people are killed and 40 wounded in Haifa, when another militant from Hamas blows himself up

• Dec. 3 – In Gaza City, the IDF sends in helicopter gunships and jets to hit Palestinian Authority targets near Arafat’s headquarters. The mission effectively confines Arafat to Ramallah. Israel is retaliating for the killing of 25 people by suicide bombers over the preceding weekend

• December 9 - Hamas, Islamic Jihad, Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade, and a fourth militant Palestinian group, propose a plan for a temporary cease-fire through the end of Ramadan on the condition that Israel agrees to halt its policy of assassinations. Israel rejects the
The offer comes the same day that a suicide bombing near a Haifa bus stop wounds 29 people.

A spokesperson for Prime Minister Sharon says, “Israel deals only with the Palestinian Authority”

- Dec 12 – In an area of the West Bank near a Jewish settlement close to Nablus, a gunman kills 10 Israelis on a bus
- Dec 13 – Israeli helicopter gunships shoot at Palestinian buildings in the West Bank and Gaza. A Palestinian police station in Ramallah is among the targets
- Dec 16 – In a statement, Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat calls for an end to attacks on Israel
- December 17 – In Hebron, a member of Hamas was killed during a raid by Israeli troops. According to a spokesperson for the IDF, “The force arrived at Dakidek's house in order to arrest him, but he escaped. The force called him to stop, he did not stop and they shot him.”

Meanwhile, in Gaza, a mortar was released into the Jewish settlement of Gush Khatif. No one was wounded in the attack.

The incidents in both the West Bank and Gaza happened one day after Yasser Arafat, the Palestinian leader, called for an end to violence in the region

- Dec 20 – An announcement is made by the political wing of Hamas: it will stop its suicide bombings and mortar attacks so long as Israel halts its political assassinations and stops killing Palestinian civilians. The Izzedine al-Qassam Brigades, the armed wing of Hamas, agrees to put an end to anti-Israeli attacks the following day
- December 24 - Unless Arafat arrests the assassins of Israeli Tourism Minister Rehavam Zeevi, Israel says it will not let him attend Christmas Mass in Bethlehem. European and U.S. intervention fails

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- January 4 – A Palestinian freighter, called the Karine-A, loaded with 50 tons of arms – including anti-tank missiles – is intercepted by Israel. Arafat denies any connection to the weapons
- Jan 9: Two Hamas militants kill four Israeli soldiers before being shot dead near an Israeli village on the edge of the Gaza Strip
- January 17 – At a ballroom celebration, a Palestinian gunman from the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades kills six Israelis and wounds 24 others before being killed
- January 18 – Two Israeli tanks and an armored personnel carrier park outside Arafat’s Ramallah headquarters, confining him to his office complex a day after a Palestinian gunman bursts into his banquet hall and kills six Israelis
- January 19 – A radio broadcasting headquarters - that of the Voice of Palestine - and buildings housing Palestinian television services, are destroyed with explosives by Israeli forces. According to Palestinian security sources, all inside the center were evacuated
- January 22 - Before being shot dead, a Palestinian gunman kills two Israelis and injures 39 when he opens fire on Jaffa Road. The gunman was from Al-Aqsa Martyrs brigades
- January 27 – The first Palestinian woman suicide bomber, Wafa Idris, blows herself up on the busy shopping street, Jaffa Road, in West Jerusalem. One Israeli is killed and dozens wounded. The Al-Aqsa Brigades claim responsibility for the attack
- January 30 – Two officers of Israel’s Shin Bet, internal security service, are wounded by a suicide bomber - who had previously been an informer - on the border between Israel and the north-western area of the West Bank
- February 2 – The Israeli government and Palestinian sources confirm that there was a meeting held on January 30 between Prime Minister Sharon and senior Palestinian officials – the first of its kind since Sharon took office.
Sharon’s main agenda was to put an end to the terror and violence in the region – no political progress would be made until critical steps were made to halt violence. Sharon expressed that Israel’s security was his main issue while Palestinian officials presented their interests – that of a Palestinian state and the need for Palestinian security. According to Palestinian sources, the fact that the meeting happened was significant, however, it “did not produce many results”

- **February 3** – The IDF confirms that a day earlier, its tanks entered a Palestinian-controlled area of Gaza while in pursuit of four armed Palestinian gunmen. The pursuit began when the gunmen were found in an area around the Jewish settlements of Gush Katif. According to the Israeli army, the tanks entering the Palestinian-controlled area of Gaza were used as cover during searches for the gunmen. Its forces left the Palestinian-controlled area today. According to Palestinian security sources, five Israeli army tanks and a bulldozer had entered the area

- **February 6** - In the Jordan Valley settlement of Hamra, a Palestinian gunman kills three Israelis and injures four. Al-Aqsa claims responsibility

- **February 8** - In Mei Ami, an agricultural community in northern Israel, two Palestinians die as a car bomb prematurely explodes

- **February 10** – Before being shot down, two Palestinian gunmen kill two Israeli soldiers, and wound four other people, in Beersheva, near the army’s southern headquarters From the Gaza Strip, Palestinians fire homemade Qassam-2 rockets into the Negev Desert

- **February 11-13** – In response to the rocket attacks, Israel bombs security compounds in Gaza City. Moreover, searching for the manufacturing and launching sites of the rockets, the IDF initiates a military incursion into Gaza

- **February 15** – Palestinian mines blow up an Israeli tank. Three crewmembers are killed in the explosion. This is the first time that one of Israel’s highly sophisticated tanks is destroyed. Over a Jabalya refugee camp in Gaza, Israeli jets attack a Palestinian police compound

- **February 16** - In the West Bank settlement of Karnei Shomron, a suicide bombing at a shopping mall kills two and leaves 27 wounded. The PFLP claims responsibility for the attack and a third person later died from wounds suffered during the attack. The same day, a Palestinian suicide bomber kills himself though he fails to injure anyone else and a second Palestinian attacker is shot dead near Hadera

- **February 18** – In southern Gaza, a Palestinian shoots dead three Israelis and then kills himself. In Galilee, a suicide bomber is stopped for questioning and a policeman from a Bedouin village is killed. The Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigades claim responsibility for both attacks

- **February 19** – In the settlement of Mehula, in the West Bank, a suicide bomber blows himself up at a bus stop. In an ambush on an army checkpoint near Ramallah, Palestinian gunmen kill six Israeli soldiers. Three groups claim responsibility – two groups linked with Fatah and the armed wing of Hamas

- **February 20** – Israel initiates an attack on buildings belonging to the Palestinian Authority. Arafat’s headquarters in Ramallah and the Palestinian Authority compound in Gaza City are attacked. Sixteen Palestinians are killed

- **February 25** – An Israeli policewoman is killed and ten are wounded when a Palestinian gunman opens fire in the region of Neve Yakov in northern Jerusalem. Al-Aqsa claims responsibility
February 27 - At a roadblock near Jerusalem, a female suicide bomber blows herself up, yet fails to inflict any wounds on others.

February 27-March 1 – Near the West Bank towns of Nablus and Jenin, Israeli troops invade two Palestinian refugee camps – the Balata and Jenin refugee camps. Twelve Palestinians and one Israeli soldier are killed. As the fighting continues there are more than 20 Palestinians casualties in total. This is the beginning of an operation where Israeli forces will enter several cities and refugee camps. According to the IDF, “the refugee camps are central bases for terrorist factors responsible for the murder of scores of Israeli civilians.” The aim is to send a message that there is “no safe haven for terror.”

March 2 – In west Jerusalem, in an ultra-Orthodox neighborhood, a suicide bombing kills nine Israelis and wounds dozens. Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades claims responsibility.

March 3 – Ten Israelis are killed when a sniper assaults an Israeli checkpoint in the West Bank. Al Aqsa Brigades claims responsibility.

March 5 – One person is killed and 11 wounded when a suicide bomber blows himself up on a bus in Afula, in northern Israel. Islamic Jihad claims responsibility for the bus bombing.

In a Tel Aviv restaurant, a Palestinian gunman opens fire, killing 3 Israelis and injuring more than 30 before he himself is shot dead. Al-Aqsa claims responsibility for the shooting.

March 7 – Six are injured in a suicide bombing in the West Bank settlement of Ariel, in a hotel lobby. The PFLP claims responsibility for the bombing.

In the Gaza Strip settlement of Atzmona, five Israeli youths are killed and 18 wounded in a shooting and grenade attack on the dormitories of a pre-military school.

March 7-8 – Several Palestinians are killed as Israel continues advancing into Palestinian-controlled territory. Israelis enter refugee camps near Tulkarem in search of suspected militants.

In the Gaza Strip, Israeli helicopters fire rockets into Jabalaya refugee camp, killing forty Palestinians.

March 9 – In Netanya, a Palestinian gunman opens fire killing three Israelis and injuring 25. Al-Aqsa claims responsibility for the shooting.

A suicide bomber blows himself up killing 11 Israelis and injuring an estimated 54 at Jerusalem's Cafe Moment, across the street from Prime Minister Ariel Sharon's official residence. Hamas claims responsibility for the bombing.

March 14 - Israeli tanks begin to withdraw from Ramallah.

The U.S. had been putting pressure on Israel to withdraw.

March 15 – Israeli pull troops out of all Palestinian-controlled West Bank towns, except for Bethlehem.

March 17 – In the French Hill district of Jerusalem, a suicide bomber blows himself up and injures nine Israelis. In the town of Kfar Saba, in central Israel, a Palestinian gunman wounds one woman before being shot dead.

March 20 – Seven Israelis – including four soldiers – are killed and 29 are injured when a suicide bomber blows himself up on an intercity bus near the Arab-Israeli town of Um-el-Fahm. Islamic Jihad claims responsibility.

March 21 – In a shopping center, on King George Street in Jerusalem, a suicide bomber kills himself and three Israelis. Seventy are injured. The Al Aqsa Brigades claim responsibility.

March 22 - North of the West Bank city of Jenin, a suicide bomber blows himself up, killing himself and injuring an Israeli army officer.

March 26 – Yasser Arafat, Hosni Mubarak, King Abdullah II, and 10 other members of the Arab League are missing from the Arab League Summit in Beirut.
Sharon had hardened his conditions for Arafat's trip; and Arafat refused to attend the Summit as he feared that Israel would not allow him to return to the West Bank

- March 26-28 – In Beirut, Lebanon, delegates from a number of Arab states endorse a plan for peace in the region which is proposed by Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince Abdullah. The plans calls for Arab nations to accept Israel as their neighbor on the condition that Israel “withdraws from all the occupied territories, accepts the creation of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital, and allows for the return of Palestinian refugees”

- March 27 – In the lobby of a hotel in Netanya, 29 Israelis are killed, and over 100 are injured when a suicide bomber blows himself up as guests sit down to a seder, a traditional Jewish Passover meal, on the first night of Passover. Hamas claims responsibility for the attack, and a spokesman from Hamas is quoted by the Israeli press as saying that “the attack was timed to undermine the Beirut meeting of the Arab League”

Israel responds to this attack with "Operation Defensive Shield" - a destructive Israeli offensive in the West Bank

- March 29 - By a Jerusalem supermarket, a suicide bombing attack kills three – including the bomber – and leaves 28 wounded. Al-Aqsa claims responsibility. The Israeli Cabinet declares Arafat an enemy and Israel launches Operation Defensive Shield. Israel sends tanks and bulldozers to attack Arafat's Ramallah compound, confining Arafat and dozens of aides to several rooms. An offensive into areas in the West Bank, under Operation Defensive Shield, Israeli tanks enter Hebron, Nablus, Jenin, Tulkarem, Qalqilya, Ramallah, and Bethlehem, in addition to a number of Palestinian-controlled villages in the West Bank, by April 4.

Arafat vows he would die as a martyr before surrendering. Ariel Sharon reports that the goal of the Israeli military operation is to uproot terrorists in the areas under control of the Palestinian Authority.

- March 30 – Killing himself and wounding at least 29, a suicide bomber attacks a cafe in Tel Aviv's entertainment district. Al-Aqsa claims responsibility

- March 31 – An explosion set off by a suicide bomber in a crowded restaurant in Haifa kills 15 Israelis, and injures more than 30. Izzedine al-Qassam – the armed wing of Hamas – claims responsibility.

Later that day, at an emergency medical center south of Jerusalem, a suicide bombing attack killed the bomber and injured one.

According to an announcement by Ariel Sharon, Israel is at war and Yasser Arafat is “the enemy of Israel and the entire free world. In March, a total of 259 Palestinians and 130 Israelis were killed. Not all of the deaths were accounted for above

- April 1 - In Jerusalem, a car bomb explosion leaves a suicide bomber dead and seriously injures the policeman who was inspecting the car. The policeman dies of his wounds

- April 2 – Running from Israeli troops, about 30 Palestinian gunmen enter a Franciscan monastery in Bethlehem, breaking into the compound with their weapons. Accompanying the gunmen are about 170 Palestinian police and civilians.

The Palestinian policemen and civilians entering the church were seeking refuge from Israeli forces. The Israeli attack was part of an Israel military offensive against terrorists behind the suicide attacks on Israelis. Several dozen priests, monks and nuns are caught in the compound Sharon offers Arafat permanent exile.

Arafat announces that he would rather die than leave the West Bank

- April 4 - An Israeli sniper kills a Palestinian bell ringer while walking to the church

Israel precludes Javier Solana – the European Union foreign policy chief – and Joseph Pique – the Spanish Foreign Minister – from meeting with Yasser Arafat

- April 5 - 4 priests leave the Church of Nativity
Anthony Zinni – the U.S. envoy to the region – is the first foreign official to see the Palestinian leader since Israel began its military offensive. Israeli forces locate and assassinate six senior leaders of Hamas – the militants had escaped from the Jenin refugee camp.

- April 7 – Pope John Paul II communicates his serious concern for the priests inside the church.
- April 8 – A battle involving gunfire breaks out around the church and Christian leaders ask Israel to pull out of Bethlehem. According to a Franciscan official, Israel violated “every canon of human decency.” Israel said the Palestinians opened fire, wounding two Israeli border policemen.
- April 10 - Eight people are killed and 22 injured as a suicide bomber attacks a bus by Haifa. Hamas claims responsibility for the attack. The IDF enters Ramallah and IDF security forces arrest Akram Kassam - a senior official in Palestinian military intelligence – for his alleged connection with Hamas.
- April 12 – A suicide bombing attack kills the bomber and six others, and wounds 86 people outside, Machaneh Yehudah, a busy market in Jerusalem. Two Chinese workers were among those killed in the attack. Al-Aqsa claims responsibility. The attack occurs while Secretary of State Colin Powell is on his trip to Israel.
- April 13 – In an attempt to end the stalemate, Christian leaders meet with Secretary of State Colin Powell. A Palestinian is fatally wounded by gunfire in a hostel nearby the Church of Nativity. Palestinians say he was a civilian. Israel radio says the man was armed and aiming fire at soldiers.
- April 14 - Israel will allow the Palestinian gunmen in the Church of Nativity to leave the church unharmed on the condition that they agree to either face trial in Israel or accept permanent exile. The gunmen refuse.
- April 15 – Israeli troops and the Palestinian gunmen in the Church of Nativity exchange fire. An Israeli ambulance evacuates two men from the church compound.
- April 17 - Israeli soldiers fire and wound a Palestinian who leaves the Church of Nativity – the injured Palestinian is taken to a hospital. A sick priest is also taken to a hospital after being evacuated.
- April 23 – Negotiations begin concerning the siege at the Church of Nativity. Palestinians propose that militiamen on Israel's wanted list be taken to the Gaza Strip. Israel maintains that the gunmen either be tried in Israel or be deported.
- April 24 – While inside the church compound, two Palestinians are shot – one of the men is critically wounded by an Israeli sniper and dies later in a hospital. Two Palestinian police surrender, saying that they are ill.
- April 25 - Israeli troops detain nine young Palestinian civilians for questioning when they come out of Church of Nativity in Bethlehem. While still inside his compound, Arafat approves the sentencing of four men convicted of Israeli Tourism Minister Ze’evi’s murder in a provisional court. Sharon rejects Arafat’s decision. He continues to demand that the murderers be extradite.
• April 26 – Despite Israel’s policy of isolating Arafat, Turkish and Greek foreign ministers visit Arafat at his compound. In Bethlehem, 4 Palestinian policemen - who had been inside the Church of Nativity - surrender. Israeli sniper fire injures 2 Palestinians in the church compound. The two men are evacuated and given medical treatment

• April 27 - An Israeli sniper wounds a Palestinian inside the Church of Nativity compound. The Palestinian is evacuated for medical treatment

• April 28 – Israel’s Cabinet agrees to a U.S. proposal to release Arafat from his confinement. According to the agreement, six men on Israel’s most-wanted list will be transferred from Arafat’s compound to a West Bank prison in Jericho. The men in detention will be supervised by British and U.S. military officials

Negotiations concerning the siege at the Church of Nativity in Bethlehem fail to bring agreement. Yet, both sides say the talks will continue

• April 29 - Talks over the siege at the Church of Nativity remain at a stalemate

• April 30 – Israelis and Palestinians agree on a deal for 26 to leave the besieged church compound. Twenty-six Palestinians come forward from within the Church of Nativity, though there are still a number of Palestinians inside

During the month of April, a total of 311 Palestinians and 58 Israelis were killed - mostly during Israel's West Bank offensive

• May 1 - In accordance with the terms of ending Arafat’s isolation, the 6 men on Israel’s most wanted list are transferred to a jail in the West Bank town of Jericho. Israel then withdraws from Arafat's compound. In Bethlehem, two Palestinian policemen leave the compound - one is injured with a gunshot wound, the other sick.

• May 2 - Areas inside the Church of Nativity compound are ablaze and suffer damage when a heavy exchange of fire erupts between Palestinian gunmen within, and Israeli troops on the perimeter of the site. While trying to control the fire, three are injured with burns.

• May 3 - Escaping the watch of Israeli troops, foreigners enter the Church of Nativity in Bethlehem. After entering the church compound, the foreigners report the existing conditions inside the church – food is sparse and there is damage near the basilica.

• May 6 – Negotiations are underway to end the siege of the Church at Bethlehem.

According to Palestinian officials, there is agreement for the siege to end so long as six to nine Palestinian militants are expelled to Italy, and more than 30 others are transferred to a Gaza prison guarded by American and British jailers. However, Israeli officials report that though progress is significant, the agreement has fallen through as Italy was not informed of its potential involvement in the agreement

• May 7 - 16 Israelis are killed and at least 57 others are injured in a suicide bombing attack in a crowded hall south of Tel-Aviv, in Rishon Lezion. The armed wing of Hamas claims responsibility for the attack

• May 8 – Near Haifa, a man planning a suicide bombing attack is critically injured when the bomb he is handling prematurely explodes

• May 9 – An agreement is reached and announced over the situation in Bethlehem at the Church of Nativity. Italy and Spain will take a number of the militants while Austria, Greece, Luxembourg and Ireland will take the others

• May 10 – Standoff at the Church of Nativity ends. The Palestinians leave the church

• May 19 Disguised as a soldier, a suicide bomber blows himself up in a market in Netanya, killing three people and injuring 59. Hamas and the PFLP both claim responsibility

• May 20 - A suicide bomber blows himself up at a bus stop when a policeman patrolling the border stopped him for questioning. No one is injured

• May 22 - South of Tel Aviv, in Rishon Lezion, two Israelis are killed and 37 are injured when a suicide bomber attacks. The Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades claims responsibility for the attacks
• May 24 - Outside a Tel Aviv disco, guards shoot a suicide bomber dead before he reaches the club. His bomb explodes prematurely killing him and injuring 5

• May 27 - A suicide bombing attack kills two in Petah Tikva. Fifty-three people are injured. The Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades claims responsibility

• June 5 - At the Megiddo junction in northern Israel, a man drives a car packed with explosives into a bus, killing seventeen Israelis in addition to the driver, and wounding 38 people. Islamic Jihad claims responsibility for the attack

• June 6 – Israeli forces storm into Yasser Arafat’s compound in Ramallah and then pull out hours later. Israel is responding to the suicide bombing attack of the previous day

• June 9 – In Gaza, Palestinian security officials arrest two Islamic Jihad leaders

• June 11 – At a restaurant in Herzliya, a suicide bombing attack kills one Israeli and injures 10. While Hamas lauds the attack, no organization officially claims responsibility for the attack

• June 18 - At rush hour, a suicide bomber blows himself up aboard a bus in Jerusalem, killing 19 people and injuring 74. Hamas claimed responsibility for the attack

• June 19 - At a bus stop and popular hitchhiking spot, in the French Hill area of Arab east Jerusalem, a suicide bombing attack kills seven – including the bomber - and wounds 37 others. Al Aqsa claims responsibility for the attack.

In Gaza, in Khan Yunis and in the Jabalia refugee camp, Israeli helicopters attack weapons’ manufacturing plants.

In another incident, Israeli forces discover and demolish a tunnel on the Israeli-Egyptian border used for smuggling weapons. The tunnel paved a course for travel from an area controlled by Israel to territory of the Palestinian Authority – the IDF has discovered a number of tunnels of this nature by the Israeli-Egyptian border near Rafah. Israeli soldiers came under heavy fire from grenades and machine-guns while carrying out the operation; the unit did not suffer any casualties.

• June 24 – President Bush announces his outlined plan for Middle East peace. According to the U.S. President’s speech, the U.S. would support the creation of an independent Palestinian state on the condition that the Palestinian people “elect new leaders, leaders not compromised by terror,” alluding to the U.S. position that Arafat should not be included in a reformed Palestinian government

• June 25 - Israeli troops seize control of Hebron. Israeli forces surround the governor's compound, arrest the leader of Palestinian intelligence, and exchange fire with Palestinian forces. Four Palestinian policemen are killed

• June 26 – Saeb Arakat, chief Palestinian negotiator, announces the Palestinian Authority’s plans for presidential and legislative elections to take place in January. According to Palestinian cabinet member, Nabil Sha’ath, present-day authority President Yasser Arafat says he will run for re-election

• June 30 – Israeli special forces kill leader of Hamas’ militant wing, Muhanad al-Taher, and two other militants. The assassination was carried out in a raid on a house in Nabulus

• July 16 – In the West Bank, near the Jewish settlement of Emanuel, Palestinian gunmen open fire on a bus after detonating a roadside bomb. Eight people are killed and 25 are injured. Hamas claims responsibility.

• July 17 – Two Palestinian suicide bombers kill three people in a low-income neighborhood in Tel-Aviv. Islamic Jihad claims responsibility.

• July 23 - An Israeli jet dropped a one-ton bomb on a terrorist’s home in Gaza City, killing Sheik Salah Shehada, the leader of the Islamist group Hamas and 14 other people. An estimated 140 were injured.
APPENDIX B:
IDF Urban Operations Bi-Lateral Exchange

AWCC-CSL-OG 24 January 2003

MEMORANDUM FOR COL Jose Arroyo and MAJ Brian Demeyere, TRADOC


1. This report presents unclassified highlights of the Bi-Lateral Exchange visit with the Israeli Defence Force in Israel.127

2. The purpose of the trip was to exchange information on each side’s current and emerging methodology for conducting urban operations; another principal purpose from the Israeli perspective was to expose U.S. officers to Israeli military and civilian culture and strategic situation. The delegation was based out of Tel Aviv, and visited the IDF Ground Forces Headquarters (MAZI)128 at Kiryat Malachi, the IDF Armored Corps Museum and War Memorial at Latrun, the Israeli Special Forces Training Brigade School at Camp “Adam”, and the Old City area of Jerusalem. See agenda, enclosure 1.

3. Key observations:

   a. Despite extensive experience in the 1967 (Jerusalem) and 1973 (Suez) wars and in Lebanon in the 1980’s and 90’s, and during the current conflict in Gaza and the West Bank, the IDF has not discovered any “silver bullet” approaches to conducting military operations on highly populated complex terrain. [Doctrine]129

   b. The IDF views “urban warfare” as significantly different from “MOUT.” MOUT, while difficult, due to complexity of terrain and presence of non-combatants, is considered a “conventional” military operation to be executed in accordance with traditional military principles. “Urban warfare”, on the other hand, is something different, requiring new military approaches. Jerusalem in June 1967 was MOUT; Jenin or Ramala today is urban warfare. Principle difference from IDF perspective is that the enemy in MOUT is an identifiable armed force and civilians are an “obstacle” to unrestrained military actions but not determinants of the ultimate outcome; in “urban warfare” the “enemy” is not only the armed force but also a significant portion or perhaps the majority of the population of the urban area.129 Since it would be unacceptable to

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127 All US presentations were unclassified. Some IDF presentations were classified.
128 The MAZI is the newly organized IDF equivalent, roughly, to TRADOC – responsible for doctrine, weapons development, exercises and training, and organizational issues.
129 Some, but not all, IDF delegates feel that the US may face urban warfare rather than MOUT if the US attempts to take Baghdad. Unofficially, in private social discussions delegation members surveyed were
public opinion, immoral, and infeasible in anything less than “total war” to destroy the entire population of the urban area, the military must shift its objective in urban warfare from destruction of the enemy to “creating a new reality” within the urban complex. This requires acceptance of the following:

1. Political considerations will always and at every instant be dominant; military operational and tactical considerations must take second place.
2. Cannot seek “solutions”, can only seek to create favorable trends. Must expect, and undertake, prolonged confrontation. No quick victories.
3. Decision will be achieved by mental manipulation.
4. Must undertake “effects” warfare, but the majority of effects must be mental, rather than physical. Physical acts are undertaken primarily for their psychological effect.  
5. In order to succeed, must control the conflict. To control the conflict, must control the “friction.”

In the IDF view, therefore, urban warfare has major implications for training and education of officers and soldiers – all must possess broad and deep cultural and psychological understanding of their opponent, themselves, and the “spectators in the arena” [regional/world opinion]. Frequently one may have to do things that seem at odds with short term military/national interests in order to alter the longer term trend lines. Also must accept that high level politicians will (and should) exercise oversight and intervention at operational and tactical levels on every occasion. The IDF has not yet determined exactly how they will change their military training and educational systems; they do intend to attempt to “broaden the officer corps’ education beyond “traditional” military professional knowledge.” [Doctrine, Leader Development and Education, Training]

c. The IDF recognizes a requirement to remain capable of “conventional military operations” even while conducting urban warfare. The aviation and naval elements remain primarily focused on conventional operations. The IDF ground force has begun cycling platoons from committed battalions out of urban warfare back to home station for a week at a time to do refresher conventional operations training. [Training]

d. The IDF is reorganizing its combat intelligence corps significantly to increase the number and types of intelligence personnel in its infantry battalions and maneuver brigades. The IDF has also revised its channels so as to send “special” and national-level intelligence quickly to battalion or even company level. [Organization, Doctrine]

unanimous in support for the US undertaking military operations to eliminate Saddam Hussein – but disagreed on the degree to which the Iraqi populace in general would be hostile or neutral in that conflict.  

For both sides. For example, the IDF alleges that some engagements are specifically crafted by the Palestinians for the media (P.A. representative to a press pool: “Go to this intersection at 4 pm and you will see the war.” -- “There is nothing happening at that location until 1600, then suddenly there is a riot or a sniper or an RPG fires at a Jewish target – Israeli security forces respond to the scene, a short fight takes place in front of the cameras, and then at dark the Palestinians hide their weapons and sit down at the café for dinner.”) Note also, however, that the number of actual incidents and engagements (more than 600 in 2002) significantly exceeds those reported in the US media.
e. The IDF conducts both unit internal and SME external debriefings/AARs following every operation. Focused on the questions: What were the results? What process led to that result? What are the differences between the desired and the actual results? What was the cause? Emphasized that there is absolutely no attempt to ask/answer the question: Who is responsible/ to blame? In support of this policy, Israeli civil law expressly prohibits the use of any information from military debriefings for either criminal or civil prosecution of any sort. If it is determined from other sources that an investigation of any operation is required, investigators are not permitted access to military debriefing records or documents in any fashion. [Training, Leader Development and Education, Doctrine]

f. A significant unresolved leadership issue is how brigade and battalion level leaders operate far forward to provide the appropriate “heroic example” to their soldiers while at the same time maintaining the ability to access and synchronize the multiple systems required to fight modern unconventional battle in an urban environment. [Leader Development and Education, Doctrine]

g. ARMOR: The IDF believes heavy armor is essential to modern urban combat operations. Tanks provide high levels of protection, psychological impact, and excellent precision target acquisition and engagement systems. Shortcomings include lack of adequate ability to communicate with dismounted infantry; inability to discern laser designation with thermal sights, vulnerability to expedient flame weapons (have directed removal of all external gear from armored vehicles to reduce flammability). The IDF deploys most of its infantry inside tanks (both Merkava and M-60’s) now rather than APCs in urban warfare situations. Have added additional belly armor plate to protect against buried explosive charges. Have decreased ammunition loads by 50% to reduce chance of penetrating top down RPG having secondary effects. Employ tank main gun as “sniper” and counter-sniper weapon. The IDF is employing tank main gun sub-caliber (.5 cal) training system as a combat system – permits engagement of hostile individuals in close proximity to sensitive targets (mosques, hospitals, etc.) without inflicting collateral damage capturable by media. Has begun doctrinal modifications and training programs focused on “battle teams” of one tank and one IFV. [Doctrine, Training, Organization, Material]

h. AVIATION: The IDF generally is only selectively employing fixed wing assets in support of urban warfare to avoid possible collateral damage issues. Even attack

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131 Many members of the IDF delegation were openly skeptical of US SBCT as an effective urban operations force. In their view, the Stryker is totally unsuited to operations in built up areas. The IDF has forbidden the employment of any light armored vehicles within urban areas – only heavy tanks and reinforced APCs. While understanding the US strategic deployment problem, many IDF delegation members viewed it as likely that an SBCT would suffer heavy casualties if used in MOUT or urban warfare situations. IDF has directed its R&D community to develop a heavy armored APC, and increasing the armor protection of its reconnaissance elements throughout the force.

132 Even though all IDF tanks do possess an external field telephone, unlike US tanks.

133 The IDF retains multiple types of non-AT tank ammunition, including both HEP and fletchette rounds.

134 The IDF also has begun installation of a “gun camera” system in all tanks similar to fighter planes, to record every engagement both for AAR and for media-refutation purposes.
helicopters fire only when they can clearly identify and strike only the desired individual target. Most engagements are at very close range because otherwise the target can move or a noncombatant can enter the target area during the weapon’s time of flight. 80% of Israeli pilots are reservists; frequently still at work at their civilian job only three hours before the target is engaged – thus may not know the military strategic/operational situation at the time much less the complete tactical picture. IDF is increasing the number of tactical aviation control teams deployed with its ground elements to compensate. [Doctrine, Training, Organization]

i. INFANTRY: Main problem in urban area is collecting, and then disseminating to lowest levels, information. Soldiers must have situational awareness, including a knowledge of history and culture. Must develop a common combined arms language and plan control graphics135 from the dismounted soldier’s viewpoint. Whether to go into an urban area dismounted first or mounted first remains undecided. Desperately need a good individual soldier combat identification solution to solve the meeting engagement challenge. Booby traps and snipers are the greatest threats. Snipers can be suppressed or eliminated. Only complete solution to the booby trap is to stay out of urban terrain – but since that isn’t possible, must move through the walls rather than in the “normal” movement corridors.136 Have increased dismounted squad size from 7 to 9 (squad leader plus four pairs of two) to provide each soldier (except the leader?) with a “wingman.” The IDF does not have “state of the art” urban training facilities; the training and demonstrations we observed were all done in simple mock-ups constructed of 4’x8’ plywood. Most IDF training we observed was live fire, with significantly fewer safety constraints than would be normal in the U.S. [Doctrine, Training, Organization, Leader Development and Education, Material, Personnel, Facilities]

j. ENGINEERS: Initial IDF operational planning for urban warfare operations failed to recognize the degree to which engineering capabilities would be required. As just one example, each operation required significantly more armored bulldozers than originally planned for. Key remains ensuring engineer capabilities are organized and distributed so as to be available in a timely fashion anywhere on the battlefield. Greatest threat to the maneuver force is expedient explosive devices137: in less than a week had to detect, avoid, and neutralize 120 “bombs”, 5 car bombs, and multiple booby traps. IDF is increasing engineer units committed to the fight, and also increasing the training of infantry units in demolitions and breaching. [Doctrine, Organization, Training]

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135 The IDF currently provides every element a common aerial photograph of the area of operations, with every building given a number so that all references to locations can be understood by all.

136 Palestinians are adjusting to this by booby trapping exterior walls as well as streets, doors, and windows. IDF response whenever available has been K-9 team so that explosive detection dog enters first with camera.

137 The IDF believes the internet has vastly increased the rate of transfer of expedient explosive device-making technology. The IDF estimates that the Palestinians have progressed in two years to a degree of sophistication it took the Hezballah in Lebanon 18 years to achieve: multiple sequence and infrared initiators of effective directed blast and fragmentation weapons. The IDF averaged 100 IED encounters per year in Lebanon, now averaging over 500 per year and still increasing. Result is inability for personnel to move dismounted except through wall breaches; otherwise soldiers must be protected by significant armor to maneuver.
k. ARTILLERY: In earlier IDF MOUT operations, SP artillery frequently preceded tanks into cities because direct fire capability exceeds that of tanks (higher angle, multiple fuze/ammunition combinations, better penetration of structures). Doctrine was to fire artillery on outskirts of village suburbs first, thus causing noncombatant villagers to flee; then fire into the village to kill the armed opposition which had stayed. Opponents adapted to this tactic, having its fighters “hug” noncombatants and UN agencies. Resultant noncombatant casualties caused Israeli policy change forbidding the use of indirect fire in the current urban warfare environment. At the same time, the opposition’s anti-light-armor capabilities have increased, making SP howitzer crew more vulnerable, reducing its direct-fire contribution. As a result the IDF now is sending entire FA units back to infantry basic training and employing more and more as dismounted infantry. [Doctrine, Material, Training]

l. Women in the military: The IDF has women in all branches. Women in the infantry, armor, engineers, and artillery do not serve in combat units, but do serve as instructors of combat skills (gunnery, sniper marksmanship, demolitions, etc.) in those branches. The male IDF soldiers we met did not seem to have any difficulty with females directing and instructing the training of skills and techniques the women themselves would not actually have any combat experience with, nor did they express any resentment of the women wearing “combat branch” insignia.  

4. Both TRADOC and MAZI representatives expressed themselves highly pleased by the exchanges; and encouraged continuing the direct contacts through individual interactions and additional group fora.

Encl 1

JAMES O. KIEVIT
Professor, National Security Leadership
HQDA Spt Branch, CSL-OGD

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138 This was somewhat surprising, because in other ways Israel is an openly chauvinistic society – an unescorted woman (not in uniform) walking alone on the street can expect to be openly propositioned, for example.
APPENDIX C:

BG(ret) Avidor Comments on the Battle of Jenin

The Battle of Jenin, April 2002
From BG (IDF, ret.) Gideon Avidor
POC: Dr. Russell W. Glenn, RAND
(310) 393-0411, ext. 6685

Editor’s note: The following are details regarding the Battle of Jenin as compiled by General Avidor and sent to the editor on April 30, 2002. General Avidor notes that the remarks represent IDF perspectives. The comments are provided for your personal use in hopes of stimulating additional contemplation on the challenges confronting a force assigned to conduct an urban operation. Please do not distribute further without checking with the editor (Dr. Glenn, who only lightly edited the comments).

General Avidor’s comments:

I collected some interesting points from open sources. It is not complete, but it gives a picture of the battle.

One of the Palestinian commanders - a leader commanding during the final stand - said that the Palestinians had two weeks to prepare themselves. They knew what was coming as the IDF had "visited" Jenin before. The defenders organized themselves in groups of fifteen to protect a sector. They were armed with small arms: AK47s, RPGs, and many explosives. They did not have a central command, central plan, nor did they exercise central coordination; each group leader planned and executed operations himself. They started the battle at the perimeters of the camp and moved to the rear (the center of the camp) as the battle progressed. The Palestinians fought from the houses. Sometimes they entered a house using a different door at the same time the IDF entered. They fought with snipers and explosives like mines and booby traps. The defenders were successful as long as the IDF moved slowly from house to house, even when it was supported by attack helicopters. They gave up when the IDF started using bulldozers (which were huge and heavily armored).

Because of ROE, there were strict orders regarding what weapons could be used:

- Tanks were used for their good sights and night vision capability. They were not allowed to use their main gun for fear of uncontrolled damage, but could employ the auxiliary MG. In some cases an additional .50 caliber MG was mounted on the main gun barrel. (It is generally used in training as a sub-caliber device).
- Tanks operated with closed hatches and the crews stayed inside for several days during the operation. They were used as protected mobile firebases behind the leading infantry troops. Their biggest fear was 100-kg mines under the belly. (We lost two tanks this way in Gaza a month before) – but moving behind the infantry solved this problem. (One needs to remember that our tanks are well protected against RPGs and the like).
- No artillery or mortars were used.
The troops moved from house to house taking their time to clear a structure, then providing cover for another unit moving to the next house.

The civilian population was asked to leave. Most of them did. When troops came close to a house they checked to see if there were civilians inside. If so, they were asked to leave. If they refused, they were moved to one room and kept there for the rest of the fight. The soldiers gave the civilians food and water, and sometimes medical help (to the civilians that stayed in their houses).

The battle itself was mainly a sniper fight. In some cases attack helicopters delivered a missile through a window were Palestinians snipers were hiding.

Intelligence was gathered by RPVs [UAVs], unmanned balloons, ground observation, HUMINT (very successful, sometimes warnings in real time were given), and the like.

Troops had air photos for coordination.

House-to-house movement, through backyards and through the walls when possible, was the standard.

Problem areas were:
  - Forward logistics. (Water was pushed forward by 1 l’ bottles thrown from door to door).
  - Friendly forces identification in closed areas. There were many units involved. In several cases friendly fire was exchanged. In one case in Nablus, an Israeli sniper mistakenly killed an IDF company commander.

The Palestinians used many homemade booby traps. These were placed street side, in the doors of unoccupied houses, or were attached to corpses lying on the ground. In some cases when a short cease fire was granted to let the civilian population evacuate, get food, and the like, it was used to renew booby traps in areas previously cleared by the IDF.

The big international humanitarian cry about this battle was caused by actions taken after an IDF platoon moved to capture a house in order to provide fire support for another platoon moving to the next house (a common routine). While in their concentrating position – in the street before entering the house – booby traps, explosives, and sniper fire from the roofs were employed against them. Thirteen soldiers were killed in few minutes, including the company commander that was leading this platoon. The rescue battle was long, painful, and took several hours. At that stage the Palestinians were in their last position, about 70 square meters in size. The IDF had only two KIAs in Jenin before that engagement. As a result of this ambush, the decision was made to bring in the bulldozers and stop playing nice and polite. The bulldozers – which are gigantic, moved in and in their way cleared passageways. They destroyed houses and by the end cleared away those making the last Palestinian stand. The battle was over. If you happen to see an air photo of the whole camp, you can see the portion of the battle area and its damage (it covers about 10% - 15% of the camp area).

The battle started with the commitment of an airborne reservist brigade reinforced later by Special Forces (regulars), which added difficulties to the command and control system.
In another example (Nablus), the battle was concluded much faster. Regular infantry and airborne brigades attacked the camp from all sides simultaneously. The battle took two days

The biggest problem in this battle [Jenin] was that the wrong concept was used in working with the media, and the "day after" planning (if there was any). There is nothing new here for those who studied and read the literature about it [urban warfare]– apparently not all did.

Editor’s comment: To see “before and after” photographs provided during an Israeli government briefing, see http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/go.asp?MFAH0llb0 (which provides the briefing and a link to the photographs) or http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/go.asp?MFAH0ll60 (which provides only the photographs). Web sites accessed May 1, 2002.
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