Far More Intellectual than a Bayonet Charge
The Need for Joint Unconventional Warfare Doctrine

A Monograph
by
MAJ David P. Matarazzo
U.S. Army Special Forces

School of Advanced Military Studies
United States Army Command and General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
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Approved by:

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__________________________  Director, School of Advanced Military Studies
COL Kevin C.M. Benson, M.M.A.S.

__________________________  Director, Graduate Degree Program
Robert F. Baumann, Ph.D.
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Far more intellectual than a bayonet charge: the need for joint unconventional warfare doctrine

**Author(s)**

David Matarazzo

**Performing Organization**

US Army School for Advanced Military Studies, 250 Gibbon Ave, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 66027

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14. ABSTRACT
This monograph investigates whether the U.S. military should establish joint doctrine for unconventional warfare. Since the passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, joint doctrine has become central to everything the U.S. military does. Training, education, programs, procurement, and war planning are all guided by joint doctrine. Since the U.S. has recently conducted unconventional warfare against the Taliban in Afghanistan, it is clear that unconventional warfare is relevant to the U.S. military. Because unconventional warfare is a relevant mission, and joint doctrine is central to military operations, it is therefore relevant and timely to ask if the U.S. military needs joint doctrine for unconventional warfare. The monograph first establishes criteria for determining whether joint doctrine is appropriate for a task. The five criteria are below. Does UW involve the employment of joint forces? Does UW fit the demands of law, policy, or joint capstone or keystone doctrine? Is UW normally conducted as a multinational or interagency effort? Does the lack of joint doctrine for UW hamper joint training and education on UW? Will a lack of joint doctrine for UW lead to other operational or organizational problems? Next, the monograph examines existing joint and Service doctrine for unconventional warfare to determine if it is sufficient. Since the doctrine is not found to be sufficient, the criteria are then applied to determine that joint doctrine is appropriate for unconventional warfare. Once it has been established that joint doctrine is necessary and appropriate, components of the doctrine are recommended. The monograph compares the uses of joint doctrine and joint tactics, techniques, and procedures to the recommended doctrinal components to determine which one is more appropriate. Based upon these findings, the monograph concludes that the U.S. military should publish a new joint tactics, techniques, and procedures manual for unconventional warfare. It also recommends changes to existing joint doctrinal manuals. Further, it recommends that the U.S. Special Operations Command should be the lead agent for the new doctrine. The monograph also recommends that because it is broader, the work of Bard O’Neill, rather than Mao Tse-tung, be used as the theoretical basis of U.S. military insurgency and unconventional warfare doctrine.

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Unconventional Warfare Doctrine by MAJ David P. Matarazzo, U.S. Army Special
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The monograph first establishes criteria for determining whether joint doctrine is appropriate for a task. The five criteria are below. Does UW involve the employment of joint forces? Does UW fit the demands of law, policy, or joint capstone or keystone doctrine? Is UW normally conducted as a multinational or interagency effort? Does the lack of joint doctrine for UW hamper joint training and education on UW? Will a lack of joint doctrine for UW lead to other operational or organizational problems? Next, the monograph examines existing joint and Service doctrine for unconventional warfare to determine if it is sufficient. Since the doctrine is not found to be sufficient, the criteria are then applied to determine that joint doctrine is appropriate for unconventional warfare. Once it has been established that joint doctrine is necessary and appropriate, components of the doctrine are recommended. The monograph compares the uses of joint doctrine and joint tactics, techniques, and procedures to the recommended doctrinal components to determine which one is more appropriate.

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INTRODUCTION

The moral strain of isolated fighting made ‘simple’ war very hard upon the soldier, exacting from him special initiative, endurance, enthusiasm. Irregular war was far more intellectual than a bayonet charge, far more exhausting than service in the comfortable imitative obedience of an ordered army. Guerrillas must be allowed liberal work room: in irregular war, of two men together, one was being wasted. Our ideal should be to make our battle a series of single combats, our ranks a happy alliance of agile commanders-in-chief.¹

T.E. Lawrence, Seven Pillars of Wisdom

As T.E. Lawrence found while fighting alongside the Arabs during The First World War, irregular, or unconventional warfare (UW) may be simple in the sense that it employs men as individuals rather than disciplined military units, but it is still a very intellectual undertaking.

Because UW is so intellectual, one might wonder whether simple tactical doctrines are sufficient to guide its conduct or whether more complex doctrines are required. Since the 1970s, doctrine has become increasingly important to the U.S. military as a central organizing force. If the US wishes to do as Lawrence did, achieve strategic objectives by combining the tactical actions of diverse elements such as raiding guerrilla bands, ships, aircraft, and armored forces, does the organization need a doctrine that integrates all of these elements? This monograph will investigate whether the U.S. military needs joint doctrine (or joint tactics, techniques, and procedures) for UW. The U.S. military has conducted UW since before its inception as a nation. In light of this, it is significant to ask whether the U.S. military has sufficient doctrine for the conduct of UW.

UW has a long tradition in the U.S. military. During the American Revolution, American militias conducted guerrilla warfare against the British. In addition, American regulars under the command of Francis Marion, Andrew Pickens, and Thomas Sumter employed guerrilla tactics in

¹ T.E. Lawrence, Seven Pillars of Wisdom. (Privately printed: 1926. Reprint, New York: 1962), 348. T.E. Lawrence was an assistant in the British Museum’s excavation of Carchemish on the Euphrates and later an officer in the British Army attached to the staff of the Hajez Expeditionary Force. During the Arab Revolt he served as an advisor to the Arabs.
their campaigns against the British forces. During The Second World War, the United States and
the United Kingdom conducted UW in France, Burma, China, Greece, and Yugoslavia through the
Office of Strategic Services. The U.S. conducted UW against North Korean and Chinese
communist forces in the Korean War under the auspices of the Army’s Combined Command for
Reconnaissance Activities Korea, the Air Force’s Special Activities Unit Number One, and the
Central Intelligence Agency’s Joint Advisory Commission-Korea. In 1951, the U.S. Army
published its first doctrine for UW, Field Manual 31-21, Organization and Conduct of Guerrilla
Warfare. The following year, the U.S. Army formed its first permanent unit with the primary
mission of conducting UW, the 10th Special Forces Group (Airborne).

Doctrine, on the other hand, does not have a long tradition in the U.S. military. Prior to the
First World War, American military doctrine was largely implied; a collection of ‘tricks of the trade’
and military folk ways. Not until 1905 did the Army publish its first doctrinal manual in the
modern sense, Field Service Regulations. It was after the First World War that doctrine finally
took shape as a formal class of knowledge in the U.S. military. Over the course of the next 50

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2 Aaron Bank, From OSS to Green Berets: The Birth of Special Forces (New York: Pocket
Books, 1986), 148. Colonel Aaron Bank was a member of the Office of Strategic Services Jedburgh
teams that conducted unconventional warfare in France during The Second World War and was the First
commander of the 10th Special Forces Group (Airborne).

3 Ibid., 152.

4 Richard L. Kiper, “Unconventional Warfare in Korea: Forgotten Aspect of the ‘Forgotten
War,’” Special Warfare (August, 2003), 34-35. Dr. Richard L. Kiper is a professor of history at Kansas
City Community College and was an infantry and Special Forces officer in the U.S. Army during the
Vietnam War.

5 U.S. Department of the Army, Field Manual 31-21, Organization and Conduct of Guerrilla
Warfare (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1951).

6 Bank, From OSS to Green Berets: The Birth of Special Forces, 187-188. Mike Skinner, “The
Major Mike Skinner is an active duty officer in the U.S. Army Special Forces.

7 Roger J. Spiller, “In the Shadow of the Dragon: Doctrine and the US Army after Vietnam,” The
Journal of the Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies (December, 1997), 41. Dr. Roger J.
Spiller is the George C. Marshall Professor of Military History at the U.S. Army Command and General
Staff College.

8 Andrew J. Birtle, U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine 1860-
1947 (Washington, D.C.: Center for Military History, 1998), 271. Dr. Andrew J. Birtle is a historian
with the U.S. Army Center for Military History.
years, doctrine assumed its present identity as fundamental principles that guide the employment of forces. In the years between the Second World War and the Vietnam War, the U.S. Army organized itself primarily according to its war plan for the reinforcement of Europe, War Plan 4102. In the aftermath of Vietnam, the U.S. Army became increasingly focused on doctrine as a central organizing force. It was largely the legacy of the Vietnam War that caused the U.S. Army to become a doctrine-based Army.9

More recently, the U.S. military, as a whole, has become more focused on doctrine. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 established the current system of joint doctrine.10 The legislators who created the law found that top military commanders lacked the authority they needed to carry out their missions. Specifically, they found that combatant commanders lacked the ability to modify Service doctrine to their unique situations. They felt that the lack of emphasis on joint doctrine meant that when Services were employed jointly, Service doctrines clashed.11 This law, along with other regulatory instruments that followed it, now requires that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff be responsible for the development and promulgation of joint doctrine, that doctrinal voids be filled, that joint doctrine be coordinated with combatant commanders, the Services, and the Joint Staff, and that Service, multi-Service, and multi-national doctrine be consistent with joint doctrine.12

Furthermore, a joint doctrine center has been established and each Service has its own doctrine center. The joint doctrine center publishes a professional journal focused, in part, on joint

11 Defense Reorganization: The Need for Change: Staff Report to the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, By Barry Goldwater, Chairman (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1985), 165. Senator Barry Goldwater was a three-term senator from Arizona. He was the Chairman of the Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on Armed Services. He retired from the Air Force Reserve as a Major General.
doctrine, *Joint Force Quarterly*. In light of the improvements in the development and implementation of joint doctrine, it can now be argued that the U.S. military is, or is becoming, a doctrine-based organization.

Joint doctrine has become central to everything the U.S. military does. Training, education, programs, procurement, and war planning are all driven by joint doctrine.\(^\text{13}\) Therefore, it is a significant question to ask whether joint doctrine is required for any given task. If joint doctrine is established unnecessarily, it may cause the U.S. military to focus on inappropriate missions. On the other hand, failure to establish joint doctrine where it is required could lead to significant gaps in the military’s training, education, programs, procurement, and war planning. It is essential that an appropriate metric be established and that it be correctly applied to determine whether joint doctrine is necessary for UW. As historian Robert A. Doughty explained in referring to the role of doctrine in interwar France, “Doctrine is the substance that binds them [organization, training, and equipment] together and makes them more effective. Although a false doctrine can be dangerously suffocating to all innovation, an adequate doctrine can be conducive to creative solutions and is a vital ingredient in any recipe for success.”\(^\text{14}\)

Joint Publication 1-01, *Joint Doctrine Development System*, describes the uses of joint doctrine. The uses it describes are as follows: guide the employment of joint forces or guide employment when significant forces of one Service are attached to forces of another Service, or when significant forces of one Service support forces of another Service; provide the national position for multinational doctrine consistent with existing security procedures; provide for

\(^\text{13}\) Russell W. Glenn, “...We Band of Brothers”: The Call for Joint Doctrine for Urban Operations (Santa Monica: RAND, 1999), 17. Dr. Russell W. Glenn is the Rand Corporation expert on urban warfare, public safety, policing, and law enforcement. He served in the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and is a graduate of the School of Advanced Military Studies.

multinational or interagency coordination during joint operations; provide the foundation for building a joint culture and a basis for joint training; provide instructional material for the professional military education system; and inform US Government agencies concerning the employment of US joint forces.\(^{15}\)

It follows that a shortfall in one or more of these areas indicates a need for new joint doctrine. This monograph will use these areas as a primary source of criteria for determining whether joint doctrine is necessary for unconventional warfare.

The first use provides a criterion. Joint doctrine cannot be necessary unless joint forces, significant forces of one Service attached to forces of another Service, or significant forces of one Service supporting forces of another Service are employed. If the forces of only one Service are involved in an operation, then Service doctrine is sufficient. This serves as a screening criterion—unless it is met, joint doctrine will not be recommended. The second and third uses together provide another criterion. If the U.S. military needs a position on a given task in the multinational or interagency environment, joint doctrine is the appropriate tool to provide it. Therefore, if the task is normally conducted as a multinational or interagency effort, there should be joint doctrine. Together, the fourth and fifth uses lead to another criterion. Since joint doctrine provides a basis for joint training and instructional material for professional military education, a lack of joint doctrine may hamper joint training and education. If the lack of joint doctrine for UW hampers joint training and education on UW, then joint doctrine is necessary.\(^{16}\)


\(^{16}\) U.S. Department of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual 3500.04C, Universal Joint Task List (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2002), GL-II-3. This manual defines task as a discrete event or action that enables a mission or function to be accomplished by individuals or organizations. Tasks are based upon doctrine; tactics, techniques, and procedures; or an organization's SOP; and are generated by mission analysis.
In “Handfuls of Heroes on Desperate Ventures: When do Special Operations Succeed?” Colin Gray, of the Centre for Security Studies at the University of Hull, England, argues that special operations forces must fit the demands of policy. In fact, it is correct to say that all military forces must fit the demands of policy. According to Joint Publication 1-0, *Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States*, doctrine is the broad principles that guide military operations in executing national policy. Thus, doctrine itself, including joint doctrine, must fit the demands of policy. In addition, joint doctrine must fit other demands including those in law and joint capstone and keystone doctrine. This idea provides another criterion. In order to be a valid task for the military that requires joint doctrine, a task must fit the demands of law, policy, and joint capstone or keystone doctrine. Only if a task fits those demands can it be a legitimate task for the military and thus require joint doctrine. This criterion also will serve as a *screening criterion*. If this criterion is not met, joint doctrine will not be recommended.

Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr. and Thomas Durell Young, of the U.S. Army War College’s Strategic Studies Institute, suggest that other uses exist for joint doctrine. They suggest that joint doctrine is central to operational thinking, programming, and the roles and functions of military organizations. Therefore, a lack of joint doctrine leads to flawed operational thinking, misdirected programming, and confused roles and functions. This suggests another criterion. If a lack of joint doctrine will lead to other operational or organizational problems, then joint doctrine is necessary.

Altogether, these sources have suggested five criteria. Two of the criteria are *screening criteria*; these are criteria that must be satisfied in order for joint doctrine to be recommended. The

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17 Colin Gray, “Handfuls of Heroes on Desperate Ventures: When do Special Operations Succeed?” *Parameters* (Spring, 1999): 2-24. Dr. Colin S. Gray is also European Director of the National Institute for Public Policy.


other three are *evaluation criteria*; these are criteria whose satisfaction suggests that joint doctrine is necessary, but each of these criteria does not necessarily need to be satisfied in order for joint doctrine to be necessary. To review then, the criteria are as follows:

1. Does UW involve the employment of joint forces or the employment of significant forces of one Service attached to forces of another Service, or significant forces of one Service in support of forces of another Service? *(Screening)*

2. Does UW fit the demands of law, policy, or joint capstone or keystone doctrine? *(Screening)*

3. Is UW normally conducted as a multinational or interagency effort? *(Evaluation)*

4. Does the lack of joint doctrine for UW hamper joint training and education on UW? *(Evaluation)*

5. Will a lack of joint doctrine for UW lead to other operational or organizational problems? *(Evaluation)*

In order to employ these criteria to make a recommendation, some standard must be established of how many criteria must be satisfied in order to recommend that joint doctrine is or is not necessary. Doctrine and literature provide no guidance here. With a lack of any model, rule, or precedent, it is reasonable to require that a simple majority of criteria (including both screening criteria) be satisfied in order to recommend that joint doctrine is necessary. For the purposes of this monograph, the standard is that both screening criteria and one evaluation criterion must be satisfied in order to recommend that joint doctrine is necessary.

One assumption underlies this monograph. The current U.S. policy of supporting selected resistance movements with combat forces (exemplified by support to the Contras in Nicaragua and the Mujahideen, and later the Northern Alliance, in Afghanistan) will not change in the near future.

The only limitation of this work is that it will not consider classified sources. In addition, the research will only consider changes to joint doctrine and it will not recommend changes to law, policy, or orders. Due to the changed national security situation since September 11, 2001, some
sources dated earlier, such as the *National Military Strategy*, will not be considered because they are not consistent with current national security situation.

T.E. Lawrence was able to integrate irregular Bedouin tribesman with British armored, air, and naval forces to accomplish strategic objectives. However, the successful formula for integrating these forces was not immediately obvious. It required significant reflection upon history, theory, and the situation at hand. Similarly, determining the correct doctrine for UW today will require significant reflection. In order to determine if joint doctrine is necessary for UW several steps must be taken. First, current doctrine must be examined to determine if there are doctrinal voids. Second, if a doctrinal void is found, the criteria must be applied thoughtfully to determine if joint doctrine is appropriate. Finally, if the criteria are satisfied, a coherent recommendation must be made suggesting how to fill the identified voids.
DOCTRINAL ANALYSIS AND LITERATURE REVIEW

The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 required the U.S. military to examine and fill doctrinal voids.\textsuperscript{20} However, identifying those voids is not a simple process. In order to identify doctrinal voids, the entire body of doctrine must be examined and analyzed for sufficiency. First, there must be sufficient doctrine for those who provide strategic direction to joint forces, employ joint forces, and support or are supported by joint forces. This is the role of joint doctrine and generally corresponds to the strategic level of war. Second, there must be sufficient doctrine for those who implement joint doctrine. This is the role of joint tactics, techniques, and procedures (JTTP) and generally corresponds to the operational level of war.\textsuperscript{21} Finally, Service doctrine must be examined to understand how doctrine will be implemented at the tactical level. If each of these roles is filled satisfactorily, and the body of doctrine for a given task or subject composes a coherent, logical whole, then no doctrinal void exists. If there is not a coherent, logical whole then there is a doctrinal void that must be addressed.

In the case of UW, there is a significant body of doctrine that must be examined. Joint doctrine, including The Joint Doctrine Encyclopedia; Joint Publication 1, Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States; Joint Publication 1-01, Joint Doctrine Development System; Joint Publication 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations; Joint Publication 3-05, Doctrine for Joint Special Operations; Joint Publication 3-07.1, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Internal Defense (FID); and relevant Service doctrine will be analyzed for their sufficiency in providing guidance at the operational and strategic levels of war. At the same time, these documents will also be reviewed for any pertinent information on the role of doctrine. In addition, historical doctrine including Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication 20, Volume II, Unconventional

\textsuperscript{20} U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Electronic Library: The Joint Doctrine Story.
\textsuperscript{21} U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Publication 1-01, Joint Doctrine Development System, I-2. The role of joint doctrine and joint tactics, techniques, and procedures is paraphrased directly from the manual. The correlation to the levels of war has been added by the author for the sake of clarity.
Warfare, dated 1983, will also be reviewed for any lessons learned or fundamental principles which may still be useful today. Finally, a few works of especially relevant literature will be reviewed for a theoretical understanding of UW.

The *Joint Doctrine Encyclopedia* defines and discusses unconventional warfare for approximately two pages. It briefly discusses the political-military dimension of UW, illustrates how UW can be conducted independently or in support of conventional forces, and discusses the forces that conduct UW. While the encyclopedia is a valuable reference on UW, its discussion is completely at the strategic level. It provides no guidance on the planning or conduct of UW at the operational or tactical levels.

Joint Publication 1, *Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States*, is the capstone publication for all US joint doctrine. This publication explains how the U.S. Armed Forces are employed as an instrument national power and how they are employed in joint warfare. The publication describes doctrine as fundamental principles that guide the employment of forces. It explains the role of joint doctrine in guiding forces, shaping the thinking of the Armed Forces, and encouraging innovation. While this publication explains the role of doctrine, it does not discuss UW.

Joint Publication 1-01, *Joint Doctrine Development System*, explains the joint doctrine development system. It implements the changes required by the *Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986*, by establishing how the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff develops, reviews, approves, and maintains joint doctrine and JTTP. The publication also states that the purpose of joint doctrine and JTTP is to enhance the operational effectiveness of US

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24 Ibid., vi, I-9.
forces. It goes on to explain the differences between joint doctrine and JTTP. This manual is the sole source of information on the procedures for developing joint doctrine.

Joint Publication 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations (JP 3-0)*, is the keystone doctrine for all joint operations including war, military operations other than war, and multinational operations. JP 3-0, does not discuss UW, but it does discuss *support to insurgency* as a type of military operations other than war. Support to insurgency is closely related to UW. The publication describes the operation as involving supporting resistance movements aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government. It also describes the role of U.S. forces as providing logistics and training, but states they normally do not themselves conduct combat operations. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual 3500.04C, *Universal Joint Task List*, describes the operation *support insurgencies* as including the tasks *conduct unconventional warfare across joint operational areas* and *conduct unconventional warfare in the joint operational area*. However, the prohibition against U.S. forces conducting combat operations is included only in the definition of support to insurgencies. While *Doctrine for Joint Operations* does not mention UW explicitly, its discussion of supporting insurgencies includes UW.

Joint Publication 3-05, *Doctrine for Joint Special Operations (JP 3-05)*, provides an introduction to joint special operations. JP 3-05 defines UW and the activities that comprise it. It states that UW involves long duration military and paramilitary operations that are normally conducted through, with, or by indigenous or surrogate forces supported by an external source. It also explains that UW can be conducted as a part of a theater campaign or as a subordinate campaign, and explains the differences in focus if it is conducted independently. The manual also

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26 Ibid., I-1.
ties UW to the ideas of resistance and insurgency. It states that UW involves organizing the civilian population against a hostile government or occupying power to achieve U.S. objectives. It specifies that special operations forces (SOF) do not create resistance movements, but that they advise, train, and assist them and when required *accompany them into combat* (emphasis added). This is in contrast to JP 3-0, which stipulates that U.S. forces supporting insurgencies normally *do not conduct combat operations* (emphasis added). JP 3-05 also emphasizes that UW is not limited to guerrilla warfare or insurgency. It states that UW includes, but is not limited to guerrilla warfare, sabotage, subversion, intelligence activities, and unconventional assisted recovery.²⁹

Joint Publication 3-05 goes on to describe each of these UW activities. The manual characterizes guerrilla warfare as being the military or paramilitary component of an armed resistance movement that destroys or degrades the military capability of an occupying power or hostile government, and undermines its legitimacy. It defines subversion as clandestine operations designed to undermine the military, economic, psychological, or political strength or morale of a regime or nation. It describes sabotage as operations to degrade a nation’s defensive capability by attacking its defense resources. The manual goes on to explain that intelligence activities include such things as assessing the intentions and capabilities of indigenous and coalition forces. It describes unconventional assisted recovery as operations by UW forces to move selected personnel from adversary-held, hostile, or sensitive areas to areas under friendly control.³⁰

UW is also closely related to foreign internal defense, another task discussed in *Doctrine for Joint Special Operations*. As described above, UW involves, but is not limited to, supporting armed resistance movements and insurgencies. According to the *Universal Joint Task List*, support

³⁰ Ibid., II-7 to II-8.
Foreign internal defense, on the other hand, involves assisting other governments in protecting themselves against insurgency and other threats. Thus, in at least one aspect, UW and foreign internal defense perform exactly opposite roles; one supports insurgencies against hostile governments and the other assists friendly governments in protecting themselves from insurgencies.

However, JP 3-05 treats these two missions differently. In the case of UW, it gives only a general description and no further guidance. In the case of foreign internal defense, it follows up its description by referring to Joint Publication 3-07.1, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Internal Defense (FID)*, for more information. Joint Publication 3-07.1 covers the fundamentals, the organization and responsibilities, planning considerations, employment considerations, and training responsibilities for foreign internal defense in detail. Thus while UW and foreign internal defense are so similar, UW has only a general description in joint doctrine while foreign internal defense has an entire JTTP manual dedicated to it. The discussion of UW in Joint Publication 3-05 is useful at the strategic level, but provides no guidance for the conduct of UW at the operational or tactical levels. The same is true of joint doctrine in general; it provides only strategic guidance on UW.

Service doctrine also discusses UW. Air Force Doctrine Document 1-1, *Air Force Tasks*, and Air Force Doctrine Document 2-7, *Special Operations*, mention UW, but neither manual provides any guidance for its planning, command and control, organization, or execution. Marine Corps doctrine does not mention UW, but does mention support to insurgency as a military operation other than war. However, the manual provides no specific guidance on how to support

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insurgencies.\textsuperscript{34} Naval Warfare Publication 3-05, \textit{Naval Special Warfare (Revision D)}, addresses UW in generally the same terms as JP 3-05, but adds specific roles for Naval Special Warfare Forces in guerrilla warfare, sabotage, and subversion. It provides no guidance on how Naval Special Warfare Forces fulfill these roles.\textsuperscript{35} Air Force, Marine Corps, and Navy doctrine all discuss UW, but none provides any detailed guidance on its planning or conduct at any level.

Army doctrine has many references to UW and support to insurgency. Field Manual 7-15 (FM 7-15), \textit{Army Universal Task List}, includes the Army tactical task, \textit{conduct unconventional warfare}.\textsuperscript{36} It also includes the Army tactical task, \textit{conduct combat search and rescue} which includes unconventional assisted recovery in its description.\textsuperscript{37} FM 7-15 also includes the Army tactical task \textit{support insurgencies}. In its description of this task, the manual states that Army special operations forces may support insurgencies by conducting conventional or unconventional warfare.\textsuperscript{38} This manual clearly establishes that UW is a doctrinal task in the Army, but provides no guidance.

The Army’s Field Manual 3-0 (FM 3-0), \textit{Operations}, does not address UW, but does discuss support to insurgency. The manual states that support to insurgency is normally conducted by Army special operations forces that provide logistics and training, but normally do not conduct combat operations.\textsuperscript{39} It is significant that while UW is addressed in other manuals and includes combat operations, the Army’s keystone doctrinal manual for operations does not address it directly.

\textsuperscript{34} U.S. Department of the Navy, Marine Corps Doctrine Publication 1-0, \textit{Marine Corps Operations} (Washington, DC: Department of the Navy, 2001), 10-14.
\textsuperscript{35} U.S. Department of the Navy, Navy Warfare Publication 3-05, \textit{Naval Special Warfare (Revision D)}, (Washington, DC: Department of the Navy, 2000), 1-5 to 1-6.
\textsuperscript{36} U.S. Department of the Army, Field Manual 7-15, \textit{Army Universal Task List} (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 2003), 8-17.
\textsuperscript{37} Ibid., 8-32.
\textsuperscript{38} Ibid., 8-16.
Field Manual 100-25 (FM 100-25), *Doctrine for Special Operations Forces*, devotes less than two pages to UW. It defines UW, provides a short vignette of UW in the Philippines during the Second World War, and provides a short narrative that emphasizes the role of UW in the Cold War environment. The narrative begins by stressing that winning the conventional land battle remains the absolute priority. It states that UW is composed of guerrilla warfare and support to insurgency.\footnote{40} This contradicts JP 3-05, *Doctrine for Joint Special Operations*, which emphasized that UW is not limited to guerrilla warfare and insurgency.\footnote{41} The fact that Army doctrine contradicts joint doctrine can be explained in that FM 100-25 was published in 1999, five years before the current version of JP 3-05. FM 100-25 adds nothing to U.S. military doctrine for UW and provides no guidance that is useful below the strategic level.\footnote{42}

Field Manual 3-05.20 (FM 3-05.20), *Special Forces Operations*, discusses UW for 10 pages. This manual defines UW, discusses its phases of execution, its use independently or in support of conventional forces, the nature of indigenous and surrogate forces, and the contemporary UW environment. This manual also relates UW to unconventional assisted recovery, effects-based operations, and information operations. It states that in UW, Special Forces may work with and through insurgents (forces targeting a constituted government), partisans (forces targeting an occupying power), and coalition forces. It further discusses guerrilla warfare, evasion and recovery, intelligence activities, and other offensive actions. While Field Manual 3-05.20 does

\footnote{40} U.S. Department of the Army, *Field Manual 100-25, Doctrine for Special Operations Forces* (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1999), paragraph 2-3.
add some concepts to our strategic ideas for UW, it also provides no guidance on planning and conduct of UW below the strategic level.  

Field Manual 3-05.201 (FM 3-05.201), *Special Forces Unconventional Warfare Operations*, is the only current doctrinal publication in the Army or any other Service written specifically for UW. The preface of this manual states that its purpose is to guide Special Forces commanders and staffs at the battalion and lower echelons during the planning and conduct of UW. The manual provides an overview of UW including UW aspects, a discussion on the nature of resistance and insurgency, the dynamics of insurgencies, and U.S. sponsorship. It makes a clear linkage between UW and insurgency, confirming the earlier assertion that UW and foreign internal defense involve both sides of the same problem—insurgency and counterinsurgency, but are not limited to those ideas. FM 3-05.201 adds significantly to the theoretical and strategic understanding of UW and provides specific tactical guidance on the conduct of all phases of UW by Special Forces battalions. However, it provides no guidance for the planning or conduct of UW at the operational level and provides no guidance for forces other than Army Special Forces.

In considering all of the extant joint and Service doctrine relevant to UW, it seems clear that a doctrinal void exists. Joint doctrine, including the *Joint Doctrine Encyclopedia* and JP 3-05 provide an understanding of UW, but only from a strategic point of view. Doctrine of all four Services claims a role in UW, but provides little guidance about integrating their forces and capabilities in the joint UW fight. Army doctrine, including FM 100-25, and FM 3-05.20, provide some additional understanding of UW, but no guidance at the operational or tactical levels of war. FM 3-05.201, *Special Forces Unconventional Warfare Operations*, provides detailed tactical guidance for Army Special Forces battalions, but no operational guidance. We are left with plenty

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of strategic ideas about the nature of UW, good tactical guidance for Army Special Forces, but absolutely no operational level guidance. Most importantly, there is no guidance on how to integrate forces from the four Services that claim a role in unconventional warfare.

In addition to the current doctrine, there is a wealth of historical doctrine for UW and counterinsurgency. The Army’s modern professional interest in UW began in the late 1930s and early 1940s with a number of articles in professional journals.\(^{45}\) The Army conducted UW in the Second World War and published its first doctrine for UW in 1951.\(^{46}\) Additionally, the Army has published doctrine on counterinsurgency since the 1920s. Before that, the Army and Marine Corps both had a large body of informal doctrine on counterinsurgency and small wars.\(^{47}\) Although this body of historical doctrine for UW and counterinsurgency is no longer authoritative, it still has value to modern planners.

One of the most important volumes of historical doctrine to consider is Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication 20, Volume II, *Unconventional Warfare*, dated 1983. This manual was written to assist commanders and staffs plan and direct joint UW operations.\(^{48}\) The manual includes operational level guidance on command and control, organization, administration, intelligence, operations, logistics, and communications for joint unconventional warfare.\(^{49}\) This manual was replaced by JP 3-05, which failed to provide the explicit operational level guidance for joint UW.

In addition to doctrine, there is a large body of literature that is useful in answering the research question. “…*We Band of Brothers*: The Call for Joint Doctrine for Urban Operations,


\(^{49}\) Ibid., vi.
published by the Rand Corporation, makes an argument analogous to the one in this monograph. While this monograph asks whether joint doctrine is necessary for unconventional warfare, the Rand Study questions whether joint doctrine is necessary for urban warfare. While it does not present specific criteria related to the requirement for joint doctrine, it is useful to examine the methodology Rand used to answer their question. The Rand study also discusses the role of doctrine in driving training, technological development, and organizational design.  

It is impossible to discuss the theory of UW without discussing the writings of Mao Tse-tung. Mao is perhaps the best known and most read theoretician and practitioner of UW. Mao emphasized the importance of rigorous analysis. He criticized those who tried to copy techniques from one conflict and apply them without change to another. He referred to this practice as “cutting the feet to fit the shoes.” In light of this, it is ironic that many have attempted to copy some of his conclusions from the Sino-Japanese War, such as the three stages of protracted war, and apply them to all insurgencies. Mao is an excellent theoretical source because he has been so widely emulated. However, his view of UW tends to be somewhat narrow, encompassing only his ideas of the Protracted People’s War in a rural environment.

For a broader and more complete look at insurgency, Bard O’Neill’s book, *Insurgency and Terrorism: Inside Modern Revolutionary Warfare* is an excellent source. It provides a complete explanation of the nature of insurgency, the types of insurgencies, their strategies, and a wealth of other information. Because it is so much broader than, yet still inclusive of, Mao’s ideas, this book

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50 Glenn, “...We Band of Brothers”: The Call for Joint Doctrine for Urban Operations, 17.

51 Mao Tse-tung, *Selected Writings of Mao Tse-Tung*, CSI reprint (Fort Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute, n.d.), 78-79.

52 Mao Tse-tung, *Selected Writings of Mao Tse-Tung*, CSI reprint, 208-210. In *On Protracted War*, Mao conducted a detailed analysis of the Sino-Japanese War before concluding that the war would be a protracted war which would pass through three stages; he did not state that all insurgencies would pass through those stages.
provides a far superior overall theoretical understanding of insurgency. Because insurgency is closely related to UW, this is essential to understanding UW.

An author of particular interest to the study of UW is T.E. Lawrence. In *Seven Pillars of Wisdom*, Lawrence wrote of his experiences in the Arab revolt during The First World War. Because Lawrence was a Westerner advising and assisting indigenous forces, his experiences are very similar to our modern concept of UW. Perhaps the most enduring value of this book is Lawrence’s thought process in developing his doctrine for the Arab Revolt. After taking Wejh, he spent 10 days in a tent recovering from illness. During this time, Lawrence considered what he knew of military history, theory, and of the situation he faced. He determined that it was not necessary to defeat the Turks tactically in order for the Arabs to achieve their strategic objectives. He concluded that victory to the Arabs was geographical; they wanted to control all Arabic-speaking lands. The Arabs did not have to destroy the Turkish army and they did not have to dislodge the Turks from the terrain and cities they still occupied, such as Medina, to be successful. In fact, he determined that the Turks were best left in the places they occupied. This left the Arabs in possession of 99% of Arab speaking lands and the Turks confined to their outposts along the railways. The Arabs understood they could interdict just enough to prevent the Turks from causing any harm. This would ensure final victory for the Arabs. While Lawrence’s doctrine for the conduct of UW does not apply in every situation, his approach to problem solving will apply. He was not afraid to contradict current theory. He understood the problem he faced, considered relevant history and theory, and used the elements that applied to develop a doctrine that would successfully solve the problem. Lawrence’s approach to problem solving serves as a model to any modern thinker, especially those interested in problems of unconventional warfare.

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Another work by Lawrence of significant value in the study of UW is “Twenty-Seven Articles.” In this work, Lawrence explained his approach to fighting alongside the Arabs. He summarized the principles that would allow other British officers to work successfully with the Bedouin. While many of the specifics apply to the Arab cultural norms, the philosophical underpinnings of this work are universal when working with indigenous or surrogate forces. The significant lessons of the work include learning about other cultures and languages, listening skills, leadership and understanding human nature and relationships, communication skills, conflict resolution, respect, sense of humor, and open mindedness. “Twenty-Seven Articles” summarizes the skills it takes to be a successful practitioner of UW.

UW is discussed in joint doctrine at the strategic level, but not at the operational or tactical levels. Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps doctrine claim a role in UW, albeit indirectly in the case of the Marine Corps. Only Army doctrine discusses UW at length. Army doctrine provides some general strategic guidance and an entire manual devoted to the tactical conduct of UW. However, in all of the U.S. military’s current doctrine, there is no guidance for the conduct of joint UW at the operational level of war. In fact, the only operational level guidance is a superceded JCS Publication from 1983. As Major Brian Thompson points out in his award-winning essay, “Surrogate Armies: Redefining the Ground Force,” joint doctrine makes no prescription for integrating surrogate forces into our joint warfighting dynamic. A doctrinal void does exist; the U.S. military lacks guidance for joint UW at the operational level of war.

54 T.E. Lawrence, “Twenty-Seven Articles” The Arab Bulletin (August 1917).
55 Brian L. Thompson, “Surrogate Armies: Redefining the Ground Force” (Research paper, U.S. Naval War College, 2002), 28. This essay won second place in the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Strategic Essay Competition.
ANALYSIS

As established previously, once a doctrinal void is found to exist, the next logical step is to apply the criteria to determine whether joint doctrine is appropriate. The analysis will address each of the criteria in turn, and present evidence to show that the criterion is or is not satisfied. Based upon the results of the analysis, a recommendation will be made as to whether the US. military needs joint doctrine or JTTP for UW.

The first criterion asks if UW involves the employment of joint forces or the employment of significant forces of one Service attached to forces of another Service, or significant forces of one Service in support of forces of another Service. To answer this criterion, three areas will be investigated. First, does doctrine call for the employment of joint forces or the employment of significant forces of one Service attached to forces of another Service, or significant forces of one Service in support of forces of another Service in the conduct of UW? Second, does Service doctrine of more than one Service claim a role in UW? Third, are there historical examples of joint UW operations?

The first area asks whether doctrine calls for the employment of joint forces in the conduct of UW. Joint doctrine states that UW is joint. Joint Publication 3-05, *Doctrine for Joint Special Operations*, states that all special operations are inherently joint. The publication continues by stating that even special operations that are conducted as a single-service operation require joint support and coordination. Joint Publication 3-05 later states that special operations forces are most effective when they are fully integrated into the [joint] campaign plan. The Joint *Doctrine Encyclopedia* states that while UW is principally the responsibility of Army Special Forces, all designated special operations forces may conduct UW. In addition, special operations forces may

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57 Ibid., III-1.
be augmented by conventional forces to conduct UW. Thus, current joint doctrine makes clear that UW involves the employment of joint forces or at least the employment of significant forces from more than one Service department.

Historical doctrine for UW also called for the employment of joint forces in UW. JCS Publication 20, Volume II, *Unconventional Warfare*, stated that one of its purposes was to assist commanders and staffs plan and direct joint UW operations. The 1969 Army Field Manual 31-21, *Special Forces Operations*, went so far as to spell out the roles of forces from the different Services in UW. It states that Army Special Forces are trained to participate in UW; Navy Sea Air Land (SEAL) Teams and Underwater Demolition Teams (UDT) and selected reconnaissance elements of the U.S. Marine Corps have the capability to conduct UW on hostile shores, restricted waterways, and river areas; Air Force Special Air Warfare Units participate in UW primarily by providing airlift and support to UW forces. From a doctrinal perspective, UW has been considered a joint undertaking since at least 1969. Since current joint doctrine as well as historical doctrine calls for the employment of joint forces in the conduct of UW, the first area of investigation is satisfied.

The second area to investigate is whether Service doctrine of more than one Service claims a role in UW. Current Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps, and Army doctrine all discuss their Service’s role in UW (or support to insurgency in the case of the Marine Corps). Air Force Doctrine Document 1-1, *Air Force Tasks*, includes UW as one of the capabilities included in Air Force special operations forces capabilities. Air Force Doctrine Document 2-7, *Special Operations*.

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operations, states that combat aviation advisors are tasked with the mission of conducting UW.\textsuperscript{62} OPNAVINST 3500.38A/ USCG COMDT INST 3500.01A, Universal Navy Task List (UNTL), Version 2.0 includes the task conduct unconventional warfare.\textsuperscript{63} In describing the task support personnel recovery worldwide it includes the use of unconventional assisted recovery mechanisms.\textsuperscript{64} Naval Warfare Publication 3-05, Naval Special Warfare (Revision D), addresses UW in generally the same terms as Joint Publication 3-05, Doctrine for Joint Special Operations. It adds that Naval Special Warfare forces participate directly in guerrilla warfare and sabotage, and provide support to subversion in the coastal or riverine environment.\textsuperscript{65} Marine Corps doctrine does not mention UW, but does mention support to insurgency as a military operation other than war. Its discussion of support to insurgency is identical to joint doctrine, except that it states that a Marine air-ground task force may provide logistic and training support to an insurgency.\textsuperscript{66} Since support to insurgency includes UW, this implies a Marine Corps role in UW.\textsuperscript{67} Army doctrine claims the largest role in UW. Field Manual 100-25, Doctrine for Special Operations Forces, Field Manual 3-05.20, Special Forces Operations, and Field Manual 3-05.201, Special Forces Unconventional Warfare Operations, define the Army’s role in UW. Since all four Services claim a role for their forces in UW, the second area has been satisfied.

The third area asks whether there are historical examples of joint UW. This monograph will only consider modern examples of UW in which a Western power is the external source supporting the indigenous or surrogate forces. These provide the closest examples of the sort of

\textsuperscript{62} Ibid., 24, 48.
\textsuperscript{63} U.S. Department of the Navy, OPNAVINST 3500.38A/ USCG COMDT INST 3500.01A, Universal Navy Task List (UNTL), Version 2.0 (Washington, DC: Department of the Navy, 2001), 3-396.
\textsuperscript{64} Ibid., 3-43.
\textsuperscript{65} U.S. Department of the Navy, Navy Warfare Publication 3-05, Naval Special Warfare (Revision D), (Washington, DC: Department of the Navy, 2000), 1-5 to 1-6.
\textsuperscript{67} U.S. Department of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual 3500.04C, Universal Joint Task List, E-A-60.
UW the U.S. military might conduct in the future. One of the best examples of joint UW is T.E. Lawrence’s experience during the First World War. Lawrence wrote of the use of air raids, ships, equipment from British sappers, and British Army instructors for the irregular forces in his UW operations with the Arabs. In the Second World War, there were examples of varying degrees of jointness in the conduct of UW. Detachment 101, which operated in the China-Burma-India Theater, had an organic light aircraft squadron, while the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) operations in Europe did not. Since both examples relied on airpower for transportation and supply, both were inherently joint. However, the more integrated, joint structure of Detachment 101 avoided many command and control and resource allocation problems that plagued the OSS operations in Europe. These historical examples clearly demonstrate the joint nature of UW. Even the exception helps to prove the rule—the failure of the OSS to be fully joint in Europe led it to have problems not experienced in other theaters where the effort was more joint in nature.

The first criterion asks if UW involves the employment of joint forces or the employment of significant forces of one Service attached to forces of another Service, or significant forces of one Service supporting the forces of another Service. Current joint doctrine and relevant historical doctrine do define UW as joint. Second, each of the four Services claims a role in UW. Finally, historical examples demonstrate that effective UW is conducted as a joint operation. The evidence is clear; UW is a joint endeavor.

The second criterion asks if UW fits the demands of law, policy, or joint capstone or keystone doctrine. In fact, UW does fit the demands of law, policy, and joint keystone doctrine.

UW fits the demands of law. U.S. Code even goes so far as to mandate joint doctrine for UW. Because Section 167, U.S. Code, Title 10, Armed Forces, lists UW as a special operations

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68 Lawrence, Seven Pillars of Wisdom, 349-350, 351, 352, 636.
activity and gives the commander of the U.S. Special Operations Command responsibility for doctrine relating to it, the law creates a requirement for doctrine for UW. Furthermore, the same section charges the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with the responsibility of developing doctrine for the joint employment of the Armed forces. Since it has already been established that UW involves joint employment of the Armed forces, this law also requires the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to develop joint doctrine for UW.  

To determine if UW fits the demands of policy, we must first define policy. Although the U.S. Government has no definition for policy, the dictionary defines it as “a definite course or method of action selected from among alternatives and in light of given conditions to guide and determine present and future decisions, or a high-level overall plan embracing the general goals and acceptable procedures, especially of a governmental body.” While governmental policy is normally articulated in policy documents, these documents are often classified and compartmented. Because of this, it is often difficult to research them in an unclassified forum. However, since strategy explains how to use the instruments of national power to achieve policy objectives, the demands of policy are often illustrated by strategy and other documents. For the purposes of this monograph, strategy documents, and other documents written at the policy level will be used to infer the demands of policy.

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual 3500.04C, Universal Joint Task List (UJTL), is a statement of policy that directs an UW capability. It includes Conduct Unconventional Warfare across Joint Operations Areas as a theater strategic task for joint

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70 Armed Forces, U.S. Code, Title 10 (1956), Section 167.
72 U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Publication 1-01, Joint Doctrine Development System, I-1. This publication states that Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manuals reflect joint policy.
forces. It also includes *Conduct Unconventional Warfare in the Joint Operations Area* as an operational task for joint forces. Another operational task is *Operate Theater Unconventional Assisted Recovery Coordination Center*. In discussing the tactical task, *Conduct Joint Personnel Recovery*, the manual lists *Conduct Unconventional Warfare* as an Army tactical mission. In discussing support to insurgencies, the *Universal Joint Task List*, lists *Conduct Unconventional Warfare across Joint Operational Areas* as a theater strategic task. Six other operations in the *Universal Joint Task List* include UW as an operational task. Clearly this policy statement calls for an UW capability and links support to insurgency with UW.

In addition, there are at least four other policy areas that demand a UW capability. They include regime change, preemption, innovation, and support to resistance movements.

According to the *Quadrennial Defense Review Report* of 2001, U.S. forces must have the capability to set the conditions for a regime change if so directed. Because UW is focused on political-military objectives and may involve supporting an existing insurgency aimed at the overthrow of a hostile government, it is an ideal tool for affecting regime change. While UW is certainly not the only option the U.S. might exercise to effect a regime change, it has some distinct advantages. Because UW efforts can support an existing insurgency that is already aimed at overthrowing the constituted government, it can provide the U.S. a low visibility, economy of force option to affect regime change. One example is Special Forces operations with the Northern

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74 Ibid., B-C-C-21.  
75 Ibid., B-C-C-141.  
76 Ibid., B-C-D-21.  
77 Ibid., E-A-60.  
78 U.S. Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review Report* (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2001), 29. While this document does not prescribe policy, it does review strategy, programs, and resources, all of which are intended to implement policy. Therefore, this document is useful in ascertaining policies.  
Alliance and the change of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan in 2001. In this example, a small number of Special Forces soldiers trained, advised, and assisted surrogate forces from the Northern Alliance to displace the Taliban regime. UW is well suited to satisfy the policy requirement for regime change.

The second policy area is preemption. According to U.S. strategy, the U.S. will defend itself by preempting terrorists, rogue states, and other adversaries. JP 3-05 ties preemption directly to UW, stating that special operations forces conduct UW to preempt adversaries by neutralizing their capabilities before the fight. According to this publication, UW provides a tool to satisfy the U.S. policy regarding preemption.

In its discussion regarding innovation, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America focuses on new and more innovative methods of dealing with the threats posed by rogue regimes and weapons of mass destruction. It also states that the U.S. response to rogue states and their terrorist clients must take full advantage of innovation in the use of military forces. In further explaining this idea, it explains that innovation in the military involves experimentation with new approaches to warfare to provide the President with a wider range of military options.

Similarly, Joint Vision 2020 stresses the importance of innovation in the military. The document opens by articulating the vision of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The vision emphasizes innovative organizations to transform the joint force. The document later stresses the importance

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of intellectual innovation. Based upon these documents, the U.S. policy to pursue innovation in the Armed Forces is explicit.

Many in the defense community describe the threats posed by terrorists, rogue regimes, and weapons of mass destruction as asymmetric threats. Asymmetric warfare is simply a way of acting, organizing, and thinking differently from one’s opponents. According to Keith Dickson, of the Joint Forces Staff College, one innovative approach the U.S. military can use is to employ its own form of asymmetric warfare. There are several advantages to this approach to warfare. Adversaries have moral, informational, and organizational vulnerabilities that can be exploited asymmetrically. Asymmetric approaches offer the ability to achieve strategic goals at a lower cost than conventional approaches. Asymmetric effects outweigh their costs. Asymmetric warfare can be conducted overtly, covertly, or clandestinely. Asymmetric warfare can be conducted at the strategic, operational, or tactical levels. Dickson further concludes that the appropriate means through which the U.S. should wage asymmetric warfare is UW. In other words, UW answers the current call for innovation in the armed forces.

Current Army doctrine also correlates UW to asymmetric warfare. According to Army Field Manual 3-05.20, Special Forces Operations, UW provides both a counter to asymmetric threats and an asymmetric offensive capability. This manual further states that UW forces’

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85 Keith Dickson, “The New Asymmetry: Unconventional Warfare and Army special forces,” Special Warfare (Fall 2001): 14-19. Dr. Keith Dickson is an associate professor of military studies at the Joint Forces Staff College. He has served over 23 years in the U.S. Army, the majority of it in special operations units.
86 U.S. Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-05.20, Special Forces, paragraph 2-3.
location in hostile territory and their relationship with indigenous or surrogate forces provides them a capability for use in counter-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.\textsuperscript{87} According to Major Greg Metzger, UW can be used to produce leverage against other states. He describes how the Contra insurgents were useful in pushing the communist Sandinista regime in Nicaragua to the bargaining table in the 1980s. This in turn pushed the Sandinistas toward democracy.\textsuperscript{88} FM 100-25, also cites U.S. support to the Contras in Nicaragua as an example of supporting an insurgency to put indirect pressure on an adversary.\textsuperscript{89} UW is an innovative, even asymmetric, approach to warfare that provides a tool in the fight to counter the proliferation of weapons mass destruction, and is flexible enough to provide leverage against other states. UW is an ideal approach to satisfy the U.S. policy on innovation in the Armed Forces.

Finally, concerning support to resistance movements, FM 3-05.201 states that the U.S. has a current policy of supporting selected resistance movements.\textsuperscript{90} JP 3-07 explains this policy more by stating that the U.S. Government may support an insurgency against a regime threatening U.S. interests.\textsuperscript{91} U.S. support to the Contras in Nicaragua and the Mujahideen in Afghanistan in the 1980s and the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan in 2001 help illustrate this policy. Furthermore, these resistance movements were insurgencies against established, albeit unfriendly, governments. Since Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual 3500.04C, \textit{Universal Joint Task List}, states that support to insurgency includes UW, this extant U.S. policy of supporting resistance movements (including insurgencies) creates a requirement for a capability to conduct UW.

\textsuperscript{87} Ibid., paragraph 2-33.
\textsuperscript{89} U.S. Department of the Army, Field Manual 100-25, \textit{Doctrine for Special Operations Forces}, paragraph 2-3.
Clearly UW fits the demands of policy. The *Universal Joint Task List* calls for a UW capability in the U.S. Armed Forces. In addition, four other extant U.S. policy demands indicate a requirement for a UW capability.

Joint keystone doctrine also calls for a UW capability. Joint Publication 3-0 lists support to insurgency as a type of military operation other than war. As described above, the connection between support to insurgency and UW is established by the *Universal Joint Task List*. Thus, joint keystone doctrine also calls for a UW capability.

To summarize, UW fits the demands of law, policy, and joint keystone doctrine. U.S. Code, Title 10, Section 167, not only establishes UW as a special operations activity, it mandates that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Commander of U.S. Special Operations Command develop doctrine for its joint conduct. The *Universal Joint Task List* calls for UW as a task at both the operational and strategic levels. In addition, four other policy demands require or suggest a UW capability. Finally joint keystone doctrine requires a UW capability in the US military. The second criterion is satisfied.

The third criterion asks *if UW is normally conducted as a multinational or interagency effort*. The definition of UW specifies that it is predominantly conducted through, with, or by indigenous or surrogate forces. This makes it inherently multinational. The *National Security Strategy of the United States of America* emphasizes repeatedly that the U.S. will accomplish its strategies by building multinational coalitions. General Riscassi, the former commander in chief of the United Nations Command in Korea, summed it up, “Almost every time military forces have deployed from the United States it has been as a member of — most often to lead — coalition

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operations.” Since U.S. military operations are almost always multinational, it is reasonable to expect that U.S. UW operations will also be multinational.

In fact, a review of U.S. UW operations reveals that they are normally multinational, but the degree of multinational involvement varies from operation to operation. During the Second World War, the Jedburgh teams that conducted UW in France were created by the U.S. Office of Strategic Services in partnership with the British Special Operations Executive, and manned by Canadian and French soldiers, in addition to British and Americans. From the strategic decision making all the way to the teams on the ground in occupied France, the Jedburghs were a multinational operation. The UW operations by North Korean partisans during the Korean War were also multinational to a degree. The Republic of Korea Navy operated in conjunction with the partisans, and the partisans were ultimately integrated into the Republic of Korea Army. However, the Republic of Korea Government and Army had great reservations about the partisans. Although they participated in strategic decision-making, it was the Eighth U.S. Army that was responsible for the employment of the North Korean partisans.

U.S. operations to support the Contras in Nicaragua were somewhat multinational in nature. While the U.S. provided the logistic and training support, Honduras provided support and basing. Although this operation was multinational to a degree, Honduras functioned as a client state, enabling the U.S. to conduct UW.

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The UW effort against the Taliban in Afghanistan in 2001 was a part of a large coalition effort. A coalition of 29 nations took part in the operations to unseat the Taliban regime.\footnote{U.S. Department of State, International Information Programs News Release, Rumsfeld Welcomes Coalition Members to Pentagon (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of State, 2002).} Virtually all of the UW operations that the U.S. has participated in since The Second World War have been multinational to some degree. However, the degree of multinational participation varies from a thoroughly integrated effort among equal allies to those in which the U.S. conducted UW through client states. While it is fair to say that the U.S. has normally conducted UW in a multinational way, the levels of multinational participation have been variable.

There are no such qualifications when considering the interagency nature of UW. UW must be an interagency effort because elements of any one agency cannot accomplish all of the activities required to successfully wage UW. FM 3-05.201, \textit{Special Forces Unconventional Warfare Operations}, states that UW is an interagency effort and military operations represent only a small fraction of the overall U.S. effort.\footnote{U.S. Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-05.201, \textit{Special Forces Unconventional Warfare Operations}, 1-22.} Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication 20, Volume II, \textit{Unconventional Warfare} went so far as to spell out specific roles for other government agencies in UW.\footnote{U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication 20, Volume II, \textit{Unconventional Warfare}, 5-6.}

While the Department of Defense’s role would be to advise, train, and assist the resistance organizations, UW may require the Department of State to coordinate support for a shadow government or government in exile, to replace the existing regime. Intelligence agencies would develop mechanisms to provide intelligence on resistance organizations. Other government agencies could develop initial contacts with resistance organizations and provide lethal and non-lethal aid to resistance organizations and the general populace. From a doctrinal and an operational perspective, UW cannot be accomplished without full interagency cooperation.
Historically, UW has been seen as an interagency effort in post-World War II U.S. policy. National Security Council Directive 10/2, *National Security Council Directive on Office of Special Projects*, dated 1948, spelled out the interagency responsibilities for UW that existed during the Cold War. While out of date, this policy directive offers valuable insight into relationships and authorities between various elements of the U.S. Government during UW. The directive assigned responsibility for covert operations, including sabotage, subversion and assistance to underground resistance movements and guerrillas, to the Central Intelligence Agency. Specifically, it ordered the creation of the Office of Special Projects within the CIA to manage covert operations. The directive went on to specify that the Office of Special Projects would take policy direction and guidance from the Department of State, which would have primacy in time of peace, and the National Military Establishment during time of war.¹⁰⁰

UW is clearly an interagency effort, and has been considered interagency in U.S. policy since at least 1948. In addition, UW is generally a multinational effort. UW always involves the cooperation of indigenous or surrogate forces, and normally involves coalition partners. The purpose of this criterion was to determine if the U.S. military needs a position on UW in the multinational and interagency environment. While this criterion would be satisfied with either interagency or multinational involvement, it has been shown that UW has strong interagency involvement and varied levels of multinational involvement. The third criterion is clearly satisfied.

The fourth criterion asks if the lack of joint doctrine for UW hampers joint training and education on UW. Since UW involves the employment of joint forces, and fits the demands of law, policy, and doctrine, there is a resulting need to effectively train the forces that conduct UW and educate the leaders who plan, organize, and resource UW operations.

Doctrine provides the material upon which training and education are based. In fact, the word *doctrine* comes from the Latin word *docere*, which means ‘to teach’. According to Douglass Lovelace and Thomas Durell Young of the U.S. Army War College’s Strategic Studies Institute, joint doctrine is crucial for effective joint training and education because it provides the doctrinal principles that orient and focus joint training. They go on to explain how joint doctrine guides the *Universal Joint Task List*. This in turn, influences joint force commanders’ Joint Mission Essential Task Lists. During training, commanders use joint doctrine to frame training tasks and derive measures of effectiveness for their training. This results in improved warfighting capability. The current lack of training and education on joint UW can then, at least in part, be attributed to the lack of joint doctrine for UW. According to Lovelace and Young, this causes a loss of warfighting effectiveness.

Similarly, in a study for the Rand Corporation investigating a perceived doctrinal void, Russell Glenn argues that doctrine provides uniform standards and consistency of method in training. Glenn establishes that joint doctrine ensures that combatant commanders receive units with compatible approaches to warfighting. Common doctrine enables units to function effectively together during operations without loss of training time or unnecessary loss of life. This statement clearly applies to UW; without appropriate joint doctrine, combatant commanders will receive units with incompatible approaches to this unique task and the result could be a loss of time or unnecessary loss of life. The lack of joint doctrine for UW does hamper joint training and

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102 Ibid.


105 Russell W. Glenn, “…We Band of Brothers”: The Call for Joint Doctrine for Urban Operations, 17.
education on UW. Furthermore, this leads to a decrease in warfighting effectiveness. The fourth criterion is therefore satisfied.

The fifth and final criterion asks if a lack of joint doctrine for UW leads to other operational or organizational problems. According to joint capstone doctrine, joint doctrine is far more than just a playbook for operations and training. In fact, joint doctrine promotes a common perspective from which joint forces plan, train, and conduct military operations. It also shapes the way the armed forces think about the military instrument of power and forms the foundation for addressing the future of the armed forces.¹⁰⁶

A lack of joint doctrine for UW leads to a number of problems. One area where problems may occur is in planning. According to U.S. Code, joint doctrine is the foundation of joint planning.¹⁰⁷ In writing the law, Congress found that the lack of joint doctrine meant that Service doctrine dominated operational thinking. Congress viewed this as a problem because it led to a clash of Service doctrines when Services were employed together in joint operations.¹⁰⁸ In the employment of joint UW forces, Service doctrine will likely dominate operational thinking unless there is joint doctrine to lead operational thinking. Since the Army is the only Service with a significant body of doctrine for UW, its doctrine dominates operational thinking on UW. To illustrate this skewed perspective, during the U.S.-Republic of Korea Combined Unconventional Warfare Doctrine Conference of July 2002, three U.S Services were represented; however, the U.S. doctrinal presentation was made by the Army. According to Congress, the only way to solve

this problem is to establish joint doctrine. Then, joint doctrine, rather than Service doctrine, serves as the foundation of joint planning and clashes of Service doctrines are avoided.

Furthermore, the lack of joint doctrine for UW may lead to difficulties in the approval of operation plans—including those incorporating UW. In the development of operations plans, possible courses of action are tested for suitability. In order to be considered suitable, a course of action must be consistent with joint doctrine. In addition, when the Joint Chiefs of Staff reviews operations plans, they are expected to incorporate joint doctrine. Since there is no joint doctrine for UW, it is impossible for UW planners to incorporate appropriate doctrine in their planning. This is likely to lead to difficulty when the operations plans are tested for consistency with, and inclusion of, joint doctrine. This will, in turn, make the approval process more difficult. The way to overcome this planning dilemma is to establish joint UW doctrine.

Other areas that are guided by doctrine include technological development and organizational design. A lack of doctrine can cause these activities to be haphazard, inefficient, uncoordinated and ineffective. A lack of joint doctrine for UW has detrimental effects upon technological development and organizational design of systems and forces for UW.

According to Douglas C. Lovelace and Thomas Durell Young, one collateral value of joint doctrine is that it helps senior leaders determine the capabilities needed by the combatant commanders. It also informs senior civilian leaders and government agencies about capabilities, limitations, and risks associated with the employment of military forces. It follows that a lack of joint doctrine for UW correspondingly hampers the ability of senior civilian leaders to understand the U.S. capabilities, limitations, and risks, of employing the armed forces in UW.

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110 Ibid., III-16.
111 Glenn, "...We Band of Brothers" : The Call for Joint Doctrine for Urban Operations, 17.
112 Lovelace and Young, "Joint Doctrine Development: Overcoming a Legacy," 94.
Another possible problem involves resourcing Service programs. In recommending changes to Service programs, one factor considered by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is whether those programs conform to doctrine. If programs do not conform to joint doctrine, the Chairman may recommend adjustments. If there is no joint doctrine for UW, it could be difficult for the Chairman to find that programs related to UW conform to joint doctrine. Thus, it is unlikely that the Chairman would recommend approval of these programs without modification.

One additional problem caused by a lack of joint doctrine for UW is that it leaves a void in joint doctrinal publications that may be filled by other doctrine. Since Operation Enduring Freedom showcased the ability of special operations forces to leverage the power of surrogate forces, many authors have recommended doctrinal changes to address this void. In “Transforming America’s Military: Integrating Unconventional Ground Forces Into Combat Air Operations,” Major David M. Sullivan argues that air-centric, surrogate warfare is the future of the American way of war. He recommends that joint force commanders place all special operations forces under the tactical control of the joint forces air component commander.

Sullivan’s rationale is based upon the assumption that the U.S. military is unlikely to conduct large-scale conventional ground combat in the future. Operation Iraqi Freedom has since proved his assumption false. The U.S. military employed two corps of Army and Marine Corps forces in the campaign to liberate Iraq. However, the danger of false doctrines such as Sullivan’s vision of special operations forces supporting “air-centric warfare” is still real. As long as a doctrinal void exists in the area of UW, it is probable that proposals to fill that doctrinal void will be suggested. The only way to ensure that an immature doctrine based on underdeveloped theories

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113 Ibid., 95.
and incomplete historical analysis does not fill the UW doctrinal void, is to create reasoned, valid doctrine. A valid UW doctrine must be based upon proven theory and a complete analysis of the relevant military history of UW.

Despite all of these reasons, there are those in the special operations community who still argue that joint doctrine should not be established for UW. Some claim joint doctrine for UW is unnecessary because UW is the job of U.S. Army Special Forces or special operations forces alone. Colonel Michael Kershner, former deputy commander of the U.S. Army Special Forces Command, cited U.S. Code, title 10, Section 167 when he wrote that by law, only forces of the U.S. Special Operations Command are authorized to conduct UW.\footnote{Michael R. Kershner, “Unconventional Warfare: The Most Misunderstood Form of Military Operations,” Special Warfare (Winter, 2001): 2. Colonel Michael R. Kershner is a retired U.S. Army Special Forces Officer. He has served as the director of Special Operations at the U.S. Army War College and as the deputy commander of the U.S. Army Special Forces Command.} However, this is Colonel Kershner’s interpretation of the law; U.S. Code, Title 10, Section 167 does not preclude other forces from participating in UW. The section states that UW is a special operations activity and indicates that the commander of U.S. Special Operations Command shall have responsibility for and have authority to conduct several functions relating to special operations activities. This law does not restrict the ability of other forces to participate in UW. Furthermore, the \textit{Joint Doctrine Encyclopedia} states that while UW is principally the responsibility of Special Forces, it can be conducted by all designated special operations forces and they may be augmented by selected conventional forces.\footnote{U.S. Department of Defense, \textit{Joint Doctrine Encyclopedia}, 714-715.} Without discussing the linguistic, cultural and training requirements, the law does not preclude conventional forces from participating in UW. In fact, joint doctrine specifically states that conventional forces may play a role, albeit a limited one, in UW.

All five of the criteria that determine if joint doctrine is necessary have been satisfied. UW involves the employment of joint forces. UW fits the demands of law, policy, and keystone
doctrine. UW is always conducted as an interagency effort and generally as a multinational effort. The lack of joint doctrine for UW leads to a lack of training and education on joint UW. Finally, the lack of joint doctrine leads to other operational and organizational problems, including Service doctrine dominated operational thinking, complications in approval of operation plans, inability to inform civilian decision makers about the capabilities and limitations of joint forces, and complications in the approval of programs involving UW. Furthermore, a review of U.S. law and joint doctrine reveals that UW is not the exclusive purview of special operations forces or Special Forces alone. Due to all of these factors, the overwhelming conclusion of this monograph is that joint doctrine is necessary for UW.
RECOMMENDATIONS

Having established the need for joint doctrine for UW, the next logical step is to recommend what might be included in such doctrine. Several sources provide examples of doctrinal components. One example is Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication 20, Volume II, *Unconventional Warfare*. Another possible source is Joint Publication 3-07.1, a manual written for the related task—foreign internal defense. A final source is the study by the Rand Corporation, “...We Band of Brothers”: *The Call for Joint Doctrine for Urban Operations*. While urban operations are not the focus of this monograph, it is still useful as a template since it makes a cogent argument for joint doctrine to fill a doctrinal void. Below is a comparison of the components these documents include or recommend (note: the descriptions have been changed from their original where “[UW]” appears):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>JCS Publication 20</th>
<th>JP 3-07.1</th>
<th>“...We Band of Brothers”</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Introduction and scope</td>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>Theory and character of [UW] including the political dimensions of [UW]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Command and control</td>
<td>Organization and responsibilities for [UW]</td>
<td>Intelligence</td>
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<tr>
<td>Personnel and administration</td>
<td>Planning for [UW]</td>
<td>Command and Control</td>
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<tr>
<td>Intelligence</td>
<td>Employment for [UW]</td>
<td>Information Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operations</td>
<td>Training</td>
<td>Fire power and fire support, including weapons effects and guidance for engagement systems selection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logistics/Administration</td>
<td>Legal considerations</td>
<td>Noncombatant considerations</td>
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<tr>
<td>Communications and electronics support</td>
<td>Civil affairs estimate</td>
<td>Weapons of mass destruction in [UW]</td>
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<tr>
<td>Psychological operations estimate</td>
<td>Legal considerations</td>
<td>Logistics</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Training Requirements</td>
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</tbody>
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By using the only current, related doctrinal reference as an example (JP 3-07.1), and including aspects of the other examples, an initial recommended list of components can be created. The following is the recommended list of components for the proposed doctrine: introduction (including theory of resistance and insurgency and the political dimensions of UW); organization...
and responsibilities for UW (including joint, interagency, multinational and nongovernmental players); planning for UW; employment for UW (intelligence, operations, logistics, communications, command and control, information operations, fire support, and noncombatant considerations); training for UW; legal considerations; and estimates of the situation (including civil affairs and psychological operations).

The next logical question is whether this doctrine should be written as joint doctrine or JTTP. According to Joint Publication 1-01, *Joint Doctrine Development System*, joint doctrine and JTTP have different audiences. The nature of the audience determines which is needed, doctrine or JTTP. Joint doctrine is written for those who provide strategic guidance to joint forces (the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and combatant commanders); employ joint forces (combatant commanders, commanders of subunified commands, or commanders of joint task forces); or who support or are supported by joint forces (combatant commands, subunified commands, joint task forces, component commands, the Services, and supporting agencies). JTTP are written for those who implement joint doctrine, such as joint forces, subordinate commands of joint forces, and commands at echelons where joint forces interact. In general, it is fair to say that joint doctrine is written at the strategic level and JTTP are written at the operational level. By analyzing the proposed components of the recommended doctrine, we can determine to which audience the recommended doctrine applies, and therefore whether joint doctrine or JTTP is more appropriate.

First, the introduction includes the theory of resistance and insurgency, including the political dimensions. While those who provide strategic direction and employ joint forces must understand the theory of resistance and insurgency, this applies most strongly to joint force commanders conducting UW. It is those commanders who will make critical decisions about how

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joint forces will support resistance and insurgent organizations. This introductory section has utility at the strategic level, but is most appropriate as JTTP.

Next, the proposed doctrine includes a chapter on organization and responsibilities for UW. This chapter applies most strongly to the commander of joint forces who will conduct joint operations. However, due to the joint, interagency, and multinational aspects of UW, this chapter has implications for those who provide strategic direction to the joint forces, those who employ the joint forces and many supporting agencies. Additionally, this has implications for many organizations outside the Department of Defense. While joint doctrine is not authoritative to these organizations, it is useful to inform them of the U.S. military’s position on UW. This doctrinal information must be covered in JTTP, but may require some modifications to joint doctrine.

Similarly, planning, and employment for UW apply most strongly to the commander of the joint forces who conducts UW. However, this too will have some implications for those who provide strategic guidance. Training, on the other hand, is not the responsibility of the joint force commander. It is the responsibility of the Services and the Commander of U.S. Special Operations Command. Joint doctrine for planning and employment of UW should be written as JTTP, but may also require some additions to or modifications of joint doctrine. Joint doctrine related to training for UW should be written as joint doctrine.

Legal considerations are primarily the responsibility of the joint force commander, but may also affect strategic leaders. Still, it is probably most appropriate to cover the legal implications of UW in a single, JTTP-level publication. Similarly, the estimates are a function of the joint force commander and belong in a JTTP manual.

Since each one of these components is appropriate at the joint tactics, techniques, and procedures level, a new JTTP publication should be published to answer this requirement for joint UW doctrine. Furthermore, insurgency and resistance theory; organization, planning, employment, and training for UW were all found to have implications at the joint doctrine level. Additions and changes should be made to existing joint doctrine publications to accommodate these components as
necessary. For example, based upon the joint tactics, techniques and procedures established for UW, uniform standards of training must be established for the forces who will conduct UW. These standards must be promulgated to the Services and the Commander of U.S. Special Operations Command through joint doctrine.

The development of a new JTTP publication, with corresponding changes to existing joint doctrine, is a joint doctrine project that must be assigned to a lead agent such as a Service, combatant command, or joint staff directorate.\textsuperscript{118} Since U.S. Code, Title 10, \textit{Armed Forces}, stipulates that UW is a special operations activity and assigns U.S. Special Operations Command responsibility for the development and establishment of doctrine for those activities, U.S. Special Operations Command should serve as the lead agent for joint doctrine for UW.\textsuperscript{119}

As established above, new doctrine for UW should include the theory of resistance and insurgency. Currently, the U.S. military uses Mao’s Protracted Popular War as its primary theoretical source on insurgency.\textsuperscript{120} Both the Army and the Marine Corps have adopted Mao’s three stages of Protracted People’s War to describe the nature of insurgency. Also, the current Army manual on UW contains at least six references to Maoist theory—more than any other

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{118}Ibid., II-5 to II-6.
  \item \textsuperscript{119}\textit{Armed Forces}, U.S. Code, Title 10, section 167, (1956).
  \item \textsuperscript{120}Fleet Marine Force Manual 8-2, \textit{Counterinsurgency Operations} states on pages 9-13 that it is based upon the evolutionary nature of subversive insurgency as set forth in communist doctrine. The manual later states that Mao Tse-tung’s doctrine on protracted war has three stages. \textit{Counterinsurgency Operations} (pages 9-13) describes those three stages as: passive stage (strategic defensive), active stage (strategic stalemate), and counteroffensive stage. Army doctrine including Field Manual 90-8, \textit{Counterguerrilla Operations} (paragraph 1-7) and Field Manual 3-05.201, \textit{Special Forces Unconventional Warfare Operations} (page I-7), also describe insurgency as progressing through three stages: latent or incipient insurgency, guerrilla warfare, and mobile warfare or war of movement. These phases sound more familiar when one remembers that Mao predicted that the Sino-Japanese was would pass through three stages. Mao predicted in \textit{Selected Writings of Mao Tse-tung} (pages 210-214) that in the first stage, strategic stalemate (Army’s guerrilla warfare phase), guerrilla warfare would be the primary form of fighting, and that in the second stage, strategic counter-offensive (Army’s mobile war or war of movement phase), mobile warfare would be the primary form of fighting.
\end{itemize}
Obviously, Mao’s ideas comprise the foundation of U.S. doctrinal thought on insurgency and UW.

Modern scholars, such as Bard O’Neill, of the National Defense University, take a much broader view of insurgency. O’Neill’s theory of insurgency subsumes Maoist theory, including Protracted Popular War as one of four insurgent strategies. O’Neill’s theory also includes the conspiratorial, military-focus, and urban warfare strategies. Because O’Neill’s theory is so much broader than, but also inclusive of Mao’s theory, O’Neill’s ideas provide a more appropriate theoretical basis for insurgency in doctrine. Given the relationship between insurgency and unconventional warfare, O’Neill, rather than Mao, should be used as the theoretical basis of future U.S. military doctrine on insurgency.

Similarly, O’Neill’s definition of insurgency is much broader than the current joint definition. O’Neill’s definition includes struggles between ruling and non-ruling groups aimed at maintaining or changing the political community, while the joint definition includes only movements aimed at overthrowing a constituted government. The joint definition excludes many contemporary insurgencies whose goals fall short of overthrowing of a constituted government. These insurgencies’ goals may include secession; increasing political, social or economic power; or maintaining the status quo. In order to include such diverse insurgent groups such as these, the doctrinal definition should be revised in a manner similar to O’Neill’s.

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122 Bard E. O’Neill, *Insurgency and Terrorism: Inside Modern Revolutionary Warfare* (New York: Brassey’s Inc., 1990), 32. Dr. O’Neill is Professor of National Security Strategy and Director of Studies of Political Violence and Terrorism at the National War College and he is also Adjunct Full Professor of Politics at Catholic University where he teaches graduate courses in the Department of Politics.
124 O’Neill, *Insurgency and Terrorism: Inside Modern Revolutionary Warfare*, 20. Some examples cited by O’Neill include the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, who wish to secede from the government of Sri Lanka; the Miskito Indian insurgents in Nicaragua who wish to gain more political,
This monograph has used several terms not listed in the Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. These terms include indigenous (native, originating in, or intrinsic to an area or region), partisan (a resistance movement dedicated solely against an occupying power), surrogate (someone who takes the place of or acts for another), and underground (a covert unconventional warfare organization established to operate in areas denied to the guerrilla forces or conduct operations not suitable for guerrilla forces). These terms should be considered for inclusion in future doctrine for UW and in future versions of Joint Publication 1-02.

Joint doctrine for UW should also include guidance on how to integrate UW into the phases of the joint campaign. According to JP 3-05, Doctrine for Joint Special Operations, special operations forces are most effective when they are fully integrated into the campaign plan. FM 3-05.201, Special Forces Unconventional Warfare Operations, describes U.S. sponsorship of UW as developing in seven phases: preparation, initial contact, infiltration, organization, buildup, combat employment, and demobilization. FM 3-05.20, Special Forces Operations, on the other hand, describes special operations as having five phases: predeployment, deployment, employment, redeployment, and postdeployment. However, according to Joint Publication 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, phases represent the joint force commander’s vision of how a campaign will unfold and are determined by the joint force commander.

social, and economic benefits without rejecting the existing political community; and the Ulster Volunteer Force who seek to maintain the status quo in Northern Ireland.

127 Ibid., 2-5.
An example provided in *Doctrine for Joint Operations* is typical of the phases a joint force commander might choose and can be applied throughout the range of military operations. This notional example includes the following four phases: deter/engage, seize initiative, decisive operations, and transition.\textsuperscript{132} In order to integrate UW into the overall campaign plan, joint doctrine should provide guidance on how to synchronize UW with the joint force commander’s campaign plan phases, rather than dictating specific phases for UW. Moreover, specific guidance on phases should be deleted from Service doctrine.

In addition to these recommendations, several areas that require further research have been identified. The joint doctrine development community does not have an established set of criteria to determine if joint doctrine is necessary for any given task. Rather, proposals are approved or disapproved by the J-7 of the Joint Staff after an analysis and a vote by the members of the joint doctrine working party. The analysis considers relevant international agreements; lessons learned files; extant and emerging joint, multinational, and Service doctrine and procedures; interviews, meetings, working groups; and other sources.\textsuperscript{133} This monograph has proposed a set of five criteria to determine whether joint doctrine is necessary for UW. It would be useful to research whether these criteria, or some others, would be valuable as a general set of criteria for the joint doctrine working party to evaluate the validity of proposals for new doctrine.

Counterinsurgency is a topic related to UW that also requires relevant and timely doctrine. Currently there is a joint tactics, techniques and procedures manual for foreign internal defense, Marine Corps doctrine for counterinsurgency (published in 1980) and Army counterguerrilla doctrine (published in 1986). A useful area for further research is the need for additional counterinsurgency doctrine.


T.E. Lawrence developed a successful doctrine for UW by thoughtful analysis of his current situation and reasoned application of relevant history and theory. By following a similar approach, this monograph has found that the U.S. military requires a JTCP manual for UW and appropriate changes to related joint doctrine publications. It recommends U.S. Special Operations Command be appointed as the lead agent to develop the new UW doctrine. Furthermore, this doctrine should use the ideas of Bard O’Neill as its theoretical basis. Several new terms should be considered for inclusion in the new doctrine. Lastly, the doctrine should provide guidance on how to integrate UW into campaign planning, rather than dictating phases to be used in UW operations. Unconventional warfare is more intellectual than a bayonet charge and requires an equally intellectual doctrine to be successful.
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