Preparing for the Inevitable: Examining Future U.S. Peacekeeping in Israel and the Occupied Territories through the Lens of the Sinai and Lebanon Peacekeeping Missions

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Abstract

“Preparing for the Inevitable: Examining U.S. Peacekeeping in Israel and the Occupied Territories through the Lens of the Sinai and Lebanon Peacekeeping Missions.” by Major Timothy J. Parker, Military Intelligence, 67 pages.

Many lessons from the Multinational Force and Observer (MFO) mission to the Sinai and the Multinational Force II (MNFII) mission to Lebanon are relevant for future U.S. peacekeeping operations in Israel and the Occupied Territories (OT). A final peace between Israel and the Palestinians is a critical U.S. national interest and is unlikely to occur without a US-led international peacekeeping force. It is important that the U.S. begin to consider the strategic and operation requirements for this mission.

Strategic conditions that assisted the success of the MFO and challenged the MNFII must be considered before US involvement in Israel and the OT. The commitment to the treaty of two viable parties, the reduction of external destabilizing influences, and the resolved leadership of the US are the three essential strategic conditions needed.

The operational environment of Israel and the OT more closely resembles that of 1982 Lebanon, with its urban and populated countryside, ethnic, religious, and political factions, and militias, terror organizations, and pronounced foreign influence. The Sinai, on the other hand, presented a much larger area, with few urban areas, sparse population, and no internal divisions. Despite the differing operational environments, the MFO and MNFII still provide relevant operational lessons for Israel and the OT.

Critical operational lessons are: the necessity of a clear and achievable mission, selecting an effective organization structure for the force, the importance of a unified and compact command structure, tailoring the force for the specific environment and assigned mission, the need for the force to be able to adapt to changes in the situation, and the benefit of maintaining impartiality in the conduct of the mission.
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I. INTRODUCTION

The half-century old struggle between Israel and the Palestinian people is one of the foremost strategic concerns for the United States (U.S.), with new implications in the global war on terror. Islamic extremists, that small minority of violent and intolerant Muslims, continue to manipulate the Palestinian crisis, using managed perceptions of Israeli repression to garner funds, recruits, and international support in their terrorist endeavors against Israel, the U.S., and the West. Anti-Westernism is used to block the efforts of Muslim moderates and distract the masses from their depressed economic situation and lack of freedom.

Israeli/Palestinian peace prospects are not hopeful. The Israeli government and the Palestinian leaders are unable and unwilling to create the inevitably unpopular final resolution due to past broken promises, current levels of violence, foreign instigation, and the political rivalries within each faction. A trusted outside force will likely have to act as guarantor of any agreement in order to encourage a settlement. Because the U.S. is the only nation trusted by Israel, as well as the only nation that has sufficient influence on both parties, the involvement of U.S. forces is unavoidable.

The U.S. is not without experience conducting peacekeeping in the Middle East. The successful Sinai Multinational Force and Observer (MFO) mission has strengthened the peace between Israel and Egypt since 1982 and continues to this day. The MFO provides the only example of a successful Arab-Israeli peace mission, and contains many unique aspects in its organization that could be relevant to future Arab-Israeli peace missions. Conversely, the 1982 Multi-National Force II (MNFII) to Lebanon ended in an embarrassing U.S. withdrawal following the deaths of hundreds of U.S. Marines at the
hands of terrorists. The MNFII example provides an excellent replication of the complex environment of foreign influence, factional fighting, and conflicting religions, all in an urban terrain. This paper attempts to extract the lessons learned from these very different examples and determine the applicability of the lessons to the inevitable future U.S. peacekeeping operations in Israel and the Occupied Territories (OT).

A. WHY ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN PEACE IS A CRITICAL U.S. NATIONAL INTEREST

Peace between Israel and the Palestinians, within the larger context of Israeli-Arab peace, has been an interest of the United States since the 1960’s. With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the ending of the Cold War struggle in the Middle East, the U.S. renewed Israeli-Palestinian peace initiatives throughout the 1990’s, ending with the second Palestinian Intifada in 2000, also known as the Al-Aqsa Intifada. The terrorist attacks against the U.S. on 11 September 2001, and the subsequent U.S.-led global war on terror, have placed Israel and the OT, consisting of the West Bank, Gaza strip, and Golan Heights, in the forefront of international debate once more.

The repressive measures taken by the Israelis in order to combat Palestinian terrorism in the OT and in Israel is manipulated by Islamic extremists to ignite a hatred for Israel, the U.S., and the West. The hatred fuels terrorism against the U.S. and inhibits moderate Islamic groups from gaining influence in the Islamic world. Jack Straw, the British Foreign Secretary, reflected this concept when he stated that, “One of the factors that helps breed terror is the anger which many people in this region feel at the events over
the years in Palestine.”¹ A *Washington Post* article by Caryle Murphy stated even more succinctly, “If we want to avoid creating more terrorists, we must end the Israeli-Palestinian conflict quickly.”² The Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment states that, in the “popular view”, U.S. support for Israel in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is a major cause for Arab anti-Americanism.³ The assessment goes on to propose that Israel is a “new front” of Al Qaeda’s war.⁴ The Israeli-Palestinian conflict, utilized by Islamic extremists to incite hatred and terrorism, has made resolving the conflict a critical facet to the overall U.S. strategy for winning the global war on terror.⁵

**B. WHY U.S. INVOLVEMENT IS INEVITABLE**

The involvement of a U.S. peacekeeping force is an old idea, with renewed popularity. The Palestinians have long asked for a multinational force to support a peace in the OT, with the first request in 1988 to President Ronald Reagan.⁶ The most recent was a plea by Yasir Arafat to the UN Security Council in November 2000, just at the beginning of the latest Intifada, asking for a 2,000 member multinational force in the West Bank.⁷

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⁴ *Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment* “Eastern Mediterranean/Israel/External Affairs”
⁵ Dore Gold, former Israeli ambassador to the UN, in his book *Hatred’s Kingdom*, refutes both Straw and Murphy, claiming the Palestinian issue is not the key cause of terrorism. Instead, the extremist Wahhabist sect of Islam, and its Saudi supporters, are the source of the problem. He, however, does not refute that the Palestinian issue is used by Islamic extremists to incite terror.
⁷ Neil MacFarquhar, “Arafat Asks U.N. Council to Send Force to Protect Palestinians”, *New York Times*, November 11, 2000. A.8. Arafat’s request was rejected by the US because both parties, Israel and the Palestinians didn’t agree with the deployment of a peacekeeping force.
Various Israelis are now discussing the option of an external multinational force involved in a peace settlement. In April of 2003, the Jaffe Center for Strategic Studies, a leading Israeli strategic think-tank at Tel Aviv University, published a plan for peace calling for international peacekeeping forces to uphold any agreement. The paper suggested an organization similar to the multinational forces used in Kosovo and East Timor, and would be “preferably under United States leadership”. The idea garnered support from one of Israel’s senior ministers as well as Martin Indyk, the former U.S. ambassador to Israel. The Israeli government, though still resistant to any international interference in the current Intifada, embraced the MFO in the Sinai and acquiesced to a UN force of observers in Hebron and the Golan Heights, indicating that a multinational force is a possible solution for the Israelis under the right conditions.

Israel is sure to demand strong U.S. participation if any such force is agreed upon. The international community has done little to earn the trust of Israel in the past. For example, in 1967 the UN acquiesced to Egyptian pressure and rapidly withdrew the UN Emergency Force from the Sinai in 1967, thus permitting Egyptian forces to sweep across the Sinai and threaten Israel. This instigated the 1967 war and “contributed to an Israeli mistrust of the UN peacekeeping system.” A second example occurred in 1979, when a UN officer working in the Sinai was convicted of smuggling weapons for the PLO. Today, the international community is perceived by the Israelis to be sympathetic to the

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9 *Jerusalem Middle East Newslne*, “Jaffee Center Envisions UN Troops to Enforce Palestinian Ceasefire”, 8 April 2003. Foreign Broadcast Information Service.
10 Thomas W Spoehr, “This Shoe No Longer Fits: Changing the U.S. Commitment to the MFO.” *Parameters*, vol. 30, Issue 3, (Autumn 2000), 2
Palestinians and generally anti-Israeli. In 2003, Israeli Foreign Minister Silvan Shalom accused the UN of thirty years of unjust attacks and discrimination against Israel. A poll conducted by the European Union in November of 2003 concluded that fifty-nine percent of Europeans believed that Israel was the greatest threat to world peace, coming in ahead of Iran and North Korea by six percentage points. In contrast, U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell declared that, “We [the U.S.] are seen as Israel’s big supporter and we are, and we always will be.” Israel, desiring a big supporter, will require U.S. leadership and participation in any Israel/OT peacekeeping mission.

The international community is also assessing the possibility of peacekeepers for Israel and the OT. Kofi Annan, the United Nations Secretary General, and Joshke Fischer, the German Foreign Minister, endorse the idea of an international force, while Russia’s Foreign Minister commented that Russia could participate in a peacekeeping force if certain conditions were met.

Lastly, a reluctant U.S. is beginning to understand that a commitment of U.S. forces may be necessary. The Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee in the U.S. Senate, Richard Lugar, an Indiana Republican, remarked that U.S. and allied military involvement may be required to have any stability in the region. Senator Diane Feinstein, a Democrat from California, was in agreement with Lugar and stated that all serious

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16 Moscow ITAR-TASS, “Russia says it Could Take Part in Middle Eastern Peacekeeping Force.” 21 June 2003, FBIS.
efforts to resolve the situation required U.S. leadership.\textsuperscript{17} Even Secretary of State Colin Powell has discussed putting U.S. observers in Israel and the OT.\textsuperscript{18} The efforts to reach a peace agreement by George H.W. Bush in 1991, and the enormous efforts made by the Clinton administration in the late 1990s, ended without a settlement. The commitment of U.S. forces as part of a multinational effort may be what is required to encourage an agreement for a permanent peace in the region.

There are many valid arguments against U.S. peacekeepers in Israel and the OT. Eliot Cohen, director of the strategic studies program at Johns Hopkins University, points out that U.S. soldiers could easily become targets of terrorist groups such as HAMAS and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, or simply provide them a safe haven from Israeli reprisals while terror attacks continued against Israelis.\textsuperscript{19} Cohen uses the example of terrorist attacks against MNFII in Lebanon to illustrate what could happen if U.S. peacekeepers are deployed in the region again. Robert Kagan, writing for the \textit{Washington Post}, strongly opposes any U.S. peacekeepers in a final settlement.\textsuperscript{20} Kagan’s argument is similar to Cohen’s, even to the point of using the same negative example of U.S. forces in Lebanon. Both Kagan and Cohen give good reasons for concern, and make it even more important to examine past examples of U.S. peacekeepers in the Middle East, extract the correct lessons, and prevent repeating past mistakes. Both respected authors, however, fail to offer any alternative solutions of their own.

Another argument against U.S. involvement is the high cost of training, deploying


\textsuperscript{18} Kagan, A 21

and sustaining a large force in Israel and the OT. This argument fails when one considers that the U.S. has given Israel over 240 billion dollars since 1973, which is predominantly spent on security, and a Washington economist totaled the overall economic cost of supporting Israel since 1973 at 1.6 trillion dollars.\textsuperscript{21} Since the 1993 Oslo Accords, the U.S. has committed 1.3 billion dollars in economic assistance to Palestinians living in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.\textsuperscript{22} Though any commitment of U.S. forces is sure to be costly, in the long term, resolving the problem and ending the constant economic drain is a better fiscal solution.

The United States has acted as a peacekeeper in the Middle East before. In the Sinai, the MFO has been an unqualified success, keeping the peace between Israel and Egypt for over 20 years. In Lebanon, however, the MNF II is considered a failure, with hundreds of U.S. Marines killed by terrorists, a subsequent U.S. withdrawal, and Lebanon descending further into chaos and continued foreign occupation. Lessons from both of these experiences in Middle East peacekeeping can be applied to future U.S. involvement in Israel and the OT.

\textbf{C. METHODOLOGY}

The purpose of this paper is to answer the question of what lessons can be extracted, at the operational and strategic levels, from the MFO and MNFII peacekeeping missions that are relevant to anticipated U.S. peacekeeping in Israel and the OT in the near future.

\textsuperscript{20} Kagan, A
\textsuperscript{21} Francis, David R. “Economist Tallies Swelling Cost of Israel to U.S.” \textit{The Christian Science Monitor}, 9 December 2002. http://www.csmonitor.com/2002/1209/p16s01-wmgn.html. Visited 12 March 2004. The 1.6 trillion dollar total includes many peripheral costs such as economic impact of the Arab oil embargo, aid given to Egypt and Jordan to secure peace treaties, and lost military sales due to Israeli objections or competition
This paper first describes the strategic and operational environment in Israel and the OT in respect to politics, geography, demography, threat, and security capabilities. Next, the MFO and MNFII missions are described similarly, with the addition of analysis of assigned mission, organization, operations, and operational and strategic lessons learned. Finally, the lessons learned from the MFO and MNFII are compared to the Israel and OT operating environment to determine which lessons learned are relevant. Those lessons that are relevant become part of the recommendations for future U.S. peacekeeping operations in Israel and the OT.
II. ISRAEL AND THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES

In order to relate the lessons of the MFO and MNFII to a future Israeli peacekeeping mission the current strategic and operational environment in Israel and the OT must be understood. Countries or international actors that either actively support, or actively disrupt, the peace process have the greatest impact within the strategic environment. The operational environment includes the Israel/OT geographic, demographic, political, and security situation.

A. STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT

The current strategic situation of Israel provides an indication of those countries that would support any future peacekeeping endeavors and those that would undermine them. Israeli relations are solid with Egypt and Jordan, and both countries have been active in the fight against terrorism. Egypt has taken a special interest in assisting the peace process, while Jordan was praised in the 2002 U.S. State Department publication *Patterns of Global Terrorism* for “thwarting attempts to exploit Jordanian territory for attacks in Israel.”23 Based on this, Jordan and Egypt would most likely strongly support the success of a U.S.-led peacekeeping force.

Syria and Lebanon, Israel’s remaining two neighbors, have both assisted the U.S. in its fight against Al Qaeda, but continue to provide sanctuary and resources to anti-Israeli terror organizations.24 The Lebanese government has gone as far as to call Hezbollah’s

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24 U.S Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism 2002, 52, 58, 59
attacks on Israel “resistance activity” and permits additional terrorist organizations to operate from Lebanon.  

Syria has an interest in maintaining pressure on Israel via terror groups over the issue of the Golan Heights region, occupied by Israel since 1967. In January of 2004, Syrian President Bashar Assad reaffirmed the Syrian position of talks based on the land-for-peace principle.  

Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon echoed this sentiment by declaring, “No one should have any illusions. The price of peace with Syria is leaving the Golan Heights.” A peace treaty that includes the return of the Golan Heights to Syria could bring Syrian support for the peacekeeping mission.  

Iran, though not a neighbor to Israel, plays a significant destabilizing role in the region. Iran, described by the U.S. State Department as “the most active state sponsor of terrorism in 2002”, provides funding, training, weapons, and sanctuary for anti-Israeli Palestinian groups. As an example, in January 2002 Israeli forces intercepted a ship carrying fifty tons of weaponry and explosives. The ship and its 100 million dollar illegal cargo originated from Iran, and was bound for Palestinians in the Gaza strip, most likely for allies of Yasser Arafat. Iran stands as an enemy of peace in Israel and Palestine. The Iranian-supported terrorist organizations act as a source of power projection for Iran. With the use of terrorists, Iran can pull levers of violence that affect the U.S. and Israel, as well as Arab countries such as Egypt, Lebanon, Syria, and Jordan. In addition, violence in Israel keeps the world, especially the U.S., occupied. If an acceptable peace

25 U.S Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism 2001, Middle East Overview, 5
28 U.S Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism 2002, 77
takes hold in Israel and Palestine, Iran faces a reduction of influence. Geoffrey Kemp, currently the Director of Regional Strategic Programs at the Nixon Center and previously President Reagan’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, wrote in a December 2002 essay that “The Iranian regime...is irrevocably hostile to the most basic American interests in the Middle East, especially the search for an equitable resolution to the Arab-Israeli conflict that provides for Israel’s recognition and security.” Ultimately, Kemp concludes that unless the hard-line theocratic regime in Iran falls or abandons its current ideology, Iran is likely to oppose the success of peacekeepers in Israel/OT.

B. OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

The geographic and demographic conditions in Israel/OT present a small but complex environment for future peacekeeping. Israel is a country of about 6.7 million people and about twenty thousand square kilometers, comparable to the size of New Jersey (see Appendix B). The population consists of about 5.2 million Jews, and 1.3 million Arab Muslims, and small Druze Muslim and Christian populations. With Gaza at 360 square kilometers and the West Bank at 5,860 square kilometers, the Occupied Territories are collectively just over six thousand square kilometers. The West Bank and Gaza have a population of approximately 3.1 million people, of which about nine percent, or around

33 Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment “Eastern Mediterranean/Gaza and West Bank/Geography.” Jane’s Information Group, a well respected independent organization, provides intelligence and analysis on national and international defense, security, and risk developments. Jane’s is generally considered to be impartial. Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment is designed to provide risk analysis for regions and countries
280,000, are Israeli settlers. Two languages are spoken, with Hebrew dominating Israel and Arabic dominating the OT. Israel and the OT provide a complex environment in terrain and people, though not as complex as Lebanon, nor nearly as large as the Sinai.

The latest addition to the Israeli and OT countryside is the Israeli Security Fence. The Israeli Security Fence is intended to “prevent illegal entry into Israel through the seizure, interrogation, and arrest” of terrorists, according to the Israeli Ministry of Defense Security Fence website. The barrier, constructed of steel, concrete and razor wire, is not following the 1967 border, but instead cuts into the West Bank to include Israeli settlements. This has created enormous controversy, as the fence is perceived to be an Israeli land grab by the Palestinians, and separates some Palestinians from towns and fields, and cuts vital water and electricity routes. Though only about one-third of the fence is complete, over 130 kilometers as of October 2003, and construction of the most contentious areas are on hold, the final disposition of the fence will play a role in any future peacekeeping mission. If the final route of the fence mirrors an actual agreed line of separation it will assist the peacekeepers in their mission. If it does not, then it will become irrelevant, or even an obstacle to the peacekeeping forces.

The political environment in the OT again falls between the simplicity of the Sinai and the byzantine Lebanese environment. The ongoing Al-Aqsa Intifada began on 28 September 2000 following an inflammatory visit to the Al Aqsa mosque compound by

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34 Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment “Eastern Mediterranean/Gaza and West Bank/Demographics”
Ariel Sharon, who was then the opposition Likud party leader and is currently the Israeli Prime Minister. The mosque, one of the holiest sites of Islam, located on the Noble Sanctuary, or the Temple Mount, which is one of the holiest places of Judaism. In the years that have followed, over 2,500 people have been killed in the continuing violent Intifada. The Performance-based Roadmap to a Permanent Two-state Solution to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, published on 30 April 2003 by the Bush Administration, was an attempt to restart the peace process and lead to an eventual final resolution. Despite this effort, however, peace is no nearer. The implementation of the Bush Roadmap collapsed by mid-September 2003 and may not recover.

SECURITY FORCES

The security forces of the Palestinian Authority are in tatters after three years of chaotic Intifada, direct conflict with Israeli security forces, and reprisals against their installations and equipment by the Israelis. The Palestinian Police Force (PPF), the security arm of the PA, was created by the 1994 Cairo Agreement. In 1999, the PPF was estimated at around 40,000 personnel who were previously members of Fatah and the Palestine Liberation Army (PLA), organizations loyal to Yasser Arafat. Arafat, considered the voice of the Palestinians, was the founder of the Fatah party, previously

38 Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment “Eastern Mediterranean/Israel/External Affairs/Historical”
the Chairman of the PLO,\textsuperscript{41} and the current PA president. As the PA President and Supreme Commander of the PPF, Arafat retained control of all security forces.\textsuperscript{42}

The PPF is not a monolithic security force, but is instead a fractured conglomerate of thirteen semi-autonomous services with overlapping and over-watching authorities and responsibilities. The PPF has a full range of capabilities, to include police, customs, paramilitary, counter-terror, intelligence collection, protection for senior PA personnel, naval police, and a small air police.\textsuperscript{43}

The current effectiveness of the PPF is difficult to judge. First, much of the PPF infrastructure such as, police stations, jails, vehicles and equipment, have been destroyed during the Al Aqsa Intifada, often targeted by Israelis in retaliation for a terrorist attack on Israel. Secondly, the confused command and control network and the destroyed security infrastructure greatly reduces the PPF ability to carry out security functions. Conversely, the subsequent decline of the PA, along with participation in the Intifada, has increased the prestige of rival organizations, such as HAMAS, which carry out security functions in the neighborhoods that they control. Lastly, the will of the PPF to crackdown on Palestinian terror organizations has not been proven. With nearly 40,000 personnel, if equipped, retrained, vetted to exclude those tied to terror, and motivated in support of peace, the PPF could become a viable security force in the OT and could assist future


\textsuperscript{42} Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment “Eastern Mediterranean/Gaza and West Bank/Security and Foreign Forces”

\textsuperscript{43} Ibid.
peacekeeping efforts.

Israel has a robust intelligence and security structure that would be essential to any peacekeeping effort. The security forces consist of over 20,000 Israeli National Police, supported by over 45,000 Civil Guards, a counter-terror and hostage rescue unit, and a capability for undercover operations specifically in the West Bank and Gaza. Israeli intelligence has an extensive worldwide capability, technological collection capability, and a redundant collection capability against Palestinian terrorism in the West Bank and Gaza. The cooperation of the Israeli security and intelligence services would be crucial for the success of peacekeepers in the region, though even the vaunted Israeli security cannot prevent all attacks that seek to destabilize the peace.

THREATS TO PEACE

There are numerous Palestinian organizations that seek the destruction of Israel and reject the PA, and therefore would likely attempt to disrupt any peacekeeping effort. The three main groups are HAMAS, Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP). HAMAS, the acronym for Islamic Resistance Movement in Arabic, has gained the support of tens of thousands of Palestinians through its mosques and social programs. Its suicide attacks against Israel have also earned it a place on the U.S. State Department Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) list. Though strongest in the Gaza Strip, HAMAS is well organized in the West Bank as well, and is

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\[\text{\textsuperscript{44}}\] U.S Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism 2002, 107. FTOs are designated by the Secretary of State and are groups that “conduct international terrorism and threaten the interests of the United States.” Once designated, the US can “block designees’ assets in US financial institutions; criminalizes witting provision of material support to designated groups; and blocks visas for members of FTOs without having to show that the individual was involved in specific terrorist activities.” (PGT 2002, p 150)
believed to have between 100 and 300 hard-core activists.  Like many of the rejectionist groups, HAMAS receives support from Syria and Iran, though claims to not be influenced by any outside state. The PIJ, which receives external support from Lebanon, Syria, and Iran in the form of weapons, training and safe havens, has carried out numerous attacks against Israel, and is also on the U.S. FTO list. The strength of the PIJ is unknown, and so far, the PIJ has avoided intentionally targeting U.S. personnel.

The PFLP has conducted numerous attacks on Israel, the most prominent being the assassination of the Israeli Tourism Minister in 2001. The PFLP, and its splinter group, the PFLP-General Command, both receive some support from Syria and both have been designated FTO by the U.S. State Department.

Hezbollah is different from the other rejectionist groups in that it formed in response to the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982 and remains generally in the southern portion of Lebanon. Hezbollah is a Shia Muslim group with very close ties to Iran, and tactically aligned with Syria. Hezbollah has directly attacked the U.S. in the past, most notably the 1984 Beirut truck bomb that killed 241 Marines. Hezbollah remains dedicated to eliminating Israel and portrays itself as being the cause of Israel ending its eight-year occupation of southern Lebanon in 2000. The strength of Hezbollah is estimated at “several thousand supporters and a few hundred terrorist operatives”, and is on the U.S. FTO list.

Another group of potential “enemies of peace” are the Jewish extremist groups.

45 Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment “Eastern Mediterranean/Israel/Security and Foreign Forces”
46 U.S Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism 2002, 52, 77
47 Ibid., 52, 77, 117
48 Ibid., 117
49
Jewish extremist groups historically have come from the eight to ten percent of Israel’s Jewish population which are ultra orthodox Jews, and also from the settler populations, which feel most threatened by the Palestinians.\textsuperscript{51} There is no estimate of the number of Jewish extremists, but based on the comparatively small number of incidents, the number of individuals willing to use violence is small. It must be considered that, if a peace settlement was counter to their interests, such as closing settlements or turning over the West Bank or parts of Jerusalem, the number of Jewish extremists, and those sympathetic to them, would rise. Only the group, Kahane Chai, also known as Kach, is designated as a FTO by the U.S. State Department. Kahane Chai, based in the West Bank settlements, has carried out several anti-Palestinian attacks, and desires to restore the biblical state of Israel, which would include Gaza and the West Bank.\textsuperscript{52} Other Jewish extremist groups are Gush Emunim, who plotted to destroy the Al Aqsa mosque on the Temple Mount in the 1980’s, and Terror against Terror (TNT), a precursor group to Kahane Chai.\textsuperscript{53}

One cannot forget another threat to peace in the Middle East, Al Qaeda. Al Qaeda would loathe a peaceful Palestine replacing the propaganda goldmine of the Israeli occupation. In addition, U.S. peacekeepers in Israel and the OT would provide highly visible targets for Al Qaeda operations. Though most Palestinian groups try to distance themselves from Al Qaeda, Israeli authorities have arrested individuals that have claimed to be working for Al Qaeda in the West Bank and Israel.\textsuperscript{54} Israeli intelligence allegedly

\textsuperscript{49} Ibid., 118  
\textsuperscript{50} Ibid., 109  
\textsuperscript{51} \textit{Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment} “Eastern Mediterranean/Israel/Demography”  
\textsuperscript{52} U.S Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism 2002, 111  
\textsuperscript{53} \textit{Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment} “Eastern Mediterranean/Israel/Security and Foreign Forces”  
\textsuperscript{54} U.S Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism 2002, 55.
assassinated Al Qaeda’s leader for southern Lebanon in March of 2003\textsuperscript{55}, again indicating Al Qaeda activity in the region. The assassination of a U.S.AID officer in Jordan in October of 2002 by individuals paid by Al Qaeda\textsuperscript{56} proves both the capability and will to operate in the region against U.S. targets. The November 2002 Al Qaeda attack against an Israeli hotel and airliner in Kenya, which left three Israelis dead and threatened hundreds in the packed airliner,\textsuperscript{57} further underscores Al Qaeda’s interest in attacking Israel.

An understanding of the environment in Israel and the OT is critical in order to relate the lessons learned from the Sinai and Lebanon to future peacekeeping in the region. The threats to peace from external actors such as Iran and Syria, the complexity of terrain, population, and politics, and the capability of indigenous security forces to counter the numerous terrorist organizations are determining factors for the success of any mission. HAMAS, the PIJ, the PFLP, Hezbollah, Al Qaeda, and Kach are just the most prominent terror groups that would oppose a peace settlement. Any force entering the region must be prepared to deal with a hostile terror environment. Clearly, the environment becomes simpler with the cooperation of capable security forces on both the Israeli and Palestinian sides.

\textsuperscript{55} Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment “Eastern Mediterranean/Israel/Intelligence”
\textsuperscript{56} U.S Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism 2002, 57.
\textsuperscript{57} Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment “Eastern Mediterranean/Israel/External Affairs”
III. THE SINAI AND MFO: A SUCCESS STORY

A. MFO BACKGROUND

The MFO was born out of the 1979 Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty, which called on an UN-led force to supervise the implementation of the treaty and prevent future violations. In the context of the Cold War struggle, the Soviet Union blocked creation of a new UN force in protest of Soviet exclusion from the treaty process.58 Arab states, angry at Egypt for making peace with Israel, as well as pro-Arab/anti-Israeli states of the Non-Aligned Movement assisted in defeating any new UN force for the Sinai.59 In July of 1979, the Soviets doomed the ongoing United Nations Emergency Force II (UNEF II) mission, which had been acting as a buffer in the Sinai since the end of the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, by not renewing its mandate.60 This left no viable UN force able to support the requirements of the treaty.

To ensure the Egyptian-Israeli Treaty of Peace remained viable, Jimmy Carter, President of the United States, was forced to promise both Egypt and Israel that the U.S. would create a multinational force to meet the treaty requirements if the UN failed to do so.61 The UN attempted to negotiate approval for such a force for almost two years.

58 Tabory, 3. The Multinational Force and Observers in the Sinai, written in 1996 by Dr. Mala Tabory of the Tel Aviv University, provides a detailed look at the MFO, without pulling any punches, and is the best source on the creation and operations of the MFO located. No other book found exclusively addresses the MFO or matches the detail found here.
59 Spoehr, 3. LTC Thomas Spoehr’s US Army War College research project, The Fat Lady has Sung: The MFO in the Sinai, written in 2000, provides analysis of the MFO in light of strategic changes in the region since MFO’s inception. Essentially Spoehr argues that a much reduced force could accomplish the mission because of the maturity of the Israeli-Egyptian relationship.
60 Robert B. Houghton and Frank G. Trinka, Multinational Peacekeeping in the Middle East, New York: Center for the Study of Foreign Affairs, 1984, 39-40
61 The Multi-National Force and Observers. http://www.mfo.org. Visited October 2003. The MFO is an active organization with an excellent website that provides up-to-date information on all aspects of the mission, as well as archives of historical and related material. The MFO website and all MFO publications,
Finally, in September of 1981, the UN conceded that it was unable to create the required force due to the Soviet-led resistance. The U.S. fulfilled its commitment when, in December of 1981, President Reagan signed a law approving up to 1,200 U.S. troops for the mission and the U.S. began negotiating with Israel and Egypt to create an acceptable alternative force, the MFO.  

From 1979 to March of 1982 when the MFO was activated, the Israelis and Egyptians continued to comply with the peace treaty. In order to accomplish this, some stop-gap measures were put in place. First, Israeli and Egyptian forces separated themselves with a five-kilometer buffer zone without any external assistance, which indicated a high level of trust, cooperation, and a strong will to make the treaty succeed. Second, U.S. surveillance flights continued based on previous agreements to provide indications of compliance. Lastly, the Sinai Field Mission (SFM), a group of about forty U.S. State Department and U.S. civilian contract personnel, modified their mission from electronic monitoring to a treaty verification mission. Both the Egyptian and Israeli governments respected the SFM for its work alongside UNEF II since 1975, and therefore the SFM was incorporated into the MFO as the Civilian Observation Unit (COU).  

The MFO was unique in that it was created for a very specific mission with the input of the two treaty parties, and later, with the input of the MFO itself. In December of 1981 through January 1982, from the temporary MFO headquarters in Alexandria, Virginia, the first Director-General, American diplomat Mr. Leamon Hunt, and MFO Force however, are overly politically sensitive, avoiding negative comments or softening them when possible.

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62 Tabory, 14
63 John Mackinlay, The Peacekeepers: An Assessment of Peacekeeping Operations at the Arab-Israel Interface, London: Unwin Hyman Ltd, 1989. 172 Mackinlay provides a unique perspective and additional details due to his having served on the MFO staff. Mackinlay was also able to interview key
Commander, Swedish General Bull-Hansen, quickly developed organizations, deployment and execution plans, and MFO Standard Operating Procedures, all with Israeli and Egyptian input. Mr. Hunt and General Hansen were excellent choices to lead the new organization, as both men had experience at peacekeeping in the Sinai. Mr. Hunt had been the Director of the SFM, while General Hansen served in the Sinai as part of UNEFI in 1956 and 1957. The forces were quickly organized and made ready for deployment on 10 March 1982. All MFO forces were in place by 20 March and began training and orientation. On 25 April, MFO assumed functions on schedule. Israel then withdrew from the final zone, placing the Sinai back under Egyptian sovereignty.

Creating the MFO force was a challenging exercise in politics. The national composition of the force required approval by the treaty parties, Egypt and Israel. This ensured the parties would have confidence in the MFO, as the process eliminated all Soviet bloc countries, which Israel mistrusted, and Egypt rejected all of the Organization of African Unity, as they did not support the treaty with Israel. Many other states did not want to be a part of a non-UN peacekeeping force, and some even considered it illegal. The inclusion of the treaty parties in the creation of the MFO gave them a sense of ownership as “both countries perceived the MFO as theirs.”

leaders in the MFO, which provides information not published elsewhere.

64 Tabory, 15
65 Mackinlay, The Peacekeepers, 172, 174
67 Tabory, 20
The strength of U.S. commitment was critical to getting international participation.

“The various states did not join because of Israeli or Egyptian solicitations, but primarily because they were asked to do so by the U.S.”

To encourage participation, the U.S. offered incentives of military training for developing nations. U.S. leadership of MFO provided a dual advantage for the Israelis, bringing close U.S. presence and involvement to the Sinai and eliminating a UN mission with a perceived anti-Israeli bias. The importance of U.S. commitment to the MFO remains, as evident in the September 2002 withdrawal of Fijian troops from the UN-led mission in Lebanon, but Fiji remained in the MFO.

The assassination of Anwar Sadat on 6 October 1981, and the implication of further terrorism, caused hesitation of some donors, such as Australia and New Zealand. The four European Community countries, Britain, France, Italy, and the Netherlands, initially tried to link participation in MFO to resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian crisis. Even though this was rejected by Israel, the European Community countries eventually joined. Throughout the process, many Arab countries, opposed to Egypt’s peace with Israel, pressured against any support for the MFO. The final composition of the MFO was of ten countries: the U.S., Australia, New Zealand, Colombia, Fiji, Uruguay, the United Kingdom, Netherlands, Italy, and France. Only the U.S. was required to permanently

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69 Tabory, 21
70 Ibid., 21
71 Pelcovits, 16
73 Tabory, 21
74 Houghton, 44
75 Tabory, 23-35
remain in the MFO.\textsuperscript{76} All others participants provide either a five or two year commitment.

\textbf{B. MFO MISSION, ORGANIZATION, AND OPERATIONS}

The mission of the MFO is “to supervise the implementation of the security provisions of the Egyptian-Israeli Treaty of Peace and employ the best efforts to prevent any violation of its terms.”\textsuperscript{77} The specific tasks that were assigned to the MFO from the treaty are: 1) the operation of checkpoints, reconnaissance patrols and observation posts along the international boundary and specified zones within the Sinai (see Appendix C), 2) the periodic verification of the implementation of the provisions to be carried out not less than twice per month unless otherwise agreed by the parties, 3) additional verifications within forty-eight hours after receipt of a request from either party, and 4) to ensure the freedom of navigation through the Straits of Tiran.\textsuperscript{78}

The MFO organization is loosely based on the UN model, but adapted to the specific needs of the Sinai. The Director-General (DG), approved by Egypt and Israel to serve a four year term, is the head of the organization. He or she must be a U.S. civilian, and usually has extensive diplomatic experience.\textsuperscript{79} The DG operates from the MFO headquarters in Rome and, with the advice of Egyptian and Israeli representatives, controls MFO diplomatic, policy, and financial matters.\textsuperscript{80} The first DG was Mr. Leamon R. Hunt, who was assassinated by terrorists in Rome on 15 Feb 1984.\textsuperscript{81} \textsuperscript{82} Though the

\textsuperscript{76} Houghton, 42
\textsuperscript{78} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{79} Tabory, 21
\textsuperscript{80} Houghton, 47
\textsuperscript{81} Tabory, 68
\textsuperscript{82} The murderers have never been determined. The Italian communist group, the Red Brigades
DG’s legitimacy, and therefore the legitimacy of the MFO itself, was initially questioned by France, the DG gained the required authority by letter of habilitation from Egypt and Israel giving the DG and MFO the necessary authority within their countries.\textsuperscript{83} Assisting the DG are MFO representatives in Cairo and Tel Aviv, who conduct liaison with the host government as well as embassies of MFO participating nations. The representatives also assist in procurement, contracting, logistics, and day-to-day operations.\textsuperscript{84}

The force commander is a general officer of any nation other than the U.S., and must be approved by both treaty parties. His headquarters is located in North Camp, at el Gorah in the north of the Sinai Peninsula (see Appendix C). He is empowered to conduct operations in support with the treaty.\textsuperscript{85} The MFO Force Commander’s staff consists of personnel from contributing countries. The internationalism of the staff acts to “submerge [the] national identity” of each staff member and prevents the force acting as, or being perceived as, a U.S. surrogate.\textsuperscript{86}

The MFO force is currently composed of eleven countries, which include the U.S., Australia, Canada, Columbia, Fiji, France, Hungary, Italy, New Zealand, Norway and Uruguay. In 1983, the MFO deployed 2,692 military personnel, but as the situation normalized these numbers gradually fell, ending 2003 with only 1,685 on duty.\textsuperscript{87}

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{83} Tabory, 37
\textsuperscript{85} Houghton, 47
\textsuperscript{86} Mackinlay, The Peacekeepers, 175
\end{flushright}
force itself is broken into the Force Commander Staff, Operations, and Support (see Appendix D). The Operations element is the backbone of the MFO and accomplishes the treaty requirements. It includes three infantry battalions, one U.S., one Colombian, and one Fijian. These units are armed as light infantry, with no artillery or armor support. In addition is the Italian Coastal Patrol Unit to enforce maritime treaty requirements around the Straits of Tiran. Last, but most important, is the Civilian Observation Unit (COU).

The COU is an evolution of the Sinai Field Mission (SFM), which was created as part of the Sinai II agreements in 1975. Most of the SFM personnel simply changed armbands when the MFO was activated in 1982 and began the verification mission in the COU. The use of SFM personnel brought experienced and respected individuals into the MFO that were able to provide invaluable continuity to the mission. Though originally about forty members, the COU is now fifteen members, all of whom are U.S. citizens and eight of which are tasked from the U.S. Department of State. The COU reports are sent simultaneously to Egypt and Israeli liaison officers to ensure transparency and impartiality of the mission.

The treaty divided the MFO area of operations into four zones (see Appendix C). Zones A, B, and C are in the Sinai and sovereign Egyptian territory. Zone D comprises a three-kilometer strip of territory inside the Israeli border. The treaty caps Egyptian and Israeli military forces in each of these zones. It is the mission of the COU to conduct verification that the two parties are in compliance with these limitations. This is

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89 Mackinlay, *The Peacekeepers*, 172
90 Tabory, 72
91 Hughes, “MFO FY 2003: A Year of Continuity. a Year of Change.” 42
accomplished through regular and surprise inspections, usually beginning with one day of over-flights followed by two or three days of follow-up ground inspections.  

Inside Zone C, which rests along the Egypt-Israeli border, the three infantry battalions operate thirty sites, to include command posts, known as Sector Control Centers, observation posts, and checkpoints. These operations throughout Zone C meet the requirements of the treaty. The Coastal Patrol Unit ensures freedom of navigation in the Straits of Tiran, as dictated by the treaty.

The liaison officers are critical to the success of the MFO mission. Both Israel and Egypt provide liaison officers, who meet regularly with MFO counterparts and accompany COU personnel on inspection in their respective zones. Liaison officers promote the resolution of issues rapidly and at the lowest levels. The liaisons are crucial to keeping within treaty guidelines and correcting reported violations within the treaty specified forty-eight hours.

Specific freedoms are granted to the MFO within the treaty, which allows the organization to conduct its mission credibly. The MFO has full freedom of maneuver within treaty-designated zones, and conversely the MFO compounds can deny uninvited intrusion from the treaty parties. All MFO communications are protected and the use of codes is permitted, which serves to retain the necessary security of the inspection mission. Diplomatic protections are extended to MFO members in that any MFO member

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93 Tabory, 2
95 Ibid.
96 Tabory, 73
97 Houghton, 57
98 Tabory, 89-90
charged with a crime can only be tried by his or her home nation. This prevents any potential harassment or intimidation of MFO personnel in the conduct of their mission. All of the above freedoms are essential for a credible neutral treaty monitoring organization to operate.

The MFO is armed with only light weapons and no armor capability, which fits the mission of monitoring treaty compliance. The MFO would be unable to stop aggressive action by either treaty party member, but is able to provide early warning of military preparations within the treaty zones. In addition, the rules of engagement, the guidelines for MFO soldiers in using deadly force, are very restrictive, allowing firing weapons only in self-defense. MFO soldiers wear their home nation military uniform, but have a distinct identity through the wearing of a red beret, MFO armband, and vehicles painted with MFO on the sides.

Terrorism was a concern while building the MFO, especially in light of Anwar Sadat’s assassination in 1982, and the subsequent assassination of MFO Director General Hunt in 1984. The MFO was not tasked in any way to detect, deter, or combat terrorism. Each treaty party nation remained fully responsible for control of terrorism emanating from its sovereign territory. The MFO simply had to report suspicious activity to the local police, and was required to turn over any non-MFO personnel detained by the MFO.

A final critical point about the MFO is that the organization can only be withdrawn if both treaty parties agree or if the UN Security Council unanimously votes to do so. If contributor nations withdraw, the U.S. remains as the guarantor of the treaty, and

99 Ibid., 92
100 Houghton, 51
101 Tabory, 83
therefore is responsible for filling any gaps in the MFO force structure.\textsuperscript{103}

\section*{C. MFO LESSONS LEARNED}

That the MFO has been successful is not in question. The question is: why has it been so successful and can these reasons be transcribed to future peacekeeping in Israel and the OT? There are several reasons for MFO success.

The commitment of Israel and Egypt to the peace process is the overwhelming reason for MFO’s success.\textsuperscript{104} The treaty parties’ commitment is proven by the period between 1979, when the treaty was signed, and 1982, when MFO began to operate, in which both parties followed the treaty with very little external monitoring. Israel even removed Israeli settlers from the Sinai,\textsuperscript{105} a precedent that may have implications in the OT. With limited international backing and only lightly armed, the MFO was “totally reliant on cooperation of parties.”\textsuperscript{106}

The second reason for the success of the MFO was the strong U.S. commitment. The U.S. earned the trust of, and was in a position to influence, both treaty parties.\textsuperscript{107} Cooperation in building MFO, and any violation of the treaty, could be rewarded or punished respectively. The U.S. was also able to garner sufficient international participation to make the MFO a credible and legitimate international body. Clearly, without the U.S. push, the MFO would never have come to life, nor lasted over twenty years.

\begin{footnotesize}
102 Ibid., 76  
103 Ibid., 108  
104 Houghton, 43  
105 Ibid., 48  
106 Tabory, 116  
107 Pelcovits, 16
\end{footnotesize}
A third key reason for the success of MFO was the strategic and operational environment. Strategically, though many opposed the Egypt-Israeli Peace Treaty, foreign powers had almost no influence in the Sinai. In the operational sense, the Sinai presents a relatively uncomplicated battlespace, as there was “considerable space to separate the former combatants; and the area is generally free of third-party factions seeking to undermine the peace process.” Geographically, the open Sinai desert leaves military forces exposed to overhead reconnaissance and provides MFO observation posts generally unrestricted views of all approaches. The canalizing mountain passes makes monitoring vehicular movement much easier. Demographically, the Sinai also presents a fairly uncomplicated environment. It is sparsely populated, with about 60,000 people in the 61,000 square kilometer area. Most of the population is concentrated on the coastline, with Bedouins inhabiting the interior. There is no armed conflict among the population of the Sinai itself. Best of all, the MFO mission does not require peacekeepers to operate in urban terrain, though the base camps at el-Gorah and Sharm el-Sheik are in towns.

Lastly, the MFO did not face any substantial terrorist threat attempting to destabilize the peace. Egypt and Israel, both wanting the MFO to succeed, upheld their security responsibilities to protect the MFO. Though many terrorist groups and countries opposed the Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty, they proved unable or unwilling to attack the MFO.

Unity of support from the treaty parties, isolation of the peacekeepers in protected garrisons and in remote observation posts, and lack of a terrorist threat make the MFO

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108 Spoehr, 7
mission substantially different from the environment that peacekeeping in Israel and the OT would present to any outside force. It is necessary, then to look for another example to balance the examination of the MFO. The 1982 MNFII mission to Lebanon, with its numerous competing factions and foreign influence, religious and ethnic confrontation, urban setting, and terrorism provides the needed example.

\[110\text{ Pelcovits, 85}\]
IV. LEBANON AND MNF II: FAILURE OF THE WORST KIND

“They sent us to Beirut
To be targets that could not shoot.
Friends will die into an early grave,
Was there any reason for what they gave?”
Written by an unknown Marine, Beirut, 1984

The outcome of United States peacekeeping efforts in Lebanon are a marked difference from the MFO experience. The MFO mission continues today without a single death to hostile actions. The MNFII mission ended with over 300 U.S. dead and many more wounded, and none of the U.S. goals accomplished. In order to understand why there was such a drastic difference in outcome in the two cases, the historical context of Lebanon and the strategic and operational environments in 1982 must be understood.

A. MNFII BACKGROUND

Lebanon is a small country at approximately ten thousand square kilometers, the same size as the West Bank and Gaza Strip combined, or about half the size of Israel, and one-sixth the size of the Sinai Peninsula. The national population density of Lebanon is very similar to that of Israel and the Occupied Territories. A 2002 estimate of the population was approximately 3.8 million people, with one million of those living in the capital, Beirut. The 1983 population was estimated at about three million. Over

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ninety percent of the population is ethnically Arab; however, that ethnically homogenous group is divided almost equally between Christian and Muslim sects. The last census was taken in 1932, with no desire to update it for fear the precarious power sharing arrangements based on religious (also called confessional) groups would be upset. The terrain is generally a narrow coastal plain surrounded by hills and the Lebanon Mountains (see Appendix E). The mountains, throughout history, have provided havens for minority religious groups, be they Christian or Muslim sects, from the persecution of whoever controlled the territory at the time. Muslim dominance since the 632 AD has resulted in the coastal cities being predominantly Muslim with Christians occupying the mountains.

European influence in Lebanon, also known as the Levant, extends back to its inclusion within Alexander the Great’s empire, and through the Roman and Byzantine empires. Around 632 AD the Arabs, inspired by the spirit of Islam, swept across the Middle East and beyond, bringing Lebanon under Muslim rule and bringing Arab settlers to the region. The Crusades interrupted Muslim dominance from 1095 to 1291, holding some coastal cities for over two hundred years. Arab rule was ended by the Muslim Mamluk conquest in 1252, which was in turn followed by the Ottoman Turks, who ruled from 1516 until 1916.

International Airport Terrorist Act, October 23, 1983” 20 December 1983.

115 U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Near East Affairs, “Country Information: Lebanon” 2
In 1842, the Ottoman sultan divided Lebanon into a Christian and Druze Muslim\textsuperscript{117} section, in hopes to halt the internecine fighting, however this served only to increase the conflict.\textsuperscript{118} In 1860, French troops landed to stop a Druze Muslim-Christian war and protect the Christian Maronite\textsuperscript{119} community following a massacre of approximately 10,000 Christians. The French, by interceding, fulfilled the 1649 pledge of King Louis XIV of France to be the Maronite protector.\textsuperscript{120} Following World War I and the defeat of the Ottoman Empire, Lebanon became a French mandate, and the Greater State of Lebanon was officially created.\textsuperscript{121} Under the French, a constitution was developed in 1926. This 1926 constitution is the basis for the current Lebanese government, which included the tacit agreement of power sharing along confessional lines. The presidency would go to a Maronite Christian, the Prime Minister would always be a Sunni Muslim, and the Speaker of the Chamber of Deputies would be a Shiite Muslim, while the Chamber of Deputies, similar to a parliament, itself would be split along confessional lines.\textsuperscript{122}

Lebanon was invaded in 1941 by allied troops and secured from the Nazi collaborationist Vichy French regime. In 1946, the French departed Lebanon, fulfilling their promise to grant the Lebanese their independence.\textsuperscript{123} Lebanon created a government

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\textsuperscript{117} The Druze are a sect of Islam who prescribe to the teachings of Darazi, who in turn followed the Fatimid Caliph of Egypt, Al-Hakim. Al-Hakim believed he was god incarnate. (Willis, 16)

\textsuperscript{118} Willis, 18

\textsuperscript{119} Maronite Christians evolved from the followers of St Maroun, a Syrian 4\textsuperscript{th} Century priest. The Maronite church is in union with the Roman Catholic Church (Maroun.org. “The Life of St Maroun.” http://www.maroun.org/saint/maroun/life/. Visited on 10 March 2004) Another man credited with saving the church and another possible namesake is Yahunna Marun (Joanas Maro) who led many Christians into the mountains of Lebanon after the initial Arab Muslim invasion in 660 AD. (Willis, 15)

\textsuperscript{120} Shulimson, Marines in Lebanon: 1958. 2

\textsuperscript{121} U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Near East Affairs, “Country Information: Lebanon”

\textsuperscript{122} Willis, 19

\textsuperscript{123} Shulimson, Marines in Lebanon: 1958. 2
along the lines of the 1926 constitution that precariously balanced power between the relatively equal Christian and Muslim populations. The power sharing agreement became known as “The National Pact”, and stipulated that the Maronites would not seek Western intervention and the Sunnis would not seek integration into a Greater Syria.

One must keep in mind that each major religious group was subdivided into smaller rival groups. Muslims contained Sunni, Shia, and Druze sects, while the Christians consisted of Maronites, Greek Orthodox, and Armenians, to just name a few of the largest communities. These sects often had competing agendas within and between the major religious groups.

The first U.S. intervention in Lebanon occurred in 1958. The pro-West Lebanese president, Camille Chamoun, faced a mostly Muslim rebellion backed by the United Arab Republic and inspired by Egyptian President Nasser’s Arab nationalism and anti-Westernism. The 14 July 1958 revolution in Iraq replaced the pro-Western King Faisal with the Arab nationalist regime of Brigadier Abdel Karem Kassem. President Chamoun, fearing additional rebel pressure inspired by the Iraqi coup, requested U.S. and British assistance. Fearing the collapse of Lebanon, one of the few Western allies remaining in the Middle East, President Eisenhower committed marine and army units to Lebanon. With over 14,000 U.S. troops deployed throughout Lebanon, negotiations took place, a compromise president was installed, concessions were made, and peace was

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124 Willis, 21
125 "The Long Commission Report” 25
126 Shulimson, Marines in Lebanon: 1958: 2
127 The United Arab Republic (UAR) was the short-lived union of Egypt and Syria from 1958 to 1961. The UAR had a pan-Arab platform that was a perceived threat to absorb Lebanon. (Lesch and Tschirgi. 18, Shulimson, Marines in Lebanon: 1958, 5)
128 Shulimson, Marines in Lebanon: 1958. 5
restored. The U.S. withdrew after three months with only one hostile casualty.  

The 1970s brought new unrest as Jordan violently expelled the PLO\(^{130}\) which subsequently moved into southern Lebanon,\(^{131}\) joining the over 100,000 Palestinians that had fled to Lebanon in 1948. The arrival of the PLO further exacerbated Christian and Muslim differences in Lebanon, leading to a generally Muslim-Christian civil war from 1975 to 1981, but which also included Lebanese Muslims and Christians fighting the PLO.\(^{132}\) In 1976, the Lebanese government requested and received Syrian army forces to help control the Palestinians. The Arab League subsequently deployed the Arab Deterrent Force of 3,000 personnel, which combined with the already deployed 27,000 Syrian forces to attempt to stem the violence.\(^{133}\) The Arab Deterrent Force was not able to stop the violence nor could it control the PLO in southern Lebanon.

In 1978, frustrated by continuing attacks by the PLO on northern Israel, Israel invaded the southern part of Lebanon. In response, the UN, with U.S. support, called for the withdrawal of the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) and created the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) to provide security in that region. Israel did withdraw later that year, but turned over a twenty-kilometer security zone on the Israeli-Lebanese border to the


\(^{130}\) King Hussein of Jordan, fearful that the PLO and PFLP would soon overthrow his regime, attacked the PLO and Palestinian refugees, who were supported by Syrian tanks, pushing them into Lebanon in what is known as Black September. (BBC News. “Black September: Tough Negotiations” 1 Jan 2001. http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/in_depth/uk/200/uk_confidential/1089694.stm. Visited on 14 March 2004. 5)

\(^{131}\) U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Near East Affairs, “Country Information: Lebanon” 3

\(^{132}\) U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Near East Affairs, “Country Information: Lebanon” Willis, 27

\(^{133}\) Azrael and Pavin, ed., Kelly “Lebanon: 1982-1984” 2, Willis, 31
South Lebanese Army, an Israeli-allied Lebanese Christian militia.

The U.S. negotiated a cease-fire between the PLO, Israel, and Syria in 1981, which lasted almost one year, despite violations. It ended on 6 June 1982, with Operation PEACE FOR GALILEE, the second Israeli invasion of southern Lebanon, which was in response to continued PLO attacks on northern Israel. The Israelis, along with Maronite Christian allies, drove all the way into East Beirut, pushing the PLO before them and destroying the supporting Syrian Air Force. The PLO prepared to defend from within the city of Beirut, a much more difficult environment for the IDF, and the IDF settled in for a siege of the city.

A U.S. diplomatic effort, led by President Ronald Reagan’s Special Envoy to the Middle East, Ambassador Phillip Habib, pressed for a resolution to the standoff and achieved an agreement for the evacuation of 15,000 PLO and Syrian troops from Beirut. On 25 August 1982, a 2,000 strong Multinational Force, later designated MNFI, composed of U.S., French, and Italian troops deployed into Beirut to assist in the evacuation. The evacuation was completed successfully and MNFI was withdrawn by 10 September, only 16 days after its arrival. A rapid chain of events was to bring a quick return of the MNF.

On 14 September, the Maronite Christian president-elect of Lebanon, Bashir Gemayal, was assassinated. Anticipating renewed violence in the wake of the assassination, the IDF moved further into the city, securing Muslim militia strongholds.

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134 Willis, 36
135 U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Near East Affairs, “Country Information: Lebanon” 3, Willis, 36
136 „The Long Commission Report” 29, 35
137 U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Near East Affairs, “Country Information: Lebanon” 3,
On 18 September, the world became aware of the massacre of up to 800 Palestinian refugees at the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps, which lay in the Israeli zone of occupation. Though the murderers were Christian Phalangist militiamen, Israel was perceived to have “stood back” while the atrocity happened. The Israeli Defense Minister, Ariel Sharon, was later forced to resign over the massacres.

Amin Gemayal, brother of Bashir, was selected to be president by the Lebanese parliament. Amin, recognizing the precariousness of the situation, requested a return of the MNF in order to bring security to Beirut and facilitate the withdrawal of Israeli forces. Two days after the shock of the Sabra and Shatila massacres, U.S. President Reagan announced the return of the Multi-National Force, now known as MNFII, to Lebanon. Separate Letters of Agreement between the government of Lebanon and the three MNFII participants, the U.S., France, and Italy, paved the way for the deployment.

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138 Phalangists were members of a Maronite Christian political party and militia. The party was started in 1936 by Pierre Gemayal and has fascist roots. ([Tiscali Reference – Hutchinson’s Encyclopedia](http://www.tiscali.co). Visited on 17 January 2004.)

139 The Kahan Commission was established by Israel to determine responsibility for the massacre. The commissions report, issued on 8 February 1983, was very detailed and open. It determined that Defense Minister Sharon, who approved the entry of the Phalangists into the camp, should resign, and several senior military officers should be removed from their positions. Israeli forces had encircled the refugee camps because of suspected terrorists operating out of them. The Phalangists were permitted entry as part of an attempt to root out terrorists and PLO fighters. The Phalangists, days after the assassination of their leader, Bashir Gemayal, and twenty-five other followers, appeared to be motivated by revenge, not uncommon in Lebanon. The Commission believed that Sharon should have anticipated the Phalangist massacre, and that Israeli ground commanders were slow to react once they realized a massacre was being committed. ("Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Events at the Refugee Camps in Beirut [The Kahan Commission]", The Government of Israel, 8 February 1983. [http://www.us-israel.org/jsource/History/kanhan.html](http://www.us-israel.org/jsource/History/kanhan.html). Visited 14 March 2004., and [Britannica Concise Encyclopedia. “Sabra and Shatila Massacres.”](http://concise.britannica.com/ebc/print?eu=402700). Visited on 14 March 2004.)

140 U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Near East Affairs, “Country Information: Lebanon” 3

No further agreements, with Israel, Syria or any faction, are noted.\textsuperscript{142}

The history of Lebanon has enormous implications for the MNFII deployment. First, Lebanon, since 632 AD, has been divided along religious lines, a separation formalized in the National Pact, which created a precarious balance and prevented strong national unity. The Lebanese first consider themselves a member of their subgroup before considering themselves Lebanese. One estimate places the number of Lebanese factions at up to 164 and the number of independent militias at forty.\textsuperscript{143} The Long Commission\textsuperscript{144} summarized the fractious nature of the country best by describing, “seventeen officially recognized religious sects, two foreign armies of occupation, four national contingents of multinational forces, seven contributors to a UN peacekeeping force, and some two dozen extralegal militias”.\textsuperscript{145} Secondly, there is an historic link between the West and the Christian communities, specifically the French protection of the Maronites since 1649. This link taints any Western intervention as possibly pro-Christian. In more recent times, a history of Israel supporting Christian factions is evident, thus tainting the Christian forces as anti-Muslim and pro-Israeli. External involvement is rampant as shown by the arrival of the PLO, two Israeli invasions, one Syrian force arriving with Cold war

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\textsuperscript{142} Mackinlay, “MNF2 in Beirut: Some Military Lessons for Peacekeepers.” 16. John Mackinlay wrote an excellent essay on lessons from Beirut. This is the same John Mackinlay who wrote The Peacekeepers utilized in the Chapter III.
\textsuperscript{144} The Long Commission was convened by the Secretary of Defense on 7 November 1983 to conduct an independent inquiry into the 23 October 1983 bombing of the Marine barracks in Lebanon. The Chairman was Admiral Robert L.J. Long. Numerous conclusions were reached on how the disaster could have been avoided and recommendations for correcting the identified problems. No individuals were found culpable. The Long Commission report is an excellent source, providing the necessary background and detail to understand the situation; however, much of the report is focused only on the terrorist bombing incident, and not the overall situation. (“The Long Commission Report” also known as “Report of the DoD Commission on Beirut International Airport Terrorist Act, October 23, 1983” 20 December 1983. \url{http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/AMH/XX/MidEast/Lebanon-1982-1984/DOD-Report. Visited on 20 January 2004.”}
\end{flushright}
implications, joined by other Arab League forces, as well as the influence of Iran on the Shia minority. Lastly, a series of successful interventions by the West, specifically the U.S. in 1958 and 1981, created overconfidence in the U.S. government leading to the decision to send in MNFII.146 It is into this unstable and complex environment that the MNFII force entered.

B. MNFII MISSION, ORGANIZATION, AND OPERATIONS

The Reagan administration’s decision to deploy MNFII was made at an emotional moment driven by the need to respond to the Sabra and Shatila massacres and borne on the wake of the success of MNFI.147 Due to the haste of the deployment, the strategic purpose of the mission was not well established at the time of initial deployment. The U.S. strategic goals, however, evolved to include the following: withdrawal of all foreign forces and create a stable ally in Lebanon, secure northern Israel and therefore assist Arab-Israeli peace process, weaken PLO and therefore weaken international terrorism, and lastly demonstrate U.S. superiority over the Soviet Union by blunting the endeavors of a Soviet surrogate, Syria.148 The U.S. strategic goals, however, failed to translate into an operational mission for Marines that were deployed into Beirut.

One of the core problems for MNFII was the ambiguity of the mission. Each of the four original MNFII participants created separate “Letters of Agreement” with the Lebanese government, so the mission of each country was different. For the U.S., the letter agreed to “provide an interpositional force at agreed locations and thereby provide a

\[145\] “The Long Commission Report”
\[146\] McWhirter, 6
\[147\] Ibid., 5
\[148\] Ibid., 5
Multi-national presence to assist the Lebanese government and the Lebanese Armed Forces in the Beirut area.”

John Kelly, the U.S. Ambassador to Lebanon from 1986 to 1988, posed the hindsight questions in his 1996 essay, “between whom should the interpositional force go and at locations agreed by whom?” There were no answers to those questions for the Marines deploying into Lebanon. As stated by Colin Powell, who served as the senior military assistant to Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger during the MNFII deployment, “Our Marines had been stationed in Lebanon for the fuzzy idea of providing a “presence.” The Long Commission stated that the “presence’ mission was not interpreted the same by all levels of …command” causing confusion that was never rectified.

The French scoffed at the description of an “interpositional force”, preferring a mission of “maintaining the peace and protecting the civil population” as stated by the French Foreign Minister. The U.S. Secretary of Defense, Caspar Weinberger, later described the mission as “not a force to maintain peace, it is a deterrent force.” Kelly describes the U.S. deployment as a bargaining chip for further diplomatic efforts, as evidenced by the 9 March 1983 remarks in testimony to congress by the Assistant Secretary of State for the Near East and South Asia, Nicholas Veliotes. He stated that, “It is our intention to phase out the multinational presence [MNFII] just as soon as the evacuation of Syrian, Israeli, and Palestinian forces is complete and the Lebanese Army

149 Mackinlay, “MNF2 in Beirut: Some Military Lessons for Peacekeepers.” 16
152 The Long Commission Report” Conclusions and Recommendations. 7
154 Ibid., 7
is able to do its job countrywide.”¹⁵⁵ That statement describes a far greater mission than to act as an interpositional force as described in the Letters of Agreement or a “presence” as described by Colin Powell.

Additional guidance on how to execute the mission dictated that the U.S. MNF “would not be engaged in combat”, that peacetime Rules of Engagement would be in effect, and that the U.S. military commander in Europe would “be prepared to extract U.S. forces in Lebanon if required by hostile action.”¹⁵⁶ Collectively this guidance had a great impact on how the Marines carried out their mission, and the perception of the Marines by various militias and foreign interests.

The organization of the U.S. MNFII force, and its command structure played key roles in its overall failure. The core of the U.S. contribution to MNFII was the 32ⁿᵈ Marine Amphibious Unit, the same unit that had just days before departed Lebanon after the successful evacuation of the PLO. A Marine Amphibious Unit is a headquarters element designed to serve as the coordinator of air-ground operations. The main subordinate unit is a Battalion Landing Team. The Battalion Landing Team consists of three rifle companies of 180 men, a weapons company of 200 men operating eight 81mm mortars, twelve Dragon anti-tank missiles, and heavy machineguns, and a headquarters and service company of approximately 200 personnel acting as the battalion staff or in support roles.¹⁵⁷ The Marines in Lebanon also received additional helicopter lift assets.¹⁵⁸

By the end of December, after the 24ⁿᵈ Marine Amphibious Unit had relieved the 32ⁿᵈ

¹⁵⁵ Ibid., 8
¹⁵⁶ “The Long Commission Report” 36
¹⁵⁷ Hammel, Eric p 67 The Root, by Eric Hammel presents an in-depth account of the Marines in Beirut from the personal level. Details of the individual Marines and their thoughts and actions paint the picture of life in Beirut with the MNFII all the way through the pull out of U.S. forces.
Marine Amphibious Unit, a battery of 155mm howitzers and a platoon of five M-60A7 tanks came ashore bringing the U.S. Forces to approximately 1,700 men.\textsuperscript{159} The Marines established their base of operations at the Beirut International Airport, which lay directly on the Mediterranean, just outside the city, and was overlooked by hills currently occupied by the Israeli Defense Force.\textsuperscript{160}

The other forces of the MNFII also took up their positions. The French contingent, with 2,000 troops and an armored car squadron set up at a racecourse in the Maronite Christian area.\textsuperscript{161} By positioning their forces in the Maronite area, the French gave a perception of continuing their historic ties to the Maronites, and destroyed any chance of being viewed as impartial in the conflict. The Italians arrived with approximately 2,000 troops mounted in Armored Personnel Carriers and established their headquarters, and a field hospital, near several Muslim refugee camps (see Appendix E).\textsuperscript{162} The British, who did not arrive until 8 February 1983, deployed a nominal contingent of 100 soldiers in armored cars to the Christian East Beirut suburbs.\textsuperscript{163} Once all forces were deployed, MNFII stood at approximately 6,000 troops.

One can clearly see that messages can be communicated, intentionally or unintentionally, by the location and disposition of forces. In this case, the U.S. remaining on the coast was perceived as barely committed or linked with Israeli forces on her flank.

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\textsuperscript{158} Mackinlay, “MNF2 in Beirut: Some Military Lessons for Peacekeepers.” 16

\textsuperscript{159} Mackinlay, “MNF2 in Beirut: Some Military Lessons for Peacekeepers.” 16

\textsuperscript{160} Mackinlay, “MNF2 in Beirut: Some Military Lessons for Peacekeepers.” 16

\textsuperscript{161} Mackinlay, “MNF2 in Beirut: Some Military Lessons for Peacekeepers.” 16. In Eric Hammel’s “The Root” the French specifically requested this area in order to be able to control the port and downtown area. Historic ties to Maronites where not mentioned as a reason. P35

\textsuperscript{162} Mackinlay, “MNF2 in Beirut: Some Military Lessons for Peacekeepers.” 16

\textsuperscript{163} Ibid., 16
The French displayed support for the Maronites while the Italians showed support for the Muslims, but in a humanitarian way.

MNFII was not organized as a single military force, which led to different actions and reactions by each contingent. Each contingent was located in a separate area, with separate logistical support structures, and each taking direction from its own national defense organization in a style that was accurately describe as “federated.” On the ground, liaison cells and determined cooperation by commanders created a workable environment, though not ideal. The speed at which MNFII was deployed, as well as variations in national interests, were the main causes of the non-integrated and cumbersome arrangement.

Chain of command for the U.S. contingent of Marines was very long and complex. At the top were President Reagan and Secretary of Defense Weinberger. Next, orders were passed to the commander of U.S. Forces Europe, then to the commander of Naval forces in Europe, followed by the U.S. Sixth Fleet Commander, then to the Carrier Task Force (CTF) commander, to the Amphibious Squadron Commander, who was placed in charge of U.S. forces in Lebanon, and finally to the Marine Amphibious Unit commander, who was in charge of on-shore forces. Aside from the long and convoluted chain of command, the U.S. effort failed to apply the principle of unity of command even with its own forces. CTF-60, the Carrier Task Force that provided naval gunfire and air support to the Marines ashore, was not directly subordinate to commander of U.S. forces in

\[164\) Ibid., 16
\[165\) Ibid., 20
\[166\) Waugh, 15
Interjected in this already confusing structure was the influence of the Presidential Special Envoy in Phillip Habib, and in the three U.S. Ambassadors to Lebanon that served during the deployment.

Each of the MNFII contingents operated separately and in their own way. The U.S. Marines began with limited presence patrols, extended to patrolling the Green Line separating Christians and Muslims in November of 1982, and began combined patrols with the Lebanese Armed Forces in June of 1983. The Marines began training the Lebanese Armed Forces in December of 1983, which continued throughout the mission. In March of 1983, the U.S. delivered thirty-two M-48 tanks to the Lebanese Armed Forces and provided the required training.

C. THE UGLY END OF MNFII

The arrival of MNFII forces brought a period of relative calm of about one year. The improved security allowed the government of Lebanon to regain some control and functionality within the country; however, the violence did not stop. The bombing of the U.S. Embassy in April of 1983, which left sixty people dead, was just one example of the continued violence.

The relative peace came to an end in September of 1983, when the withdrawal of the Israeli forces from the Shouf hills surrounding Beirut created a vacuum. Druze and Christian militiamen fought for the hills, while the Lebanese Armed Forces were pushed

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167 Ibid., 15
169 Ibid.
171 Mackinlay, “MNF II in Beirut: Some Military Lessons for Peacekeepers.” 16
from the area, reducing the credibility of the Lebanese government. Beirut itself began to be shelled by the Druze militiamen.\textsuperscript{172} There is some discussion that the U.S. should have expanded its mission and occupied the Shouf as the Israelis withdrew, thus preventing the fighting that took place for it and controlling the high ground that would later rain artillery and mortar fire onto the Marine positions at the airport.

The U.S. and French used air and naval support to assist the Lebanese Armed Forces against the Druze, who now controlled the Shouf. This clearly placed the U.S. and French on one side of the conflict, while the British and Italians maintained a more neutral position. As the war moved into Beirut itself in order to escape U.S. and French air strikes and naval gunfire, it was clear that the government of Lebanon, supported by the French and U.S. contingents, were opposed by the Druze, Shia, and Palestinian factions.\textsuperscript{173} Numerous other factions continued to defend their smaller interests as well.

Terrorist attacks increased, targeting the Lebanese government, and French, U.S., and Israeli interests. Bombings, kidnappings, and attacks by snipers became widespread. The most notable attacks were the near simultaneous suicide truck bomb attacks against the U.S. and French headquarters on 23 October 1983, resulting in 241 U.S. Marines and fifty nine French soldiers killed.\textsuperscript{174} As the chaos continued, the legitimacy of the government of Lebanon was degraded and hopes for a political solution waned.\textsuperscript{175} In January 1984, the Lebanese Armed Forces were reduced to being just one more faction when many Muslim and Druze units abandoned the army for their sectarian militias. Without the Lebanese Armed Forces, Gemayal’s government was almost powerless,

\textsuperscript{172} Ibid., 17  
\textsuperscript{173} Ibid., 18  
\textsuperscript{174} Friedman, \textit{Beirut to Jerusalem}. 201-202
leaving little for MNFII to support.\textsuperscript{176}

In early February 1984, the government of Lebanon requested the MNFII contingents to redeploy to “safer locations”.\textsuperscript{177} By 31 March 1984, all MNFII contingents had redeployed, with hundreds of dead and wounded and Lebanon in the same condition as upon their arrival in September of 1982.\textsuperscript{178}

The group that claimed responsibility for the bombing of the marine barracks was Hezbollah, an Iranian backed Shia group. In fact, a U.S. Federal judge found Iran liable for the bombing, stating that it was “beyond question that Hezbollah and its agents received massive material and technical support from the Iranian Government”.\textsuperscript{179} The attacks had less to do with actions of MNFII or U.S. forces in Lebanon, but more to do with U.S. Iranian relations as a whole. Demonstrating the accuracy of this conclusion is the fact that Iranian surrogates also bombed the Iraqi Embassy in Beirut in 1982, clearly relating to the ongoing Iran-Iraq war, and bombed the U.S. Embassy annex in September of 1984, after the MNFII had departed.\textsuperscript{180} The French, also convinced of Iranian complicity, retaliated for the bombing against the French headquarters by striking Iranian Revolutionary Guard positions in Lebanon’s Bekaa Valley.\textsuperscript{181}

The effects of the U.S. and MNFII withdrawal from Lebanon were severe. The Lebanese factional fighting grew worse, peaking in 1985 and 86, and tapered off with the Taif Agreements in 1989. During the sixteen year civil war over 100,000 people were

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{175} Mackinlay, “MNF2 in Beirut: Some Military Lessons for Peacekeepers.” 18
  \item \textsuperscript{176} U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Near East Affairs, “Country Information: Lebanon” 3
  \item \textsuperscript{177} Mackinlay, “MNF2 in Beirut: Some Military Lessons for Peacekeepers.” 18
  \item \textsuperscript{178} Ibid., 19
  \item \textsuperscript{180} Mackinlay, “MNF2 in Beirut: Some Military Lessons for Peacekeepers.” 25. U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Near East Affairs, “Country Information: Lebanon” 4
\end{itemize}
killed, almost one million displaced, and a quarter of a million left Lebanon permanently.\textsuperscript{182} For the U.S., all her strategic aims in the region were set back. Lebanon was not secure nor an ally, the PLO and international terrorist prestige was strengthened, Iran was encouraged in using terror as an instrument of foreign policy, U.S. credibility was damaged while Syrian (and therefore Soviet), prestige was bolstered, and complications to the Middle East peace process still have effects to this day. In the post 9/11 era, one cannot escape the use of Beirut as an example by Al Qaeda of U.S. weakness as demonstrated in the following passage from a fatwa issued by Al Qaeda in August, 1996.

“Where was this false courage of yours [United States] when the explosion in Beirut took place on 1983 AD (1403 A.H). You were turned into scattered bits and pieces at that time; 241 mainly marines soldiers were killed… It was a pleasure for the "heart" of every Muslim and a remedy to the "chest" of believing nations to see you defeated in the three Islamic cities of Beirut, Aden, and Mogadishu.”

Osama bin Laden "Declaration of War against the Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holy Places.", 1996.\textsuperscript{183}

In 1996, before there was a 9/11, Ambassador Kelly reflected in his essay on MNFII that “Western failure in Lebanon fueled the forces of political Islam and terrorism that continue to threaten stability today and that will threaten well into the next century.”\textsuperscript{184} He has been proven correct in the actions and words of Al Qaeda.

\textbf{D. MNFII LESSONS LEARNED}

There are numerous lessons to be learned from the American experience in Lebanon. First, the speed of deployment prevented the necessary analysis to understand the

\textsuperscript{181} Azrael and Pavin, ed., Kelly “Lebanon: 1982-1984” 11
\textsuperscript{182} U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Near East Affairs, “Country Information: Lebanon” 5.
\textsuperscript{183} NewsHour with Jim Lehrer Online. “Bin Laden’s Fatwah.”
situation. Instead of delaying the mission to examine the situation and secondary effects of the deployment, assumptions were made that eventually proved fatal. The foremost false assumptions were that the U.S. could act in Lebanon as a neutral party despite historic ties to Israel, Cold War animosity towards Syria, and support for the Lebanese government, which more and more became a pro-Christian faction. Another assumption was that the Government of Lebanon, to include the Lebanese Armed Forces, could be reconstituted as a legitimate power. The last fatal assumption, created by overconfidence, was that the U.S. could force a diplomatic settlement necessary to end the Beirut mission.

Second, it is impossible to be a peacekeeping force, and very difficult to be an interpositional or deterrent force, if not all of the major involved parties are fully supportive of a peace agreement. In the case of Lebanon, the government of Lebanon made individual letters of agreement with each of the MNFII contributing nations, and garnered a gentleman’s agreement from some of the militias not to attack MNFII forces. Unfortunately the influence of the government of Lebanon was very limited, and each of the many factions, PLO, Druze, Maronite, Shia Amal Militia and hundreds of others, pursued their own interests when the MNFII overtly supported the government of Lebanon. External interests were critical to the final collapse of MNFII. Israel, Syria,

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184 Azrael and Pavin, ed., Kelly “Lebanon: 1982-1984” 1
Iran, and Libya\textsuperscript{188} as well as the Palestinians all exerted influence in Lebanon to varying degrees. Though Israel and Syria occupied large portions of the country, it was the ire of Iran which struck the greatest blow to the French and U.S. forces ensuring their departure.

The U.S. MNFII contingent was not in a position to support an agreement between all parties, because, very early on, the Marines were directed to support the government of Lebanon, which was identified with the Christians and Israelis.\textsuperscript{189} Thus, all illusions of impartiality were lost. The U.S. was perceived to be pro-Christian and pro-Israeli from the outset, and over time, the U.S. removed any doubt of this by its actions. Transition from impartial to partial began with the location of deployed units, assisting the Lebanese Armed Forces with training and equipment (the U.S. was the only contingent to do so),\textsuperscript{190} joint Lebanese Armed Forces/Marine patrols, naval gunfire against Muslim positions, reconnaissance flights, and direct support of Lebanese Armed Forces at Auq al Gharb with naval gunfire.\textsuperscript{191} Colin Powell summarized the effect of U.S. naval gunfire in stating, “When the shells started falling on the Shiites, they assumed the American “referee” had taken sides against them.”\textsuperscript{192} U.S. air strikes against Syrian positions in December of 1983 capped the escalation of partiality, and highlighted Cold War and Soviet prestige issues.\textsuperscript{193} By taking sides with the government of Lebanon, the U.S. removed the pressure on Amin Gemayal to compromise with Muslim factions, as occurred to settle the 1958 uprising, and which eventually ended the war in 1989.

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\textsuperscript{188} Mackinlay, “MNF2 in Beirut: Some Military Lessons for Peacekeepers.” 21  
\textsuperscript{189} Waugh, 9  
\textsuperscript{190} Malone, et al, 14  
\textsuperscript{192} Powell, 281
\end{flushright}
Gemayal became obstinate once he believed he had full U.S. support. The journalist, Thomas Friedman, in his book *From Beirut to Jerusalem*, sums up the Marines in Lebanon in this manner, “President Amin Gemayel, instead of using the Marines as a crutch to rebuild his country, began to use them as a club to beat his Muslim opponents…they made the Marines an extension of what they knew, and what they knew was feud.” Even if it was necessary to take sides, no adjustment to the mission or forces deployed occurred once the U.S. clearly did so.

A clear and achievable mission must be given to the forces on the ground, accompanied by an organization that has unity of command and effort, is configured for the environment, integrated with other tools of national power, and can adjust to meet changes in the environment. The lack of clear goals for MNFII played a decisive role in its failure. How can a military force accomplish its mission if the mission is vague, hidden, or not possible to accomplish? As stated by Ambassador Kelly, “A token force with a vague mission was probably a recipe for failure.”

In addition, MNFII ignored the old lesson of unity of command. MNFII was not truly a Multinational force, but instead four national contingents loosely cooperating when their national purposes coincided. Even within the U.S. contingent the naval air and artillery support were not under the command of the CTF 60 commander, and the multiple layers of command up to the Secretary of Defense hindered flexibility and responsiveness to changes on the ground or changes in the diplomatic arena. In addition,
the constant rotation of leadership, both the six-month rotation of U.S. Marine units, and
the three different U.S. Ambassadors to Lebanon, and two Secretaries of State made
continuity of command at both the strategic and operational levels inherently difficult.

Once the mission and risks became clear, the U.S. MNFII contingent should have
been reorganized to meet that threat. Terrorism as a major threat was clear through the
bombing of the U.S. Embassy on 18 April 1983 and numerous other bombings and
kidnappings. Despite this, the U.S. MNFII contingent never gained the intelligence
structure, force protection posture, or expertise to combat terror.\textsuperscript{198} Instead, they
remained organized for strictly conventional and peacekeeping operations.

Finally, the links between diplomatic effort and military effort, or between strategic
purpose and operational tasks, were unsynchronized. In other words, diplomatic goals
were confused with military tasks.\textsuperscript{199} In the end, the Marines sat at Beirut International
Airport taking casualties while waiting for a diplomatic settlement that would never
come. As LTC David B. Waugh states in his U.S. Naval War College thesis, “Perhaps
nothing the military could have done in Lebanon, short of full scale invasion and
occupation followed by reconstitution of the state, could have changed the political
circumstances which resulted in failure of the peace effort. It was not an operational
military failure, but a strategic political one.”\textsuperscript{200}

\begin{itemize}
\item\textsuperscript{198} McWhirter, I
\item\textsuperscript{199} Azrael and Pavin, ed., Kelly “Lebanon: 1982-1984” 12
\item\textsuperscript{200} Waugh, 23
\end{itemize}
V. COMPARISON

In order to determine if the lessons of the MFO and MNF II missions would be relevant for a future peacekeeping mission to Israel/OT, they must be compared to what was described as the current Israel/OT environment in Chapter II.

A. THE STRATEGIC AND OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

The strategic situation present at the formation of the MFO was challenging, as many countries did not want the MFO mission to succeed. A final peace settlement between Israel and the Palestinians may face similar challenges. Iran’s current regime would likely oppose a peace, and Syria, who continues to demand the return of the Golan, would likely oppose any peace that did not return the Golan Heights\textsuperscript{201}. International Islamic extremist organizations would also oppose and seek to shatter any attempts at peace. Unlike the MFO, however, a UN force would probably not be blocked as long as Israel and Palestinian representatives had an agreed treaty, therefore a UN led mission would remain a possibility.

Terrorism was used to try to derail the Egypt-Israel peace process in the 1980s, most notably the assassinations of both Anwar Sadat, the President of Egypt and signatory of the treaty, and Leamon Hunt, the Director General of the MFO mission. Terrorism will certainly be used to try to derail the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, as it has so successfully done in the past. Rejectionists from Islamic and Jewish extremist groups, disgruntled settlers and refugees, and foreign powers should be expected to try all means to cause the collapse of the peace settlement. Unlike the MFO forces, peacekeepers

\textsuperscript{201} \textit{Guardian Unlimited} “Israel announces Golan expansion”
operating in Israel-OT must be organized and prepared to deal with the substantial terrorist threat.

The MFO succeeded in a harsh strategic environment for two reasons. The first was the absolute commitment of the two treaty countries to maintain the treaty. This ardent desire to make the treaty work allowed the MFO to survive through the assassinations and minor breaches or incidents, and ensured that both parties acted against internal efforts to derail the treaty.

The second reason was the diplomatic, financial, and military backing provided by the United States. With U.S. support, Egypt and Israel could focus on making the peace successful without needing to appease any outside powers, such as the Soviet Union, Arab League, or even the UN. The commitment of the U.S. also raised the cost for any treaty party that failed to uphold the peace. Non-compliance could lead to the loss of U.S. support, then leaving the country exposed to the nations so recently disregarded.

A peace treaty in Israel and OT would require both of these elements. The will of the Israelis and Palestinians must be strong enough that they can weather the inevitable terror attacks and minor breaches to the treaty, and more importantly, each side must be willing to neutralize their internal violent opposition. This means the Israelis must be willing to deal with resistance from armed settlers and Jewish extremists and the Palestinian Authority (PA) must be willing to crack down on terrorists and terror groups such as Islamic Jihad and HAMAS. Any external peacekeeping force would have a difficult time assembling the required intelligence capability required to aggressively attack and eliminate the terrorist threat.

The Palestinians, in signing any peace with Israel, will alienate those backers who are rejectionist, thus taking away a source of diplomatic, financial, and military support. This is similar to Egypt, who alienated the Soviets and was expelled from the Arab League for making peace with Israel. In Egypt’s case, the U.S. supplanted any allies lost due to the peace, providing the diplomatic, financial, and military support needed. The U.S. and her allies must provide the same service to a Palestinian leadership that embraces peace, with the goal of ending Palestinian dependence on any rejectionist elements or nations.

At the operational level, there are far more differences than similarities between the MFO and Israel-OT. The MFO operated in a sparsely inhabited open desert, which provided a simple operating environment. The West Bank and Gaza are quite different, with numerous urban areas, farmland, and groves of trees. In addition, while the population of the Sinai was generally peaceful, the OT is full of armed militias, quasi-police, armed settlers and terrorist groups, all of which could be violently opposed to a peace settlement. Therefore, many of the operational methods of the MFO, such as isolated observation posts and reliance on technical surveillance, are not appropriate for Israel/OT. The operational environment is far more similar to the chaos of the MNFII in Lebanon.

The MFO also has the benefit of monitoring an easily recognizable international border, though there originally were a small number of disputed border areas that had to be treated separately. Depending on the terms of the settlement, the West Bank has a great potential to be a complex, twisted border with local civilians, whether Palestinian or Israeli, needing to cross the border for their livelihood. Even if the Security Fence is completed, the West Bank border will prove a much greater challenge than the Sinai.
The MNFII provides a very different set of strategic and operational conditions. The strategic conditions surrounding the deployment of MNFII were ambiguous and the administration did not have the time available to clarify the situation, thus MNFII entered Lebanon with numerous false assumptions about the situation. Without agonizing over each poor assumption preceding MNFII, the applicable lesson for Israel-OT is that a hasty deployment in reaction to events is dangerous and that the MFO model of careful planning over time, and with the inclusion of the treaty parties, is preferred. If a hasty deployment is required, then clarification and adjustment must follow shortly.

The operational environment was also unclear for the MNFII deployment. The urban terrain, numerous factional militias, and foreign troops occupying parts of the country created a very complex mission. Again, the speed of the MNFII deployment prevented any substantial effort to clarify the situation. Without initial clarity, mistakes in mission, organization and capability of the forces were subsequently made. In addition, both strategic and operational environments changed drastically over time, with very little adaptation on either level.

Israel and the OT will have a complex environment, similar to Lebanon, with urban areas, external influences, terrorism, and hostile factions. Elements at the strategic and operational levels will oppose peace, overtly or covertly. The lesson from MNFII is that it is dangerous to enter a complex environment without adequate understanding and preparation for the situation, and if forced to do so, adaptation to the realities discovered is a must.

**B. MISSION, ORGANIZATION AND OPERATIONS**

The mission of the MFO was clearly defined in the treaty, which, in contrast to
MNFII, allowed a tailored force to be created to meet the mission tasks and requirements. The well-defined MFO mission also prevented unintended or not fully comprehended expansion of the mission. Clearly, these are desirable for any future Israel-OT peacekeeping. In addition, the Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty defined the responsibilities of the treaty parties. The definition of Israeli and Palestinian responsibilities is essential to the success of any Israel-OT peacekeeping mission. In contrast, the MNFII mission was not clear, thus leaving the U.S. MNFII contingent hesitant to act or adapt, as no clear goal had been established.

Command and control plays a crucial role in all missions. The chain of command for MNFII proved a critical limitation, both in its lack of unity between the national contingents as well as within the U.S. contingent, and in the many layers of command convoluting the mission and limiting agility. The MFO again provides a better command example with a civilian Director–General and a Commander of Forces, who is a general officer, providing a compact and unified command structure. It is important to note that the MFO still has the interference of each national command authority and has never truly been tested in a crisis. The MFO model also provides continuity of command to balance frequent troop rotations, with the leadership able to serve multiple year terms. Lack of continuity was a weakness of the MNFII, which likely contributed to their difficulty in understanding and detecting the changes in the environment.

In relation to the organization of the peacekeeping force, the MFO model contains elements that any Israel-OT peacekeeping force should emulate. The MFO provided another unique example that may be transferable to Israel-OT, and that is the use of civilian personnel to conduct treaty verification. Small numbers of civilian inspectors
(who are much less evident and therefore are less of a security risk, would not incite disgruntled people, and would have far less of an impact on sensitive sovereignty issues) could conduct inspections of treaty requirements such as dismantling of settlements, retention of terror related prisoners, weapons storage sites, etc. Hand-in-hand with the use of civilian inspectors is the MFO practice of using attached liaison officers from the treaty parties who build mutual trust between the peacekeeping forces and treaty parties and facilitate treaty verification and the correction of discrepancies.

The MNFII organization was ‘come-as-you-are’ due to the rapid deployment, with the later addition of armor and additional airpower. A critical failure of MNFII that must be accounted for in an Israel/OT mission was the lack of counter-terror, force protection, and additional intelligence collection and analysis capabilities. An Israeli-OT peacekeeping force must have these capabilities in order to succeed.

In the conduct of operations, MNFII is the closest correlation to the likely Israel-OT requirements, and therefore provides the most applicable lessons. The first lesson from MNFII is that impartiality is critical to the credibility of the mission. If a treaty party perceives favoritism, then the slighted party has little incentive to continue to honor the treaty for fear of the growing strength of its rival. The MNFII was perceived to support the Christian government in Lebanon as well as Israel when they arrived, and the mission to assist the government of Lebanon confirmed that perception. U.S. forces arriving in Palestine will face the preconception of being partial to Israel that must be countered.

A second operational lesson from MNFII is the need to monitor and adapt to changes in the environment and the mission. The MNFII forces faced a slowly shifting mission as well as an environment that changed from accepting the MNFII presence to extremely
hostile, but few adjustments were made to the official mission, organization, or operations. The Israel-OT peacekeeping force must be able to monitor similar changes and adapt to meet them.

Clearly many of the lessons from the MFO and MNFII are transferable to the Israel/OT environment. Mission clarity, concise command and control, the use of liaisons and civilian verification teams, adaptability and impartiality are just a few. The task now is to project these lessons into recommendations for a future force.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The MFO and MNFII lessons learned that are relevant to the current environment in Israel/OT provide a start point for any future U.S. peacekeeping mission in Israel and the OT. In examining those lessons, recommendations can be made for the future peacekeeping mission, though the exact conditions of a future deployment cannot be determined.

A. STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT

The success of the MFO and failure of MNFII show that the existence of specific strategic conditions are critical for peacekeeping to succeed. First, it is critical that there are two viable treaty partners who have agreed on enforceable terms for peace. Those treaty parties must demonstrate the will to carry out the terms of the treaty, to include taking effective action against internal rejectionists.

Second, external influence against the peace must be reduced to a minimum and then assessed to determine if the reduction is sufficient. For example, if the U.S. cannot prevent Iran, Syria, or Al Qaeda from operating effectively in Israel and the OT, then precursor operations may be needed before committing U.S. forces to potentially suffer another Beirut. Offensive operations may be required against terror cells before the arrival of peacekeepers. Warning should be given that nations will be held responsible for their actions and the actions of their surrogates, like Iran using Hezbollah. Economic sanctions, diplomatic isolation and censure, and even military action may be appropriate measures if actions are taken to undercut the peace.

Third, the need for a substantial and resolved U.S. commitment is required. If the U.S. is not prepared to continue the mission despite setbacks and inevitable U.S.
casualties that will occur, then the U.S. should not begin such an overwhelming endeavor as solving this Gordian Knot of Middle East peace. The U.S. must be willing to place significant diplomatic, economic, and military muscle into this problem or risk failure. Once committed to supporting a resolution, the U.S. must remain committed, or suffer a severe setback to our strategic aims and prestige, as the U.S. did after its departure from Lebanon. The security services of Israel and the PA, even if fully committed to the treaty, will not prevent all attacks from being successful. Pre-emptive attacks and U.S. reactions to attacks must be determined in advance, and treaty partners must be restrained in their response to violations. Terrorist attacks are intended to derail the peace, and to overreact or abandon the effort is to play into the terrorists hands.

**B. OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT**

Once it is determined that the strategic conditions are right for U.S. and international forces to deploy into Israel and the Occupied Territories, then the operational requirements must also be understood and met. First, the mission must be clearly defined and achievable, not only for the peacekeepers, but also for the Palestinian and Israeli security forces. In Israel and the OT, a realistic mission would be acting as an interpositional force along the agreed upon border, as well as conducting treaty verification. The details of the treaty are critical as they define what becomes tasks for the peacekeeping force, which in turn drives the organization, capabilities and numbers of forces required for the mission. Some examples of the tasks include monitoring Palestinian and Israeli police, ensuring terrorists remain jailed, verifying removal of settlements or barriers, and ensuring compliance with arms limitations.

Second, an organization framework must be selected for the mission. The force will
need to include a strong U.S. participation to rally sufficient international support,
provide sufficient resources and capability, and ensure Israeli participation in the treaty.
The force will also have to be international to assuage the current global paranoia of U.S.
hegemony as well as balance a perceived U.S. partiality for Israel. The force should attempt to have Muslim or even Arab participation to increase legitimacy among Palestinians and Muslims worldwide.

The MFO model of a force completely independent of any international or national organizations, which includes treaty party input, would be a workable model, though a UN or NATO model could also be applied. The possibility of simply expanding or transferring the current MFO mission to keep peace in Israel-OT is a viable consideration, as the MFO has earned the respect of Israelis and Arabs alike over the past twenty years. The risk in expanding the MFO is that methods used in the Sinai may accompany the transfer and prove dysfunctional in complex Israel-OT environment. A consideration, if the MFO organizational model were selected, is the diluted influence the U.S. would have over the organization. This would create greater international legitimacy and impartiality, but could prove disastrous if decisive action is required.

The total number of forces required is difficult to determine without specifics of the peace treaty, the level of threat, and knowing the capability and effectiveness of Palestinian security forces at the time. Neither the MFO, serving in a vast open space, nor the MNFII mission, deployed into a major city, can provide a model to determine force requirements for Israel/OT. Various numbers have been offered. Robert Kagan, writer for the Washington Post, suggested a force of ten to twenty thousand troops, with another ten
to twenty in reserve.\textsuperscript{202} Thomas Friedman, foreign affairs writer for the \textit{New York Times} and a former \textit{New York Times} Bureau Chief in Lebanon and Jerusalem, comes close to Kagan with a recommendation of 30,000 troops.\textsuperscript{203} Eliot Cohen, director of the strategic studies program at Johns Hopkins University, seems to go overboard, claiming a necessary rise in Army end strength of 100,000 troops would be required.\textsuperscript{204} As a benchmark, 60,000 troops were originally deployed into Bosnia, a country one third larger than Israel and the OT with less than half the population. Despite the relative calm, about 20,000 troops remain in Bosnia to keep the peace.\textsuperscript{205} A conservative recommendation, for a force serving as an interpositional and verification force, is at least 20,000 to 25,000 troops, made up of four task-organized brigades, a headquarters, and additional counter-terror, force protection, intelligence, naval, and air assets.

Third, the force must have a unified and compressed command structure. A single multinational headquarters should command all the involved forces, and have direct control of U.S. naval and airpower if these forces are required in certain circumstances. Decisions must be able to be made rapidly and enforced through all echelons, a difficult endeavor if the UN model is used.

The success of peace in Israel and Palestine is a strategic issue for the U.S., and therefore the U.S. leadership in the force should have authorization for direct contact with the National Security Advisor, bypassing the Department of Defense and State, if

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required. The leadership should also provide the continuity that rotating forces often lose. Leadership continuity ensures that the details of the complex environment are understood and that incremental changes to the situation can be recognized and adapted to.

The MFO provides a solid model for a multinational command structure. The civilian Director-General is overall in command, while the Force Commander, a General Officer, conducts the approved operations. In the case of Israel and the OT, the Director-General should be a U.S. citizen, either a diplomat or retired military officer, who has a solid understanding of the region and has earned the respect of both parties. The Force Commander could come from the next largest contributor of troops, preferably European, and in the best case, British. If there is little participation from the international community, the U.S. could then fill both positions. Mr. Leamon Hunt and General Bull Hansen proved the value of regionally experienced and respected leadership for the MFO. A contemporary example would be retired commander of U.S. Central Command, General Anthony Zinni, or a previous Middle East ambassador or special envoy to the region; such as George Mitchell, the Chairman of the Sharm el-Sheikh Fact-Finding Committee in 2001 and author of the Mitchell Plan for Israeli-Palestinian peace. The MFO model provides that the two top positions are confirmed by the treaty parties and serve for three-year terms that can be renewed. This process, which promotes legitimacy, impartiality, and Israeli/Palestinian ownership of the mission, should be continued for Israel and Palestine peacekeeping.

Fourth, the force must be tailored to meet the mission and specific tasks required. A robust force protection and counterterrorist capability, to include intelligence collection and analysis, will be necessary. U.S. linguist capability and regional intelligence
networks must be developed in advance. Hiring local personnel, or even U.S. citizens of Palestinian and Jewish descent, as translators can effect the perception of U.S. impartiality and, with or without intent, influence U.S. operations. The peacekeeping force needs trained U.S. military linguists in key intelligence and translator positions. The use of Israeli or Palestinian intelligence information can provide tainted or skewed information. U.S. intelligence networks must be developed in the region in order to corroborate or vet outside intelligence. Skilled linguists and intelligence networks take a long time to create, therefore the U.S. should begin building these resources now.

A robust information operations element must be included, as the success of the peacekeeping effort depends on public perceptions, in Israel/OT and abroad, and the enemies of peace have a well-developed information operations capability of their own that must be countered. The MFO model of using low profile civilians to conduct treaty verification can be adopted, as well as the integration of liaison officers at all levels to ensure cooperation between peacekeepers and Israeli and Palestinian security forces.

Fifth, the force must be adaptable to a changing environment. The MFO has not had a requirement to adapt, and the MNFII failed to adapt to change, so neither provides a model for future Israel/OT peacekeeping. The recommendation for Israel/OT is, first, to keep the peacekeeping command element in place for at least three years, as recommended above, in order to detect and adapt to incremental changes to the situation. In addition, the peacekeeping mission should be planned as a progressive military campaign, with specific goals and objectives to be achieved during specific time periods, different phases of the mission, and branches and sequels accounting for the most probable contingencies. This prevents the ‘hunker-down-and-wait’ mentality that
overcame the Marines in Beirut as well as the ‘peacekeeping-with-no-end’ in which the MFO is trapped in the Sinai. Next, a cell internal to the peacekeeping mission should be established that tracks critical data (i.e. attacks on peacekeepers, number of people crossing the border legally and illegally, number of negative stories in local press, etc) with the purpose of detecting changes, predicting the course of the change, and feeding branches and sequels to the operational plan. This allows the peacekeeping commander to adjust forces, training, equipment, information operations, and operations to meet the changed situation (Though still dependant on support from U.S. and other participant nations’ support for changes in forces). Lastly is to build a mechanism into the treaty that brings treaty parties and peacekeepers together every six months in order to address unforeseen issues. Examples could be an area of the border that was ill defined in the treaty, a new border crossing point needed due to unexpected economic growth in that area, or security in a specific town that must be dealt with. With these mechanisms in place, the peacekeeping force should be able to adapt as necessary.

The sixth, and last, operational requirement for success is the need for impartiality of the peacekeeping force. Although this is extremely difficult to do if terrorism continues, it must remain a goal. There is much the U.S. can do to achieve this. First, U.S. information operations to combat rumors and distorted news must be priority. Next, both Israel and the Palestinians must be held to the same standard at all times, regardless of political implications. The MFO model, being a separate non-national entity, is best able to act with less fear of political repercussions; whereas a UN or NATO-led-force may be restrained due to national interests. Another issue is the training of the Palestinian security forces that must take place. In Lebanon, the training of the Lebanese armed
forces by the Marines tainted the Marines as pro-Christian. In Israel/OT, the concern that the peacekeeping force would be perceived as pro-Palestinian is less likely, so a U.S.-led force could also conduct the security training in conjunction with peacekeeping. However, another option that should be explored is a separate force, either a nation or international organization, such as the UN, not participating in the peacekeeping force, or even a civilian contracted company, that could conduct the training. Clearly, the training would still need to be closely coordinated with the peacekeeping force, but by separating the training, the Palestinian security forces could gain greater legitimacy in the eyes of the Palestinian people by being independent and not subordinate to the peacekeepers.

The force that will keep the peace in Israel and Palestine in the future can avoid the mistakes of the past and capitalize on the lessons already paid for in American boredom in the Sinai and blood in Lebanon. By meeting the inevitable challenge of Israel/OT peacekeeping one of the most divisive issues in the world today has a chance at resolution. Resolution of this issue would have a positive effect on the overall global war on terror.

C. RECOMMENDED AREAS FOR FURTHER STUDY

This study focuses on a future role for U.S. forces in Israel and the OT in support of an agreed treaty, but such a treaty may never come about, and as discussed in the introduction, peace in Israel and the OT is a vital national interest. The U.S. may be forced to act in our own national interest before any agreement can be made. Possible scenarios of U.S. intervention could be to prevent a wider regional war, to prevent an atrocity, to eliminate a dire terrorist threat to the U.S., or to remove the Palestinian cause as an instigator of anti-U.S. terror. Essentially, the U.S. would not be a peacekeeping
force, or even a peacemaking force, but an army of occupation, replacing the Israeli occupation of the OT. Technically, the force could be a caretaker force, with the OT in a U.N. protectorate status.

The U.S. goal in such a case should be to work towards creating the conditions discussed in this study. As an occupying power or caretaker, the U.S. should push for a fair and impartial treaty that has a chance of creating lasting peace. Once Israeli and Palestinian representatives sign the treaty, the international peacekeeping force, if not already integrated, should begin peacekeeping operations and join the U.S. forces. From this point, the Israel/OT peacekeeping force should incorporate the lessons learned for the Sinai and Lebanon as described above, with the ultimate goal of creating a viable Palestinian state capable of securing itself.
APPENDIX A – UN Resolution 242

UN Security Council Resolution 242

November 22, 1967

The Security Council,
Expressing its continuing concern with the grave situation in the Middle East,
Emphasizing the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war and the need to work for a just and lasting peace in which every State in the area can live in security,
Emphasizing further that all Member States in their acceptance of the Charter of the United Nations have undertaken a commitment to act in accordance with Article 2 of the Charter,

1. Affirms that the fulfillment of Charter principles requires the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East which should include the application of both the following principles:
   (i) Withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict;
   (ii) Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force;

2. Affirms further the necessity
   (a) For guaranteeing freedom of navigation through international waterways in the area;
   (b) For achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem;
   (c) For guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and political independence of every State in the area, through measures including the establishment of demilitarized zones;

3. Requests the Secretary General to designate a Special Representative to proceed to the Middle East to establish and maintain contacts with the States concerned in order to promote agreement and assist efforts to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement in accordance with the provisions and principles in this resolution;

4. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the progress of the efforts of the Special Representative as soon as possible.

Source: U.S. State Department, http://www.state.gov/p/nea/rls/21974pf.htm
Visited on 10 December 2003
APPENDIX B – Map of Israel and Occupied Territories

Source: U.S. State Department, http://www.state.gov/p/nea/rls/21974pf.htm
Visited on 10 December 2003
APPENDIX C – Map of Sinai

Source: www.MFO.org
Visited on 21 Nov 2003
APPENDIX D – MFO Organization Chart

Source: www.MFO.org
Visited on 21 Nov 2003
APPENDIX E – Map of Lebanon and Beirut

Source: http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/middle_east_and_asia/lebanon.gif
Visited on 20 Feb 2004
APPENDIX F – Acronyms and Definition of Terms

COU: Civilian Observation Unit (see SFM)
DG: Director General, Civilian director of the MFO, headquartered in Rome.
FTO: Foreign Terrorist Organization, Designated by the U.S. Department of State
IDF: Israeli Defense Force
MFO: Multinational Force and Observers, located in the Sinai
MNFI: Multi-national Force I, conducted successful evacuation of PLO and Syrian forces from Beirut.
MNFII: Multi-national Force II, sent to Beirut after shortly MNFI.
OT: Occupied Territories, considered the Gaza Strip, West Bank, and Golan Heights
PA: Palestinian Authority, a nascent Palestinian government with authority in limited areas of West Bank and Gaza strip.
PLO: Palestine Liberation Organization
PPF: Palestinian Police Force
SFM: Sinai Field Mission, civilian observers in the Sinai beginning in 1975. Transform into COU in 1982 as part of MFO.
UN: United Nations
U.S.: United States
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## Abstract (Maximum 200 Words)

Many lessons from the Multinational Force and Observer (MFO) mission to the Sinai and the Multinational Force II (MNFII) mission to Lebanon are relevant for future U.S. peacekeeping operations in Israel and the Occupied Territories (OT). A final peace between Israel and the Palestinians is a critical U.S. national interest and is unlikely to occur without a US-led international peacekeeping force. It is important that the U.S. begin to consider the strategic and operation requirements for this mission.

Strategic conditions that assisted the success of the MFO and challenged the MNFII must be considered before US involvement in Israel and the OT. The commitment to the treaty of two viable parties, the reduction of external destabilizing influences, and the resolved leadership of the US are the three essential strategic conditions needed.

The operational environment of Israel and the OT more closely resembles that of 1982 Lebanon, with its urban and populated countryside, ethnic, religious, and political factions, and militias, terror organizations, and pronounced foreign influence. The Sinai, on the other hand, presented a much larger area, with few urban areas, sparse population, and no internal divisions. Despite the differing operational environments, the MFO and MNFII still provide relevant operational lessons for Israel and the OT.

Critical operational lessons are: the necessity of a clear and achievable mission, selecting an effective organization structure for the force, the importance of a unified and compact command structure, tailoring the force for the specific environment and assigned mission, the need for the force to be able to adapt to changes in the situation, and the benefit of maintaining impartiality in the conduct of the mission.