Division METL – Clinging to an Antiquated Paradigm?

A Monograph
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ABSTRACT

Since the end of the Cold War and its associated deterrent strategy, the United States’ global responsibilities have not only increased the U.S. Army’s tempo in stability and support operations but has also increasingly challenged longstanding roles of traditional Army headquarters – particularly the division headquarters. U.S. Army divisions over the last decade have increasingly found themselves operating beyond the tactical level of war – an area they are not organized or prepared for. Division doctrine over the last decade has clearly framed the division as the Army’s highest tactical unit, asserting that it does not prosecute the operational level of war. However, the realities of the last decade have demonstrated that Army divisions do operate beyond their traditional tactical roles and must be prepared to operate in much more complex environments that span the operational level of war. This monograph hypothesizes that U.S. Army Divisions are operating beyond the tactical level of war, and prosecuting the operational level of war on a routine basis. If this monograph’s hypothesis is true, two important questions emerge. First, what implications does this trend have for how Army’s divisions prepare for future operations, and secondly, and the focus of the monograph, if divisions are routinely operating at the operational level of war, why do they have a METL based on tactical tasks? Two case studies of past 10th Mountain Division operations - Operations UPHOLD DEMOCRACY and ENDURING FREEDOM provide a basis for analysis against criteria extracted from current Army white papers outlining the desirable characteristics of our future forces. These operations highlight the increasingly complex environment that divisions operate in, as well as the widening gap of irrelevance in the U.S Army’s Training doctrine. The study concludes that the traditional, tactical METL approach is no longer appropriate for today’s Army divisions requiring a shift to a more operational, core competency approach to division operations. Finally, the study makes recommendations across the doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership, personnel and facilities (DOTMLPF) focusing on training and operational doctrine and leadership. Finally, this study identifies two areas requiring additional research: What is a core competency approach versus task approach to training? And last, given the environment’s evolution over the last decade and today’s move toward a more modular, expeditionary force structure - has the division headquarters become obsolete?
Abstract

Since the end of the Cold War and its associated deterrent strategy, the United States’ global responsibilities have not only increased the U.S. Army’s tempo in stability and support operations but has also increasingly challenged longstanding roles of traditional Army headquarters - particularly the division headquarters. U.S. Army divisions over the last decade have increasingly found themselves operating beyond the tactical level of war - an area they are not organized or prepared for. Division doctrine over the last decade has clearly framed the division as the Army’s highest tactical unit, asserting that it does not prosecute the operational level of war. However, the realities of the last decade have demonstrated that Army divisions do operate beyond their traditional tactical roles and must be prepared to operate in much more complex environments that span the operational level of war.

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

Since the fall of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, the rapidly changing strategic environment has continued to increase its demands on the United States- the world’s sole remaining super power. The United States role as the strongest and wealthiest nation on earth incurs numerous responsibilities around the globe. ¹ This incredible global responsibility has not only increased the United States Army’s tempo in stability and support operations but has also increasingly challenged the traditional roles of current standing Army headquarters. Specifically, U.S. Army divisions have increasing found themselves operating beyond the tactical level of war – an area they are not organized or prepared for. For example, the Army in 1993 set a new precedent by selecting the 10th Mountain Division as an Army Force(ARFOR) HQs for Operation RESTORE HOPE in Somalia- a historical first for a U.S. Army Division. Again in 1994, the same division was designated as joint task force (JTF) 190 in Operation RESTORE DEMOCRACY. In 1995, the forward deployed 1st Armored Division was alerted to assume control of the failed situation in Bosnia as Implementation Force (IFOR) for Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR. More recent examples of divisions operating beyond their current mandates include the 10th Mountain Division and the 101st Air Assault in their roles as JTF Headquarters in Operation ENDURING FREEDOM.

¹ George L. Fredrick, “METL Task Selections and the Current Operational Environment.” School of Advanced Military Studies, United States Command and General Staff College, KS, AY 99-00, 5.
U.S. Army doctrine has historically stated that divisions are the highest tactical level unit and normally do not operate at the operational level of war. Furthermore, the doctrine defines division level tactics as those that involve the movement and positioning of maneuver forces on the battlefield in relation to the enemy, the provisioning for fire support, and the logistical support of forces prior to, during and following engagements with the enemy. The doctrine concludes that commanders at this level are principally concerned with accomplishing near term objectives. However, the last decade indicates that Army divisions in fact need to be prepared to accomplish much more than these traditional roles. Indeed, the role of today’s division headquarters is becoming as complex as the strategic environment itself.

The purpose of this monograph is to examine the current operational trends within the U.S. Army in order to identify training methodology implications for divisions and brigades in today’s environment. This monograph is based on the hypothesis that today’s U.S. Army divisions are operating beyond the tactical level of war, and are in fact prosecuting the operational level of war on a routine basis. If this hypothesis is correct there are several questions that must be asked. First, what implications does this trend have for how Army divisions prepare for future operations? Secondly, how do today’s divisions meet this evolving requirement? Thirdly, and most important, if divisions are routinely operating at the operational level of war, why do they have a mission essential task list (METL) based on tactical tasks? These trends suggest that the METL may be an inadequate methodology beyond the brigade level. This monograph seeks to prove it’s

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3 Department of the Army, *FM 71-100 Division Operations*, 5
thesis: Given the modus operandi of U.S. Army divisions today, the traditional tactically oriented METL methodology inadequately meets the training and competency requirements of today’s divisions, requiring divisions headquarters to adopt a more operational, competency approach to future operations. To accomplish this, the monograph first explores the strategic operating environment that led to the development of the METL methodology in the 1980s and compares that to the environment the Army operates in today. Once the changed environment is established, Chapter Three will explore the training environment of today’s divisions and brigades and compare that to the training environment of the 80s in an effort to identify implications. This chapter of the monograph expects to illustrate that the METL methodology remains a valuable tool for training management at the battalion and brigade levels - those units that represent a capability for a combatant commander. The chapter hopes to expose the methodology’s shortcomings given the modus operandi of today’s divisions. The monograph seeks to prove it’s thesis by applying the desired characteristics outlined in the Army’s two current white papers: Concepts for the Objective Force 2001, and The Way Ahead, Our Army at War, Relevant and Ready, 2003. The selected criteria for evaluation are agility, versatility and lethality. Using these criteria, the monograph will conduct analysis on two 10th Mountain Division operations in two different theaters of war separated by a span of eight years: Operation RESTORE DEMOCRACY as JTF 190 in 1994 and Operation ENDURING FREEDOM as CJFLCC and JTF Mountain in 2002. Given the results of this analysis the monograph will make conclusions as to the impact of the METL beyond the brigade level. The impact will look at two areas. First, its applicability at the division level and second, the cost in terms of competencies today’s division headquarters should
possess. Based on findings, the monograph will make recommendations across doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership, personnel and facilities (DOTMLPF) as appropriate and propose areas for future study.

**Operational Level of War**

*On transitioning from a division Headquarters to an ARFOR headquarters, and absorbing the responsibilities and the broader horizons expected of an ARFOR headquarters, was really a demand that was truly a challenge.*

MG Stephen L. Arnold  
CG, ARFOR Somalia and 10MD  
Cited in Operation RESTORE HOPE Oral History Interview RHIT JHT 048  
26 February 1993

Based on the monographs hypothesis, it is necessary to define the operational level of war as a point of departure for further argument. The U.S. Army’s FM 3.0 *Operations* defines the operational level of war as the level at which campaigns and major operations are conducted to accomplish strategic objectives within theaters or area of operations (AOs). Furthermore it links the tactical level of employment of forces to the strategic objectives. The focus at this level is operational art, the use of military forces to achieve strategic goals through the design, organization, integration and conduct of theater strategies, campaigns, major operations and battles.  

4 FM 3.0 describes the tactical level of war as “the employment of units in combat.” It includes the ordered arrangement and maneuver of units in relation to each other, the terrain, and the enemy to translate potential combat power into victorious battles and engagements.

Doctrinal Foundation for Divisions and Corps

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War Era, doctrine concerning the role of the U.S. Army division has begun to evolve with changes in the operating environment - an indicator of the disconnect between theory and action. As mentioned earlier, doctrine has traditionally framed the division clearly in the tactical arena, and continues to do so with some subtle yet significant differences. For example, on the eve of validating Army Air-land Battle Doctrine in Operation DESERT STORM in 1990, Army divisions were operating under the 1990 Field Manual (FM) 71-100 Division Operations. The manual exemplified the essence of air land battle stating that the division is the largest Army fixed organization that fights as a tactical team, conducting tactical operations in a low-, mid-, or high intensity combat environment. Furthermore, those were the basic units of maneuver at the tactical level.\(^5\) This manual focused on the division’s role in the defense and the attack within the framework of deep, close, rear and emphasizes the headquarters role as providing command, control and supervision of tactical operations of the division and its organic, attached, or supported units.\(^6\) By 1996 the Army had been involved in several stability and support operations - Hurricane Andrew, Haiti, Somalia and the Balkans. These experiences began to shape the Army’s division doctrine. The 1996 FM 71-100 Division Operations maintained its

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\(^6\) Department of the Army, *FM 71-100 Division Operations* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1990, 1-1. This version of the division manual states that divisions defend against three or more assaulting divisions. The defending division commander directs, coordinates and supports operations of his brigades against assaulting regiments. The division interdicts follow-on regiments to disrupt and delay those forces as they attempt to join the battle. When attacking, the division commander directs, coordinates and supports his brigades operations against enemy battalions and regiments. The division interdicts deeper enemy echelons, reserves and combat support forces.
tactical spirit and the divisions role as the “largest Army organization that fights and trains as a tactical team”, stating it is “largely self sustaining and capable of independent operations”- a subtle, but significant change toward the operational level of war.

Furthermore, the manual expanded on the division’s role in tactics. It defined division tactics as involving the movement and positioning of maneuver forces on the battlefield in relation to the enemy, the massing of combat power, and the provision of logistic support for division forces prior to, during and following engagements. Additionally the doctrine maintained that commanders within divisions are principally concerned with accomplishing near term objectives. The manual continued to maintain that divisions are not normally designated as JTFs.

Notwithstanding this gradual expansion of the division’s role on the battlefield, the 1996 manual’s most significant change was the addition of a section on the division’s role as an ARFOR Headquarters- this addition was based on the 10th Mountain Division’s 1993 experience in Somalia. This change in the doctrine marked the first time in division doctrine history where the division assumed an operational role and responsibility for the conduct of operational tasks. The 2002 Final Draft edition of the manual significantly expanded on the division’s role as an ARFOR Headquarters and emphasized the operational role of the ARFOR.

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CHAPTER 2

THE NEW ENVIRONMENT

In 1638 Galileo published his book, *Discorsi*, in which he outlined two now famous maxims in the scientific world. His first maxim concerning observation of phenomenon was *describe first and explain later - that is the how precedes the why*. This chapter will attempt to follow that maxim in discussing the environments of yesterday and today. The chapter will first briefly discuss the characteristics of the Cold War. Second, it will discuss the United States National Security Strategy (NSS) within the context of the Cold War environment. Third, it will explore how this environment contributed to the United States’ operational and training doctrine, and lastly, the chapter focuses on the strategic environment of today and contrasts it with previously discussed Cold War elements.

The Cold War Strategic Environment

Following World War II, disputes between the Soviet Union and the Western democracies, particularly over the Soviet takeover of East European states, led British Prime Minister, Winston Churchill to warn in 1946 that an "iron curtain" was descending through the middle of Europe.⁹ For his part, Joseph Stalin deepened the estrangement between the United States and the Soviet Union when he asserted in 1946 that World War II was an unavoidable and inevitable consequence of "capitalist imperialism" and

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implied that such a war might reoccur.\[^{10}\] Such was the beginning of the Cold War. The Cold War was a period of East-West competition, tension, and conflict short of full-scale war, characterized by mutual perceptions of hostile intention between military-political alliances or blocs.\[^{11}\] Although this superpower rivalry brought the world to the brink of war in the 1970s, it did aid in the world’s stability. Throughout the third world, either the Soviet or United States ideology provided a political, economic and military over watch to new, deteriorating or failed states. This over watch served as a loose binding agent to the world’s stability.

Questioning the legitimacy of nuclear weapons in 1946, strategic analyst Bernard Brodie wrote, “Thus far the purpose of the military establishment has been to win wars. From now on its chief purpose must be to avert them.”\[^{12}\] The idea that Brodie expressed was nuclear deterrence, which was the cornerstone of U.S. NSS during the Cold War period. The deterrent strategy had three basic pillars. First, a deterrent force (U.S.) must be capable to inflict unacceptable damage on a threatening nation (U.S.S.R.) through its retaliatory strike capability. \[^{13}\] Second, the deterrent nation must have the plans and the readiness necessary to demonstrate that it can deliver on its "message." Third, the

\[^{10}\] Ibid.
\[^{11}\] Ibid.
\[^{13}\] Ibid., Inherent in the first pillar of deterrence is the nations ability to guarantee the safety of its nuclear arsenal. There must be no way for the opponent to eliminate the deterrent capability of the threatening nation. Strategists call this "second strike capability," that is the retaliatory force should be protected from destruction through a first strike. This safeguarding of the super powers nuclear arsenals was a key component to the stability and control of nuclear weapons during this era. With the destabilization and fall of the Soviet Union in 1989, that safeguard began to deteriorate, increasing the ability of non-state actors to gain super power-grade weapons.
deterrent nation must successfully communicate to the opponent the price it will have to pay for attempting to achieve an unacceptable objective.  

Given the threat of nuclear attack and the spread of communism, the United States, in the 1988 NSS outlined one of its major national security objectives as the preventing domination of the Eurasian land mass by the Soviet Union, or any other hostile power or coalition of powers. Given this threat and the grand strategy of deterrence, the NSS further expanded on the requirements of the U.S. conventional force capabilities to deal with the Soviet threat, stating that “careful attention to ensure our forces’ technological superiority and high readiness to accomplish their deterrent and war fighting missions.” This verse of the NSS captures the spirit of how the nation’s strategy shaped the military’s operational doctrine of the era. It is within the context of this bipolar, strategic environment and associated deterrent strategy that the Army finalized its operational doctrine - Air Land Battle to combat the Soviet threat.

The genesis of the Army’s operational doctrine during the Cold War was grounded in the acknowledgement that, regardless of how successful an active defense was, the numerical superiority of follow-on echelons would at some point prevail by sheer numbers and roll over U.S. defending forces in Europe. General Starry’s concept of the major central battle fought by the corps and divisions, analyzed functionally, suggested

14 Ibid., For the United States conveyance of the deterrent message had two aspects: Deterrence had to address opponent as well as friend. The opponent had to believe in deterrence, and deterrence had to reassure U.S. allies in Europe. Reassurance and deterrence were two sides of the same nuclear coin.  
16 Ibid., p.18. Complete text from this except of the 1988 NSS is helpful: “The most demanding threat with which those forces must deal is of course the soviet union. Soviet Forces will always outnumber our own in any presently foreseeable conflict- particularly when viewed in terms of active forces and major items of combat equipment. For this reason we must continue to give the
and clarified the requirement for U.S. forces to fight a deep fight simultaneously with the main close-in battle, thus allowing U.S. forces to disrupt the enemy’s echelonment, throwing him off his timetable and preventing defeat.  

The clearly defined threat of the 1980s acted as a catalyst not only in operational doctrine, but also in the Army’s adoption of the battle focused and METL training methodology. Initially introduced in 1987, battle focused training was grounded in the recognition that a unit could not attain proficiency to standard on every task whether due to time or other resource constraints. However, it concluded that commanders could achieve a successful unit-training program by consciously narrowing the focus to a reduced number of vital tasks that were essential to mission accomplishment.

**The Strategic Environment of the 21st Century**

In September 1999, a U.S. Commission on National Security for the 21st Century published its forecast for the future strategic environment. The study characterized an international system so fluid and complex that many of the fundamental assumptions that had steered the U.S. through the chilly waters of the Cold War would require serious rethinking.

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17 Air Land Battle doctrine was published in the 1982 FM 100-5 Operations.
18 Building on the deep battle thinking of his predecessor, General William E. DePuy, TRADOC Commander, General Don A. Starry stewarded his original central battle and operational concepts from their genesis in 1976 to their official form as Army Air-Land Battle Doctrine in the the 1981 FM 100-5 Operations. Air-Land Battle Doctrine continued to mature to its final form which provided the doctrine for the first Gulf War.
This new environment envisioned in 1999 and realized in September 2001 has had a tremendous impact on the military institution. It is now possible see the decade between the fall of Soviet Union in August 1991 and the attacks on the Pentagon and World Trade Center as an era of the unexpected. The age of relative predictability has been replaced by one of unpredictable and complex patterns of armed conflict. At the very least, METL development has become more problematic.

“In the new world we have entered, the only path to peace and security is the path of action.”

-President George W. Bush
June 2002

As scholars and columnists struggle to define the new world order, the realities of September 11, 2001 provided the catalyst for the most radical change in the U.S National Security Strategy since the emergence of the United States as a global superpower. The U.S. National Security Strategy of 2002 hearkened the birth of a new strategy in the face of an evolving and complex environment where the U.S. is threatened less by conquering

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22 The 1999 commission findings are one of many theories on the new world order. Two significant works include Samuel P. Huntington’s 1993 book *The Clash of Civilizations* (New York: Touchstone, 1996) argues that the world has splintered into seven or eight major civilizations and conflict along “fault lines” will escalate into broader wars between civilizations. Huntington asserts that the rivalry of super powers is replaced by the clash of civilizations. Robert Kaplan presents a second competing work on the future of world conflict in his work *The Coming Anarchy*. (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983) Kaplan uses West Africa as his barometer for what the character of the 21st century is likely to resemble. Kaplan first asserts that the environment will be the national security issue of the 21st Century. Moreover, the political and strategic impact of surging population, spreading disease, deforestation, soil erosion, water depletion, air pollution and migration will be the sparks of future conflict between groups. Kaplan further asserts that the scarcity of these natural resources will provide the catalyst to dissolving the traditional cartographic boundaries of today’s maps. He argues the classic cartographic world will be replaced with a jagged glass pattern of entity states, nebulous and anarchic regionalisms that no longer recognize traditional cartographic boundaries.

states as we are by failed ones. In dismissing the deterrent strategy, the Bush Administration outlined preemption as the way to national security:

“It has taken almost a decade for us to comprehend the true nature of this new threat. Given the goals of rogue states and terrorists, the United States can no longer solely rely on a reactive posture as we have in the past. The ability to deter a potential attacker, the immediacy of today’s threats, and the magnitude of potential harm that could be caused by our adversaries’ choice of weapons do not permit that option. We cannot let our enemies strike first…to forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the U.S. will if necessary act preemptively.”

As both the operating environment and security strategy has changed, the military now faces the task of determining how to meet these requirements. Although many of the requirements may be met through organizational and technological change, others will only be met through changes to doctrine and training as alluded to by the NSS. As the Cold War provided the operating environment that led to an appropriate operational and training doctrine, so too is today’s operating environment significantly shaping the military establishment’s way ahead.

In June 2001 the Army published FM 3.0 Operations, marking an end to the Air Land Battle doctrine that had served the U.S. Army during the Cold War years. The salient points of the new operational doctrine includes the concept of full spectrum operations (the complete range of operations from peace keeping to total war), a

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26 Several parts of the National Security Strategy have significant implications for the Department of Defense: (18): “Before Afghanistan, that area was low on the list of major planning contingencies, yet in a very short time we had to operate across the length and breadth of that remote nation, using every branch of the armed forces. We must prepare for more such deployment by developing assets such as advanced remote sensing, long-range precision strike capabilities and transformed maneuver and expeditionary forces.” (19): “While maintaining near term readiness and the ability to fight the war on terrorism, the goal must be to provide the
battlefield framework that emphasizes decisive operations and a new element of combat power—information. Since the publishing of FM 3.0, the Army has continually refined it’s operational concepts to meet the evolving requirements of the operating environment. The latest white paper, *The Way Ahead, Our Army at War Relevant and Ready* describes the future environment as an even more unpredictable and complex environment than the Army currently understands; it emphasizes concepts for more expeditionary, flexible, agile, versatile forces survivable and sustainable across the entire spectrum of military conflict.  

Where the operational doctrine suggests a return to the train, alert, deploy model, the white papers direct it. In many ways the Army has come full circle in its approach to train, alert, deploy. During the Cold War era, forward deployed forces in Germany were served well by the train, alert, deploy model. Subsequently, the smaller scale contingency (SSC) dominated 1990s forced the Army into a alert, train, deploy model. And yet today the suggestion of current and future operational doctrine clearly communicates that U.S. forces must be prepared for full spectrum operations all the time, anywhere in the world. This is a full circle return to the train, alert, deploy model with one subtle, yet significant, difference: there is no longer a clear threat. The Army’s challenges therefore are several: how does the Army execute a train, alert, and deploy strategy against an ambiguous, ill-defined threat any where in the world at a moments

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notice? And how does the Army train its soldiers, leaders and units to meet this
demanding requirement? These questions and others like it will be explored in the next
chapter, The Training Environment.
CHAPTER 3

THE TRAINING ENVIRONMENT

With Chapter Two’s exploration of the strategic operating environment and appropriate national security strategy, it is apparent that the Army’s charter is to decipher from these changes the relevant implications for the military establishment. In that vein, Chapter Three will explore the training environment and its evolution over the last decade in an effort to identify those relevant implications. First, the chapter will define what Battle Focus and the METL methodology is and what challenges U.S. Army forces face in today’s uncertain, complex operating environment. Secondly, it will discuss division and above and brigade and below roles in Army training; further exploring the gaps between training doctrine and training practice. Lastly, the chapter will explore the idea of operational training and suggest implications for the future.

Battle Focus and METL Methodology

The Army’s Cold War training methodology was designed to train the Army to deter war, and if deterrence failed, terminate war on terms favorable to U.S. and allied interests. The Army’s Battle Focused system of training was based on two revolutionary requirements. First, the requirement for units and soldiers to train as they were expected to fight, achieving proficiency for specific missions through mastery of

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individual and collective tasks, and secondly, the requirement to perform to a standard versus training to a specific amount of time. From these two requirements, nine principles were established: train as a combined arms and service teams, train as you fight, use appropriate doctrine, use performance oriented training, train to challenge, train to sustain proficiency, train using multi-echelon techniques, train to maintain, and make commanders’ the primary trainers. Today’s Army is the product of those revolutionary requirements and nine principles.

Army training doctrine defines battle focus as a concept that derives peacetime training requirements from wartime missions. More importantly, battle focus guides the planning, execution and assessment of each organization’s training program to ensure members train as they fight. Additionally, commanders’ use battle focus to allocate resources for training. Resources are allocated based on wartime mission requirements.

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29 By FY 1989 most aspects of Army training had been re-cut from the pre-1970 mold. The Army Training and Evaluation Program (ARTEP) replaced the mobilization-based Army Training Program (ATP). The ARTEP required squads through battalions to perform to a standard, not simply train for a specified period of time. It required units to train, as they would fight, achieving proficiency for specific missions through the mastery of individual and unit tasks. The development of National Training Centers was the apex of the Army’s training strategy. Vincent H. Demma, Department of the Army Historical Summary (Washington, DC, 1989), 1.

30 The 2002 FM 7.0 Train the Force changed the original nine principles to ten: The most disturbing change to these principles includes: replacing Train as you Fight with Train for Combat Proficiency. In the author’s opinion, other additions and/or deletions to the principles, have significantly altered the original intent and spirit of the doctrines underpinnings. This effect is consistent throughout the manual. For example, the definition of “Battle Focus” was changed from “the concept used to derive peacetime training requirements from wartime missions” to omitting the words “wartime mission” and replacing it with “assigned and anticipated missions.” This very vanilla approach to training is not surprising and is probably representative of not only the doctrine writer’s confusion, but also the Army’s inability to solve today’s training dilemma.


32 During FY 1989 General Vouno stated that the Army would adhere to its training philosophy, which emphasized the attainment of standards rather than simply putting in time. A major step in institutionalizing this approach was General Vouno’s approval on 15 November of 1988 of FM 25-100 Train the Force, a manual that espoused the training doctrine that prepared soldiers for Air Land battle.
Finally, the battle focus concept provides the linkage between the collective mission essential tasks, or the mission essential task list, the leader tasks, and the soldier tasks which support them.  

Recalling Chapter Two, the METL methodology’s premise is built on the recognition that a unit cannot attain proficiency to standard on every task whether due to time or other resource constraint. However, commanders can achieve a successful unit training program by consciously narrowing the focus to a reduced number of vital tasks that are essential to mission accomplishment. The METL combines the essential tasks selected by the commander from war plans and external directives. War plans are derived as the units wartime operations or contingency plans. Subsequently, external directives are defined as additional sources of training tasks that relate to the units’ wartime mission.

After a decade of struggling to apply a Cold War training model to a post Cold War world, the Army published its revised training doctrine, FM 7.0 Train The Force in 2002. The manual’s major contributions were first an update to the Army Training and Education System; second, an assertion that the doctrine is applicable at all echelons of command; third, an emphasis on joint/multinational and interagency training; fourth, a discussion of Stability and Support Operations Training; fifth, a re-emphasis on the train-alert-deploy sequence and last, the integration of the Live-Virtual-Constructive

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34 Karl W. Eikenberry, 2.
35 George L. Fredrick, 20.
36 The manual makes a cursory one page mention of joint, interagency and multinational training. It offers no solutions or considerations to assist commanders in operating in this environment.
training and lastly codifying the training execution model. In addition to not being accompanied by the FM 25-101 “How to” version, the manual offers no major training solutions to commanders beyond the 1988 cold war doctrine. In essence, the manual applies an old paradigm to a changed world with less clarity. Its contribution is a blurring of the concepts of battle focus and METL to the point of providing little training value to commanders. In fact, its ambiguity makes battle focus and METL development harder and more illusive.37

Understandably, this latest doctrine is the result of a training debate that has been ongoing for years as evidenced a decade of professional dialogue and studies concerning the balance between wartime METL readiness and the realities of contingency operations. One such study published in 1998 by LTC Michael Jones, LTC Mark E. O’Neill and LTC Curtis M. Scaparrotti entitled *Training America’s Army for the Next Millennium* captured the essence of the Army’s training difficulties. The study explored the extent to which the environment had changed since the doctrine was written and determined the aspects of training that were still valid and which elements may be required and desirable. The study asserted that the publishing of the capstone training doctrine represented a revolution in the way America trains and thinks about warfare.38 The authors acknowledged that on top of serving the Army well for over ten years, the doctrine, in large part, remained valid; however, they suggest that some change and improvement was required to carry the first training revolution to the next level.39

37 Fm 7.0 introduced two new inputs to METL Development (enduring combat capabilities and operational environment). This changed the traditional three to now five inputs.
38 Explanatory note. Capstone = Fm25-100 and 101.
Secondly, the Jones study made the case that the Army is in the midst of the second training revolution, citing the information age and technology’s effect on organizations, leaders, soldiers, doctrine, and training. The complexity of today’s strategic environment and its effect on training for ambiguity will revolutionize Army Training a second time. Although it is not known where this second training revolution will take us, the Army has recognized the need to rapidly adapt to the full spectrum of operations without compromising the mission to prosecute conventional war.  

**Training Challenges of Today’s Environment**

The Jones study’s assessment of the strategic environment 6 years ago is more accurate today than it was then. As chapter 2 outlined, the last decade has been one of great change, posing more and more challenges to how and what the Army trains. The highly complex nature of conflict today combined with the mandate to be “everything for everyone, anywhere in the world - all the time” will yield yet a third challenge for Army forces - increased operations tempo (OPTEMPO) in a variety of lethal and complex environments around the world.

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41 A study of the Army’s newest White Paper- *The Way ahead, Relevant and Ready, our Army at war*, 2003 outlines the Army Chief of Staff’s vision for our Army. The general nature of the paper is consistent with the author’s comment of “be everything for everyone, anywhere in the world- all the time” through several excepts:(3) To succeed, the Joint Force must adopt a joint and expeditionary mindset, reflecting greater versatility and deployability, while ensuring the necessary capabilities to conduct both sustained combat and potentially simultaneous operations to reestablish stability. (6): Adapting our forces to meet the challenges of the GWOT will require a capabilities based modular, flexible and rapidly employable Joint – Army team, capable of dominating any adversary and controlling any situation across the full range of military operations (14): As the Army repositions and reconfigures it’s forces, we will expand the Joint Force commander’s ability to rapidly deploy, employ and sustain Forces throughout the Global battle space in any environment and against any opponent.
Complexity, often embodied in concepts like the Marine Corps “three block war” is beyond the scope of this paper, yet central to the heart of its premise. The last decade has shown that armed conflict has assumed bewildering expressions, creating for planners and commanders very complex problem sets. The era of conventional warfare between nation states has been supplanted by a mixture of sub-state and interstate warfare based on age-old politics of identity, extremism, and particularism. 42 The nature of this environment and the conflicts that it creates will forever challenge traditional methods of thinking.

**Division and above Roles and Responsibilities**

As discussed earlier, the Army’s latest training doctrine offers no major training epiphanies beyond the spirit of the 1988 version of FM 25-100. Building on 25-100’s assertion that commanders are the primary trainers responsible for their unit’s performance, assessment and resource allocation, FM 7.0 *Train the Force* embraces the Top Down, Bottom Up approach to training as a team, and addresses the roles of MACOMs, Corps, and Divisions as having the unique responsibility for managing and supporting training for subordinates. 43 Contrary to embracing complexity and innovative training approaches espoused by the Army’s current white papers, FM 7.0 states that these organizations most important contribution to training is to establish stability in the training environment by maintaining focus on war fighting tasks, identifying and providing resources, protecting planned training, and providing feedback that produces

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42 Michael Evans, 9.
43 The top down bottom up approach to training is a team effort in which senior leaders provide training focus, direction and resources, and junior leaders provide feedback on unit training proficiency, identify specific unit training needs and execute training to standard in accordance with the approved plan. Department of the Army, *FM 7.0 Training the Force* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2002), 1-12.
good training and develops good trainers and leaders.\textsuperscript{44} In reality however, the training environment of the last decade has handicapped these organizations ability to achieve this mandate.\textsuperscript{45} Instead, today’s divisions and corps find themselves reacting to the requirements of increased operational tempo and mission complexity. As this reality increasingly widens the gap between training doctrine and training practice, it calls into question these organizations contribution to training. As LTC Jones pointed out in his study, the division’s contribution to training through the quarterly training brief (QTB) is misplaced by a disjointed training vs. resource cycle. This question coupled with the realities of increasing operational level concerns at division level suggests that perhaps the role of divisions and corps in training is evolving. It is possible that the responsibilities of the division headquarters have become so vast that it is time to acknowledge a separation of labor in the training environment.

The monographs assertion that the Army’s latest training doctrine provides no real value to today’s training environment and that the doctrine is an application of an old paradigm begs the question of what is a potentially new paradigm? If we acknowledge the operational level performance of division headquarters and their staffs, we must also acknowledge that this reality will impact the military in at least three ways. The first impact will be the training implications for tactical units, and how they remain at high levels of readiness, capable of performing tasks across the entire spectrum within a train, alert and deploy model.\textsuperscript{46} Secondly, the training implications for division commanders

\textsuperscript{44} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{45} (Emphasis added) By simply restating old doctrinal requirements in new doctrine provides little help to the field.

\textsuperscript{46} The MTW concept vs. Global engagement debate has been ongoing for years. Even though the wartime mission remains paramount in the training doctrine, the realities of SASO and SSC dominated the training environment of the 1990s.
and their battle staffs as they struggle with less conventional and more complex, joint, interagency, and multinational operations. For example, consistent operational level assignments suggest a campaign plan and operational art approach to assigned problem sets. However, the current division headquarters construct is not organized for the operational level of war and requires considerable augmentation and expertise to conduct it. A third implication closely related to the second, suggests that retention of tactically focused division METLs may be costing us certain cognitive competencies at the division level.\(^{47}\) In other words, do current operational trends suggest the need for divisions that are focused on the execution of tactical tasks or does it suggest a need for divisions that are proficient in forming, employing, sustaining, command and controlling multiple and simultaneous joint, interagency and multinational (JIM) operations across an extended battle space?\(^{48}\) Given this increased role of the division headquarters, the once clear line between tactical and operational level units has at least blurred and may have shifted

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\(^{47}\) McNaughton, Johnson and Sollinger provide a excellent analysis for today’s requirements for flexibility and agility. The study focuses on the operational experiences of the 10\(^{th}\) Mountain division in 1992 and 1993 and its non-traditional roles as ARFOR and JTF. The paper explores the challenges faced by a division headquarters when it is required to expand to meet operational level requirements. The study documented four patterns: 1) Span of control challenges, taxing the division’s expertise and communications. 2) The enlargement of the AO from a traditional 30 Km frontage to over 100km frontage, stretching a divisions LOS communications equipment. 3) The challenges of a division commander and his staff’s requirement to carry out a range of unfamiliar tasks normally associated with an operational level Headquarters 4) Sizable political –military challenges.

\(^{48}\) Authors observation: divisions METLs have over the last decade gradually evolved toward a more generalized set of requirements ( not even tasks) that provide the unit maximum latitude in training focus as global conditions changed around them. In other words, today’s division METLs are merely a cold war left over requirement that provides the division little training focus. Instead of the METL providing it’s intended focus, its irrelevance has been subjugated to “checking the block” with extremely broad and vanilla requirements that prevent it (the METL ) from becoming an obstacle to a conditions and requirements driven training focus. See Chapter four for supporting evidence to this claim.
entirely. This reality may also suggest that the tactical METL and training management, as we know it belongs within the realm of brigade and battalion commanders, freeing division commanders to focus on the operational level of war.

Brigade and Below Training

*The key to fighting and winning is an understanding of “how we train to fight” at every echelon. Training programs must result in demonstrated tactical and technical competence, confidence, and initiative in our soldiers and their leaders. Training will remain the Army’s top priority because it is the cornerstone of combat readiness.*

*General Carl E Vouno.*

Given the military instrument’s mandate to fight and win the nations wars, the Army’s ability to execute at the highest spectrum of conflict will remain the top priority in Army training programs. Over the last decade the Army’s two major theater of war (MTW) training methodology has clashed with the smaller scale contingency realities and has in large part survived. Professional consensus coupled with the enormous tactical successes Army formations have enjoyed over the last 10 years lends credence to the methodology’s soundness at least at the tactical level. Although challenging, the METL methodology for the tactical level continues to enable commanders to train units for success on complex battlefields.

As discussed earlier in the chapter however, there continues to be challenges in the training environment beyond those imposed by the operating environment. For example, the Jones study, outlined four gaps between current training doctrine and training practice and suggest solutions. First, the authors explained that the training guidance cycle is out of synch and does not account for corps and MACOM. Secondly,
the training cycle is out of synch with other systems of training like ammunition, land and other resources. Third, that the Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution System (PPBS) defense planning system and budgets drives training, which is wrong. Fourth, combat training centers (CTC) rotation cycles are often impractical given real mission requirements of unit on the long-range schedule and last, training doctrine does not account for the eight step training model, which is widely accepted in today’s divisions.

Although FM 7.0 addresses many of the shortcomings presented by the Jones study, today’s brigades and battalions continue to experience problems in the resourcing and plan approval cycle of training management. Like training doctrine before it, FM 7.0 states that the purpose of the QTB is for the senior commander to review and approve training plans of subordinate units. Furthermore, it forms a contract between the senior commander and the subordinate commander. As a result the senior commander agrees to provide resources, including time and protect the subordinate unit from unprogrammed taskings. In reality, the resource allocation cycle discussed in LTC Jones’ article drives the training management cycle not the QTB. Given this reality, the QTB becomes eyewash instead of real training management business, ironically, often becoming a training distractor itself. Beyond the disconnect between resource allocation and plan approval cycles, this monograph asserts that the training management cycle continues to remain turbulent due to the doctrinal requirement for subordinate units METL to align and support its higher headquarters, a headquarters that is more often engaged an operational problem sets that tactical ones.

In summary, operational trends suggest that tactical training and training management is best handled at the brigade and battalion level, while divisions set

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49 FM 7.0 Training the Force, 4-28.
conditions for tactical training success primarily through resourcing and establishing
priorities based on mission requirements.

**Operational Training**

Notwithstanding the challenges divisions face in shaping the training
environment for brigades and battalions, their more complex challenge is how to be
successful as the lead headquarters in the next conflict or contingency mission. History
has shown that platoons, companies, and battalions trained in core battle drills and
mission essential tasks have successfully adapted and succeeded in smaller scale
contingencies. If this is the case, it seems valid that the same core tasks or competency
approach would work for the division headquarters. In fact, a recent RAND study has
observed that division METLs are being modified to include tasks more related to a JTF
headquarters, but notes that staffs will have to grow larger to accommodate new
capabilities and skill sets. 50 As operational training is largely conceptual and intellectual
by nature, it occurs at the Battle Command Training Program (BCTP) level if at all.
However, the challenges Army divisions face today are beyond the current training
doctrine. In other words the training doctrine has yet to catch up with the realities of the
operating environment as evidenced by the operational experiences of the 10th Mountain
Division (L) over the last ten years.

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50 McNaughter, Johnson and Sollinger, 5.
CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

Criteria

This monograph seeks to prove the thesis by applying criteria extracted from the Army’s most recent white papers: *Relevant and Ready: Our Army at War*, 2003 and its precursor, *Concepts for the Objective Force*, 2002 to two 10th Mountain Division case studies. Although the future force is not within the scope of this paper, its operational concepts and characteristics for the Army’s future force are. These characteristics provide a measure of merit for this monograph’s case studies and the direction the U.S. Army wants its future force to move. The future force concepts described in these papers generally describe a force that is more strategically responsive or expeditionary and provides the nation with an array of highly deployable, more agile, versatile, lethal, survivable, and sustainable formations. 51 In an effort to focus on the conceptual and cognitive competencies the Army desires in its division headquarters, those characteristics generally associated with a materiel solution set are avoided. Those include deployability, survivability and sustainability. Selected criteria are agility, versatility and lethality. 52 These characteristics were selected due to their conceptual and

51 Both white papers generally describe the same desirable characteristics of the Army’s future forces. As the Objective Force White Paper listed the characteristics as a framework, the most recent white paper, *Relevant and Ready, our Army at War* embeds these characteristics throughout an expeditionary mindset and joint framework. What is important to note however, is that these force characteristics: more deployable, agile, versatile, lethal, survivable and sustainable are common ideas to both papers.

52 Although the Army’s 2003 White Paper- *Relevant and Ready* technically supercedes the 2002 White Paper, *The Objective Force*, both papers retain the same desirable characteristics for our future force as well as their definitions. Interestingly these same characteristics are described by FM 3.0 *Operations* as part of the Tenets of Army operations. In all three cases the definitions are remarkably similar. Given agreement
cognitive connotations as well as the emphasis that these characteristics are given in the Latest Army white paper, “The Way Ahead, Our Army at War, Relevant and Ready”:

We will develop in our leaders, soldiers and department of the Army (DA) Civilians, an unprecedented level of adaptability. We must have balance in our forces, with the ability to operate decisively in any environment against an unpredictable threat that will make every attempt to avoid our strengths. Similarly, we will reexamine our doctrine, processes, education, training methodology and systems to develop and institutionalize a Joint and expeditionary mind set.

Agility

Army forces must process the mental and physical agility to transition among the various types of operations, just as we have demonstrated the tactical war fighting agility to task organize on the move. Agile forces will be required to transition from stability or support operations to war fighting and back again. Agility is tied to initiative and speed. Agile formations make those transitions quickly because they are more mobile and able to adapt faster than the enemy, thereby denying him initiative. As the Army crafts a more rapidly deployable force structure, it must continue to grow leaders who are highly adaptive and on these characteristics by three separate sources, each source is considered equally valid and authoritative sources for desired characteristics of our future forces.

53 In addressing the considerations for the Objective force, the white paper emphasis transition, and the mastering of transition as the key to victory stating that the complex nature of war fighting will require commanders to master transitions. Transitions- going from offense to defense and back again, projecting power through airheads and beach heads, transitioning from peacekeeping to war fighting and back again- sap operational momentum. Mastering transitions is the key to winning decisively. Forces that can do so provide strategic flexibility to the National Command Authorities, who need as many options as possible in a crisis. The Army, with the versatility and agility of its formations, has historically provided those options and the Objective Force will continue to do so in the operational environment of tomorrow. Eric Shinseki, United States Army WHITE PAPER: Concepts for the Objective Force  (Washington, D.C. October 2002), 4.
mentally agile. Future force leaders will be schooled in operational art and science and must be masters at troop leading in dynamic operational environments -- the intellectual component of a more agile force.

**Versatility**

Versatility describes the inherent capacity of future force formations to dominate at any point of the spectrum of military operations. The Army will move toward organic task-organized units that incorporate combined arms capabilities at the lowest tactical level, maximizing versatility, agility and improving the capabilities for the close fight. These formations will be capable of adapting to changes of mission-mastering transitions--with minimal adjustment. The future force will be designed for full spectrum success while optimized for major theater of war. The force design means that formations will possess the inherent versatility to operate effectively anywhere on the spectrum of military operations without substantial augmentation to perform diverse missions with in a single campaign. The future force will use a train-alert-deploy model vice the alert, train deploy method of today’s specialized formations that must tailor force packages after alert. The versatility of future force elements will significantly reduce, but not eliminate, the need for commanders to alter the mix or to introduce new forces for post-conflict stability operations. Future force soldiers and leaders will need to perceive post-conflict operations as combat ready tasks, equally important to the missions

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54 Emphasis added.
56 Summarized from Shinseki, 11.
57 Shinseki, 12.
accomplished during combat operation. Seamless transition from combat to stability operations underscores the need for agility in the future force.  

Lethality

The lethality of the future force will exceed that of today’s conventional heavy forces. A great majority of the lethal characteristics are provided through technological improvements in weaponry and munitions. Future forces will have the capability to destroy enemy formations at long ranges, with smaller calibers, greater precision and devastating target effects through organic, line of sight (LOS), beyond LOS and non LOS fires. However, there is a conceptual, organizational, and interoperability component of lethality as well. Future forces will be optimized for decentralized non-contiguous operations. They will be employed in simultaneous operations distributed across the Joint Area of Operations (JOA). In contrast to the phased attrition based operations of the past, this approach is focused on disrupting the integrity of the enemy’s battle plan by exposing the entire enemy force to air/ground attack rather than rolling up his forces sequentially.

Criteria Summary

These criteria are and will be paramount to the success of future formations. The ability to rapidly adapt to any threat or environment will require intellectually agile leaders and soldiers equipped and trained to rapidly apply lethal and non-lethal effects anywhere in the world across any point on the conflict spectrum. Through their agility,

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58 Ibid., 12.
59 Schoomaker, 13.
60 Ibid., 13.
61 Ibid., 13.
versatility, and enabling technologies, these formations will achieve unprecedented levels of lethality. To achieve these characteristics will require mastering both the operational and tactical levels of war. This monograph asserts that the operational level of war has broadened to include division formations. The Army must prepare to meet those requirements by adopting a more operational or core competency based approach to division level operations versus today’s tactical METL based approach. Division commanders and their battle staffs must be more skilled in their application and employment of tactical formations, able to achieve the agility, versatility and lethality required of tomorrows formations. See figure 1 for Criteria summary.

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<tr>
<th>Criteria Summary</th>
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<tr>
<td>Agility</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Mental agility to Master Transition (Cognitive)</td>
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<td>• Highly adaptive, mentally agile leaders</td>
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<td>• Leaders schooled in operational art</td>
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<td>Versatility</td>
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<td>• Physical ability to master transition- minimal adjustment to force design for post conflict</td>
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<td>• Use the train, alert, deploy model</td>
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<td>• Post Conflict operations are combat ready tasks</td>
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<td>Lethality</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Across the elements of Combat power</td>
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<td>• Interoperable. Ability to integrate JIM elements of combat power</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Simultaneous operations across the entire JOA</td>
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Fig. 1. Criteria Summary
Case Studies

10\textsuperscript{th} MD (L) as JTF 190, Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY, 1994

On Sept 30\textsuperscript{th} 1991, a newly elected Haitian President, Jean Bertrand Aristide, was overthrown in a coup d’etat led by LTG Raoul Cedras.\textsuperscript{62} The coup was followed by widespread condemnation by the UN Security Council, and immediate diplomatic measures were taken to restore the elected leader. Diplomatic efforts by the UN over the next three years included embargoes, sanctions, diplomatic envoys and a host of resolutions aimed at restoring the elected government in Haiti. The government under Cedras was repressive and violations of basic civil rights began to take their toll on the people of Haiti. By June 1994 the rape and murder of family members of political activists was increasing. The economy continued to spiral downwards and the efforts of humanitarian agencies in Haiti were having very little success. Haiti was in the midst of civil disorder and was the poorest country in the Americas.\textsuperscript{63} As a result of these and other growing concerns, U.S. President Bill Clinton announced that diplomatic efforts had failed. The Clinton Administration gathered the support of twenty other countries and announced that military actions would follow to reinstate the legitimate government of Haiti.\textsuperscript{64}

Two operations plans (OPLAN) were developed for contingency operations in Haiti, OPLAN 2370 and OPLAN 2380. OPLAN 2370 was a forced entry plan by JTF 180 using airborne and amphibious forces in a non-permissive environment. XVIII


\textsuperscript{63} Janes Keeping democracy on schedule in Haití, Jane’s defense weekly, Vol. 25, No. 24, June 1996), 35.
Airborne Corps served as the nucleus of JTF 180. OPLAN 2380 was entry by JTF 190 using light infantry in permissive conditions. The two plans had different missions - an invasion versus operations other that war (OOTW).\textsuperscript{65} The 10\textsuperscript{th} Mountain Division (Light Infantry) was the nucleus of the Multinational Force Haiti (MNF Haiti)/JTF 190 in Haiti during Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY. MNF Haiti was the U.S. led coalition force in Haiti and included contributors from 20 different countries.\textsuperscript{66} UPHOLD DEMOCRACY was not only joint and combined; it was also an interagency operation. MNF Haiti included Army, Air Force, and Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard members as well as department of defense (DOD) civilians. It also included military units and civilian police from numerous other countries. On top of this complexity, MNF Haiti operations were much more than just military. The nature of OOTW in Haiti required daily interaction with other governmental agencies ranging from the U.S. Embassy to the Department of Justice, with United Nations representatives, and with nongovernmental organizations and private voluntary organizations. Coordinating the efforts of these organizations was an immense task.\textsuperscript{67}

The Planning and Preparation for Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY began on 25 July 1994 with notification from XVII Airborne Corps to begin planning for operations in Haiti. The draft 10th Mountain Division OPLAN 2380 was published and distributed on 10 August 1994. The final OPLAN was approved on 01 Sept 1994 and the

\textsuperscript{64} Blue Helmets, 623 in Gregory D. Reilly, 29.
\textsuperscript{65} Unclassified except from 10\textsuperscript{th} Mountain Division (L) SECRET After Action Report on Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (Center for Army Lessons Learned, Ft Leavenworth, KS. 2002), Exec Summary.
\textsuperscript{66} Ibid., 5
\textsuperscript{67} Ibid., 5
division was alerted for deployment on 09 September 1994. Major General (MG) Steele, JTF 190 commander, in a documentary interview made several points concerning the operations planning and preparation process. First, upon notification the division would become JTF 190, the primary consideration was time; plan fast was the guidance. Second, the new JTF had to integrate into existing plans that had been in the works since 1993. The division was behind in planning, on a short time line, and also had to execute a Haiti specific train-up. Third, training was assessment based, and training programs are mission based; but once the mission becomes specific, a unit must change in mid-stream. Given this reality, the 10th MD (L) threw out the August training plan and replaced it with specific training for Haiti. Finally, the division did not realize the magnitude of the task once it arrived in Haiti, nor did it realize the magnitude of standing up a JTF.

Although the division did not change its METL following mission assumption, figure two offers a comparison of an inferred pre-assumption METL against the Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY mission statement. This comparison illustrates at a minimum the disparity between what the unit had trained for and what the unit was tasked to perform.

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68 Ibid.
69 William M. Steele, Baumann Collection for Invasion, Intervention and Intervasion, Combined Arms Research Library, Ft Leavenworth, KS, Audio Tape NHAITI102.AC040 (U)
70 Refer to Appendix 2 for analysis used to deduce a possible pre assumption METL for that time frame.
As part of the after action review, the division submitted recognized areas of special consideration given the challenges the division faced in transitioning to a JTF:

Forming a JTF Headquarters from a division was a particularly unique aspect of this operation. It is possible to successfully make a division a JTF Headquarters but significant expansion is needed. In size the division staff of 300 expanded to a JTF staff of 800 very quickly. Many of the augmenters were from services other than Army. Or were experts in areas normally above division level. Also, the normal division staff is relatively junior and inexperienced in conducting JTF level operations.

In addition to general observations, the AAR examined all aspects of the operation, of note are several specific observations. First, the division intelligence architecture is organized to support the tactical intelligence requirements of the division commander and the major subordinate commands. The intelligence mission in Haiti
added the operational level intelligence requirements for an entire theater. Having to focus on both the tactical and operational levels of command for intelligence support required the formation of an extremely robust intelligence support organization. Second, there was no blue print for how to transform the 10th Mountain Division into a JTF Staff. Through significant coordination and effective mission analysis as well as input from BCTP Operations Group D, critical augmentation requirements were identified. The JTF 190 staff could not have been formed without tremendous contributions made by joint augmentees. Third, even with augmentation provided through Forces Command FORSCOM, the JTF staff was new to the operational level of war, multinational force considerations and inter-service coordination. Fourth, a key decision by the commander was the establishment of a third maneuver brigade with coalition troops. By delegating operations in Port-au-Prince, Haiti’s capitol city, the JTF commander was able to spend more time at the operational and strategic level. And lastly, by training on the METL at the battalion and brigade level, the division was trained and ready for the employment of infantry in combat operations, as well as OOTW. Even though many missions were non-standard, infantry doctrine still provided the appropriate foundation for the tasks and individual skills required to perform peace operations.

Analysis

Agility

The 10th MD (L) arguably overcame the difficulties of becoming a JTF as the operation is seen as a model for JIM operations. However, it is noteworthy that these challenges were overcome only through significant discomfort and tremendous support

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71 10th MD (L) CLASSIFIED OEF AAR, 23.
from external agencies.\textsuperscript{72} This level of required support and associated difficulty is not considered consistent with agility. In addition to significant external support, the division admittedly had not prepared for the operational level of war\textsuperscript{73}. Although a successful operation the Army should strive for higher levels of agility and achievement of it with significantly less difficulty than that experienced by the 10\textsuperscript{th} Mountain Division in Haiti.

**Versatility**

The division’s experience in Somalia\textsuperscript{74}, coupled with the commanders’ stringent force protection policy and resistance to engage the Haitian street hampered the units ability to dominate all points of the spectrum of conflict.\textsuperscript{75} The division clearly used an alert-train-deploy model vice a train, alert deploy model as evidenced by scrapping the last quarter’s planned training in favor of Haiti specific training.\textsuperscript{76} It is of positive note however that the division credits METL proficiency at the company through brigade level for a successful transition into Haiti specific tasks. The last aspect of versatility is that post conflict operations are combat ready tasks. In other words the unit is equally adept at both. Although probably attributed to the divisions experience in Somalia in 1993, the division’s transition to peace operations in Haiti was cumbersome.\textsuperscript{77}

\textsuperscript{72} Ibid., Executive Summary
\textsuperscript{73} Ibid., Executive Summary
\textsuperscript{74} In 1993, the 10\textsuperscript{th} MD (L) for the first time in division history assumed the role of ARFOR for operation RESTORE DEMOCRACY. During this operation 18 U.S. Serviceman were killed in action, causing an outcry in U.S. domestic opinion, which eventually led to U.S. withdrawal from Somalia.
\textsuperscript{76} The practice of alert train deploy had become standard practice for the Army by the end of the peacekeeping decade. Units trained on their war time METL until they were in the rotation window for a contingency rotation, once reaching that window, training focus was refocused on the required SOSO tasks.
\textsuperscript{77} Kretchik, Baumann and Fishel, 100.
Lethality

The applicable aspects of lethality for this operation are certainly interoperability and integration of joint, interagency and multinational (JIM) elements of combat power and the ability to operate simultaneously across the entire JOA. Similar to the agility criteria conclusions, the division had significant challenges integrating operational level assets into the division’s architecture, which degraded the unit’s ability to leverage information. Similarly the division’s ability to operate across an extended JOA was limited due to the division’s tactical communications infrastructure.

10th MD (L) as C/JTF MTN, Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, 2001

As this monograph is being written, Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) is ongoing and much of the operation remains classified. The following information comes from unclassified excerpts from the 10th MD (L) Operation ENDURING FREEDOM classified after action review (AAR), 2003. 78

On 15 Nov 02, U.S. Central Command (U.S.CENTCOM) designated its Army service component (ARCENT) to be the Combined/Joint Force Land Component Command (CJFLCC). Several days later, the ARCENT Headquarters deployed to Camp Doha, Kuwait to establish the CJFLCC Headquarters. This headquarters assumed command and control of all forces that were conducting combat operations in the Afghanistan Combined Joint Operations Area (C/JOA). On December 1st, XVIII Airborne Corps (18 ABC) ordered the 10th MD (L) to deploy its tactical command post (TAC) to Karshi-Khanabab, (K2) Uzbekistan. This TAC was designated as the

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78 10th MD (L) Operation Enduring Freedom Classified SECRET After Action Review. (Center for Army Lessons Learned, Ft Leavenworth, KS. 2003)
Combined/Joint Force Land Component Command forward headquarters (FWD HQ) (CFLCC (FWD)). Subsequently the division deployed to Bagram, Afghanistan and on 22 February 02 formally assumed responsibilities as Combined/Joint Task Force Mountain (C/JTF MTN). Notwithstanding the Army’s doctrinal assertion that division headquarters are not normally designated as JTFs, the 10th Mountain Division’s performance as a C/JTF was remarkable given the constraints and complexity it operated under at the time.

Planning details for the operation remain classified. However, at the time of notification the division was operating dispersed in three different theaters, with elements in Bosnia, Kosovo, the Sinai, Uzbekistan, Qatar, Kuwait as well as Homeland Security (HLS) missions in the continental United States (CONUS). Approximately 50% of the general and special staff was deployed as a multinational headquarters for operations in Kosovo. From a planning perspective it is unknown why the division was selected as the CJFLCC (FWD) and subsequent CJTF MTN while simultaneously operating as a multinational headquarters in Kosovo. However, such unpredictability serves to reinforce the author’s assertion that divisions increasingly find themselves prosecuting more and more complex operations at the operational level of war and the Army should take steps to prepare them for such responsibility.

For purposes of this monograph, three unclassified key observations were extracted from the classified AAR. First, as the CJFLCC Forward and subsequently as Combined/Joint Task Force Mountain (CJTF MTN), the headquarters was influenced by political, logistical and security constraints as well as the personalities of senior commanders. Initially alerted and deployed to operate as the forward headquarters for
CJFLCC and charged with the responsibility for controlling the Coalition Joint Operations Area Afghanistan, the headquarters coped with a very complex command and control scheme that doctrinally would be given normally to a larger, more capable operational level headquarters. Second, as C/JTF MTN, the division commander was responsible for coordinating the activities of special operations, conventional, interagency and indigenous forces within the Combined/ Joint Operations Area (C/JOA). To add to the difficulty of this task, no staff member had any previous joint experience or exposure to JTF operations. Third, illustrating the level of complexity for command and control, the division as CJFLCC had twenty-five different headquarters reporting to it and operating in the CJOA.

The 10th MD (L) admittedly was unprepared, ill equipped and untrained to conduct combined and joint operations and would have benefited from training as a JTF headquarters. The division’s after action review concluded with multiple training implications for the future. First, the division headquarters would have profited from training as a JTF headquarters. Secondly, the division headquarters would have benefited from Joint Forces Training and exercises. Third, specific areas of emphasis that need training were: Joint command and control, Joint logistics, Joint ROE, coalition, interagency and nongovernmental organizations and Joint Task Force operations in general.

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79 With the exception of the Commanding General, Chief of Staff and the G3, no staff member had any joint or JTF experience. 10th MD (L) Operation ENDURING FREEDOM Classified SECRET After Action Review, 2.
80 Ibid., Executive Summary
81 Ibid.
82 Ibid.
A contrast between the 10th MD (L) METL before OEF in 2002 against the 10th MD’s METL as of spring 2004 illustrates a gradual shift from specific tasks to general operations in the division METL (See figure 2 METL contrast). Several inferences can be made from this shift to general operations. First, the tactically oriented, essential tasks approach was no longer suitable to meet the operational requirements of the division. Secondly, the division’s experiences demonstrate a requirement to be prepared for a variety of more complex, full spectrum mission sets versus the narrow focus, essential task approach of old. And lastly, this trend suggests an effort for the division to think in terms of operations vice tasks- a clear move toward an operational art approach.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>10th MD (L) METL</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>FY 2002 METL – Beginning OEF</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conduct Tactical Deployment/redeployment Activities</td>
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<tr>
<td>Conduct a Movement to Contact/Search and Attack</td>
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<tr>
<td>Conduct an Attack</td>
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<tr>
<td>Conduct Area Defense</td>
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<tr>
<td>Perform CSS and Sustainment Operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>Exercise Command and Control</td>
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<tr>
<td>Protect the Force</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>FY 2004 METL – After OEF</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conduct Tactical Deployment/redeployment Activities</td>
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<tr>
<td>Conduct Offensive Operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>Conduct Defensive Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exercise Command and Control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perform CSS and Sustainment Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conduct Survivability Operations</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Fig. 3. 10th MD (L) Before and After OEF METL

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83 Author’s observation in discussions with former G3 Planners and Trainers.
Analysis

Agility

Similar to case study one, the division in large part overcame the difficulties of becoming a JTF, albeit with significant discomfort. In reality, the difficulty in transition and level of preparedness had not changed in eight years. The 10th MD was as unprepared, ill-equipped, and untrained to conduct combined and joint operations in 2002 as it was in 1994. Like 1994, the division again found itself ill-equipped cognitively to deal with the complexities of the operational level of war- with only the Commanding General and Chief of Staff having Joint experience.

Versatility

The division overcame significant challenges of manning and equipping as a JTF only through the persistence and application of nonstandard work arounds. Similar to case study one, this suggests a less than optimal level of proficiency in transitioning to an operational headquarters. This is an Army problem, not a unit problem. Considering the second subcomponent of the criteria, the unit did utilize a train-alert-deploy model although with significant challenges. There was significant post conflict transition. Combat operations continue as of this writing.

84 10th MD (L) Operation ENDURING FREEDOM Classified SECRET After Action Review, Executive Summary.
85 Personal interview with LTC(P) James Klingaman. Although the unit technically used a train alert deploy model, there was significant turbulence in the division. During this time the division was scattered in several places, including JRTC and Kosovo. The infantry battalion (1-87 IN) that was alerted and deployed to Afghanistan in December 01, was the battalion that had been used to fill critical shortages in personnel for the Bosnia and Kosovo battalions. The other battalion (4-31 IN) deployed following dispersed operations in the U.S, Kuwait and Qatar. See Appendix 1 10th MD (L) Disposition for details.
Lethality

The after action review reveals that the unit faced considerable challenges and required significant external resources to achieve interoperability with joint, interagency and multinational (JIM) elements. The unit was not equipped to command and control operations across the JOA with twenty five reporting subordinate headquarters. 86
CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Conclusions

Although these operations are separated in time by eight years, several common challenges are consistent with each operation. First, in both cases the division was not prepared, equipped or trained to operate as a JTF even though this division has done it three times in the last ten years. This indicates a problem with theory and doctrine, not with the unit. Secondly, in both cases the division staff and leadership were unprepared for the complexity of the operational level of war. Third, interoperability and the integration of joint, interagency, and multinational elements of combat power remained a significant challenge. Fourth, in both cases the division staff and leadership were engaged with tasks inconsistent with their division’s tactical METL, most often involving operational level requirements. The opposite, however, is true for the tactical units involved. Battalions and brigades credit their effectiveness to their readiness on battle drills and proficiency in their wartime METL. Such disparity between the brigade and the divisions experience and level of preparedness for operations suggests that the division’s METL is not preparing them for operations and should be changed accordingly. The examination of these two operations conducted by the 10th Mountain Division suggests

87 Although not presented as a case study, similar conclusions can be made by an examination of the 10th Mountain Division’s role as ARFOR in Operation RESTORE HOPE in 1993, which prompted the Army to include in FM 71-100 Divisions Operations, a section on operating as an ARFOR Headquarters.

88 Emphasis added, to point out that Army doctrine has at least been as consistent over the last decade that divisions do not operate as JTFs, as it has been inaccurate.
that, had the unit had been better prepared, equipped and-- most importantly-- trained to conduct operations at the operational level of war (JTF, etc) it would have been more agile, versatile and lethal. Moreover, if this conclusion can be drawn about the 10\textsuperscript{th} Mountain Division and its operations over the last decade, it is only reasonable to expect that other U.S. Army divisions may have been required to perform at similar levels as well. \footnote{Note: List other operations for reference a) 82\textsuperscript{nd} Airborne as JTF 180, 1994. b) 1\textsuperscript{st} Armored Division, MNF, IFOR 1995 c) 101\textsuperscript{st} Air Assault as JTF 180, 2001} Therefore it seems prudent that all U.S. Army divisions should consider adopting a more operational, competency based training approach toward division operations. This approach will better prepare not only the 10\textsuperscript{th} Mountain Division, but other U.S. Army divisions for the operating environment of today and tomorrow.

**Recommendations**

As the monograph’s conclusions suggest, the experiences of the 10\textsuperscript{th} Mountain Division are not unique and all divisions should pursue capabilities that enable mission planning and execution at the operational level of war. One measure toward that end would be the adoption of an operational, core competency approach to division operations versus today’s tactical METL methodology. Other recommendations are outlined below by appropriate DOTMLPF category.
**Doctrine**

First, rescind and rewrite FM 7.0 *Train the Force*. In its current form it is a field manual that tries to apply an old paradigm (battle focus) to an environment completely opposite of the one that existed during the methodologies origin. Following this rewrite, the Army should publish a FM 7.1 that truly helps commanders achieve train, alert, deploy and readiness across the full spectrum of operations. Second, the final draft of FM 3-91.1 *Division Operations* should not be published in camera ready copy (CRC) until it addresses the shortcomings this monograph has discussed. Specifically, the FM should endeavor to grasp the operational level of war beyond a list of the responsibilities of ARFOR headquarters. The manual should at a minimum outline in detail a division headquarters’ role as a JTF, CFLCC or ARFOR and provide a blue print for how divisions should expand to meet those responsibilities. As the FM stands today, it provides little value to division-level leadership. Third, the division manual should expand on its brief mention of joint, interagency and multinational operations. In its current form the manual provides neither clarity nor guidance for these operations. One suggested approach to solve this problem is a collaborative effort between Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate (CADD) and BCTP Operations Group D. The end product would better serve the Army.

**Training**

First, division headquarters should adopt an operational or core competency approach to training it’s headquarters. It should focus its collective energy on operational level tasks much like standing JTFs. Second; the highest headquarters for tactical training
management should be the brigade. The division’s role in training should be limited to resourcing and establishing priorities based on mission requirements. Third, battalion quarterly training briefs (QTB) to a division headquarters should be abolished. In their current form they are a training distractor and little more than eyewash.

**Leadership.**

First, the Army must find new ways to grow agile and flexible leaders for tomorrow’s force. Part of the solution toward a better understanding and application of the operational art should occur at Command and General Staff College (CGSC). Operational art and joint operations should be an area of emphasis versus an area of familiarization. Second, revamp the officer education and assignment system. The current system neither encourages nor rewards officers who return to the schoolhouse to teach the next generation. This is particularly true for CGSC. The Army should reward its most gifted and rising commanders for returning to the college to give back to the next generation.

**Recommended areas of further study**

Although this monograph has proved its thesis that the traditional, tactically oriented METL methodology is inadequate to meet the training and competency needs of today’s divisions, it only makes suggestions for potentially alternative methods. In other words, if we discard the METL for division and above, what do we use in its place? One answer to this question may lie in an ongoing professional debate within the Army concerning core competencies. Those skill sets the Army desires of its officer corps are outlined in FM 25-100 Leadership. As the debate goes, this same approach could be
applied to higher level headquarters as they struggle with more and more complex and various problems sets. The challenge we face is how do we train competencies? This area requires further study.

The final recommended area of study should explore the research question: Have division headquarters become obsolete? Given the Army’s move toward a more modular, expeditionary force structure, perhaps the division headquarters no longer has a role as the Army changes to a series of brigade-like units capable of deploying and being employed under the auspices of one of many standing JTF like headquarters scattered around the world.
### 10th MD Battalion Disposition

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<td>1-32 IN</td>
<td>MRE JRTC</td>
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<tr>
<td>2-22 IN</td>
<td>BOSNIA</td>
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<tr>
<td>1-87 IN</td>
<td>USMA/BLK LV</td>
<td>UZBEKISTAN</td>
<td>AFGHANISTAN</td>
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<td>MRE JRTC</td>
<td></td>
<td>KOSOVO</td>
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<tr>
<td>4-31 IN</td>
<td>HLS (Aberdeen) *</td>
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<tr>
<td>2-87 IN</td>
<td>SINAI</td>
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* Plus 1x CO Kuwait, 1x CO Qatar. Deploys to Afghanistan in MAR 02

**Source:** LTC (P) James Klingaman, Advanced Military Studies Program Instructor (SAMS). Interviewed by author, Ft Leavenworth, KS., 22 November 2003.
APPENDIX 2 Basis for inferred 10th MD (L) 1993 METL

Although research efforts did not yield the original 1993 pre-Haiti 10th MD (L) Division METL, sufficient doctrinal material as well as subordinate unit METLs from past combat training center (CTC) rotations were obtained to infer a probable Division METL.

1990 Light Infantry division Doctrine.

The light division operates as part of a corps or joint task force. It can be landed into secured operational areas or can gain entry from the sea. The light infantry division does not have the mechanized assets to move with the heavier heavy forces; rather it is more effectively employed in terrain favoring dismounted operations such as large urban areas, mountains or jungles.

First, the role of the light division......

+ Light divisions employ attack helicopters and fires support to defeat the enemy. They require additional artillery, engineer and armor forces, and mobility augmentation when operating against heavy enemy forces in open terrain.

Light divisions concentrate on shaping the battle field for enemy destruction by antitank forces.

Specific capabilities...

- Attacking light forces or seize terrain.
- Combat operations in contingency areas as part of larger forces.
- Reinforce forward deployed forces.
- Economy of force.
- MCUT operations.
- C2 Organic and augmentation forces.

Combined with subordinate battalion METLs from 1993.

1-87 IN

- Execute perimeter SOP.
- Maneuver.
- Passage of lines.
- Move tactically.
- Fight Meeting Engagement.
- Attack/counterattack by fire.
- Perform relief in place.
- Perform linkup.
- Perform raid.
- Infiltrate.
- Embasure.
- Perform sit assault.
- Maintain OMECA.
- Attack (Built up area).
- Defend (Built up area).
- Defend (Anti-armor).
- Sustain force.

Possible Division METL

For this time frame.

- Deploy the Force.
- Conduct MTC/Search and Attack.
- Attack.
- Area Defense.
- Perform CSS Operations.
- Conduct Command and Control.
- Protect the Force.

Example Light Missions...

- Movement to contact.
- Attack.
- Defend.
- Delay.
- Withdrawal.
- Raid.
- Passage of lines.

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