The Joint Expeditionary Culture Gap

A Monograph
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Accepted this 26th Day of May 2004
**ABSTRACT**

Transformation has all the Services reevaluating the way they think about warfare and more importantly, how they can best leverage technology, be strategically mobile and thus relevant to future operating environment. "Getting to the fight" quickly coupled with sustainability appears to be the "long pole in the tent" for most of the Department of Defense (DOD). The term "expeditionary" pervades most Service’s common vocabulary, yet it is discussed superficially not holistically. Categorized as merely a rapid deployability issue, little has been discussed of the cultural issues that are inherent in adoption of this expeditionary capability or mind-set. The significance of this topic becomes clear as Joint Vision (JV) 2020 mandates cultural assimilation. The document states, "To be the most effective force for 2020, we must be fully joint: intellectually, doctrinally, and technically interoperability is a mandate for the joint force of 2020 training, education, experience, exercises this will not only overcome the barriers of organizational culture and differing priorities, but will teach members of the joint team to appreciate the full range of Service capabilities to them." The implications of developing more expeditionary forces for our Nation go beyond getting to a hostile country quickly. The very nature of future warfare demands us to be prepared for conflict before a crisis occurs--across the full spectrum of conflict. The attributes of an expeditionary force need to be analyzed collectively, for there are many inexplicably linked visible components of this complex system. The most obvious are Service doctrine, equipment and the means for deploying. The focus of this monograph is on the not so visible component-the Service’s organizational culture. Looking at the historical evolution of the Services through numerous case studies presented evidence that there is a cultural divide that detracts from the US DOD’s combat effectiveness. This gap begins with whom we recruit into our institutions, how we indoctrinate them and is reflected in the doctrine that we create to govern the behavior of our personnel. The answer to the requirements for the future does not exist with superficial changes to equipment or shallow edicts, but rather a comprehensive evaluation in the way we view warfare and the manner in which we prepare for it.
Abstract

THE JOINT EXPEDITIONARY CULTURE GAP by Major James D. Davis, United States Marine Corps, 77 pages.

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# Table of Contents

TABLE OF CONTENTS ........................................................................................................ iii  
ILLUSTRATIONS ................................................................................................................... iv  
INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................. 1  
WHY DOES CULTURE MATTER? ...................................................................................... 3  
CHAPTER ONE ................................................................................................................... 6  
The COE, Joint, Culture, And Expeditionary ....................................................................... 6  
THE COE ............................................................................................................................. 6  
JOINT DEFINED ................................................................................................................ 9  
EXPEDITIONARY DEFINED ............................................................................................. 10  
CULTURE DEFINED .......................................................................................................... 12  
SO, WHAT IS AN EXPEDITIONARY CULTURE? ............................................................... 17  
DO ALL SERVICES NEED AN EXPEDITIONARY CULTURE? .......................................... 18  
CHAPTER TWO .................................................................................................................. 19  
Service Culture, History, Indoctrination and Doctrine ......................................................... 19  
CULTURAL HISTORY ....................................................................................................... 19  
USA .................................................................................................................................... 20  
USMC .................................................................................................................................. 23  
USN .................................................................................................................................... 27  
USAF .................................................................................................................................... 28  
RECRUITING ...................................................................................................................... 30  
INDOCTRINATION ............................................................................................................. 33  
DOCTRINE ........................................................................................................................... 38  
CHAPTER THREE .............................................................................................................. 45  
Conclusions From A Historical Perspective ........................................................................ 45  
JOINT OPERATIONS IN HISTORY .................................................................................. 45  
Vietnam 1965-72 ................................................................................................................ 45  
Kuwait 1991 ......................................................................................................................... 48  
Air Force vs. Army ............................................................................................................. 49  
Navy vs. Marine Corps ....................................................................................................... 49  
Army vs. Army .................................................................................................................... 50  
Army vs. Marine Corps ....................................................................................................... 50  
Kosovo 99-Present ............................................................................................................. 51  
Liberia 25 July to 8 October 2003 ..................................................................................... 54  
CHAPTER FOUR ................................................................................................................. 58  
Recommendations .............................................................................................................. 58  
JOINT SHARED VISION .................................................................................................... 58  
JTF REORGANIZATION ..................................................................................................... 59  
RECRUITING ...................................................................................................................... 63  
INDOCTRINATION ............................................................................................................. 63  
BIBLIOGRAPHY .................................................................................................................. 69
# ILLUSTRATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FIGURE</th>
<th>PAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. KEY CONCEPTS AND CAPABILITIES NESTING DIAGRAM</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. NOTIONAL JTF ORGANIZATION</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. JOINT FUNCTIONAL COMPONENT COMMANDS</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE</th>
<th>PAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. MEPS RESEARCH FINDINGS</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. BOOT CAMP COMPARISON MATRIX</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
INTRODUCTION

Our experience on September 11th, and indeed in the Afghan campaign, have served to reinforce the importance of moving the U.S. defense posture in these directions. Our challenge in the 21st century is to defend our cities and our infrastructure from new forms of attack while projecting force over long distances to fight new and perhaps distant adversaries. To do this, we need rapidly deployable, fully integrated joint forces capable of reaching distant theaters quickly and working with our air and sea forces to strike adversaries swiftly, successfully, and with devastating effect.1

Joint Vision (JV) 2020 prescribes full spectrum dominance as a prerequisite for the Joint Force of 2020. In order to achieve this, the Services must be able to “Rapidly project power worldwide . . . to any point on the globe and operate effectively in order to achieve full spectrum dominance.”2 More succinctly stated, our country, as a maritime nation must gain and maintain an “expeditionary culture” to operate within the uncertain environment of the multi-polar world. Expeditionary, in this context, is more than mere capability--its roots lie deeper and need to be embedded in the character, or better stated, the culture of our Services.

The significance of this topic becomes increasingly clear as Joint Vision (JV) 2020 also mandates cultural assimilation. This document states, “To be the most effective force for 2020, we must be fully joint: intellectually, doctrinally, and technically . . . interoperability is a mandate for the joint force of 2020 . . . training, education, experience, exercises . . . this will not only overcome the barriers of organizational culture and differing priorities, but will teach members of the joint team to appreciate the full range of Service capabilities to them.”3 The implications of developing more expeditionary forces for our nation go beyond getting to a hostile country quickly. The very nature of future warfare demands us to be prepared for conflict before a crisis

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2Joint Vision 2020.

3Ibid.
occurs--across the full spectrum of conflict. The attributes of an expeditionary force need to be analyzed collectively, for there are many inexplicably linked and seemingly invisible components of this complex adaptive system of systems. The most obvious visible components are Service doctrine, equipment and the means for deploying. The subject of this monograph will address an invisible component--the four Services’ distinct military cultures, and their resultant impact upon the combined effectiveness of the US Military Forces.

In the course of this monograph, I intend to answer the following questions:

Are there significant cultural differences within the branches of the U.S. Armed forces?

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4Systems thinking defined by Peter Senge as “a discipline for seeing structures that underlies complex situations . . . that is by seeing wholes we learn to foster health . . . from seeing parts to seeing wholes,” The Fifth Discipline: The Art and Practice of the Learning Organization, (New York: Doubleday Books, 1990), 69.
And if so, what is the impact on the joint expeditionary capabilities and warfighting effectiveness of the U.S. military?

WHY DOES CULTURE MATTER?

Dr. Williamson Murray, historian, theorist and veteran provides some insight stating, “

Culture . . . may be the most important factor in military effectiveness on the battlefield . . . it comprises the ethos and professional attributes, derived from both experience and intellectual study, that contribute to military organizations’ core, common understanding of the nature of war.”

The key point that Dr. Murray makes is the need for a “common understanding of the nature of war.” The hypothesis of this monograph is that there are significant differences in the organizational cultures of the various branches of the U.S. Armed forces. These cultural differences have a significant negative impact on the joint expeditionary capabilities, and thus the warfighting effectiveness of the U.S. military. Each military service views warfare through the lens of its own institutions’ history, and the context of the environment in which it has historically operated and solely dominated…that of air, land and sea. With such a loose coupling of diverse cultures, it is next to impossible to possess a shared vision of warfare.

Our DoD is adapting to the changing geo-political makeup of the world by beginning to reorganize into “expeditionary forces.” However, the Services tend to view or prepare for expeditionary operations differently. The danger lies in the way transformation is executed and whether these initiatives are equipment or people oriented. The USAF’s aerospace expeditionary task force (AETF), the Army’s Stryker Brigade and the Navy’s Strike group reorganization are all equipment-based or task organization oriented; thus providing superficial solutions. The focus of transformation must be on the human dimension of warfare, which forces us to take a deeper look into the psyche of our Service cultures.

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The purpose of this monograph is to highlight the Services cultural differences, trace their origins, identify what the contemporary operating environment will demand of the US DoD, and recommend solutions to close the expeditionary cultural gap; thus providing our nation with the most effective and potent force possible in an extremely fluid international environment.

Chapter One will define key terms such as joint, culture, and expeditionary culture. I will describe the contemporary-operating environment (COE) within which the US Military will operate. Further explanation will address the need for each service to adopt an expeditionary culture and mindset in order to achieve the stated objectives in JV 2020 to effectively operate in this environment. Chapter Two will examine, compare, and contrast each service’s culture. To do so, I will examine who is joining each branch, what their motivations and expectations are, as well as the individual and collective training they receive. In this analysis, I will identify the gaps and their origins, and some potential effects they have on interoperability. Chapter Three will conclude with the historical implications from the clashing of our cultures, illuminating the fact that the status-quo is detrimental to our unity of effort at the JTF level. Chapter Four will be my recommendations to mitigate the negative impact that these differences have upon the joint warfighting capability of the United States.

The term “expeditionary” pervades most Service’s common vocabulary, yet it is addressed superficially rather than holistically. Categorized as merely a rapid deployability issue, little has been discussed of the cultural aspects that are inherent in the adoption of what should rather be an expeditionary mind-set.

This monograph will take us to the nexus of the joint force; where the “mediums” of air, land, space and sea meet . . . at the operational level of war, and more specifically at the Joint Task Force (JTF). Increased emphasis will lie between the cultural differences between the US Army and US Marine Corps. This thesis will not discuss the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) forces. While an arguably a relevant and expeditionary “force” in
readiness, USSOCOM does not yet have the title of an independent service. Likewise, the United States Coast Guard (USCG), as assigned to the US Department of Transportation, will not be addressed.
CHAPTER ONE

The COE, Joint, Culture, And Expeditionary

THE COE

As globalization leads to increasingly short-fused operations that require an expeditionary force ready to deploy and employ at a moments notice, we must adapt to the growing requirement to be ready, willing, and able to project our national power rapidly and maintain the initiative. Future operations, as noted by interventions in Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq can be described as “Come-as-you-are” conflicts. The complexity of joint and combined operations inherently complicate even the simplest operations. “Operational Readiness” will take on a new meaning in the future.

Max Boot, Strategist and best-selling author on national security issues, in his recent book *Savage Wars of Peace* states,  

By the end of the 1990s, the US Armed Forces . . . recognized they were not configured for the challenges ahead. The air force reorganized itself into expeditionary units. The Army . . . medium-weight brigades designed to employ anywhere in the world within 96 hours. But the armed forces need to change more than their organizational chart; they need to change their *outlook*. Their mindset remains that of a mass army composed of conscripts mobilized to win a big war, but that is not the role of the armed forces early in the 21st century. They are a smaller, all-volunteer force, one of whose duties is policing the Pax Americana. “The mentality of an imperial army is, of necessity, utterly different from that of a mass army,” writes strategist Eliot Cohen. “The former is composed of soldiers; the latter crusaders. The former accepts ambiguous objectives, interminable commitments and chronic skirmishes as a fact of life; the latter wants a definable mission, a plan for victory and decisive battles. In the imperial army the trooper finds fulfillment in the soldier’s life; in the mass army in the belief that he exists to fight and win America’s wars.”\(^6\)

\(^6\)Max Boot, *Savage Wars of Peace*, 332.
Boot further explains that, “The incompatibility between the armed forces’ big war mindset and their small war missions accounts for a great deal of the angst suffered by the Services, especially the army, since the end of the Cold War.”

LtGen Paul Van Riper, and MG Robert Scales discuss the COE and the joint nature of future operations in their essay on “Preparing for War in the 21st Century:”

Ground forces remain the indispensable foundation of that strategic versatility. Air and naval capabilities complement but can never replace the ability to deploy ground forces tailored to the peculiar conditions and objectives of a given conflict. To say that in no way deprecates their importance. No American commander today would consider launching ground combat operations without command of the air and space, nor littoral operations without command of the sea. Moreover, as the United States continues to shift from a forward deployed to an expeditionary force posture, dependence on both aerospace and naval capabilities will increase merely to ensure ground forces reach the theater of operations rapidly and safely. Hence to insist that future US military operations will inherently be joint is not just rhetoric but rather frank acknowledgment of strategic and operational imperatives. But only in unusual conditions will air, sea, or space operations alone produce decisive strategic results. In almost every circumstance, the effective integration of all components--land, sea, air, and space--will be required.

In 1997, then Commandant of the Marine Corps General CC Krulak stated how he envisioned the COE:

In one moment in time, our service members will be feeding and clothing displaced refugees, providing humanitarian assistance. In the next moment, they will be holding two warring tribes apart--conducting peacekeeping operations--and, finally, they will be fighting a highly lethal mid-intensity battle--all on the same day ... all within three city blocks.

The COE that General Krulak speaks of reflects the non-contiguous, non-linear battle space in which we operate. We see it in Afghanistan and Iraq today. Force Protection is one example of how culture can form the basis for operations and campaigns. As the “casualty aversion bug” has bitten many US Commanders, we see how this begins to degrade the effectiveness of our military

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7Ibid., 33.


to understand the environment in which they are operating. With no rear areas, force protection often becomes a primary concern in many commanders’ minds. Instead of preparing our service members for this eventuality, we see one Service’s initiative to create new “Force Protection Commands.”\(^{10}\) This command is being formed to mitigate the threats we will face in the future.

As the nature of the environment evolves, another approach would be to ensure that the uniformed member of our Services are warriors first and foremost, then MOS specialized second. Thus, personal security at every level is ensured for every member regardless of MOS. Presently the responsibility for “rear areas” is being abrogated to additional commands, which only further complicates the already complicates command relationships.

The 2004 Draft of the USMC *Small Wars Manual* highlights this concern:

> Force protection is a good example how bureaucratic checks and balances can have unintended consequences. A logical and important concept, and certainly not a new one, force protection has been taken to an illogical extreme in some cases by the cumulative effect of respective layers in the chain of command in order to insulate organizations from blame. This type of reflexive response can cause considerations such as force protection to become ends unto themselves and impede mission accomplishment. Unfortunately, basing arrangements like Bondsteel [Kosovo] tend to preclude the close interaction necessary for a peacekeeping force to gain legitimacy from the local populace and develop a true understanding of the local situation.\(^{11}\)

This discussion leads us to the troop welfare versus mission accomplishment dilemma that forces commanders to make tough calls and thus take risks. For example, the culture of the US Army officer corps is currently battling the “risk aversion demons” as discussed by LtCol William Bell, in a speech to the Joint Services Conference on Professional Ethics (JSCOPE) committee, he states “No one trusts the system. Courtney Massingale has replaced Sam Damon in our actions.”\(^{12}\)

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\(^{10}\)BCTP OPSGRP “D” brief on operational Force Protection, addressing SAMS students on a US Army future command structure initiative to assist with combating threats such as terrorism and insurgency, February 2004.


\(^{12}\)Courtney Massingale and Sam Damon are the two contrasting characters in the US Army in the book, *Once an Eagle*. Massingale, the always clean, politically correct rising star who never really commanded in combat until a General Officer; Damon, fought through the ranks engaging in combat at nearly every rank to achieve his general officer stars through meritocracy and leadership in combat.
Further, he states that troop leading duty has been deemed too risky to the career of an officer. Officers do the minimum necessary to qualify for promotion and opt for more high visibility billets to improve chances of selection for the next rank.\textsuperscript{13}

Now that we understand the complexity of the COE and some of the effects it has on the joint force, we must discuss the joint force that will be assembled to operate within its parameters.

\section*{JOINT DEFINED}

Finding definitions for joint is not difficult. Joint Publication (JP) 1-02, \textit{Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms} provides a broad but conceptually limiting definition; “joint--Connotes activities, operations, organizations, etc., in which elements of two or more Military Departments participate.”\textsuperscript{14} The definition for a joint force becomes clearer-- “A general term applied to a force composed of significant elements, assigned or attached, of two or more Military Departments, operating under a single joint force commander.”\textsuperscript{15} From these definitions, we can deduce that joint is an organizational structure. JV2020 expands our understanding by explaining what the joint force is expected to accomplish and the foundation of joint operations. “The joint force, because of its flexibility and responsiveness, will remain the key to operational success in the future.”\textsuperscript{16} and that “interoperability is the foundation of effective joint, multinational, and interagency operations.”\textsuperscript{17}

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\textsuperscript{15}Ibid., 245.
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\textsuperscript{16}CJCS \textit{JV2020}, 2.
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\textsuperscript{17}Ibid., 15.
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In order for the Services to be able to operate in a joint environment, they must be able to demonstrate interoperability. “To build the most effective force for 2020, we must be fully joint: intellectually, operationally, organizationally, doctrinally and technically.”\textsuperscript{18} “The synergy gained through the interdependence of the Services makes clear that “jointness” is more than interoperability”\textsuperscript{19} and that “The foundation of ‘jointness’ is the strength of individual Service competencies pulled together.”\textsuperscript{20} Interoperability is the ability to operate in an environment with multiple Services seamlessly across the spectrum and throughout the mediums of conflict. The synergistic effect of all of our service organizations must capitalize on the strengths of one service to over come the shortfalls or weaknesses of the other.

Some of the desired attributes of a truly joint operating force are as follows:

- Common terminology is commonly utilized and understood
- Doctrines complement one another
- Services understand each others capabilities and what they contribute to the operational framework
- C4ISR that shares information in a rapid manner and contributes to the common operating picture
- Egos and service rivalries are minimized. Understanding Title 10 responsibilities that each Service must comply with and leveraging the strength of each service to conduct decisive action against threats to our national security. Unity of effort.
- Integrated planning and execution as the Services interact, at the “nodes of interoperability,” we must possess standard tactics, techniques and procedures that facilitate rapid, decisive action with reduced threat to where our forces interact.
- Operating from a shared perception of the environment and thorough understanding of all the Services capabilities and limitations.

**EXPEDITIONARY DEFINED**

Expeditionary as defined lacks a translation to a modern context. Cambridge dictionary defines expeditionary as “a group of soldiers sent to another country to fight in a war.” JCS

\textsuperscript{18}Ibid., 2.

\textsuperscript{19}Ibid., 34.

\textsuperscript{20}Ibid.
publication 1-02 only defines it in concert with a force as, “An armed force organized to accomplish a specific objective in a foreign country.”

A more appropriate definition requires a more contemporary look at the nature of expeditionary operations to determine the essence of what the military forces must do as part of this “expedition.” The defining characteristic of expeditionary operations is the projection of military force into a foreign setting in accordance with our national interests. The term expeditionary implies the ability to rapidly deploy to a distant theater, and operate in austere environments with self-sustainment.

General James L. Jones, current Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR) states that the term expeditionary “Encompasses more than a simple task organization and a mission involving actions beyond U.S. borders. The term . . . describes a pervasive mind-set, a perspective that influences all aspects of organization, training and equipment.”21 The JCS definition could fit virtually any organization within the U.S. DoD. General Jones adds a few additional attributes--rapidly deployable, forced entry capable, and self-sustainable-- that would align this definition with the effects we as Services hope to achieve in defending our Nation’s national interests. These capabilities need to be coupled with the ability to reconstitute rapidly in theatre and assume further mission takings. An implicit capability within this expeditionary force is the attribute of mental agility, or better stated, “institutional agility” that must pervade every service-member. Every Soldier, Sailor, Airman and Marine must be mentally agile and able to adapt to each and every type of environment that the COE may present. To be relevant in the future, and achieve full spectrum dominance, requires a systemic review of organization and material to ensure flexibility. The Branches of the U.S. Armed Forces must be designed and continually modified to maintain their flexibility and adapt to constant change. The DoD viewed

as a complex adaptive system of systems (manifested in the joint force) provides the best possibility to meet future operational requirements. Transformation to a joint expeditionary force must focus on human beings, for it is they who make up the decision-makers of this system, supported by technology and not vice-versa. Paul van Riper and Robert Scales remind us that despite technological superiority, the nature of warfare, backed by 2500 years of written history remains valid:

In the end, war is a contest of human wills, not machines, in which means must be subordinated to ends if the results are to justify the costs. In the world we confront, those ends are likely to be more complicated, and the circumstances in which they must be pursued less predictable, than ever before in our history. A military posture that evades rather than accommodates that reality is doomed to expensive irrelevance.”

Therefore, in applying the term expeditionary in a modern context, we determine its definition is measured in the type of mind-set it inculcates into the members of the organization. It is but one of the components of the culture that must reside in our Service’s distinct personalities.

**CULTURE DEFINED**

General John J. Sheehan, USMC (Ret.), former Regional combatant commander, US Atlantic Command, was clear concerning what educational institutions accomplish, “Each service, in its institutional process of education, teaches a culture. Whether you accept it or not, it happens.”

One way to define culture is through the anthropological definition. This accounts for the totality of the behavior of the individuals within a system or institution. Leslie White, a well known PhD and anthropologist, proposed one anthropological construct of culture in 1975.

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White proposes that a cultural system is composed of three significant components: technology, sociology, and ideology. Technology consists of the tools and weapons and the techniques with which to use them. Sociology consists of the customs, institutions and codes of a group. Ideology consists of the ideas (concepts) and beliefs of a group. This definition is appropriate because it not only addresses intangible aspects of sociology and ideology, but also the tangible in technology. Another relevant aspect of culture is that it tends to develop inertia and as such resists change. Although culture resists change, it is never static. This morphing, however, may not be perceptible in the short term, particularly to those existing within a society or organization. Culture has the ability to exert significant influence over the behavior of individuals, yet they can remain unaware of its existence, particularly when they are absorbed in it for a long time. External entities such as artifacts, behavior and structures reflect culture, yet they are not culture in and of themselves. Despite the existence of these external influences, culture is essentially about people and primarily transmitted by people, although this transfer is largely subconscious and not a deliberate attempt to transfer “culture” as a formal construct. Finally, individual cultures exist within broader societies and are composed of numerous subcultures. Furthermore, it is impossible to completely separate a culture from the broader society and from the individual subcultures that make up a larger culture. This is important to remember when analyzing the US Military.

No arguments found challenged the notion that military cultures exist and many articles present military culture as an established fact, but it is still necessary to define what a culture is. This is not simple, as Edgar H. Schein of the Sloan School of Management at Massachusetts Institute of Technology, pointed out in his study of organizational climates and cultures summarized in his article, “Organizational Cultures.” There are wide and varied opinions on this

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Based on his own studies, he defines organizational culture as

> What a group learns over a period of time as that group solves its problems of survival in an external environment and its problems of internal integration. Such learning is simultaneously a behavioral, cognitive and an emotional process. Extrapolating further from a functionalist anthropological view, the deepest level of culture will be the cognitive in that the perceptions, language and thought processes that a group comes to share will be the ultimate causal determinant of feelings, attitudes, espoused values, and overt behavior.

> Culture can now be defined as (a) a pattern of basic assumptions, (b) invented, discovered, or developed by a given group, (c) as it learns to cope with its problems of external adaptation and internal integration, (d) that has worked well enough to be considered valid and, therefore (e) is to be taught to new members as the (f) correct way to perceive, think, and feel in relation to those problems.

Professor Don Snider, a political science instructor at West Point, applied Schein’s and the theories of others directly to the military, establishing four basic elements of military culture:

1. discipline
2. professional ethos
3. ceremonial displays and etiquette
4. cohesion and esprit de corps

Additionally, he created a more specific definition:

> Military culture may be said to refer to the deep structure of organizations, rooted in the prevailing assumptions, norms, values, customs and traditions which collectively, over time, have created shared individual expectation among the members. Meaning is established through socialization to a variety of identity groups that converge in operations of the organization. Culture includes both attitudes and behavior about what is right, what is good, and what is important, often manifested in shared heroes, stories, and rituals that promote bonding among the members.

Each of these definitions imply there is some type of organizational memory when they discuss such issues as time, shared expectations, assumptions, norms, values and perceptions of what is right and important.

By applying portions of definitions from both Schein and Snider, and the concept of organizational memory, it appears obvious that each of the Services overwhelmingly meet each of

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26Ibid., 111.
the criteria. This same confidence is not present when reviewing the joint community. A constant theme of every discussion thus far has been time. Officers generally do not serve in the joint world for extensive periods; nor do they train or operate in a joint environment, except in rare cases. There is very little time for socialization or bonding to occur and develop the other shared attributes. This makes it difficult, if not impossible, to develop a sense of community.

We can anticipate internal opposition to JV2020 and any movement towards any type of joint culture for the joint force that may impede the creation of a joint expeditionary culture. Some fear that a strong joint culture will weaken the Service cultures and thus degrade their capabilities. Others feel that a strong joint culture will reduce the competitive spirit between the Services necessary to produce innovation, growth and prevent stagnation.\(^{28}\) Schein’s, and a to degree Snider’s arguments demonstrate that this fear is unfounded; subcultures are natural and often necessary developments of large cultures.\(^{29}\) Even within each Service, subcultures collectively define each Services identity and personalities. Snider argues that currently there is no strong mega-culture, but only “an identifiable set of subcultures;”\(^{30}\) not unlike the many subcultures within each Service. However, Snider along with Howard Grave in “Emergence of the Joint Officer” does acknowledge that “Now more than a decade later, during which America’s armed forces have fought several conflicts under unified command, a new joint culture is emerging at the field-grade and senior officer levels.”\(^{31}\) A more sensible position can be found by viewing any of the Services. Each possesses a unified service culture supported by many diverse

\(^{28}\) Seth Cropsey, “The Limits of ‘jointness’” (Joint Force Quarterly, Summer 1993) and Harvey M. Sapolsky, “Interservice Competition: The Solution, Not the Problem” (Joint Force Quarterly, Summer 1993). These authors believe the benefits from service competition and debate are more important than interoperability, which will diminish the power of individual Services and the extinction of multiple perspectives.

\(^{29}\) Schein, 117.

\(^{30}\) Snider, 19.

\(^{31}\) Howard D. Graves and Don M. Snider, “Emergence of the Joint Officer” (Joint Force Quarterly, Autumn 1996), 53.
subcultures, many of which are intertwined. Assuming it were possible, it is unlikely that after
two hundred years anyone is going to recommend an initiative to undo the Service cultures based
on a perception that it is weakening the branch or community subcultures.

The evidence and theories appear to support the position that interoperability can be
rooted in the culture of the Services. The challenge with this, as it applies to a joint expeditionary
culture is that instead of developing its own subcultures, it must be the product of many
subcultures. The nexus of this joint expeditionary culture relies on the Services ability to adopt a
common understanding of the external influences resident in the COE. For additional insight into
how this may come about, it is necessary to look at how people within these organizations
develop the shared assumptions, perceptions and values.

It is significant that Schein’s definition is supportive of JV2020’s endstate. JV2020
requires full interoperability at all levels including intellectual, cognitive, organizational and
doctrinal. The very basic foundation required to achieve this high goal is set out in Schein’s
definition of a culture, “a pattern of basic assumptions . . . adaptation and internal integration, that
has worked well enough to be considered valid and, therefore is to be taught to new members as
the correct way to perceive, think, and feel.”\textsuperscript{32} Despite these similarities, the DoD’s stove-piped
training, education systems and doctrines are based upon differing views of the COE, their
perceived role within, and the competition for missions and, ultimately, dollars. The Services
have adopted procedures designed to deconflict or mitigate vice integrate these four distinct
cultures in the most complex and risk laden of human endeavors--conflict. JV 2020 mandates
assimilation as opposed to mitigation; and thus, we must take steps to change our mind-sets to
achieve the stated endstate.

\textsuperscript{32} JV 2020, 111.
SO, WHAT IS AN EXPEDITIONARY CULTURE?

The following describes the attributes of a joint expeditionary culture: Military Services that empower their junior leaders, trust and earn trust, inoculate a warrior ethos, prepare for uncertain environments and provide legitimacy for actions. They must impart a sense of identity, inspire with personal sacrifice, teach that the good of the organization is more important than the good of the individual, prepare for the horrors of combat and instill the expectation of operating in austere operational environments. The Service must promise them nothing but membership in an organization, accentuate the privilege of service to the nation and define what “service” means. The organization must instill in its members decisiveness and inherent understanding of the nature of the mediums in which they will operate and how they relate to the other forces. An adaptive mindset must be created and implemented through the indoctrination process. This can only be achieved through shared mutual hardships, via a significant emotional event, that transforms an individual from that of the former self to a member of an organization, (citizen to service member) who possesses mental agility, a combative warrior spirit and the mental and physical attributes necessary to operate in the increasingly complex COE.

What are the implications for attaining these components of a joint expeditionary culture? For the Services to achieve this endstate and possess the means for operating in the COE, one must examine the entire system the Services have created to instill in their members the necessary attributes to operate within the confines of their organizational framework. Recruiting, through initial entry training (IET), and the doctrine the service espouses frame the type of organization each is compelled to operate from within. However, can all the armed Services be expeditionary forces? Must they be expeditionary forces to gain an expeditionary mind-set? More to the point, can any Service afford to not operate with an expeditionary mind-set?
DO ALL SERVICES NEED AN EXPEDITIONARY CULTURE?

The nature of operations in the COE illustrates the importance of an expeditionary mindset for the DoD. The decentralized nature of future conflict urges us to review how we create junior leaders, both officer and enlisted to be successful and adaptable. JV 2020 demands it, the COE requires it, and it is up to the military Services to implement it.

Transforming Cold War heavy forces into nimble, 21st Century expeditionary forces is daunting indeed, especially so long as modernization accounts remain fiscally constrained. Changes to the outwardly obvious elements of doctrine, force structure and equipment must be matched by dramatic shifts in the less visible aspects of organizational culture that are so critical to a service’s self-image.33

Creating this joint expeditionary cultural mindset promises to be the most challenging piece to the JV 2020 puzzle. The services in the US Armed Forces viewed as complex adaptive systems, have deeply embedded cultures that define them as institutions. While a centralized control and methodically structured plan may facilitate cultural change, it certainly will not contribute to the overall desired endstate--a decentralized and focused institution able to operate in the complexity presented by the COE. This challenge will be exceptionally difficult to overcome.


CHAPTER TWO

Service Culture, History, Indoctrination and Doctrine

In analyzing the cultures of the US armed Forces, there are numerous metaphorical examples presented to help characterize the disparities. Here is one attempt by a US Navy Admiral to capture the cultural make-up of our Services,

It occurred to me that the Services could be characterized by different breeds of dogs. The Air Force reminded me of a French Poodle. The poodle always looks perfect. Sometimes seems a bit pampered and always travels first class. But don’t ever forget that the poodle was bred as a hunting dog and in a fight, it’s very dangerous. The Army is kind of like a St. Bernard. It’s big and heavy and sometimes seems a bit clumsy. But it’s very powerful and has lots of stamina, so you want it for the long haul. The Navy, God bless us, is a golden retriever. They’re good natured and great around the house. The kids love them. Sometimes their hair is a bit long, they go wandering off for long periods of time, and they love the water. Marines I see as two breeds, Rottweilers and Dobermans, because Marines come in two varieties, big and mean, and skinny and mean. They’re aggressive on the attack and tenacious on the defense. They’ve got really short hair and they always go for the throat.  

CULTURAL HISTORY

Each Service in the DoD has a rich cultural history and are thus enslaved to their experiences” and held captive to the way they have previously or historically fought, been employed and defined past successes. The personalities of the Services makes them who they are, and tells us how they came to be, rather than what they need to be in the future. To further complicate the analysis, there are numerous subcultures within each within each service. Susan Marquis, author of Unconventional Warfare: Rebuilding U.S. Special Operations Forces describes some of these subcultures:

Analysis of military organizational culture is not new. In the U.S. Navy there are the black shoe, brown shoe, and “felt” shoe cultures, referring to those whose careers are focused on ships of the line, naval aviation, or submarines. The U.S. Army's combat support and combat service support branches, including the engineers and logistics, have a different perspective on combat operations than the combat arms branches such as infantry and armor. The U.S. Air Force is also divided into distinctive

34RAdm J Stark, USN, in a speech made in Newport, RI on 10 November 1995.
communities, with the three largest being those in the bomber force, "tac air" or fighters, and airlift. Each of these subgroups within the military Services has its own traditions, insignia, and unit pride.\textsuperscript{35}

Tracing the roots and evolution of each Service through America’s history will better reveal how the unique cultures of each service came into being.

USA

The Army sees itself as ultimately the essential artisans of war. It is divided into branches, or subcultures, interdependent on each other, but formed around the triumvirate of power--infantry, artillery and armor. Key leaders rise from these branches. Their service, forged by history and the nature of war, is a mutually supported “brotherhood of guilds.”\textsuperscript{36} The US Soldier normally identifies first with his branch, then the Army, due in large part to their pride in their trade and the requisite special skills they acquire in their training.

The experience of the Army, in its finest years of World War II, from the invasion across the beaches at Normandy to the destruction of the Nazi Regime, made an impression that has persisted with remarkable tenacity and effect right down to the present. The Army’s experiences in Vietnam and Korea have been relegated to unpleasant aberrations--the wrong kinds of wars because of political errors and lack of public support. The suggestion that the Army’s experience in World War II was an aberration, and that such peripheral conflicts might be the only kind of wars the Army will be asked or permitted to fight in the COE, has probably been rejected unconsciously, not because it is clearly wrong, but because it undermines a much more satisfying self-image.\textsuperscript{37}


\textsuperscript{36}Carl H. Builder, \textit{The Masks of War} (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press) 33.

\textsuperscript{37}Builder, 186.
Present day operations require a focus on the everchanging environment in which the Army will operate and away from the Central European victories of yesteryear. The Army must also reevaluate its need for heavy armor and artillery. However, such a reevaluation will most certainly be met with internal resistance from within the institution itself. The conflicts of these internal interests will act to derail the institution leaving them an ineffectual force in today’s fluid environment and frozen in both time and place in Central Europe. This may well be the most debilitating problem facing the Army’s leadership in the coming decade. This fracture in the Army will precipitate a change in identity from its preferred self-image; victors of the land war in Europe in World War II.\(^{38}\)

Whether or not the Army likes the image or label, it has been, is, and will likely continue to be the nations loyal and obedient servant. Its remembrance of itself as liberator and defender of Europe may make for nice memories, but it is not a realistic image for the present.\(^{39}\)

The defined endstate is to create an Army ready and relevant in the COE. Would masses of highly synchronized and combined arms armored formations best achieve this goal or would small autonomous units capable of independent operations while leveraging technology better suit the desired vision? Most of the COE will demand the latter; however, the situation on the Korean Peninsula may call for the former. The question for the Army today may be, “What does your country need you to be?” The answer may appear to reflect an Army that combines both capabilities.

Throughout our history, the United States has operated under a “mobilization strategy.” This methodology centers on maintaining a small professional Army that will buy the country enough time to enact a draft and mobilize the reserves in the event of a major conflict. Due largely to fiscal constraints, the US Army is organized, equipped and trained in this manner. Part

\(^{38}\)Ibid., 189.

\(^{39}\)Ibid., 187.
and parcel to this is a mobilization “doctrine” is the associated big war mind-set, which the
current CSA is taking steps to eradicate.

As the current Chief of Staff of the Army attempts to alter the culture of the largest
institution in the DoD, he will most certainly meet resistance from within. One of his first
initiatives is to inculcate each Soldier with what he calls a warrior ethos. His guidance provided
below captures the essence of this mandated change:

Every Soldier is a Soldier first, regardless of whether they’re a truck driver or a typist, a
maintainer or infantryman. While technology has helped the Army become more lethal
and effective, individual Soldiers still do the fighting . . . technology has to enhance the
human dimension. Warfare fundamentally is a human endeavor. It’s a test of wills. It’s a
test of things deep within us.  

Creating a warrior ethos in the US Army promises to be much more complex than the issuance of
edicts.

Along with the emphasis on instilling a warrior ethos in his Soldiers, the Chief of Staff
understands the importance of an expeditionary mind-set for the US Army’s cultural
transformation, summed up as follows:

This challenge is above all one of mindset, because American soldiers are predisposed
with good reason to seek certainty, planning, preparation and synchronization in the
application of force. We have engaged repeatedly in conditions of uncertainty and
ambiguity, to be sure, but always viewing such operations as the exception rather than the
rule. That must no longer be the case. In this globalized world, our enemies shift
resources and activities to those areas least accessible to us. As an elusive and
asymmetric enemy seeks refuge in the far corners of the earth, the “norm” will be short
notice operations, extremely austere theaters of operation, incomplete information--
indeed, the requirement to fight for information, rather than fight with information. This
is the essence of the expeditionary mindset we seek.

He concludes:

This new reality drives the transformation underway in the United States Army. Be it
“mindset,” “culture,” or “attitude,” it is the lens that shapes our perception and

40Army Chief of Staff, General Peter J. Schoomaker, Working Draft: An Army at War -- A
Campaign Quality Army with a Joint and Expeditionary Mindset.

41Schoomaker, Army White Paper (Draft), Serving a Nation at War, A Campaign Quality Army
with a Joint and Expeditionary Mindset, 4.
interpretation of the future, and governs our responses to its challenges. It is the logic for a campaign quality Army with a joint and expeditionary mindset. 42

These initiatives are critical if the Army is to shift its institutional conventional warfighting structure to be ready and relevant for the COE.

*What is the Army?* Carl Builder, a strategist, PhD and author of the book, *The Masks of War*, describes them as “First and foremost, the nations obedient and loyal servant. A neutral instrument of state policy, that when ordered to action, does not ask ‘why?’ or ‘what for?’” but acts obediently. What is the Army about? “Keeping itself prepared to meet the demands of the American people . . . prepared to forge America’s citizenry [into soldiers] into an expeditionary force to defeat Americas opponents overseas.” 43 The Army, like most large institutions, is a captive of its own internal fiefdoms. The guilds of the army, its branches and particularly those of the powerful combat arms freeze the institution by their understandable interest in maintaining a balance of power. The three traditional combat arms branches, in a fraternal embrace of interdependence in combat have created remarkably stable troika of control over the Army that shows no sign of weakening. 44

If history is any indication of the difficulties in achieving a cultural shift in such a large and complex grouping of subcultures, General Schoomaker has a monumental task before him.

**USMC**

A Marine is not a Soldier, Sailor or Airman nor does a Marine take kindly of being categorized as one of the aforementioned. He takes pride in that fact and to call him (or her) one of the above would be considered an insult. The title of Marine is a title earned and one that evokes a deep sense of pride and a deeper ethos. It is a title worn with dignity and honor--for life.

42 Schoomaker, 6.

43 Builder, 27.

44 Ibid., 33.
Marines have fought for their very right to exist in most every major war and subsequent draw-down throughout history. They understand the importance of their image, as perceived by their nation and are aware that some within the populace view them as extremists, alienating them from the very population that they are sworn to protect.  

The Marine Corps practices a generalist approach to training vice over-specialization. Every Marine whether having entered the ‘Corps through Parris Island, San Diego or Quantico, soon learns that he is first and foremost a rifleman. While the assigned specialty may take the preponderance of time and training, every Marine has first been indoctrinated with the “every Marine a rifleman” mind-set. 

The expectation of a Marine officer is to be a Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) officer; well rounded, adaptive, and able to discuss intelligibly the capabilities of all the elements of the MAGTF. When queried, a Marine will most always identify with his Service first and then his military occupational specialty (MOS). The Marine Corps does have what could be described best as a loose-coupling of subcultures centered on three distinct groupings of MOSs: ground combat arms (infantry, artillery, combat engineers, tankers, and amphibious assault vehicle personnel) aviators and combat service support. Infantry officers and aviators generally serve as the duo of senior leadership, with the Commandant of the Marine Corps an infantry officer and the Assistant Commandant an aviator. 

Marines enjoy a particularly comfortable relationship with their Navy brethren. As a separate Service within the department of the Navy, Marine officers consider themselves Naval officers and believe in the symbiotic relationship with the US Navy. As late as 1978, the

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45Sara Lister, Assistant Secretary of the Army, in a speech on 26 Oct 1997 at a conference in Baltimore sponsored by Harvard University's Institute for Strategic Studies. "I think the Army is much more connected to society than the Marines are," she was quoted as telling the meeting. "The Marines are extremists. Whenever you have extremists, you've got some risks of total disconnection with society . . . that's a little dangerous.” After much ado, she resigned soon after.
Commandant was not officially recognized with a seat at the table of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, except on matters specific to the ‘Corps.'

Tasked by the nation to “Be the most ready when the nation is least ready,” the Marine Corps is the only Service designated by law to maintain a minimum size--three divisions, three aircraft wings and appropriate support. Mandated as the “First to fight,” the ‘Corps’ indoctrination, training, doctrine and polices are all aligned to this requirement. Committed and loyal to their historical expeditionary culture, the Marine Corps maintains a level of readiness across the spectrum of conflict and always task organizes to meet the mission. Yet, in the words of LtGen Victor Krulak, “Being ready is not what matters. What matters is winning after you get there.”

The Marine Corps is inherently joint in nature and operates across the mediums of conflict. It relies on the Navy for transportation and support, the Army for theater logistics, and the Air Force for Strategic lift and additional aviation support. Of all the Services, Marines embrace interoperability in the joint environment, required by the COE and as stated by the current commandant. In his guidance to the Marines of his ‘Corps, General Hagee states:

We must remember that we are part of the team that makes up the Nation's joint warfighting establishment. Due to our expeditionary culture, we have always been responsive and immediately employable with our sister Services, special operations forces, as well as our coalition partners. We will leverage these institutional strengths to assist in achieving a victory in today's Global War on Terrorism and other threats to our security. As we transform our ‘Corps for this century, we must carefully preserve the strengths of our past while not losing the flexibility to contribute to tomorrow's unique national security needs. All our actions will focus on enhancing our warfighting excellence at each level of war, at home and abroad. Every member of our Corps must remain focused on our main effort, the warfighting excellence of the individual Marine and our combined arms Marine Air-Ground Task Forces, in order to ensure that we "will be found equal to every emergency.”


47Title 10 US Code, Chapter 507, Section 5063.

48Victor H. Krulak, LtGen, USMC; April 1965.

4933rd CMC, Gen Hagee guidance to the Corps.
General Jones described the attributes of an expeditionary force which possesses capabilities such as agility, flexibility, versatility, speed, forcible entry and sustainability. He continues to emphasize the associated mind-set that is critical to the success of an expeditionary force:

In the Marine Corps . . . an expeditionary mind-set is a powerful part of our unique service culture. Beginning with recruit training, Marines are imbued with the notion of doing with less, of fighting and prevailing in an austere operational environment, of living a Spartan existence...creating a proper level of mental preparedness . . . the rugged lifestyle they become inured through training becomes second nature . . . held as a point of pride.”

However, General Jones fails to mention the ethos with which each Marine is infused from the moment of acceptance in the institution--“every Marine a rifleman.” “Marines don’t guard Marines” is another unwritten axiom adopted by the Corps. Each Marine unit is prepared, trained and equipped to defend themselves to the man, regardless of their MOS. From this ethos, a “warrior spirit” emerges and permeates the mind-set further. It is not something that can be issued, nor can it be acquired upon decree. It is rather a part of their heritage, and thus the culture that is given by inherently belonging to that organization.

*What is the Marine Corps?* America’s 911 force in readiness, they are the first to fight. They are flexible warriors first and occupational specialty second, who sacrifice all they are to serve the nation. *Who are the Marines?* They are the embodiment of Sailor, Soldier and Airman combined into one fighting institution that is bound by honor to uphold the amphibious and expeditionary traditions of their beloved country and ‘Corps.

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50Jones, 61-62.
More than any other service the Navy is an institution marked by the strong sense of self. It is the most independent of all the Services as it has its own army, Navy and air force . . . and would prefer to be given a mission, retain complete control over the assets, and be left alone.\textsuperscript{51}

The Navy believes independence of command is paramount to Naval warfare and our maritime nation. Throughout our history Ship’s Captains have served as “ambassadors abroad” representing US interests. Sailors proudly identify first with the Navy and then their MOS. The Navy has distinct subcultures: Carrier based aviation pilots, surface warfare officers, submariners, amphibious (Gator) and mine countermeasures (MCM), and Land based aviation pilots.

The Navy trains Sailors as specialists vice generalists, due in large part to the amount of equipment and maintenance required to operate large city-like mobile warfighting platforms constantly subjected to salt spray and the elements. Their mind-set and doctrine is based upon Mahanian Sea power theory--freedom of navigation in the sea-lanes is the basis for their heritage.

The Navy is the most tradition-based institution of the Services.\textsuperscript{52} Service on the high seas demands a particular type of individual, and the mind-set that pervades the Sailors of the Fleet provides them the justification for what some might view as anachronistic and draconian measures to prevent indiscipline amongst the ranks. The necessity of such measures stem from the reality of long periods at sea and the ability for the ship’s crew to maintain control when hundreds, and even thousands of Sailors are “held captive” on a ship for months at a time. The belief that no one interferes with the decisions of the ship’s Captain represents the independence of a life at sea. According to the Navy Officer, politicians and other military members alike do

\textsuperscript{51}Builder, 31.

\textsuperscript{52}Ibid.
not understand the Navy and their culture. The independent nature of naval operations has bred the perception that a certain degree of arrogance exists within the Navy from those who try to influence naval activities, policies or procedures.

**Who is the Navy?** The supranational institution that has inherited the British Navy’s throne to naval supremacy. **What is it about?** Preserving and wielding sea power as the most important and flexible kind of military power for America as a maritime nation. The means and the ends are found within the institution and longstanding traditions, “Both of which provide for a permanence beyond the people who serve them.”

**USAF**

The National Security Act of 1947 created the USAF as a Separate Service. The youngest of the Services, the USAF gained its independence based on the argument over airpower theory, first presented by Giulio Douhet, an Italian air advocate and theorist. Douhet was determined to persuade the Italian government to build an independent air force, even at the expense of the Navy and Army. The US Air Force has taken this theory and built a powerful institution in their relatively short fifty-seven year history.

The USAF won its independent status from the US Army Air Corps in the aftermath of World War II. It based its break from the Army on the following three premises: 1) airpower can be the decisive instrument of war, 2) the decisive use of that instrument requires air superiority, and 3) achieving air superiority requires central control of air forces.

The founders of the Air Force believed that strategic bombardment was both the means and ends for national strategy. Despite the relative ineffectiveness of airpower to be decisive in the Battle of Britain, the strategic attacks on the German heartland’s center of industry (the

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53Ibid., 32.

54Ibid., 68.
Schweinfurt ball bearing plants) and the inability for the air force to decide victory in Korea, airpower theory remained the justification for the independent Air Force.

The Air Force leaderships’ “reverence for technology” has been the cornerstone of their culture and has coveted their doctrine. Going back to World War II, despite the effects of our allies and sister-Services engaged in operations that spanned the globe, the conclusion the USAF drew was victory via strategic attack.\textsuperscript{55}

The USAF, not unlike the Navy and the sea, maintains that freedom to operate in the sky has several layers. These layers are represented by the following priorities in decreasing order--air to air combat, strategic attack, interdiction, and close air support. They believe that close air support to land bound maneuver forces is the least efficient use of airpower; thus, the lowest level of emphasis is placed on these missions.

Airmen tend to be more specialist oriented. The bond is not to their institution, but the love of flying and flight. They identify themselves as pilots first, then by airframe, rather than Service. The subcultures within the Air Force divide these specialties into the following categories: fighter pilots (formerly known as TACAIR), transporters (STRATAIR), and all others. They operate under the premise that other Services do not understand how to properly employ aerospace power. The most equipment-centric of all the service--they are enamored with technology--it is the means by which they wage war.\textsuperscript{56}

Within the DoD, the Air Force as an institution appears to be the least willing to embrace joint operations--it sees itself, and the institution, as an essentially independent strategic maneuver element that no one but an Airman can understand and employ correctly. This is not only reflected in their doctrine but in their approach to training and education. One example: In

\textsuperscript{55}Ibid., 69.

\textsuperscript{56}Ibid., 32.
an attempt to create a joint exercise with students across the four Service’s advanced military studies programs, the Air Force’s School of Advanced Airpower Studies declined to participate.\textsuperscript{57}

\textit{Who is the Air Force?} The keeper and wielder of the decisive instruments of war--the technological marvels of flight that have refined war. \textit{What is the USAF about?} The Air Force ensures the independence of those who fly those machines for their intended purpose--the ultimate means for both freedom of flight and for destruction in war.\textsuperscript{58}

**RECRUITING**

What type of person joins each of the Services and what is the motivation to join? In light of the constant challenge to get mentally and physically qualified volunteers for service in the nation’s military, what means and methods do the services employ to provide their institutions with able bodied recruits to meet manpower requirements?

Each Service has recruiting themes or slogans created to peak the interests of young people into joining their respective Service. Consulting firms are hired to target populations and analyze demographics. Recruiters are always under pressure to meet or exceed quotas. Most crucial to not only the short term recruiting success, but moreover to the caliber of military professionals within the ranks of the US military for the long term, are the answers to the type of person is targeted and what is the motivation by which they are driven to join.

In a random and independent research survey conducted at the Military Entrance Processing Station (MEPS) in Kansas City, Missouri, recruits were given a survey to answer focused on why they joined the US Armed Forces. The two questions highlighted for this study were:

\textsuperscript{57}Interview with COL Kevin Benson, “SAASS does strategic, not the operational level of war,” as quoted from the Director of SAASS to the Director of SAMS. The Marine Corps’ School of Advanced Warfighting (SAW) as well as the Navy’s advanced program both agreed that the exercise was relevant and important given the joint nature of future operations.

\textsuperscript{58}Builder, 33.
1. Why did you choose to enter the Armed forces of the US? and
2. What was the main contributing factor for your decision to join the Service that you did?

This survey, conducted in December 2003 and January 2004, occurred while all 4 Service’s “poolees” were awaiting shipment to boot camp. In this survey, seven questions were asked of 241 participants. The following reflects the breakdown by Service: USA--96, USN--39, USMC--62, and USAF--44.

The answers varied greatly but were grouped into the following subcategories for analysis: Question 1-- Money, challenge, patriotism, experience and travel; Question 2-- Standards, to learn a trade, family reasons, espirit-de-corps of the organization, job security and incentives (money or other tangible benefits the Service promised).

The following table depicts the results:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service</th>
<th>2 Most common reasons joined Armed Forces: percentage</th>
<th>2 Most common reasons joined Specific Service: percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>Money: 70%</td>
<td>Patriotism: 28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USN</td>
<td>Money: 69%</td>
<td>Travel: 26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USMC</td>
<td>Challenge: 44%</td>
<td>Patriotism: 35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAF</td>
<td>Money: 55%</td>
<td>Patriotism: 23%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The results of this survey conclude that different people join different services for specific reasons. The Services that espoused the “Look what I can do for you” approach appeared to be reflected in the motivations for selecting a Service. These motivations indicate a stark contrast to the type of individual we need in the joint expeditionary forces. These findings highlight that our approach to recruiting must change; furthermore, the manner in which we recruit must target those individuals that are pre-disposed to attitudes of serving, vice being served.
Many factors, such as expanded employment opportunities, have made recruiting more difficult. In varying degrees, each Service seeks to attract recruits by introducing financial benefits; web pages flaunt enlistment bonuses and money for college. The more traditional incentives to join the military, such as patriotism and sacrifice, are being dwarfed and negated by the emphasis placed on financial ones. The US Army’s Senior Review Panel discovered that Army leaders and Soldiers expressed concern that their institution is becoming more like a civilian job that a martial institution and profession. The rights of the individual and concerns over privacy are beginning to receive priority over the core values espoused by the Army.\textsuperscript{59}

John Derbyshire, a British Army veteran and frequent contributor to \textit{The National Review}, makes the following observation on the current state of recruiting in the US Armed Forces,

> You might further observe that it is precisely the fear and challenge of arduous training that lures many young people into the military life. That last observation, while true, is unfortunately not true enough for a modern society. If you identify all those young Americans who thrill at the idea of organized combat—of killing people, blowing things up, and facing great bodily risks in the service of their country—you will find that you have about half a million of them, practically all young men. You are then faced with three problems: One, this is not enough to supply the country's defense needs, as currently defined; two, not many of your recruits are willing to do the ancillary tasks an army depends on (cooking, construction, dentistry, accounting, recruiting, and so on); and three, politically powerful lobbies—feminists, homosexuals, even the disabled—will be enraged that the force you have assembled does not look sufficiently like America.\textsuperscript{60}

John Hillen, in his article on the civil military gap, relates his thoughts on recruiting today,

> But today's military, facing recruiting and retention problems, is again trying hard to look like society. Political leaders of both parties press the military to "get with it" and conform to prevailing civilian values. Thus, the Army, in its never-ending effort to sell itself in the absence of conscription, stresses such incentives as financial benefits, training, and job security, as if the Army were a sort of high school with a salary and fresh air. Nevertheless, enlistments continue to decline and the Army is having to accept enlistees who would have been turned away five years ago. And thanks to the trend


\textsuperscript{60} John Derbyshire, from \textit{The National Review}. 
toward feminization, the Army is losing Hispanic recruits to the Marine Corps, which alone satisfies their pursuit of machismo. Indeed, the Marine Corps still sells itself not as a place to work, but as a place to grow in honor, courage, and commitment—values little taught or even respected in much of civilian society. Small wonder that Thomas Ricks found some new Marines contemptuous of the society whence they came after meeting the uncompromised standards of boot camp. They had achieved genuine self-actualization, not the feel-good therapy of victimhood.\textsuperscript{61}

Present recruiting methodology stresses incentives and boasts benefits, while undermining the privilege and honor of serving the Nation and protecting our freedom. Its 2\textsuperscript{nd} and 3\textsuperscript{rd} order effects, while not clearly evidenced, will most certainly have ramifications within the parameters of the COE. Only through a thorough analysis and honest evaluation can the Services decide if whom they recruit into their ranks is the type of individual that can be effective in this environment.

With such varied recruiting strategies and cultural dissimilarities, how can the Services be expected to operate seamlessly in the complex COE? Clearly, the Services must become more particular to the type of individual they recruit for their ranks and then maximize efforts to retain those personnel into the ranks of the warfighting profession, emphasizing and instilling the “warrior ethos” throughout every phase of the individual’s development. This must begin with recruiting and continue through indoctrination and follow-on training in order for us to be able to assemble some semblance of a joint expeditionary culture. Teamwork can only be fostered when there is an assimilation of similar attitudes, beliefs and values.

\textbf{INDOCTRINATION}

Defined as the process by which one transforms a civilian into a member of a Service, the focus here is the phase commonly referred to as recruit training or boot camp. This period covers

\textsuperscript{61}John Hillen, “The Danger in Closing the Gap,” \textit{(Orbis, FPRI, Winter 1999.)} A former paratrooper and decorated combat veteran of the Gulf War, he is a defense and intelligence expert who is published widely on all facets of national security and military affairs. He holds degrees from Duke University, King’s College London, and a doctorate from Oxford.
the time when recruits are “in training” and not yet members of the Service. Even in this regard, different methodologies emerge from the Services, as to when a civilian actually becomes a member of the service or is still considered a trainee or recruit.

Boot Camp, Basic Military Training (BMT) and Recruit training are all names for the process of transforming civilians into members of an organization, in this case a military organization with distinct cultures, values and ethos. The following matrix provides the comparison to the four Services boot camps.\(^{62}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service</th>
<th>Duration of IET</th>
<th>Methodology</th>
<th>Gender Integration</th>
<th>Culminating Event/Time</th>
<th>Number of Camps</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>8 Weeks</td>
<td>Build on existing personalities Trainee vs Recruit</td>
<td>CS/CSS-yes IN/AR/FA-no</td>
<td>Victory Forge / 8th</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USN</td>
<td>9 Weeks</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Battle Stations / 9th</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USMC</td>
<td>12 Weeks</td>
<td>Achieve new identity</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Crucible / 11(^{th})</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAF</td>
<td>6 Weeks</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Warrior Week / 6th</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The most glaring and controversial issue is whether gender-integration at boot camps is allowable or even acceptable. Boot Camps begin the inoculation process of Services cultures. Standards are set and requirements outlined. The environment tests individual resolve, physical and mental capabilities and stresses them to the point of exhaustion. Yet, the very issue of standards rises from the reports of gender study groups indicating that all is well. Three of the four Services have adopted gender-integrated boot camps. Stephanie Guttman in, *Kinder*.

\(^{62}\)Neither the USAF nor the US Navy has regulations or orders governing boot camp readily available to the public to review methodologies of their basic training program of instruction.
Gentler Military, as well as Brian Mitchell in Weak Link: The Feminization of the American Military both discuss the negative effects gender-integration has on readiness in world-wide rapid deployable forces. This results in lowered standards and increased sensitivity and thus dilutes the overall effectiveness of transforming civilians into service members, further hindering the instillation of a warrior ethos. Compromising standards stands as the largest complaint from Drill Sgt’s interviewed at Fort Jackson, SC, the basic training ground of the majority of US Army combat service support (CSS) recruits.

Each Service possesses a different methodology for indoctrination. This warrants scrutiny of each.

US Army. The Army separates MOS’s for basic training by virtue of the MOS they will be assigned following boot camp. The fields of infantry, armor and field artillery are segregated during basic training and continue to be through advanced individual training (AIT) and on-station unit training (OSUT). The basis for this rule of segregation is outlined by Army policy, built upon the following MOS assignment rule and definition of direct combat:

Rule: Service members are eligible to be assigned to all positions for which they are qualified, except that women shall be excluded for assignment to units below the brigade level whose primary mission is to engage in direct combat on the ground, as defined below.

Definition. Direct ground combat is engaging an enemy on the ground with individual or crew served weapons, while being exposed to hostile fire and to a high probability of direct physical contact with the hostile force’s personnel. Direct ground combat takes place well forward on the battlefield while locating and closing with the enemy to defeat them by fire, maneuver, or shock effect.


64Gutmann, 63.

In light of the nature of the COE and from recent observations in operation in Iraq, this policy clearly warrants review. “Well forward on the battlefield” is a relative term, and in the COE against an asymmetric threat, the logic behind the definition is no longer valid.

**US Marine Corps.** The Marine Corps conducts gender-segregated basic training. The Corps believes gender segregated units have a significant effect on operational unit combat readiness and effectiveness, not because of the military skills it teaches but because of the way it teaches them. The Marine Corps uses a rheostat approach to training, designed to make the individual first into a Marine, no matter the gender, and then to produce effective operational units through unit and sustainment training. This works for the Marine Corps because of their mission, composition and culture. Marine Corps leaders believe that “In gender segregated recruit training, the strong, positive role of the DI [Drill Instructor] . . . without the distracting undercurrent of sexual attraction . . . provides and environment free from latent or overt sexual pressures, thereby giving new and vulnerable recruits the opportunity to focus on and absorb Marine standards of behavior.”

The Marine Corps begins integrated training after the Marines have graduated boot camp and arrive at the School of Infantry to conduct Marine Combat training. Marines from all MOS’ undergo three weeks of infantry skills training before attending their follow on schools where gender integration begins to represent the gender make-up their MOS dictates in the operating forces.

**US Navy.** The Navy integrates men and women during boot camp. Although the Navy has taken steps recently to increase the challenge of boot camp, issues continue to arise out from reduced standards to facilitate lower attrition rates amongst recruits. “Battle Stations,” a 12-hour

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culminating event was implemented to provide a significant emotional event to create the ceremonious rite of passage into the Navy.

The Navy utilizes gender-specific standards at boot camp and for their physical fitness test (as all Services do). According to James H. Anderson, PhD and Policy Analyst from The Heritage Foundation in his essay titled, “Boot Camp or Summer Camp? Restoring Rigorous Standards to Basic Training,” the Services have lowered the standards for their recruits in order to mitigate the effects of gender-integration. In describing the impact of slackened standards, he states that “Integrated basic training has lowered standards, engendered resentment and undermined morale.” Some of the initiatives that the Navy has taken in their recent history point to the challenges they have with gender-integration. These steps include showing recruits on the bus a video telling them that “physically, anyone can make it through boot camp,” recruits no longer drilling with rifles (deemed “anachronistic”) and are all are issued a “blue card” used to signify to the leaders that the recruit needs a “time-out” and the environment has become too stressful. Although the “stress card” (as it was so aptly named) was eventually dropped, the overall standards have decreased significantly to mitigate the integration during basic training. Additional standards that have been dropped include the Navy’s stretcher-bearing requirement test. They have increased the number of litter bearers from two to four personnel to accommodate the fact that female Sailors generally have less upper-body strength. For anyone that has served on a ship, this seems ludicrous given the amount of limited space one has when negotiating narrow passageways and ladder wells.

Like its sister Service the Army, the Navy also segregates recruits by “ability” for physical training. These groups compensate for a lack of physical strength and prevent

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68 Kate O’Byrne, “When Lives Are at Stake,” (Ex Femina, September 1997) 11.
embarrassment for those unable to keep up, but are touted as ways to push the individual so improvement can be individually measured.

**US Air Force.** What is notably distinct in the US Air Force’s version of boot camp they call Basic Military Training or BMT, is the length of the course. A 6-week course, it is the first stage in creating an Airman to prepare them for their follow on MOS schools. It, like the Navy and Army, integrates men and women during this critical phase of indoctrination.

Similar to the Navy, the Air Force has recently revamped the standards of BMT to meet the demands of the current operating environment, precipitated by continued external and internal criticism. In August of 1997 a focus group of Air Force Pilots formed to discuss declining morale. They voiced strong sentiment in favor of increased standards at BMT. 

DOCTRINE

Each Service creates doctrine. Ideally, Service doctrine is the product of the history of the Service based on an acceptable theory of warfare aligned with Joint Doctrine. The USAF subscribes to airpower theory, the Marine Corps, maneuver warfare theory, and the Navy has its roots in Mahan and Corbett’s theories on seapower. As for our largest Service the US Army, the answer is not so clear. Additionally, what appears to be the theoretical basis for joint doctrine? The purpose of the following section is to analyze the Services capstone doctrinal documents that define the theory in which each service derives their doctrinal framework.

**US Army, Field Manual (FM) 1:** Defined as the capstone publication for all US Army doctrine, this publication has four chapters titled: The Army and Profession of Arms, The Strategic and Joint Operating Environment, The Army in Military Operations, and The Way Ahead.

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The Manual describes the core competencies for the US army and list them as: Shape the Security Environment, Prompt Response, Mobilize the Army, Forcible Entry Ops, Sustained Land Dominance, Support Civil Authorities. The manual, from introduction to conclusion speaks about the Army as a Service. Not present in FM 1, one had to turn to FM 3-0 titled Operations, to find the current US Army definition of doctrine:

The concise expression of how Army forces contribute to unified action in campaigns, major operations, battles and engagements . . . provides the principles for conducting operations . . . linking tactical operations to strategic aims.70

What theory of war does the US Army base its doctrine on? Having been immersed in US Army doctrine for the last two years, I have experienced difficulty discerning this . . . as have most of the US Army Soldiers I ask. Most every Officer I have queried over the past two years gives me a different answer. The answers that been offered to me stem from “operational art,” “Clausewitzian,” “Jominian,” or maneuver warfare theory to name a few.

The focus of FM 1, The Army, is the US Army as a Service. There is little if any discussion dedicated to the theory or nature of warfare, nor does it identify the type of warfare philosophy or theory within which this large organization will function. One must go to FM 3-0, Operations, or 3-90, Tactics, to find more on their philosophy of warfighting. While these huge volumes interweave prescriptive, technique based directions, and many diagrams on how to array units, they fall short of teaching soldiers how to think about and operate in war or military operations other than war. The principles of Jomini are clearly adopted throughout these publications, yet conspicuously absent is the very essence of what FM 1 should capture--a warfighting philosophy that will guide and direct a proper mind-set in each soldier, thus ensuring battlefield success in the chaotic nature of warfare, especially in the COE of the 21st Century.

Although the US Army leadership “talks” Clausewitzian theory, their doctrine is scientific, methodical and analytical; much more in line with the Swiss theorist.

70FM 3-0, Operations, 1-14.
This Service discusses Clausewitzian tenets such as fog and friction. They also understand the inexplicable ties military operations have to policy, yet the structure of their doctrine focuses on organizing, equipping and employing US Army units for combat, while adhering to many of the same maxims that Jomini wrote about so many years ago. Jomini’s multitude of maxims created formulas and principles, which, if followed correctly, will breed success in combat. US Army Doctrine emerges from this philosophy.

The US Army’s culture, as a system of interrelated, yet clearly delineated branches has difficulty inculcating a common mind-set for how operations should conceptually be conducted. Couple that with a lack of a clear warfighting philosophy and it only exacerbates the problem associated with their clearly separate branch system. To be a coherent and cohesive organization, a common theory of warfare has to be adopted from within a Service, before assuming a joint culture. An identifiable theory of war from which to form a Service doctrine is a critical first step.

A comparison of the US Army to the Marine Corps’ will offer a vastly different view to the formation and application of doctrine. The US Army chooses a more analytical than recognitional decision-making model and focus in their utilization of the military decision making process (MDMP), which often-times emphasizes process over product. This becomes readily apparent to the student attending intermediate level school at the CGSOC.

What is notably absent from US Army doctrinal publications is a definitive theory of warfare that needs to be the guiding philosophy that breeds unity effort, and is fully inculcated in every US Army Soldier.

**US Marine Corps, Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication (MCDP) 1.** The Marine Corps identifies this as the capstone doctrinal document for their Service. It is relatively short booklet; 100 pages long. *Warfighting*, is based on maneuver warfare theory. It contains 4 Chapters: The Nature of War, Theory of War, Preparing for War and The Conduct of War.
Maneuver Warfare as the Marine Corps defines it, “A Warfighting philosophy that seeks to shatter the enemy’s cohesion through a variety of rapid, focused, and unexpected actions which create a turbulent and rapidly deteriorating situation with which the enemy cannot cope.”

The Core Competencies delineated by MCDP 1 are as follows: Expeditionary Readiness, Combined Arms Operations, Expeditionary Operations, Sea-based Operations, Forcible Entry, and Reserve Integration.

A comparison to the Marine Corps’ definition of doctrine to the US Army’s will further emphasize the contrast in styles of warfare with a clearly different theoretical base:

A teaching advanced as the fundamental beliefs of the Marine Corps on the subject of war, from its nature and theory to its preparation and conduct. Doctrine establishes a particular way of thinking about war and a way of fighting, . . . a mandate for professionalism, and a common language. . . . Our Doctrine does not consist of procedures to be applied in specific situations so much as it establishes general guidance that requires judgment in application. The Marine Corps style of warfare requires intelligent leaders with a penchant for boldness and initiative down to the lowest levels. . . . We will not accept lack of orders as justification for inaction; it is each Marine’s duty to take initiative as the situation demands.

The Marine Corps also demonstrates the importance of an expeditionary mind-set reflected in its Service doctrine, MCDP 3, *Expeditionary Operation*, described here as:

A state of mind. An expeditionary mindset implies the versatility and adaptability to respond effectively without a great deal of preparation tie to a broad variety of circumstances. Another part of this expeditionary mindset is a global perspective oriented to responding to a diverse range of threats around the globe rather than specific threats in a specific part of the world. This mindset is a matter of training and institutional culture.”

The essence of Warfighting reflects the Marine Corps’ adherence to maneuver warfare theory; its tenets are nested throughout the MCDPs and Marine Corps Warfighting Publications (MCWPs).

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71 MCDP 1, *Warfighting*, 73.

The US Navy, Navy Doctrinal Publication (NDP) 1. *Naval Warfare* contains 5 Chapters: Who We are--The Nature of Naval Services; What We do--Employment of Naval Forces; How We Fight; Naval Warfare; Where We are Headed--Into the 21st Century. It espouses Maneuver warfare theory with an obvious emphasis on Naval Warfare and seapower.

NDP 1 resembles MCDP 1 with additions that include US Navy capabilities and forces. Interestingly, the title *Naval* refers to all the Naval Services, including the Marine Corps and the Coast Guard (when the Coast Guard is under operational control). Both the Chief of Naval Operations and the Commandant of the Marine Corps endorsed the introduction. It is clearly derived from MCDP 1, for maneuver warfare theory is resident throughout this publication. Yet, the Navy in practice appears to place the least amount of emphasis on doctrine for their way of war. While NDP 1 claims to be the Capstone document for all Naval doctrine, it is difficult to ascertain its utilization in the Navy Fleet forces. Navy forces typically operate within an environment of highly centralized control and rigid operating procedures. It is not until the Officer achieves the rank of Commander or Captain (the rank commensurate with command of a ship) does he receive the freedom of maneuver and decentralization reflected in NDP-1.

The USAF, Air Force Doctrinal Directive (AFDD) 1. This doctrinal publication consists of 7 chapters: An Introduction to Doctrine--Policy, Strategy, Doctrine and War; Principles and Tenets; Roles Missions and Functions of Air and Space Power; Expeditionary Air Force Organization; Core Competencies; Distinct Capabilities; and Linking the Future to the Present--Vision, Operating Concepts, and Doctrine. The Core Competencies stated are: Air and Space Superiority, Precision Engagement, Information Superiority, Global Attack, Rapid Global Mobility, and Agile Combat Support.

In Chapter Two’s text, one section is devoted to the nature of war, based upon Clausewitz’s enduring truths. AFDD 1 lists them as; War is an instrument of policy, War is a
complex and chaotic human endeavor, and War is a clash of opposing wills. The publication, in a follow on section titled the, “Changing Character of the American Way of War” states:

Early airpower advocates argues that airpower could be decisive and achieve strategic effects . . . while not proved . . . the 1991 Persian Gulf War has proven that air and space power can be a dominant . . . decisive element of combat in modern warfare . . . it is a maneuver element in its own right, co-equal with land and maritime power and as such . . . no longer merely a supporting force to surface combat. 73

As noted in the foreword by the USAF Chief of Staff, General John Jumper asserts that there are two principles in AFDD 1 that are the pillars of his doctrine--unity of command, and centralized control and decentralized execution. “We believe that airmen work for airmen and the senior airman works for the joint force commander.” 74 This appears to be a non-negotiable dictum in the Air Force culture, consistent with their adoption of airpower theory and resident throughout their doctrine and in practice. The questions that remain are; is this attitude conducive to a joint expeditionary culture? Is it aligned with JV 2020?

Interestingly, the USAF’s doctrinal webpage provides a direct link to the 50 Questions every airman can answer booklet, a supplemental guide supporting the understanding of USAF doctrine, and thus, the Air Force’s view or theory of warfare. One of the most interesting questions asks the following question and provides a ready-made answer:

What is operational art? Air and space operational art differs from the operational art of surface force commanders because air and space strategies are not linear nor are they directly related to geographic or topographic considerations. Finally, a person cannot be trained in the air and space operational art as you might train someone to change a tire. Expertise in operational art is only gained by breadth of experience, personal study and professional education. 75

Is operational art different by virtue of the Service or medium you operate from within? This statement diverts from JV 2020’s conceptual model of joint operations. An underlying

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73 AFDD-1, 18-19.
74 Ibid., ii.
75 50 Questions Every Airman Can Answer, 5.
imperative throughout joint doctrine requires the integration of all subordinate forces through the mediums of conflict into a synergistic single campaign effort designed to link tactical actions across the battlespace to achieve strategic or national objectives. How can we in the DoD have such varied views of warfare?

This publication does address the Expeditionary requirement for the joint force in the COE. The Expeditionary Aerospace force (AEF) provides the source or readily trained operational and support forces. Subordinate to the AEF, the aerospace expeditionary task force (AETF) deploys as a task organized, integrated package with the appropriate balance of forces, sustainment, control and force protection. This task organization is further described as the means the air force will conduct a vast majority of its important business away from our garrison locations. Use of the word “expeditionary” is purposefully designed to encourage a new way of thinking among Air Force Airmen about conducting aerospace operations with minimal notice from generally austere, remote locations with minimal support.

Given these vastly different Service doctrines, we can now see the many challenges that face the task of creating a joint expeditionary cultural mindset.

\footnote{AFDD-1, 73.}
CHAPTER THREE
Conclusions From A Historical Perspective

JOINT OPERATIONS IN HISTORY

The following four case studies will focus on the cultural seams and the effects they had on campaigns where our Service members fought and died for their country.

As painful as it may be to open old wounds, the record of Army/Marine Corps cooperation in battle is littered with the debris of inter-service rivalry. From Saipan to Seoul, Khe Sanh to Desert One, Point Salines to Panama City…the Army and Marine Corps have clashed over roles and missions.77

This statement was never truer than in the rice paddies, highlands and coastal plains of Vietnam.

Vietnam 1965-72

One of the harshest criticisms on the US campaign plan in Vietnam comes from Max Boot in his book, *Savage Wars of Peace*. Throughout his book, he describes the history of US military interventions from the position that large conventional conflicts were the exception and not the norm throughout US American history. His main theme, continuous throughout the text, criticizes the US Military’s tendencies to forget lessons of the past and fight the type of wars we wanted to fight despite the enemy’s motivations or strategic or political objectives. This was never more clear, he succinctly points out, than in Vietnam.

Was the war in Vietnam a conventional war against communism, a counter-insurgency or a combination of the two? General William Childs Westmoreland, the US Army’s “Golden Boy”78 was sent to Vietnam to fight a war for which nothing in his training or experiences had


78*Savage Wars of Peace*, 289.
Having entered Second World War a First Lieutenant, by 1945 he was promoted to full Colonel. Westmoreland achieved flag rank during the Korean War and subsequently commanded the 101st Airborne Division. He went on further to be named the Superintendent of West Point, following closely in the footsteps of Eisenhower and MacArthur.

At a press conference early on in the conflict, when asked what the answer to counter-insurgency operations was, Westmoreland gave a one-word reply: firepower. This mind-set characterized his plan to rid the South Vietnamese of the North Vietnamese Communist menace.

What Westmoreland inherited initially was a flawed advisory attempt. The intention of the Military Assistance Command--Vietnam (MACV) was to create a South Vietnamese (SVN) Army conventionally capable of defeating a NVA adversary much like the US had faced in Korea. The lessons of Nicaragua, Haiti and the Philippines were all but forgotten. The real enemy, in hindsight, was the guerilla, but more specifically unconventional forces that infiltrated into the south. The advisors trained and equipped the ARVN forces for the wrong type of war.  

Lt Colonel John Paul Vann, an outspoken and controversial American advisor spent several years in Vietnam. Considered and expert in counter-insurgency operations (COIN) he emphatically stated that this guerilla war required the utmost discrimination in killing. His Army superiors refused to listen, and his scheduled brief to the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1963 canceled for unknown reasons.

Westmoreland chose instead to develop a conventional approach to the war. With an emphasis on attrition, his firepower oriented search and destroy campaigns were undertaken to fix and destroy enemy North Vietnamese Army (NVA) and Vietcong (VC) formations that refused to cooperate. In December of 1965, not long after the Marines landed on the beaches of DaNang,

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79Ibid, 293.
80Savage Wars of Peace, 288.
81Ibid., 289.
the commanding general of Fleet Marine Forces Pacific, Lt General Victor “Brute” Krulak proposed a different campaign plan. His plan emphasized counter-insurgency tactics learned from US experiences in the Philippines, Nicaragua and Haiti—one that focused on separating the insurgents from the populace and the food in the South. He captured this “ink-blot” strategy in a seventeen-page memo intended to route through the JCS and DoD. Despite winning favor with many well-known Army General Officers such as Maxwell Taylor and James Gavin, Westmoreland determined this approach would not work fast enough. Contrary to the policy from Westmoreland and MACV, the combined action platoons (CAPs) under Lewis Walt, Commanding General of III Marine Amphibious Force (MAF) as well as Robert Komer’s Civil Operations Revolutionary Development (CORD) were implemented to address the insurgency. Unfortunately, these became veritable sideshows and were not integrated into Westmoreland’s real war of attrition.  

Andrew Krepinevich, Jr., in his book The Army and Vietnam, details the flawed strategy adopted by MACV and the Army throughout the intervention in Southeast Asia. He describes in detail, what he labels as the “folly” of the US attempt to transplant to Indochina the operational methods that had been successful in the European battlefields of World War II. Krepinevich details the away in which the US Army was unprepared to fight a war of counter-insurgency in Vietnam and predicts the culture is still not prepared today to address such threats. 

With this large war and conventional mind-set, came the associated overhead and support infrastructure that is required to sustain such a force. As one Vietnam veteran indicated, for every Soldier in the bush, four or five were in the rear areas sleeping in beds with sheets and many with

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82 Lewis Walt, as a 2ndLt at the Basic School in Quantico, was the recipient of many classes on the “small wars” in the Caribbean and South America by then Capt Lewis B. Puller, a Marine Corps icon and pioneer in counter-insurgency operations.

83 Ibid., 247.

84 Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., The Army In Vietnam, (The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986.)
air conditioning. Operations in Southeast Asia are a glowing example contrary to the requirement of an expeditionary force to operate in austere environments.

The resultant clashes of cultures were never more clear than in Vietnam, and the effects caused by the post-World War II culture versus the “small war” mind-set highlights many of the same difficulties we have today in executing joint operations in a complex environment. The Marines (as well as many Special Forces Soldiers), having spent the better part of fifty years in the Caribbean and South America, understood the nature of the conflict they were about to embark. This is a clear example of what great influence a culture can have over thousands of lives for close to a decade in this difficult time in our nation’s history. Would COIN operations solely have worked in Vietnam? One can only speculate, but for sure, a more comprehensive plan that included balanced elements of COIN and conventional operations integrated into a coherent campaign plan would most assuredly been more effective than what transpired just thirty some years ago.

Kuwait 1991

In the wake of the flawed Iranian hostage rescue attempt in 1980 and joint issues that arose out of after-action reports (AARs) from Granada during Operation URGENT FURY, the Goldwater-Nichols legislation was born. In 1986, the Goldwater-Nichols Act (GNA) mandated a better integrated joint force and improved the command relationships from the President, the Secretary of Defense and the Combatant commanders. Even though Services had previously exchanged officers to their Service schools, these initiatives proved inadequate in transcending Service cultures. The first joint operation following GNA was anything but joint---the US Army

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85 Boot, 252.
planned and executed Operation JUST CAUSE in Panama with USAF transport aircraft, some Marines on the periphery and the Navy SEALs conducting operations that resulted in fratricide.86

Throughout the planning and execution of Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM there are numerous examples of cultural clashes and Service rivalries that detracted from the campaign plan to restore the international border of Kuwait and defeat the Iraqi armed forces in the Kuwaiti theater of operations (KTO).

Air Force vs. Army

Targeting was the main point of friction between the Army and the Air Force. The Army nominated targets they deemed critical to the success of their operations yet the USAF Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC) frequently dropped these nominations based on what they deemed as higher priority targets. Additionally, the Fire Support Coordination Line (FSCL) became an issue to the Air Force. They believed the Army put it too far in front of their units, preventing Air Force sorties from attacking enemy formations that were fleeing from the impending advance of coalition forces. The airpower enthusiasts in the JFACC were thus unable to attack the Iraqi forces with impunity throughout the land combat operations portion of the war.87

Navy vs. Marine Corps

The US Navy and Marine Corps traditionally hold a Naval Service bond forged through history. However, in Operations in the KTO, the Navy maintained an aircraft carrier focus as they wrestled with the Air Force for laurels in the “air war.” This focus left little room for amphibious assault planning, despite the capabilities resident in two amphibiously embarked Marine

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87 Ibid., 73.
Expeditionary Brigades (MEBs) in the Arabian Sea. The Navy Commanders had to be coaxed from a Headquarters Marine Corps (HQMC) dispatched team of planners to illuminate the potentiality of an amphibious assault into Kuwait.\(^8^8\) The effects of an impending amphibious assault from these MEBs are subjective, yet they reportedly fixed as many as six Iraqi divisions in Kuwait City facilitating the rest of the coalitions ground offensive to move with relative impunity across the less heavily defended open desert.

**Army vs. Army**

US Army VII Corps trained, equipped and ready to fight the Soviets in methodical central European conventional battle, planned to fight the Iraqi Army the same way—through meticulous planning and synchronization. This proved to be a vastly different mind-set than the XVII Airborne Corps, a CONUS-based traditionally strategic reserve and contingency force trained and equipped to respond anywhere a contingency may arise in the world on short notice. The Airborne Corps shared much more in common with First Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF) and other joint and coalition forces than they did their from members of their own Service.\(^8^9\)

**Army vs. Marine Corps**

I MEF, as a supporting effort in the south along the Kuwaiti border, was tasked to breach the Iraqi obstacle belt and fix those forces in place to allow the main effort, VII Corps to decide the fate of the Iraqi military by destroying the Republican Guard units in the North. Before the offensive, the CENTCOM Commander, Gen Norman Schwarzkopf assembled an Army planning team consisting of US and British Army planners. Lt. General Walter Boomer, the Commanding General of I MEF was not included. As a result, no Marine planners were involved with the

\(^8^8\)Ibid.  
\(^8^9\)Ibid.
completion of the ground offensive plan. The result of such an omission was what we call a “de-
synchronized” plan. I MEF, under Lt General Boomer’s guidance, attacked quickly and
vigorously (as Marine Corps doctrine and culture dictates) through the Iraqi obstacle belt, faster
than anticipated from CENTCOM. VII Corps the main effort in the North, was unable to generate
enough speed to keep pressure on the quickly culminating Iraqi forces. When ordered to speed
up, their highly synchronized rehearsed plan did not permit them to conform to such demands.
They were unable to generate enough tempo to trap the Republican Guard forces.

General Schwarzkopf understood the complexity of the coalition forces and determined a
decentralized command and control structure would best facilitate the type of tempo he needed to
defeat Iraq’s military forces in Kuwait. He assigned separate areas of operations (AOs) to his
subordinates to give maximum freedom of movement and initiative. Yet, the very freedom he
provided proved flawed, as the cultural implications of the campaign plan were not well thought
out.90

Operations in the KTO had demonstrated that a joint culture had not yet matured
sufficiently to take into account and accommodate the different Service cultures. The challenge
for present and future planners is to recognize the un-quantifiable value that Service cultures play
in warfighting.91

Kosovo 99-Present

In June of 1999, the NATO nations concluded Operation ALLIED FORCE with the
President Slobadon Milosovich’s signature on the military technical agreement (MTA) essentially
ending the occupation of the Serbian province of Kosovo. Despite the atrocities committed
against the primarily Muslim Kosovars, the Serb Army (VJ), and military police forces (MUP)
were allowed to conduct a peaceful withdrawal, unhindered by NATO forces.

90Ibid., 74.
Concurrent with the signing, the US contingent of the NATO peacekeeping force under the direction of Task Force Falcon (TFF) assumed an AO in multi-national brigade East (MNB-E) to enforce the signed agreement. The preponderance of those forces composed of the US Army’s 2-505th (Airborne) and the 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit, Special Operations Capable (26th MEU [SOC]). Although not categorized as a joint operation, the 26th MEU(SOC) was TACON to TFF for the 25 days they operated in Kosovo and Albania in support of Operation JOINT GUARDIAN.

Throughout the entire operation, there were numerous examples of interoperability issues that stemmed from the different cultures of the Services. Some of them include:

**Risk aversion.** Orders from TFF mandated minimal night movement. Checkpoints were to be closed down on main supply routes (MSRs), and troops were to be returned to bases, and any night movement had to be justified and reported all the way up to TFF. Since the mission as briefed and written included providing a safe and secure environment with the enforced the MTA as the overriding purpose of the operation, the constraints placed on the maneuver elements appeared directly contradictory to the nature of the environment and the mission. Retributions amongst Serbs and Kosovars occurred primarily at night. The only way to enforce the MTA was to operate at night. To exacerbate the dilemma, the orders additionally deemed force protection as “paramount.”

**Rules of Engagement (ROE).** TFF placed more stringent ROE than KFOR established. One example—60-mm mortar illumination rounds were delegated down to company level for clearance in KFORs ROE. The environment was such that the only way to spread the influence and prevent violent acts was to be physically present or make the criminals think you were. With two rifle companies of just over 450 men operating a city of 100,000, this was challenging to say the least. With observation teams spread throughout

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91Ibid., 74.
the city of Gnjilane and Cobra gun ships providing additional intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), we found that that deterrence could be greatly enhanced if we could provide illumination over potential crime scenes. Trying to utilize 40mm M203 delivered illumination rounds with a mere range of 400 meters at best, proved infeasible. Yet, not matter what the justification was, repeated attempts to utilize mortar illumination was denied by TFF.

“Plug and Play” units. Company I of Battalion Landing Team (BLT) 3/8 was a reinforced rifle company of approximately 225 Marine and Sailors. On 25 June 1999, Company I was relieved by a mechanized (M113) equipped Engineer Company. The type of unit conducting the relief was incorrect for the nature of the mission in the urban environment of Gnjilane, Kosovo. The Soldiers tasked to replace the Marines were not equipped with the manpower, training or mind-set to be able to execute this mission. Not one week after the relief-in-place, a patrimonial site with a Serbian statue was overrun, toppled and trucked away by local Kosovar Albanians, all in the presence of this security force. This action demonstrated the ineffectiveness of KFOR and the US forces charged with the mission they were assigned.

The mission to enforce the MTA and insure a safe and secure environment created a double-binding dilemma for the leadership and units employed during Operation JOINT GUARDIAN. Force protection became the primary mission. The mind-set that resonated from TFF was that nothing we were doing in Kosovo was worth the loss of one US Service-member. Without a complete understanding of the nature of the environment and a dedication to accomplishing the peacekeeping mission in Kosovo, this could not be accomplished. This

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92The author commanded Company I, BLT 3/8, the ground combat element of the MEU(SOC) throughout the operation. Each of the six maneuver elements of BLT 3/8 were given an AO further broken down into platoon and even squad AOs. He speaks from his experiences in 1999, and from a return trip to Kosovo in 2001 as Executive Officer of BLT 2/8 and 24th MEU(SOC) during Operation RAPID CHEETAH.
situation demanded that commanders take risks. Without a decentralized approach to operations with Soldiers and Marines living in and amongst the population, there was no way to be an effective peacekeeping force. This method of employment was not something the US Army headquarters at TFF were willing to endorse.

Sarah Chayes, former NPR reporter and Founder of Afghans For Civil Society, a NGO based in Kandahar, reported a similar “fortress mentality” that the US Military had in Afghanistan exemplified by having thousand of servicemen hunkered down in their bases and not intermixing with the population to stabilize the security environment even right within the vicinity of these large “fortresses.”

Liberia 25 July to 8 October 2003

The focus of this final case study will be on the planning phases for the noncombatant evacuation operation in the country of Liberia, from a JTF planner’s perspective. Major Bill Harmon, Chief of plans for JTF Liberia discussed the cultural effects of planning military operations other than war (MOOTW) off the coast of West Africa last year. In forming the JTF, Southern European Task Force (SETAF) became the core, and was augmented via the Deployable Joint Task Force Augmentation Cells (DJTFAC) from all Services throughout the US European Command’s (EUCOM) area of responsibility (AOR), as well as CONUS based units. He identified several specific areas where the clashing of cultures was most significant and created friction in the JTF.

Three of the four Services sent a Colonel/Navy Captain as their senior service representatives in the JTF staff; the Air Force sent a Major General. This was perceived as an effort to “guard the interests” of the AF. While the AF element did strategic airlift well

93Sarah Chayes, in a presentation to SAMS on 6 November 2003. While non-attribution policy precludes inclusion of such comments, Ms Chayse agreed to allow this comment to be included in this monograph via email on 15 April 2003.
(USTRANSCOM mission) they did not appear to be so good at “other than war” missions. When it can time to issuing orders and directives to the AFFOR element, the Chief of plans had to be very specific to that element, citing that the Air Force members of the Joint Planning Group (JPG) were not empowered to make decisions for their Service in this time-sensitive planning environment. He found that the key weakness was the USAF planner’s inability to work with commander’s intent and a mission. They were not able ascertain implied tasks and fell back on safety and procedural issues as reasons whey they could not support the JTF. Moreover, if they were not tasked to do a particular mission in writing, they would not execute, with no matter to the urgency of the situation.

Another major observation from Major Harmon regarding the USAF culture was that it did not mesh well with the Army, Navy and Marine Corps. The Marine Corps who provided the preponderance of the forces for JTF LIBERIA, sent planners empowered to make decisions and coordinated with their parent HQ’s when timely decisions had to be made, as did the Army and Navy. The AF planners were never able to effectively commit to a specific course of action or task without checking first with their parent commands. Further, he noted that the AF appears to be struggling to refine airpower theory and how it relates to MOOTW in the COE.

Even in the US Army, the subcultures of the branches came into play. In this expedition, planners from the JTF clashed with combat service support (CSS) planners that were determined to build forward operating bases (FOBs), intermediate staging bases (ISBs) and create an unnecessary infrastructure for a force that was only intended upon operating for a short time with a planned withdraw. These are all traits of the nature of expeditionary operations. The CSS planners did this despite direction from the planners that such facilities were not necessary given the timeframe and maritime nature of the operation.

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As for another friction points, the US Navy culture clashed in the leadership realm with the Army members of the JTF staff. The Navy provided the deputy commander for the JTF. This Rear Admiral insisted on forming an Admiral’s mess. A formal Navy tradition, the intention of the Admirals mess is to build camaraderie amongst the officers of ships and bring about issues that might well be missed without such a gathering. This act, not well explained or understood, alienated most every officer and enlisted Soldier in the JTF staff. They equated the Admiral’s mess to increased benefits to the officers who attended, and this event eroded the sense of teamwork the JTF HQ had worked so hard to establish.

Even more disturbing, the US Navy, as well as the Air Force, seemed to be bereft of decision-making doctrine or processes. This makes planning exceptionally difficult when forming a short notice JTF to do crisis action planning.

The good aspects of service competition were lost in JTF Liberia due to the Service parochialism and vastly different cultures experienced by the Chief of plans. While we as a joint force always seem to find a way to succeed, the JTF LIBERIA case study demonstrates that we often do so in spite of ourselves. While all Services have made strides we still have a long way to go. \(^95\)

In conclusion, consider the following statement that comes from a Captain on the ground as part of JTF Horn of Africa, as he relates his opinion of what the expeditionary mindset entails in the context of the cultural environment in the JTF while deployed:

I think that Expeditionary is a mindset. It is the willingness to live out of a seabag and a pack (not luggage and foot lockers as many deployed here with!). It is wanting to be dirty while remaining sanitary. It is wanting to "rough it" to an extent. It is expecting to work long hours, 7 days a week. It is a willingness to say good-bye to family, and miss holidays and birthdays. It is a mental preparation to be deployed at a moments notice. Always having your seabag packed and your war gear ready. I am disheartened by the fact that they won't let me carry my M9. I expect to do so while forward deployed. I expect to wear my Gas Mask. I expect to eat MRE's. I expect to have to look forward to that shower that I may only get once a week. None of this is what I am seeing here, at least not wholly. Now take the other Services, individually or wholly and the mindset is

not the same. Being forward deployed may mean not being on a ship, or not being stationed in CONUS, or not being able to wear starched cammies, or simply having to wear cammies in the first place! Maybe the Corps is better at it because we are used to doing the impossible with nothing. We do not have the best facilities in CONUS, so we get used to making do. . . We are the light Infantry and are used to living out of our seabag. We pack light and freeze at night, and this is unheard of in other Services. We thrive in hardship, hell, we almost expect it. Others shun it and attempt in every way to work around it.96

There is a marked differential between facilitating an expeditionary culture vice making every armed force expeditionary, the latter perhaps not feasible given fiscal constraints. This argument is not that every Service culture be the same. The argument is this: in light of our country’s tumultuous history, the COE in which we will operate, this demands we put warriors in uniform and equip them, mentally and physically for the environment in which they are to operate . . . no more TF Smiths . . . no more Beirut’s, no more 507th Maintenance Companies. Not while we stand idly by. A warrior ethos is a good start; and a joint expeditionary mind-set even better, but it will take a more holistic and honest approach to the realities of the COE from within our institutions to prepare our members to not only go in harm’s way, but feed the hungry when necessary, win the hearts and minds of the populace, and when absolutely necessary, kill. As I argue, that starts and finishes with our Services’ cultures.

These cases have highlighted the issues that evolve around our cultures and have identified some of the cultural gaps throughout our recent history. We must now take action to mitigate some of the inherent cultural seams that we as a joint force have exhibited.

CHAPTER FOUR

Recommendations

JOINT SHARED VISION

What the Services need to achieve success in the future centered on what Peter Senge would call a shared vision. The DoD must learn to view warfare from the same shared vision for us to adopt a proper mindset and insure mental, cognitive and physical interoperability.

You cannot have a learning organization without shared vision. Without a pull toward some goal, which people truly want to achieve, the forces in support of the status quo can be overwhelming. Vision establishes an overarching goal. The loftiness of the target compels new ways of thinking and acting.97

To achieve shared vision, DoD must assume the attributes of a learning organization. Senge discusses the criticality of consensus that the shared vision brings to the organization and to change, and fight the internal resistance, this can become a daunting task.

Shared vision is vital for the learning organization because it provides the focus and energy for learning.98

To achieve a joint shared vision, a methodology must be established and implemented. JV 2020 is a start, but a more comprehensive discussion of a philosophy and theory of warfighting must be wholly understood and implemented throughout the DoD. Service Chiefs must concede and create doctrine and implement it through their institutions in recruiting, indoctrination, training and education. The joint staff as well as the Joint Forces Commander has a monumental task before them if we are to achieve a joint expeditionary cultural mind-set. There

98Ibid., 206.
must be collaboration from each Service, as they must fully “buy-in” to the joint shared vision to truly achieve the desired endstate.

   Some things can be learned in peacetime, and others only in war, and that if the military are to make the most of their opportunities when war comes they must be organizationally prepared to learn.”

Metanoia, a word with Greek origins means a shift of mind. In the early Christian traditions, it was described as an awakening of shared intuition and “direct knowing of the highest, of God.” It is high time that we in the DoD achieved a state of metanoia, especially in light of current world events and the threats to our nation that exist throughout the world.

   While the first step in achieving a joint expeditionary culture is in adopting a joint philosophy of warfighting, perhaps the most difficult of that step is to implement this mind-set through each Service’s culture. The second step now is to look at how we organize forces to achieve a single battle construct. This will force us to analyze the current JTF structure and determine if it is the most effective or just the most efficient way to organize for conflict.

**JTF REORGANIZATION**

   A Service component command structure appears at first glance to be the least effective in insuring interoperability. Functional component commands are better, but will they really suffice in the complexity of the COE?

   The specific climates in which the Services carry out their operational assignments directly shape both their outlook on war and peace and those tools with which they equip themselves. Throughout most of its history, the United States has practiced compartmentalized warfare organized in the nature of its dimension or medium. Each service had a distinct role and operated nearly independently: the Navy laid claim to blue-water operations, the Marine Corps developed itself into an expeditionary force, and the Army focused on large-scale ground warfare.

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With the relatively late arrival of the Air Force, that service built its doctrine of airpower around the belief that aircraft could collapse the enemy’s will as they collapsed his cities, and thus strategic airpower trumped the other Services, relegating them to peripheral operations. As recently as World War II, many, if not most, of the battles were either primarily land (the European campaign), primarily maritime (the Pacific campaign), or primarily air (the Battle of Britain or the strategic bombing of Germany’s industrial centers). Historically, therefore, military campaigns conducted along the lines of the separate Services are understandable. The separateness of military operations into different mediums is an assumption born from history.

At least two challenges arise from this joint architecture. The first is that it creates a seam between components in today’s multi-dimensional operations. The second is that “jointness” kept at the three-star level does not support emerging operational concepts using smaller, dispersed forces, both on the ground, at sea or in the air. As late as Operations DESERT SHIELD and DERSERT STORM, the solution to interoperability was to separate services by creating separate AOs. This achieved little integration, and, as discussed, the very manner in which I MEF attacked de-synchronized the entire CENTCOM plan.

A current model of a joint task force, aligned along functional component commands as depicted in figure 2. When joint doctrine refers to “functional component commands,” it is speaking of the medium in which the force operates. As joint operations have evolved, this has created unnatural seams. Military operations today, even at relatively low levels, operate in multiple dimensions simultaneously. To be successful, the principle of unity of effort must cut across these mediums, and therefore must cut across the stove-piped component or functional and Service commands. Information operations are but one example of a functional area that cuts across the mediums with no proven way to unify the desired effects. Why does the

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100Senge, 15.
the Defense Department retain ground, maritime, and air component commands when modern operations do not lend themselves to such a neat compartmentalization? A proposed approach changes the way in which the component commands are defined along mission-oriented functions rather than the existing organizational architecture paradigm of medium-based commands. The following model, presented by Michael P. Noonan, member of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, fellow of the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society, and Contributing Editor to Orbis Magazine, in his essay titled, Joint Force (Re) Organization, represents a new joint task force command structure to break down the barriers that the mediums create:
Each component of this proposed organization would have elements of all Services to operate through the mediums, but be based on the *mission* of that element, vice the *medium* in which it operates. The concept is not new. Due to the special capabilities (the means) in which USSOCOM and the Navy and Marine Corps possess and the nature of special and amphibious operations, Joint Special Operations Area (JSOAs) and amphibious objective areas (AOAs) provide the required unity of command to operate totally integrated through the 3-dimensional battlespace. Unity of command and unity of effort are maximized as confliction with other components is minimized. It is high time to think through the way in which we envision integrating the Services along new lines if we are to truly develop seamless, complementary forces to achieve our national objectives.

Forcing “jointness” down to the smaller unit levels, under other Service commanders will prove to be painful at first, but a collective training program will mitigate the short-term cultural differences. More importantly, we must plan to mitigate the complexity of the COE through a
restructuring of the JTF that eliminates seams and forces us to know and understand each Services strengths and weaknesses.

**RECRUITING**

We are an all-volunteer force. The emphasis for recruiting should be on Service, and all that entails. The overemphasis on unearned incentives attracts the wrong type of person into our armed forces. We must define our requirements and send the right message to those who show interest in service to this nation. In order to implement this, perhaps an “up or out policy” should be revisited. The following initiatives should be studied and/or implemented to assist us in achieving the culture we require:

- Tougher entrance criteria
- De-emphasis on financial incentives
- Acceptance of higher rates of attrition in basic training
- Drop “up or out” personnel policies

Only through implementation of some or all of these initiatives will we bring the type of person into the service of our armed forces.

**INDOCTRINATION**

Military organizations should inculcate in their members a relentless empiricism, a disdain for a priori theorizing if they are to succeed. The ‘learners’ in military organizations must cultivate the temperament of the historian, the detective, or the journalist, rather than the theoretical bent of the social scientists or philosopher.¹⁰¹

Boot Camp standards need to be reevaluated with the proper emphasis placed on the methodology for boot camp implemented. Potential members of the US DoD must be screened and evaluated to determine their potential for military service; this process starts with recruiting but must continue at basic training. Gender segregation at entry-level training should be revisited

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with a renewed emphasis on the realities (human dimension) of combat. Enforced and realistic standards must be reemphasized. Services must recognize that there are differences between the genders, both physical and psychological. Boot camp methodology must be changed to de-emphasize the Entry-level training mind-set and adopt a screening and evaluation model.

Service-members need a genuine test to achieve change in their character, and this only comes through the possibility of failure in achieving their goals. To truly indoctrinate the recruits into a culture of a fraternal organization of warrior-ship, with an expeditionary mind-set, the Services must strip recruits of their previous identities and create them in the Service’s image. In short, they must replace the former self with the identity of the self within the Service.

Standards must be established and strictly adhered to. Maximum effort does not equal maximum achievement. Stephanie Gutmann describes the current way around holding recruits to standards by creating “team” events with a de-emphasis on the individual and an overemphasis on teamwork as a way around enforcing standards that women are physiologically unable to achieve. She quotes AR 350-6 that states, “All Soldiers regardless of gender, train to a single standard, the Army standard. Differences in performance requirements between the sexes, such as the Army physical fitness test scoring, are based on physiological differences apply to the entire force.”

She goes on to say that, teamwork has replaced individual effort because, as a female drill sergeant states, “In the new Army, competition, except against oneself, is out.”

Team building, while critical to military effectiveness, must be reserved for those good enough to make the team. They must have proven their individual worth as a potential performer in the military, not as a way to disguise the differences in the capabilities of men and women as we prepare them and evaluate their potential for service in the US Armed forces.

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102 Army Regulation 350-6, Initial Entry Training, October 2001.

103 Guttmann, 37.
According to a member of the Congressional Commission on Gender Related Issues, it is the Service Chief’s responsibility for the training and indoctrination of their members. Despite the stance of the commission, he considers the Marine Corps’ policy of segregation as ideal for the ‘Corps. He stated further that each Service has its own culture and must be held accountable for the actions of the members of the Service. Given the US Army’s current policies on and definitions of “direct combat” are no longer valid, does this necessitate another look at how they conduct recruit training? The basis for the criteria in the “train as you fight” policy for the US Army is based upon their definition of direct combat (in Brigade and below) which equates to a decreased likelihood of women in engaging the enemy directly. This methodology applies to the armor, infantry and artillery branches, yet for the very soldiers who support them, it does not. Given the COE, replete with a non-contiguous nonlinear battlespace, have we not identified a flaw in the logic of the very premise in which this rule was written? The real question to address is; are we preparing our Soldiers for the eventuality of asymmetric threats that they have faced, and will continue to face in the future? Now is the time to reevaluate the assignment and training of all who serve to determine the most effective type of training they need to succeed and survive in the COE.

The following passage states the alternative view presented from the same Commission from Commissioners Keys, Blair and Moore in regards to gender-integration during boot camp:

A Commission study measured the inculcation of attitudes in graduating recruits in all four Services that were considered conducive to cohesion. The attitudes were commitment, respect for authority, and group/service identity, all essential to a warrior spirit. Marine Corps recruits scored highest on those attitudes, and in fact, female Marines

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104 Interview with Lt General Christmas, USMC (Ret), 08 April 2004. General Christmas served as a member of the Congressional Commission for Gender Related Issues and voted in favor of allowing service chiefs to decide how IET was conducted, despite a split vote of the commission, 6-4. The Chairman, Anita Blair, Commissioners Keys, Moore and Moskos offered a differing opinion, citing that there was evidence that not only is there a serious problems with gender-integrated basic training, but there is also sufficient evidence that gender-separate training produces superior results. They stated further that gender-integrated basic training is “flawed.” The problems they identified centered on the difficulty of providing appropriate privacy in a highly controlled environment, the fundamental physiological differences of the genders and the control of sexual conduct. These issues do not arise out of gender-segregated basic training.
recruits scored at the highest levels of all the graduating recruits who were measured. . . . The modern battlefield exposes many non-combat personnel to the risks of battle. For the sake of the lives of all personnel, basic training should emphasize skills and attitudes that will enable them to survive and to help, not endanger, others. The principle of military effectiveness should dictate how the Services train and it should not be subordinated to any other goal.  

Many other officers in our profession believe gender-integrated training at the entry-level is flawed. Colonel Kevin Benson believes that gender-integration should start at AIT.  Dr. William Gregor, a professor at the SAMS and retired US Army officer conducted numerous physiological studies on the physical effects of training males and females together in any environment. In his essay titled, Why Was Nothing Done? 25 Years of Ignoring Physical Readiness, he destroys the myth that gender-normed physical training standards are best for the US Army. These double standards actually create a phenomenon he calls “task shifting,” defined simply as “members of a unit picking up the slack” for weaker members who cannot perform as their military occupational specialty dictates. He goes on to state that, “Unlike the operations in Panama and Iraq in 1991, the [GWOT] is a long distance event that tests the Army’s and the Soldier’s endurance. . . . During the period of the draft, many trainees were not assigned an MOS until after completing Basic Combat Training.” He states that due to the loss of the 507th Maintenance Company in An Nasiriyah the Army should work towards revisiting basic combat training (BCT) and insure that the CSS Soldiers receive training adequate for the environment in

105 Congressional Commission on Military Training and Gender-Related Issues, July 1999, xliv.  
106 Interview with Col Kevin Benson, Director of the SAMS, conducted 26 February 2004. When asked, “Should boot camp in the US Army be gender-integrated?” He believes that the combat service support garrison mentality breeds a focus on the technical aspects of the branches and has degraded the mind-set required for a warrior mentality. He spoke of a REFORGER exercise in Germany in 1990 as an example, and then related it to the 507th Maintenance Company, the unit that was ambushed while conducting convoy operations in an AO of a non-contiguous, non-linear battlefield during OIF. “We never asked them to be able to do that.”  

107 Dr William Gregor, interview dated 7 April 2004.  
which they will operate, with no clear front lines and secure rear areas. He concludes, based on his empirical data, that the training he speaks of challenges the Soldier to fully prepare him and her for the COE. This training at boot camp does not include gender-integration.

A recent report that made headlines on the cover of The Army Times\textsuperscript{109} reported that Ranger School may be expanded to include CS and CSS Soldiers. This might further lead one to believe that this is due to the inadequacies of Army Boot Camp.

Perhaps the time has come for a comprehensive review of the policies and procedures set in place in the 1990’s that not only do not contribute to the effectiveness of our military, but also detract from it. John Derbyshire of the National Review writes,

In particular, the administration needs to recognize that many of the ideologically driven sex-integration efforts of the 1990s were mistaken, and destructive of military culture, and should be rolled back. We have the advantage, however, that many of the things that were just proposals ten years ago have now been tried, and the results widely publicized. No reasonable person today can deny that coed basic training is possible only with drastically lowered standards; nor that if men and women are put together in the same units, or on the same ships, a lot of sexual activity will result; nor that unit cohesion, without which no military mission can be carried out, is seriously degraded by the presence of open sexual tensions. I believe the public and their representatives in Congress are much readier now than in the 1990s to accept some firm defense of traditional military culture.

The time is past due for a holistic evaluation of and upgrade to our Service cultures.

While we may have declared ourselves victors in the cold war, conquerors of Serbia and Saddam’s Iraq, and the “New age military” who took out the Taliban in Afghanistan, we have still yet to face an adversary that could stand up to us “toe-to-toe” in a conventional manner in which we are wholly prepared for. And that, I believe is just the point. The enemies of our nation have found and are finding new ways to counter our military muscle. It will be Soldiers, Sailors, Marines and Airman that “win” our future wars-- \textit{if} we pick the right people, indoctrinate them correctly, provide them with relevant doctrine and most importantly, prepare them with the right mind-set that a joint expeditionary culture demands from them.

\textsuperscript{109}The Army Times, 10 April 2004 edition.
People don't understand that there is a problem; the politicians don't address anything but money and weapons. Why? Because it is hard to understand the intangibles of effective military cultures--leadership, trust, cohesion--and the ingredients required to create such cultures. It takes an understanding of military history, psychology, sociology, anthropology, and economics, to name a few of the subjects necessary to grasp this military culture concept. This holds especially true when I talk about transitioning the U.S. Army from a second-generation force to a third-generation force so it can deal with fourth-generation threats. When it comes down to it, it is easier to just pour more money into the black hole without ever making anything better. . . . Unfortunately, the recent war in Afghanistan demonstrates again the thesis in my book. Tora Bora was not the result of political decisions but of a second-generation military--in this case CENTCOM (Central Command, or the headquarters that controls the Central Asia/Middle East region) unable to plan on the move or adapt to the collapse of the Taliban and/or al Qaeda. There was simply no mental process in place to deal with the fast-moving environment that existed after all the "targets" melted away or created a new front. A third-generation military, based on trust, professionalism (in the true sense of that overused word), and unit cohesion takes pride in being able "to plan on the fly" and make things happen without relying on centralized planning tools that create orders days behind reality. This takes a well-educated (in the classical sense) mind that possesses experience dealing with such environments. Today's military bureaucratic culture does a bad job at nurturing this type of leader.\textsuperscript{110}

While this is but one man’s opinion, the ramifications of such a statement paint a bleak picture for the US armed forces if we fail to prepare our warriors for an uncertain future.

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