Service Culture Effects on Joint Operations
The Masks of War Unveiled

A Monograph
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Knowing oneself is critical to efficient and effective operations in any sphere of human endeavor. This is particularly important in the endeavor of warfare where human life is the medium of exchange and the fate of nations lies in the balance. Currently, U.S. military forces are involved in the largest and most important operations since the Vietnam era while simultaneously attempting to affect the most radical transformation perhaps in American military history. Within the U.S. military services a thorough and clear self awareness is absolutely essential to the success in both these efforts. A key aspect of self awareness, successful joint operations, and effective transformation requires a thorough understanding of the component service cultures and their potential to effect operations. This paper proposes that unique U.S. military service cultures exist, that they have effects on operations, and that understanding the unique service cultures is an important component in planning operations as well as planning transformation.

RAND corporation analyst Carl Builder’s central thesis in his 1989 work The Masks of War is that each service is influenced in its actions by an inherent service culture. This culture is a product of the service’s history and the personality types of its key leaders. Service culture manifests itself in a variety of ways including the service’s budget priorities, doctrine, officer training, evaluation and assignment. The cultural phenomenon described by Builder eighteen years ago is inherently at odds with the U.S. military’s developing vision to operate in an integrated, inter-service way. Joint operations yield benefits by capitalizing on service strengths in an efficient and synergistic manner. The emphasis on service integration has increased greatly since Builder first explained his thesis. The purpose of this paper is to attempt to evaluate the current validity of Builder’s arguments given the ever increasing emphasis on jointness since the inception of the Congressional mandates outlined in the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986.

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DISCLAIMER

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Army, or the Combined Arms Center.
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CHAPTER ONE

SERVICE CULTURE: AN APPROACH TO THE PROBLEM

“Know thy enemy and know thy self and you will win a hundred battles.”

Sun Tzu

Knowing oneself is critical to efficient and effective operations in any sphere of human endeavor. This is particularly important in the endeavor of warfare where human life is the medium of exchange and the fate of nations lies in the balance. Currently, U.S. military forces are involved in the largest and most important operations since the Vietnam era while simultaneously attempting to affect the most radical transformation perhaps in American military history. Within the U.S. military services a thorough and clear self awareness is absolutely essential to the success in both these efforts. A key aspect of self awareness, successful joint operations, and effective transformation requires a thorough understanding of the component service cultures and their potential to effect operations. This paper proposes that unique U.S. military service cultures exist, that they have effects on operations, and that understanding the unique service cultures is an important component in planning operations as well as planning transformation.

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PRIMARY AND SECONDARY QUESTIONS

The primary focus of this paper is an analysis of the current relevance of Carl Builder’s 1989 conclusions regarding service culture. Specifically, this paper addresses the question: is Carl Builder’s thesis regarding service culture, as stated in The Masks of War, reflected in joint operations since the passage of the Goldwater-Nichols act in 1989? The answer to this question will be in part based on an examination of several secondary questions.

Several secondary questions relate directly to the primary focus of this paper. An important question that sets the stage for this monograph is what are some of the debilitating effects of service culture on joint operations? This critical question is addressed by an analysis of joint operations prior to the Goldwater-Nichols act. This analysis establishes the preconditions for military reform in the middle 1980s and addresses the issue of what were the specific challenges of early joint operations? Pre-Goldwater-Nichols joint operations were analyzed by numerous agencies and the specific problems of these operations were traced to systemic causes.³

Another question that this paper addresses is: what were the systemic causes of early joint operations problems and how was Goldwater-Nichols designed to address them? Carl Builder’s

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³ Lochler, James R., Victory on the Potomac (College Park, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 2002), 44.
analysis of operations and strategy indicates that the dominance of separate service culture is one of the systemic causes of joint operations problems. Thus, a key question to understanding the challenges of joint operations is what are the specific service cultures as identified by Builder?

Since the Goldwater reforms and the publishing of Builder’s book, the U.S. has executed numerous joint operations. Another critical secondary question that is fundamental to the state of U.S. joint operations capability since Builder’s work was published is how successful were operations in the post-Goldwater-Nickels era? Operations Desert Shield and Allied Force will be analyzed as case studies representative of post Goldwater-Nichols joint operations. This monograph looks at these two operations to determine if the general provisions of Goldwater-Nickels were adhered to, and, most importantly, were the operations successful? A related question is: to what extent did service culture remain in evidence? Once it is determined if service culture is in evidence, the analysis will proceed to determine if the effects of service culture resulted in operational disconnects. Carl Builder’s work is part of a general consensus that the department of the defense needed to institutionalize inter-service capabilities and cooperation. This view was politically bipartisan and was not readily accepted by the component services. The Goldwater-Nichols act mandated a variety of compulsory changes in the way inter-service activities were conducted. However, it did not mandate many changes within the structure of the individual services. An important question that this paper addresses is whether service cultures identified by Builder continue to be perpetuated within the individual services?

A final issue that is addressed is whether the Goldwater-Nichols reforms are sufficient to address the service cultural issues identified by Builder. Toward this end, this paper evaluates whether further reforms are necessary in the form of a Goldwater-Nichols II reform act designed to eliminate any remaining dysfunctional aspects of service culture. It is clearly important and appropriate to look at Builder’s conclusions with respect to the 18 years since the Goldwater-Nichols’s mandates. A final question is whether Carl Builder’s view of service culture is still a
valid hypothesis that can lead to better understanding and communications in an inter-service world, or is it outdated as we enter an inter-agency one? Are the current challenges to joint operations the same parochial service challenges of 1986 or are they bigger challenges that require a Goldwater Nichols reorganization Act of 2004? This one aimed, not at DOD, but at the full spectrum of the National Security organization.

**METHODS AND SOURCES**

In Chapter two Builder’s argument for service culture and its relationship to joint operations is explained and summarized. Carl Builder’s thesis is that the U.S. services each have a unique service culture and that these cultures influence all service operations including joint operations. He believes that awareness of these cultures can be used to predict how services will act in the future. Chapter Two lays out Builder’s thesis in detail and briefly summarizes the Goldwater Nichols Act of 1986. This analysis will primarily be derived directly from Builder’s 1989 work *The Masks of Command*. This analysis will be supplemented by reference to another important work by Builder written in 1994, *The Icarus Syndrome: The Role of Air Power theory in the Evolution and Fate of the U.S. Air Force*. Several other history sources are used to lend additional support to the conclusions regarding service culture reached by Builder. This analysis continues with the systemic issues identified and the response of the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act. The passage of Goldwater-Nichols occurred three years prior to the publishing of Carl Builder’s book in 1989. The two issues are related because Builder’s view is that his thesis is a major factor contributing to the difficulty of U.S. joint operations which Goldwater-Nichols addresses. The prime sources for this review is the legislation itself. Another source, James R. Locher III’s work, *Victory on the Potomac*, is an in depth analysis of the Goldwater-Nichols Act legislative process. It provides key insight to policy makers perceptions of joint culture.
Several articles are also used to support the author’s analysis of the significance and intent of the act.

Joint operations are a difficult and challenging aspect of warfighting—one that U.S. forces found difficult to master on several occasions. Chapter Three contains two cases studies of pre-Goldwater-Nichols joint operations. The American attempt to rescue U.S. hostages held in Iran in 1979, Operation Eagle Claw (Desert One) and the U.S. invasion of Grenada Operation Urgent Fury in 1983. Both operations reveal a variety of inter-service operational shortfalls. These shortfalls are evident in the areas of interoperability, training, and planning. The problems were an embarrassment to the services and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Even more significantly, the lack of inter-service cooperation and communication resulted in marginal mission performance, cost the lives of American soldiers, lost political capital in the form of national political will and international respect, and in some circumstances, resulted in mission failure. This chapter, entitled “Joint Awkwardness”, is a relatively straight forward analysis of early joint operations. This analysis will demonstrate the specific short-falls, focused on Builder’s themes that are now acknowledged to have prevailed in the execution of joint operation prior to Goldwater-Nichols. This chapter describes the major key events in these operations and the lessons learned. Operation Eagle Claw, the Iranian hostage rescue perhaps best known for the name of the rendezvous point at which the mission failed –Desert One, is described and evaluated using several sources. The best of these sources is that of mission commander Colonel Charlie Beckwith entitled Delta Force: The U.S. Counter-terrorist Unit and the Iran Hostage Rescue Mission, published in 1983. This book provides a well document and comprehensive description of the operation and most importantly a detailed analysis of its failure. It suffers somewhat because of the closeness to the subject of the author and because it was written soon after the operation when emotions still ran high. Col Kyle’s The Guts To Try is another primary source for this operation. Combined with the official joint history of Operation Eagle Claw, these books provide a clear view of how the
operation was conducted. Further detailed analysis of the potential impacts of service culture is
provided in Bob Woodward’s analysis of the period The Commanders. Numerous articles
provide additional detailed discussion of specific aspects of the operation.

A variety of articles and online sources support Beckwith’s and Kyle’s accounts and provide
useful facts and operational details. Two online sites that were valuable are specwar.net a
website devoted to special operations history, and helis.com a website devoted to the history of
helicopter warfare. An additional very valuable source to the general conduct of Operation Eagle
Claw is a monograph written at the U.S. Marine Corps staff college entitled The Iranian Hostage
Rescue Case Study.

Urgent Fury is described using a variety of sources. The most valuable was British Army
Major Mark Adkin’s Urgent Fury: The Battle for Grenada. Adkins was a member of the British
Army staff in Barbados at the time of the operation and thus has a unique insider’s view of the
battle. Additionally, his position outside the U.S. military permits him to be very free in his
criticism of the American operation. Though an excellent source, Adkin’s occasionally strident
tone indicates the possibility of bias against U.S. military capabilities and this must be taken into
account when viewing his work. A more sober account is the 1997 official joint history,
Operation Urgent Fury, by Ronald Cole. Together these two works provide operational insights
and tactical detail sufficient for the purposes of this paper. Lessons learned can be extracted from
these two works or one very detailed monograph: Command and Control and Communications
Lessons Learned: Iranian Rescue, Falklands Conflict, Grenada Invasion, Libya Raid.

U.S. forces have conducted a variety of operations since the late 1980s. All operations since
the 1980s have been executed within the context of the Goldwater-Nichols reforms. They have
all been characterized as “joint.” Operations since Goldwater-Nichols include Operations Just
Cause, Desert Shield, Desert Storm, Restore Hope, and Allied Force. Most of these operations
have been successful. Two case studies taken from this period, Operation Desert Shield in 1990 and Operation Allied Force in 1999, will be the primary focus of Chapter four. Both operations are well documented and enough time has passed to permit objective analysis, yet, recent enough to be relevant. Both of these operations are well document in primary and secondary sources. Definitive historical accounts have been written on both operations. The existing sources meet the requirements of this paper.

Operation Allied Force has been covered in a variety of provocative and well thought out, if not completely comprehensive, books. Most notable of these are David Halberstam’s *War in a Time of Peace: Bush, Clinton and the Generals*, and Michael Ignatieff’s *Virtual War: Kosovo and Beyond*. These works, combined with a variety of analysis in respected journals, provides sufficient information to place this operation within the context of the subject of this paper.

The Builder culture thesis is further evaluated in chapter five by looking at current documents that might be indicative of service culture existing today. A variety of primary document material will be used to determine if there are traces of service culture within contemporary institutional documentation. This chapter will analyze service specific documents and compare similar categories of documents across service lines. These documents include service leadership and ethos doctrine, service operational doctrine, joint doctrine, service officer evaluation reports, and statements made by service leaders in recent official and official publications. The analysis of these service specific statements, doctrine, and policy results in further conclusions regarding the continuing prevalence and influence of service culture.

Chapter five summarizes the issues and conclusion identified in the previous chapters. It identifies findings relating to the persistence of service culture in current services and an operational effect of this culture based on recent joint operations. Further, chapter five examines

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4 Ibid., 445.
the question of whether further military reform on the scale of the Goldwater-Nichols act is advisable.

This final chapter of the study will rely on the references in the previous chapters as sources of data from which to draw insights and conclusions. Several articles addressing the current status of joint operations will be drawn upon as appropriate to buttress or provide contrast to the author’s conclusions and make recommendations for the future if appropriate.
CHAPTER TWO

MASKS OF WAR

“Nothing is so important in war as an undivided command...there should be only one army, acting upon one base and conducted by one chief.”

Napoleon Bonapart

This chapter examines Carl Builder’s thesis that the U.S. military services each have a unique service personality and that their cultural characteristics influence service operations, including joint operations. The examination will summarize how Builder defines the individual service cultures in his book, The Masks of War, and how these service cultures affect the Joint Organizations to which they belong. This chapter conclude with a summary of what many believe is the most dramatic military reform legislation in American history, the Goldwater Nicholas Act of 1986.

Builder’s study of military service culture was sponsored by the RAND Corporation and initiated by the Army. Specifically the study’s purpose was to determine why differences existed in the ability of the various services to conduct systems analysis. It is important to note that the study began before the Goldwater Nichols act of 1986 was passed but was not published until 1989.

Builder’s study examines each service in war and peace, by missions, roles, procurement philosophy, leadership styles and corporate cultures. He methodically sketches out the institutional personalities into five “identities” with recognizable behavior patterns. These patterns he categorizes as altars of worship; concerns with self-measurement; preoccupation with toys versus the arts; degrees and extent of intra-service distinctions; and insecurities about service

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legitimacy and relevancy. The following discussion outlines the major conclusions regarding each service’s culture determined in the Builder study.  

**Air Force**

Simply put, Builder finds that the Air Force worships at the altar of technology. The object it worships is the instrument of flight- the airplane. The Air Force measures quality over quantity. It has a thirst for technological advancement that surpasses numbers of things or wings.  

Using the phrase “Toys versus the Arts” Builder describes the characteristics that attract and hold the attention of service professionals on an individual level. There is an old adage that the only difference between men and boys is the size and price of their toys. Builder’s description of the successful Air Force personality leaves no doubt that the image of the professional Air Force officer could have created this adage. The Air Force loves its toys. Pilots identify themselves with their aircraft: “I fly A-10’s.” Builder concludes that the pilot identity transcends Air Force identity. Pilots tend to see themselves first as pilots even more than Air Force officers.  

The prospect of combat is not what motivates Air Force officers according to Builder. Rather, combat is the excuse they have to fly their planes. Flying is the ultimate Air Force experience. Consequently, the “hotter” the flying the individual officer achieves in his career the close his professional experience is to the Air Force ideal. The Air Force intra-service distinction is simple: those who fly and those who don’t. Pilots are the clearly chosen elite Air Force class. Within the pilot class, the “rated” officers, there has been a historical battle for dominance between fighter pilots and bomber pilots. Dominance between these two groups depends on the

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7 Ibid., 32-33.
8 Ibid., 23.
technology of the era and the national strategy. Currently the fighter pilot clique dominates. During the 1950s and early 1960s the B-52 bomber pilots of the Strategic Air Command were clearly the dominant class. However this class of sub-cultures continues. Within Air Force service culture other pilots, transport, reconnaissance, and helicopter, rate below the fighter and bomber pilots but clearly above the “unrated.” What is really telling about the dominance of the pilot class is that they are often blind to the institution’s class structure. An illustration of this is evident at the conclusion of a videotape by Air Force Chief of Staff Anthony McPeak which he ends with the phrase “See you on the flight line.” A serving Air Force officer observed that probably only one in five Air Force personnel see the flight line as part of their daily working environment.⁹

Builder makes the argument that as the youngest, least established service, the Air Force is the most sensitive about its legitimacy and most nervous about its relevancy. The fight for Air Force independence was long and hard and, Builder argues, not completely won. The Air Force sees the possession by the Navy and the Army of their own aircraft as a constant reminder of the fragility of Air Force legitimacy. However, the Air Force is supremely confident in the ability of its aircraft to solve any question about relevancy. The Air Force culture believes at its most fundamental level that airpower can do it all. The ultimate proof of this view according to Air Force culture is the results of the Enola Gay mission to Hiroshima.¹⁰

**Navy**

Builder’s view of the Navy is that it worships at the altar of tradition. The object it worships is independent command. Naval officers love their institution and in there view it deserves only the best. Because of this the Navy is obsessed with measurement- it is consistently

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the most concerned about its size. A reflection of this is that the peacetime number of capital ships has basically remained unchanged since WWI.\(^\text{11}\)

The ships are of critical importance to the Navy. The pride and interest naval personnel take in their institution is the source of their attraction to it not the specific technological components. Builder makes the point that naval aviators have always considered themselves naval officers first and pilots second.\(^\text{12}\)

Intra-service distinction occurs in the Navy through an extensive mission pecking order. At the top is the carrier based fighter aviation and at the bottom is mine warfare. Although Builder makes a case for status distinctions being platform based he also highlights the value of diversity in Navy culture. In the Navy, experience counts and diverse experience is best. The service value of diverse experience helps create the self image among naval officers as naval officers first and specialists second. However, within the service there is no substitute in the quest for individual success for a strong record of service within the carrier based fighter elements.\(^\text{13}\)

Builder calls the Navy the hypocandriac of the services because it is “constantly taking its own temperature” and worries about its own future health. The concept of independent command at sea is essential to understanding the Navy’s motivations and resistance to command and control technology advancements. The Navy, according to Builder, “jealously guards its independence and is happiest when left alone.” The Navy is the most disgruntled over encroachment of Washington into Command and control issues. As technology makes distance less relevant, the Navy’s frustration with C2 issues is likely to grow.

\(^\text{11}\) Ibid., 21. Builder states that the Navy’s demand for capital ships has remained essentially unchanged since before WWI. At the date of his book in 1989 the Navy had 17 capitol ships. The Navy website lists all ships and does not separate “capital ships”. However, a detailed examination of Carrier Battle Groups online results in the same conclusion as Builder with a number of 18 carriers and destroyers.

\(^\text{12}\) Ibid., 24.

\(^\text{13}\) Ibid., 25.
The Navy’s view of institutional legitimacy and relevancy is exactly the opposite of the Air Force. It is supremely confident in its legitimacy and less sure of its relevancy. The Navy’s more than 200 year history, the importance of maritime commerce, decisive roles in the nation’s wars, particularly World War II in the Pacific, and the strategic vision of historic figures such as Alfred Thayer Mahan provide the Navy with firm institutional foundation. Thus, the Navy does not doubt its legitimacy.

The relevance of the Navy, on the other hand, has been a source of challenge, discomfort and dispute. Two relatively recent technological advances are the primary source of the Navy’s discomfort: the long range land bomber and nuclear weapons.\textsuperscript{14} This anxiety regarding the Navy’s relevance is best represented by the Navy’s post World War II Admiral’s revolt. This episode began as a response by senior naval officers to the budgetary challenge of long range Air Force bombers, specifically the B-36. The public and impassioned, though ultimately unsuccessful, challenge to the Department of Defense’s decision for the Air Force resulted in the relief of the Chief of Naval Operations and the destruction of other prominent officer’s careers.\textsuperscript{15}

\textbf{Army}

The Army worships at the altar of the country. The good of the nation is all important to the Army. It does not worship an object but the people who loyally serve. Selfless service is the highest ideal of Army service culture.\textsuperscript{16} The Army measures its health by end strength –the total number of personnel authorized and serving as defined by Congress. This relates back to the people who serve. The Army is used to growing and shrinking as the nations needs change.\textsuperscript{17}

The Army’s attraction has historically been in skills of soldiers, not their equipment. No matter how good the equipment and technology, the Army will always see its soldiers as the true

\textsuperscript{14} Ibid., 29.
\textsuperscript{15} Jeffrey Barlow, \textit{Revolt of the Admirals} (Washington: Brassey’s, 1998), 2.
\textsuperscript{16} Builder, \textit{Masks of War}, 20.
\textsuperscript{17} Ibid., 22.
value upon which to hang the rest of its resources. The Army has made great strides in accepting new technologies and methods since 1986, however, it still views its soldiers as its most valuable resource and places emphasis on the training of the people in its organization in order to meet the demand for skills necessary for success. Builder does note a shift in the Army’s attitude toward toys in its effort to claim bigger budget slices.\(^1\)

Army intra-service distinction is between the traditional combat arms and all others. All others understand and accept their role to support the combat arms. Branch distinctions are a source of pride and esprit de corps; but, promotion, selections and power influence is not as clear as it is in the Navy and Air Force. The interdependency of the branches is a service ethic – the concept of the combined arms team. Thus team work is stressed, and Army branches have no illusions regarding there independent capability.\(^2\) Competition for promotion is within the branches of the Army and thus virtually all branches can be promoted to the most senior ranks, and all but the absolute highest service command positions have equivalents in all branches.

The Army is the most secure of all services in its relevancy and legitimacy. Though its size has increased and decreased the Army feels that its basic raison d’etre has proven true since the birth of the nation: to secure ground it must be occupied by the Army. The Army sees its’ roots in the nation’s citizenry, its history of Service to the nation and its utter devotion to the country. The Army is the loyal servant.\(^3\)


The study on which the *Masks of War* is based was conducted during the same time frame that the Goldwater Nichols legislation was drafted and passed. The fact that inter-service

\(^{1}\) Ibid., 24.
\(^{2}\) Ibid., 26-27.
\(^{3}\) Ibid., 30.
cooperation needed a push in a different direction was not a secret. Operations Eagle Claw and Urgent Fury described in chapter three are major reasons for the widespread and bipartisan support for the legislation. It is important to briefly summarize some of the important points of the Goldwater Nichols legislation in order to properly assess the continuing influence of service culture in operations after the Act was passed.

The first objective of Goldwater Nichols was to reorganize the Department of Defense and to strengthen civilian authority in the department. Increased responsibilities and authority were given to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Joint Staff was assigned in direct support of him. The Act enhanced the authority of the unified commanders and made them more capable of fulfilling their warfighting roles. As a consequence, the legislation reduced the influence of the individual service chiefs. 21 The new central position of the unified commanders and their relationship with service culture is explored in detail in Chapter Four.

The legislation mandated goals and improvements in several key areas. It established the position of Vice Chairman. It called for an improved joint officer management policy. Officer quality of those assigned to joint duty would improve. Joint experience became a pre-requisite for promotion to the general officer ranks. Waivers were required to move officers early from joint positions in an effort to establish continuity of joint staffs and reduce service personnel policy impacts on the joint staffs. The legislation required specific aspects of operations that transcended service boundaries to improve and emphasize joint operations. These included education, doctrine, training, and readiness assessment. 22 In summary, the legislation moved the issue of jointness from an afterthought in military operations to the absolute center of American

military warfighting philosophy. The Goldwater Nichols Act has been called “the most important and successful American defense legislation of the twentieth century.”

**Conclusion**

Builder is very clear that Service culture is a strong aspect of the military services of the U.S. and that it effects virtually everything that the services do. Service behavior and culture is defined by Builder as the service’s sense of self. For the Navy it is marked by its independent nature and its stature. The Air Force sees itself as the “keeper and wielder of the decisive instruments of war,” its beloved planes. The Army is focused on keeping itself prepared to meet whatever demands the nation asks of it. Builder sees the different service cultures reflected in the architecture of the different service’s institutional buildings. In a word: Navy-opulent, Air Force-futuristic and the Army-strongly conservative. The Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 was a congressional attempt to check service parochialism and encourage integration of the services towards Department of Defense reorganization with greater unity of command and unity of effort.

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25 Ibid., 35.
CHAPTER THREE

JOINT AWKWARDNESS

“One more such victory... and we shall be ruined.”

Pyrrhus

This chapter analyzes two Joint Organizations in execution of strategic missions. Both Operations occurred prior to the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986. In fact, both operations provided momentum to the passing of that legislation. Many of the issues and challenges identified in the two operations were directly addressed by the Goldwater-Nicholas Act. The two operations examined are the 1979 Operation Eagle Claw (often referred to as “Desert One”) and Operation Urgent Fury in Grenada in 1983. Each of these joint operations will be examined and analyzed for evidence of service culture influence.

Entire books have been written on the two operations that are the focus of this chapter: Operation Eagle Claw, the ill fated rescue attempt of American hostages in Iran in 1980, and Operation Urgent Fury, the toppling of a Cuban backed totalitarian regime on the island of Grenada in 1983. Therefore, the purpose of this chapter will be rather limited. These two operations highlight many of the characteristics associated with joint operations that are directly or indirectly related to service culture in the early 1980s. The two subject operations are briefly examined in terms of planning, command structure, and execution. In each case, the discussion will culminate with a highlight on issues relating to or indicators of the influence of service culture.

27 Lochler, 218-219.
OPERATION EAGLE CLAW

Strategic Situation

The Iranian hostage drama of 1979 marked a strategic shift in the political situation for Iran and for America. The Shah of Iran, a friend and ally of the U.S., was deposed and Iranian “student” militants seized the U.S. Embassy in Tehran capturing the embassy occupants as hostages. The Iranian Revolutionary Guard held 52 American hostages. Demands by the Iranians ranged from lifting the $8 billion U.S. freeze on Iranian assets to release of Iranians in U.S. prisons over the course of the negotiations. The negotiations between Iran, the Carter administration, and the UN security council continued for a long and frustrating 64 weeks.

Planning

An audacious plan to rescue the hostages was sponsored by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). The plan involved all four services, eight helicopters, twelve planes and numerous special operations operators. It was to be the first employment of the Army’s newly organized anti-terrorist unit: Delta Force.

The plan was simple in concept and complex in execution. It called for the insertion of Delta Force commandos into the area of the American Embassy in Tehran by helicopter. The insertion was to be followed by an assault on the embassy, liberation of the hostages, and movement of the hostages for pickup by helicopter at a stadium complex adjacent to the embassy. A key aspect of the operation was a rendezvous in the desert between Air Force fixed wing C-130 transports and fuelers and Marine Corps/Navy helicopters. This rendezvous was critical because it was impossible for the helicopters to fly the requisite distances fully loaded. At the rendezvous point, code named “Desert One,” the empty helicopters would take on

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28From the summary article “Operation Eagle Claw” available online at the Helicopter History Website at: http://www.helis.com/featured/eagle-claw.php.
fuel and the Delta Force operators and proceed to the embassy. On return, the helicopters would transfer operators and hostages to the C-130s, take on fuel and return to base. As often happens, the plan did not survive the first stages of execution. ‘Murphy’ was busy in all services in the Iranian desert.

**Joint Command Structure**

The Chief of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Air Force General David C. Jones, named Army Major General James B. Vaught the Joint Task Force Commander. General Vaught was an Army general experienced in airborne operations, but did not have a special operations background.  

The ground component commander was Army Colonel Charlie Beckwith. Beckwith had extensive experience in Special Forces and in fact had been part of the creation on the newly formed Delta Force which was to execute the actual release and escape of the hostages. Air Force Colonel James Kyle was to lead the Air component of the operation. Interestingly, the naval component did not have any Marine helicopter representation at the command center to assist Major General Vaught or Air Force Major General Phillip C. Gast, the deputy commander. General Vaught reported directly to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff who reported through the Secretary of Defense to the President.

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31 Ibid., 374.
Figure 1, Joint Command Structure for Operation Eagle Claw.
Figure 2, Area of Operation Eagle Claw Area of Operation.\textsuperscript{32}

**Execution**

The first phase of the operation called for the positioning of the Task Force for a refuel operation and transloading at Desert One. The Air Force C-130s, with fuel and Delta Force on board, departed from Masirah, Oman at 1805 24 April 1980 for the flight to the rendezvous

\textsuperscript{32} From the summary article “Operation Eagle Claw” found online at the Helicopter History Website at: http://www.helis.com/featured/eagle-claw.php.
point. The Marine helicopters departed at 1905 from the USS Nimitz located just east of the Persian Gulf.

The mission ran into problems almost immediately. Weather caused the Marine aircraft to arrive late. This necessitated an adjustment of the time line which in turn jeopardized the ground mission of Delta. More importantly, during the deployment of the eight helicopters mechanical problems resulted in only six making it to Desert One. Additional maintenance problems resulted in one of those being not mission capable. That left the Task Force with one less than the six helicopters that was considered the minimum needed to ensure mission success.

Because of the critical shortage of mission ready helicopters, the Mission was aborted by Colonel Beckwith. This decision was immediately followed by a further incident which ensured the futility of the mission. One of the helicopters crashed into one of the C-130s killing 8 servicemen. The exact cause of the crash has never been positively determined. However, speculation from eye witnesses indicates that the dust from the C130’s and the Sea Stallions was likely an important factor.\(^\text{33}\)

**The influence of Service Culture**

After the mission failed the President appointed an investigative group under Admiral James L. Holloway, former chief of naval operations and a distinguished naval aviator.\(^\text{34}\) The Holloway Special Operations Review Group identified 23 separate issues that contributed to the failure of Eagle Claw.\(^\text{35}\) Some of these issues identified by the Holloway group do not relate at all to service culture. The weather is an example of this type of factor. Other issues identified by Holloway are challenges in all operations. Intelligence is an example of this type of factor.

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\(^{33}\) Kyle, 332-338. 
\(^{35}\) Ibid., 141.
However, there are some characteristics of how Operation Eagle Claw was organized, planned, and executed which indicate the influence of service culture.

One of the major mission issues was the Marine helicopters. Seven of the Holloway group findings were directly related to the helicopter issue. The maintenance failures they experienced were largely due to encountering a severe sand storm enroute to Desert One. The CIA had flown into the landing site and done a site preparation. Pilots reported that sensors had picked up radar at 3,000 feet but nothing below that. Yet, pilots for Eagle Claw were told to fly at 200 feet to avoid radar.\(^{36}\) A contributing factor may have been the concern of the pilots and their commanders with risking their aircraft. The senior airmen in the mission may have been overly concerned with technology—their aircraft and the enemy radar. The airmen may have been overly concerned with the vulnerability of their own technology while at the same time they overestimated the capabilities of both the Iranian and the Soviet radar technology to detect the aircraft. This resulted in the mission fatal minimization of the number of aircraft used for the mission and unnecessarily low flight altitudes. Over emphasis on communications intercept likewise inhibited the use of communications technology to workout problems during the helicopter deployment.\(^{37}\) The JTF commander, a product of the Army culture of team play and selfless service, left the altitude decision and all other flight related planning to the Air Force chain of Command.

The organization of the JTF may also somewhat influenced by service culture. According to Carl Builder’s analysis, the Army tends to do what it is told without argument. If the Department of Defense and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s intent is to have a joint

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\(^{36}\)From the article “Operation Eagle Claw: The failed rescue of American hostages, Iran, 1980.” available online at the Specwarnet website at: http://www.specwarnet.com/miscinfo/eagleclaw.htm

\(^{37}\)Bolger, 149-151. Bolger goes further and compares the Marine operational altitudes of 100-300 feet (thus putting themselves in the worst of the sand storm) with the Sun Tay raiders in 1970 who penetrated the much more sophisticated and deadly North Vietnamese airspace at an altitude of 1000 feet and higher.
operation with all four services involved, the likely reaction of the Army would be to “make it happen” not to question why one service should not participate or to argue for a better solution. The Army’s culture may have prevented General Vaught or Colonel Beckwith from questioning the decision to include Navy Sea Stallions with Marine crews that were not special operators for what was clearly a special operations mission. Air Force Colonel James Kyle, the air component commander for the mission, indicated that there were many Air Force special operations experienced air crews available for the mission. The helicopters that left the *USS Nimitz* were not special operations aircraft and their crews had no special operations experience. Carl Builder describes Navy culture as focused on the institutionally traditional roles that give it legitimacy. The counter-terrorist mission was a new game. Successful participation in Eagle Claw would be an important factor in future service funding decisions. Therefore the Navy had a service interest in participation in the mission even though its personnel and equipment were not optimal. This fact contributed to the problems encountered in the mission. The Navy equipment and Marine crews were sent to the *USS Nimitz* without their mechanics. The Navy provided the platform for launching the Marines without fully supporting it. Security considerations prevented maintenance crews on the *Nimitz* from knowing the nature of the mission that they were supporting. Thus the Marines received no more than routine support from the Navy at the tactical level. The Navy and the Marines, though a key part of the operation were not integrated in the command structure. No helicopter command elements were part of the advance headquarters team at Desert One.

All evidence indicates that the Marine Sea Stallions were part of the operation primarily to ensure sea component participation. Beckwith believed that experienced Air Force crews were not used on the Sea Stallions in order to “make sure that each of the services had a piece of the

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38 Kyle, 67-69.
action.” Air Force Sea Stallions, trained for long distance special operations, were available from the Air Force. The Holloway group reported that the USAF had ninety-six long distance and aerial refueling qualified personnel available and another eight-six with “fairly recent” special operations or rescue experience.  

To summarize, a major problem with the organization of the joint force for Operation Eagle Claw was the priority to include all services in the mission. A successful conclusion to the mission would therefore be to the benefit to all the services involved. Technology also was a major factor in both the planning and execution of the mission. A focus on technology drove the flight plan and also drove the individual decisions of Marine aviators to abort their mission. Finally, it was the Army commanders, Colonel Beckwith and General Vaught, who approved the plan and supervised the execution. These commanders permitted the weak link, the Marine helicopter phase of the operation, to proceed unchecked. Both retired at the rank they held at the time of Eagle Claw.

OPERATION URGENT FURY

Strategic Situation

Operation Urgent Fury in Grenada in 1983 is another Joint Operation that was executed prior to the passing of Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986.

Bolger., 156.
Daniel Bolger’s account of the operation is perhaps the most analytical. However, his conclusions are also the least explicable. Although he goes to great lengths to critically examine the faults with the Marine air crews and to repeatedly compare them unfavorably with the demonstrated performance of Air Force long range helicopter crews at Son Tay and in the Mayaguez operation, Bolger ultimately concludes they were not a critical aspect of mission failure. Bolger’s rather bizarre conclusion is that the mission was a failure because Beckwith made an emotional irrational decision to abort once he learned that only five helicopters were available for the mission. Bolger asserts that Beckwith was guilty of being too fixated on the plan, too concerned with Delta Force casualties, and over tired. Bolger 157-159.
As Ronald Cole put it “if the …Iran rescue mission provoked thought on joint reform, events in…Granada in late 1983 sparked action.”\textsuperscript{42} On 12 October 1983 militants overthrew a Marxist government on the island of Grenada and assassinated those government officials formerly in charge. At the time there were 600 American medical students living in the country. The NSC under President Ronald Reagan ordered joint planning to begin for an operation to evacuate the students. They did not want a repeat of the failure of the Iranian hostage rescue attempt. The President assigned three objectives to the military, rescue the U.S. students on the island, restore democratic government, and eliminate Cuban influence.\textsuperscript{43}

**Joint Command Structure**

General John Vessey, USA, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, attended the NSC meetings. He persuaded Secretary of Defense, Casper Weinberger, to direct the Commander in Chief of U.S. Atlantic Command (CINCLANT), Admiral Wesley McDonald, to command the operation under his responsibility for the Atlantic Ocean area of operations. McDonald received the execute order on 22 October, and was told to execute operations on 25 October. He diverted the *USS Independence* carrier battle group and Marine Amphibious Readiness Group 1-84 to the area and tasked. Less than two weeks later, the Secretary of Defense inserted Vessey into the operational chain of command. Vice Admiral Joseph Metcalf was tasked by McDonald to command Joint Task Force 120 which would command the operation.\textsuperscript{44}

Major General Norman Schwarzkopf, commander the Army 24\textsuperscript{th} Infantry Division, was designated to serve as advisor to the JTF commander.\textsuperscript{45} This addition to the JTF

\textsuperscript{43} Bolger, 275.
\textsuperscript{45} Cole, 2.
staff came late in the very short planning period. Schwarzkopf was only given two majors as assistants. No members of the small Army contingent were experts at joint fire control, a key component of joint command, and in fact there were no such experts in the JTF.⁴⁶

![Joint Command Structure for Operation Urgent Fury](image)

Figure 3, Joint Command Structure for Operation Urgent Fury.

**Planning**

The planning for the operation was conducted by the JTF 120 staff. This staff was an ad-hoc staff quickly put together specifically for Operation Urgent Fury. The bulk of the planning was accomplished in four days between 20 October and execution on 25 October. In addition to a lack of time, planning efforts were hampered by a lack of resources, planning data, and tools. For

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⁴⁶ Atkin, 135.
example, there was a shortage of maps. Planners and troops had to rely on old tourist maps to operate\textsuperscript{47}

The rush to plan Urgent Fury caused amazing oversights in the planning process. These began to become apparent at the operation planning conference on 22 October. The planning conference did not even mention the Joint Staff contingency plan for an invasion of Grenada, OPLAN 2360. Many planners did not know of the plan’s existence until after the operation. The planning conference was also marred by the absence of many key commands. The Air Force Military Airlift Command (MAC) was not present at the conference despite its importance for the deployment of troops and logistics sustainment. Also absent was a U.S. Marine Corps representative. The Special Operations and Army representatives were only Lieutenant Colonels and did not have sufficient rank to make their commander’s concerns known. The conference totally ignored logistics aspects of the operation. Both the joint staff and LANTCOM staff logisticians were not even aware of the operation until hours before execution due to security concerns.\textsuperscript{48}

OPLAN 2360 indicated that the Army’s XVIII Corps would be the headquarters likely to command the operation.\textsuperscript{49} Instead, the planning for the operation was dominated by the naval staff of TF120 built from Admiral Metcalf’s 2\textsuperscript{nd} Fleet Staff—though in actual execution most of the operation was to be a ground operation.

Special operations planning was delegated by JTF 120 to the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) then newly formed at Fort Bragg. Without specific planning guidance Army Major General Richard Scholtes built his own plan. He plan called for a composite unit called TF 123 which would consist of Army special operations (Rangers, Special Operations Aviation, and Delta Force), Navy special operations (SEAL teams), and Air Force special operations (combat

\textsuperscript{47}Cole, 3.
\textsuperscript{48}Atkin, 132-133.
\textsuperscript{49}Ibid., 132.
controllers and C-130s). These units would use a combination of air landing and airborne operations to seize and control key high value targets around the island until the arrival of conventional forces. The plan called for the special operations forces to do most of the fighting but to be redeployed from the operation within 24 hours.\(^5^0\) Ultimately the JTF approved the TF 123 planning with some modification and essentially assigned the TF responsibility for the southern portion of the island.

Another key component of JTF 120 was the 22\(^{nd}\) Marine Amphibious Unit (MAU) embarked on Amphibious Squadron Four. This element was positioned approximately 500 miles off Grenada on the 20 October and was order to stand by for possible missions.\(^5^1\) The Marines, without guidance speculated on a variety of missions. Ultimately they were assigned the task of securing the airfield at Pearls and the port of Grenville on the north side of the island. The MAU was designated as TF 124.

The final aspect of the plan was the occupation of the island by conventional forces. This task was assigned to the 82\(^{nd}\) Airborne Division from Fort Bragg. For this operation the division was designated TF 121. Ultimately the plan envision that TF 121 would relieve all SOF and Marine units on the island and then turn control of the island over to a multi-national Caribbean military and police force.\(^5^2\)

**Execution**

Operations began on the night of 23-24 October as an element of SEAL Team 6 (ST6) attempted to execute a mission to conduct reconnaissance of Point Salinas and to emplace navigation beacons for aircraft carrying Army Rangers several nights later. The mission began

\(^{50}\) Ibid., 136-138.

\(^{51}\) Ibid., 138. Amphioxus Squadron Four consisted of the assault ship *USS Guam*, amphibious transport dock *USS Trenton*, the dock-landing ship *USS Fort Snelling*, and the tank-landing ships *USS Manitowac* and *USS Barstable County*.

\(^{52}\) Ibid., 143.
with a low altitude air insertion off the Grenada coast. In the process of this insertion four SEAL team members were lost. This loss combined with Grenadian patrol boat activity and heavy surf caused the mission commander to abort. An attempt the following evening to infiltrate from sea was also frustrated.\textsuperscript{53}

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{operation Urgent Fury Plan.png}
\caption{Operation Urgent Fury Plan.\textsuperscript{54}}
\end{figure}

\textsuperscript{53} From the article “Urgent Fury” found online at the Navy SEALS community website, Navyseals.com available online at: http://www.navyseals.com/community/navyseals/operations_urgentfury.cfm

\textsuperscript{54} Ibid.
The evening of 24 October saw several other Navy special operations units from ST4 and ST6 come ashore on Grenada. ST4 successfully completed a reconnaissance of landing points on the north end of the island for TF 124. ST6 operated under TF 121 control (MG Scholtes and the JSOC). Their missions included attacking the Beausejour radio transmitter and rescuing the island’s Governor General Sir Paul Scoon who was under house arrest. These missions were accomplished successfully.  

JSOC’s Delta Force was assigned the mission of securing the political prisoners at Richmond Hill prison. This mission was not a success. Significant anti-aircraft fire broke up the TF 160 helicopter formations as they approached the target. With the precision timing of the attack disrupted, damaged aircraft and casualties, the loss of surprise, and the likelihood of significant ground resistance the Delta Force commander decided to abort the mission without landing.

The Marines of TF124 landing by helicopter on the north side of the island were relatively unopposed. By 0728 of 25 October they had secured their objectives the Pearls airfield and the small town of Grenville. Keys to their success were the successful beach reconnaissance of ST4 the previous evening and suppression of the enemy air defense by Marine Sea Cobra gunships.

The final component of the Grenada operation was the TF121 assault on Point Salinas by the Army’s 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 75th Ranger Regiment. Unexpected obstructions on the runway caused the commanders of the operation to make a last minute decision to air drop the 1st Ranger Battalion. Intense anti-aircraft fire forced the drop to occur at 500 feet altitude—the absolute minimum. This minimized risk to the aircraft but eliminated any option for the jumpers to use their reserve parachutes in the event of a malfunction of the main chute. Despite the low

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55 Bolger, 299.
56 Ibid., 330.
57 Ibid., 302-305.
level approach Major General William Mall, commander of the 23rd Air Force on the lead aircraft called off the first approach after dropping only 40 Rangers. C-130 gunships were called in to reduce the anti-aircraft fire and the rest of the Rangers were dropped on a second run across the drop zone. Thirty minutes later, at 0615 the 2nd Ranger Battalion dropped onto the airfield. Once the Rangers were organized on the ground they quickly secured the airfield and killed or captured most of the Cubans in the construction guarding the airfield.58 In addition Rangers of Captain Abizaid’s A Company 1/75 Ranger Battalion secured the True Blue Medical School Campus and safely rescued 138 American medical students. By 1000 on 25 October the area around Selinas airfield was secured.59

The 2nd Brigade of the 82nd Airborne Division, the last of the ground elements, began to arrive are 1400 in the afternoon. Their arrival was met by a Cuban led counter-attack against the airfield by three BTR60 armored cars. These were destroyed by Ranger recoilless rifle fire.60 The next day the 2nd Brigade began a slow move to secure the island from the south. Marines from TF121 were moved to Saint George accompanied by Marine armor and relieved the ST6 elements in the governor’s house. Meanwhile Major General Trobaugh, commander of the 82nd Airborne Division and now the ground commander, ordered 1/75 Ranger Battalion to rescue the remaining American medical students located at Grand Anse. These were rescued in the afternoon of 26 October in a flawlessly conducted Ranger operation supported by Marine Helicopters of TF124. By the end of the day on 26 October the Marines had secured Saint George, the 82nd had taken its objectives in the south, 244 more American students were secured, and resistance was crumbling throughout the island.61 There would be more fighting ahead and in some cases significant casualties, but the major operations were at an end.

58 Ibid., 307-313.  
59 Atkin, 213-222.  
60 Ibid., 225.  
61 Bolger, 330-337.
The influence of Service Culture

Like the Eagle Claw operation, one of the controversial characteristics of Urgent Fury was the composition of forces. British Major Mark Adkin who was part of the Caribbean force observed, “It quickly became apparent to all the services that they must be in on the action. Urgent Fury would increase the prestige of the armed forces, so none of them could afford to miss out.”\(^6^2\) In particular the Navy, which played a very small operational role, was ill suited to exercise operational and planning control of the operation. There was no practical reason for assigning the operation to LANTCOM because it was outside of their typical area of operations and not the type of mission that they were familiar with conducting. The mission was with the area of responsibility (AOR) of the U.S. Forces Caribbean Command in Key West Florida.\(^6^3\) Again, it may have been the team play attitude of the Army, represented by Chairman of the Joint Chiefs General Vessey, which acquiesced to this less than optimum command structure.

Other Navy participation in the operation may like-wise be questioned in terms of its operational necessity or wisdom. Particularly the employment of ST6 in the disastrous recon of Point Salinas and the very difficult defense of the Governor General seem to be candidates as missions better accomplished by capabilities in another service.

Like the Eagle Claw operation, the vulnerability of aircraft was an important issue in the opening phase of Urgent Fury. The decision of Major Mall to abort the initial drop after the first plan drew fire is indicative of an over-emphasis on preserving the aircraft over accomplishing the mission. The tight airborne drop which should have taken minutes took almost an hour and a half to complete due to the Air Force concerns about anti-aircraft fire. Concern for the welfare of the machine outweighed concern about the initial load of paratroopers on the ground and mission

\(^{62}\) Atkins, 127.  
\(^{63}\) Ibid., 126.
accomplishment. The delay deploying the Rangers could easily have caused the failure of the
airfield seizure had the opposing Cubans been only slightly more resolute in their defense.

Operations Urgent Fury was a success, but success did not come without a price. Navy
Corsairs bombed a mental hospital near the Grenadian command post causing civilian casualties,
and Corsairs attacked a friendly Brigade headquarters wounding 17 soldiers. Still, all tactical
objectives were seized, casualties were relatively light, and the military accomplished the
strategic objective of rescuing American citizens, removing Cuban influence, and restoring
legitimate government. This operation did not fail as had Operation Eagle Claw at Desert One;
however, it still not meet General Colin Powell’s vision of “operate jointly as a way of life and
not just for occasional exercises.”

CONCLUSION

Operation Eagle Claw was a undisputed failure and Operation Urgent was a marginal
success which came about despite horrendous planning. The salient problems in both operations
were a function of the inability of the services to operate together. The services demonstrated in
these two operations that they were unable to synthesize their unique service capabilities to
achieve seamless operational effectiveness and success. The two operations raised the issue of
joint force organization. The requirement to include all the services in the operation because of
the potential post-victory benefits was so great that lives were lost and missions were not
accomplished. The cultural bias of the Air Force to preserve their planes was so great that other
mission considerations were ignored or marginalized. Army commanders were so culturally
inclined to be team players that they became non-confrontational rubber stamps on all issues
outside their immediate areas of expertise, and did not organize, plan and execute operations in
the manner dictated by their best professional judgment. These operational characteristics were

64 Cole, 3.
the result of the ingrained service cultures described by Carl Builder. These operational
caracteristics were part of the stimulus that resulted in the Goldwater Nichols Act. Future joint
operations, discussed in the next chapter, would indicate how effectively the Goldwater Nichols
reforms would mitigate the negative influences of service culture.
CHAPTER FOUR

GOLDWATER NICHOLS AT WAR

“In war there is no substitute for victory.”

General Douglas MacArthur

The Cold concluded with the fall of the Soviet Union and the U.S. entered into a post-
modern era of warfare. This era of warfare is typified by a variety of characteristics the most
prominent of which represented by the non-doctrinal but non-the-less descriptive term of
“jointness.” This term represents the U.S. military’s efforts since the Goldwater-Nichols Act of
1986 to efficiently and effectively execute military operations that apply each service’s unique
service capability in a mutually supportive and synergistic manner under an umbrella of
unqualified unity of command. Two post Goldwater-Nicholas joint operations, Operation Desert
Storm in 1991 and Operation Allied Force in 1998, represent both the positive advances since
Goldwater-Nicholas and indicate the lingering vestiges of service culture as defined by Carl
Builder.

Operation Desert Storm

Strategic Situation

On 2 August 1990 the United States and the international community were confronted
with the unprecedented Iraqi aggression against its sovereign neighbor Kuwait. The result of this
aggression was the destruction or route of Kuwait’s small armed forces and the occupation of
Kuwait by Iraq by 3 August 1990. The U.S. and its allies were concerned by the destabilizing
and precedent setting results of the invasion. They were further concerned with potential

65 Douglas MacArthur, from his speech to the U.S. Military Academy Corps of
additional aggression against the American ally, Saudi Arabia. Iraq had invaded with a force of over 1000,00 troops—significantly more than was needed to overcome Kuwait’s tiny army but enough to threaten successful operations against the Saudi National Guard of 70,000 troops. As a result of the actions of Iraq the U.S. began to deploy defensive forces to Saudi Arabia in August 1990. This deployment, Operation Desert Shield, assured U.S. allies in the region of the U.S. commitment to oppose further aggression by Iraq. Between August 1990 and February 1991 the U.S. government executed a full court press across the spectrum of national capabilities. This resulted in the diplomatic isolation of Iraq in the UN and among its neighbor nations in the Middle East. At U.S. urging, the UN applied economic sanctions against Iraq. Information operations stimulated unprecedented domestic support for the President George H. Bush administration policy. On 12 January 1991 the Congress of the United States authorized the President to use force to evict the Iraqis from Kuwait. An unprecedented U.S. military deployment into Saudi Arabia had amassed a huge military presence across the border from Kuwait and Iraq in Saudi Arabia. This military buildup was such that in February 1991 the U.S. military had not only achieved the combat power necessary to defend Saudi Arabia, but it also had established the capability to execute offensive operations to liberate Kuwait if ordered by the national command authority.

**Joint Command Structure**

To execute operation Desert Shield and later Operation Desert Storm, the U.S. military conducted operations under a command structure established by the Goldwater-Nichols act of 1986. This command structure was built around U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) which was a joint regional command based in Tampa Florida and responsible for the Middle East Area.

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of Operations.\textsuperscript{67} At its peak in February 1991 the U.S. forces under CENTCOM numbered over 500,000 personnel, over 2000 combat aircraft, and six carrier battle groups.\textsuperscript{68} It was a robust joint command that rivaled anything that the U.S. had fielded in the twentieth century.

**Figure 5, U.S. Central Command Combat Forces Operation Desert Storm 1991.**\textsuperscript{69}

**Planning**

The Defense Department’s plan to defend Saudi Arabia from attack was a cold war contingency plan designed to counter an unexpected conventional Soviet thrust through Iraq into Saudi Arabia. This plan, code named Operations Plan (OPLAN) 1002 foresaw an immediate massive U.S. air response to the Soviet invasion which would allow time for U.S. ground forces to deploy into the region. Although the plan was somewhat vague, the U.S. had taken numerous


\textsuperscript{69} No single source specifically describes the CENTCOM joint command structure. This diagram is constructed from Scales 140-141 and references to individual commanders in Atkinson.
steps in the 1980s to increase its ability to execute a plan such as OPLAN 1002. These steps included prepositioning heavy military equipment in the Indian Ocean as well as purchasing new equipment and increasing the size of the U.S. sea and air lift capability. OPLAN 1002 was changed in November 1989 by the new CENTCOM commander, General Norman Schwarzkopf, to anticipate Iraqi aggression against its neighbors. Despite this change in focus, the new plan did meet all the needs of the situation facing the U.S. government in August 1990.

General Powell’s initial guidance for planning was presented to the Joint Chiefs of Staff soon after the invasion. Author Bob Woodward describes how Powell’s guidance called for joint operations planning from the start: “The chiefs and services had to act together on this, Powell said. Work a consensus, work with Schwarzkopf, no one-service solutions, no freelancing.” He came down hard on Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney’s military aide Rear Admiral Owen, who he perceived was seeking single service analysis and solutions on the Secretary’s behalf. According Woodward, Powell told Owen “I don’t like freelancing out of this office…. Don’t you ever do that again.”

On 6 August King Fahd of Saudi Arabia announced that U.S. forces were invited to the Kingdom to assist in its defense. On 8 August the President of the U.S. announced the commitment of U.S. forces. Army units of the 82nd Airborne Division arrived on 8 August while the Marines of the 7th Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) arrived on 14 August and began to unload heavy equipment from pre-positioned ships the next day. The first focus of U.S. forces was the defense of Saudi Arabia. At this point the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs,

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71 Scales, 43.
72 Woodward, 239.
73 Ibid., 240.
74 Scales, 48.
General Powell informed the President that sufficient defensive capability had arrived in theater to discourage or defeat an Iraqi invasion.\textsuperscript{76}

As a contingency, CENTCOM began to create plans for the liberation of Kuwait as it was building up forces for the defense of Saudi Arabia. In October CENTCOM briefed its developing plans to the national command authority. The plan was a four phase plan with phases 1 to 3 being an air campaign, and phase 4 being a ground campaign. The objectives of the air phases were as follows:

Phase 1:
- Strategic Command and Control
- Air Force and Air Defense System
- Nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons facilities

Phase 2:
- Supply and munitions bases
- Transportation facilities and roads

Phase 3:
- Entrenched front line positions
- Operational reserves—the Republican Guard Divisions\textsuperscript{77}

The phases of the air campaign were not necessarily discreet or sequential. In reality all three phases continued, once started, throughout the duration of the war. In phase 4 close air support of ground forces became a priority air mission task.

The ground campaign initially briefed in October anticipated attacking directly from Saudi Arabia into Kuwait with the equivalent of one U.S. Corps. The air campaign outline was accepted, however the ground campaigned was considered unimaginative and not well thought out.\textsuperscript{78} After much discussion CENTCOM decided a viable ground option would require the addition of VII Corps from Germany to the XVIII Corps already on the ground. CENTCOM also wanted to double the number of aircraft carriers in theater. The approval of these requested

\textsuperscript{76} Woodward, 284.
\textsuperscript{77} Ibid., 304.
\textsuperscript{78} Ibid., 303-305.
increases was announced on 8 November 1990.\(^\text{79}\) This permitted detailed planning for offensive operations to go ahead.

With the addition of VII Corps units CENTCOM rapidly moved ahead with planning a multi-corps ground campaign as phase 4 of the theater plan. By the end of November 1990 the ground plan began to take shape around a main effort by XVIII and VII Corps attacking out of the western desert of Saudi Arabia to envelop the Iraqi forces, in particular the Republican Guard, in Kuwait.\(^\text{80}\)

**Execution**

The air campaign against Iraq began in the early morning hours of 17 January 1991. Task Force Normandy, a combined Army and Air Force helicopter task force, attacked and destroyed two Iraqi early warning radar stations in western Iraq opening an air corridor into the interior of the country. The first night of the campaign more than 700 sorties were flown. The air war continued for over a month. Daily the air task order (ATO) send strikes against a highly diverse target list. For the bulk of the period all three air campaign phases were executed daily. By the end of the war CENTCOM had flown over 110,000 sorties of which more than 44,000 were combat sorties against Iraqi targets. Thousands of surface to air missiles were fired against attacking CENTCOM aircraft. Only 33 aircraft were lost in combat.\(^\text{81}\)

Naval operations began concurrent with the air campaign. Numerous small scale operations were executed including seizing oil platforms, clearing mines, and defending against the occasional anti-ship missile or small attack boat. Naval forces made several significant contributions to the campaign. First, a powerful amphibious group with a U.S. Marine brigade embarked and with a naval support group consisting of the World War II vintage battleships *USS*  

\(^{79}\) Blackwell, 107.  
\(^{81}\) Finlan, 34-38.
Missouri and USS Wisconsin. This amphibious group posed a threat against the Kuwait beaches that pinned numerous Iraqi forces in place for the bulk of the war. The Navy also contributed Tomahawk Land Attack Missiles (TLAMs) which could be fired from Navy. Over 300 TLAMs were fired during the war and 122 were used on the first day of the air war. The final major contribution of Navy forces were Naval air forces. At the height of the war six Navy carrier battle groups were contributing their air components to the air campaign. In particular the Navy and Marine laser guided bomb (LGB) capable A-6 Intruder and the electronic warfare and anti-air-defense capable EA-6B Prowler were invaluable contributions to the CENTCOM air capability.  

The ground war began at 0400 on 24 February 1991. All aspects of the ground campaign went better than expected. A major factor in the success of the ground campaign was the continuous air attack which had reduced many Iraqi front line divisions to below 50% strength. By the evening of 27 February but XVIII and VII Corps had encountered and destroyed major portions of Republican Guard Divisions and Arab Coalition forces were entering Kuwait City. The ground portion of Desert Storm was virtually complete.  

\[82\] Ibid., 38-46.  
\[83\] Ibid., 57-65.
The last several hours of the ground campaign were not as clear or as coordinated as the previous 72 hours. First the VII Corps called a halt to its advance to allow units to consolidate and refuel and to prevent fratricide as the Corps frontage contracted and the 1st Cavalry Division moved forward. Then an erroneous message indicating that a cease fire would take effect at 0500 on 28 February was received. This caused the two Army corps to not anticipate any further advance. Then a message was received indicating that the cease fire would be at 0800 and that the corps should advance as far as possible until that time. This order and counter-order created great chaos within the various units of the corps and severely inhibited the various divisions from continuing the attack east in an effective manner. Major General Griffith of the 1st AD

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84 Scales, 138.
commented that “I hope to hell we didn’t stop to soon.” Many Republican Guard elements were able to break contact and escape north to Basra once the cease fire was imposed.\textsuperscript{85}

**The influence of Service Culture**

Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm were the first large theater operations that tested the concepts and reforms embodied in the Goldwater Nichols Act. The operations, though hugely successful, included numerous indicators that service culture was still a strong influence on operations.

Throughout the campaign naval operations were not closely integrated into the rest of the campaign. This was a manifestation of Carl Builder’s description of the naval culture’s emphasis on the independence of naval command. The Naval Component Commander remained located at sea and coordination, synchronization, and to a certain extent integration at a personal level between the JFNCC and the CINC was problematic. The priority Navy focus was on the only uniquely maritime aspect of the campaign: the naval blockade of Iraq. This was not in accord with CENTCOM priorities. Thus, CENTCOM was not sympathetic to issues which were of prime concern to the Navy including the Iranian missile threat and Iraqi mine laying operations.\textsuperscript{86} Though the JFNCC and CENTCOM CINC were not on the best of terms and operational focus was not aligned, these problems were minor compared to Navy Air Force relations.

The Navy had acute problems with the Air Force because of the conflict between the Navy cultural focus on independent command and service needs, and the Air Force cultural focus on maximizing the utilization of its technology –the aircraft. One of the first problem areas was the exclusion of Navy fighters from counter-air operations over Iraq. This was because of the less sophisticated ability of F-14s to electronically distinguish friend from foe.\textsuperscript{87} Other problems

\textsuperscript{85} Atkinson, 471-485.
\textsuperscript{86} Ibid., 149-151.
\textsuperscript{87} Ibid., 41.
between the two services were perceived lack of tanker support to the Navy by the Air Force, stricter rules of engagement (ROE) set by the Air Force for Navy pilots, and suspected inequitable rationing of JP-5 between the two services. Some Navy officers even suspected that Air Force officers in Washington were claiming credit for Stealth fighter strikes when actually the damaged was caused by TLAMs.\(^{88}\)

In addition to individual tactical problems between the two services, a major operational issue also caused problems. The Air Force had difficulty integrating naval aviation into the air tasking order (ATO) which was the heart of the planned joint air campaign. This was because Navy and USMC air was keyed to the cycle of carrier deck flight operations and ship replenishment rather than the continuous air operations that was key to the success of the joint air campaign. The services also had dramatically different views of targeting for an air campaign. Air Force doctrine focused on immediate direct attack against decisive targets while the Navy view was to attack air defenses first then attack decisive targets.\(^{89}\) Additionally, USMC aircraft were gradually withdrawn from the ATO to support MARCENT close air support requirements in accordance with Marine doctrine. This was contrary to the air plan, the CINC’s guidance, and to joint air doctrine. Unfortunately the Marine air was unable to attrite the Iraqi front line units as effectively as the combined joint air capability. As the ground war drew near, LTG Boomer had to ask for JFACC support in order to achieve front line attrition against the Iraqi army units in the Marine sector—with this late support attrition rates went up but were still not as high as those achieved in the Army sectors.\(^{90}\)

The Navy Air Force disagreements on the use of airpower were a result of a clash of service cultural values. To the Navy the naval air component was a part of the overall naval team

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\(^{88}\) Ibid., 152.
\(^{90}\) Ibid., 233-234.
designed to ensure the success of the fleet and the Marines ashore. It was not an end in itself. This was in accordance with Carl Builder’s observation that naval aviators were naval officers first and pilots second. This view of the role of airpower contrasted with the Air Force view that every aspect of the air plan was focused on the employment of the technology –the aircraft—in the most decisive and effective manner possible.

The Air Force focused on technology to win. Technology was seen by Air Force leaders as constituting a paradigm shift in the decisiveness of airpower. The prevailing thought among many in the Air Force was that airpower in 1991 had the capability of winning the war single handedly. This was the view of Air Force Chief of Staff Michael Dugan which he expressed openly to the media when returning from Saudi Arabia in September 1990. This view was totally in accord with the service culture described by Builder, but was not in accord with the joint emphasis of Chief of Staff Colin Powell and Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney. For this demonstrated lack of “jointness” Dugan was relieved by the Secretary of Defense.91 The culture of the service was so powerful that it blinded even the Air Force Chief of Staff to the specific directive regarding jointness expressed by his superiors, and thus needlessly disrupted the Air Force chain of command during a critical period leading up to the war.

Dugan was not the only believer in airpower. Another apostle was the CENTCOM chief air planner, Brigadier General Buster Glosson. BG Glosson was convinced that the new precision weapons technology fundamentally changed the capability of airpower. “With new technology in hand, we did not have to wait to hit the top priority targets.”92 Even after Dugan was relieved Glosson’s view of the role of airpower in the war was little changed:

I believed if we planned the right campaign, executed it well, and gave it time to work, we’d essentially defeat Iraq from the air. That did not mean follow-up

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91 Woodward, 290-296.
92 Glosson, 21.
ground action would not be required. It did mean any ground action would be quick, with minimum loss of life.\textsuperscript{93}

Glosson was one of the two key planners on the CENTCOM staff and also a favorite of the CINC. Therefore his view of the Air Force role was very powerful even though the CINC was an Army officer.\textsuperscript{94}

Glosson’s view of airpower became an important point of friction in CENTCOM between the Army and the Air Force. Army leadership at Third Army felt that the emphasis of airpower in the JFACC was on phases 1 to 3 of the plan, and little emphasis was being placed on attriting the Iraqi army in preparation for Phase 4. Although Glosson had the CINC’s ear, the ARCENT leadership had an advocate in Army LTG Carl Waller, the deputy CINC. Glosson and Waller did not share a mutual respect. Glosson commented in his diary about LTG Waller when he was acting commander of Third Army (LTG Yoesock was away for medical reasons):

“critical mistake assigning Waller control of ground campaign. Service biases render him ineffective …I will not permit his lack of understanding of air power to undermine the CINC’s overall effort.”\textsuperscript{95} Likewise, Waller believed that Glosson was using his direct access to the CINC to divert aircraft slated in the ATO against targets in southern Iraq and Kuwait north to strategic phase 1 to 3 targets. Waller confronted Glosson directly: “Henceforth, now and forever, if anybody diverts aircraft without my knowledge, I’m going to choke your tongue out.”

Ultimately, of 3067 targets nominated to the ATO by the Army slightly over a third were attached.\textsuperscript{96} The frustration among Army leaders with the inability to get Air Force attention to the immediate threats to their front eventually led to the extension of the fire support coordination

\textsuperscript{93} Ibid., 21.
\textsuperscript{94} Atkinson, 71.
\textsuperscript{95} Glosson, 246.
\textsuperscript{96} Atkinson, 222.
line over a hundred kilometers forward of the forward Army units. This move, conducted in the last hours of the war, may have inadvertently contributed to the escape of some Republican Guard units from Kuwait. The Air Force cultural focus on the value of technology to the detriment of Army needs and the CENTCOM plan disrupted unity of command within CENTCOM.

As indicated in Glosson’s comments above, the prevailing Air Force view was that the technology available for Operation Desert Storm was unprecedented in its capabilities. However, just as in previous conflicts, the Air Force focus on technology caused many in the Air Force to resist employing it for fear of losses. There was resistance in the Air Force against employing such aircraft systems such as the F-117 stealth fighter and the JSTARS system because of the fear of the loss of the system. This resistance was overcome, but still a dominant theme of the air planning was to minimize losses. Historian Rick Atkinson describes how General Glosson’s Vietnam experience contributed to this view: “his squadron had twenty-six airplanes; three months later when the squadron moved to Thailand, Twelve were left. He was determined to avoid incurring such losses again.” This reflects the culture of retaining and not risking technology.

During Desert Storm, General Schwarzkopf validated his reputation for a fast temper. However, in most cases this was directed primarily at his Army subordinates. In fact his attitude toward the other services, particularly the Air Force and Marines was very much hands off—and totally opposite of the micromanaging he imposed on Yoesock’s Third Army. Schwarzkopf view of air operations was clear: “There’s only going to be one guy in charge in the air: Horner.” Essentially, the Air Force was given greater freedom by Schwarzkopf then he gave

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97 Trainor makes the connection of this issue to the frustration with close air support, Trainor, 472; Glosson discusses the potential for missing RG units, Glosson, 269-276.
98 Glosson, 26-27, 84.
99 Atkinson, 65.
100 Ibid., 219.
the subordinates with whom he was most familiar—the Army. Schwarzkopf, for all his temper, behaved similarly when it came to dealing with subordinate Marine officers. In the case where there was a dispute between subordinate Army and Marine commanders regarding boundaries Schwarzkopf instead of decisively arbitrating the dispute, ignored it and told the disputing subordinates to work it out—which they did not do. This is an example of the passive Army culture in joint operations being dominant even over the very strong personality of Army commanders.

Other Army leaders were also unwilling to impose on other services or the political leadership. Joint Chief of Staffs Chairman General Colin Power had significant reservations regarding the wisdom of pursuing the use of force to eject Iraq from Kuwait. Powell was not an enthusiastic supporter of the policy but he kept his views to himself. He always carefully couched his concerns in an impersonal and professional way so as to personally remain loyal to the President. Thus, he never directly expressed to the President that in his military judgment the decision to use force to liberate Kuwait may not have been wise.

Desert Storm, from a purely results point of view, was a resounding success. At the time it seemed to validate the new American way of war—inspired by the Goldwater Nichols Act. However, this may have been partly an illusion. There were certainly many cases of inter-service compatibility problems and stress. Historian Rick Atkinson wrote that more inter-service issues may not have occurred simply because of the personality of CENTCOM commander General Schwarzkopf. In Atkinson’s view Schwarzkopf’s infamous temper caused many subordinates to bury the hatch between themselves in a common alliance against the CINC. Still, as discussed above, inter-service discord was a major characteristic of service relations below the level of the

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101 Trainor, 154.
102 Woodward 310-313.
103 Atkinson, 62.
CINC and caused problems using all resources effectively and commanding and controlling operations.

**Operation Allied Force**

**Strategic Situation**

In March 1998 U.S. intelligence received indications that Serbian Security Forces were preparing to conduct a crack-down against ethnic Albanians in the Serb province of Kosovo. The Serbian goal was to destroy the insurgent Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA). Member countries of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) as well as the United Nations (UN) feared that Serbian operations would be used as a means to use military force against the Kosovo Albanians. These indicators began a process of U.S. and NATO negotiations with the Serbian government under Slovanon Milosevic. These negotiations culminated on 18 March 1999 in Rambouillet France, when a Kosovo Albanian delegation unilaterally signed a NATO sponsored agreement for NATO supervision of a three year period of Kosovo autonomy. Serbia refused to sign despite warnings of the possible use of military force. On 24 March 1999 NATO authorized the NATO Supreme Commander, U.S. Army General Wesley Clarke, to begin a military campaign to force Serbian recognition of the Rambouillet agreement.104

**Joint Command Structure**

Analysis of the Kosovo War command structure must start with the NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe, Army General Wesley Clarke, the SACEUR. Clarke is unique among U.S. senior commanders because according to author David Halberstamm he was selected

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as the SACEUR over the objections of his own service chief, the Army Chief of Staff. This was primarily because Clarke was not widely respected within his own service.\footnote{David Halberstam, *War in a Time of Peace: Bush, Clinton, and the Generals* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2001), 392-396.}

As the SACEUR Clarke’s immediate superior was not the President of the United States, but rather the NATO Secretary General. However, he was also “dual hatted” as the U.S. region European Command (EUCOM) Commander. In this latter role he reported directly to the President. For executing missions in Operation Allied Force Clarke functioned in both roles. He was the SACEUR when executing NATO directives and commanding allied forces, and he was the EUCOM commander when directing U.S. forces –specifically U.S. Air Forces Europe.

![Diagram](image.png)

Figure 7, NATO and U.S. Command Structure in Europe, 1999.\footnote{This command structure diagram is constructed using information from Daadler and Lamrath. None of the sources consulted for this paper clearly articulated the actual command structure.}

### Planning

In June 1998 the NATO defense ministers met in Brussels. High on their agenda was the deteriorating situation in Kosovo. Among other directives the ministers directed the NATO
military command to “develop a full range of options with the mission of halting or disrupting a systematic campaign of violent repression and expulsion Kosovo supporting international efforts to secure the agreement of the parties to a cessation of violence and disengagement; and helping to create the conditions for serious negotiations toward a political settlement.” In response the NATO military command developed two types of options: intrusive and preventive. The intrusive options included a phased air campaign and a full range of ground offensive options.107

Planning for operations against Serbia in regards to Kosovo occurred in two distinct realms. One realm was within the context of the U.S. only command structure. The other was within context of the NATO command structure. The American command’s plan was the result of a directive from General Clarke, the EUCOM CINC, to General John Jumper, commander United States Air Forces in Europe (USAFE). This plan was developed by the 32nd Air Operations Group at Ramstein Air Base and code named Operation Nimble Lion. It would have pitted a substantial number of aircraft aggressively against 250 targets throughout Yugoslavia. A Separate air plan, CONOPLAN 10601 was designed by NATO and approved by the NATO Advisory Council (NAC). There was overlap between the plans but the NATO plan, which was much less aggressive than the U.S. plan and phased to gradually increase pressure, was the one that became the basis for Operation Allied Force.108

Planning the NATO air campaign for Kosovo conceived of three phases. Phase one would be an extensive attack to destroy Serbian air defense capability and the Serbian Air Force. Phase two would strike at Serbian military targets conducting or supporting operations in Kosovo. The final phase was designed to attack important infrastructure in the country to force a political solution.109 As an indicator of the difference between the U.S. Air Force plan and the NATO

107 Daadler, 33.
108 Benjamin Lambeth, NATO’s Air War for Kosovo: A Strategic and Operational Assessment (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 2001), 11.
109 Daaldar, 33-34.
plan, the NATO plan authorized attack on only 91 of 167 NATO acknowledged phase one targets. Authorization to hit additional targets would only come after the Serbian response to phase one was evaluated.\textsuperscript{110}

Four primary ground options were proposed. The first two options assumed a negotiated solution and the requirement for NATO troops to conduct peace operations. The first option assumed a cease fire with troops stabilizing the situation while a peace settlement was negotiated. This option would require 50,000 troops. The second option assumed a peace settlement was reached before troops arrived. This option required 28,000 NATO troops. The latter two options conceived of an opposed entry of NATO ground troops. In the first of these options NATO forces entered all of Yugoslavia intent on complete regime change. This option required 200,000 ground troops. The final option was limited to military operations in Kosovo and defeating all KLA and Serbian military forces in the province. This option required 75,000 ground forces.\textsuperscript{111}

Though the options supplied by the NATO military command were relatively clear, the political decision making apparatus made no clear decision regarding options until literally just prior to the execution of combat missions.

**Execution**

The President ruled out the use of ground forces prior to the beginning of hostilities because of domestic political considerations, thus limited the challenges faced by Serbian forces.\textsuperscript{112} This was a critical announcement because it encouraged the Serbian government that all they had to do was weather a short though possibly violent air campaign.\textsuperscript{113} Asked what would happened if Serbia failed to respond as predicted in the three phase bombing campaign an

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{110} Lambeth, 13-14.
\item \textsuperscript{111} Daaldar, 33-34.
\item \textsuperscript{112} Ibid., 97.
\item \textsuperscript{113} Halberstam, 425.
\end{itemize}
American administration officials stated simply “there is no phase four.” Thus, the operation got off to an inauspicious start.

From the beginning the campaign was plagued by hesitancy. It was not enthusiastically supported by the Pentagon or Congress. There was no clear mandate for how much power could be applied. What was clear was that all of the power of the U.S. military and its allies would not be applied decisively, and that NATO ground capability was not an option.

From the beginning of operations on 24 March 1999 the NATO air campaign encountered unexpected problems and did not achieve the same levels of success experienced in Desert Storm eight years previously. The Air Force had major problems detecting and destroying Serbian surface to air missile (SAM) radar sites. Additionally, man portable air defense missiles (MANPADS) and anti-aircraft artillery (AAA) made low level attacks very dangerous –forcing most missions to operate at altitudes above 15,000 feet. The nature of the enemy force, the terrain, and weather also were more difficult than expected. Thus, at the tactical level although the Air Force campaign achieved success, it was much more difficult and success was much less dramatic than anticipated. Targeting intelligence also indicated short-falls as evidenced by the inadvertent targeting of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade.

At the operational level the pursuit of the air campaign was made more difficult by the requirement to maintain consensus in the nineteen member NATO alliance. Target selection and approval was not driven by an overall effects based strategy but rather by a rather amorphous strategic strategy to affect the enemy will. Finally, at the operational level, after the initial days of strikes had no obvious effect on Serbian will, the NATO high command vacillated regarding the priority focus of the campaign. Similar to the Desert Storm issue, the JFACC wanted to strike

114 Daaldar, 100.
115 Ibid., 130.
116 Lambeth’s work NATO’S Air War For Kosovo: A Strategic and Operational Assessment describes in detail the operational problems encountered by NATO air forces in Chapter Six, “Friction and Operational Problems”, 102-177.
strategic targets while General Clarke insisted that the priority be given to the difficult to target Serbian tactical ground units in Kosovo.\(^\text{117}\)

The bombing of Serbian and Kosovo targets ended after 78 days on 4 June 1999 with the agreement of Milosevic to meet NATO terms. Although plagued with a variety of problems the gradual escalation of the power of the air campaign, combined with adroit diplomacy which won Russian support for the NATO cause, convinced Milosevic that further resistance was futile. Essentially he agreed to move all Serbian military and police forces out of Kosovo and permit NATO ground forces to establish control of the province.\(^\text{118}\)

**Influence of Service Culture**

Although the bulk of the NATO problems prosecuting the war against Serbia revolved the complex consensus decision making apparatus in the alliance, service culture continued to be a factor in the Kosovo war. This was demonstrated through the service’s preparation for war, execution of the campaign, and the attitudes of the senior service commanders.

One of the major shortfalls of the campaign plan to achieve NATO objectives in Kosovo was the lack of a ground component. This lack should have been a major concern for the U.S. Army leadership. In fact the Army leadership had significant concerns about the viability of the plan; however the service culture of being a team player prevented those doubts from being voiced strongly. Author David Halberstam described how weakly the Army’s dissatisfaction was expressed:

> If those reservations had not been voiced that forcefully in the discussion inside the Tank, being muted because of a sense of which way the play was going, they could be heard as a kind of softer background chorus within the Pentagon in the days that followed [the briefing of the plan]. A policy that placed everything on airpower and therefore went against the most elemental philosophy of the U.S. Army, and that had no proviso in case airpower failed, made people unhappy.\(^\text{119}\)

\(^{117}\) Ibid., Chapter Seven, “Lapses in Strategy and Implementation,” 179-218.  
\(^{118}\) Halberstam, 475-478.  
\(^{119}\) Ibid., 423.
The Army culture of selfless service thus allowed the nation to pursue a military plan which had significant short-comings.

The Navy was not intimately involved in the theater planning for the operations. The war began with only 350 aircraft available for combat operations. This was less than the 410 available in October 1998 when war was less likely, and is less than a third of the total number employed at the height of air operations. The difference between the October number and the number at the start of the war was the absence of any U.S. aircraft carrier in the area of operations. Just weeks before the beginning of the war the Navy elected to move the USS Enterprise from the Mediterranean-Adriatic region to the Persian Gulf and then sent it home. This operation was conducted despite the fact that the USS Kitty Hawk, stationed in Japan, was reasonably available for Persian Gulf duty. It is unprecedented, if the Navy was truly integrated into theater operations, that the only Aircraft Carrier in the theater would be removed from the theater for any reason other than another national emergency. This represents the naval culture of independent command which places no emphasis on integration into the joint planning or command structure.

The NATO air headquarters which ran the air campaign on a day to day basis was Air Forces South (AFSOUTH) under the command of U.S. Air Force LTG Mike Short. This headquarters was subordinate to the CINC South, Navy Admiral James Ellis. However, as in the prewar planning and operational maneuvers of the carrier battle group, this headquarters appears to be absent from effect control of operations in Kosovo. Ellis is only mentioned once in Ivo H. Daalder’s history of the war and not mentioned at all in David Halberstam’s description of the operations. By all accounts AFSOUTH appears to have reported to and received guidance directly from SACEUR. This absence of an assertive Navy presence is indicative a Navy culture

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120 Daalder, 103-104.
which is not engaged unless the interests of the Navy are directly involved. It affected operations in that it put the typical Air Force personality of LTG Mike Short in direct contact with the untypical Army personality of General Wesley Clarke.

General Wesley Clarke’s personality was not typical of the Army service culture. Army Chief of Staff General Reimer opposed General Wes Clarke’s promotion to four star rank and appointment as a CINC because he did not fit the service culture of selfless service. He was “too brash and cocky, too sure that his way was the right way, and therefore not a good listener and difficult to deal with. In addition, people felt that he was so driven and so absorbed in his mission –far too self-absorbed it seemed to many of his critics –he could be quite hard on the people who worked for him.”

Army general Gary Shelton, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff also was not an enthusiastic supporter of Clarke. This lack of trust and support between Clarke and his Army peers, primarily based on Clarke’s non-adherence to the service culture severely undermined his ability to influence strategic military and national strategy in Washington. This problem undercut any arguments he made to include ground forces in the Kosovo campaign. It also caused great friction between General Clarke and LTG Short despite the fact that both men essentially had the same view of airpower.

General Short was an example of the Air Force service ethos of victory through technology. As a contributing planner and the executer of the Kosovo air campaign he was of the strong belief that it should be designed similar to the campaign which contributed to victory in the Gulf War. Short was a firm believer that high technology embodied by the stealth fighter and precision bombs had fundamentally altered the nature of airpower and its employment. He was totally dissatisfied with the NATO air plan:

121 Halberstam, 393.
122 Ibid., 437.
123 Ibid., 448-449.
To him it was too reminiscent of Vietnam, politically acceptable to nervous NATO politicians and the most cautious members of the Clinton team, but diluted at the expense of military excellence. In Short’s opinion, it was essentially toothless and squandered and neutered this remarkable new technology. Even worse, he believed it gave an unwanted signal to Milosevic of an America that was faint of heart and thereby encouraged him to stick it out.\textsuperscript{124}

Short was convinced that Clarke did not understand the Air Force’s original plan and that he had not presented a strong case for it to NATO’s political leadership. Short’s service culture bias toward technology made him an excellent practitioner of air operations, but it blinded him to the very well and very powerful constraints placed on the SACEUR by the NATO leadership. The poor relationship between Short and Clarke put incredibly strain and stress on both commanders, and created disunity within the command. Interesting, despite the lack of enthusiasm for the NATO air plan, in general Air Force leaders were the only military leaders who showed any enthusiasm for bombing Kosovo because they were “eager to show what airpower, without ground troops, could do in situations like this. It might help end an inter-service argument that had lingered after Desert Storm.”\textsuperscript{125}

A final indicator of the impact of service culture on the operation was the decision to conduct most bombing from an altitude of 15,000 feet or greater. This reflects the Air Force cultural bias against loss of aircraft. This decision was made despite the know degradation in bombing accuracy and contributed to the inability of NATO to quickly and decisively effect Serbian ground forces in Kosovo.

\textbf{Conclusions}

\textsuperscript{124} Ibid., 445-446.
\textsuperscript{125} Ibid., 423.
The operations described in this chapter, Operation Desert Storm and Operation Allied Force, demonstrate that the efforts of the Goldwater Nichols Act had substantially reduced the problems of conducting joint military operations. However, problems directly or indirectly associated with service culture remained important and effected operations. The Goldwater Nichols reforms were successful in standardizing command organizations, processes, and technical compatibility. As the case of the two operations in the 1990s demonstrates, the reforms were much less successful in medicating the effects of service culture. The Air Force remained focused on defining itself through the decisive application of technology. Likewise, it remained adverse to risking that technology in combat. The Navy remained aloof and somewhat disinterested in any operation in which the Navy was not the central player. Finally the Army, in the interest of fair play and team play, was ineffective in managing the execution of operations by the other services. Army leaders were also relatively ineffective in voicing opposition to policy at the strategic level.
CHAPTER FIVE

BACK TO THE FUTURE

"An army formed of good officers moves like clockwork."

George Washington, 1776.

Carl Builder’s thesis proves relevant- even in today’s context. Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi freedom are beyond the scope of this monograph. In fact, the ongoing Global War On Terror (GWOT) is too contemporaneous to properly analyze the effects of joint culture within the context of these events. However, the examination of several operations prior to Goldwater Nichols and after Goldwater Nichols validates that joint culture still exists and affects the way services work as part of a joint team. This chapter will analyze indicators of current joint culture, summarize the progress toward increased effectiveness in joint organizations, make recommendations for future subjects of study.

The problems addressed in Masks of War were recognized and examined on a strategic level. It took an act of congress – the Goldwater Nichols act of 1986 –to motivate the services to integrate. This monograph has laid out the argument that the Goldwater Nichols Act has been very effective improving the quality of joint operations. Despite the very positive trend, much remains to be done. The Goldwater Nichols Act most directly affected the organization and equipping of joint organization, despite this service culture continues to affect how operations are planned and conducted.

Pre- Goldwater-Nichols the Army had 17 divisions, the Air Force had 27 tactical fighter wings and the Navy had 15 aircraft carriers. During the 18 years since Goldwater Nichols the nation’s military has downsized and transformed to meet post-Cold War national strategic

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126 Wintle, 65.
127 Builder, Masks of Command, 20.
defense needs and to allow dollars used for defense to be spent on domestic and economic issues. Today the army has 10 divisions, the Air Force has 10 Air Fighter Wing equivalents that are combat coded, and the Navy has 12 aircraft carriers.\textsuperscript{128} The down sizing process illustrates the on-going influence of service culture. The Army loyally sacrifices its divisions in the spirit of service to a nation –Army divisions are thereby reduced by 45\%. The Air Force pushes forward with technology choosing to have fewer aircraft wings but increases the emphasis on stealth and research and development –Air Forces wings are reduced 63\%. The Navy maintains its tradition to maintain its size and control over the seas. The Navy carrier fleet is reduced only 20\%. The Navy continues to have very convincing arguments for maintaining its’ size, including ship rotation requirements, long lead times for maintenance schedules, and commitments to capital ship building projects. The relative distribution of the service down sizing and the nature of the intra-service transformation are indicative of the persistence of service culture. The Army reduced its force almost by half with few internal structural changes. The Air Force modernized and downsized, expanding its technological edge in the process. The Navy changed the least.

On the Goldwater Nichols 10\textsuperscript{th} anniversary, General Shalikashvili, then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, reviewed the progress made on the main provisions of the legislation. He graded eight separate objectives and concluded that in all objectives progress was made. In specific areas, such as the enhanced authority of unified commanders, he rated the legislation an “A.” He said it “proved successful during several joint and combined operations including the invasion and liberation of Panama and Desert Storm.”\textsuperscript{129}

Goldwater Nichols was successful in forcing the services to get senior officers joint staff experience and it was successful in creating joint staff positions and ensuring they were filled by

\textsuperscript{128} This fact is taken from the official Navy information website available online at http://www.chinfo.navy.mil/navpalib/factfile/ships/ship-cv.html. This website lists all 12 active aircraft carriers as well as the thirteenth carrier, the \textit{USS George H. Bush} which is under construction.  
\textsuperscript{129} Lee Roberts.
quality qualified officers. One consequence of this mandated personnel policy is a back-log of senior officers waiting for their joint job before they can be promoted to the next level. The services wait until it is absolutely essential for promotion before assigning quality officers to joint staff positions. This is indicative that the services have not internalized the value of joint staff experience. They regard it as a block to be checked rather than a valuable professional experience for the assigned officer. The process then sets the conditions wherein service acculturated officers bring their service culture to the joint organization with the potential for negative impacts on the joint organization’s functioning. Officers need joint experiences sooner in their professional development progression, and service culture must be adjusted so that joint staff duty is considered professionally enhancing. Officers should be exposed to the concept of service culture in their professional education experience so that they understand it and are aware of its potentially negative effects. An examination of the service’s officer evaluation system indicates that service culture dominates the officer’s experience when not in a joint assignment.

The Navy’s Fitness Report and Counseling Record RCS BUPERS 1610/2\textsuperscript{130} contains a series of performance traits with professional expertise and command experience at the top. The very first duty related block on the form is entitled “Command employment and command achievements.” There is an individual and summary score that the reporting senior must assess; however, there is no senior rater ranking which compares the officer to other officers of equal rank. This supports the cultural priority the Navy places on command and duty experience. It also indicates that the Navy in inclined to commit evaluators to objective reporting which may taint the independence of the subordinate in command. The report does not evaluate values.

\textsuperscript{130} This information is taken directly from the Navy Officer Evaluation Report form: RCS BUPERS 1610-1 Fitness Report and Counseling Record (E7-O6). NAVPERS 1610/2 (O3-O2).
The Air Force’s Performance Report, AF Form 707A, is an annual report that places priority on the technical skills and experiences. This makes it easy to separate the pilots from the support officers and even the pilots by type of aircraft they fly. The Air Force has a 3 block Senior Rater portion in which it compares the individual against other officers. It is convenient for boards to sort by aircraft identity of pilots. The Air Force fitness report, since it makes pilots and their aircraft easily identifiable to boards makes it easy to continue to discriminate promotions based on the Air Force class system.

The Army’s Officer Evaluation Report, DA Form 67-9, emphasizes an evaluation of the officer’s values and attributes such as honor, loyalty, and selfless-service. It also evaluates professional skills such as communicating and planning. The Army also places emphasis on motivational leader skills which confirms their continued emphasis on the soldier as the most important asset they possess. Senior raters are asked to recommend three assignments for which the officer is best suited, with emphasis on the assignment that serves the Army best in support of the Army’s selfless service characteristic.

An examination of service’s motto’s also suggests that basic cultural characteristics have not changed. The Army is now an “Army of One,” the Air Force wants to “Cross into the Blue,” and the Navy is appealing to sailors to “Accelerate your Life.” The mottos broadly reflect the service cultures described in chapter two. As the motto suggests the Army places its priority on the soldier, the Air Force appeals to those who want to fly, and the Navy places its emphasis on independence, both for the individual and for the service. The Navy Chief of Naval Operation’s (CNO) website is particularly revealing in its service culture identity. The title of the

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131 This information is taken directly from the Air Force Officer Evaluation Report form: AF FORM 707A, 20000601 (EF-V2), Field Grade Officer Performance Report (MAJ thru COL).
132 This information is taken directly from the Army Officer Evaluation Report form: DA FORM 67-9, OCT 97, Officer Evaluation Report.
CNO’s guidance document for 2004 is “Accelerate our Advantages.”\textsuperscript{134} Unanswered is the question: advantages over who? In fact, none of the mottos seem to reflect the Department of Defense’s joint warfare policy: “Joint warfare is team warfare”.\textsuperscript{135}

The Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 had a positive impact on the way the services work together. The success of operations such as Desert Storm and Allied Force are proof of this positive impact. However, there is ample room for continued improvement. The Department of Defense recognizes the importance of jointness to future operations and is placing emphasis on a seamless team of teams. Each of the services continues to manifest unique cultural attributes similar to those described by Carl Builder. These are not necessarily negative attributes. It inspires tradition, pride, and spirit. It also keeps the services focused on honing specific service tasks to the highest degree of professionalism. Each service brings different capabilities and expertise to the table, as well as different services attitudes. The attitudes and culture of the services are often uniquely suited to maximize the effectiveness of service capacities within service unique operating environments. The attitudes of the services can be leveraged and synchronized, in the same way as capabilities, toward a common goal. In fact joint doctrine and effective joint command requires it.

As the U.S. military continues to refine its capabilities some changes should be considered which may further increase the capabilities of the services to conduct joint operations. Arguably, the global war on terrorism has exposed some new challenges in integrated cooperation-specifically at a strategic inter-agency level. The Goldwater Nicholas Act did what congress intended it to do. It forced the services to cooperate in a systematic manner in the execution of joint operations. It created the organizations and facilitated the environment where

\textsuperscript{134} This document is available online at the CNO official website http://www.chinfo.navy.mil/navpalib/cno/ .

joint operations could be practiced as a matter of routine. It encouraged the services to look for common systems and data-bases, and to develop a common doctrine to increase their ability to communicate effectively. Joint Combatant Commands lead the way in initiating the purchase of common information systems. Thus, in summary, the Goldwater Nichols legislation must be considered an unqualified success.

Even with the changes imposed by the Goldwater Nichols Act we have established that the service culture characteristics, as described by Builder, are alive and well today. There are not indications that current trends will change the situation in any significant way in the future. As with individual personality characteristics, behavior can change but the essential characteristics that make people and institutions who they are remain an integral part of their identity. The learned tendencies, preferences, and inclinations remain. This is not necessarily a bad thing. One of the strengths of U.S. military capability is the ability of a joint commander to integrate diverse and unique service capabilities and characteristics. These unique capabilities, when combined by experienced joint commanders and their staffs compliment each other and increase the overall capability of the joint team exponentially. In other words: the more tools in the tool box, the more things you can build, and the tool box is much more valuable than just the sum of the individual tools. The integrated tool box can be used to build things faster and better. The key to success is to be aware of the impediments to integration that exist when service cultures clash. Joint commanders and staffs must be able to recognize the communication and resource errors that often occur as a result of service culture, and minimize their impact on mission success. Joint commanders must be self-aware of their impact of their own service bias and culture on their decision making. Builder’s argument may not have gone far enough. Those who have worked with the Marine Corps are certainly aware of the Marine Corps’ very strong and distinctive culture within the Department of the Navy but not addressed in Builder’s work. Marine culture brings an entire spectrum of unique and critical capabilities to the joint team.
Despite the success of the initial Goldwater Nichols Act, it is time for a Goldwater-Nichols Act II. As the military transforms to meet the challenges of new threats and missions a need is emerging for a new legislation to provide the basis for the military to make hard but necessary decisions. This new legislation must have two focuses. One focus is to continue to reform the joint warfighting capabilities of the services. The other must be to integrate other governmental agencies into the joint warfighting team as required by the needs of the GWOT. Further military reform must be specifically focused to eliminate some of the remaining dysfunctional elements of service culture identified in this paper, without destroying those aspects that make each service unique and expert.

The other focus of the legislation must be on interagency integration and national command authority leadership role. Reform is absolutely necessary in this area. Just as Goldwater Nichols very specifically required the services to conduct joint war fighting operations and train and assign personnel accordingly, further reform must extend that integration into all agencies that have a role in the effective wielding of national power across the full spectrum of conflict. Future reform efforts must focus on how agencies such as the National Security Council (NSC), the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), and others including the Home Land Defense Department integrate into the joint team. Further expansion of the joint warfighting concept to include agencies beyond the Department of Defense will require the consideration and mitigation of the unique cultures that those agencies will bring to the challenge of warfighting. We can expect an expansion of Builder’s thesis by extending his argument on organizational culture to operations outside of DOD. Although not the focus of this paper, recent events of Operations Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom seem to provide strong evidence that such interagency reform is absolutely necessary.
Another potential impact of Builder’s thesis worth considering is the extension of the Builder thesis beyond the Defense Department and other agencies to the national leadership in both the executive and legislative branches. If the President, Secretary of Defense and the NSC chairman are veterans of a particular service, it is likely, and perhaps inevitable to affect national decision making. Builder’s book forward was written by Senator Nunn, a veteran of the Army and Chairman the Senate Arms Services committee. Based on the evidence provided by Builder and the analysis of this paper it is logical to assume that a Senator’s prior exposure to a particular military service culture has a great influence on how he legislates –particularly in areas of military affairs and national security. Likewise, if the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Secretary of Defense, and the President all had similar service backgrounds, it is likely that this could have a significant effect on national policy and strategic campaign planning. Such circumstances, if they occur, are unavoidable. However, an understanding and acceptance of service culture permits leaders to be self aware of the effects of service culture and account for it in the decision making process.

In the 18 years since Builder wrote his book and outlined his service identities, some interesting trends in service personality evolution have been noted which could effect our understanding of how the services work together. For example the famous Wong monograph of 1998 documented a generational culture difference within a service. If Wong’s thesis regarding generational differences is correct, and the institution fails to shape the individuals as they are acculturated into the service, then the expectation may be that services characteristics, such as the Army’s selfless service creed, may be tempered by generational characteristics over time.

136 Leonard Wong, Generations Apart: Xers and Boomers in the Officer Corps (Carlisle, Strategic Studies Institute, 2000), available online at: http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA385404.
The Goldwater Nicholas Act will celebrate its twentieth anniversary in two years. Current operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom, as well as the GWOT will surely identify areas that need improvement and increased emphasis in the realm of joint operations. The joint operations concept so integral to successful operations must expand beyond DOD players and into an inter-agency arena. This expansion must not focus only on organization and process, but must also take into account the benefits and the challenges of unique organizational culture. The success of past operations, the adjustments to improve each successive joint operation, and the arena of future reform all owe Carl Builder a debt of gratitude for the awareness of unique service cultures that he highlighted in 1986. This awareness is a critical tool in solving current cultural communication barriers and making future joint warfighting more effective.
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