THE 1956 SUEZ CRISIS AND THE UNITED NATIONS

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Strategy

by

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ABSTRACT


The 1956 Suez Crisis is the first example of a preemptive strike after World War II. The episode provides lessons about the lengths to which nations will go to secure their interests and the limits of the United Nation’s influence. How the UN uses its power is the point of contention. In 1956, Great Britain, France, and Israel believed the organization would protect their security interests through the unbiased maintenance of international law. Yet, as common in the Cold War, UN action was hampered. A war began and ended with a cease-fire in fifty-five hours. Three militarily superior armies won their tactical fights but were strategically defeated. Most notably, the influence of global authority shifted to the superpowers. Through all this, the UN changed its mission and purpose. The primary question therefore is did the UN resolve the 1956 Suez Crisis? Resolution had to include a status quo ante bellum, the return to the existing system before the war, or the recognition of a new international Regime. The UN’s ability to resolve such crises directly affects its legitimacy in the international community.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This thesis is dedicated to my wife, Jean Gwendolyn, and to all those who serve to keep the United States of America a free, safe, and prosperous nation.
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

General Introduction

For centuries, international law recognized that nations need not suffer an attack before they can lawfully take action to defend themselves against forces that present an imminent danger of attack. Legal scholars and international jurists often conditioned the legitimacy of preemption on the existence of an imminent threat – most often a visible mobilization of armies, navies, and air forces preparing to attack. (Bush 2002, 15)

In an interview at the end of 2003, United Nations (UN) Secretary-General Kofi Annan reflected on the challenges facing the UN following Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). The United States (US)-led war to overthrow Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein ended over twelve years of diplomacy since the 1991 Persian Gulf War. Kofi Annan assumed that the circumstances by which the OIF coalition went to war, the American doctrine of preemptive war, put the UN at its most significant crossroad since 1945.

By 2003, Iraq had violated seventeen UN resolutions, had expelled UN weapons inspectors, and had funded suicide bombings in Israel. The administration of President George W. Bush, fresh from its victory in Afghanistan and armed with the 2002 National Security Strategy, was determined to enforce the UN resolutions. The UN’s response to the looming war, mused Annan, crippled its effectiveness in dealing with other long-standing disputes and possibly its credibility as an organization that worked by consensus: “Those who are opposed to war could not understand that we could not stop the war and those who were for the war were upset that we did not support it.” He further demurred that preemptive war was “never mentioned in the [UN] Charter and [was]
something the organization had never dealt with before” (Annan interviewed by Shawn, December 2003).

Contrary to Mr. Annan’s assertions, the UN had precedents of unsanctioned preemptive strikes from which to refer. For example, preemption was the casus belli (reason for war) in the Arab-Israeli War (1967), Bosnia (1995), and Kosovo (1999). The first preemptive strike in the postmodern era, however, was in the Suez Crisis in 1956 when a British, French, and Israeli coalition launched an attack into Egypt to depose Colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser. Nasser, like Saddam Hussein of Iraq, was an authoritarian dictator who seized power through a coup d’etat. Both men sponsored cross border terrorism against Israel. Both men routinely violated UN resolutions. Both faced strikes when opposing parties no longer found utility in diplomacy. The 1956 war and OIF are reminders that political disputes can digress into open conflict. As Carl Von Clausewitz famously said in his treatise, On War, “War is nothing but the continuation of policy with other means” (Clausewitz 1976, 69).

It will be event in this study that when the Tripartite Coalition (just like the OIF Coalition) could not achieve their political ends through the diplomatic channels, open warfare became their only recourse. Unlike the failed Operation Musketeer, OIF succeeded in overthrowing the Iraqi regime. Annan believed that OIF and the very doctrine of preemption could be “seen as a precedent that other governments [could] use” (Annan interviewed by Shawn, December 2003). Four contemporary examples to consider are: Pakistan or India could use preemption as a justification to wage war over Kashmir; the two Koreas could explode to preempt an invasion across the demilitarized zone; Israel could use preemption to attack its many regional antagonists -- Syria, Iran, or
the Palestinian Liberation Organization; and Russia could attack the former Soviet republics.

In light of the implications of preemption, if the UN does not acknowledge its role as the main interlocutor in the world community, preemption could lead to the unilateral use of force in trouble spots around the world, such as Kashmir, Abkhazia, Nagorno-Karabakh, the Koreas, and the former Soviet Union. The United Nations should therefore review the circumstances of the 1956 Suez Crisis, to understand how genuine divisions amongst its members impair effectiveness.

Background

From the start, the Suez Crisis was never a problem between Egypt and two, or even three, powers only: it concerned a very large part of the world. (Eden 1960, 548)

President Franklin Delano Roosevelt first used the moniker United Nations in the 1 January 1942 "Declaration by United Nations" when a twenty-six nation coalition joined to defeat the Axis Powers. He later declared after the February 1945 Yalta Conference that the attendees had agreed to end unilateral action, polar alliances, and power blocs. The United Nations would be the alternative to the failed League of Nations. That year at the UN Conference on International Organization in San Francisco, fifty countries met to draft the UN Charter. Its founding nations signed the charter on 26 June 1945 based on the 1944 Dumbarton Oaks Conference and the organization officially came to life on 24 October 1945.

However, liberal institutions exist under the permission of the practitioners of Realpolitik. Within weeks of Yalta, Josef Stalin built his Soviet power bloc in Central and Eastern Europe. In response to the communist bloc, the Western alliance built their own
power bloc as part of the *cordon sanitaire*, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), and the Baghdad Pact. By the end of the 1940s and well into the 1950s, the frictions of the Cold War ended hopes of a cooperative Regime. When the Cold War moved into the Middle East the Anglo-French-Israeli invasion of Egypt appeared a historic inevitability.

Despite the existence of the UN, several wars including the 1956 Suez War erupted. Fighting did not happen without cause. After World War II, the politics of the Middle East changed dramatically. The most significant event was the creation of Israel in 1948 which divested the Palestinian inhabitants of their territory. Arab countries took up the Palestinian cause in the first Arab-Israeli War of 1948. The resultant armistice of 1949 designed a ceasefire not peace. Consequently, border incidents between Egypt and Israel continued.

As for the British and French in 1956, they each developed heated disputes with Colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser and his Egyptian junta. When the plan to finance the Aswan Dam failed, the dictator nationalized the Anglo-French owned Suez Canal Company. Arguably, this was the *casus belli* of their entry into what was truly an Egyptian-Israeli war.

**Historic Overview**

The Isthmus of Suez is a land bridge in eastern Egypt joining the continent of Africa and Asia (See figure 1). The creation of the modern Suez Canal was the Herculean undertaking of Count Ferdinand Marie de Lesseps from 1859 to 1869. De Lesseps built the canal for the La Universelle du Canal Maritime de Suez (Universal Company of the Maritime Suez Canal). Four years later, the Suez Canal Company incorporated with $40
million in capital stock jointly owned by the French government and the Ottoman Empire.

The immediate strategic importance of the inland waterway cannot be underestimated. It allowed the European powers to reach colonies in East Africa, India, and the Pacific Rim without having to negotiate the Horn of Africa. The British House of Commons saw such value in the system that in 1875 they agreed to purchase controlling shares in the Suez Canal Company for £3,976,582 (Kinross 1969, 274-275). Egypt thereafter became the focal point of British Middle East policy, supplanting the declining Ottoman Empire; Egypt soon became a protectorate of Great Britain.

![Figure 1. Egypt, 1956](image)

In 1881, the nationalist Egyptian Army Colonel, Ahmed Arabi, led a revolt with the slogan “Egypt for the Egyptians!” In a series of events presaging the ascendancy of Nasser, Arabi seized power. European stakeholders grew concerned that a radical
Egyptian government would default on its debts, seize the canal, and upturn the status quo of international commerce. Great Britain and France soon decided that their intervention was “an absolute necessity” to protect their vital interest. The British Parliament dispatched its army; France’s weak government waffled on authorizing force. Consequently, Great Britain intervened unilaterally (Kinross 1969, 278).

On 19 August 1882, a British expeditionary force seized the Suez Canal with the aid of British reinforcements from India. They quickly defeated Arabi’s forces at the Nile Delta and the following day the British force occupied Cairo. Queen Victoria gained total control of Egypt. France's failure to act decisively in her national strategic interest left Egypt open for Great Britain to takeover.

The internationality of the Suez Canal was codified six years later. Under the terms of the 1888 Convention of Constantinople, the waterway was to remain open as a neutral passage for merchant ships of all nations in times of peace and war. Great Britain was the guarantor of the Canal’s neutrality. Its management was the responsibility of the newly formed Suez Canal Company.

In the 1950’s, Great Britain still had a vested interest in the Suez Canal. It was her link to the British dependencies in the Pacific. The British government also held the largest financial stake in the Suez Canal Company. For France, on top of the French dispute over the canal, the government in Paris loathed Nasser’s active support of Algerian revolution. As for Israel, her grievance with Egypt dated back to the 1948 War up to the terrorist attacks originating from Egyptian camps in the Sinai. Their Anglo-French-Israeli alliance of convenience formed in October 1956 to save the European economic interest and ensure Israeli national preservation.
On 29 October 1956, the Israeli Operation Kadesh started as a precursor for the Anglo-French Operation Musketeer. British and French troops joined the offensive on 4 November. The international community shocked at the brazen use of force compelled a ceasefire fifty-five hours later. After repairs, the canal reopened in early 1957. An agreement between Egypt and the shareholders of the Suez Canal Company paid shareholders approximately $81 million in six annual installments.

The gravity of this crisis should not be underestimated. Just like 1914 on the eve of the World War I, the convergence of alliances had the potential for a world war. Within weeks of signing the UN Charter in 1945, the Soviet Union formed the communist power bloc, the Warsaw Pact. Using this as leverage, the Soviets supported Egypt politically, economically, and militarily. They made threats ranging from the introduction of a Soviet “volunteer” army to assist Egypt (something similar to the Chinese “volunteers” in the Korean War) to Soviet Foreign Minister Bulganin’s veiled threat of bombing London and Paris (Longgood 1957, 155).

In the west, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) formed to counterbalance the Warsaw Pact. The Western powers also succored Israel during its formative years. Despite President Dwight D. Eisenhower’s intense opposition to the invasion, when the Soviet Union began their saber rattling, Eisenhower was prepared to destroy the Soviet Union. The superpowers had the will and capability to fight each other in 1956 if brought to the point of war.

Added to the Middle Eastern problems, the world faced the prospect of another continental war when the Hungarian Crisis flared. On 23 October 1956, a week before the invasion of Egypt, students and workers took to the streets of Budapest, Hungary
demanding the removal of Soviet control. As the allied invasion of Egypt progressed, the Kremlin answered the Hungarian challenge on 4 November in an event similar to the later crack down in China’s 1989 Tiananmen Square Massacre. Covered by the confusion in the UN Security Council over the Suez Canal, Soviet tanks rumbled through Budapest streets and by many estimates killed 30,000 Hungarians; 200,000 people fled their country. By 14 November, Hungary was once more a Marxist outpost.

The events of 1956 were the first true test of the effectiveness of the UN system since the Korean War (1950-1953). In 1950, the body joined to resist the North Korean invasion of South Korea and uphold the rule of international law. Similarly, in 1956, the UN joined to determine which actors had violated international law and how best to respond.

By the end of the crisis, Israel won substantial gains. They stopped the terrorist attacks, they destroyed Egypt’s new Soviet weapons, and more importantly, the new Jewish nation established itself as a highly professional and credible military power under leaders such as the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) Chief of Staff Moshe Dayan.

Egypt’s tactical defeats were translated into success. Egypt gained the sympathy of the UN General Assembly now inundated with third world nations that voted as an anti-western bloc. More importantly, Nasser’s prestige rose in the Arab world. Like Saddam Hussein in 1991, Gamal Nasser had stood up to the world’s greatest powers and survived. Soon Nasser met his strategic objective of removing Europeans from Egypt. British military garrisons lost all mandates in Egypt established under previous agreements. Nasser’s nationalization policies seized all European holding in the country and forced the flight of most foreigners from Egypt by the end of the 1950s. Gamal Nasser had
succeeded in meeting Ahmed Arabi’s 1881 nationalist goal of having “Egypt for the Egyptians!”

The fortunes of Great Britain and France, in contrast, were dismal after the war. Both governments collapsed with the resignation of British Prime Minister Anthony Eden and ouster of French Premier Guy Mollet. Both nations saw the percipitous downfall of their colonial holdings around the world. Their economies and alliances with America were in turmoil. For the French, the Nasser-sponsored Algerian insurrection continued to humiliate the Fourth Republic as surely as the Suez operation, their 1954 defeat in Indochina, and their surrender to the Nazis in 1940.

The Research Question

Given the Cold War, the events in the 1956 Suez Canal Crisis brought humanity to the point of world war. Although the major fighting ended in fifty-five hours, the primary question is: Did the UN resolve the 1956 Suez Crisis? In order to answer the research question, this thesis answers three secondary questions: (1) What was the relevance of the UN as a system of international order? (2) Was the reaction to the tripartite invasion effective? (3) Did the UN resolve the underlying issues that caused the war?

Scope

The scope of the thesis will include the principal parties to the dispute: Egypt, Britain, France, Israel, and the United Nations. It must also include the outside influencers, such as the US, the Soviet Union, and Hungary.
Assumptions

This study makes three assumptions: there is an international “Regime,” standing international laws and agreements comprise that Regime, and finally, the Regime changes over time. The first assumption proscribes a worldview that there is a global order in which the UN leads affairs. Thomas Hobbes wrote that when such a commonwealth exists as the UN, the signers confer onto the body the powers of nation-states through a “plurality of wills” and “sovereign voices” (Hobbes 1962, 134). The signers therefore gave up national rights to wage unilateral war on the condition that the Regime will protect the national interests of states.

Next, the study assumes the system of international law, shown as “R” in figure 2, regulates global organizations, international law, commerce, and travel (Lopez and Stohl 1989, 492-494). The Hobbesian view of the UN as the embodiment of the Regime accepts that by monopolizing force the global body will act in such a manner as to cause its member nations to coexist under its protection. This is the genesis of “collective security” (Hobbes 1962, 134).
Note: George A. Lopez and Michael S. Stohl use this Venn diagram in their 1989 book, International Relations: Contemporary Theory and Practice, to represent the sources of International law. This study uses the same diagram to establish the Regime of international order based on the body of international legal custom, treaties, and laws, which overlap and reinforce each other.

Finally, the author assumes that the Regime progresses over time based on the political will of governments to negotiate differences. Thomas Hobbes wrote that once parties politically solemnized a covenant like the UN Charter, the members could not lawfully change the covenant without permission of all parties to the Regime (Hobbes 1962, 134). This thesis takes the position that despite the legality of the matter, Regime changes are due to adjustments in the distribution of power, shifts in national patterns of interests, or seismic changes in national interests. For example, the 1953 Egyptian revolution that brought Gamal Nasser to power shifted the distribution of power in the region and affected the national interests of many actors around the world. This study
will use this assumption to explain how Egypt changed the international Regime. The extreme shift in national interests made the tripartite invasion in 1956 inevitable.

One cautionary note overshadows the evolution of the Regime: conventions regarding the laws of war, international law, international accords, agreements, and treaties are decidedly Western. They reflect the regional and national ethos of certain peoples, mostly western European and American. It is a fallacy to conclude that the entire world should acknowledge standards of the Regime. Outside of the modern western nation-state, the majority of the world knows, and has only known, tribalism, totalitarianism, theocracies, failed states, rouge states, and many permutations of governance that fall outside the standards of the Regime.

One clear example of this is that authors such as Anwar Sadat will point to the election of Gamal Nasser as proof of his legitimacy as a head of state. Nasser, like many despots including Saddam Hussein, ran unopposed elections. Nasser’s government was illegitimate only to Western European pluralists. The fight in the 1956 Suez Crisis (and OIF) was between the West and an Arab dictator for whom the Regime symbolized only a protocol. Adhering to the Regime was not part of their ethos so they could not (or would not) follow such requirements.

**Limitations**

There are several limits to this study. First, “resolve” as used in the thesis’ primary question does not only define the cessation of hostilities. The completion of the 1956 crisis must also include the re-establishment and maintenance of peace, international order, and international law, a *status quo ante bellum* or a new Regime. If
hostilities end with one party successfully violating treaties, conventions, or international normative standards, then the UN fails this criterion.

Next, the terms “Realpolitik” and “Liberalism” have specific definitions. \textit{Realpolitik} as developed by Napoleon III and Otto Von Bismarck is the application of foreign policy based on the calculations of power and national interest (Kissinger 1994, 137). It is counter to the Liberalism of President Woodrow Wilson, which seeks collective security as a national interest through the pursuit of international peace. The study may also use the terms “realism” or “real” interchangeably with \textit{Realpolitik}.

Liberalism runs contrary to \textit{Realpolitik}. It organizes society to move beyond nation-state sovereignty to the sovereignty of international institutions such as the UN. Essentially, Liberal thinkers do not seek a balance of power but are content to have strong and weaker nations as long as world order remains. The only \textit{casus belli} is to maintain peace. This study may use the term “idealist” interchangeably with Liberalism.

The final limitation in this study is Robert Keohane’s definition of Regime. As shown in figure 2, a Regime must embody principles, norms, and decision-making procedures in a “persistent and connected sets of rules (formal and informal) that prescribe behavioral roles, constrain activity, and shape expectations.” Both Hobbes and Keohane argue that governments forgo independent decision-making for explicit rules with an expectation that signatories will follow the protocols for a greater shared interest (Keohane 1989, 75-76,113). The first assumption of this study is that UN is the embodiment of the current international regime.
Delimitations

This research will remain focused on the political and strategic examination of the 1956 crisis. It will cover the history of the Suez Canal to help in understanding the events that led to the crisis. It will not discuss operational events unless they are pertinent to understanding of the conflict. The study will address the UN, member nations, personalities, and historical situations, which directly influenced the ability of the UN to resolve the 1956 Suez Crisis.

Significance of the Study

The 1956 Suez Crisis is significant for the historic and political lessons it provides. First, contrary to Kofi Annan’s 2003 statement, the event is an example of the use of preemptive strikes. Like OIF, the Suez Crisis demonstrates the limits of the UN’s power to maintain world peace when national interests are threatened.

The canal’s nationalization must be understood as a threat the West. If the Soviets gained control of the Suez Canal through Nasser, they would influence Middle Eastern oil reserves supplying the West and one of the two inter-oceanic trade routes. A resultant economic depression would have brought Western Europe to its knees.

Next, the Suez Crisis was an awakening for Great Britain and France. It was another sign that they were no longer colonial powers and scarcely great powers. They were unable to counter America’s strategic weight in the international community. In contrast, the OIF Coalition prosecuted their 2003 war despite international opposition because of America’s overwhelming power. The 1956 coalition was unable to exert influence inside or outside the UN. The end of the crisis marked the transfer of global
authority to the Superpowers: the US and the Soviet Union. Hereafter, America became the main arbiter in the Middle East, a position it struggles to maintain today.

The author believes that the most notorious significance of the 1956 Suez Crisis is a historical linkage between the events, modern terrorism, and postmodern anti-Semitism. This is relevant because although Egypt lost the tactical fight in 1956, she successfully employed what Joseph Nye called “soft power,” the indirect exercise of power, to win the strategic campaign (Nye 2003, 60). This became a reoccurring pattern in wars for the remainder of the twentieth century. Gamal Abdel Nasser emerged as the “godfather” of the genocidal bigotry that has metastasized in the Arab world today. Nasser’s Egypt provided countries, like pre-OIF Iraq, Syria, Iran, Libya, and even North Korea and Cuba, an example of an enduring “rogue state.” Like Saddam Hussein and today’s pantheon of dictators, Nasser’s victories were exclusively diplomatic and informational. The approach was five-fold: (1) The strategic use of non-state actors (terrorists) to wage undeclared wars anonymously in order to bleed a stronger enemy, (2) make an alliance with strong power blocs to gain “hard power,” (3) use information campaigns for global support by proclaiming, for example, “Death to the British and their friends wherever they may be found” (Lloyd 1978, 34), (4) blame Israel or a Zionist lobby as the cause of the violence, and (5) appeal to the international community through the media for sympathy when reprisals occur.

At the end of the Suez Crisis there began the unlikely alliance of the Soviet Union and Arab states. The Soviets under Josef Stalin had made it a point to suppress all religions. He also saw no value in associating with underdeveloped countries since they could not offer the Soviet Union worthwhile assets.
Nikita Khrushchev had a different view. Communism sought to fight imperialism. Since Arab countries were mostly under western imperial mandates, it benefited the Soviet Union to assist Arab states whenever possible. In the succeeding years, Arab nations admired the Soviet Union for “helping” Egypt by forcing out western (connotative for imperial) powers from Egypt and for financing the Aswan Dam.

Finally, there is karmic irony in the Suez Crisis given the contentious events at the UN prior to OIF. In 1956, President Dwight D. Eisenhower argued that only the UN should adjudicate disputes. To that end, the US actively opposed Great Britain, France, and Israel. Similarly, the OIF Coalition faced opposition from French President Jacques Chirac and German President Gerhardt Schroeder as the US, Great Britain, Australia, Spain, and other allies attempted to enforce UN Resolution 1441.

Given all this, the Suez Crisis must be dissected, studied, and reevaluated for the lessons it holds for the new century in which the free world fight the Global War on Terror. Above all, it must be studied to reform the UN.

**Summary**

The parallel between the 1956 Suez Crisis and OIF is unmistakable: terrorist attacks, dictators who defied international law, preemptive strikes against the dictators, and outcries from the international community. Both events tested the effectiveness of the UN to maintain world peace. This study examines the UN in what Kofi Annan should have termed the organizations “greatest crossroad” (Annan interviewed by Shawn, December 2003). On completion, this thesis will answer the relevance of the UN in international order, the reaction of the UN to the tripartite invasion, and whether or not the UN resolved the underlying issues that caused the 1956 Suez Crisis.
CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW

Introduction

The literary research has two sections. In the first section, the author looks at primary sources that constituted the Regime. Specifically, the author covers the 1888 Convention of Constantinople, the UN Charter, and the UN Resolutions. Other primary sources for the research include the autobiographies of participants in the dispute.

In the second section, the author reviews current literature that aid in understanding the war. Several authors have written about the Suez Crisis with the clarity and detachment provided by time. Their works provide an impartial look at the events perhaps with more lessons for a world struggling to make the UN live up to its mandate.

Primary Legal Sources of 1956 Regime

1888 Convention of Constantinople

_The Suez Canal and League Sanctions: Geneva Special Studies_ by Raymond Leslie Buell is a primary source document. It uses the 1888 Convention of Constantinople as its background, outlines arguments against closing the canal, and provides proposals for its operating authority. In 1888, all major European powers signed the binding treaty establishing the neutrality of the Suez Canal. The agreement guaranteed: free and open passage to all sea going nations in times of war and peace (Article 1); free passage in both times of peace and war even to the “ships of war of belligerents” (Article 4); during times of war, Powers may not disembark nor embark
within the Canal (Article 5); and the Egyptian Government will take the necessary measures for insuring the execution of the Treaty (Article 9).

The United Nations Charter

Kind-hearted people might of course think there was some ingenious way to disarm or defeat an enemy without too much bloodshed, and might imagine this is the true goal of the art of war. Pleasant as it sounds, it is a fallacy that must be exposed. (Clausewitz 1976, 75)

The Charter of the United Nations signed on 26 June 1945 will be the primary source in analyzing the UN in 1956. It affirms the need for collective security, the sovereign equality of its member nations, the legitimacy of treaties, and the benefits to the members through direct diplomatic communication. It is fair to say that liberal-thought inspired the framers of the UN Charter; they saw the end of the nation-state as the main interlocutor for war and peace. In some respects, nation-states see the UN as a threat to their sovereignty.

Several parts of the UN Charter are relevant to this thesis. Article 25 requires all member states to “accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council.” This Article is important when analyzing the action and inaction of the Security Council prior to the crisis. Article 27 requires an affirmative vote of nine members of the Security Council, including concurring votes from the permanent members. The amendment to Article 27, adopted 17 December 1963, does no effect this study.

Article 34 allows the Security Council to probe any dispute, or any situation that might lead to international friction to determine possible dangers to international peace and security. Article 39 empowers the Security Council to “determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression.” Article 40 empowers
the Security Council to force compliance with its provisional measures, as it deems necessary or desirable in order to prevent an aggravation of disputes.

The UN Charter corrected the deficiency of the League of Nations by providing a method for enforcing its resolutions. Chapter 7 specifically outlines the ability to use force. It allows the Security Council to decide what non-military enforcement is necessary to secure its resolution. It permits the Security Council to authorize military action to maintain or restore international peace, and it guarantees the “inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a member of the UN.”

**Related UN Resolutions**

Seven UN resolutions addressed the events in the Middle East in the 1950s. Resolution 106 passed 29 March 1955, condemned Israel for attacking the Egyptian *fedayeen* (Arab terrorist) camps, “as a violation of the cease-fire provisions of Security Council Resolution 54 (1948) and as inconsistent with the obligations of the parties under the General Armistice Agreement between Egypt and Israel.” Next, Resolution 108 signed 8 September 1955 deplored the 24 February 1949 outbreak of violence along the armistice demarcation line between Egypt and Israel and called upon both parties to pacify their areas.

Following the nationalization of the Suez Canal, the UN passed Resolution 118 on 13 October 1956, which demanded that the settlement of the Suez Crisis should meet six provisions. The Soviet Union however vetoed the operative part of the resolution. Resolution 118, with no means of enforcement, became the *casus belli* for the invasion.
After the tripartite attack on Egypt, the UN passed Resolution 997 on 2 November 1956, which called for a cease-fire, the reopening of the Suez Canal, and the restoration of secure freedom of navigation. Resolution 1000 followed on 5 November 1956. It established a UN Command for an emergency international force to secure and supervise the cessation of hostilities in accordance with all the terms of General Assembly Resolution 997. Finally, Resolution 1002 passed 7 November 1956 and Resolution 1120 passed 24 November 1956 demanded that Israel immediately withdraw behind the armistice lines established in 24 February 1949.

Other Primary Sources

In October 1956, the US State Department published The Suez Canal Problem: July 26 – September 22, 1956. This volume is one of the most useful literary sources for this research. The Suez Canal Problem demonstrates that America was concerned about the nationalization of the canal as an “international problem carrying dangerous potentialities for the world.” The US, Great Britain, and France agreed that “the Egyptian action threatened the freedom and security of the Canal as guaranteed by the Convention of 1888.” Each country wanted to assure the global use of the waterway was consistent with the interests of the newly liberated Republic of Egypt (State Department, 1956).

Autobiographies

The autobiographies of Anthony Eden, Selwyn Lloyd, David Ben-Gurion, and Anwar el-Sadat are valuable primary literary sources of the crisis. These men provide a detailed look at the events from varied perspectives. When analyzed against the treatise by Gamal Nasser, coalition fears of another Adolph Hitler are understandable.
British Prime Minister Sir Anthony Eden (1897-1977) serves as the best articulator of the actions of 1956. Throughout World War II, Sir Winston Churchill so valued Eden's advice that Eden became Churchill’s heir apparent. Eden in his autobiography, *Full Circle*, described the events that would eventually lead to his resignation. He sternly declared that there would be a reckoning for the moral backslides of the UN, the reluctance of the UN to uphold the standards of international law that this study calls the R-curve.

Similarly, Eden’s Foreign Minister, Selwyn Lloyd (1904-1978), saw the grave nature of the Suez Crisis. In his autobiography, *Suez 1956*, Lloyd wrote that Nasser’s threat to the British regional position became clear as Nasser expelled the British army from the Canal Zone (and Egypt) and as a Soviet-backed propaganda campaign began against Great Britain.

The next party to the invasion was Israeli Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion (1886-1973). David Ben-Gurion immigrated to Israel from Poland after he survived the Holocaust. He rose to serve as the Israeli Prime Minister and Defense Minister. After many disappointments, Ben-Gurion rejected the UN’s authority. The UN did not defend the Israeli right to use the Suez Canal in accordance with the 1888 Convention of Constantinople. The UN did not deter the many Arab terrorist attacks. The UN condemned Israel for exercising its inherent to self-defense per Article 51 of the Charter.

Ben-Gurion wrote of his concern for the very survival of the Israeli state in his autobiography, *Israel: Years of Challenge*. Israeli lives were cheap in the eyes of the international community; a few killings a week went unnoticed. There was no imperative to enforce the Armistice of 1949.
On the other side of the crisis, there are the works of Gamal Nasser and Anwar el-Sadat, his deputy. First, Colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser (1918-1970) was a secular nationalist who wanted to model his reforms after Mustapha Kemel (Ataturk) in Turkey. Gamal Nasser wrote that his role was that of a guardian to show Egypt the “right way” (Nasser 1956, 72-73). He declared in *Philosophy of the Revolution*, that he sought to lead the Arab world, "African Circle,” to eliminate colonial powers from the Middle East and Africa, and establish a Pan-Arab state from the Strait of Gibraltar to the Indian Ocean.

Anwar el-Sadat (1918-1981) was less charismatic than his predecessor. Sadat was a cadet at the Abbasia Military Academy when he met fellow cadet Gamal Nasser. He served as a Nazi agent during World War II and later assisted Nasser’s rise to power. In his autobiography, *In Search of Identity*, Anwar el-Sadat cautiously justified the seizure of the Suez Canal although he would have told Nasser to do so differently. Later, whereas Nasser claimed the Soviets forced an end to the fighting, Sadat credited the US. Interestingly, no primary source attributed the end of hostilities to the UN.

**Secondary Sources**

**Histories of the Crisis**

There are many records of why the disputes between the Great Britain, France, Israel, and Egypt degraded into open warfare. Dr. Hugh J. Schonfield may be the best at recording the war. In his book, *The Suez Canal in Peace and War: 1869-1969*, Schonfield explains the rise of Egyptian nationalism and its conflict with the British government who wished to maintain the Commonwealth and NATO’s strategic interest in the canal. Similarly, in *Suez Story: Key to the Middle East*, William F. Longgood believes the 1956 crisis was a convergence of several factors: “internal Egyptian
problems, a dictator trying to remain in power, the failure of the US to understand Arab psychology, and the ever-fermenting nationalistic zeal of the Arab world” (Longgood 1958, 142).

Jon D. Glassman adds a new perspective to the Suez Crisis. He wrote *Arms for the Arabs* in 1976 as an appraisal of the Soviet Union’s involvement in subsidizing wars in the Middle East. He sees a continuum between the major Middle East wars (1956, 1967, and 1973) and the Soviet arms sales. Glassman argues that the Soviet Union sold large quantities of antiquated arms to Israel’s enemies in order to destabilize the regional balance of power in their favor. This strategy would draw the US and her allies towards the Jewish state further alienating the Arabs from the West. Arab nations would trend towards the communist bloc.

*Warriors at Suez: Eisenhower Takes America into the Middle East in 1956*, written by Donald Neff in 1981 should be read critically. Neff effectively relates the events of 1956 and provides good factual data using documents obtained from the Central Intelligence Agency and State Department under the Freedom of Information Act. Neff tries to appear fair but unfortunately, he displays a pro-Egyptian bias. He uses phrases “selfish and sometimes cynical motives” and “Israeli aggression against the Arabs” without equally documenting the catalytic activities of the Nasser junta. Donald Neff further portrays Nasser as heroic, young Arab nationalist confronting dim-witted colonial powers.

The starkest example of Donald Neff’s bias is that he attributes the origin of the crisis to the 28 February 1955 Israeli strike against the Egyptian *fedayeen* in Gaza that killed 38 soldiers and civilians. This is disingenuous. It ignores a multitude of Egyptian
attacks on Israel, Egypt’s violations of the 1949 Arab-Israeli Armistice and UN resolutions, and Egypt’s violation the 1888 Convention of Constantinople, all of which occurred before 1955. Neff writes, “Nasser was careful . . . in acting legally and in making sure that traffic through the canal continue unimpeded. He wanted by all means to avoid giving the West an excuse to accuse him of violating the 1888 Convention of Constantinople that guaranteed free passage through the canal” (Neff 1981, 282).

Henry Kissinger also sees the cynical nature of the invasion but gives it a more balanced treatment in Diplomacy, his opus maximus on foreign policy and the art of international relations. In Chapter 21, “Leapfrogging Containment: The Suez Crisis,” Kissinger properly centers the issue on Cold War relations and Realpolitik diplomacy. Unlike Neff, Kissinger portrays Nasser as a Soviet proxy instead of an independent actor. More importantly, Kissinger lays the case that competing national interests regularly neutered collective security. Western democracies should therefore temper Liberalism with realistic pursuit of concrete interests.

Great Britain and France understood this. They used the UN’s ineptitude to legitimize their conflict: “The UN was thus transformed from a vehicle for solving international disputes to a final hurdle to be cleared before resorting to force, and, in a sense, even as an excuse for it” (Kissinger 1994, 539). This is a recurring theme in A Dangerous Place: The UN as a Weapon of World Politics by Abraham Yeselson and Anthony Gaglione.

**Literature on the UN**

The final group of literary sources focuses on the UN’s reaction to the crisis. The UN and How It Works by David Cushman Coyle details the structure of the organization
to maintain peace and better global living conditions. Coyle believes that the UN is a preventative diplomacy and peacekeeping body instead of its mandated function to assure collective security. He confuses the purpose for the organization.

Max Harrelson in *Fires All Around the Horizon: The UN’s Uphill Battle to Preserve the Peace* and Norman MacQueen in Chapter 5 of *The UN and Crisis Management*, “UN Peacekeeping in the Cold War Decades and the Transition Period, 1956-1989,” echo this. Harrelson, firstly, labels Great Britain, France, and Israel as aggressors despite the fact that the UN had never formally given them the “scarlet letter.” He then proceeds to describe the crisis as “the first time that permanent members of the Security Council had taken clear-cut act of aggression against another member nation,” and that the UN ended the war, (Harrelson 1989, 71 and 77). MacQueen likewise lauds the organizations ability to “salvage some kind of security role for itself, which was both ‘legitimate’ and effective” (MacQueen 1997, 63).

Coyle, Harrelson, and MacQueen believe that “the influence of the UN” succeeded in stopping the violence, which is questionable given that actors on both sides of the crisis never credited the UN for anything but obstruction. Again, no primary actor in the 1956 crisis credits the UN for ending the conflict.

**Summary of Literature**

This is not a complete catalog of the literature used in the research. It simply discusses the most important references for the methodology and the analysis. The primary sources include documents surrounding the dispute and its final settlement. Finally, this chapter outlined the works that tackled the Suez Crisis and the UN. The variety of references in this study gives an appreciation of all perspectives in the crisis.
CHAPTER 3

Methodology

**Introduction to the Research Methodology**

If one side uses force without compunction, undeterred by the bloodshed it involves, while the other side refrains, the first will gain the upper hand. That side will force the other to follow suit; each side will drive its opponent toward extremes, and the only limiting factors are the counterpoises inherent in war. To introduce the principle of moderation into the theory of war itself would always lead to logical absurdity. (Clausewitz 1976, 75-76)

Given the thousands of difficult choices politicians make, the technique that the author uses, is a logical way of modeling complex decisions in a competitive global environment. The methods used for the analysis derive from macroeconomics principles, a quantitative social science used as a legitimate measure of behavior. It uses a standard times-series graph to illustrate the political relationship of actors in the 1956 Suez Crisis. In the analysis of the events, this will make patterns of behavior in the Suez situation more discernible than the simple use of text. The methodology accepts a relationship between the political will to negotiate disputes and time. This is consistent with the *Clausewitzian* mantra that war never breaks out wholly unexpectedly (Clausewitz 1976, 78).

**The Regime**

There is a lot of literature on Regime theory but the theoretical baseline must begin with Thomas Hobbes and John Locke at the “State of Nature.” Figure 3 demonstrates the progression of the international Regime, or R-curve, on a time series graph. It measures time along the horizontal scale and the variable (Political Will to
Negotiate Disputes) along the vertical scale. The Regime ($R_1$) comes from the Regime in figure 1, the standard of international order or international law as set by the UN Charter. Beginning at the State of Nature, the R-curve is an upward slope that reflects the political will of governments to abide by a set body of laws.

![Figure 3. Time-Series Graph](image)

*Note:* A time-series graph represents the progression of the international Regime. Its measures time along the horizontal scale and the variable (Political Will to Negotiate Disputes) along the vertical scale. Regime ($R_1$) or the R-curve is an upward, or positive, slope reflecting a relationship between the political will of governments to abide by a set body of laws over time.

Thomas Hobbes was the first philosopher to differentiate between the function of the state apparatus and civil society. Hobbes fervently opposed the lawlessness involved with populism (Kaplan 2002, 86). In his 1651 treatise, *Leviathan*, Hobbes saw men as characteristically selfish, individualistic animals constantly at war and the human condition reduced to “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short” lives where men depend on
the security of their own strength. In such a condition, famously known as the “State of
Nature,” industry, culture, trade stagnate (Hobbes 1962, 100).

To prevent this frenzied existence, the Hobbesian world needed a coercive superstructure to maintain order to distinguish civil justice. Men therefore formed the Social Contract, or the covenant, which regulates society. A major function of the Regime is to prevent anarchy (Keohane 1989, 77 and 106).

Sierra Leone is the clearest example of the need for a Leviathan. Mercenaries protected Freetown, Sierra Leone in 1996 and 1997. When these enablers of coercive order left, gangs of armed, drugged-addicted teenagers ravaged the city for two years. This was the model of the State Of Nature. Freetown needed those lower levels of Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs, order and safety, before a democracy and free elections. When fighting the repugnant forces, it does not help countries like Sierra Leone “to hold elections if there is no government able to stop violence” (Kaplan 2002, 83).

If Thomas Hobbes best defined the brutishness of international machinations, then John Locke proffered visions of utopian Liberalism. Locke argued that the original state of nature was a content existence of reason and tolerance, equality and independence, with the guarantee of life, health, liberty, or possessions. Since competition leads to conflict, actors gained collective security by coordinating their behavior (Keohane 1989, 106-107). So then, in the Lockean world, international Regimes such as the UN exist to protect the world community from the lawlessness of entities outside the Regime.

When the State of Nature ended with the establishment of the first settled communities, the R-curve rose dramatically. Historically, this point should start with the Code of Hammurabi (1780 BC) which first organized society. His code of laws, publicly
arranged in methodical sets, is the first example of an enforceable Regime. The body of regulations can be termed the “Social Contract.”

There is little evidence of an international Regime in antiquity or in the medieval world, the Code of Chivalry proscribing extensive battlefield cruelty was the closest attempt at a Regime. Alberico Gentili (1552-1608), an Italian legal professor at Oxford University developed the concept of *De Jure Belli*, or Concerning the Law of War, in 1598. Gentili’s ideas took from the chivalric concept by emphasizing a need to decrease the destruction of life and property, care of noncombatants and enemy prisoners of war, and the conditions of parley where combatants may consult with one another.

Hugo Grotius (1583-1645), a Dutch jurist, credited Gentili for establishing the basis for his treatise. In 1625, the Grotius developed *De Jure Belli Ac Pacis*, or Concerning the Law of War and Peace. Grotius contended that there existed rules of national conduct, which made the use war as an instrument of national policy criminal except in extreme cases.

The Peace of Westphalia (1648) settled the Thirty-Years War. From then on, the R-curve makes the sharp upward spike. For example, the Congress of Vienna (1815) established the principle of neutrality. Next, the Declaration of Paris (1856) standardized international laws of neutrality with respect to the rules of maritime warfare. More germane to this study, the 1888 Convention of Constantinople established the international neutrality of the Suez Canal and bonded 22 nations to keep the waterway open in both war and peace.

Other laws of war emerged at the First Hague Conference (1899) and the Second Hague Peace Conference (1907), the establishment of the Permanent Court of
Arbitration, or Hague Tribunal and the Declaration of London (1909). When examining such institutions of governance and warfare, Carl Von Clausewitz provides three useful considerations. First, war never breaks out wholly unexpectedly. Second, war is never autonomous but is always as an instrument of policy. Third, the state must be prepared for war in which violence eclipses every policy (Clausewitz 1976, 88).

World War I immediately tested the new international Regime. All nations capable of implementing international law were actively fighting. As a result, belligerents routinely violated the standing conventions previously mentioned. After the war, the international community attempted to disarm the world powers and proscribe certain weapons. Most notably, as Hugo Grotius suggested in 1625, the Kellogg-Briand Pact (1928) “outlawed” warfare between nations as a tool of foreign policy. Sixty-two countries ultimately ratified the pact but, with no enforcement power, it never contributed to international peace. Kellogg-Briand ultimately failed to stop the undeclared wars in the 1930s and 1940s: 1931, Japan invaded Manchuria; 1935, Italy invaded Ethiopia; 1938, Germany invaded Austria and Czechoslovakia; 1939, Germany invaded Poland; 1939, the Soviet Union invaded eastern Poland, the Baltic states, and Finland; and 1940, Germany invaded Scandinavia, Luxembourg, Belgium, the Netherlands, and France.

Through the League of Nations, President Woodrow Wilson had wanted collective security as a national interest. Nothing spoke more to the failure of an unenforceable international Regime than World War II. Nevertheless, humanity once more attempted to enforce peace with the creation of the UN. It proposed to outlaw the offensive use of force by member states unless in self-defense, collective self-defense, or collective security. Unlike the toothless League of Nations, the UN set conditions to
enforce the will of the world in Chapter 7 of its charter. On the face of it, Chapter 7 harkens to the principle of Niccolo Machiavelli that values are useless without arms to back them up. Therefore, for policymakers, projecting power must come first; values are second (Kaplan 2002, 61). Centuries later, Thomas Hobbes later mirrors these ideas in a warning that “covenants without the sword are but words and of no strength to secure a man at all” (Hobbes 1962, 129).

The State

Hobbes defined the State as a “commonwealth” or “great Leviathan” as an artificial being of greater stature and strength than individual citizens (Hobbes 1962, 19). No matter how noble the Regime attempts to be, the world exists in an anarchic collection of states that have individual and often conflicting national security concerns. In this case, political realism will frequently supersede the idealist’s dreams. Machiavelli understood that national self-interest forced political decisions. A morality of good results, not good intentions, drives policy to uphold or reject the Regime. If policy does not produce beneficial results, it cannot be good, hence Machiavelli’s famous maxim, “the end justifies the means.”

John Spanier is the most recent theorist used in this study to understand the real interests of the state. Given preventative diplomacy, Spanier writes that in fact:

There are ambitious and warlike states that are unappeasable and had to be opposed [requiring] a willingness to risk war and strong military forces to support a policy of deterrence. To fear risking war left the states that most desired peace at the mercy of the more ruthless states. (Spanier 1990, 75)

Governments wield power as a means of enhancing their national security. Real national security concerns are a fusion of five areas: national preservation, national
prestige, economic security, national welfare, and ideology. As shown in the 1956 Suez Crisis, the degradation of any security area threatens a state’s real interests.

National Preservation takes on the form of physical security, territorial security, and political independence. Physical security refers to safety within national boundaries. Territorial integrity referred to the preservation of national borders. Finally, political independence refers to the ability of a sovereign government to act free of foreign control to the benefit of its domestic political and economic system (Spanier 1990, 75-76).

National Prestige is the second facet of national security. It is the amorphous notion of national status or as Spanier described, the “reputation of power.” This concept is often subjective and requires other nations to perceive the willingness and capabilities of other nations to use power.

Economic Security is the third form of security in this paradigm. This raises questions of the financial health of a nation and a link between finances and a stable, strong economic base.

National Welfare refers to the ability of the state to enable the rise in the standards of living as part of its social policies, often defined as the “good life.” This reflects the desire of people in all communities in the world for a better life – a concern that all governments must answer or else they end like Louis XVI and Marie Antoinette in 1793.

Finally, in this model, the state is responsible for the preservation of a binding national ideology. A binding ideology or principles such as liberty and capitalism describes reality and prescribes a desirable future for the state and or the world (Spanier 1990, 83).
Construction of the Methodology

The Integrated Elasticity Model

The process for examining the Suez Crisis begins with the Regime as defined in figures 2 and 3. The curves on figure 4 indicate whether the relationship between the variables is positive or negative depending on its upward or downward orientation; this shows how much of a response there is in $Y$ when $X$ changes. A positive slope indicates increases in $X$ associated with increases in $Y$. A negative slope indicates the opposite, a decrease in $Y$ when $X$ increases.

![Figure 4. The Integrated Elasticity Model](image)

*Note:* based on the *Law of Disputes*, is a time-series graph used to demonstrate the utility of each party in a dispute to enter conflict.

The $R_1$ Curve reflects the positive relationship between the political will of governments to create a body of laws and time. The desire to remain at or above $R_1$ is either elastic (willing to immediately enter conflict), or inelastic (slow to enter conflict) depending on the utility of maintaining peace or entering conflict and as such reflects an
elasticity in the political will to negotiate. Figure 4 is the second time-series graph used in this study. It demonstrates what the author calls the Integrated Elasticity Model -- the reaction of all parties in a dispute at various points in time.

To understand the Integrated Elasticity Model, the author proposes a Law of Disputes: all things being constant (ceteris paribus) the political will to resolve disputes becomes more elastic as time passes. It understands that war never breaks out wholly unexpectedly, and that political disputes can digress into open conflict: “War is nothing but the continuation of policy with other means (Clausewitz 1976, 69 and 78). This thought is consistent with Thomas Hobbes’ contention that warfare has not only a fighting component but during a portion of time, “the will to contend by battle is sufficiently known. Therefore, the notion of time is to be considered in the nature of war” (Hobbes 1962, 100).

All parties in a dispute follow one of the slopes in the Integrated Elasticity Model. Given the Law of Disputes, the dispute curve (D-curve) is generally a negative slope that continuously declines as long as actors maintain the disposition to fight. It follows that the D-curve will always slope downward when actors pursue their interests against external actors. It also follows that the D-curve will inevitably intersect the R-curve at T. The D₃ in figure 4, the Standard Negative Utility Curve demonstrates the Law of Disputes and is used as the measure of all other curves.

Two exceptions to the Law of Disputes (discussed later) occur when the actors in a dispute negotiate a settlement or when parties seek to remain neutral. In the former, D₄ has a negative and decreasing slope, which never reaches below the R-curve. D₅ is
neither positive nor negative so that barring an immediate, extreme positive change in the Regime, shifts in the R-curve will never intersect it.

The $D_1$ Curve

To begin with, $D_1$ is the Extreme Negative Utility, or Radical, Curve is a severe permutation of the $D_3$ curve. It is defined by an immediate political utility in disregarding the existence of an international regime. Practitioners of the $D_1$ curve therefore have the greatest elasticity in not seeking a peaceful resolution to disputes. $D_1$ will always intersects the R-curve early at $T-2$.

In the twentieth century, Japan’s invasion of Manchuria or Germany’s invasion of Western Europe demonstrated the $D_1$ curve as the political will to disregard the existence of the League of Nations, the Kellogg-Briand Pact, and any negotiated systems of avoiding conflict. In the twenty-first century, non-state actors, terrorists such as Al Queda, Hamas, Sein Fein, et al, have taken up the mantle of the $D_1$ curve. Since terrorists, as extra-national actors, cannot legitimately negotiate disputes, they are therefore most elastic.

The $D_2$ Curve

$D_2$ is the Marginal Negative Utility, or Catalyst Curve. It is a volatile permutation of the $D_3$ curve with all the characteristics of $D_3$ until a Catalyst causes a strong, immediate utility in going below the R-curve. Actors show a marginal elasticity until spurred by an incident, a casus belli. It always intersects the R-curve at $T-1$.

Prior to America’s involvement in World War II, for example, the Unites States demonstrated a $D_3$ curve with the Axis Powers. The war in Europe had raged for years, France had fallen, and Great Britain was fighting for her survival. In Asia, Japan
systematically brought the Pacific Rim under her control. Through it all, America watched; there was no *casus belli*. The attack on Pearl Harbor was the catalyst that defined the moment when the US had utility to resort to open warfare. Similarly, the July 1956 Nationalization of the Suez Canal was a *casus belli* for Great Britain, France, and Israel. They showed a marginal elasticity but were more likely to renounce the rules of international regime given the impasse at the Security Council.

Arthur Goodhart, a professor at Oxford University and jurist advising the Eden government in 1956, wrote that in a case such as this where Nasser was a catalyst, it was proper for a state to use unilateral force to protect the lives of its citizens living abroad and to protect a vital national interest which had been imperiled. Further, independent national action was appropriate outside the UN. In these instances, the state that altered the status quo of the Regime is guilty of aggression (Lloyd 1978, 239).

The D₃ Curve

The D₃ is the Standard Negative Utility Curve used as a measure of all other curves. It demonstrates the Law of Disputes, *ceteris paribus*, the political will to resolve disputes become more elastic as time passes. The downward slope continues as long as there is national utility in maintaining the dispute, becoming more elastic as time passes. It always intersects the R-curve at T.

The Cold War is a classic example of the D₃ Curve. The Soviet Union and the US kept many disputes alive since they saw political, ideological, social, and economic utility in not ending them. In this case, it behooved both actors to maintain an agreed level of conflict as long as it did not degenerate into open war between them.
The D₄ Curve

There are two forms of inelasticity. *Ceteris paribus*, they will never result in conflict. The first type is the D₄ Marginal Utility, or Negotiation, Curve. It assumes that like D₃, disputes left unresolved will eventually lead to conflict over time. This therefore necessitates resolving disputes in accordance with the norms of the Regime.

The D₄ Curve best describes Article 39 of the UN Charter. The Security Council is authorized to determine threats to peace and to adjudicate the differences. This does not advocate the use of war as a policy nor does it abrogate the international Regime to appease an aggressor. If the R-curve shifts upward radically, it will eventually collide with the Negotiation Curve. The D₄ Curve is important when analyzing the UN reaction to the Suez Crisis and the tripartite invasion.

The D₅ Curve

D₅ is the Zero Curve or Appeasement Curve and demonstrates Perfect Inelasticity. The D₅ curve is Pacifism. It shows an adamant political will to keep the peace under all circumstances. Pacifism is extreme idealism where only peaceful relations should govern human intercourse. Moreover, capitulation should resolve disputes when negotiations fail. This is the behavior of neutral countries such as Switzerland, Belgium, and Luxembourg during the early years of World War II.

D₅ also reflects a *Chamberlainian* fatalism that evil is an unstoppable force which must be mollified. There is no moral passion associated with it. Nothing akin to what Robert Kaplan called “clean hatred” for evil (Kaplan 2002, 71). It disregards the existence of evil men, institutions, and states as it welcomes rogues into the global
community as equals – conversely, it ignores the enlightenment of the Liberal world altogether.

The Complex Elasticity Model

The most accurate way of looking at the world based on the Integrated Elasticity Model is the Complex Elasticity Model, shown in figure 5. It represents the possible behavior patterns of disparate parties in a dispute. This also shows that international politics and international law are not compatible.

![Complex Elasticity Model](image)

Figure 5. The Complex Elasticity Model

Note: the Complex Elasticity Mode is a time-series graph used to demonstrate accurately the possible behavior patterns of parties in relation to the R

Shifts in national patterns of interest, changes in the constitutional status of governments from elections, revolutions, or *coup d’etat* affect international relations and therefore they affect the R-curve. States attempt to use existing law to define the acceptable parameters of international behavior. An immediate, positive change in the R-curve, a change to the status quo incompatible with the standards accepted by the
international community, will result in conflict. Changing D-curves result when there are: 
(1) shifts in the R-curve, (2) substitutes to the Law of Disputes (peace, negotiation, or open 
conflict), (3) changes to societal norms regarding the appropriate use of conflict in public 
policy, or (4) financial limitations to a nation-state’s capacity to use its “hard power.”

Conclusion

This chapter addressed the theoretical concepts of Regime and the state’s interests in the Regime as a baseline for the Methodology. Literature on Regime theory begins 
with Thomas Hobbes and John Locke at the State of Nature and for the purpose of this 
study ends with the UN Charter. This is the foundation for the next sources: the laws that 
constituted the Regime, related UN resolutions on the Crisis, and memoirs on the subject. 
Chapter 4 will provide a historical setting of the events leading to the war.
CHAPTER 4

HISTORICAL SETTING

“The Suez Canal might be thought of . . . as a giant fulcrum on which balances the might of East and West - - whoever controls Egypt and the canal has taken a long step toward world domination” (Longgood 1957, x).

Strategic Value and Interests

The Suez Canal still had enormous strategic value to Europe after World War II. Economically, the Suez Canal facilitated a 40% increase in the global commercial shipping industry. British merchant routes between Calcutta and Liverpool and French merchant routes between Basra and Marseille averaged 11,650 miles by transiting around the Cape of Good Hope. Transiting the canal dropped the distance by 45% to 6,400 miles. Ships that averaged five trips annum, increased to seven trips (Longgood 1958, xii-xiii).

Figure 6. The Interoceanic Routes Used by the British and the French to Travel from Their Homeports to Their Colonies or Interests When Using the Cape of Good Hope and the Suez Canal

40
Northward to Europe went rubber from Malaya; wheat and wool from Australia; chrome from East Africa; cotton, tea, oils, manganese from India; jute from Pakistan; tea and oil from Ceylon; and copper from Africa. Southward to markets of the Pacific world went the finished products from the factories of Europe: metal goods, cement, paper, fertilizer, machines, sugar, chemical products, salt, cereals, railway materials, and petroleum (Longgood 1957, xi).

The most valuable cargo heading north was oil, the key to the postwar European economy. In the 1950’s, the Middle East recovered 3.5 million barrels of oil daily, or 179.8 million tons annum. As shown in figure 7 and table 1, this amounted to 23% of the total global production. Each day the Suez Canal passed 1.5 million barrels of oil for European and American markets. Europe, unlike America, was almost entirely dependent on Middle Eastern oil; 75% of traffic headed for Europe through the Suez Canal carried oil. Great Britain and France received 80% of their oil from the region (Longgood 1957, xi; Kunz 1991, 199).

![1955 World Oil Production](image)

**Figure 7. 1955 World Oil Production**
In 1955, 14,666 ships from 48 countries, nearly all maritime nations, used the Suez Canal; 8,000 of those ships were oil tankers. Table 2 shows that of six major oil-producing nations in the Middle East recovering a combined total of 115 million tons of oil per annum, 74 million tons (64%) of their oil was shipped through the canal. Revenue from the Suez Canal tolls reached $94 million by the end of fiscal year 1955, the highest annual receipts since its opening in 1869. Still in 1950 Egypt blocked the Straits of Tiran barring Israel from the waterway (Longgood 1958, xii-xiii).

Table 1. 1955 Oil Production

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>MILLION TONS/ANNUM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MIDDLE EAST</td>
<td>179.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NON-MIDDLE EAST</td>
<td>590.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>770</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source*: Kunz 1991, 199.

Table 2. 1955 Oil Shipments to West

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>VIA CANAL</th>
<th>VIA PIPELINE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kuwait</td>
<td>44</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qatar</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bahrain</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>74</strong></td>
<td><strong>41</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

British Strategic Interests

Since the 1875 stock purchase, the British government held 353,204 of 800,000 shares of stock in the Suez Canal Company (44%), which generated a substantial amount of revenue from tolls (Longgood 1957, xi). Using an example of a medium sized oil tanker paying $11,000 per trip in tolls, the canal made $161,326,000 in 1954 ($70,983,440 revenue to the British government).

Besides the revenue generated for British coffers, as shown in Figures 9 and 10, Europe was enormously dependent on oil from the Middle East to run its economy. Most notably, 70% of Middle East oil went to Great Britain and France. Of the total oil imports into those two countries, 79% transited through the Suez Canal. In his memoir, Full Circle, Anthony Eden wrote that the Middle East oilfields were producing 145 million tons per annum. Almost half of that oil (70 million tons) passed through the Suez Canal in 1955 destined for Western Europe. Another 40 million tons of oil reached the ports of the Levant by pipelines running through the territories of Egypt’s allies, Syria and Saudi Arabia (Eden 1960, 478).
In the 1950’s the Soviet Union had started a relationship with the government of Gamal Nasser as a way to leapfrog the containment policies of the West. British Prime Minister Anthony Eden feared that such a relationship would work to the determent of Great Britain and her allies. Eden wrote that, “at any time the Egyptians might decide to interfere with [the passage of oil].” Nasser might also prompt his in Syria and Saudi Arabia to cut the pipelines (Eden 1960, 478). Under Soviet influence, Nasser’s Egypt would not only control the flow of Middle Eastern oil to the free world but would cost Great Britain nearly $71 million in revenue. The Soviet Union would gain an unacceptable economic leverage over the West.

1955 GROSS EUROPEAN OIL IMPORTS

![Pie chart showing oil imports from the Middle East with percentages: 42% for Great Britain, 28% for France, 19% for Italy, and 11% for Germany.]

Figure 9. 1955 European Oil Imports from the Middle East

Militarily, the Suez Canal played a vital part of British foreign strategy. It linked Great Britain to East African military bases, Pacific Commonwealth partners, and allies. If the expanding Soviet Union influenced the Suez Canal Zone, they could control the movement of forces across major theaters.
Table 3. 1955 European Oil Imports from the Middle East

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Gross Oil Imports</th>
<th>Imports Using the Suez Canal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Great Britain</td>
<td>39.8</td>
<td>23.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>26.0</td>
<td>13.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>18.2</td>
<td>8.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>94.4</strong></td>
<td><strong>47.2</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Kunz 1991, 201.

French Strategic Interests

France’s national interest in Egypt went beyond their real interests in the canal although private French shareholders owned 56% of the Suez Canal Company. France desperately needed to revive its national prestige following its quick capitulation to Nazi Germany in 1940. In order to remove that stain, the French Army ferociously fought a new kind of war in Indochina – guerre revolutionnaire, or revolutionary war. This too
ended in disaster; the French were defeated at Dien Bien Phu and lost Indochina as a colony.

John Shy and Thomas W. Collier argue in Makers of Modern Strategy that the communist world, from its base in the Soviet Union was winning the war for global domination while the West remained mesmerized with fancies of nuclear power. The communists had won the first battle in China under Mao Zedong. Then the French lost Indochina. In North Africa, “Nasser’s coup . . . was seen as yet another Communist victory.” The next battle was for French controlled Algeria where Gamal Nasser was sponsoring an insurrection in the next Communist offensive (Shy and Collier, 1986, 852).

Algeria was no simple colony like Indochina. Algeria was the southern extension of France. Legally, it belonged to metropolitan France. Over a million French settlers owned farms on the Algerian coastal plain and lived in Algerian cities. The Algerian-French were given full French citizenship including representation in the Parliament. This large Franco-centric population would not countenance reverting authority to the “uncivilized” colonial masses. The French governor declared that, “Algeria and its entire people are an integral part of France, one and indivisible, and France will no more quit to Algeria than Provence or Brittany. L’Algerie c’est la France!” (Neff 1981, 161).

On 1 November 1954, the Algerian insurgents, Front de Liberation Nationale’ (FLN), began their uprising. Much like the Palestinian cause, this quickly gained Arab sentiment across North Africa. The harsh response of the French military, many returning from the Vietnam debacle, earned the rebels more regional support. By September 1956, as the world debated the answer to Nasser’s seizure of the Suez Canal and the Hungarian Crisis, the FLN moved their war into Algerian cities. Unlike the situation in Vietnam, the
Algerian rebels backed by Nasser could easily prey on the massive Algerian-French population and began to massacre civilians with increasing ferocity.

Gamal Nasser had now become a quintessential Arab “boogey-man.” The French were calling him the “Dictator of the Nile” the “Mussolini of the Arab world” and a threat not only to Western influence in the Mediterranean and Europe’s oil supply but also a threat to the lives of their people overseas (Neff 1981, 161). Negotiated plans to appease him failed. Egypt continued to funnel arms to the Algerian rebels; in September 1956 the French navy intercepted Egyptian cargo ships with Soviet weapons for Algerian rebels (Eden 1960, 582). French military officers now openly began to question the competency of their political leaders in Paris as the FLN became firmly entrenched in the Arab sections of all major Algerian cities. For the government of Guy Mollet, removing Gamal Nasser had become a political necessity and matter of maintaining French pride.

**Israeli Strategic Interests**

Even Israel itself is but a result of imperialism. For if Palestine had not fallen under the British mandate, Zionism would never had been able to muster enough support to realize a national home in Palestine. The idea would have remained a mad hopeless dream. (Nasser 1956, 99)

Israel was the first and possibly most aggrieved party in the Suez dispute. Like France, the problem went beyond the canal itself. It was about the security of its citizenry and territorial integrity. Before Moshe Dayan ordered the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) blitzkrieg through the Sinai Peninsula in October 1956, Egypt had disregarded nine UN resolutions regarding Israel’s security (UN Resolutions 54, 59, 61, 62, 73, 95, 111, 113, and 114). The United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) and their observers attempted to police the boundaries to no avail since their staff averaged
between thirty-five and sixty observers for four ceasefire lines. The UNTSO presence
often led to accusations and counter-accusations of partiality by both sides. Yet, unlike
the French who stood to lose another colony, the Israelis fought for their very existence.

The most significant problem for Israel was the creation of non-state actors to
wage war anonymously. Egypt continued to declare that it remained at a state of war.
War never materialized in the conventional form. Egyptian Intelligence officers trained
and equipped Arab terrorists, or fedayeen (one who sacrifices himself), to infiltrate border
settlements in civilian clothing. On Nasser’s orders, these terrorists penetrated into the
heart of Israel to kill as many Jews as possible and sabotage the nation’s infrastructure.
Gamal Nasser continued to gain credibility as a leader in the Arab world by sponsoring
these fedayeen raids (Neff 1981, 35).

The strategic situation for Israel grew darker. David Ben-Gurion proclaimed,
“[t]wo blows for one” (Lash 1961, 67). Thereafter, Israel turned to a policy of reprisal
against the fedayeen along the armistice demarcation line. In February 1955, these Israeli
strikes into Gaza killed 39 Egyptians and garnered international condemnation. As a
result, Nasser decided to arm Egypt against a pending conventional war with Israel. Soon,
he sharply increased troop concentration along the Israeli border as if signaling a
forthcoming invasion. Simultaneously, the fedayeen, operating in isolation or in small
bands, continued attacks into the Jewish state.

There should be no doubt about the policy of the Egyptian regime. In Philosophy
of the Revolution, Gamal Nasser linked the establishment of Israel with colonial powers.
Colonial Britain had to be eliminated from the Middle East, ergo so too its Jewish proxy.
The prelude was a statement to Israel: “. . . soon will be proven to you the strength and
will of our nation. Egypt will grind you to the dust.” To the survivors of the Holocaust, Nasser beckoned memories of the Third Reich. On 31 August, he made a cryptic pronouncement in an official communiqué to the world:

“Egypt has decided to dispatch her heroes, the disciples of Pharaoh and the sons of Islam and they will cleanse the land of Palestine . . . There will be no peace on Israel's border because we demand vengeance, and vengeance is Israel's death” (Kissinger 1994, 527-528 and Eden 1960, 575).

The international community finally took notice of the instability in the Middle East by the end of 1955 but it aimed its censure at Israel. The massive raids led to UN Resolution 106 in which the Security Council “condemned” Israel for a “flagrant violation” of the 1949 cease-fire. The UN Security Council expressed its concern that Israel failed to comply with its obligations and warned that if she did not, the Council would “have to consider what further measures under the Charter was required to maintain or restore the peace” (Luard 1989, 21-22). Resolution 106 was a forewarning that the Security Council might invoke Article 42, the provision to authorize “forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security.” It labeled Israel the aggressor who committed an offensive military action inconsistent with a nation’s right to self-defense under Article 51.

Israel was desperate to prevent the cross border incursions but the UN never held Egypt accountable for the attacks. Israel offered a formal peace agreement with open borders. This was an impossible proposal since it meant that Nasser (and the Arab world) would have to recognize Israel as a nation-state. Gamal Nasser was a star in the Arab world, but if he stopped the fedayeen, he would have lost his leadership role. Instead, he made an impossible proposal. Nasser offered peace if Israel forfeited the Negev Desert
and allowed several hundred thousand Palestinian refugees the region to return. Israel would never give up half its territory or allow the Palestinian repatriation within its borders. Both sides were hopelessly deadlocked and set to continue fighting (Kissinger 1994, 527-528).

The darkest realization of Nasser’s true commitment to the destruction of Israel came in a warning to British Foreign Minister Selwyn Lloyd. The Israeli Ambassador to London presented him with captured documents from a raid on a *fedayeen* camp. In his book, *Israel: Years of Challenge*, former Israeli Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion wrote that the Israeli Ambassador produced an Arab translation of Adolph Hitler’s *Mein Kampf* issued to officers in the Egyptian Army (Ben-Gurion 1963, 131). In addition, he gave Lloyd a 15 February 1956 operations order written to Egyptian commanders in the 3rd Division. The directive in Paragraph III said in part:

> Every Commander should be prepared and prepare his troops for unavoidable wars with Israel in order to achieve our supreme objective, namely, annihilation of Israel and its complete destruction in as little time as possible and by fighting against her as brutally and cruelly as possible. (Lloyd 1978, 35)

Ben-Gurion understood that the UN Security Council could not (or would not) guarantee the existence of the Jewish state. There was international indifference to the murders of over 800 Israeli citizens. He also understood the grim irony that the international community would condemn Israel in Security Council Resolution 106 for defending themselves while never bringing Egypt to account for the *fedayeen*.

Massed Egyptian troops on Israel’s border and the February 1956 directive garnered similar world apathy. IDF Intelligence believed that Soviet weaponry went to not only the Algerians rebels but more closely to Syria and Jordan, whose armies had
unified under an Egyptian command; a surprise attack by all three countries would effectively end Israel. Ben-Gurion’s concern was decidedly *Realpolitik*:

> We were advised to rely on the UN Charter but we could hardly accept the Charter alone as a sufficient guarantee of Israeli security or as a deterrent to the aggressive plans of our neighbors. The Charter had been there in 1948 when the Arab states invaded us but had moved no member state to come to our rescue. (Ben-Gurion 1963, 98)

In short, Israel did not receive the rights of the R-curve. Unlike the Berlin Crisis and the Korean Conflict, the new UN Secretary-General, Dag Hammarskjöld, was reluctant to invoke Article 41 of the UN Charter. Israel, therefore, had no reason to observe the proscriptions of the international community. Ben-Gurion announced that Israel would attack Egypt directly and unilaterally against the fedayeen raids in its own defense (Ben-Gurion 1963, 82-83).

**Soviet Strategic Interests**

The Soviet Union under Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev was cavalier with Egypt. Many religious Arab states rejected communism and communist inroads into their countries since the atheist Soviet Union banned Islam. Likewise, Josef Stalin saw little use in acquiring developing nations.

Secular Arab states and the Soviets found a use for each other with Nikita Khrushchev in power. It was in the Soviet national interest to break down Western control incrementally through non-aligned countries instead of the *domino effect*, an often used Cold War metaphor that, like a row of falling dominoes, the rise of communism in countries would cause the fall of neighboring states in linear sequence. As Anwar Sadat put it:
“The Soviet Union was extremely happy with this because it had found somebody to fight its battles for it--somebody to wake up the Third World countries and the colonies for a small price . . . It seemed the Soviet Union liked the game, for the Russians made a practice of letting us fight their battles for them, as happened in the Yemen and elsewhere” (Sadat 1978, 143-144).

Given the cordon sanitaire around the Soviet Union, the Soviets strategic interest in Egypt by the 1950’s was significant. First, The Soviet Union needed Mediterranean ports. The Soviet navy could never leave its Black Sea ports through the Bosphoros Straits without alerting the staunch western ally, Turkey, and the West. Next, the containment of Soviet expansion proved effective in the 1950s. The communists could not move into the Western Europe. Nikita Khrushchev saw opportunities in Third World anti-imperialist sentiments, the core of communist ideology. The Soviets only had to emphasize to colonies eager for independence that the Western European capitalist system was the source of Arab suffering, as seen in Palestine.

Khrushchev found a willing patsy in Gamal Nasser. Arms sales to Egypt would allow the Soviet Union to leapfrog containment into the heart of the Middle East. This would also give them influence over global commerce and the West’s oil supply. Quid pro quo, the Arabs would receive modern weapons and financial aid for the improvement of their medieval infrastructure while the communists expanded their sphere of influence. Political Officers for new “culture missions” in Egypt accompanied the Soviet arms. The Soviet-fed propaganda machine in Cairo began to spew anti-American and anti-Western venom (Longgood 1958, 144). By the following year, as the Union Jack lowered forever over Port Said, Egyptian trade with the communist world had increased by 65% and the “Voice of the Arabs” radio was a daily conduit of Soviet propaganda. The Cairo radio
blared out a daily diatribe of anti-Jewish and anti-Western hate and an incitement to kill the Jews in Israel (Eden 1960, 572).

American Strategic Interests

President Dwight D. Eisenhower had other worries by 1956. In 1952, the former General had run for president as an anti-war candidate. The US had borne a considerable global burden since the end of World War II: the Cold War and the Korean War. The American public expected their icon to provide a peace dividend. Eisenhower therefore ran on a “Peace in Korea” platform and won the 1952 election overwhelmingly. After a 1955 heart attack, a visibly weakened Eisenhower ran for re-election in 1956. Then the Suez Crisis happened at the height of the summer campaign season with such suddenness that the Republican Party feared they could not capitalize on the President’s popularity.

Some voters understood that America had the Panama Canal and plenty of Texas oil. To them, the Suez Crisis posed no real American security concern. Still, various lobbies appealed to the President. For example, the National Federations of Syrian and Lebanese American Clubs pleaded with Eisenhower to prevent the use of force against Egypt. Exporters and oil executives urged peace to prevent the interruption of world commerce. The Joint Chiefs of Staff advised against the use of force, urging that the US should focus on keeping the Soviets out of the region if fighting began. Even the US Senate led by Majority Leader Lyndon B. Johnson made a general statement expressing the need to keep the canal operating “as the major artery of world traffic” (Divine 1974, 119-120).

Also significant in the American strategic calculation was the *Tripartite Declaration Regarding the Armistice Borders of 25 May 1950*. The US, Great Britain,
and France agreed to allow the sale of arms to the Middle East as long as the purchasing state does not intend to “undertake any act of aggression against any other state.” In addition, they agreed to oppose any war between states in [the Middle East]. Consistent with their obligations as members of the United Nations, the three governments would take action both within and outside the United Nations to prevent such violations (Kunz 1991, 197-198). When the war came, Eisenhower believed the 1950 agreement outlawed the Anglo-French strike. The British and French countered that the pact was null and void during the Israeli Operation Kadesh; the Europeans had no intention on using their troops to “defend Nasser” (Lloyd 1978, 176).

The United Nations Strategic Interest

The UN had morphed by 1956. Previously, the US and Great Britain managed the majority voting bloc in the General Assembly. The Soviets could only muster a smaller bloc and therefore had to resort to using their veto in order to express diplomatic power. In 1955, the entry of several Afro-Asian nations, newly freed colonies, tilted the voting from the West toward the Soviet Union when the communists saw an opportunity to inflame anti-colonial resentment in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. Soon, former colonies voted together against their former occupiers, often siding with the communist bloc.

Also, when Dag Hammarskjöld replaced Trygve Lie as Secretary-General in March 1956, he radically changed the purpose of the UN. Lie had earned the enmity of the Soviet Union by leading the effort for the Korean War. In contrast, Hammarskjöld had adopted the concept of “quiet diplomacy.” He rationalized that, “[nations were] on dangerous ground if [they] believe that any individual, any nation, or any ideology has a
monopoly on rightness, liberty, and human dignity” (Lash 1961, 149). In the Middle East, Hammarskjöld asserted that quiet diplomacy, with the backing of the Great Powers operating in the region, would be more productive to re-establish the armistice agreements than a raucous public airing of differences entangled in the intrigues of the Cold War. Whereas formal action would undoubtedly trigger a Soviet veto, the Secretary General had the power to act on his own in a situation threatening peace and security (Lash 1961, 69). His method would arbitrate between the parties without citing fault.

Events Leading To the Crisis

Colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser

We began our plans for expelling the English from Egypt because their presence here weighs upon us and our progress, and leads many among us off the right track and into emotional detours. (Nasser 1956, 76)

In his memoir, Suez 1956, Selwyn Lloyd wrote that his most urgent problem when he assumed his diplomatic post in 1955 was the Middle East. Upon seizing power, Nasser wasted no time in fulfilling his political agenda. He renounced Egypt’s obligations to the 99-year Suez Canal Zone concessions with Great Britain. The mandate was scheduled to end in 1968 but the dictator demanded the immediate withdrawal of all British soldiers. Then with Khrushchev as his benefactor, Nasser refused to join the Baghdad Pact, the Anglo-French alliance with Turkey, Iraq, and Pakistan aimed at preventing Soviet expansion into the Middle East.

By 1956, Nasser declared his regional aims in Philosophy of the Revolution: leadership of the Arab world, the elimination of the “white man” from the Middle East and Africa, and a universal Islamic Empire with limitless power, a Pan-Arab state from
the Strait of Gibraltar to the Indian Ocean. The regional Arab states were promptly denounced over “Voice of the Arabs” radio as secret allies of Israel if they stood up to Nasser’s demagoguery (Lloyd 1978, 33-34).

In May 1956, to the dismay of the free world, Nasser withdrew Egypt’s recognition of Taiwan in favor of the People’s Republic of China; by August, he began selling cotton to the communist state. Then the free world saw the procurement of Soviet weapons as Nasser’s most egregious offense. He intended to arm Egypt to fight Israel as well as arm revolutionaries in Algeria. The qualitative advantage of the weapons quickly changed the balance of power in North Africa and the Middle East. Anwar Sadat wrote that this purchase liberated the Egyptian national will from centuries of colonial hegemony (Sadat 1978, 135 and 144).

Selwyn Lloyd expressed the general European concern of the similarities between Nasser’s junta and Hitler’s Third Reich. Indeed, much of the text of Philosophy of the Revolution strongly resembled Mein Kampf. Nasser ran a police state with a propaganda machine “which even Doctor Goebbels would have envied” (Lloyd 1978, 34). To the Western ear, he spewed a communist discourse like Arab Leninism laced with Nazi bigotry.

Soviet Arms for the Arabs

Nasser’s purchase of Soviet weapons bears more examination. Nasser was faced with the shame of Egypt’s loss to Israel in the 1948 war. His resentment of King Farouk’s failures to supply and train the military prior to the war was an excuse for the 1953 coup d’état. After the 1955 Israeli retaliation against fedayeen camps in the Sinai, Nasser faced similar internal resentment and a need to modernize the military. Egypt
appealed to the world for weapons to defend itself against the Israelis, now condemned under UN Resolution 106. The West, especially America, balked at the idea of arming Nasser. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles assumed Nasser was so anti-communist that he would never seek Soviet aid. Russia also resisted helping Egypt at first. The Soviet policy was never oriented towards the Middle East. In fact, the communists decried the 1953 Egyptian coup d’etat as a fascist uprising staged by the Americans to stop the revolutionary potential of Egypt. With new strategic concerns given the cordon sanitaire, the Kremlin thought Nasser was worth a gamble (Longgood 1958, 143).

In September 1955, Egypt announced that it had negotiated a deal for $100 million in Czechoslovakian military equipment in exchange for Egyptian cotton. The deal included approximately 148 tanks, 126 MiG-15 fighter aircrafts, 28 IL-28 bombers, 100 self-propelled artillery pieces, and hundreds of other artillery pieces. The 50% increase in Egyptian weaponry greatly alarmed the Israeli government, if not for the mass then for their qualitative superiority. For example, the MiGs outmatched the Israeli Meteor fighters. Israel’s pre-World War II Mark 3 tanks were substantively inferior to the T-34s, the latter of which fought splendidly against the vaunted German Tiger tanks. Eden warned Moscow to stop the sales as it violated the UN arms embargo from the 1948 war. Khrushchev shot back that he would abide by the embargo if it were part of a general embargo agreed and supervised by the UN (Heikal 1972, 57).

The Western fear that the Middle East would be absorbed into the communist sphere was coming to fruition. The Soviets had now indeed taken root in the Arab world. Egypt was now militarily dependent on Soviet Union and by default aligned with Moscow. The Soviet aid so destabilized the regional balance of power that there were
predictions of an Arab-Israeli arms race, a possible Middle Eastern war, and thereafter a Soviet-American confrontation. In February 1956, “the Egyptian government released photographs of some of these Soviet-supplied armaments arrayed on the frontiers of Israel” (Eden 1960, 368).

**Suez Canal Nationalization**

In antiquity, we built pyramids for the dead. Now we will build new pyramids for the living. (Heikal 1973, 62)

The Suez Crisis formally began with the Aswan Dam scheme. Nasser was in trouble with his disaffected populace. Egypt remained economically dysfunctional despite his improvements. Its agricultural base was primitive and its infrastructure saw no improvements under colonial occupation. The one great source of national wealth, the Suez Canal, provided the Egyptian economy very little of its $25 million annual profits. Added to this, the Egyptian street also resented ongoing Israeli strikes into the Sinai, ostensibly caused by Nasser’s *fedayeen*. They angrily demanded a response using the newly purchased Soviet arms. The dictator decided to gamble on his party’s pet project, the Aswan Dam.

The Aswan Dam would be an engineering achievement. It would rise 384 feet high and would be 3 miles long. It would back the Nile River 265 miles clear into the Sudan and, by harnessing the power of the Nile Egypt would produce 10 billion kilowatt-hours a year of hydroelectric power (50% of all the total electrical power in Africa). Further, it would irrigate new farmlands substantially increasing the country’s arable land. For Egypt, the dam, the greatest Egyptian-made project since the Pyramids, would be a symbol of the new nation. Just as Egypt was free of imperial powers, they would be free from dependence on the Nile floods. The Egyptian street adored the project. It would
employ thousand Egyptians for 10 years at the cost $1.3 billion (Longgood 1958, 144). In terms of national security concerns defined in Chapter 3, the Aswan Dam scheme was a search for national prestige and economic security masked in the talk of national welfare.

Financing the Aswan Dam project was a challenge for obvious reasons. The US and Great Britain argued that it was too large for Egypt’s weak economy and unstable political base. After the Soviet arms purchase, however, the West could not afford another strategic misstep. In December 1955, they proffered a $400 million loan package in conjunction with the World Bank. Stage one of the deal would pay for the survey and site preparation. Stage two would finance the building of the dam. The World Bank also stipulated that its officials would supervise Egypt’s budget. If the original grant did not cause Nasser to move closer to the West, then the construction would make Egypt financially dependent on the West much as the Suez Canal did over a century ago (Kissinger 1994, 528-529).

Nasser was insulted by the terms and promptly declined the offer. Further, he countered that the Soviet Union had offered $1.2 billion repayable at 2% interest over 60 years, which he wanted the West to match (Schonfield 1969, 146).

Nasser was bluffing and the Soviet Union had intentionally facilitated the deception. Unbeknownst to Nasser and the Soviet Union, the Eisenhower administration learned that no Soviet arrangement existed. On 19 July 1956, America withdrew the offer. As Ahmed Hussein, the Egyptian Ambassador to the United States, hurried to Secretary of State John Foster Dulles in a desperate attempt to restore the deal, Dulles informed him in blunt diplomatic language that, “it [was] not feasible in present circumstances to participate in the project” due to Egypt’s lack of financial stability to
support the vast project (Longgood 1958, 145). Next, the British and the World Bank pulled their offers.

The embarrassing news reverberated throughout the globe. Rather than national prestige, Egypt felt the humiliation of colonial subservience (Heikal 1973, 68 and 72). Nasser was furious. He was returning from a summit with Nehru and Tito when he heard what he called an invitation to the Egyptian people to bring down his government. The dictator understood that Egypt had to regain a sense of honor quickly or the mob would oust him as he did King Farouk.

Gamal Nasser’s revenge came on 26 July 1956. On the fourth anniversary of King Farouk's exile, Nasser addressed a large crowd in Alexandria. His three-hour speech was described as reminiscent of the hysterical oratory of Adolph Hitler. He attacked the West; Washington, he charged, “shamelessly abrogated the principles of international relations.” He accused the World Bank of plotting to “trick Egypt into giving up her sovereignty.” He noted that Egypt was receiving a pittance of the company's £35,000,000 annual earnings.

Next, Nasser announced the Canal Nationalization Law in which he froze all Suez Canal Company assets in Egypt. He declared:

Egyptians would not permit any imperialists or oppressors to rule us militarily, politically, or economically; we will not submit to the dollar or to force. We are determined to live proudly and not to beg for aid. I look at Americans and say: May you choke to death on your fury…

[This] money is ours and the Suez Canal belongs to us. Egyptians built the Suez Canal and 120,000 Egyptians died building it. We shall build the High Dam on the skulls of the 120,000 Egyptian workers who died building the Suez Canal…
Thirty-five million Egyptian pounds have been taken from us every year by the Suez Canal Company. We shall use that money for building the high dam. We shall rely on own strength, our own muscle, our own funds.

All the money that belongs to the canal will be consolidated. It will be frozen. It belongs to Egypt. A new Suez Canal Company will be formed. In addition, it will be run by Egyptians! Egyptians! Egyptians! (Longgood 1958, 146-147).

He punctuated his speech with the name "de Lesseps," a reference to the architect of the canal. On that signal, Egyptian troops seized the Suez, expelled all British officials, and blocked the Strait of Tiran. The Egyptian crowds were delirious at the “theft.” Anwar el-Sadat summed it best in 1977 when he wrote that once the canal was taken, “Nasser turned into an Egyptian mythical hero.” Egyptians need a moment of self-fulfillment, “after nearly a century of humiliation and oppression at the hands of British colonialists” (Sadat 1978, 143).

Conclusion

The events leading to the Suez Crisis showed yet again that unilateral action, polar alliances, and power blocs are realities in the global system of anarchic states. As shown in this chapter, the causes of the war were only partially a matter taking the Suez Canal. The other reasons for the British, French, and Israeli venture were to stop a regional demagogue from growing too powerful; to restore the standards international law or at least to negotiate changes in the law in the international forum; and to stop the mass murders shrouded in the Palestinian and Algerian causes. The UN’s failure to quickly resolve these issues left Anthony Eden, Guy Mollet, David Ben-Gurion, John Foster Dulles, and Nikita Khrushchev only to do exactly what led to the previous world wars -- make the situation so volatile that war became a historic inevitability.
CHAPTER 5
STRATEGIC ANALYSIS

Introduction

In world politics, rules and procedures are not complete nor are they well enforced. (Keohane and Nye 1977, 26)

Eden, Mollet, and Ben-Gurion understood one important thing about the postmodern world: the placation of evil deeply troubled the world. It was incompatible with the hard lessons of the Second World War to compromise with Nasser, a man who Mollet decried had the ambition to recreate the conquests of Islam. The tripartite leaders were therefore morally inclined to avoid repeating the mistakes of the past.

The Anglo-French-Israeli coalition tried to abide by international law through negotiations with Egypt. This chapter describes the political attempts at reaching a peaceful solution. Each time Nasser remained obstinate. The coalition appealed next to the UN. The UN disregarded all Egyptian violations. To the aggrieved parties, further pleading meant the cardinal sin of appeasement. Selwyn Lloyd argued that “[b]ecause Hitler was not checked, 20 million people had died. Eden was determined to see that it did not happen again” (Lloyd 1978, 250).

This chapter also examines the circumstances of the invasion using the Complex Elasticity Model from Chapter 3. This will further show that the UN failed to live up to its Charter. In particular, Article 25 of the Charter mandated all member states accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council. Article 39 allowed the Security Council to determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of
aggression and shall make recommendations. Finally, Article 40 empowered the Security Council to force parties to comply in accordance with findings in Article 39.

Analysis of the Events

The Coalition

Clausewitz wrote that “war never breaks out wholly unexpectedly, and war [is never] thought of as something autonomous but always as an instrument of policy” (Clausewitz 1976, 78 and 88). The Nasser government had previously done everything possible to gain the ire of the west. Now Nasser had stolen the Suez Canal. The Complex Elasticity Model, figure 11, shows how the dictator unilaterally changed the R-curve. The suddenness forced the world to accept the adjustments or fight to maintain the status quo. Predictably, the Great Powers were infuriated. The $R_2$ line made it politically impossible for Great Britain and France to negotiate beyond certain limits, which would endanger all their political and economic claims around the world.

The nationalization was understandably not without repercussions in the international community. In the United States, Dulles declared that Nasser must "disgorge" the canal. Even Sadat intimated to Nasser the following day that “this step [meant] war” for which Egypt was not prepared to fight. Eden heard of the “theft” while dining with King Faisal of Iraq. He remonstrated that Nasser had “a man with Colonel Nasser’s record could not be allowed to have his thumb on our windpipe” (Eden 1960, 474). Eden then interrupted dinner to contact Guy Mollet.
Figure 11. Elasticity during the 1956 Suez Nationalization.

Note: The event of July 1956 defines the $D_2$ Marginal Negative Utility Curve. A catalyst or catalysts such as the Suez Canal Nationalization and fedayeen attacks become the proximate cause for the utility in going below the R-curve.

Across the English Channel, Mollet was already engaged in fighting Nasser’s proxy war in Algeria. This added insult to French pride, if left unanswered, would doom his government, still reeling from Dien Bien Phu. In the Middle East, Egypt viewed the canal situation quite differently. The former colony became relevant in the international community. Nasser returned to Cairo to a hero’s reception.

On 27 July 1956, Anthony Eden sent a formal note of protest to the Egyptian Government against the seizure of the Suez Canal. The British government was convinced that as a matter of law, the nationalization was incompatible with the Concession between Egypt and Great Britain as well as the 1888 Convention of Constantinople (Lloyd 1978, 92-93). Eden then sent a telegram to President Eisenhower which opined that the British cabinet and Chiefs of Staff were agreed not to allow Nasser to seize the canal “in defiance of international law;” that the threat to Western oil supplies
was immediate; that “the canal [was] an international asset and facility . . . vital to the free world;” and urged the US to join with Great Britain and France in taking a firm stance which would garner the support of all maritime nations (Eden 1960, 476).

That day, the Bank of England was instructed to block the current Egyptian sterling balances held in London. The funds for the Suez Canal Company in London were frozen. All exports of arms and military equipment authorized under the Tripartite Agreement of 1950 were stopped. Four Egyptian destroyers on port calls in Great Britain and Malta were delayed. Later the night of 27 July, Egypt sent back Eden’s note “with an unsigned slip attached, which read: ‘Return to British Embassy’ ” (Eden 1960, 476).

Great Britain and France concluded that Nasser had to be humiliated. If bringing the dictator to heel was untenable then, like Colonel Arabi in 1881, Colonel Nasser had to be dethroned (Kissinger 1994, 532 and 533). Eden favored hard levers of power, an immediate attack to regain the canal. The recent evacuation of British forces from the Canal Zone, however, prohibited a strike. The British command wanted more time to deploy forces and plan a massive assault. Great Britain and France would increase their military in the Mediterranean at Cyprus and Malta while their diplomats debated a resolution. The British deployed to the region and called up reserves. French troops went from Algeria three days after the nationalization and were place under British command (Eden 1960, 564-565).

Israel too was ready for war. Despite surgical strikes against the fedayeen, Israel could not act decisively given international pressure. Ben-Gurion believed “the Israeli cause did not garner world and UN attention because the killings [2-3 murders a week] were not grand enough” (Ben-Gurion 1963, 82). In mid-1956, the IDF mobilized the
army for Operation Kadesh. Towards the end of October, there were rumors of the Egyptian Army increasing its numbers along the Gaza frontier of Israel and the Sinai desert.

**Negotiations**

The international community made three bilateral and multilateral attempts to resolve the situation outside the UN between July and October 1956. In August 1956, eighteen members of the London Conference agreed on proposals for a new Suez Canal Board, representing the users of the Suez Canal and the interests of Egypt to operate the canal. A five-nation delegation headed by the Prime Minister of Australia presented the resulting Eighteen Power Proposal to Egypt. Nasser rejected it. Egypt, he argued, had the legal right to nationalize any company registered in Egypt.

Secretary of State Dulles explained after the initial failed talks, that the UN must work out a provisional solution in order to ward off the economical impact of a canal shutdown. Secretary Dulles emphasized the availability of equitable resolutions only if the Government of Egypt (Nasser) chose that way. He presented the Dulles Plan in London. It proposed internationalizing the operation of the canal in order to maintain its unconditional neutrality. A board composed of Egypt and user states would run the facilities under the auspices of the UN. Egypt, this time with Soviet political backing, promptly rejected the plan as a violation of Egyptian sovereignty.

The alliance against Nasser now began to coalesce. Operation Kadesh was ready for execution as the separate planning for Operation Musketeer neared completion. The US urged moderation. From 70,000 feet in the air, U2 over flights of the Middle East
indicated activity in the Negev Desert and along the Israeli border Egypt. By all indications, the US believed that an attack would come from Israel only.

Eisenhower was deeply engrossed in maintaining peace in the Middle East. There was no real American interest except how the affair played out vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. From the outset, Dulles attempted to avert a war knowing that a US involvement “could have a disastrous effect on Eisenhower’s candidacy” (Divine, 1974, 118). Therefore, the US decided that America would not waste political capital, let alone military hardware, for a colonial cause.

As the presidential campaign progressed, the Democratic Party homed in on the Suez situation to indict the “inept and vacillating Republican policy.” Specifically, they claimed that Eisenhower’s confusion and Dulles’ brinksmanship were destroying true peace without firing a shot (Divine 1974, 118).

The President needed to act quickly to dispel suggestions that he was too frail from his heart attack to provide effective leadership. To placate the allies, Eisenhower sent Dulles to decry the nationalization publicly as “an angry act of retaliation against fancied grievances” (Divine 1974, 118-121). Next, he US blocked the Suez Canal Company’s funds in the US and froze all Egyptian assets. Finally, Dulles offered to underwrite the shipment of oil around the Cape of Good Hope up to $500 million should a full European boycott of the Suez Canal become necessary (Longgood 1957, 151). That was all Eisenhower was willing to do.

After over a month of diplomatic failure, Great Britain and France made one more attempt at mediation before using force. On 12 September 1956, as 3 Para (3rd Battalion Parachute Regiment), the lead British paratroop unit for Operation Muskeeteer, began
training in the heat of the Cyprus summer, the Europeans petitioned the UN to find Egypt a danger to free navigation through the Suez Canal and that the Egyptian recalcitrance created situations that threatened international peace and security. All the while, the fedayeen raids into Israel continued with increased ferocity. The Jewish state anxiously expected a major attack from the Arab states using the new Soviet arms.

The Hammarskjöld Compromise

This was the UN’s chance to live up to its charter. On 20 March 1956, after becoming UN Secretary General, a UN resolution appointed Dag Hammarskjöld to survey the compliance of the 1949 Armistice Agreements. The Arabs and the Soviets welcomed the move. Hammarskjöld asked the Middle East governments for assurances that they would unconditionally abide by a cease-fire reserving only the right for self-defense under Article 51 of the Charter. After great pains, the parties agreed. By June Hammarskjöld was lauded for averting war in the Sinai. Yet the fedayeen continued to strike into Israel after the cease-fire.

Hammarskjöld assumed he had the backing of the Security Council throughout his efforts to force the Egyptians and Israeli to comply with the armistice, even as Egypt militarized the Sinai and Israel seethed at what Ben-Gurion saw as the indifference to the Nasser raiding parties. Hammarskjöld worked to manage the flare-ups but warned the Security Council that the cease-fire of the summer was in danger of becoming a “dead letter” (Lash 1961, 76).

In the foreground of international affairs, however, was the nationalization of the Suez Canal and the Anglo-French determination to recover their investment. The intractable Nasser considered any internationalization of the waterway as “collective
colonialism” (Lash 1961, 77). On 23 September 1956, after Secretary of State Dulles’ *Suez Canal Users’ Association* proposal failed, Great Britain and France again formally asked the UN Security Council to consider the potential threat to peace. In response Egypt demanded that the Security Council consider the two Europeans allies greater threats to international peace.

The parties agreed to hold closed, “quiet diplomacy” in early October under the direction of the Secretary-General. Dag Hammarskjöld proposed no solutions during the talks but noted points of mutual agreement. They emerged with an agreement on six principles for a final settlement which later became the foundation of Security Council Resolution 118 passed on 13 October 1956: (1) free and open transit through the Canal without discrimination; (2) respect for the sovereignty of Egypt; (3) insulation of the canal from the politics of any country; (4) Egypt and the users would agree on tolls and charges; (5) a fair proportion of the dues should be allotted to development; and (6) arbitration would resolve disputes between the parties (Patil, 1992, 340-341).

All parties in this exercise in quiet diplomacy left Hammarskjöld’s conference in consensus on the principles for resolution of the dispute. The next issue, as British Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd asked, was: “how were these principles to be implemented?” Without something more concrete, the six principles were to Lloyd nothing more than “a pious hope about as binding on Egypt as Chamberlain’s piece of paper had proven binding upon Hitler” (Lloyd 1978, 159 and 169).

After ten days, a vote was due at the UN. The draft resolution before the Security Council on 13 October 1956 had two parts. Part One of the resolution laid down the six principles. Part Two, the operative portion, declared that Egypt must demonstrate its
intention to adhere to Part One. The implementation of the resolution, coherent system to carry out the six principles, mattered most to the British and French. Eden wrote that the Anglo-French alliance, “hoped to test the Egyptian intent on permitting free passage of Israeli shipping, banned since 1950 (Eden 1960, 563). Then on 12 October, President Dwight D. Eisenhower held an election-time press conference to assuage a concerned American electorate. He announced that the British, French, and Egyptians, “agreed on a set of principles on which to negotiate, and it looks like here is a very great crisis that is behind us” (Lloyd 1978, 160). The comment sabotaged of the negotiations.

The next day, the Egyptian ambassador, bolstered by Eisenhower’s statement “clearly felt that the pressure was off” and hedged at any further negotiations into implementation of the resolution (Lloyd 1978, 160-161). Soviet Foreign Minister Dmitri Shepilov indicated that he would support the principles in Part One but would veto the operative provisions of Resolution 118 on the grounds that it contradicted Egyptian sovereignty. When the vote was taken, Part One unanimously passed. On Part Two, nine members on the Security Council voted in the affirmative, the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia voted against it. Since the Soviet vote amounted to a veto of the implementation of Resolution 118, Part Two did not pass (Lloyd 1978, 162).

UN Resolution 118 was rendered unenforceable; six aimless principles flapping in the air. There was no time limit or method for implementation of Resolution 118. Nasser was given a way to legally stall any further international effort indefinitely. Eden, Mollet, and Ben-Gurion saw themselves “strung along over months of negotiations from pretext to pretext, from device to device, and from contrivance to contrivance. At each
stage in the pilgrimage, even at the UN, they saw their position co-opted” (Eden 1960, 563-564).

Hammarskjöld wanted more talks in New York. He believed he could persuade the parties to come to a consensus. However, while Great Britain and France suffered economically from the crisis, months of diplomatic skullduggery effectively legitimized Nasser’s “plunder”. The British government implemented gasoline rationing after a 10% cut in supply. The entire British economy felt the effect from the fuel shortage as panic buying of fuel began and factories reduced their workers to four-day workweeks. Oil companies by some estimates lost about £4 million in revenue. Further, rationing took about £20,000 a week to enforce. No Tripartite nation trusted agreements made by Nasser and their security concerns could not wait on further negotiations.

Figure 12. Analysis of the UN Actions during the 1956 Crisis

*Note:* Hammarskjöld forced the UN to operate on the D₅ Appeasement Curve and not his chartered D₄ Negotiated Curve.

In the *Complex Elasticity Model* shown in figure 12, the dashed line demonstrates the behavior UN should have taken, finite negotiations which would lead to conflict if a
party did not abide by the established rule of law, R₂ intersecting with D₄. Under the UN Charter, the Security Council should have censured Egypt as a danger to world peace. If Egypt continued to defy the world body, the UN should have taken measures under Articles 40-43 to force compliance with its resolutions. It did nothing. Accepting Nasser’s change of the established international Regime over the course of protracted negotiations while disregarding the national security concerns of Great Britain, France, and Israel defined appeasement. This formed the catalyst for immediate conflict. The UN did not live up to its charter. It was a reminder of Hobbes’ warning that “covenants without the sword are but words and of no strength to secure a man at all” (Hobbes 1962, 129).

The Collusion

Three months into the crisis the public outcry began to fade as close door debates took place. Egypt seemed a minor issue. People in Europe went about their lives more concerned with the crises in Algeria and Hungary. The original plan for Operation Musketeer, dated to start on 15 September, had been twice postponed in the hopes of finding a peaceful settlement. The military equipment on ships was beginning to deteriorate, batteries were running down, and vehicles were becoming unserviceable. The delays also had a toll on the Anglo-French soldiers. Reservists activated for an immediate invasion of Egypt now grew restive in the sweltering Mediterranean outposts (Lloyd 1978, 170).

Only Israelis felt the constant danger from Egypt. Egypt and Syria established a military command and were beginning to collaborate on a new invasion plan of the Jewish state. Jordan’s pro-Nasser government signaled that they would unite in the Arab
multinational command and while their fedayeen launched raids into Israel. By September, the fedayeen had machine-gunned four Israeli archeologists in Bethlehem, stabbed a little girl gathering firewood, dragged the body of a truck driver across the Jordanian border, and just as the Security Council vote was about to be taken in October, two kibbutz workers were murdered.

Representatives from Great Britain, France, and Israel met in secret on 16 October 1956 at Sèvres, France. Desperation drove David Ben-Gurion: eight hundred Israelis had died since the incursions began; the Egyptians, Syrians, and Jordanians seemed poised to strike with their new Soviet weapons; and the UN refused to acknowledge the gravity of the situation. The Anglo-French alliance agreed to support Operation Kadesh as their cover to retake the Suez Canal. The following week, the French intercepted a ship carrying Soviet weapons from Egypt to the Algerian FLN.

On 24 October 1956, Dag Hammarskjöld sent a confidential letter to Egypt personally requesting the implementation of the six principles of UN Security Council Resolution 118. Nasser would not relent. This was the final action on the $D_3$ Standard Curve setting in motion the $D_2$ Catalyst Curve in figure 12. Nasser (like Saddam Hussein in 2003) had provided his enemies with a *casus belli*.

Eden argued that contrary to its mandate, the UN Security Council did not utter a syllable of censure against the violations of Nasser. Instead, they passed the feckless Resolution 118 with no method of enforcement under Article 25 (Eden 1960, 564-565). Speaking before the British House of Commons, Eden declared that:
“[N]o arrangement for the future of this great international waterway could be acceptable to Her Majesty’s Government, which would leave it in the unfettered control of a single power, which could, as recent events have shown, exploit it purely for purposes of national policy” (Kissinger 1994, 531).

David Ben-Gurion received a private message from Dwight Eisenhower on 28 October 1956 warning that the US would oppose any Israeli attack on Egypt. The warning arrived too late.

The Invasion

The war began on 29 October 1956 with the Israeli Operation Kadesh. The IDF paratroop battalion dropped into the Sinai at the Mitla Pass forty miles from Suez. IDF armored, mechanized, and light forces covered with French Mystere’ fighter jets in close support next attacked across the 1949 armistice line to link up with the paratroopers in the Mitla Pass. In concert with the IDF ground assault, British and French aircrafts bombed Egyptian air bases destroying the newly acquired Soviet MiG-15s. White crosses were painted on the IDF tanks to allow pilots to identify them from the air. The Israelis routed the Egyptians in short order, taking five thousand prisoners of war and seizing large numbers of Warsaw-Pact arms, much still packaged in their cellophane wrapping. Nasser ordered his remaining forces to withdraw from the Sinai Peninsula to protect the Suez Canal.

The international uproar that followed muted the IDF victory. Anti-West riots erupted in Jordan with gangs shooting and stoning official buildings. The nine Arab League nations voted to break off relations with the coalition nations (Longgood 1957, 156). The UN met in an emergency session to demand a halt to all offensive military operations. Eisenhower, on an aerial tour of the US southern states in his last active week...
of campaigning, remarked, “Well this is war.” His National Security Council, convening that evening, agreed, “If Russia came openly to Nasser’s assistance . . . war was inevitable” (Divine 1974, 166-167).

America demanded that Israel withdraw straight away and asked the Security Council to condemn the Jewish state for an act of aggression. The Soviet Union rushed to make a similar demand. They too proposed a draft resolution in the Security Council calling for a full and unilateral withdrawal by Israel. Britain and France quickly vetoed the measure.

In Cyprus, the airfields were abuzz with the arrival of many transport aircrafts to deposit British 3 Para and their French allies on the sands of Egypt. The paratroopers were well trained, supplied, and acclimated to the region. As the diplomatic wrangling continued over Operation Kadesh, the British received orders to “capture El Gamil Airfield, Port Said, advance east to the edge of the town, link up with the seaborne Royal Marines, [and] prevent any reinforcements coming in from the west.” Brigadier Paul Crook wrote that: “All ranks received the news with pride and gratification . . . the ‘Toms’ wanted to go and have a crack at Nasser” (Crook 1989, 81 and 84).

The French troops from Algeria had the 3rd Parachute Battalion (Etranger) of the French Foreign Legion, Les Paras (2 Regiment Parachutiste Coloniale and part of 11 Demi-Brigade Parachutiste de Choc). They were to jump into Egypt to capture Port Faud across form Port Said. Port Faud was in the French section of the city and the invaders assessed that local support was possible.

Five days later, Israel achieved her strategic objective. The IDF had destroyed the Egyptian forces, had taken control of the Sinai Peninsula, and the European partners had
assured that all Soviet-made airframes were destroyed. Moshe Dayan remarked that, “if it were not for the Anglo-French operation, it is doubtful whether Israel would have launched her campaign; and if she had, its character, both military and political, would have been different” (Heikal, 1973, 107). With Israeli success, only the Anglo-French strategic objectives remained; seize the canal and depose Gamal Nasser.

As planned, when Israel neared the Suez Canal, Egypt and Israel received an Anglo-French ultimatum demanding they stay ten miles away from the waterway. They demanded an end of hostilities, withdrawal from the Suez Canal Zone, and for peace enforcement under a joint Anglo-French force contingent. Israel agreed; Egypt fervently declined. When Nasser heard the message, he ordered a firing squad to position itself in the Government House courtyard. Anyone who suggested accepting the ultimatum would immediately be executed (Sadat 1978, 145).

As early as 3 November 1956, UN General Assembly convened to debate two resolutions. One Afro-Asian bloc proposal would authorize Dag Hammarskjöld to negotiate a cease-fire. The second joint Colombian-Canadian-Norwegian proposal would organize a United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) to separate the parties. Great Britain, France, and the Soviet Union abstained from the vote since there was no substantive difference in the UNEF from the UNTSO. The next day, the United Nations debated the Soviet invasion of Hungary (Lloyd 1978, 202 and 204).

On 4 November 1956, Anthony Eden and Selwyn Lloyd began to hear the sounds of a demonstration in Trafalgar Square. There was first noise, then a crescendo of howling, and finally the booing from the British public. The bombing of Egypt was not popular despite the rationing and economic turmoil in Great Britain. The evening of 4
November, Eden’s Cabinet was convinced that efforts at the UN were fruitless. They sanctioned a daytime invasion. The following morning, debates over a cease-fire proposal and the UNEF continued.

From Cyprus, on 4 and 5 November 1956 Royal Air Force bombers continued to strike Egyptian airfields with considerable vigor in preparation for ground combat forces. Paratroopers packed into their transports. The considerable loads weighted down the “Toms” so to save weight they disregarded their reserve parachutes. At 0415 hours (0715 GMT), the first plane took off Cyprus for a three-hour flight to Port Said. At sea, coalition transports left Marseilles and Malta for Egypt. Operation Musketeer began when seven thousand British and French paratroopers jumped onto El Gamil Airfield in Port Said and onto a narrow strip of sand at Port Faud (Crook 1989, 85).

At first, Nasser was very doubtful of the reports of the airdrops. He had never anticipated that Anthony Eden would collaborate with the Israelis to overthrow an Arab state. The French were suspect but Nasser retained the ideal notion of the British gentlemen who never lied, colluded, or exercised Realpolitik. “Nasser could not bring himself to believe that Eden . . . would jeopardize the security of all Britain’s friends and Britain’s own standing in the Arab world by making war on an Arab nation alongside Israel” (Heikal, 1973, 107).

The British 3 Para seized the airfield in under an hour. Some Egyptians fought tenaciously but few could employ enough firepower to overwhelm the allies or to counterattack. The commander of 3 Para, Paul Crook, wrote that “considering the large stocks of good weapons and ammunition [the Egyptians] had available they did not do
very well, especially as for the first 24 hours they had to deal with lightly equipped parachutists” (Crook 1989, 83).

The French, however, received intense enemy mortar and machine gun fire. With French close air support and heavy naval gunfire, Les Paras captured their objective. Along with the massive bombardment, tanks and commandos of the Royal Marines swarmed the Egyptian shore in a show reminiscent of the Normandy invasion. They completed the seizure of Port Said in due course. Later that day, the British and French UN ambassadors informed Dag Hammarskjöld that they accepted the UNEF proposal (Lloyd 1978, 207).

As 3 Para and Les Paras won their tactical engagements, their nations were quickly moving towards a strategic defeat by Egypt. The IDF victory was so complete that there was no perceptible threat to the Suez Canal; ergo there was no reason for the massed and seemingly well-orchestrated invasion unless Eden and Mollet planned to attack previously. When 3 Para and Les Paras entered Egypt, the collusion with Israel was evident.

Nasser also played his strategic hand well. He sunk forty ships in the canal blocking its use to the world and trapping thirteen vessels in transit. When the Egyptian military commander in Port Said proffered surrender terms, Nasser promptly nullified them. The dictator told him to stand firm and await Soviet assistance the next day. Then Soviet Foreign Minister Bulganin sent the first significant threat from the Soviets to Great Britain and France in a cryptic question known as the Khrushchev-Bulganin Ultimatum:
“In what situation would Britain find herself if she were attacked by stronger states, possessing all types of modern destructive weapons? And such countries could, at the present time, refrain from sending naval or air forces to the shores of Britain and use other means -- for instance, rocket weapons... We are fully determined to crush the aggressors by the use of force and to restore peace in the East” (Kissinger 1994, 542-543).

Concurrently, the Soviet consul in Port Said, Anatoli Tchikov, took to the city distributing weapons to all, especially children and exhorted over loudspeakers: “Fight on people of Port Said! Russian help is coming! Tonight London and Paris will be destroyed by atomic rockets.” This was enough to convince the citizenry (Crook 1989, 90). Adding to the Soviet offer of help, Nasser issued an international call for volunteers to repulse the invaders.

The genuineness of Soviet threats is doubtful. Anwar el-Sadat wrote that when he asked for assistance, the Soviets firmly refused; “No help at all could be pinned on the Soviet Union” (Sadat 1978, 146). The global effect of the threat, however, was profound. The US dispatched an aircraft carrier to Europe and General Alfred M. Gruenther, NATO Supreme Commander threatened to retaliate against the communist-bloc if they attacked Western Europe.

Next, Nasser’s Syrian allies, Nationalist Army officers led by Abdel Hamid al Sarraj, destroyed the Iraq Petroleum Company oil pipeline from Iraq to the Mediterranean Sea. The only way that Western Europe could get Middle East oil was by going around the Cape of Good Hope. Since 1869, the world had depended on access to the Suez Canal with Western economies calculating their continual right of entry under the 1888 Convention of Constantinople. As a result, there were not enough oil tankers in existence to supply the oil needs of the west (Savage 1962, 179). In an added insult to
Europe, Eisenhower would later withhold American oil and the use of surplus US oil tankers contingent on the coalition’s withdrawal from Egypt. This action further reduced the oil supply of Europe and caused a crisis the British currency.

The Fallout

“Will you please deal with your allies-Britain and France—and leave us Israel to deal with?” Message sent to President Dwight D. Eisenhower from Gamal Nasser (Sadat 1978, 145).

Figure 13. American and Soviet Reaction to Operation Musketeer.

Note: the Eisenhower Administration expressed a $D_4$ Curve in the Middle East but maintained a $D_3$ Standard Utility Curve with the Soviet Union.

President Dwight Eisenhower was adamant that he would only enter a war if the Soviets threaten the West, as shown in figure 13. With one week left before the US presidential election, the Anglo-French-Israeli Coalition wrongly calculated Eisenhower would support America’s traditional allies or at least feign neutrality. The American response was one of stupefaction at the coalition’s unilateral use of force without
consultation with their major ally (Divine 1974, 168). Eisenhower immediately labeled the British and the French as aggressors and the Egyptians the clear victim of aggression.

Adlai Stevenson, Eisenhower’s opponent in the election, took the opportunity to criticize Eisenhower as a “part-time president” who let lesser men like John Foster Dulles and Vice-President Richard Nixon make incredible foreign policy blunders. He blamed the administration for the Soviet’s foothold in the Middle East and while publicly demanding the President not to go to war, he expressed an unease with “any policy that linked [the US] with Communist Russia and President Nasser” (Divine 1974, 170).

In truth, the US did not support her allies for Realpolitik and principled reasons. First, Eisenhower knew of Israeli movements but the secret Anglo-French plan deeply offended him, especially in the last week of the 1956 Presidential election campaign. He deeply believed the invasion violated the Tripartite Agreement of 1950. He also believed Europeans facilitated the Israeli invasion. Remarkably, Eisenhower never raised such concerns about Nasser’s fedayeen. The US believed this action would affect long-term Arab relations as well as relations with the Third World now courted by the Soviets. Here American Realpolitiks was more important than defending Anglo-French or Israeli interests.

After the Soviet’s offer to intervene in Egypt, America was very wary that any escalation could easily force a head-on military confrontation with the Soviet Union in a wider war. By this time, Soviet tanks were on the move into Hungary where they could continue west into Germany if the allies were focused on Egypt. Eisenhower even suggested Operation Musketeer endangered America’s commitment to her NATO obligations if the Soviets attacked Western Europe (Kissinger 1994, 524, 532-534, 541).
The second reason America did not support her allies was that world opinion favored Egypt as a “victim of imperialist bullies.” Selwyn Lloyd wrote that Dwight Eisenhower “had twice let us down and relieved the pressure on Nasser at critical moments” (Lloyd 1978, 168). He described Americans as loyal and dependable allies but underneath, they disliked colonialism, a resentment left from the days of the British Empire, and a desire to see the remaining Empire crumble (Lloyd 1978, 36). So then, the US, a former British dependency now extolling the virtues of liberal democratic institutions, could hardly be associated with colonial powers nor credibly assist Great Britain and France in securing their claims in Egypt. America could not allow the Soviet Union to be the champion of the Third World against Western imperialism.

Still, Eisenhower faced another dilemma. Adlai Stevenson used a 1 November 1956 nationally televised speech to denounce the administration for its Suez policy namely allowing Russian arms sales to Egypt, withdrawing the Aswan Dam offer, and Dulles’ political machinations. He labeled the Eisenhower foreign policy apparatus as a catastrophic failure that succeeded in “aligning the United States in the UN with Soviet Russia and the dictator of Egypt against the democracies of Britain, France, and Israel” (Divine 1974, 171). Ironically, the US authored UN Resolution 997 that passed on 2 November 1956 by a vote of 64 to 5 in the General Assembly. Resolution 997 urged all parties to an immediate cease-fire, a withdrawal of all forces behind the armistice lines, to desist from raids across the armistice lines into neighboring.

On 5 November, Dag Hammarskjöld sent a message at 1430 EST (2130 GMT) demanding that the British, French, and Israelis comply with the Afro-Asian proposal and stop offensive operations by 0800 GMT. Further, the Secretary General told the Anglo-
French partners that any peacekeeping in the region in the second proposal would exclude them. The alliance was resolute until discussions began in New York of oil sanctions (Lloyd 1978, 206).

Israel was reluctant to withdraw from the buffer zone it had created in the Sinai. David Ben-Gurion countered Dwight Eisenhower that their action was akin to the 1916 American punitive expedition into Mexico against Pancho Villa. Eisenhower then threatened sanctions (Ben-Gurion 1963, 83). Simultaneously, Eisenhower used direct financial pressure against Great Britain. He was prepared to aggravate the British recession by refusing US endorsement of a $1.5 billion loan to Great Britain to stabilize the pound. He then threatened to sell the US holdings of the British pound and thereby precipitate a collapse of the British currency. Finally, he ordered the suspension of oil shipments from America to Great Britain and France during the winter months.

As the Security Council searched for a response to the invasion, the Soviets proposed that the UN mount a joint action to force the British, French and Israelis out of Egypt. They even suggested that a “joint Soviet-American military action to put an end to the hostilities in the Middle East.” As the Soviets were bemoaning the fate of Arabs in Egypt and the Middle East to the UN, ironically they were brutally crushing Hungary (Kissinger 1994, 543).

Anthony Eden was stunned that the US openly opposed the invasion and shockingly, seemed to side with the communist-bloc. Earlier at Sèvres, Mollet prophetically cautioned the other collaborators against relying on American support. Citing America’s late entry into World War I and II, he proclaimed that the US took years before assessing the Realpolitik dangers to her interests, or as he put it:
“understands foreign relations problems.” Washington would therefore need another two years to understand the gravity of the Suez Nationalization (Neff 1981, 344).

At home, things became worse for Eden. Prominent publications were calling this “Eden’s War” and a folly on a grand scale because there was “No treaty, no international authority, no moral sanction for this . . . action.” Moreover, there was the run on the British pound and gold reserves fell by £100 million in one week. Eden’s government did not have enough currency to keep the pound solvent for long and as mentioned, President Eisenhower would not help without a cease-fire (Neff 1981, 409). Moreover, Eisenhower through the Secretary of the Treasury, George Humphrey, prevented Great Britain from drawing British pounds from the International Monetary Fund and the US Treasury inflated the value of the pound (Lloyd 1978, 210-211).

There was another woe for Eden. Gasoline had been in scarce throughout Europe since the July nationalization. Faced with universal opposition to the invasion, the anger of the US, and the threat of the collapse of the pound sterling, Anthony Eden capitulated. As their troops were ready to seize the canal, Great Britain and France accepted a ceasefire on 6 November 1956.

The next day, 3 Para and Les Paras stopped advancing toward their main objective, the Suez Canal. Brigadier Crook wrote that he “received the signal telling us to stop . . . Given another 24 hours we might have finished the job. But the politicians couldn’t or wouldn’t allow this” (Cook 1989, 101). The news hit General Andre’ Beaufre, the French commander, like a blow in the pit of his stomach. He declared that the allies had committed an irretrievable error. “Only two courses were open: either we obey the order and charge on, presumably alone; or play the ridiculous game now forced
on them.” Without the assurance of British support the French commander obeyed
(Beaufre 1967, 115).

At the same time, America went to the polls. President Eisenhower had kept his
promise to the American people by providing peace and prosperity after the burdens of
World War II and Korea. The price for peace: America would not shore up her allies and
appeared to appease a dictator. For that, the electorate rewarded Eisenhower with a
second term; he won a landslide 41 of 48 states with 457 of 530 electoral votes.

The larger price for peace: the Soviet Union used the Suez Crisis as a screen to
invade Hungary. The Soviet Air Force bombed Budapest; Red Army tanks rolled into the
city razing the insurrection at a cost of thirty thousand people. Corpses of rebels littered
the streets. Hungarians who survived began fleeing across the Austrian border. The
rebellion was ignominiously quashed (Neff 1981, 413).

The Unites Nations Enforcement Force (UNEF)

To introduce the principle of moderation into the theory of war itself would always lead to logical absurdity. (Clausewitz 1976, 76)

Resolution 1000 passed on 5 November 1956 established the United Nations
Emergency Force (UNEF) to secure and supervise the cease-fire in accordance with all
the terms of Resolution 997. The UN’s first peacekeeping force was manifestation of the
changing nature and purpose of the organization. Article 42 of the charter mandated
peace enforcement. Hammarskjöld carried his belief in neutrality to its utmost in the
UNEF. As Eden feared, the six thousand soldiers were in fact similar to the UNTSO.
They were posted with weapons entirely in Egypt but had no authority to fight. The
UNEF would administer the withdrawal of the invaders and act as a buffer between Egypt and Israel.

Early on 21 December 1956, the last French paratroopers made a defiant withdrawal march through Port Faud to the hymns of a military band. By sunset the next day, the British completed their departure from Port Said with less fanfare. Jubilant crowds of Egyptians replaced them. By midday on 23 December, the merriment reached a fevered pitch when units of the “defeated” Egyptian Army marched into Port Said, the verisimilitude of battlefield victors. The crowds waved Egyptian flags and pictures of Nasser as if at an Arab Reichstag rally and shouted "Long Live Nasser" and "Down with Eden and Mollet.” Then in ritual form, they burned British and French flags. That day the mob dynamited the colossal statue of Ferdinand de Lesseps at the Port Said entrance of the Suez Canal and threw its rumble into the canal. The Israelis withdrew from the Canal Zone and the Sinai on 8 March 1957. The UNEF stayed until 1967 when Nasser threw them out of Egypt.

Conclusion

Through the road to war, the UN chose inaction. Egypt violated nine resolutions regarding the sovereignty of Israel, refused to abide by Resolution 118, and Article 25 of the Charter. The UN never condemned Egypt. The fedayeen ran unchecked across the Sinai under the watch of the UNTSO. Nasser amassed arms and publicly declared his desire to destroy the Jewish state as his army massed in the Sinai in violation of Article 39 of the UN Charter. The UN did nothing.

Was the United Nations an impartial mediator during the 1956 Suez Crisis? Selwyn Lloyd wrote of the events that “this was a classic example of double standards”
in an organization which had lost its Liberal bearings. It took seven days, from 28 October to 4 November 1956, for the members of the UN to denounce the Soviet Union for their invasion of Hungary. In the end the Soviets continued to consolidate their territorial gains. By contrast, it took three days, from 30 October to 2 November 1956, to denounce the Anglo-French-Israeli Alliance who had previously petitioned the UN for a resolution of their legal grievances (Lloyd 1978, 205).

So then, did the UN settlement end the immediate conflict or resolve the underlying issues that caused the war? Outright, no nation-state credited the UN for halting the war. The UN appeared unconcerned or oblivious to crises until shooting actually started. In its haste to end the fighting, the body disregarded the national security concerns of aggrieved parties. Most significantly, throughout the Suez Crisis, the UN allowed individual nations to set the diplomatic agenda for the world. The UN could not therefore act as a *Leviathan* no matter how much Dag Hammarskjöld labored. In this case, the US and the Soviet Union were the powers that ended the fighting not the UN.

Given Hobbes’ contention that war has a time component, Clausewitz’s mantra that war is not wholly unexpected, and the author’s Law of Disputes unless the source of the fighting are resolved, the fighting will occur again. For example, the UN remained in the Sinai until Nasser forced them out in 1967. Then Nasser remilitarized, sparking the Six-Day War. Egypt again closed the Suez Canal. There was more international outrage, more talks, and more agreements. In October 1973, Egyptian troops attacked Israeli forces on the east bank of the canal. The IDF counterattacked and eventually encircled the Egyptian Third Army. Truly none of the issues leading to the 1956 Suez Crisis came any closer to resolution until the 1979 Camp David accord.
CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Introduction

From the start to the end of the business, not one single syllable of censure or regret was uttered by the United Nations or on its behalf either by the Security Council or by the General Assembly, at the seizure of a great international waterway by force. (Eden 1960, 564-565)

The United Nations was founded to keep the peace. In order to do so, it was understood at its start in 1945 that the Regime of international order had to be respected in order to avoid armed conflict. The chief purpose of the UN, therefore, is to mediate disputes in the interpretation of the Regime. The Security Council was the heart of this system and the Secretary General was its chief executive. The Security Council, however, was infected with the same Realpolitik the organization had aimed to overcome, as shown in the abuse of the veto. Unfortunately, the Secretary General entrusted to steer this body like a large ship ran it aground.

This chapter makes several conclusions about the importance of international institutions, and the reaction of the United Nations to the Suez Crisis. It will also answer the thesis question: Did the United Nations resolve the 1956 Suez Crisis? The author will also give recommendations for UN reform. Again, this study must warn that outside of the Western nation-state, the majority of the world only knows tribalism and despotism and has no cultural linkage to the standards of the Regime. It is a logical fallacy to conclude that a totalitarian state under Gamal Nasser would have an interest in upholding the UN Charter or its resolutions if it did not serve Nasser’s Realpolitik interests. In 1956 the UN Charter was a greater burden to Great Britain, France, and Israel than to Egypt.
Importance of the International Regime

The UN is the modern incarnation of the international *Regime*. When UN Secretary General Kofi Annan opines that those who opposed OIF could not understand why the UN could not stop the war and those who support the war were upset that the UN did not endorse it, he was expressing the global opinion that UN is a *Leviathan* designed to regulate international behavior (Annan interviewed by Shawn, December 2003). The UN had the power to influence both the 1956 Suez Crisis just as it could have influenced events before OIF. This power fits Joseph Nye’s definition of either “hard power” or “soft power” (Nye 2003, 60).

How the UN used its power is the point of contention in this thesis. British Prime Minister Anthony Eden, French Premier Guy Mollet, and Israeli Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion believed in the ability of the UN to guarantee their national security. The charter mandated that any use of force had to be either for self-defense, or collective self-defense, or for collective security. Yet, as common in the Cold War, the definition of aggression depended on political ideology. And, similar to the events before OIF, not following the UN’s original collective security mandate crippled the UN’s effectiveness in dealing with other prolonged disputes and possibly its credibility as an organization that worked by agreement.

First, the heterogeneous General Assembly could never speak with one voice. As discussed in Chapter 4, Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld espoused preventative diplomacy. That is, he favored separating warring states instead of defending a victim from an aggressor. Arthur Goodhart advised Anthony Eden’s government that when a state altered the status quo of the international Regime, they are guilty of aggression. It
was then appropriate to use force per Article 51 of the UN Charter to prevent threats to the lives of citizens and to protect a vital national interest, which had been imperiled (Lloyd 1978, 239).

As shown in Chapter 5 of this study, Hammarskjöld had a different worldview. He did not demand a restoration of the status quo but rather wanted to prevent worsening ongoing conflicts through negotiations. This is historically, politically, and morally significant: Hammarskjöld took a position towards collective security and aggression that countered the intent of the UN. Gamal Nasser took advantage of international good-faith to seize property. In 1940 a worldview like Hammarskjöld’s would have endorsed Germany keeping France, Poland, Belgium, Luxembourg, and Czechoslovakia, if Germany and Great Britain negotiated the end of the Battle of Britain. Likewise, Hammarskjöld’s type of reasoning would not have differentiated between the Allied and Axis powers because the cost of the Second World War would be too great. Nor would this idealism have led the effort to stop North Korea in 1950. Just as there was no recovery for Hungary under Hammarskjöld’s watch in 1956, there could have been no Berlin Airlift in 1948.

Outside of the Cold War abuse of the veto system in the Security Council, the UN Charter remains unfulfilled primarily because of Dag Hammarskjöld’s precedent. Maybe it was the euphoria of global decolonization that motivated him to steer the UN from the Regime of established law or maybe it was a sincere pacifist belief. Regardless, under his “quiet diplomacy” the UN condoned breaches of international law “in order to obtain a temporary easement” (Eden 1960, 648). Further, the UN permitted the violation of law, as the seizure of the Suez Canal, the fedayeen raids, Algeria rebellion, and Hungary
invasion undoubtedly were, because the Soviets raised the clamor of anti-colonialism. This was akin to Satan rebuking sin (Eden 1960, 553).

The UN remains important nonetheless. As an idea, it provides a forum for mediating disputes, establishing the international Regime, and enforcing the Regime. In practice, it has minimized some wars. Arguably, the global appeasement of Nasser, through the mechanism of the UN, averted a third world war, a potential nuclear war.

Then there is the significance of the perceived legitimacy of the UN through diplomatic and informational power. When the UN attempts to influence the world, preventative diplomacy creates three questions: (1) is peace under all circumstance a valid security concern? (2) What must the UN accept to avoid a major global war? (3) Should nation-states surrender their national security concerns for the good of peace?

Reaction to the Suez Crisis

What was the international reaction to Operations Kadesh and Musketeer? Quite simply, the world unified to condemn the Anglo-French-Israeli Coalition. Of the superpowers, the Soviet Union protested and threatened while the United States actively worked to defeat the invasion. The callous hypocrisy of it all was that Soviet tanks were massacring Hungarian nationalists by the thousands while the Soviets, Americans, and UN pressed the Tripartite Coalition to acquiesce to the Egyptian dictator.

The Soviets threatened but, more or less, they were posturing. The United States response was inexcusable. By denying Great Britain, France, and Israel succor even through neutrality, Eisenhower validated Guy Mollet’s fears that Washington did not understand the gravity of the Suez nationalization; America took years before acting
against the Realpolitik dangers to her interests. In retrospect, the nearly 50 years of Middle East history shows that Mollet was correct.

It was, however, the UN’s obligation to prevent the war. Was the failure to do so a matter of the UN leadership or it a flaw in the Security Council system and the veto? As described in chapters 4 and 5, Dag Hammarskjöld did not properly lead the global Leviathan once it was clear that Nasser was an ambitious dictator. When using quiet diplomacy, the Secretary General did not sound a clarion against the violations of international law and thereby allowed individual nation-states to set the diplomatic agenda for the world. The US, as described in Chapter 5, became the Leviathan; Eden, Mollet, Ben-Gurion, and Sadat cite Eisenhower for ending the invasion not the UN.

The veto was also a problem. When it served the Soviets to oppose the operative portions of Security Council Resolution 118 despite the reasonableness of the offer, they vetoed it. When it served the Anglo-French strategic and operational objectives in seeing Operation Kadesh succeed, they vetoed the proposed resolution to stop the Israeli invasion.

Moreover, the Security Council directly contributed to the invasion of the Suez Canal by ignoring the national security concerns of the British, French, and Israeli since their grievances were individually minor. The Security Council system proved responsive only to clear, highly visible breaches of peace. As long as small regional violations never swelled into global crises, the UN would ignore the security of its members. By 1956, this became acute in the Middle East. In Chapter 3 of this thesis, the Law of Disputes states: Ceteris paribus, the political will to resolve disputes becomes more elastic as time passes. The UN system ignored the misconduct of Gamal Nasser as
minor compared to other Cold War issues. When the Tripartite Powers appealed to the UN in September 1956, they took the last “legal” hurdle to overcome to justify open warfare. The UN should have reacted in accordance to its Charter. It could not because of Cold War and anti-colonial tensions. This last bit of diplomacy gave the invaders no further recourse other than war.

**Resolution of the Suez Crisis**

The United Nations never resolved the 1956 Suez Crisis. It is tempting to label the war resolved under a new interpretation of international law. In this thesis, resolution had to include the cessation of hostilities and the re-establishment of the *status quo ante bellum*. Indeed, there was a cease-fire, the fighting ended, the European armies left Egypt, and the UNEF went into the Sinai.

The logical question then is if the issue was not resolved with the cease-fire and UNEF, what happened and when was the conflict resolved? When given a chance to mediate the disputes the UN did not stop the march to open war. When war came, Dag Hammarskjöld did not have the political capital to influence either side through quiet diplomacy. During the war, Cold War tensions worked against the UN meeting its collective security mandate.

Since the UN could not act as a *Leviathan*, the US was the driving force in ending the fight. Anwar Sadat wrote that President Eisenhower saved Egypt: “[b]oth Britain and France obeyed his orders and withdrew their forces by December 23. Israel followed suit. It was the US attitude . . . that turned [Egyptian] defeat into victory,” (Sadat 1978, 146-147). Thus, instead of conflict resolution, there was conflict postponement until another
opportunity for the parties to resume the war presented itself, as in the 1967 and 1973
Arab Israeli Wars and the Algerian Revolution.

Recommendations

1. Resolve Disputes Before a Catalyst to War Emerges

UN inaction was the proximate cause of the invasion. Their neglect formed the
justification used by Great Britain, France, and Israel in 1956, by NATO in 1997 and
1999, and by the US-led OIF coalition in 2003. The world must monitor the degradation
in the security precursors of nations as defined in Chapter 3 of this thesis. Examining
security concerns is crucial especially for those nation-states with the hard powers
necessary for war. When disputes emerge, rather then waiting for an appeal to the
Security Council, the Secretary General must be proactive in analyzing the situation in
accordance with Chapters 6 and 7 of the United Nations Charter. This will give the UN
legitimacy as a *Leviathan* and will allow the UN to shape the strategic environment for
further action under Article 40 or 41 of the Charter.

2. Restructure the UN for Future Wars

In order to identify and resolve disputes before a catalyst emerges, the UN must
reform itself to interpret the consequences of regional disputes and have a standing force
to implement UN resolutions. The UN must therefore have two directorates accountable
to the Secretary General: an intelligence body capable of impartial analysis of the trends
along the dispute curves and regional military commands capable of enforcing
international law. Most importantly, the UN must remove the absoluteness of the veto.

Article 34 of the UN Charter allows the Security Council to scrutinize all disputes
or situations that may result in international friction. The proposed UN Intelligence
Service would have the power to convene the Security Council independent of nation states when disputes increase in volatility. This would begin diplomatic negotiations prior to the outbreak of war.

Article 47 of the UN Charter allows for the establishment of a Military Staff Committee, which advises and assists the Security Council on all UN military matters. This sword in the covenant enables words to secure men (Hobbes 1962, 129). Under the Security Council, the Military Staff Committee would be responsible for the strategic course of forces used by the Security Council. Given this, when the proposed UN Intelligence Service identifies a threat to peace, the Security Council would have the power to deploy the UN Military Command as its police arm to act on the concerns of the intelligence service. It would impose itself in situations such as the Sinai, Rwanda, Haiti, Palestine, and the Balkans. Failure to allow the UN Military Command access to states in disputes would be punishable by: Security Council condemnation; suspension of rights and privileges of membership per Article 5; expulsion of offending states from the Organization per Article 6; identifying expelled states as rouge nations; and the use of global economic, diplomatic, and military power against offenders until compliance per Article 29.

Finally, Article 27 of the UN Charter requires an affirmative vote in the Security Council by all nine members including the five permanent members. This anachronism is no longer applicable to the wars of the future. A plurality of votes in the Security Council ratified by a plurality in the General Assembly is enough to meet the collective security mandate intended in 1945.
3. Enforce UN Resolutions

After nearly 50 years, preventative diplomacy proves an illogical concept marred by disobedience of the law. Tolerance for the non-resolution of conflicts weakens the *Regime*. Non-compliance with UN resolutions produces greater elasticity in governments to stop negotiations as outlined in Chapter 3 of this study and demonstrated in the Suez Crisis and OIF. Non-compliance increases friction with all parties. Moreover, accepting non-compliance of resolutions does not end ongoing clashes or their underlying causes.

As a minimum, the UN Military Command will force compliance of resolutions as the enforcement arm of the *Leviathan*. The world understands that states will always act to further their interests regardless of the UN; if it is in their interest to adhere to the Security Council, they will. If resolutions jeopardize perceptions of national security, they will ignore resolutions. The latter, however, does not absolve the UN from developing a structure to enforce its will. Just as a policeman must have the constant ability to use force in order to maintain the legitimacy of the law, so too the UN Military Command will give the UN a physical semblance of legitimacy.

4. Nations Must Develop Both Hard And Soft Power

The strategic failure of the 1956 Tripartite Invasion proves that nations need to build diplomatic, informational, military, and economic power to compensate for UN deficiencies. As long as the UN does not enforce its collective security mandate, it cannot be trusted to protect compliant member states from rogue nations and non-state actors. Therefore, the *Realpolitik* interests of nations must trump the UN. Consider that if a police force cannot protect a citizen’s home, the citizen will out of necessity gather as many arms as possible to protect himself from those who live outside the law. Similarly,
without the guarantee of UN protection, member states will (and must) amass overwhelming power to protect their vital interests. 

In 1956, the Tripartite Coalition had the power necessary for tactical success but did not have enough strategic power to overcome the crushing worldwide opposition to the war. In contrast, the OIF Coalition in 2003 prosecuted its war despite worldwide resistance because the US had overwhelming strategic and tactical power. If the Tripartite Coalition had comparable hard and soft power as the OIF Coalition, they could have ignored the sentiments against Operation Musketeer, taken the Suez Canal, freed Egypt of Gamal Nasser, and set Egypt (and Middle East) on the path to a liberal democracy such as India.

**Summary**

General Assembly Resolutions 997, 1002, 1120 created a temporary cease-fire and prevented the escalation of the Suez Crisis into a third world war. The implication of the three resolutions for the UN was the legitimization of unlawful changes in the R-Curve, a “moral backslide” that led to half a century of regional strife. The UN Charter became a greater burden to the west, its adherents, than to rogue states like Egypt under Gamal Nasser or Iraq under Saddam Hussein.

The paralysis at the UN made the Suez Crisis and OIF happen. It may lead to future wars since what many devotees of Neville Chamberlain politicized as unilateral strikes became historically inevitable. After fifty years of critical hindsight and in light of the current *Global War Against Terrorism*, without considerable reform and moral courage at the UN, the twenty-first century does not bode any better for the international *Regime* than the bloody legacy of the twentieth century.
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