MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS AND SMALL NATIONS: IMPLICATIONS AND CONSIDERATIONS IN LITHUANIAN PERSPECTIVE

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE
General Studies

by

MODESTAS PETRAUSKAS, MAJ, LITHUANIAN ARMY
B.A., Military Academy of Lithuania, 2002

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
2004

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Name of Candidate: MAJ Modestas Petrauskas

Thesis Title: Multinational Operations and Small Nations: Implications and Considerations in Lithuanian Perspective

Approved by:

______________________________, Thesis Committee Chair
Bruce W. Menning, Ph.D.

______________________________, Member
LTC John R. Sutherland III, M.S., M.M.A.S.

______________________________, Member
LTC Mark R. Wilcox, M.A.

Accepted this 18th day of June 2004 by:

______________________________, Director, Graduate Degree Programs
Robert F. Baumann, Ph.D.

The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)
ABSTRACT

MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS AND SMALL NATIONS: IMPLICATIONS AND CONSIDERATIONS IN LITHUANIAN PERSPECTIVE, by MAJ Modestas Petrauskas, 100 pages.

With Lithuania as case in point, this thesis utilizes extensive primary and secondary materials to examine the pros and cons inherent in the participation of small nations in multinational operations. The examination begins with a discussion of the nature of multinational operations with an emphasis on their diplomatic and military aspects. The larger theoretical context relies heavily on neorealist approaches and definitions to establish perspective, framework, and terminology. As the treatment shifts from theory to application, increasing emphasis falls on Lithuania as a small nation and on its relations with the United States (US) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). These latter entities provide both the impulse and likely organizational context for potential Lithuanian participation in multinational operations. The same actors and circumstances afford a near-classic example of relations between superpower actors and small and weak actors within the international system. The core of the thesis rests on a balanced assessment and analysis of the pluses and minuses, including opportunities and threats, associated with the participation of Lithuania in US- and NATO-led multinational operations. A major conclusion, resting on the criteria of feasibility, acceptability, and suitability, holds that such operations largely coincide with the interests and policies of both the minor and major actors.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to thank members of my thesis committee, Dr. Bruce W. Menning, LTC John R. Sutherland and LTC Mark R. Wilcox, who spared valuable time and provided me with insights to express my ideas coherently on paper. I also wish to extend my gratitude to the staff of the Lithuanian Land Forces Command and to the Defense Policy and Planning Department of the Lithuanian Ministry of Defense, as well as to the staffs of the Graduate Degree Programs and the Combined Arms Research Library for their cordial advice and assistance. Lastly, I am grateful to those authors whose books, articles and documents provide materials for this thesis.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE THESIS APPROVAL PAGE</td>
<td>ii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABSTRACT</td>
<td>iii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACKNOWLEDGMENTS</td>
<td>iv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACRONYMS</td>
<td>vi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ILLUSTRATIONS</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TABLE</td>
<td>xi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Background and Context of the Problem</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Research Question</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Definitions</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limitations</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delimitations</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Significance of the Study</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER 3. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER 4. ANALYSIS</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global Interests of the US</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global Interests of NATO</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania from the Perspective of US Interests</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interests of NATO towards Lithuania</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania’s Strengths</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implications and Considerations</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER 5. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feasibility</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acceptability</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suitability</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REFERENCE LIST</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CERTIFICATION FOR MMAS DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADC</td>
<td>Aide-de-Camp</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIDS</td>
<td>Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATGM</td>
<td>Anti Tank Guided Missile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BALTBAT</td>
<td>Baltic Battalion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BALTDEFCOL</td>
<td>Baltic Defense College</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BALTNET</td>
<td>Baltic Airspace Surveillance Network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BALTPERS</td>
<td>Baltic Personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BALTRON</td>
<td>Baltic Naval Squadron</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BALTSEA</td>
<td>Baltic Security and Defense Assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C3</td>
<td>Command, Control, and Communications</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C4I</td>
<td>Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAA</td>
<td>Capability Assessment Areas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CARL</td>
<td>Combined Arms Research Library</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFE</td>
<td>Conventional Forces in Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CGSC</td>
<td>Command and General Staff College</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CGSOC</td>
<td>Command and General Staff Officers Course</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIS</td>
<td>Commonwealth of the Independent States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CJTF</td>
<td>Combined Joint Task Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CM</td>
<td>Compatibility Measure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CS</td>
<td>Central Sector</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CS</td>
<td>Combat Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSS</td>
<td>Combat Service and Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DANBN</td>
<td>Danish Battalion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DANCON</td>
<td>Danish Contingent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIME</td>
<td>Diplomatic, Informational, Military, and Economic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DoD</td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPPD</td>
<td>Defense Policy and Planning Department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DS</td>
<td>Defense Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EAPC</td>
<td>Enhanced Partnership for Peace Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ELTA</td>
<td>Lithuanian News Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAS</td>
<td>Feasibility, Acceptability, and Suitability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FM</td>
<td>Field Manual</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GNP</td>
<td>Gross National Product</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GWOT</td>
<td>Global War on Terrorism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HIV</td>
<td>Human Immunodeficiency Virus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HNS</td>
<td>Host Nation Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HQ</td>
<td>Headquarters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGO</td>
<td>Intergovernmental Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMET</td>
<td>International Military and Education Training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISAF</td>
<td>International Security Forces in Afghanistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KFOR</td>
<td>Kosovo Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LAF</td>
<td>Lithuanian Armed Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LF CMD</td>
<td>Land Forces Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LITBAT</td>
<td>Lithuanian Battalion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LITBRIG</td>
<td>Lithuanian Brigade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOG FSB</td>
<td>Logistic Forward Support Battalion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOG MSB</td>
<td>Logistic Main Support Battalion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LS CMD</td>
<td>Logistic Support Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAP</td>
<td>Membership Action Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MCAT</td>
<td>Military Compatibility Assessment Tool</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MFA</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MND</td>
<td>Multinational Division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOD</td>
<td>Ministry of Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MP</td>
<td>Military Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAC</td>
<td>North Atlantic Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NBC</td>
<td>Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCA</td>
<td>National Command Authorities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCO</td>
<td>Noncommissioned Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDVF</td>
<td>National Defense Voluntary Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Nongovernmental Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NMS</td>
<td>National Military Strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSD</td>
<td>National Security Department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSS</td>
<td>National Security Strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OEF</td>
<td>Operation Enduring Freedom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OIF</td>
<td>Operation Iraqi Freedom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PfP</td>
<td>Partnership for Peace</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POLUKRBAT</td>
<td>Polish Ukrainian Battalion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRT</td>
<td>Provincial Reconstruction Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSE</td>
<td>Partnership Staff Element</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SE</td>
<td>South East</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SFOR</td>
<td>Stabilization Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHORAD</td>
<td>Short Range Air Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOF</td>
<td>Special Operations Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOU</td>
<td>Special Operation Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRADOC</td>
<td>Training and Doctrine Department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USD</td>
<td>United States Dollar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>Union of Soviet Socialistic Republics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V-10</td>
<td>Vilnius-10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WEU</td>
<td>Western European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WMD</td>
<td>Weapons of Mass Destruction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WWII</td>
<td>World War II</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ILLUSTRATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Figure</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Figure 1</td>
<td>Map of the Baltic States</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 2</td>
<td>Elements Determining the Power of a Small State</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 3</td>
<td>Estimated Procurement of the Lithuanian Armed Forces, 2004-2014</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 4</td>
<td>Structure of the Lithuanian Armed Forces in 2003</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 5</td>
<td>Structure of the Lithuanian Armed Forces in 2008-2014</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 1. Contribution of New NATO Members to Alliance ..................................44
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

Recent coalition experiences from NATO operations in the Balkans and US-led operations in Afghanistan and the Persian Gulf have demonstrated the usefulness of small nations in multinational operations. However, these operations have also uncovered a number of weaknesses that have caused friction among participants in multinational operations. Each nation brings its own diplomatic, informational, military, and economic (DIME) attributes to the multinational forces’ table. These attributes are essential to meet envisioned goals. However, national strengths often go hand-in-hand with national weaknesses or implications. The inclusion of small nations usually presents the multinational forces’ leading nation or group of nations with challenges. In many cases various weaknesses and implications can jeopardize the effectiveness of future small nation participation in multinational operations.

Before the twentieth century, coalitions were usually formed to fight wars and then disbanded. The twentieth century, in contrast, witnessed the development of long-term alliances in peacetime, as well as short-term coalitions for war. All major wars of the twentieth century involved multinational operations, except the Russo-Japanese and Iran-Iraq wars (Bowman 1997, 1).

By definition, multinational operations involve two or more states. Therefore, multinational operations inherently have international dimensions. Logically, since certain states at a certain time commonly decide to participate in a given multinational operation, motivated perhaps by a number of reasons, these states are practicing
international relations. In addition, an extension of Clausewitzian thought would hold that
even multinational military operations constitute an extension of national policies
(Clausewitz 1984, 88). Accordingly, multinational operations are derivative of the
foreign and security policies of the states involved. In order to understand these policies,
the role and behavior of small states in the international system, as well as the origins of
alliances and coalitions, this thesis addresses the basics of fundamental international
relations theory. Notably, neorealist approaches currently dominate the US Army
Command and General Staff College (CGSC) curriculum and find reflection in the
statements of national officials explaining the national security strategy and the foreign
policy of the US. Therefore, neorealist theories play an important part in supporting the
research for this thesis. Neorealism applies the classical theories of realists to the
contemporary environment. The main realist assumptions hold that nation-states are the
key actors in a “state-centric” system; that domestic politics can be clearly separated from
foreign policy; that international politics are a struggle for power in an anarchic
environment; and that there are gradations of capabilities among nation-states--great
powers and lesser states--in a decentralized international system with states possessing
legal equality or sovereignty. Neorealists consider power as a key variable, and that the
focus on the international system and cost-benefit calculations causes states to take one
course of action or another. According to neorealists, the international system changes
basically for three reasons. The first one is alteration in the nature of actors or the types of
entities: empires, states and other units. The second cause for change comes from a
change in the distribution of power among actors in the international system. The third
reason for change involves political, economic, and sociocultural interactions among various elements of the international system (Dougherty 1990, 81-123).

As for small states, according to Thomas Freiner “We can describe the small state as a state which, because of its lack of power, is unable to achieve [has to renounce] its political goals vis-à-vis most other states” (Handel 1990, 37). When addressing military capabilities, a small state is a state which recognizes the fact that it cannot ensure security by its own capabilities, and therefore must rely on the aid of other states, institutions, processes, or developments to do so (Rothstein 1968, 29). Some analysts of international relations have set a demographic criterion for their definition, holding that small states are those with fewer than 15 million in population. To summarize:

The small (or minor) power is that state which, in long term, can constitute no more than a dispensable and non-decisive increment to a primary state’s total array of political and military resources regardless of whatever short term, contingent weight as an auxiliary (or obstacle) to the primary power it may have in certain circumstances. And it is its weight as a long term increment to the major participants in the global balance of power that is the most instructive pointer to its finite resources – those on which will depend the outer limits of its action and its capacity to sustain conflict as its contingent advantages fall away. (Vital 1971, 19)

Lithuania by its very nature represents a prime example of a small state, and Lithuania might also be considered a weak state (G. Minioitaite 2003, 275). For these and other reasons, this thesis focuses on Lithuania as a case in point. In establishing context for the Lithuanian case, the US and NATO serve as supplementary subjects for the research. The US and NATO represent dominant superpower actors within the international system, especially in Trans-Atlantic perspective. Lithuanian participation in multinational operations led by the US or NATO amounts to a near-classic example of international relations between a superpower and a small state.
A superpower might be described as a power that is capable of defending itself under even the most adverse conditions. A superpower can be differentiated by population (over 200 million) and “effective population” (that part of the population that can be armed and educated to operate sophisticated weapons), or also by extensive nuclear development and space programs. Economic superiority is defined by Gross National Product (GNP) (over 500 billion dollars) and GNP per capita and by control over the largest natural resources (Handel 1990, 12-20). Superpower interests serve as qualitative characteristics that usually bear a worldwide character (Weber 1968, 912).

On 11 March 1990, Lithuania re-established its national independence. On 31 August 1993, the last Russian units left Lithuania’s territory, thus ending a half-century-long occupation. Since then, Lithuania has been in constant pursuit of ways and means to enhance its national security and also to promote its own credibility in the international security arena. After 1994, when Lithuania committed itself to the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program, more than 1,000 Lithuanian soldiers have participated in peacekeeping, peace enforcement, stabilization, and numerous other operations in Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Albania, Georgia, Macedonia, Afghanistan, and Iraq. Lithuania’s political aim to become a full-fledged member of NATO and the European Union (EU), together with its small size and limited resources, encourages the country to look for unique opportunities to contribute effectively to future multinational operations.

**Background and Context of the Problem**

Throughout history, multinational operations have been fashioned to fill gaps in capabilities to fight or to resist the multinational force’s common threat. These operations have also served at least two purposes, both understood in terms of time: short-term and
long-term. The short-term purpose focused on decisive victory—fight and win, while the long-term purpose focused during peacetime on preventive measures to deter war.

According to the US Army Field Manual (FM) 100-8 *The Army in Multinational Operations*:

Multinational operations are categorized in one of two major groups - coalitions and alliances. Coalitions and alliances create a structure that meets the needs, diplomatic realities, constraints, and objectives of the participating nation. Coalitions normally form as a rapid response to unforeseen crises and alliances are formed for achievement of long-term goals and based upon formal agreements between two or more nations with common interests. (FM 100-8 1997, 2-2--2-3)

Recently asymmetric threats have become an important issue for all nations of the world, both large and small, causing them to assess and transform their security policies and capabilities. Advances associated with globalization have also interconnected individual national vulnerabilities. Thus, there are resulting windows of opportunity for modern adversaries to strike even the strongest nations through the weaknesses of small nations. At the same time, dynamic battlespace in modern warfare implies that asymmetric threats can make any country, regardless of size and capability, a key contributor to the success of the multinational effort.

Lithuania understands that its national security policy is an integral part of global security. Therefore Lithuania actively participates in various multinational efforts. Lithuania also understands that its own security starts outside the country’s borders, beyond the Balkans, the Caucasus, Central Asia and the Middle East; therefore, Lithuania does its best to contribute to global stabilization and security. After independence in 1990, Lithuania was initially more concerned with “flag waving” in the international arena. Mere presence was important, and Lithuanian units joined other national contingents with greater military capabilities, such as those of Denmark and Poland. The
possibility of participation was a way to ensure that soldiers were properly trained for deployment. Lithuania needed support with transportation to the area of operations and within it, and required proper logistical support and communications. However, after approximately 1999, Lithuania began to concentrate on the quality of its contribution and on its own self-sustainment responsibilities. In becoming a truly international player, Lithuania sought and still seeks to recommend itself as a “security provider.” Lithuania struggles against the reputation of a “security consumer,” a reputation that in the eyes of the international community often overshadows and diminishes the actual value of Lithuania’s contribution to multinational operations.

In this thesis, the relations and interests of superpowers and small nations are thoroughly analyzed to determine whether large and small nations together can achieve common security goals. In light of NATO operations in the Balkans, the US-led multinational Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), and the current global security environment, this thesis argues that the size and resources of nations are not the sole factors governing effectiveness.

The Research Question

The value of small nations’ strengths and capabilities in multinational operations often suffers from a perception of the complexities these nations represent, particularly in the political and military areas. There is a constant debate at the National Command Authority (NCA) level of various large contributors and among the public over whether it is worth having small nations in multinational operations. Steve Bowman has identified the diverse sources of friction endemic to multinational operations, including goals, logistics, capabilities, training, equipment, doctrines, intelligence, language, leadership,
and cultural differences (religion, class and gender distinctions, discipline and cultural tolerance, work ethic, standards of living and national traditions) (1997, 2-12). This thesis examines recent coalition and alliance-building examples to answer the question: Does the incorporation of small nations into multinational operations meet the tests of feasibility, acceptability, and suitability (the FAS Test)?

To answer this principal question, this thesis examines two subordinate questions. First, what are the political-military needs of the great powers that necessitate the incorporation of small nations in multinational operations? Second, how does Lithuania serve as a case study for the incorporation of small nations into multinational operations?

**Definitions**

*Alliance* is the result of formal agreements (i.e., treaties) between two or more nations for broad, long-term objectives which further the common interests of the members (Joint Pub 5-0 2003, II-21).

*Coalition*, according to Webster’s 1913 Dictionary, is a combination, for temporary purposes, of persons, parties, or states, having different interests.

*C200*, CGSC Strategic Studies Module Block

*C-5*, heaviest fixed wing transportation aircraft of the United States Air Force, also known as the “Galaxy.”

The *European Union*, or EU, is a family of democratic European countries, committed to working together for peace and prosperity. The EU was founded on 9 May 1950. All EU decisions and procedures are based on the Treaties, to which are agreed by all the EU countries. In the early years, much of the co-operation between EU countries was about trade and the economy, but now the EU also deals with many other subjects of
direct importance in everyday life, including citizens' rights; ensuring freedom, security and justice; job creation; regional development; environmental protection; making globalization work for everyone.

The *Litas* is Lithuania’s national currency: 1 Litas=100 centas. 1 US Dollar (USD) =~2.7 Litas.

*Lithuania* is a state in northeastern Europe with an area of 65,200 sq. km. It borders Belarus--502 km of border, Latvia--453 km, Poland--91 km, Russia (Kaliningrad)--227 km. In total, the land border extends 1,273 km, with a coastline of 99 km (see Figure 1). The 3,601,138 inhabitants of Lithuania include 80.6 percent Lithuanians, 8.7 percent Russians, 7 percent Polish, 1.6 percent Belarusian and 2.1 percent others. Lithuania in 2002 had a Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of 30.02 billion USD and 8,400 USD per capita.

After winning independence and challenging the Soviet Union occupation in 1990, Lithuania started a “return to Europe.” This return meant to acknowledge and to assimilate Western values, the Western way of life on both national and individual levels, and to strive for the same living standards as in Western countries. Lithuania’s most important goal became recognition as an active participant in organizations that represent Western values and democracy at their best. Lithuania is a full member of the United Nations (UN), the Council of Europe, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, and the World Trade Organization. Lithuania is also an associate member of the Western European Union (WEU). After Russian troops left Lithuania in 1993, Lithuania and the other Baltic States applied for membership in NATO; in 1994, Lithuania was invited to join the Partnership
for Peace (PfP) program. The Individual Partnership Program was signed between NATO and Lithuania in 1994. On 29 March 2004, Lithuania became a full member of NATO, and on 1 May 2004—a full member of EU.

![Map of the Baltic States](ImageCat/PCL/Latvia/latalgh.html, 1994)

**Figure 1.** Map of the Baltic States  

The *Membership Action Plan*, or MAP, is the fundamental document on the basis of which individual candidate states prepare for membership in NATO. NATO first presented the MAP as an innovation at the summit meeting in Washington in 1999. The goal of the MAP is to continue the “open door” policy of NATO and effectively to assist the aspirant countries to focus their preparations increasingly on meeting the goals and priorities set out in the Plan.
The *North Atlantic Treaty Organization*, or NATO, is an alliance of 26 countries from North America and Europe committed to fulfilling the goals of the North Atlantic Treaty, signed on 4 April 1949. In accordance with the Treaty, the fundamental role of NATO is to safeguard the freedom and security of its member countries by political and military means. The Treaty commits each member country to sharing the risks and responsibilities as well as the benefits of collective security and requires of each of them not to enter into any other international commitment that might conflict with the Treaty. NATO safeguards the allies’ common values of democracy, individual liberty, the rule of law and the peaceful resolution of disputes, and promotes these values throughout the Euro-Atlantic area (NATO 2003). Having received an invitation in November 2002 to join NATO, Lithuania’s full membership, as well as membership for Estonia, Latvia, Slovakia, Romania, Slovenia, and Bulgaria, became a reality in 2004. Albania, Croatia and Macedonia remain potential candidates for NATO in the near future.

*Partnership for Peace Program*, or PfP, was launched by the January 1994 NATO Summit to establish strong links between NATO, its new democratic partners in the former Soviet Block, and some of Europe's traditionally neutral countries to enhance European security. The PfP provides a framework for the enhanced political and military cooperation for joint multilateral crisis management activities, such as humanitarian assistance and peacekeeping.

*RAND* is the US Research and Development Corporation, which is a nonprofit institution that helps improve policy and decision making through research and analysis. *States of the French-German Axis* include states within the EU that often identify salient aspects of their foreign and security policies with positions adopted by France and
Germany. The sense of common identification at times extends to larger internal EU issues, including the impulse to create a federal-style order for the EU and to support greater centralization of power to French-German advantage within the EU. Perceptions of such an axis are common among new independent states of Central and East Europe and find reflection in equally-common US perceptions of “Old” and “New” Europe.

**Limitations**

Important considerations of time and space, together with requirement for depth, lobby strongly for thesis limitation to Lithuanian participation in US- and NATO-led multinational operations. Within the full range of motives for multinational operations, focus falls primarily on the diplomatic (or political) and the military. Other important concerns, for example, EU enlargement and Lithuanian membership in other international organizations, are addressed only as necessary in context.

The declaration of military capabilities is usually a sensitive issue for any nation. Lithuania’s military capabilities, as well as its membership negotiations with NATO and EU, contain classified information. Comprehensive reports and correspondence that cover these issues are unavailable for public scrutiny. Consequently, sources available for this thesis cover capabilities only in a general and limited manner. Because secondary sources often rely on dated information, the author’s direct knowledge and personal experience serve to supplement the official information used in this study.

**Delimitations**

Because the participation of small nations in multinational operations is a complex and dynamic subject, the amount of pertinent material is voluminous and
constantly changing. Therefore, this study focuses on Lithuania’s perspective and the transformation necessary to meet its national security goals and the requirements for both integration into European and Trans-Atlantic organizations and for effective participation in US- and NATO-led multinational operations. Coverage is limited to Lithuania’s experience from 1990 until the spring of 2004. For reasons of accessibility, only unclassified sources were used for reference.

Significance of the Study

The inclusion of small nations in multinational operations is a subject of general international concern. Arguments often turn on the relevance of small nations. Hence, the debate over whether small nations either contribute to or hinder the effectiveness of multinational operations involves a fundamental examination of feasibility. That examination must then extend to a consideration of whether the inclusion of small nations in multinational operations outweighs the disadvantages (acceptability). Finally, the examination must determine whether the goals of an international coalition can be achieved by including small nations (suitability).

The study illuminates the challenges that arise from the incorporation of small nations into multinational operations and identifies ways and means of dealing with these implications. The Lithuanian experience promises to provide a number of lessons learned in perspective. That perspective embraces integration into European and Trans-Atlantic organizations, as well as participation in US- and NATO-led multinational operations. Additionally, this thesis provides specific information about the Lithuanian Armed Forces (LAF) to increase awareness within the military community.
CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW

There are a number of publications about multinational operations by authors who reflect various perspectives on the participation of small nations. However, no known sources provide coverage of the Lithuanian perspective within the context of the feasibility, acceptability, and suitability test. The research for this thesis relies on a mixture of primary and secondary materials, with emphasis for interpretation on the latter. Materials for this thesis were drawn from the Combined Arms Research Library (CARL), the Lithuanian Land Forces Command (LF CMD), the Ministry of Defense (MOD) of Republic of Lithuania, and the Internet. The intent of this chapter is first to provide an overview of the principle neorealist theories to build an intellectual framework and to determine key measurement units for FAS analysis. Subsequently, the chapter reviews sources that concern the Lithuanian case.

For analytical purposes, power is the most common measure used by neorealists to distinguish between states. Marshall R. Singer’s description of power, as outlined in his book, *Weak States in a World of Powers: the Dynamics of International Relationships*, explains what exactly constitutes the power of a state, with particular reference to the state as a unit or actor in the international system. For Singer, “Power is the ability to exercise influence and the ability to prevent influence from being exercised over oneself” (1972, 54). The book by John W. Spanier, *Games Nations Play*, identifies what facilitates state power. According to the author, states primarily derive power from their geographical location and size. Technology notwithstanding, dominant terrain, the
length of borders, climate, a state’s maritime characteristics, and land and air space all
play significant roles in the calculation of a state’s power. For several reasons, population
is another source of power. One reason is that a large population ensures manpower for a
sizeable army, and another reason is that a large population usually means large industry,
primarily because of consumer requirements. A third source of power is natural
resources; they provide necessary materials and independence from other states. A fourth
factor, economic capacity, is also a critical measurement of a state’s power. The
reliability of economic standards, which are used to compare the power of states, has
improved markedly since the onset of the contemporary industrial age. A fifth
measurement is military strength, which usually represents men in uniform and a state’s
weapon count. The political system and leadership is a sixth measurement or indicator of
a state’s power. Issues under a state’s political justification include the utilization of a
state’s power, determination of state’s role in the world, and setting national objectives
and priorities. The capability of leaders to make decisions with reasonable speed, their
experience, ability to gain popular approval for their policies, and the stability and
compatibility of these policies are some of the factors that influence a state’s power.
Lastly, national morale, which is expressed through popular dedication to the nation and
to support of its policies, even when sacrifice is at stake, is also a source of state power.
However, determination of one’s power is a very complex and inexact science. Both
tangible and intangible elements figure in the equation. A reason for overestimation or
underestimation of a state’s power stems from differing views over the existing gap
between a state’s actual capability and potential power. Meanwhile, intentions sometimes
prove unstable, another factor that confuses power calculations (Spanier 1984, 124-148).
Whatever its source, power is perceived in different ways. Joseph S. Nye in the article, “What is hard and soft power?,” expresses the view that power might be “hard,” such as military forces, resources, population, or “soft,” such as cultural, political values and foreign policy (Putnam 2003). Additionally, Kenneth N. Waltz in his book, *Theory of International Politics*, asserts that states, according to the strength of their ideas and institutions, may differ not only by their status as powers, but also by their weaknesses and strengths as members of various categories of states. He refers to strength as a separate and independent dimension of power (Waltz 1979, 95-97).

Nor is power exercised in a vacuum. John W. Spanier argues that within the international system individual states might be complemented by other actors. The first group of other actors includes intergovernmental actors, which might be global or regional, as well as political, military, economic, or social. Typically, assigned governmental representatives negotiate decisions through Intergovernmental Organizations (IGOs). Another group of actors that complements states consists of actors in Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs). Unlike IGOs, NGOs are not subordinate to governmental authority. NGOs usually have headquarters in one country and centrally directed operations in two or more countries. NGOs perform their functions not only across national frontiers, but also in disregard of them, or trans-nationally. Multinational Corporations are the most prominent contemporary examples of NGOs. Other subtypes of NGOs include the Roman Catholic Church and terrorist groups (Spanier 1979, 50-55).

Neorealists, particularly Barry Buzan in his book, *People, States and Fear: The National Security Problem in International Relations*, assert that the absence of a superior government to control all constituent elements means that the international
political system is inherently anarchical. Anarchy underlines the general form of relations among states, a fact which might condition the varieties and styles of the system; however, anarchy does not necessarily mean chaos and disorder (Buzan 1983, 94-95).

John W. Spanier outlines the most common strategic objectives, which states usually seek to implement, and consequently, which also basically shape both their behavior and the international system. These strategic objectives include, first, the most basic objective—security. Security essentially means physical survival. Another meaning of security is preservation of a state’s territorial integrity. Security is embodied in a state’s political independence, which represents freedom from foreign control and preservation of its domestic political and economic system, or “way of life.” A second objective is prestige, which due to its close relation to power, especially military power, may be translated as a nation’s reputation for wielding power among other states. As examples, prestige might be gained either through victories on the battlefield or through successful economic coercion. Prestige is recognized when other states note that a state is powerful, a state is willing to use its power to gain its aims, and that it has used this power effectively to achieve preset aims. Credibility lies at the core of prestige. Small states are also concerned about prestige, and for them it is less an issue of power than of simple dignity. A state’s prestige may outlast its power. Economic wealth, prosperity, or general welfare constitute the third objective of states in the international system. Wealth underlies the military strength that a state can afford. A fourth objective involves protection and promotion of ideology. Ideology is a set of beliefs that explains reality and prescribes a desirable future existence for society and the world, including the roles of specific nations in bringing about this future condition. Peace and power are the fifth objective that states
pursue. Peace should not be misread as security because peace is just one of the means to ensure the latter (Spanier 1979, 57-64).

Force is another important factor in neorealist analysis. Kenneth N. Waltz in his book, *Man, the State and War: A Theoretical Analysis*, argues that a state is the final judge of its own decisions and actions, implying that any state at any time may use force as a form influence, if a state values results more than peace. Therefore, all states must be ready either to counter force by force or to pay the cost of weakness (Waltz 1969, 160).

To paraphrase John H. Herz, a pioneer of the idea of security dilemma, states automatically raise the overall level of insecurity by ensuring the implementation of their own strategic objectives. Each state considers its own measures to achieve its own strategic objectives as defensive and refers to attempts by others as threats (Herz 1959, 231-243). According to Barry Buzan, threats, which might be generated by both external (states) and internal (non-state entities, terrorist groups or transnational corporations) sources, can be differentiated as political, informational, military, economical and ecological. These threats may also vary according to dimension, including range (spatial and temporal factors) and probability, as well as historically (Buzan 1983, 75-88).

Meanwhile, Georg Schwarcenberger and George W. Keeton in their book, *Power Politics: A Study of World Society*, hold that in order to seek strategic objectives states follow one or more of seven policy patterns. The first of the patterns is isolationism, in certain cases also known as neutrality, which involves avoidance of clashes with other states and avoidance of political alignments with, and against, other states. The second pattern is alliances, which enable states to augment their own strength through allies without further effort beyond informal or formal understandings. In individual state
perspective, alliances also offer means of redressing imagined or real inferiority by
establishing power superiority. Guarantees are the third pattern, one used particularly
when great powers are less interested in assistance from small states than in their
independence or neutrality. Treaties guarantying the small states’ independence meet this
need. The fourth pattern, balance of power, which might produce a certain amount of
stability in international relations, is often a function of alliances, counter-alliances,
treaties of guarantee and neutralization. Imperialism is a policy of domination by indirect
means and forms the fifth pattern of policies. The disguised object of imperialist policy is
to control other states under guises that leave their statehood and formal independence
more or less intact, while, in fact, committing their territories and resources to the
imperialist power. Another form of imperialism is informal division by great powers of
small sovereign states into spheres of influence. The sixth pattern is hegemony, a more
discreet form of international relations than imperialism, occurs when the passive party
must realize that hints given by the leading power are to be taken. Otherwise the party
“advised” must expect consequences, such as inconveniences or the withholding of
benefits. The seventh pattern, universalism, is the opposite of isolationism. Advocates of
universalism seek to attain security by the elimination of discrete societies and their
replacement by a universal state. The aim of universalism also might fall short of the
formal incorporation of other states into one World Empire. Lastly, there is the policy of
“neo-colonialism,” which is considered only as a candidate for membership among the
traditional patterns. This is a post 1945 variation on traditional imperialism or hegemony
that is rife among weaker Afro-Asian countries. Neo-colonialism results when
independent states, which are also recognized as sovereign and equal members of the
UN, are subject to subtle forms of interference and attempts at indirect control. Indirect control is most often gained through political, economic and even military assistance, vital to states’ survival (Schwarzenberger 1964, 160-185).

According the László Réczei’s essay, “Small socialist states,” in the book, Small States in International Relations (edited by August Schou and Arne Olav Brundtland), basic aspirations, including self preservation and safeguarding of security and power status, condition the basic foreign policy goals of the great powers. The urge is to protect and safeguard spheres of interests. Some of the conditions that affect the great powers’ existence internally lie beyond the frontiers; therefore, spheres of influence exist beyond their borders. Any interference with a sphere of influence constitutes a threat, just as interference within a great power’s borders, thus causing the great power to defend itself against such interference (Réczei 1971, 74-75). Georg Schwarzenberger and George W. Keeton add that maintenance of independence is another permanent requirement of the superpowers. Superpowers tend to implement their needs by ensuring access to ice-free and warm water ports, creating buffer zones, achieving supremacy in military power, establishing close relations with other powers in order to avoid conflict or to unite against other powers, filling in power vacuums (small nations can also be considered as power vacuums), and preventing other powers’ expansion. Superpowers might even attempt to define such permanent objectives for small states (Schwarcenberger 1964, 45-51).

Allen G. Sens in his essay, “Cooperation under Neorealism: Bringing in the Small States (of Eastern and Central Europe),” in the book, Multilateralism and Regional Security (edited by Michel S. Fortmann, Neil MacFarlane, and Stéphane Roussel), asserts that just as any actor in international system, small nations also shape their foreign
policies according to their interests. Their first concern is security. Security is understood as protection from potential threats, especially protection from potential threats within the region. Small states are also driven by diplomatic interests. These interests include access to decision making procedures and obtaining a voice, influence or consultation in diplomatic matters. Creation or maintenance of a cooperative environment and definition of a foreign policy niche or role are also concerns that lie within the diplomatic interests of the small states. A third concern is the small states’ economic interests, including access to markets and the opportunity to specialize (Sens 1997, 194). Figure 2 refers to Michael I. Handel’s book, *Weak States in the International System*, and outlines elements that facilitate the attainment of small-state power. Georg Schwarcenberger and George W. Keeton point out that there are six methods which small nations practice to guarantee survival in a struggle of the strong within the international system. The first way is to ensure that the small nation’s existence accords with the interests of the international establishment. The second method is to make sure that the existence of the small state corresponds with the interests of the great powers. According to the third ploy, small states aspire to identify their interests with the interests of at least one neighboring great power. The fourth method encourages small states to develop capabilities to offer more than token resistance to any invader. According to the fifth variant, small states endeavor to evoke sympathy in the court of world public opinion. And lastly, in collective systems such as coalitions and alliances, small states group together with other small states and medium powers (Schwarcenberger 1964, 102).
Allen G. Sens is an advocate for the role of small states in the international system; therefore, his essay has served as the “center of gravity” for this thesis. Sens acknowledges that neorealists are skeptical and doubt that cooperative enterprises survive beyond the conditions that prompted their formation. Stated more simply, this view holds that states will continue to cooperate if it is in their interests to do so. For neorealists, only the most powerful entities are important, while small states are relegated to a secondary role. Accordingly, neorealist theorists often neglect the value of “bringing the

---

**Figure 2. Elements Determining the Power of a Small State**

small states in” to different cooperation perspectives. However, in multinational operations small states are often more important than neorealists suggest.

Sens emphasizes that at the global level, there are far more small states than great powers. Additionally, in comparison with superpowers, small states are much more sensitive about the redistribution of power and more vulnerable to policy failures in the international system, including power disequilibrium. Small states continuously experience and counter external pressures, such as shifts in power distribution and the rise and decline of dominant states. Furthermore, small states face security dilemmas while cooperating with great powers, especially in environments of conflicting or excessive cooperation among great powers. Therefore, small states possess a higher degree of “rationality” in their international behavior than neorealists consider the case. According to neorealists, the ability of a small state to ensure its own security and to gain influence is based on what assets the small states can bring to a collective effort. Considering the limited extent of their “hard power,” small states tend to focus on the quality of their contribution with “soft power,” including diplomatic and geopolitical elements. Under certain conditions, as when a commitment to maintain the security of a small state symbolizes prestige to a superpower, small states are able to exploit this opportunity and to manipulate the superpower. Despite limited “hard power,” history provides examples of small states proving to be extremely difficult opponents for great powers (Vietnam), upsetting war plans (Belgium), and providing significant military contributions in larger conflicts (Dominions in World War II). Issues of political independence, economic sovereignty, and cultural protection have long figured in the security calculations of small states. Small states have long successfully dealt with
challenges to internal and external credibility in order to achieve a certain international role. Small states have also long deterred or defeated external military threats, while simultaneously maintaining their own independence, sovereignty, cultural identity and prosperity. Since great powers in the international arena increasingly struggle with these same concerns, great powers might beneficially explore the experience of small states.

Sens argues that small states are interested in multilateral arrangements on several grounds: they can afford security, including the deterrent effect, greater military capability, and greater legitimating “weight.” Great powers also tend to neutralize each other in multilateral alliances; there exists less a likelihood of one dominating and dictating power within an alliance. Consequently, there is a decreased risk that a small state’s independence and sovereignty will fall prey within an alliance to a single dominant threat. Additionally, in a multilateral alliance small states have the opportunity to obtain a voice or to sit at the table of collective decision making in hopes of influencing it. Small states have potential as mediators or bridge builders.

For their part, great powers may wish to include small states in multilateral security alliances either to prevent an opponent from gaining strength or to employ the small states as buffers, satellites, or future battlegrounds. Great powers may also include small states in security cooperation to gain prestige, to demonstrate attractiveness as an ally, or to appeal to principle. Increased membership in a multilateral effort may enhance the moral “weight” of that effort. However, inclusion of small states in a multilateral alliance might cause difficulties in maintaining cohesion and effective decision making. Great powers may become burdened by multilateral arrangements that weaken their capacity to act. Additionally, larger membership in multinational operations is likely to
embrace a greater number of internecine rivalries and hostilities. Differences in security perceptions may also cause rifts between small states and great powers. Finally, the inclusion of small states may become problematic because of varying compatibility among ideological, social, and economic systems (Sens 1997, 184-195).

The remainder of this chapter refers to literature on Lithuania’s participation in US- and NATO-led multinational operations. The purpose is to support the second phase of research, with Lithuania as case in point.


Various NATO documents, in concert with essays by Edward A. Kolodziej, “Introduction: NATO and Longue Durée,” in the book, *Almost NATO* (edited by Charles Krupnick), and Marybeth Ulrich (previously mentioned), provide a review of the
The evolution of NATO’s global interests after the Cold War and delineate how changes have influenced the international system. Articles by Joshua Spero and Frank Umbach, “US – German Core Stabilizes NATO,” in Defence News and by Marc Grossman, “New Capabilities, New Members, New Relationships,” in NATO Review, assess the role of neorealist values in the ongoing process of NATO enlargement.


In determining Lithuania’s strengths, this thesis incorporated information from Ricardas Baubinas’ paper, “Politine geografine Baltijos šaliu padetis ir jos perspektyva” (Political Geographical Situation of the Baltic States and Its Perspective). Another key source is Robertas Šapronas’ essay, “Lietuvos saugumo problemas ir Lietuvos kariuomene 2010-2020” (Lithuania’s Security Problems and Lithuania’s Military 2010-2020).

The determination of Lithuania’s national interests, particularly regarding the US, NATO, Russia and Belarus, and how these interests influence Lithuania’s power, derives from The Republic of Lithuania National Security Strategy (Lithuanian NSS). Helpful are assumptions outlined by Gražina Miniotaitė in essay, “The Baltic States: In Search of Security and Identity,” in the book, Almost NATO (edited by Charles Krupnick), and by
Edward A. Kolodziej in his earlier-mentioned work. Various documents from the Lithuanian Ministry of the Foreign Affairs support these assumptions with facts. Furthermore, *The Republic of Lithuania National Military Strategy (Lithuanian NMS)*, the Lithuanian MOD “Defence Planning Assumptions for the Lithuanian Armed Forces,” and The Defense Policy and Planning Department’s (DPPD) “Lietuvos dalyvavimo tarptautinėse operacijose koncepcija” (The Concept of the Lithuania’s Participation in Multinational Operations) help with evaluation of Lithuania’s military strength.

Lithuanian Armed Forces,” sets out guidelines for the LAF transformation. The idea is to increase the effectiveness of Lithuanian participation in multinational operations.

Neorealist theories generally hold that multinational operations, as a continuation of national and international policies, encompass the mutual interests of both great and small states. Neorealists argue that the pursuit of security, prestige, wealth, ideology, peace, and power affects the behavior of international actors and their relations with one another while shaping the entire international system. To achieve an accurate and objective analysis of how feasible, acceptable and suitable the Lithuanian contribution is to US- or NATO-led multinational operations, the research effort extended to Lithuania’s strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats within the perspective of US and NATO interests. With additional reference to fundamental aspects of multinational operations, thesis-related research includes materials that support an evaluation of the degree to which Lithuanian international policy complements US and NATO policies.
CHAPTER 3
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The outline in CGSC Student Text 20-10 was the point of departure for thesis research methodology (US Army 2003, 12-16). The process began with problem identification to define the primary question at issue and to facilitate articulation of general research objectives. The primary question came to reflect the essential thrust for the entire thesis: Does incorporation of small nations into multinational operations meet the Feasibility-Acceptability-Suitability Test? With this question to define overall focus, the next task involved developing a research path from theory to application, or to put the concern another way, from the general to the specific. Of assistance in this process was division of the primary question into two secondary and several subsequent questions. The substance of the secondary questions unfolded as follows: first, based on an examination of national political-military interests, how does the incorporation of small nations into multinational operations correspond with the political-military needs of the superpowers? and second, as a case in point, how does contemporary Lithuania figure in the larger calculus for multinational operations?

Among the myriad of small-nation alternatives, Lithuania emerged as the case study of choice for several important reasons. First, the author of this study is a Lithuanian officer fully conversant with the complex considerations governing a small nation’s decisions to participate in multinational operations. Second, Lithuania’s location on an important cultural and political “fault line” confronts that nation with a near-classical version of the fundamental dilemmas facing decision-makers in their quest for
security and stability within an evolving regional and international security environment. Third, since the re-establishment of its independence and sovereignty in 1990, Lithuania has garnered substantial practical experience with participation in multinational operations. And, finally, as the substance of this thesis indicates, the problems and prospects inherent in Lithuanian participation in multinational operations largely reflect in microcosm the same complexities confronting similar nations.

Identification of the thesis problem and its subsidiary questions provided overall guidance for the collection of pertinent information. In effect, the review of available literature in Chapter 2 captures the essence of the process according to which available sources supported development in depth of possible answers to various thesis-related questions. The actual process involved collecting a variety of pertinent primary and secondary materials from the LF CMD, MOD of Lithuania, CARL, and the Internet. These materials were subjected to critical reading to discern their perspective, veracity, value to the project, and any explicit and implicit biases.

Readings in the theory of international relations presented a special challenge. The works of various specialists and commentators reflected a broad array of inputs and schools of thought. However, the practical focus of this thesis, together with the larger contextual emphasis on working relations among great and small powers, soon suggested that neorealist theories of international relations proved most helpful in providing a conceptual backdrop for informed research. Consequently, much of the answer to the thesis’ first secondary question amounted to an analysis of existing neorealist theories. Above other approaches and interpretations, they afforded a sophisticated understanding of key imperatives for cooperation among superpowers and small nations. Neorealist
theories informed other key arguments, the development of which ensured greater
objectivity in the concluding application of the FAS test. Meanwhile, materials for
answering the primary and other subsidiary questions came from other more conventional
documentation brought to bear on the subject matter of the thesis.

In particular, reference to Lithuania as a case in point for participation in
multinational operations presented a small series of unique challenges. There was, first,
the necessity to analyze Lithuanian relations with the US and NATO. Then came the
necessity to analyze the influence of other international actors, especially as those actors
affected Lithuanian relations with the US and NATO. In addition to evidence and facts
drawn from conventional primary and secondary materials, the author drew on his own
substantial experiences, especially as they related to the analysis of Lithuanian military
capabilities. Since joining the Lithuanian military, the author has served as a planning
officer in the International Operations Section of J5, Defense Staff of Lithuania, and as an
Aide-de-Camp (ADC) to the Commander of Lithuanian Land Forces. He has also
participated in multinational operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina, NATO Stabilization
Forces (SFOR), served in Georgia with OSCE, and has taken part in a number of
multinational exercises. Personal involvement in the planning and execution of several
Lithuanian deployments to various multinational operations and exercises has provided
the author with unique insight into the Lithuanian perspective on the FAS of small nation
participation in international coalitions. He was also an active observer of the ongoing
transformation of the Lithuanian defense system prompted by integration into NATO.
Consequently, direct experience has figured prominently in the collection and evaluation
of materials for the application of a sound political-military version of FAS test application within the Lithuanian context.

The idea of using the feasibility, acceptability and suitability (FAS) test concept to evaluate the effectiveness of the incorporation of small states in multinational operations came from the Command and General Staff Officer Course (CGSOC) curriculum for 2004, C200: Strategic Studies Module Block. The FAS test is employed to evaluate compatibility among military objectives, the concepts to accomplish these objectives, and the military resources to implement these concepts (Davis 2003, C212RB-187). The determination of component criteria for the FAS test is both art and science. Because art is involved, and because art often deals with intangibles, varying premises and conclusions can sometimes lead to heated discussions. Accordingly, this thesis attempts to rely as much as possible on hard evidence in order to assure impartiality. Such an approach has particularly been the case with analysis on Lithuania. However, the analysis goes beyond Lithuania in answering the primary research question. Indeed, analysis extends to the identification and examination of US and NATO global interests. In turn, these global interests must be made relevant to Lithuania. Other key issues involve Lithuanian national strengths, weaknesses, and opportunities. The conclusion very much focuses on the potential implications of Lithuanian incorporation into US- and NATO-led multinational operations.

The final part of the thesis is the conclusion. It summarizes analytical results. The FAS test includes key arguments drawn from the overview of neorealist theories. The posited criteria for the conclusion were that the feasibility of the incorporation of Lithuania in multinational operations would be met if Lithuanian capabilities respond to
the interests and needs of the US of NATO. The *acceptability* factor of the FAS test would be met if the benefits of Lithuanian contributions to US- and NATO-led multinational operations outweigh the drawbacks to Lithuanian participation in multinational operations. And lastly, the incorporation of Lithuania in multinational operations would be *suitable* if the research results show that participation with the US and NATO produces positive effects, thanks to Lithuanian capabilities.
CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

Global Interests of the US

*US NSS* of 2002 emphasizes American internationalism as the primary tool for ensuring US National Security, which is regarded as inseparable from a safer and better world. According to the *US NSS*, US global policy is geared toward deterring and countering threats of international origin. These include threats emanating from violation of human dignity, weapons of mass destruction, global terrorism, and regional and economic instability. To deal with these threats, the US is committed to strengthening alliances with US allies and to supporting global economic growth through free markets and free trade. In addition, the US is encouraging Post-Communist societies to create an infrastructure for democracy and to cooperate with other centers of global power. At the same time, the US is also transforming its national security institutions to increase their effectiveness in dealing with the challenges and opportunities of the twenty-first century (Bush 2002c, 1).

In seeming contrast, US policy also appears in small-state perception oriented toward the maintenance of global dominance, sometimes referred to as hegemony. In liberal European eyes, recent examples of unilateral initiatives and behavior include non-ratification of the Kyoto Accords, rejection of the International Criminal Court’s full jurisdiction, halting adherence to arms control measures related to mine warfare, abrogation of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, failure to pay UN dues in a timely manner, and by-passing the UN to initiate war against Iraq. As a small nation, Lithuania itself witnessed suspension of US military assistance following ratification of the Rome
Treaty. However, within the framework of Euro-Atlantic cooperation, US strategy supports the European integration process, especially if it does not detract from US leadership in Europe. In providing security guaranties for its allies in Europe, the US expects acknowledgment of the US lead and commitment to US-oriented policy implementation. Critics attribute US difficulties with European allies to an intractable American position and the narrowness of US foreign policy (Kissinger 2002). Nevertheless, the US considers NATO and EU expansion favorable for international security and the safeguarding of young democracies in Europe. The US expects the UN, NATO and the international community to assist both in ensuring security in Iraq and Afghanistan and in their reconstruction. The UN, EU and Russia are seen as tools in resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, as well as conflicts in Sudan, Liberia and Northern Ireland. Russia, China, Japan and South Korea, the same triad also expected to cooperate in tackling the problem of North Korea’s nuclear programs (Colin L. Powell 2004). In economic perspective, Europe remains one of the largest US trade partners and investors in the US economy (US Census Bureau 2002). The increasing superiority of US military power, when coupled with differing political objectives among the European states, especially those sympathetic with the French-German axis, means that the US might favor an ad hoc coalition approach to problem solving rather than necessarily prioritizing the NATO alliance (Ulrich 2003, 35).

Wealth and military power notwithstanding, the US now is dangerously close to overextending its military forces, thanks to the current massive scale of deployments. Over 370,000 US Army troops, or over 75 percent of the total US force, are currently deployed in about 120 countries of the world, leaving just over 100,000 troops to defend
the US homeland and safeguard its borders. US military reservists number about 200,000, who must leave their civilian jobs in order to support military operations (Pyne 2004). Therefore, the sharing of manpower burdens with allies through multinational operations figures high on the American agenda. To alleviate the need for identical, across-the-board improvements by every country and to make national contributions to multinational operations more effective and reliable, the US has expressed interest in having its Trans-Atlantic allies share risks and responsibilities within multinational operations. Indeed, the US expects that multinational partners will prioritize the improvement of their military capabilities. Such action would strengthen strategic unity among the allies. Role specialization would avoid bifurcating collective-defense and peace-support responsibilities by recognizing that all countries must maintain high-intensity combat capacities. The intent is that risks to personnel and material be equitably shared among multinational partners (Thomas 2000, 72-73).

In addition, recent examples from the US-led GWOT suggest that a modern enemy is potentially capable of using a broad array of strengths and opportunities to achieve its goals and threaten a single country or multinational force. Sophisticated use of computer and telecommunication links to leap ahead of opposing intelligence capabilities and surveillance techniques are an important case in point. Adversaries effectively employed these strengths at US airports in 2001 and also against the East African embassies in 1998. Enemies might use document forgery and theft to steal the identities of others in order to gain access to many countries. Modern adversaries also might organize and run sleeper operatives and cells, which had been established prior to the September 11 attacks. Finance networks would be established to support current
adversarial operations. These networks might consist of legitimate businesses that use poorly controlled funds of nongovernmental organizations and various international donors, as well as profits from criminal operations and the narcotics trade. Information operations could be used to motivate adversaries and to draw the support of sympathizers. Additionally, an enemy might attempt to acquire and employ the Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) (Campbell 2002, 44-49).

Despite its wealth and power, the US has experienced a number of shortfalls while countering global terrorism. These have ranged from intelligence collection (especially human intelligence) to issues of intelligence fusion and rapid dissemination; from lapses in surveillance to insecure communications; and from shortages of linguists and foreign-area specialists to inadequacies in chemical and biological defense. The shortage of capabilities, which would have provided dispersed mobile forces with a common operational picture, as well as flexible and secure command and control and sensors and shooters, has slowed the US military’s ability to operate as a synergized and synchronized network. Lack of personnel affects the rotational base necessary to sustain lengthy operations. The GWOT has showed that the military might be tasked to conduct preventive attacks overseas either to destroy terrorists or to thwart anticipated terrorist attacks before they occur. Retaliatory attacks overseas could be another area for using the military to punish terrorists and states that harbor and support them. Force protection of personnel, dependents, equipment, and overseas bases is also an important concern. Homeland defense includes air defense, missile defense, protection of critical infrastructure, rapid response to chemical or biological threats, and support to domestic authorities. These concerns constitute additional military tasks. Finally, international
military-to-military contacts are needed to enhance interoperability and coalition capabilities against the enemy (Campbell 2002, 68-73).

Contemporary threats such as terrorism emphasize the necessity for a global response. A long-term campaign against modern adversaries would require contributions from a number of interconnected multinational coalitions, which could be built around key aspects of each campaign. One type of coalition should be formed to identify, isolate and destroy terrorist hotbeds and funding through alliances and agreements among states and their intelligence, finance, diplomatic, law enforcement, and military assets. Another area for multinational effort involves building a preventive international legal system. An international legal framework would help facilitate participation of states from the developing world. Such a framework would also provide broader legitimacy for anti-terrorist actions and shorten the spans between resolve and action. A third coalition would integrate political, financial, intelligence, and law enforcement dimensions to disrupt and destroy adversary networks. The purpose of a fourth coalition would be to advance global economic and political priorities, including promoting global prosperity, alleviating poverty, and combating Human Immunodeficiency Virus/Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (HIV/AIDS) and environmental threats to self-sustaining, inclusive social and economic development. A fifth coalition would address humanitarian needs that might potentially either destabilize a situation in an area of interest or cause humanitarian catastrophe. Humanitarian problems go beyond financing; therefore, legal, political and bureaucratic impediments within the international community must be overcome in order to prevent human suffering. A sixth coalition would “drain the swamps” which breed and sustain adversaries. A follow-on requirement would include
rebuilding failed states and providing assistance to fill gaps in the international system which can be exploited by adversaries. A seventh coalition would stabilize and strengthen key Islamic states around the globe and affirm the notion that military action against terrorism is not directed against Islam. This coalition would engage in serious economic and political efforts to ensure alternatives to Islamic radicalism (Campbell 2002, 51-61).

Global Interests of NATO

NATO states, as well as EU states, form a “security community” sharing fundamental values and shaping individual behavior toward common principles, norms, institutions, and processes (Deutsch 1957, 27). The objective is to facilitate peaceful change and resolution. NATO overtly addresses the requirements to eliminate regional instability, prevent global proliferation of WMD, fight terrorism and support peacekeeping. NATO also institutionalizes the engagement of the US as the strongest safeguard in defining and defending Europe, especially the EU (Kolodziej 2003, 9). After the Cold War, the NATO alliance had to adapt itself to a new security environment. Instability in Post-Communist states, which threatened to develop into conflicts similar to the disaster in former Yugoslavia, demanded new security strategies. In 1991 during the Rome Summit, NATO announced that the “Alliance will continue to play a key role in building new, a lasting order of peace in Europe” (NAC 1991, paragraph 2). Further evolution of NATO policy was broadly implied in the National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement of the Clinton administration, which, without direct mentioning NATO, visualized its enlargement as a tool in promoting democracy and free market economies and in handling other Post-Cold War threats to the international system (Clinton 1994, 21). German hesitation to assume burdens beyond the integration
of East Germany, along with US fear that unilateral German action might possibly decouple the US from NATO, also played a role in defining NATO’s goals to expand to the East (Spero 1994, 23).

In 1994 PfP and other enlargement policies, which were introduced in the Brussels Summit, were indirectly meant to overcome these fears and also to expand security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic region. Although PfP allowed self-differentiation among the partner states, PfP did not provide full NATO benefits for partners. Still, NATO through PfP “exported security” to the Post-Communist region of Europe. Nevertheless, partner states understood PfP as a condition for becoming members of NATO. This perception instilled a desire within NATO’s aspirant countries for participation in NATO missions and created demands for more attention and recognition from NATO operational and political components. Therefore, the Enhanced Partnership for Peace program in 1997 was introduced for the purposes of strengthening political consultation within PfP, developing a more operational role for PfP, and providing greater PfP involvement in decision making and planning. Meanwhile, the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) was established to enhance consultations between NATO and its partners. NATO through EAPC formulated the “Operational Capabilities Concept” in order to improve the effectiveness of partners in NATO operations. Partner Staff Elements (PSE) were established in various NATO headquarters to facilitate operational cooperation in PfP. PSE also provided partners with access to NATO procedures and documents beyond the Partnership Coordination Cell in Mons. During the Washington Summit in 1999, a new and improved Strategic Concept defined partnership as one of NATO’s security tasks, together with security, consultation,
deterrence and defense, and crisis management. The MAP became an important initiative. On 16 March 1999, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland became full members of NATO. In geostrategic perspective, this first Post-Cold War enlargement could be viewed as protection of Germany’s eastern flank; however, the enlargement was fundamentally of a moral and political character. Enlargement symbolized the success of NATO’s effort to reach out to former Eastern adversaries (Ulrich 2003, 22-26).

Further, NATO’s enlargement strategy focused on the new allies’ performance. “Security consumers” had to prove themselves as “security contributors.” Various activities, including contributing forces to NATO missions, integrating new members into NATO command structures, sharing intelligence and offering geostrategic space to support NATO operations, became vehicles for aspirants to prove their value. On 12 September 2001, NATO in defense of the US invoked Article 5 of the NATO Charter, which declared that an attack against any of its signatories constituted an attack on the alliance as a whole. NATO’s strategy after the Prague Summit in 2002 reflected the principle of “new capabilities, new members, new relationships” (Grossman 2002).

Subsequently, the invitation of seven countries for the second round of enlargement, along with the US-led GWOT and the developing crisis in Iraq, has continued to shape the agenda set out at the Prague Summit. Countries agreed on several major initiatives to facilitate more mobile, more projection-capable, and more effectively applicable and sustainable NATO forces. One of the initiatives, the Prague Capabilities Commitment, would facilitate improvement of allies’ capabilities in 400 areas. NATO also established the 21,000-strong NATO Response Forces and agreed upon Measures Combating New Threats, including terrorism and WMD. In addition, NATO approved a new military
command structure and also considered an increase in its role in Peace-Support Missions. During the Prague Summit, the Alliance also agreed to expand and intensify previous NATO strategic concepts concerning relations with the EU, Russia, Southeastern Europe and Trans-Atlantic Partnership (NATO 2002).

**Lithuania from the Perspective of US Interests**

Lithuania has been viewed by the US as a future NATO and EU member, which, together with other neighboring states, would influence decision making in the aforementioned organizations. Accordingly, US considerations of Lithuania’s value are directly linked to Lithuania’s influence on NATO and EU decision making. The US also values Lithuania as a supporter of US Euro-Asian policy and as a state that supports the US-led GWOT and the proliferation of American values. As a US ally with DIME powers, Lithuania is considered potentially capable of supporting US security, market and business interests in Europe. US European and Trans-Atlantic policies are fundamental factors that shape US interests toward Lithuania and its neighbors (Urbelis 2004, 116-117).

For its part, Lithuania can make its presence felt in a number of areas vital to the US: development of cooperation with and democratization of Russia, democratization of Belarus, stabilization of the situation in Kaliningrad, the Balkans, Middle and South Asia and South Caucasus, as well as bringing Ukraine to closer dialog and integration with Euro-Atlantic structures (Urbelis 2004, 104-108). In military perspective, America’s experience from OEF and OIF posed additional requirements, which have found reflection in plans to reposition US military bases in Europe. The nature of warfare and threats in the early twenty-first century has posed other requirements, including mobility,
speed, knowledge, precision and surprise, improved forward positioning of forces, better access to the crisis regions, “network centric warfare,” and a need for multinational resolve. Lithuania’s geographic location presents the US with a valuable asset in the redeployment of US military bases from Germany to the East. Lithuanian national territory with its airspace might be used for developing bases, headquarters and commands, and for the training of US and multinational forces. Lithuania’s experience in multinational exercises and operations, its in-place training centers, as well as low operating costs and relatively lower ecological requirements, readily lend themselves to these purposes. Lithuania’s Šiauliai Airport (C-5 capable), for example, is adjacent to main transit routes from the west toward the east and south east. This field does not require major additional investments and might serve US forces either as a forward operating site, a supplementary logistical support base, or as a site for pre-positioning US equipment and materials. Lithuania’s geographic location also retains advantages in the positioning of counter missile systems, potential early warning systems, and forward counter missile defense assets. A US military presence would decrease costs for Lithuanian training and participation in US-led multinational operations.

Interests of NATO towards Lithuania

President George W. Bush has said, “The NATO Alliance will be stronger with Lithuania's presence” (2002a). The principles for accession of new members to NATO are based on security and stability requirements with overarching political, economic and defense components. NATO accession documents require resolution of any external territorial disputes, irredentist claims, and internal jurisdictional disputes by peaceful means in accordance with OSCE principles. One of the most important conditions for
NATO admission includes military capabilities as a part of the NATO collective defense contribution (NATO 1995, Chapter 1). Lithuania’s fulfillment of these requirements promises that NATO would be able to rely on one more democratic, secure and stable state in Europe. Lithuania would also enhance NATO’s capabilities with its own. Lithuania has already assumed a role as a regional leader endeavouring to increase cooperation among the countries of the Baltic basin. Lithuanian initiative was responsible for the now-traditional meetings of the heads of the parliaments of Latvia, Estonia, Sweden, Norway, Finland, Denmark and Iceland. Lithuania has distinguished itself with an initiative that brings Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania together with the states of the South Caucasus—Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia. Lithuania also promotes individual cooperation with these states. These and other measures enhance regional security and stability, extend NATO’s “Open door” policy, spur integration of European and Trans-Atlantic structures, foster military support to the South Caucasus, and hold promise for building a direct transportation corridor through the Ukraine. These are areas of common interest not only for the Baltic States and states of South Caucasus, but also for Western countries and NATO.

As for NATO enlargement, it is worth mentioning that on 19 May 2000, Lithuania initiated the Vilnius-10 meetings in order to coordinate integration efforts among the 10 NATO candidates: Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Romania, Slovenia and Slovakia. Even after the accession of seven of these countries into the Alliance, the initiative retains its designation and promises continuing effectiveness. Furthermore, in European security perspective, NATO remains indisputably centered on collective approaches and depends on the contribution of the
states of Western, Central and Eastern Europe, new allies, aspiring allies and long-term NATO partners alike (Ulrich 2003, 19). Therefore, Lithuania’s military forces are an important item of interest to the Alliance. After transformation and proper specialization, they might effectively contribute to both US-led and NATO-led multinational operations. The authorized strength of Lithuania’s Armed Forces in 2003 was 2,336 Officers, 981 Warrant Officers, 4,497 professional servicemen of other ranks, 4,500 conscripts, 430 cadets, and 9,000 Active reservists. This force totaled 21,744 servicemen (MOD 2003a, Chapter 5, 4). Table 1 below reveals the value of contributions by new NATO members of Alliance including Lithuania.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 1. Contribution of New NATO Members to Alliance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Before enlargement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total number of inhabitants (million)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of soldiers (million)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP (billion USD)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defense budget (billion USD)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contribution into multinational operations (thousands soldiers)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It should be mentioned that modernization of the Lithuanian Armed Forces calls for the purchase of modern weapons and equipment. Lithuania’s purchasing capacities are potentially increasing due to growth in the national economy. Military sales may also be considered in the interests of NATO states in regard to Lithuania. With an anticipated annual GDP increase of about 5 percent, and a constant defense budget of 2 percent GDP, resources allocated for military purchases might reach 148 million USD (1 USD~2.7 Litas) by 2014 (see Figure 3).

Figure 3. Estimated Procurement of the Lithuanian Armed Forces, 2004-2014

Source: Based upon the information provided by the Ministry of National Defense, Republic of Lithuania (Information, “Defence Planning Assumptions for the Lithuanian Armed Forces,” 2003, Chapter 4).

Lithuania’s Strengths

Following the restoration of its independence and recognition by the international community, Lithuania set about regaining its identity and place in the international
system. From 1990 until the present, Lithuanian policy has dealt with four basic challenges in internal and foreign affairs. The safeguarding of national security has been the most basic problem. Following the withdrawal of Russian troops in 1993, Lithuania has been engaged in the constant pursuit of capabilities to deter or counter possible threats coming from unstable democracies with possible irrational and unpredictable behavior, especially Belarus and Russia. The Kaliningrad enclave has figured prominently in this calculus. The reconstruction and development of state, national, political infrastructure, economy, and ecology have constituted the second area. A third challenge has involved dealing with and balancing the dominance of superpowers and great powers in Europe, including states of the French-German axis, the US, and Russia. The final challenge for Lithuania has been to gain prestige and increased weight within the international system.

After isolationism and defensive alliance with the other two Baltic States were deemed ineffective, the Lithuanian leadership recognized that the Western states and their populations formed the dominant coalition of material and intellectual power in world politics (Kolodziej 2003, 3). Membership in NATO, WEU and EU, as well as increased cooperation with the superpowers and other strategic partners, came to be considered the primary means for overcoming the aforementioned challenges.

Geographically, Lithuania is located at the very center of Europe (the European geographic center is located 26 km North of Vilnius). Cultural development, including religious and historical ties with other European centers, dates to the fourteenth century. Western influences shaped traditions, the histories of towns and cities, and even the methods of property holding. Cultural and ethnic tolerance has been commonplace in
Lithuania since medieval times. These factors identify Lithuania as an indivisible part of Central Europe. A location on the frontier of spheres of influence for three world powers--the US, the states of French-German axis, and Russia--heightens the importance of Lithuanian security and stability. Lithuania also lies both on the main route of Eastern oil, metals and timber to Western Europe and on the route of Western European products to Eastern markets. With relatively well-developed Baltic Sea access, with air and land communications capabilities, and with experience in relations with the East Euro-Asian region, Lithuania has great potential for becoming an important control point for traffic between the East and West (Baubinas 1997, 7-12).

Lithuania’s location on the boundary between Western and Eastern civilizations and its membership in NATO and EU create a number of unique opportunities for Lithuanian leaders and diplomacy. Politicians might actively engage Lithuania in bridging gaps between the East and West. Such action can significantly assist in dissemination of Western policy within the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). As a function of bilateral and multilateral relations in the region, Lithuania could especially assert its influence both in solving regional security disputes in the Baltic and in strengthening democratic principles within the CIS. Because of geographical, political, historical, and other characteristics, Lithuania has great potential for becoming a catalyst for security cooperation between the West and Russia. Lithuania might also play a role in various kinds of regional initiatives, conferences, discussions, top-level meetings and military exercises. Another possible role for Lithuania might be cooperation and assistance to aid in strengthening security in the other two Baltic States, Latvia and Estonia. In addition, Lithuania is perhaps the most suitable state to support Belarus’
impulses toward independence and democracy. The current regime in Minsk probably cannot persist; hence, Belarus sooner or later must be exposed to greater democratic influence. As the Belarus case suggests, Lithuania can also contribute to a larger international effort fostering democracy, security and stability within the CIS countries, especially Ukraine and the states of Caucasus region. Finally, Lithuania is in a position to support economic growth and investment in Kaliningrad. Lithuania might gain a role as the most important strategic partner for Kaliningrad by channeling international assistance into this region (Šapronas 2001/2002, 11-12). The importance of Lithuania as an international actor and its space for international “gaming” might even grow if Lithuania manages to draw the attention of additional international powers.

*Lithuanian NSS* asserts, “The Republic of Lithuania continues to develop its relations with the United States of America as a strategic partner. The Republic of Lithuania considers the United States of America as the main partner of European security” (Parliament 2002, 10). The main concern of Lithuanian defense policy planners is to demonstrate to the US the importance and usefulness of Lithuania as a reliable strategic partner. Presence of the US military in Lithuania would serve as validation of the US President’s commitment to the Lithuanian nation that “Anyone who would choose Lithuania as an enemy has also made an enemy of the United States of America” (Bush 2002b). From 1995 until the present, the US has allocated more than 52 million USD in military assistance to Lithuania. The US financed the establishment of the Regional Airspace Surveillance and Control Center in Lithuania, which opened on 6 June 2000. The US also contributed to the implementation of Baltic Battalion (BALTBAT), Baltic Naval Squadron (BALTRON), Baltic Defense College (BALTDEFCOL) and other
international projects, as well as Lithuanian participation in various exercises and multinational operations. In accordance with the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program, every year about 20-30 Lithuanian soldiers, Noncommissioned Officers (NCOs), and officers graduate from various US military courses and schools. On 10 October 2002, the bilateral agreement between Lithuania and US concerning cooperation in denying proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the development of defense and military relations was signed in Vilnius. US military sales form the nucleus of Lithuania’s modern weaponry, particularly the Anti Tank Guided Missile (ATGM) JAVELIN, the Short-Range Air Defense System (SHORAD) STINGER, and the Communication system HARRIS. In 2002, the US occupied fifth place among investors in the Lithuanian economy, with direct investment totaling 367.6 million USD (8.6 percent of total direct investments). About 611 different companies and enterprises in Lithuania deal with funds of US origin, which comprised in total about 238.8 million USD (17 percent of total authorized capital) (Division of Americas 2003).

No existing isolated sovereign state is capable of ensuring its own security and quality of life with its own material and will (Kolodziej 2003, 12). Justifications for Lithuanian membership in NATO result primarily from NATO Article 5 security guarantees, international socialization, and identity construction. Successful integration into NATO would mean incorporation of fundamental transatlantic community norms into the state’s notion of legitimacy (Miniotaite 2003, 277).

At the same time, successful integration would lead to the recognition of Lithuania as an indivisible member of this community. According to Edward A. Kolodziej, “NATO’s value is thus framed as a daunting challenge of successful
governance, defined as the responses of the Western coalition of peoples and states to the
imperatives of order, welfare and legitimacy” (2003, 2). Lithuanian NSS echoes this
fundamental understanding:

Republic of Lithuania considers NATO and EU enlargement, by extending
invitations to join to all countries prepared for membership, including the
Republic of Lithuania, as the most appropriate and credible means to consolidate
its historical achievements. Membership of the Republic of Lithuania in NATO
and EU, as well as membership of the other two Baltic states, Estonia and Latvia,
will establish their security in the long-term perspective, and will also enhance the
security and stability of the whole Baltic region and will be a long-term security
gain for all states in the region. (Parliament 2002, 7)

The LAF before 2003 was doctrinally oriented, manned, trained, and equipped for
territorial defense (see Figure 4). With outdated equipment, but with relatively effective
command and control and highly motivated personnel, many specific units individually
and within the overall force have been assessed as highly capable in conducting combat
operations for a limited period of time. While seeking admission into NATO, the LAF
has been actively modernizing and continuously improving military capabilities.
Priorities have been ascribed to improvement of infrastructure, training of personnel,
 improvement in quality of life, acquisition of NATO-compatible communications, and
modernization of weapons. For example, in 2001-2004, Lithuania allocated
approximately 111 million USD for modern weaponry. The LAF spent 34.34 million
USD to purchase air defense systems, 25.36 million USD for radars, 22.36 million USD
for tactical communications equipment, 13.03 million USD for anti tank systems, 9.91
million USD for transport, and 5.92 million USD for logistics purchases (Kronkaitis
2003). Especially noticeable was progress in the area of small unit peace support
operations and in the deployment of highly capable Special Operations Forces (SOF)
units to support NATO- and US-led operations and coalitions. Most barracks have been
constructed or renovated to respond to contemporary needs. Training ranges and training areas have been modernized to provide improved basic training capabilities for individual and collective purposes. Improved personnel and infrastructure management, doctrine development, training, leadership development and integration of civilian and military leadership at the highest levels have all demonstrated the LAF as being marginally capable of conducting full spectrum operations for a limited duration of time.

In close cooperation with other Baltic States and Western countries, Lithuania has established and effectively contributed to a number of successful international projects. These projects include: BALTBAT, BALTRON, BALTDEFCOL, Baltic Airspace Surveillance Network (BALTNET), an initiative to coordinate security and defense assistance to Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania (BALTSEA), the Swedish-Baltic initiative to modernize military registration and mobilization database (BALTPERS), and the Lithuanian-Danish initiative to develop a Lithuanian mechanized infantry battalion (LITBAT) in accordance with NATO standards. However, Lithuania lacks the modern, highly responsive logistics and sustainment capabilities necessary to ensure effectiveness of military operations on the modern battlefield. Land forces lack combat power, especially in long-range indirect fire and long-range anti tank capabilities. The air force possesses limited defensive capabilities, with no offensive capabilities, and requires upgrades to airspace surveillance and control systems. The Navy is relatively capable in mine countermeasures but even still, requires modernization. The capabilities of LAF services are based on donated and outdated military equipment. The National Defense Volunteer Force (NDVF) represents a large territorial defense force, but one of very limited utility within NATO context. Lithuanian doctrine and training, based on the
experience of other NATO and non-NATO nations, lacks cohesion. Very limited training with integration of fire support is conducted for company or higher-level units. The Lithuanian military personnel management system requires significant improvement. Duplication in planning and programming systems and processes limit the effectiveness of these systems. Command, control and communications programs are not truly effective above the tactical level (MOD 2003a, Chapter 1).

**Figure 4. Structure of the Lithuanian Armed Forces in 2003**


Formal invitation in November 2002 to become a member of NATO has changed the Lithuanian strategic environment and required once again a review of its military
The Lithuanian NMS stated that in a case of war, LAF would be operating with Alliance forces. Lithuania would defend its own territory with a highly capable Reaction Brigade as the main effort, and with supporting forces, including NATO reinforcements. The Navy would provide security of maritime approaches to the country for friendly forces. The Air Force would protect and control national airspace and provide limited transport in conjunction with Allied air forces. The LAF would consist of an active component with graduated degrees of readiness, augmented by mobilized reserve personnel. In order to integrate with NATO structures, according to the Lithuanian NMS, the LAF is being transformed into three NATO-style categories. The first category, the High Readiness Forces, should be capable of immediate reaction and deployable as rapidly as necessary for full spectrum NATO operations. The second category, the Forces of Lower Readiness, the actual bulk of forces, would engage either in collective defense or serve as reinforcements or replacements. The third category, the Long-Term Buildup Forces, would provide long-term augmentation capability for the worst case scenario of Article 5 operations. In addition, reserves may be required to provide for reception, staging and onward movement of Allied reinforcements. In a crisis, Lithuania would contribute the high-readiness component of the LAF for deployment outside Lithuania in full spectrum of NATO operations. In peacetime, the LAF would continue to improve its capabilities and participate in NATO exercises, training and other programs. The LAF would simultaneously ensure homeland security by countering terrorism and preventing proliferation of WMD. Peacetime engagement, military-to-military dialogue, and confidence and security building would be additional activities intended to ensure a secure and stable environment. The LAF would remain vigilant in the protection of
classified information and remain capable of responding to non-military contingencies. Lithuania would also possess capabilities for contributing to Alliance defense against the Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) attacks, for ensuring secure command, communication and information superiority, for improving interoperability and combat effectiveness of deployed forces, as well as for ensuring rapid deployment and sustainment of forces. Lithuania would maintain effective intergovernmental crisis management and decision making capacities that support an effective emergency planning system. A final requirement would be to maintain awareness and adaptability for ensuring the development of capabilities relevant to the security environment and NATO (MOD 2003b, 12-14).

Based on NATO requirements, as reflected in the new NATO Strategic Concept enunciated after the Prague Summit, the LAF formulated a future vision for 2014 as “a highly capable NATO integrated force that is responsive, multi-role, sustainable, and maintains deployable battalion size task forces that are capable of participating in the full spectrum of NATO operations.” This assertion means that the LAF would have to focus on the development of a highly capable and modern Reaction Brigade, including trained reserves and an appropriate mobilization system, which would be fully interoperable with NATO (see Figure 5). Lithuania should be able to provide a deployable and sustainable high readiness battalion task force for full spectrum NATO operations, in addition to other forces capable of deploying and operating in conjunction with NATO forces. Because of Lithuania’s inexperience, Denmark would assist in training the Lithuanian Reaction brigade in accordance with NATO standards. This bilateral project, called LITBRIG (Lithuanian Brigade), ensures continuation of the previous LITBAT project.
Other capabilities that Lithuania must develop include a ground-based effective air defense, and an air surveillance and control system that would be integrated into NATO. Lithuania must also focus on developing host nation support capabilities for NATO reinforcements by providing appropriate facilities, services and functions. A highly capable counter-terrorist force is also a transformation priority. Reserve forces should be capable of responding to non-military crises that exceed the capabilities of the domestic civilian administration. LAF organization, training and equipment would have to be adjusted for an effective contribution to full-scale NATO operations. Selection and development of proper people, equipment, leadership and training would lead to a highly agile and flexible force, one able to respond to any contingency. It is estimated that the LAF in 2014 would consist of 1,980 officers, 967 Warrant Officers, 5,936 professional servicemen of other ranks, 2,000 conscripts, and 6,500 Active reservists, for a total of 17,633 servicemen. Eight major programs have been developed, including doctrine, force structure, personnel, training, logistics, equipment modernization, basing, programs and resources, to achieve the objective of military transformation (MOD 2003a, Chapter 1).
Lithuanian defense policy planners have identified a number of criteria for consideration in anticipation of multinational operations. These criteria generally reflect Lithuania’s intentions, which, according to neorealists, are a component part of state power. The first criterion requires that participation in multinational operations corresponds with national interests and contributes to the attainment of national objectives. Considerations include obligations that Lithuania assumed while integrating into NATO and EU, and perceptions of threats to international peace and security, a global crisis, or indications of a conflict that would result in long-term instability. The second criterion associated with multinational operations is the geostrategic importance
of a given region. Lithuania must give priority to sending forces to multinational operations in regions that have political and economic importance. Additionally, priority would be ascribed to regions where Lithuania could apply its experience and knowledge. The South Caucasus or the Middle East respond to this criterion more concretely than, for example, South America or Oceania. Organization membership constitutes the third criterion, one that emphasizes the importance of participation in NATO-, EU-, UN-, and OSCE-led operations. Important factors that must be taken into account include NATO’s unity and internal strengthening. The fourth criterion emphasizes the stance assumed by strategic partners involved in multinational operations. The position of the US, Poland and other allies who have close security ties with Lithuania, such as Denmark, would be a major consideration for Lithuania. Clear and valid international mandates for multinational operations are a fifth criterion. Political benefits that would grant Lithuania stronger positions within international organizations and increase her credibility as an actor in the international system constitute the sixth criterion. Participation in multinational operations must have military value as well. Increased military proficiency, compatibility and congruence with military transformation are some of the constituent elements of the seventh criterion. According to the eighth criterion Lithuanian obligations should enhance the international recognition of Lithuania as a credible and stable state sharing Western values. As a by-product, this enhancement would further attract foreign investments and facilitate development of foreign marketing. Lastly, the level of risk should be acceptable when considering participation in multinational operations. This criterion accounts for the public opinion factor and is sensitive to the requirement for
support through various political branches and sequels, which may subsequently follow (DPPD 2004, 1-2).

According to current 2004 information, expenses for multinational operations represent 2 percent of the annual defense budget. Taking Lithuanian economic growth into account and assuming that national GDP will increase by 1 percent annually, by 2008 national defense expenditures should increase 1.07 times. A projected three-fold increase in forces deployed to multinational operations, along with the requirement to assume logistical support, means that the price of deployments will also increase. By 2008 Lithuania plans to allocate 3.3 times more resources (a total of 6 percent of the defense budget) than in 2003. These figures imply that Lithuania will either have to decrease funding for other defense areas, or, despite international obligations, decrease the number of deployed personnel. A possible solution to this dilemma would be to finance multinational operations not only from the defense budget, but from other national sources as well. Expenditures for multinational operations only from the defense budget would negatively impact military transformation and development. Therefore, there is an existing requirement that unplanned multinational operations be financed from the national budget or special reserve funds (DPPD 2004, 3-4).

Responding to US and NATO lack of low density capabilities, from 1994 Lithuania has successfully specialized its forces for multinational operations in areas of peace keeping/enforcement, medical support, military police, and cargo handling. Additionally, in 2002, Lithuania sent a SOF Expeditionary Squadron to OEF, a contribution greatly appreciated by the US. In October 2003, Lithuania had 289 soldiers deployed in multinational operations in the Balkans, Central Asia and the Middle East. In
2004-2005, Lithuania plans to increase this number to over 554 soldiers. During 2004-2005 in particular, Lithuania intends to continue sending its SOF troops to OEF, while also sending a number of medics, cargo handlers, and logistics specialists to the International Security Forces in Afghanistan (ISAF) and to the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Afghanistan. In addition to these troops, officers and NCOs will be attached to the Headquarters of Combined Joint Task Force 7 (CJTF-7), the UK Multinational Division South East (MND SE) and the Polish Multinational Division Central Sector (MND CS) in Iraq. Lithuania plans to increase and further maintain contingents within the Danish Contingent (DANCON) and the Polish MND in Iraq. Meanwhile, Lithuania will remain engaged and keep troops within the SFOR in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Officers will serve within the Headquarters of the US brigade and contingents will be deployed with the Danish Battalion (DANBN), SFOR. Lithuania’s troops will also remain in Kosovo, as a part of the Polish-Ukrainian Battalion (POLUKRBAT), Kosovo Force (KFOR) (Tutkus 2004).

Over 1,200 soldiers in total have gained experience operating with other multinational forces. This number represented 2.5 percent of the total number of Lithuanian military personnel and exceeds the numbers of most “new” NATO members. However, the Lithuanian percentage still lags behind the standards of “old” NATO member countries, where the proportion is about 5 percent. With the demand for Alliance forces to increase personnel deployed in multinational operations up to 8 percent, Lithuania has pledged by 2014 to deploy about 1,100 soldiers, a figure that would account for 10 percent of the total Lithuanian military (DPPD 2004, 4).
An additional possibility for US and NATO defensive investment is Lithuania’s airspace and infrastructure, which should become a Cooperative Security Location. Investment in related systems would allow Lithuania to further develop its Host Nation Support (HNS) system according to contemporary requirements, thereby shaping it to support full spectrum allied operations.

Russia is another factor of common concern for Lithuania, the US and NATO. The Lithuanian NSS states: “The Republic of Lithuania attaches particular importance to cooperation with all neighbouring countries with the objective of assuring the stable functioning of democracy, civil society and free market economies in these countries” (Parliament 2002, 4, paragraph 2.3). Lithuania at present has no unresolved political issues with Russia and continues to cooperate with Russia on a bilateral, regional and all-European scale. According to international law, principles of the OSCE, and the Lithuanian-Russian Treaty on the Foundations of Inter-State Relations of 4 June 1992, both states acknowledged reciprocal independent rights to realize their sovereignty in areas of defense and security, including collective security arrangements. The two states also agreed to respect mutual relations, sovereignty, territorial integrity and inviolability of borders. The borders between Lithuania and Russia and mutual exclusion zones in the Baltic Sea were delimited on 24 October 1997. Just as in Latvia and Estonia, there is a Russian minority in Lithuania. However, the Russian minority in Lithuania represents only 8 percent of the total population and there are no problems with that minority. One of the significant factors that led to prevention of any potential ethnic disputes was granting the right to obtain Lithuanian citizenship for inhabitants who had resided in Lithuania before the declaration of the reestablishment of independence in 1990.
The Kaliningrad region is a specific area of Lithuanian-Russian cooperation. After disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991, Kaliningrad became an enclave isolated from Russia proper by Lithuania and Poland. Kaliningrad is linked with Lithuania by geographic proximity, mutual economic interest, heritage and numerous human contacts. A number of agreements between Russia and Lithuania have consolidated economic, transport, ecologic, energy, social, and cultural cooperation with this region, as well as cooperation to develop Kaliningrad. The transit of Russian citizens through Lithuania into the Kaliningrad region was an issue of utmost importance during negotiations among the EU, Lithuania and Russia. Meanwhile, ambient monitoring of oil field D-6 in the Curonian lagoon portion of the Kaliningrad region retains top priority as an environmental concern. In 2004, when Poland and Lithuania joined EU, the Kaliningrad region became a frontier of the EU. In 2000, Lithuania and Russia agreed to develop bilateral confidence and security measures. This agreement provided for one additional evaluation visit beyond the quota of Vienna Document of 1999, and extended to the exchange of information on military forces in Lithuania and in the Kaliningrad region of Russia in accordance with the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) treaty. Exchange visits by top officials have furthered relations between the states.

Satisfactory mutual relations between Russia and Lithuania date from the 1990s. In 1996, an intergovernmental commission was established to develop projects for economic, scientific, and cultural cooperation, and the resolution of differences. Working groups established under this commission specifically addressed areas of interest to both states, including trade and economics, energy, agriculture, transport, archives, social affairs, science and culture, illegal migration, regional cooperation, properties of
diplomatic missions, and financial claims. In the area of transportation, the governments of Lithuania and Russia agreed that provisions for civilian, commodity and military transit applied to mutual relations, including relations with the Kaliningrad Region. Meanwhile, as a prelude to the introduction of European and Trans-Atlantic structures to the region, Lithuania continues active political dialogue and cooperation with existing regional institutions (The East European and Central Asia Division 2001). In contrast, Russia remains ambivalent. Russian sentiments about NATO and EU enlargement are accurately reflected in the assertion by Hillary D. Driscoll and Neil S. MacFarlane: “Russia has been torn between a desire to benefit from European modernity and a fear that the uncritical acceptance of European models would result in the loss of valued cultural attributes specific to Russia” (2003, 234). This ambivalence leaves Lithuania with an important opportunity to serve Europe and the US as an intermediary in translating Western values into acceptable terms for Russia, thereby encouraging Russia to accept European and US models.

Other Lithuanian endeavours to encourage good neighbourly relations are oriented on Belarus. Lithuania shares the views of EU, OSCE and Council of Europe countries that Belarus’ authorities do not sufficiently support democratic principles. Still, Lithuania bases its relations with Belarus on pragmatic interests. Lithuania understands that the international isolation of Belarus may reflect negatively on democratization of the Minsk regime; therefore, Lithuania is actively engaged in normalizing Minsk’s relations with Western countries. Lithuania particularly is focused on persuading Belarus authorities to create a domestic and external atmosphere of at least minimal political trust by granting the political opposition access to state-run media. Lithuania also encourages
Belarus both to amend the law on elections to ensure transparency and to review the practice of overriding parliamentary powers as means of ensuring governmental rule (The East European and Central Asia Division 2002).

In the sphere of military cooperation, Lithuania already in 1992 demonstrated a determination to retain non-alignment with the East, and this determination has constitutional validation. The Lithuanian Constitution prohibited Lithuania from entering any new political, military, economic, or any other alliance with the states or commonwealths established on the basis of the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). However, Lithuania continues to foster multinational military cooperation with Russia and Belarus within the framework of PfP. On an annual basis Lithuania invites observers from these countries to participate in its largest military exercises, and Lithuania sends own observers to Russia and Belarus.

**Implications and Considerations**

During wartime, determining whether to join a coalition or alliance is not necessarily a difficult political-military proposition. Decision would mainly be based on relative success on the battlefield. During peacetime, however, multiple factors must be taken into consideration: the impact on national sovereignty; costs in resources and manpower; the impact on the nation’s military forces caused by placing assets under multinational, not national, control; potential political-economic benefits to be gained; political factors, such as the impact on opposition parties of joining the multinational operations; and overall impact on national interests (Bowman 1997, 13).

Within the context of ongoing NATO transformation, this decision process increasingly reflects two-dimensional strains within the Alliance--between Eastern and
Western Europe and between Europe and the US. West European states do not believe that Russia constitutes a threat to the Alliance. Moreover, some of these states do not believe that NATO is necessary in the contemporary international security environment. As a result, states that share these views even consider Russia a future member of NATO. Even now they favor a consultative role for Russia in NATO. In contrast, there are the Eastern European states. With anguished memories from the past, these states enter the Alliance with a hope that NATO will prevent a recurrence of Russian aggression and pressure. The East European states believe that the lax attitude of West European states toward Russia actually weakens the purpose of NATO. Therefore, the East European states reassuringly embrace America’s international commitments.

This east-west contrast in attitudes mirrors a second potential problem--friction between Europe and the US. The absence of a common threat after the fall of the Berlin Wall provided little of incentive for Europe to maintain its defense expenditures at Cold War levels. Additionally, many Europeans see American defense-oriented initiatives as reflections of unilateral global interests. Europeans would prefer a multilateral approach. Consequently, the current Bush administration has seemingly given up attempts to increase European defense budgets and has focused on a 20,000-strong Response Force under the NATO umbrella to counter “out of area” threats. The same considerations outlined above cause many Americans to perceive in European behavior both the rudiments of neutrality and the impulse to free ride on American defense capabilities. Therefore, the US has become increasingly insistent on the pursuit of American-oriented global interests. A European-oriented solution to the dilemmas inherent in this situation would re-emphasize multilateralism as an important aspect of US foreign policy, along
with circumspection in the use of military power as a primary tool for solving global problems. At some point in the future, the US may not be able resolve every international problem alone without suffering extreme psychological and physical attrition. At the same time Europe must overcome its self-assertion of “distinctiveness,” which feeds domestic pacifism and thrives on disagreements. Equally important is a European understanding that US foreign policy responds more to global responsibilities than to the psychology of certain leaders (Kissinger 2002).

Lithuania stands on the front line in the multipolar struggle among the US, the European states of the French-German axis, and Russia, or, to put situation more simply, between West and East. Varying opinions of these dominant powers concerning Lithuania’s membership in NATO and EU reinforce this assertion. Lithuanian territory lies not only in the conflict zone between Huntington’s Northern and Southern civilizations, but also on one of the routes of migration, including illegal migration, into Europe. Lithuania represents an overlapping area between Ehler’s Western Christian and Slavonic Orthodox religions. The geopolitical situation implies that Lithuania is susceptible to various forms of clashes and disagreements. A number of other factors, including ongoing integration into the Western community, lack of experience in market economics, limited internal resources and a limited market, render Lithuania vulnerable to external effects. Other countries or organizations that provide needed support may intervene and set their own rules for economic and political development in regard to Lithuania (Baubinas 1997, 7-12). Thus, Lithuania’s geographic location, while a source of strength, is also a source of difficulty.
In addition, shortfalls in NATO enlargement policy sometimes create negative consequences for Lithuania’s effective integration. Lack of attention by NATO policy planners to issues of Alliance solidarity, especially when NATO is being increasingly politicized, imposes seemingly unnecessary burdens on NATO applicants and new members. One source of irritation has involved questioning the candidates’ trust in the Alliance. In Lithuania’s case, the apparent absence of Alliance contingency plans to defend Lithuanian territory increases domestic apprehensions about NATO’s value to one of NATO’s newest members. Lack of NATO attention to this issue impedes Lithuania’s military transformation and inhibits the development of modern, deployable and sustainable forces within the framework of NATO’s needs. There is a countervailing impulse to increase commitments to territorial defense. Diverging requirements negatively affect planning, the national defense budget, participation in multinational operations, and public opinion. Other international processes, including the CFE treaty, which relate to the development and determination of required defense capabilities, suffer as a result of NATO’s seeming lack of overt commitment to immediate issues affecting Lithuanian security.

Further complicating Lithuanian participation in multinational operations are US and NATO relationships with Russia. Russia continues to oppose any US or NATO military presence in the territory of the Baltic States (ELTA 2004). Regardless of pro-Western policy flashes, dubbed as “atlanticism,” including Vladimir Putin’s intention to prioritize cooperation with the West against terrorism after 11 September 2001, Russia maintains its “statist” principles. According to these principles, Russia is oriented on promoting “its pragmatic national interests through the national mechanisms of
diplomacy and power.” The efficacy of this emphasis is directly linked with national resources and the instruments of power. With a weak economy and military, Russia is currently not in a position to erect any significant obstacles to European integration for perhaps a decade. This estimation rests on calculations of how long it would take Russia to absorb the benefits of capitalism and to rebuild its national economy, as well as conduct proper military reform (Kugel 1996, XV-XVI). However, the high concentration of military assets in the Kaliningrad region and Belarus weighs heavily enough in Lithuanian perspective to discourage any impulse for dismissing Russia from the larger strategic picture.

Currently, the “Russia first” lobby in the US is much weaker than during the first round of NATO enlargement. Furthermore, the Bush administration has taken a tougher stance—at least with reference to NATO enlargement—that stresses a “realistic” approach to relations with Russia. Consequently, the second round of enlargement has already crossed the “red line” drawn by Moscow along the western borders of the Baltic States to demarcate Russia’s sphere of influence. Increased multinational activities and the incorporation of the new NATO members and partner countries of Eastern Europe into multinational operations might elicit additional international pressure from Moscow. Russia fears that countries like Ukraine and others under Moscow’s influence will intensify their pursuit of integration into or application for NATO membership (Larrabee 2001).

An article in one of the Lithuania’s largest circulated daily newspapers, Respublika, publicized a report of the National Security Department (NSD) outlining potential negative tendencies that might jeopardize national security and stability. One
observed tendency is aggressive attempts by Russian business and financial organizations with unclear origins to invade the strategically important Lithuanian energy, natural gas, oil and transportation sectors. NSD associates this active interest to invest in Lithuania with the country’s future membership in NATO and EU. In addition, these activities could also be attempts to legitimize and gain access to Western markets. Groups that represent certain interests and leaders from the shadowy world of finance are trying to intervene in and even dominate the decision making process on strategically important economic issues. According to the article, NSD possesses information about intrusions into Lithuania by organized crime structures, which also seek to establish contacts with top officials. Information gathered by NSD implies that Lithuania is being used as a third party for sale and proliferation of weapons and dual-purpose materials. Special services of the NATO countries also have information that Lithuania is being used as a third party to violate embargoes to countries supporting terrorism. Lithuania is also allegedly being used as a third party to conduct illegal financial operations such as smuggling and money laundering to finance international terrorist organizations. The Respublika’s article highlights the vulnerability of the Lithuanian border with Kaliningrad, which is soon to become a NATO-EU border. Furthermore, the article indicates that contraband trade across the Lithuanian border may be patronized by corrupt state officials, who themselves are susceptible to negative influences from Russian special services (Respublika 2003).

Historical examples show that the cohesion of multinational operations diminishes because of differences in political-military goals. These naturally reflect the interests of individual nations in joining multinational operations. Moreover, goals that change over time within multinational operations according to the changing political-
military situation have further implications for mutual agreement. Small nations often feel bullied and under-appreciated by the larger powers, while larger powers feel as if they carry the majority of the load in terms of casualties and financial contributions.

Another area of concern for multinational military operations involves logistics. Differences in logistical and administrative doctrines among multinational partners cause common operations to stall. Larger powers often have to support smaller allies, causing significant and often unanticipated strains on resources. A third area of friction stems from diverse capabilities. Due to limited capabilities, multinational partners at times are not able to perform the duties which they were expected to discharge by the multinational command. Other problem areas are inadequate training, divergent standards, and scarce resources. Variations in equipment quality, quantity, and interoperability impose significant challenges to multinational operations. Communications equipment interoperability poses another. Doctrine differs nationally, because it derives from national character and both reflects and determines force structure and procedures.

Therefore, some national contingents within multinational forces perform only special missions or must be augmented from other national forces because of significant doctrinal differences. Intelligence sharing among multinational operations partners is always a sensitive issue involving national rules and procedures, all of which often add up to barriers to cooperation. Language differences and lack of precise mutual understanding in daily operations historically have caused sometimes disastrous miscommunications and consequences in combat actions. Lack of common terminology and the extensive use of acronyms and abbreviations worsen language barriers inside multinational operations. Historically, language has hampered both the preparation and
execution of multinational operations. Other significant disincentives for multinational operations include differences of leadership and multinational politics—which override the multinational military logic—lack of unity of command, lack of common rules of engagement, as well as national vetoes. In addition, cultural differences are another major area of potential friction. Each coalition member nation represents its own culture, one that differs at least to some extent from the other nations. Differences in religion, class, tolerance, work ethic, standards of living and national tradition should also be anticipated and planned for to avoid future problems (Bowman 1997, 2-12). Casualties are another area of concern which historically has implications for a small nation’s will, popular support, and consequently, political-military decisions to contribute to multinational operations. Small nations are more sensitive than great powers to the number of casualties acceptable during the multinational operations.

Lessons learned from operations in the Balkans, South Asia, and the Middle East suggest areas in which Lithuania might increase its weight in multinational operations. Lithuania should, first of all, increase its self-sufficiency. Appropriate adjustments in laws, which determine military purchases, as well as a combination of military and civilian resources, would enhance supply capabilities. The Lithuanian practice of utilizing liaison with strategic partners to ensure needed resources on short notice should be maintained and made more responsive. The process of packaging, loading-unloading, and the identification and security of loads should also be improved. Limited information from the lead headquarters of a multinational operation has hindered planning for the organization and capabilities of deployable forces. Estimates for equipment and supply requirements have also suffered. Contributing factors have included the limited
availability of experts in LAF and lack of training and experience in deployment planning, and the transportation of people and cargo according to US or NATO standards. Cargo handling teams have been formed either ad hoc or hired from civilian companies. Meanwhile, the assignment of liaison officers to the central headquarters of multinational operations and the establishment of the Operations Management Center in the LF CMD have proved to be effective in ensuring the flow of the most current information. The combined-joint planning approach, which was exercised by the LF CMD to ensure timely deployment and effective participation in multinational operations, has proved successful. However, combined planning with coalition partners and civilian organizations still needs improvement. An effective and responsive national command and control system in both Lithuania and in the coalition forces is a critical requirement necessary to represent Lithuanian authority and responsibility in multinational operations. Communications assume great significance. Compatibility with coalition partners and the ability to ensure operational security, as well as fire support, are critical. Sharing of intelligence procedures with the lead nation has caused concerns during multinational operations; therefore, various arrangements should preferably be agreed upon and exercised before deployment. Logistics capabilities, particularly in planning, mobilization and transportation of personnel and equipment, should be further strengthened and developed.

In 1998 RAND designed the DynaRank decision support system, based on the Microsoft Excel workbook, to assist the US Department of Defence’s (DoD) high-level resource allocation decision making. The intent was to incorporate sensitivity to strategy, amenability to a variety of data (subjective as well as quantitative analyses), and the
ability to interrelate different types of analysis into the support of other types of defense planning. In 2001 RAND modified this system into the Military Compatibility Assessment Tool (MCAT). This tool was meant to assist the Deputy Undersecretary of the Army, International Affairs, in making strategic-level Multinational Force Compatibility policy decisions. MCAT analysis evaluates those partners identified as likely to participate with the US in coalition operations. At the same time, constituent elements of MCAT analysis provide suggestions for US partner-nations about where to concentrate their focus when developing military capabilities to effectively contribute to US- or NATO-led multinational operations. Compatibility measures (CMs) range from “No capability--0” to “High Capability--3,” and are evaluated on the basis of long-, medium- and short-term fixes. The capability assessment areas (CAA), which are referenced in MCAT, represent Battlefield Functions, Combat Service Support (CSS), Command, Control, and Communications, Computers, and Intelligence (C4I). Subsequently, Battlefield Functions are divided into Maneuver, Fire Support, Air Defense and Mobility/Survivability. CSS consists of logistics and deployability. C4I is comprised of Command and Control, Communications and Intelligence. Each of the CAA, considering its specifics, is graded according to CMs. The CMs are composed of Doctrine, Technology and Operational readiness/training. In accordance with doctrine, the CMs in general terms are supposed to reflect the potential of US coalition partners in various areas, including do they fight effectively; does their doctrine cover the full scope of strategic, operational and tactical issues; does it cover Joint and Combined Operations; does it emphasize offence, defense or both; and what type of operations do they cover. Technology CMs assess what weapons and technologies the partners fight with, and what
partners’ modernization levels are. Operational readiness/training CMs evaluate what the partners’ forces are capable of, what types of missions they are trained to conduct, and what recent evaluations/exercises demonstrate the readiness of their forces (Szayna 2001, 301-326).

Military capabilities which are critical in meeting the mission and challenges of contemporary warfare include intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance to locate a range of ever-changing targets. These targets range from fixed assets to military forces on the move to individuals and small groups; interoperable and flexible command; control and communications; special forces for reconnaissance; target acquisition; search and destroy; combat search and rescue missions; rapid reaction forces to back up special operation forces; linguists, interpreters, and liaison officers; long- and medium-range precision strike capabilities; capabilities to project power into a region against an adversary’s opposition; air and naval supremacy; close air support for ground forces; strategic and theater logistics and mobility; force protection overseas; information operations; and capabilities for seizing and destroying chemical and biological agents in the hands of adversaries (Campbell 2002, 68-70).
CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Feasibility

With reference to the thesis primary question and to the problem analysis in the previous chapter, it is possible to conclude that Lithuanian participation in multinational operations is feasible. In light of US interests, Lithuania has proved it can contribute its “soft” and “hard” powers to US National Security goals and in support of American policy in Europe. From the differing perspectives of other leading regional powers, Lithuania’s decisions to support US strategies in Afghanistan and Iraq have demonstrated Lithuania’s commitment to support US global interests and initiatives. Lithuania’s support promises to increase with receipt of voting rights at the NATO and EU decision making tables, beginning in April-May 2004. In addition, membership in these organizations should enhance Lithuania’s position to offset various contending arrangements against the US. At the same time, consistent Lithuanian support promises to diminish the US-European cleavage, thereby reinforcing US interests and obligations towards Europe. Lithuania’s stand also complements pro-American sentiment in the Northern, Central and Eastern regions of Europe. In addition, Lithuania, just as other states of Central and Eastern Europe, can fill the void left by Western European nations who have become too cautious and reluctant to aid in risky operations. This posture enhances Lithuania’s reputation with the US and increases the likelihood of future US reciprocal support. Lithuania has the opportunity to occupy the moral high ground in the fight to establish more liberal democratic nations.
Lithuania’s geographical attributes count heavily in the international security equation, especially with the US and NATO committed to operations in South Asia and the Middle East. Lithuania’s location on main transit routes, together with its land, air and sea space, and relatively capable infrastructure, enable the US and NATO to achieve higher mobility, speed, global reach, and early warning. Other attributes, including experience in multinational operations, well-situated military training installations, and low maintenance costs, are factors worthy of US and NATO consideration while repositioning military forces in Europe. Incorporation of Lithuanian DIME powers into multinational operations strengthens US and NATO responses to global threats, as well as helps ensure multinational force protection and the participating nations’ homeland security.

Transformation of the Lithuanian defense system remains closely linked with US and NATO needs. Most of the recommendations of US and NATO political-military experts in the area of Lithuania’s force capability development have been taken into account by Lithuanian decision makers, with resulting implementation. The professionalism and value of even minor Lithuanian participation in US- and NATO-led multinational operations in the Balkans, Central Asia and Middle East have received positive acknowledgement from allies and supreme commanders. Lithuanian contributions help to share the manpower, economic and risk burdens of these operations. Future force development plans show deep Lithuanian commitment to increasing its multinational engagement and force modernization in accordance with existing threats and guidelines provided by US and NATO experts. The plans for transformation are financially supportable. As long as Lithuania maintains close ties with the US and NATO
and continues to implement ratified obligations concerning economic and scientific progress, Lithuania can meet superpower expectations in multinational operations. Indeed, the feasibility of Lithuanian contributions even increases under conditions of contemporary warfare. It is virtually impossible to mass forces against an asymmetric threat. Warfare at any moment can mutate into peacekeeping and vice-versa. Battlefields with irregular or urban terrain become force equalizers. A modern enemy armed with primitive weapons can inflict severe casualties. Distinctions decrease between combatants and noncombatants. Therefore, the kind of perspective offered by Lithuania on cultural perception and cultural awareness becomes an important element of military strength.

**Acceptability**

Lithuanian participation in multinational operations is *acceptable* as well as feasible. The fundamental context for Lithuanian participation in multinational operations is a competitive arena among US, French-German, and Russian spheres of interest. The level of acceptability of Lithuania’s incorporation into multinational operations remains proportional to US interests in the Euro-Asian region and dependent upon further NATO transformation. Analysis of the problem thus far suggests the tendency for the US to remain interested in a strong NATO and to close the gap with Europe. In this respect, NATO remains a derivative of US policy. Russia’s relations with the West also seem to progress positively, if somewhat erratically. Meanwhile, Belarus’ dictatorship seems destined sooner or later to step down--it fights a losing battle within the larger context of nearby modernizing nation states.
Even various challenges to Lithuanian participation in multinational operations, including limited self-sustainment and force readiness, and lack of mobility and compatibility, do not constitute insurmountable obstacles to these operations. Historical examples have often indicated that in certain cases such challenges pale in significance when compared with the political advantages of including small states in multinational operations. Still, Lithuania must find means and ways to enhance its efficiency. Lithuanian intentions to support the US and to fulfill NATO obligations are clear and enjoy popular support. Collateral developments, including membership in NATO and the EU, close interoperability with the allies, and economic and military specialization, potentially diminish these challenges. It is also true that Lithuania’s intent to increase its national power and weight in the international system should be reflected positively on its military capabilities. Military power promises to increase as a constituent part of overall Lithuanian national power. Meanwhile, closer Lithuanian relations with superpowers and allies assist in avoiding possible difficulties in the development of national policy. Miscues are more critical to smaller than larger states, although even minor mistakes can have negative consequences for the entire international system. To decrease apprehensions over multinational operations, Lithuania must consider them not only in military terms. First, the incorporation of diplomatic, informational and economic resources into particular multinational operations would emphasize to the international community the solidity of Lithuania’s intentions, thus increasing its credibility and reputation. Second, such incorporation of other DIME elements would share cost burdens and enhance synchronization and synergy. Lastly, strength would build on strength to facilitate development of new DIME capabilities. One possible way for Lithuania to
enhance self-sustainment and deployment during multinational operations would be through a collective approach: conduct combined training or establish forums with strategic partners in movement planning and resource sharing for future combined operations. An increase in the number of liaison officers with appropriate levels of expertise at a multinational operation’s leading headquarters would also be helpful. Issues of manning, training and equipment, since they might negatively impact planning and deployment deadlines and subsequent effective execution of missions in multinational operations, should be considered in combined perspective, with emphasis on compatibility with the leading coalition nations. To decrease financial costs of participation in multinational operations, especially within the areas of strategic deployment, military purchases, and training, Lithuania might enlist neighboring countries. Combining “shopping lists” with other states sharing similar doctrine and similar needs for weapons modernization would decrease costs of services and equipment purchases. Specialization in military training schools would eliminate duplication of effort and distribute expenses accordingly. Participation in multinational operations, especially significant results achieved by national forces, should be widely announced in local and international media. To maintain popular support for participation in multinational operations, Lithuania has to emphasize publicly the political and economic value of particular decisions. At the same time, Lithuanian decision makers should bear in mind that the US and NATO would be perfectly happy to accept competent partners motivated by altruism rather than solely financial gain. Lithuania should also investigate thoroughly gaps and modernization patterns in other militaries to identify niche capabilities and to reduce duplication. Lithuania should develop modular, “plug-in”
capabilities, even of small scale and low density, but nonetheless integral with larger US and NATO systems. For example, Lithuania’s contribution of SOF units to multinational operations in Afghanistan proved necessary and visible in the international arena. Therefore, despite high costs, Lithuania should further focus efforts on its SOF capabilities. Another example involves new concepts of the US future force—light and globally deployable brigade size task forces. These might provide advantageous opportunities for integration of Lithuanian battalion task force-size units. However, this concept implies that Lithuania achieves higher readiness and implements faster political decisions and systems to deploy such forces to the closest US air, land, and sea ports of embarkation or directly into the area of operations. Lithuania may overcome the strategic lift problem through arrangements with Ukrainian air companies, NATO, or strategic partners, such as the US, Poland, and Denmark.

Suitability

Lithuanian participation in multinational operations also meets the *suitability* criterion. As a democratic, stable and secure state sharing the same values with the US and other states of NATO and EU, Lithuania adds strength to endeavors by the US and NATO to increase security and stability worldwide. New democratic small nations, particularly those of the former Eastern Block, lend special legitimacy and experience to multinational operations because of recent escape from undemocratic regimes. Therefore, Lithuania can be viewed as “one of us” and can provide an important example as mediator for the benefits of democratization among other small nations. Because of higher sensitivity towards cultural awareness, which is typical of small states, Lithuania may be effectively incorporated into superpower intelligence systems (especially human
intelligence). The self-awareness and adaptability of Lithuania, traits endemic to small nations, might be effectively utilized in multinational operations, especially in light of rigid US and NATO forces designed to fight conventional warfare against nation states. Small nations can compensate for the superpowers’ over-reliance on technology, the blurring of distinctions between war and transnational crime, and the nature of modern adversaries, who can hit anything and anyone anytime, anywhere. Lithuania’s geopolitical location and its self-determination as an indivisible part of the democratic world make Lithuania a US and NATO node for further proliferation of security and democracy towards the East and South. As a small state, Lithuania is less a “lightening rod,” and is perceived as less threatening than the larger powers. Incorporation of Lithuania into US- and NATO-led multinational operations also prevents other actors from utilizing Lithuania to counterbalance US and NATO power. Lithuania’s engagement in bridge building with underdeveloped democracies of precarious security and stability, including Belarus and Russia, and the development of the aforementioned political-military initiatives in cooperation with South Caucasus and other states of CIS, provide further evidence of suitability. US and NATO motives will always be questioned, while Lithuania, as a small nation, is seen as magnanimous. In addition, Lithuania may also represent the wave of the future in collectively enhancing the contributors’ position, thereby aiding US and NATO goals. Lithuania can serve as an example to the “older” democracies of cooperation to attain mutually beneficial goals. Indeed, Lithuania’s example may also prove that democratization plays better than democratic-despot “sweetheart” business deals.


INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST

Combined Arms Research Library
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
250 Gibbon Ave.
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2314

Defense Technical Information Center/OCA
825 John J. Kingman Rd., Suite 944
Fort Belvoir, VA 22060-6218

Dr. Bruce W. Menning
DJMO
USACGSC
1 Reynolds Ave.
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-1352

LTC John R. Sutherland
COAT
USACGSC
1 Reynolds Ave.
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-1352

LTC Mark R. Wilcox
DJMO
USACGSC
1 Reynolds Ave.
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-1352
CERTIFICATION FOR MMAS DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT

1. Certification Date: 18 June 2004

2. Thesis Author: MAJ Modestas Petrauskas

3. Thesis Title: Multinational Operations and Small Nations: Implications and Considerations in Lithuanian Perspective

4. Thesis Committee Members: 

Signatures:

5. Distribution Statement: See distribution statements A-X on reverse, then circle appropriate distribution statement letter code below:

A B C D E F X  SEE EXPLANATION OF CODES ON REVERSE

If your thesis does not fit into any of the above categories or is classified, you must coordinate with the classified section at CARL.

6. Justification: Justification is required for any distribution other than described in Distribution Statement A. All or part of a thesis may justify distribution limitation. See limitation justification statements 1-10 on reverse, then list, below, the statement(s) that applies (apply) to your thesis and corresponding chapters/sections and pages. Follow sample format shown below:

EXAMPLE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Limitation Justification Statement</th>
<th>Chapter/Section</th>
<th>Page(s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Direct Military Support (10)</td>
<td>Chapter 3</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Critical Technology (3)</td>
<td>Section 4</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative Operational Use (7)</td>
<td>Chapter 2</td>
<td>13-32</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Fill in limitation justification for your thesis below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Limitation Justification Statement</th>
<th>Chapter/Section</th>
<th>Page(s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7. MMAS Thesis Author's Signature: ________________________________
STATEMENT A: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. (Documents with this statement may be made available or sold to the general public and foreign nationals).

STATEMENT B: Distribution authorized to U.S. Government agencies only (insert reason and date ON REVERSE OF THIS FORM). Currently used reasons for imposing this statement include the following:


2. Proprietary Information. Protection of proprietary information not owned by the U.S. Government.

3. Critical Technology. Protection and control of critical technology including technical data with potential military application.

4. Test and Evaluation. Protection of test and evaluation of commercial production or military hardware.


6. Premature Dissemination. Protection of information involving systems or hardware from premature dissemination.

7. Administrative/Operational Use. Protection of information restricted to official use or for administrative or operational purposes.

8. Software Documentation. Protection of software documentation - release only in accordance with the provisions of DoD Instruction 7930.2.

9. Specific Authority. Protection of information required by a specific authority.

10. Direct Military Support. To protect export-controlled technical data of such military significance that release for purposes other than direct support of DoD-approved activities may jeopardize a U.S. military advantage.

STATEMENT C: Distribution authorized to U.S. Government agencies and their contractors: (REASON AND DATE). Currently most used reasons are 1, 3, 7, 8, and 9 above.

STATEMENT D: Distribution authorized to DoD and U.S. DoD contractors only; (REASON AND DATE). Currently most reasons are 1, 3, 7, 8, and 9 above.

STATEMENT E: Distribution authorized to DoD only; (REASON AND DATE). Currently most used reasons are 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10.

STATEMENT F: Further dissemination only as directed by (controlling DoD office and date), or higher DoD authority. Used when the DoD originator determines that information is subject to special dissemination limitation specified by paragraph 4-505, DoD 5200.1-R.

STATEMENT X: Distribution authorized to U.S. Government agencies and private individuals of enterprises eligible to obtain export-controlled technical data in accordance with DoD Directive 5230.25; (date). Controlling DoD office is (insert).