THE INSTRUMENTS OF NATIONAL POWER IN RESPECT TO THE UNITED STATES COUNTERDRUG EFFORTS IN COLOMBIA

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by

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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the US Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)
THE INSTRUMENTS OF NATIONAL POWER IN RESPECT TO THE UNITED STATES COUNTERDRUG EFFORTS IN COLOMBIA, by MAJ James L. McFadyen, 76 pages.

This thesis examines how effectively the United States implements its instruments of national power into the counterdrug efforts currently being conducted in Colombia. Discussion begins with a review of the threat that the illegal narcotics trade presents to the United States, followed by an introduction of the historical relationship between the United States and Colombia, and then presents current trends in United States and Colombian relations. Analysis of the instruments of national power, including diplomatic, information, military, and economic strategies employed by the United States to stem the flow of narcotics as well as assist Colombia, was conducted in order to assess the effectiveness of the strategies within the overall counterdrug policy adopted by the United States. Conclusions and recommendations discuss the strategic importance of Colombia, the continuing threat posed by the narcotics trade, and the modifications and additions that could be made to current policy in order to increase its efficacy.
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<td>ATPDEA</td>
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<td>AUC</td>
<td>Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia)</td>
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<td>CNP</td>
<td>Colombian National Police</td>
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<td>FARC</td>
<td>Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia)</td>
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

Introduction

The United States has a clear national interest in stemming the flow of narcotics into its territory in terms of human ruin and the internal costs for prevention, intervention, and rehabilitation. The United States has further compelling interests in ending narcotics trafficking because of its connections to terrorist insurgent groups whose function is aided by the funds generated through narcotics trafficking. The United States has a special interest in Latin America, particularly in the Andean Region and Colombia, and halting the cycle of drug production, drug trafficking, narco-terrorism, and instability in the region and the hemisphere. Figure 1 shows a map of this region. This thesis will focus on the state of Colombia.

The United States’ strategy for drug control employs a multinational and multistrategy approach to the issue of illegal drugs. This approach, the National Drug Control Strategy, has five goals: education about and rejection of drug use by America’s youth; increasing the safety of American citizens by reducing drug-related violence; reducing health and social costs related to drug use to the American public; shielding America’s borders from the drug threat; and breaking foreign supply chains (Department of Defense 1998, xi).

The instruments of national power are the tools applied by the United States in its attempt to put a stop to narcotics trafficking. These instruments comprise diplomacy, intelligence, military, and economic efforts to increase the capability of source countries
to end the production and distribution of narcotics, as well as provide incentives for those countries to act in a way that is consistent with United States policies and commitments.

Figure 1. Map of Colombia.

Narco-terrorists have also developed what are essentially foreign policy instruments, including diplomacy, propaganda (information), force (military), and economic leverage (Davids 2002, 26). Certainly, these pseudo-instruments are perverted. The diplomatic “ties” appear to be with other insurgencies and crime syndicates, including Russian groups, the Irish Republican Army, and the Iranian-backed Hizbollah. Propaganda and force are used together to intimidate legitimate governments and citizens, and even to force local peasants to grow coca. It is the economic leverage that is gained from the production and sale of drugs like cocaine, heroin, and marijuana to the United States that funds these terrorist relationships and poses a considerable threat to the United States. The financial support provided by the common drug user in the United States is, in essence, providing the means by which terrorist organizations throughout the world thrive.

Colombia: History, Politics, and Insurgency

Colombia declared independence from Spain in 1810; however, it was not until 1819, when Simon Bolivar defeated Spanish loyalists, that a federation of states called Gran Colombia emerged. The federation, which included Venezuela, Colombia, Ecuador, and Panama, only lasted until 1830, when Venezuela and Ecuador split to form independent countries. In 1903, Panama declared its independence and Colombia became autonomous (Global Security 2004).

Since establishing its independence, Colombia is rare among its sister states in Latin America in that the country has been dominated by civilian, not military, rule. Military forces have traditionally been denied political power and civilian elites have been the primary contenders in the political arena. These elites are divided in a battle
between a free-thinking left and a conservative right, a development that emerged shortly after Colombia’s independence. The two traditional parties--the Liberals and the Conservatives--have competed for power and rotated frequently as the governing party in Colombia since the mid-1800s (Global Security 2004).

The rivalry between the two political parties resulted in significant political violence, the most recent and notorious of which is known as La Violencia. La Violencia (1948 to 1958) was a period in which more than 250,000 people lost their lives, and was resolved by the inauguration of cooperative government called the National Front. This bipartisan formation saw the two distinct parties agree to rotate the presidency of the country and to share cabinet positions. The advent of the National Front marked a significant and lasting change in historical political patterns in Colombia. Leftist subversion rose during the 1960s and continued through the 1980s. The illegal narcotics industry ascended in the 1970s as a dominant economic force, disrupting political and social relations and exploiting alliances of convenience with the leftist Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia, or FARC) and the rightist United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia or AUC), which became involved in the drug trade in order to finance their political goals (Global Security 2004).

The effect of the narcotics trade out of Colombia is not to be underestimated. Colombia is the world leader in supplying cocaine and a significant supplier of heroin and marijuana. The primary market for these drugs is the United States. Some scholars estimate the commercial worth of the narcotics trade to be close to ten percent of Colombia’s gross domestic product, and its effect on the legitimate market for goods out
of Colombia is the reduction of the effectiveness of macroeconomic controls and a
distortion of the consumer market, as well as the destruction of fragile tropical and jungle
ecosystems which are used to shroud the growth and production of coca and poppies used
to create cocaine and heroin (Global Security 2004).

Background

Narcotics affect virtually every country in the Western hemisphere, either as a
source country, a transit country, or a consumer country. Since the early 1900s, the
United States Government has been endeavoring to reduce the illegal use of narcotics by
its citizens. What is known today as the “war on drugs” began in the early 1970s in
response to an explosion of drug use during the turbulent 1960s (Bennett 2002, 1).

For more than thirty years, various policies and programs have been developed
and implemented in this war to combat use of illegal substances. Beginning in 1988, the
resources of the Department of Defense have been included as a tool to enforce these
policies. Despite the nation’s best efforts, illegal drugs are readily accessible and used by
millions of Americans, and the cost to the nation ranges from individual addiction and
private misery to an ever-increasing financial burden to the health and human services
sectors, as well as law enforcement agencies. Overwhelmingly, American citizens see
illegal drug use and its consequences to society and the nation as a high priority (Bennett
2002, 1). Their negative effects permeate our society, causing an economic drain on
resources, increase in violent crime, and family problems associated with drug use and
abuse (Department of Defense 1998, xii). The Government Accounting Office estimates
that drug use and its damaging consequences cost United States society over $110 billion
annually (Bennett 2002, 1).
The December 2000 National Security Strategy classified drug trafficking as a transnational threat. It is part of a broad range of criminal activities that originates overseas and threatens the safety and well being of the American people. The fiscal year 2001 counterdrug budget exceeded $18 billion and over 50 United States federal agencies are involved in the war on drugs. Additionally, countless state, local, and nongovernmental organizations are involved in treatment, prevention, and interdiction.

Scope

Though most countries in South America are involved in the illegal production and transportation of narcotics, this thesis will be restricted to a study of Colombia and the effectiveness of policies to prevent trafficking into the United States. Specifically, the instruments of national power will be examined for their usefulness in supporting the counterdrug effort in Colombia.

Importance

The illegal drug trade that originates in Colombia presents a threat to the security of the United States for the following reasons. First, individual citizens who become addicted to such drugs cause an undue burden on United States resources for treatment and create a demand for interdiction on the part of local, state, and national authorities. Additionally, an increase in drug related crimes that are committed by drug users or in connection with the drug trade is a threat to the average law abiding American citizen. Second, the funds generated by the drug trade provide the majority of the funding to support insurgency movements, which challenge the Colombian Government for control of the state. Finally, increasing instability in the hemisphere is likely to increase more
direct threats from terrorists on United States interests in the region and in the United States itself (Manwaring 2003, 6).

The importation of illegal narcotics into the United States may be considered an asymmetrical attack on the citizens of United States that must be combated. Drugs are used as a political weapon against the United States (Davis 2002, 18) and “[t]hose who contribute to the production, transport, sale, and use of illegal drugs . . . present a threat to the national security of the United States” (Department of Defense 1998, xii).

Primary Research Question

Are the instruments of national power effectively integrated into the United States counterdrug efforts in Colombia?

Secondary Research Questions

Is the current United States policy to promote counternarcotics operations in Colombia effective? Is the United States Government winning the information campaign in Colombia and the United States to gain support for United States counternarcotics initiatives and the legitimacy of the Colombian Government? What military assistance does the United States provide and are the operational outcomes effective? Is the economic assistance provided to the Colombian Government effective and how does the government of Colombia use the financial assistance?

Limitations

The most updated information applicable to this thesis is found in publications and reports from United States Government agencies. Most of these reports do not include statistical information that is less than one year old because the data are still being collected. Sources of current data, less than one year old, are difficult to locate.
This thesis will be limited to a study of Colombia in respect to each of the instruments of national power utilized by the United States. It will not discuss any other impact on the narcotics situation in Colombia.

**Delimitations**

This thesis will address counterdrug efforts in respect to Colombia, though many other countries in the Andean region of South America contribute to the flow of drugs into the United States. Colombia is the greatest manufacturer and exporter of illegal narcotics and therefore the largest threat to the United States in terms of narcotics trafficking.

Colombia is home to numerous insurgent groups that effectively use narcotic trafficking to finance their political activities and military operations. All insurgency or paramilitary organizations that have an impact on the drug trade in Colombia will not be addressed, but only the three most influential: the FARC and Ejercito de Liberacion Nacional (National Liberation Army known as ELN) are the two largest. Similarly, there are numerous paramilitary organizations, but the largest is the AUC. This thesis will concentrate on counternarcotics efforts directed against these large-scale organizations and the roles that they play as nonstate actors in the drug trade.

**Assumptions**

The primary assumption is to be able to locate enough material to establish quantifiable criteria to determine the effectiveness of the United States policy for counterdrug operations.
Definitions of Key Terms

Counterdrug: Those active measures taken to detect, monitor, and counter the production, trafficking, and use of illegal drugs (Department of Defense 2003, 126).

Counterdrug Nonoperational Support: Support provided to law enforcement agencies or host nations that includes loan or lease of equipment without operators, use of facilities (such as buildings, training areas, and ranges), training conducted in formal schools, transfer of excess equipment, or other support provided by the services from forces not assigned or made available to the combatant commanders (Department of Defense 2003, 126).

Counterdrug Operational Support: Support to host nations and drug law enforcement agencies involving military personnel and their associated equipment, and provided by the geographic combatant commanders from forces assigned to them or made available to them by the services for this purpose. Operational support does not include support in the form of equipment alone, nor the conduct of joint law enforcement investigations with cooperating civilian law enforcement agencies (Department of Defense 2003, 126).

Counterdrug Operations: Civil or military actions taken to reduce or eliminate illicit drug trafficking (Department of Defense 2003, 126).

Counterinsurgency: Those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency (Department of Defense 2003, 127).

Foreign Internal Defense (FID): Participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government to free and
protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency (Department of Defense 2003, 210).

**Guerrilla**: A combat participant in military and paramilitary operations conducted in enemy-held or hostile territory by irregular, predominantly indigenous forces (Department of Defense 2003, 227).

**Insurgency**: An organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through use of subversion and armed conflict (Department of Defense 2003, 260).

**Internal Defense and Development**: The full range of measures taken by a nation to promote its growth and protect itself from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. It focuses on building viable institutions (political, economic, social, and military) that respond to the needs of society (Department of Defense 2003, 267).

**Narco-terrorism**: Terrorism conducted to further the aims of drug traffickers. It may include assassinations, extortion, hijackings, bombings, and kidnappings directed against judges, prosecutors, elected officials, or law enforcement agents, and general disruption of a legitimate government to divert attention from drug operations (Department of Defense 2003, 355).

**National Security Strategy**: The art and science of developing, applying, and coordinating the instruments of national power (diplomatic, economic, military, and informational) to achieve objectives that contribute to national security (Department of Defense 2003, 358).

**Security Assistance (SA)**: Group of programs authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, as
amended, or other related statutes by which the United States provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services by grant, loan, credit, or cash sales in furtherance of national policies and objectives (Department of Defense 2003, 473).

**Terrorism**: The calculated use of unlawful violence or threat of unlawful violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological (Department of Defense 2003, 532).
CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW

Introduction

This chapter will review the relevant literature on Colombia, the history of United States relations in the Andean Region, narcotics trafficking, and the use of the instruments of national power in combating the flow of narcotics into the United States. This discussion will review historical, current, and future trends in writing that pertain to counternarcotics efforts in respect to Colombia. The opinions and contributions of the various authors are included in the literature review. In reviewing the literature, there were several books and documents that were notable in assisting this author in developing a clear picture of the narcotics trade and how it has influenced relations between the United States and Colombia. In order to better acquaint the reader with potential resources, a brief review of each of these is included.

In Bad Neighbor Policy: Washington’s Futile War on Drugs in Latin America, Ted G. Carpenter takes a broad and critical view of United States policies toward Colombia and the war on drugs. Carpenter discusses at length the determination of Washington to perpetuate interdiction and substitution methods of eliminating the drug problem at the exclusion of reducing demand, thus failing to produce the desired outcome in the war on drugs primarily due to ignoring the laws of supply and demand. His work is an indictment of thirty years of flawed policy towards Colombia by the United States. In rather an unorthodox recommendation, Carpenter focuses on the legalization of drugs as a means of gaining control over what he calls the “inflammatory metaphor of war” in the narcotics trade.
Russell Crandall’s *Driven by Drugs: US Policy Toward Colombia* is an in-depth and forceful account of the evolution of United States policy toward Colombia. Crandall effectively argues that the relationship between Colombia and the United States has changed dramatically from one of mutual desire to combat Communism to a one that is based almost solely on the narcotics trade and its damaging implications for both countries. Of distinct interest and information are the two chapters that describe the historical aspects of the tumultuous relationship between the two countries as far back as 1820 and the progression of violence within Colombia itself. Crandall’s presentation of the demand for illicit drugs in the United States and the ties between that demand, violence, and insurgency within Colombia, and the impact that the policies of the United States’ war on drugs has on the country is a powerful contribution to understanding the complex nature of the United States-Colombian relationship, as well as providing insight as to why Colombia receives such an enormous amount of foreign aid.

Douglas J. Davids’ *Narco-terrorism: A Unified Strategy to Fight a Growing Terrorist Menace* concentrates on the development of a unified strategy to combat narco-terrorism. The book effectively links illegal drug trafficking and terrorist operations, and reveals a failure on the part of United States policy to see that these are two aspects of the very same problem. It also points out the lack of political will on the part of United States policy makers to take necessary action to combat the two. Davids presents a thorough history of the use of narcotics as a weapon and the use of drug sales as a means to finance terrorism, and takes great pains to make the reader aware of the relationship between drug money and terrorism. Davids presents a strategy with four major aspects: to systematically educate the American public about the link between drugs and terrorists;
to use extradition from Colombia to the United States as a means of influencing drug lords to surrender and cease drug production; to create a specialized police and military force that is able to effectively contend with both the production and terror aspects of drug trafficking; and to increase the possibilities for peasant farmers who are coerced into growing coca by drug cartels and terrorist organizations by eliminating those forces and providing plausible and sustainable crop substitutes.

*More Terrible Than Death: Massacres, Drugs, and America’s War in Colombia* by Robin Kirk is one of the few references that concentrates in depth on the human rights abuses that are all too prevalent in Colombia. The author is a human rights investigator and reveals a dramatically different perspective on the war on drugs in Colombia. The focus in this book is the devastation at the personal level that has defined the state of Colombia for decades and implicates the United States’ role in doing more to aid guerillas and paramilitaries through the demand for illegal drugs than the United States’ policies to interdict and eliminate the source of drugs.

*Colombian Labyrinth: The Synergy of Drugs and Insurgency and Its Implications for Regional Stability* by Angel Rabasa and Peter Chalk gives a singularly comprehensive assessment of the relationship between Colombia and the United States and the ways in which that relationship is driven by internal conflict in Colombia itself. The authors also indicate the potential for spillover into neighboring countries and this hemisphere. The report considers the sweeping implications for Colombia, for the Andean region, and for hemispheric stability if insurgency and political violence within Colombia’s borders are not effectively managed. The authors argue that Colombia is a strategically important country whose ebbs and flows of politics, insurgency, and violence will influence the
region. The report examines sources of instability in the country, to include the strengths and weaknesses of the legitimate government, guerilla insurgencies, and paramilitary actors. The authors contend that the instability in Colombia is rooted in the drug economy, which, by and large, finances the armed challenges against the legitimate government’s authority. The report suggests that the United States sees the problem as one of counternarcotics policy, therefore missing the point of the political and military control that narco-terrorists exert over the legitimate government in Colombia. It recommends that United States policy should give priority to increasing the strength of the Colombian Government and military instead of focusing on coca-eradication programs that provide little by way of solution to the United States’ war on drugs.

*Andean Regional Initiative (ARI): FY 2003 Supplemental and FY 2004 Assistance for Colombia and Neighbors*, written by Larry K. Storrs and Connie Veillette, is a comprehensive report written to inform policy makers about the Andean Regional Initiative. It is among the most useful documents in understanding the cycle of funding to the Andean region. This document is a wealth of legislative history regarding United States policy toward Colombia, as well as a clearly written and relatively concise review of the situation in Colombia and its neighboring Andean countries. It provides a significant amount of background information on funding efforts toward drug-reduction policies in the region, with a clear explanation of the progression of funding for various aspects of the United States’ efforts in developing the Andean Trade Preference Act. The report discusses the provisions of ARI, to include expanded authorities, personnel caps, human rights, aerial fumigation, helicopter purchases, and the air-bridge denial program. While Colombia receives the lion’s share of funding through ARI, this report puts
Colombia in its regional context and discusses neighboring countries and United States policies toward them as well.

The United States of America and Colombia have a long history of diplomatic relations that has been both positive and negative. The relationship between the two countries has been dominated by the political influence of the United States. The United States officially recognized Colombia in 1821 when troops led by Simon Bolivar defeated Spanish forces at the battle of Carabobo to end Spanish rule in Colombia. The next year President James Monroe established diplomatic missions in several Latin American countries, including Colombia (Crandall 2002, 17).

Throughout the nineteenth century, the United States continued to interact diplomatically with Colombia. The United States encouraged the expulsion of Spain as a major power in South America, but was not economically or militarily prepared to actively support that expulsion until 1898, when it defeated Spain in the Spanish American War. Following Spain’s defeat, the United States became the most influential power in South America and was both economically and militarily prepared to champion its diplomatic efforts (Crandall 2002, 18).

The United States’ interaction with South America and Colombia in the twentieth century was marked by military intervention, anti-Nazism, anti-communism, and finally anti-narcoticism. During the first three decades of the twentieth century, the United States conducted scores of interventions in South America with the intent of preserving the United States’ economic and political interest in the region. These interventions often involved the United States Marine Corps. As fear of Nazi influence in South America spread, the United States adopted a policy to work with South American countries in an
effort to stop the German threat. After World War II, the United States policy for South America shifted to the prevention of communism. The relationship between Colombia and the United States was characterized as strong and military cooperation was sought to support hemispheric security (Crandall 2002, 20-25).

In recent decades, hemispheric security has been threatened by an increase in drug trafficking and the growth of narco-terrorist groups, particularly in Colombia. With these increases, the United States priority has changed to an aggressive counternarcotics policy in the Andean Region generally, but with a focus on Colombia.

With the lack of a credible threat of communist infiltration and an increasing drug problem in the United States, priorities changed from preserving political interest to preventing the flow of drugs into the United States. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the United States Government sought to influence all drug-producing nations in South America to prevent the trafficking of illegal narcotics. Colombia has been the major drug producing country in South America, and because of that has been the focal point of the predominant amount of United States support and awareness. Diplomatic relations between the United States and Colombia have improved and declined throughout the drug war (Crandall 2002, 19-24). Prior to the focus by the United States on the drug war, its relationship with Colombia was generally cordial; the relationship was characterized by common goals of promoting economic growth, of political stabilization, and anti-communism. Crandall suggests that as the United States’ interest in Colombia changed from fighting communism to fighting drug lords, so did the positive relationship break down.
Historical

The Colombian Government has historically been a weak institution that has been unable to exercise complete control over its territory. Colombia has long been known for democracy, but also for violence, including a guerilla insurgency dating back nearly forty years, and persistent drug activity (Storrs and Veillette 2003, 8). The political situation in Colombia is complicated by the legitimate government’s struggle with at least four factions: the FARC, the ELN, the AUC, and various narcotics-trafficking organizations (Carpenter 2003, 60). The stability of Colombia’s government is threatened by longstanding violence perpetrated by insurgencies and paramilitary groups, both of which are funded by the illegal narcotics trade (Storrs and Veillette 2003, 9). The country’s territory lends itself to drug cultivation and processing; it is crossed by three mountain ranges, providing isolation and habitat for hiding. A lack of national integration and a large degree of regional autonomy have characterized the Colombian political process.

The three major drug producing countries in South America are Colombia, Bolivia, and Peru; virtually all the world’s cocaine and approximately sixty percent of heroin originates in one of these three countries (Storrs and Veillette 2003, 8). Colombia’s evolution as the leading drug-producing country in South America is related to the successful reduction of drug production in Bolivia and Peru. In the past, Colombia’s drug manufacturing machine relied on coca leaves that were imported from surrounding South American countries; as cultivation in those countries waned, Colombia began to grow a larger portion of coca as raw materials for the production of cocaine. Additionally, Colombian cartels began to produce heroin as an expansion of their narcotics trade. At the same time, insurgency groups in the country realized that
providing security to the narcotics cartels would give them financial support for their political aims. Thus, the symbiotic relationship between narcotics producers and insurgents was set in motion (Rabasa and Chalk 2001, xv). As a result of this weakness, the Colombian Government has had to negotiate with or ignore challengers to its authority. History shows that this has not produced any significant or lasting resolutions.

Throughout history, the Colombian Government has suffered a loss of legitimacy and international support resulting from allegations of bribery, corruption, and undue influence from the finances of drug traffickers. Every level of the government, to include the police and military, has been suspect to the influence of drug money—even past presidents have been suspected of receiving drug money (Davids 2002, 49-50; Storrs and Veillette 2003, 90). Accusations of drug network financing of political campaigns have sharply divided political parties and adversely impacted the political process. The political power struggle has led to disruptions in economic reforms and even resulted in the downgrading of Colombia’s long-term foreign debt rating by Standard and Poor’s and other international rating services (Rabasa and Chalk 2001, 3-4). While Bogotá, the capital of Colombia, is the political center of the country, Medellin has emerged as the economic center. Other economic centers have developed in response to the great influence of money from the drug trade (Rabasa and Chalk 2001, 2).

Historical analysis shows that Colombia’s economy grew every year from 1932 until the mid-1990s. Of late, political instability and lack of security have had a detrimental effect on the economic outlook for Colombia. The economy’s sustained performance was a result of a diverse economic base and responsible management. Most of the development in the industrial sector can be contributed to the export of coffee. The
Colombian Government has attempted to expand the industrial sector through import substitution, but these efforts have failed due to weak internal markets (Rabasa and Chalk 2001, 4).

More recently, the Colombian economy began to recede due to the complex political crisis, the fall of coffee prices on the world market, and a contraction in the construction sector. The decertification of Colombia by the Clinton administration for noncompliance with drug eradication efforts added to the financial uncertainty and contributed to the sharpening of the economic problems. Political instability, high unemployment, and excessive violence prevent the success of any long-term economic stabilization plan (Rabasa and Chalk 2001, 5-6). These factors also produce a chaotic environment that is suitable for drug cartels, guerillas, and self-defense forces to operate within.

Violence has become a way of life in Colombia and the most violent regions of the country have been where two or more of the groups involved in the conflict, (guerillas, drug cartels, and illegal self-defense groups) operated. Both guerillas and paramilitaries have sought to consolidate their control by killing people who are suspected of collaborating with the other side (Rabasa and Chalk 2001, 7).

This violence has led to the large-scale displacement of people throughout the country, and the highest levels of displacement are in the zones of the country where conflict is also high. Rabasa and Chalk report that displacement is caused by illegal self-defense organizations, security forces, armed opposition groups, and other unidentified causes. This large population of dislocated people causes a significant challenge for the
Colombian Government in the areas of basic services, employment, and security (Rabasa and Chalk 2001, 7).

Law enforcement and judicial institutions have not been able to deal with the violence. The homicide rate has steadily increased over the decades, until Colombia now has the highest homicide rate in the world. The homicide rate in Colombia is thirteen times that of the United States and is the most likely cause of death in Colombia. More than 28,000 Colombians were murdered in 2002 and more than 2,900 were kidnapped, also the highest rate in the world (Hill 2003, 10). Death threats, kidnappings, and assassinations have created a climate of fear and are meant to influence the administration of justice, the legislative process, and the behavior of the media (Rabasa and Chalk 2001, 7-8).

United States policy has been directed toward stopping the flow of drugs into the United States from the Andean region of South America for the past two decades; the primary focus of this effort has been coca eradication and crop substitution. More recently, programs to expand free trade and provide alternatives to coca production have been initiated, and recognition has been given that the drug trade and guerilla insurgency is linked (Storrs and Veillette 2003, 4, 11).

The United States initially focused its efforts on interdicting illegal drugs in transit from Mexico and the Caribbean transit zones. After achieving limited success, United States’ counternarcotics policy shifted to attacking the production and refining at the source in Peru, Bolivia, and Colombia. It appears that this approach has not succeeded in reducing the drug problem. Two unintended consequences seem to have occurred: large drug cartels have been replaced by smaller cartels that are more
diversified and more difficult to detect, and the interdiction of coca leaves on transit routes from fields in Peru and Bolivia to refiners in Colombia has caused traffickers to shift coca production into Colombia and to diversify more into the heroin trade (Rabasa and Chalk 2001, xv).

**Current Literature**

Current literature predominately discusses the impact of Plan Colombia and the possible impacts of the Andean Regional Initiative (ARI) on the fight against illicit drug cultivation and production. It addresses the economic, social, political, and military aspects and the impact each is having on Colombia. Plan Colombia was developed in 1999 by former Colombian President Andreas Pastrana, in cooperation with the United States and the Clinton administration. It was to be a modern benchmark for the changing situation in Colombia, and aimed to curb drug trafficking activity and reduce cultivation of coca by fifty percent over five years. Its components included: assisting the legitimate Colombian Government control its territory; strengthening Colombian democratic institutions; promoting economic development; and protecting human rights and providing humanitarian assistance (Perl 2001, 14).

In 2001, the ARI was launched by the Bush administration. In a briefing that same year, administration spokesmen outlined three overarching goals for the region: democracy, development, and drugs.

The first goal was to support democracy and democratic institutions by supporting judicial reform, anti-corruption measures, human rights improvement, and the peace process in Colombia. The second was to foster sustainable economic development and trade liberalization through alternative economic develop, environmental protection, and renewal of the Andean Trade Preference Act (ATPA). The third was to significantly reduce the supply of illegal drugs to the United States from the source through eradication, interdiction and other efforts. (Storrs and Veillette 2003, 2)
Supporters of the initiative argued that it sustained much needed assistance to Colombia, as well as providing support to its neighbors; critics argued that ARI overemphasized counterdrug assistance and military support at the expense of human rights and the peace process (Storrs and Veillette 2003, 2).

ARI expanded Plan Colombia by increasing the amount of assistance directed at social and economic programs, by providing assistance to regional countries at risk for experiencing spillover effects from drug and insurgency activities, and by including a line item called the Andean Counterdrug Initiative, intended for training and equipping counternarcotic battalions in the Colombian Army (Storrs and Veillete 2003, 8).

The Andean Counterdrug Initiative (ACI) was the first draft of the Andean Regional Initiative. Perl (2001, 15) indicates that the title was changed as “a public relations attempt to de-emphasize its largely counterdrug component.” The Bush Administration made its first request for funds under ACI in 2001.

In testimony before the House Government Reform Committee, Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Robert B. Charles commented that ACI was protecting Americans and allies within the [Western] hemisphere “by strengthening the rule of law, building law enforcement and justice sector capacity, cultivating non-drug sources of income, and stopping heroin and cocaine from being produced and shipped to our shores” (Charles 2004, 1). According to Charles’ testimony, ACI funds have established police forces in 158 municipalities, and for the first time in history, all 1,098 of Colombia’s municipalities have a police presence (Charles 2004, 4).
In that testimony Charles also discussed challenges that face ACI, to include lack of sustained activity in forced eradication in Colombia’s neighboring countries. Charles’ emphasis was on the need to continue regional work, with a focus on Colombia. “Success in Colombia can have a ripple effect for better or worse. To be sure, the ripple effect is positive, our programs in countries bordering Colombia have also kept drug cultivation there at record low levels, increased the effectiveness and coverage of drug interdiction programs, strengthened the judiciary’s ability to prosecute, and expanded economic opportunities to the poor” (Charles 2004, 5).

Current literature also discusses the lack of progress in security, human rights violations that the government is unable to stop, slow economic progress, and lack of apparent impact on the drugs entering the United States due to the ability of the drug traffickers to adapt to changing situations. By comparison to interdiction and source reduction strategies, relatively limited consideration is given to decreasing demand for drugs or for treatment programs.
CHAPTER 3
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Introduction

This chapter provides the methodology used to analyze how effectively the instruments of national power are integrated into the United States counternarcotics efforts in Colombia. This study will also examine current United States policy and outline the method for conducting analysis of each of the instruments of national power. This chapter also describes how current doctrine, policy, and guidance will establish a foundation to examine secondary questions. The answers to these secondary questions will contribute to answering the primary question in chapter 5.

Diplomatic Instruments

To determine the effectiveness of diplomatic efforts that support the current United States policy for counternarcotics efforts, this study will cite two specific initiatives employed by the United States to influence Colombia’s efforts to wage a counternarcotics campaign: certification and extradition.

Certification is a key element of the United States’ efforts to influence drug-producing countries to develop and implement counternarcotics policies. Each year, the United States Congress requires the president to review the counternarcotics efforts of specified major drug-producing countries in order that United States assistance for those efforts is continued (Crandall 2002, 42-43; Storrs 2001, i). This research will explore the impacts of the certification program over time.

Extradition is a policy that allows Colombian drug traffickers to be sent to the United States to stand trial for drug charges, thus ensuring, by the United States court
system standards, a legal trial for the drug trafficker that he may not otherwise receive in Colombian legal system (Crandall 2002, 125-127).

Extradition was established by treaty between the United States and Colombia in 1979 and became Colombian Law in 1980 (Crandall 2002, 28). Its enforcement has been piecemeal and dependent upon the whims of a sitting Colombian administration. In 1987, the Colombian Supreme Court declared extradition unconstitutional; however, a political assassination in 1989 within Colombia spurred an emergency decree that reestablished extradition (Crandall 2002, 29). Extradition is a controversial policy for the Colombian Government and will be discussed in terms of its influence on the Colombian Government to apply additional pressure on drug trafficking organizations.

**Informational Instruments**

The information program implemented by the United States Government has two goals that will be examined in this methodology. The first goal is to maintain support for United States counternarcotics initiatives at home and abroad. One key component of this goal is to link drug traffickers, guerilla organizations, and paramilitary groups in Colombia to transnational terrorist organizations. The support of the United States population is critical to the continued funding of programs that are designed to reduce the amount of illegal narcotics entering the United States. World recognition of counternarcotics efforts as positively impacting the people of Colombia is important to countering information operations by participants in drug trafficking and legitimizes the goals of the United States in the war on drugs.

The second goal is to bolster and support the legitimacy of the government of Colombia. The information program aims to assist the host nation government with its
quest to be recognized internally and externally as the legitimate government in control and to exercise state authority within its boundaries (Department of Defense 1996, I-4). This study will highlight examples where the United States has been successful or unsuccessful in assisting the government of Colombia in achieving these goals.

The information program that is implemented by the United States government is key to success for the counternarcotics efforts in Colombia. It promotes continued emphasis on, as well as perceived support for, programs in Colombia, including resources that are dedicated to the foreign internal defense (FID) program that is performed by the United States military.

**Military Instruments**

United States military support to Colombia is key to the security of the Colombian state. This study will discuss the FID program that the United States provides to the government of Colombia to enhance its security operations. “US FID efforts are always directed at supporting internal HN [Host Nation] action programs aimed at bolstering IDAD [Internal Defense and Development]. The fundamental principle of all FID efforts is that they foster internal solutions and assist IDAD programs for which the supported nation has ultimate responsibility and control” (Department of Defense 1996, I-3). This study will discuss how the military involvement supports the Colombian government’s IDAD program.

The United States provides FID support to friendly countries that require assistance with security. This support comes in three forms: indirect support, direct support (not involving combat operations), and combat operations as a temporary solution until host nation forces are able to stabilize the situation and provide security for
the populace (Department of Defense 1996, viii). Currently, the United States military is not authorized by the Secretary of Defense to conduct combat operations in Colombia, but indirect support and direct support (not involving combat operations) are provided as part of the security assistance program.

The United States government provides indirect support to host nation governments in the form of equipment, services, and training. Indirect support emphasizes the principle of host nation self-sufficiency and building of strong national infrastructures through economic and military capabilities. Key military programs that are considered indirect support are Foreign Military Sales, the Foreign Military Financing Program, the International Military Education and Training Program, antiterrorism assistance, commercial sales licensed under the Arms Export Control Act, exchange programs, and joint and multinational exercises (Department of Defense 1996, I-5 - I-11).

Direct support (not involving combat operations) involves the use of United States forces to provide direct assistance to the host nation civilian populace or military. These operations are normally conducted when the host nation is faced with social, economic, or military threats beyond its capability to handle and will focus primarily on civil-military operations aimed at the provision of services to the local populace, communications and intelligence sharing, and logistics support (Department of Defense 1996, I-11).

The United States military plays an important role in the overall security assistance program to support stability in Colombia. Military programs and operations impact all instruments of national power and cannot be conducted in isolation. Without
proper funding, the United States military would not be able to conduct operations to further a stable environment in Colombia.

**Economic Instruments**

The economic instruments influence every aspect of counternarcotics policies aimed at Colombia and at other countries. Direct financial assistance, favorable trade arrangements, and the provision of equipment and training are used to support the governments of beneficiary countries (Department of Defense 1996, I-3). This study will refer to several initiatives that the United States has championed to advance the national economic development program of Colombia in order to give Colombian citizens a viable means of earning a living other than growing illegal coca or participating in another aspect of the drug trade.

This research will analyze the value of the ATPA and the more recent ATPDEA as both these initiatives have evolved out of Plan Colombia. Both of these acts were initiated by the United States in order to provide reduced duty or duty free treatment to recipient countries. Colombia has been participating and continues to participate in these programs. The goal of the ATPA was to promote broad based economic development, diversify exports, consolidate democracy, and defeat drug trafficking in the region by providing sustainable economic alternatives to drug crop production. The ATPDEA renewed and expanded the ATPA in 2001 to provide beneficiary countries duty free access to United States markets for any products except those that are specifically excluded by the United States government (US Trade Representative 2003, 3).

Crop substitution for Colombian farmers who grow coca for the production of cocaine is a method in which the Colombian government provides United-States-funded
incentives for farmers to shift production to legal crops. Substituted crops have included bananas, corn, rice, coffee, citrus fruit, and various grains (Carpenter 2003, 106). This study will examine the positive and negative effects of crop substitution and discuss the effectiveness of the program.
CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

Introduction

The following chapter will consider the efficacy of the instruments of national power in combating drug trafficking out of Colombia. Diplomatic efforts have included United States certification of cooperating countries, extradition rights between the United States and Colombia, and internal pressures that the Colombian government brings to bear on cartels. Informational efforts have included programs to maintain the current levels of United States public support, promote the preservation of human rights, legitimize United States diplomatic, military, and economic policies, and link drug traffickers to terrorist organizations. Military support has been in the form of United States military advisors and Department of Defense support personnel, security assistance in the form of training and equipment, and aid to the Colombian National Police (CNP). This thesis will also highlight United States programs to promote the growth of the Colombian economy, consider the efficiency of the Colombian government’s use of aid, and the viability of alternative development programs in Colombia.

Diplomatic Aspects

Certification

Certification has been a policy tool in the United States’ war on drugs since the mid-1980s. Among Latin American countries, only Colombia and Panama have ever experienced decertification (Storrs 2001, 5). Colombia was decertified in both 1996 and 1997 and has not since been decertified after taking steps to reverse the ruling the following year (Crandall 2002, 129).
The certification of drug-producing countries was instituted with the approval of the 1986 Anti-Drug Abuse Act, which was one of the most marked diplomatic efforts by the United States to influence drug-producing countries (Crandall 2002, 42). In the certification process, the President is required by Congress to certify that certain drug-producing countries are fully cooperating in counternarcotics efforts with the United States. If a country is not certified as fully cooperating then United States foreign assistance to that country will be suspended until the country is determined to be fully cooperative (Storrs 2001, 5). This law puts direct pressure on narcotics-trafficking countries to end illegal practices or risk losing financial support from the United States.

A country that is denied certification for failure to be fully cooperative can have sanctions applied if that country does not warrant waiver for the national interest of the United States. “Among the sanctions applied to decertified countries are the following: (1) most foreign assistance and financing of sales for the decertified country are suspended, with the exception of counternarcotics and humanitarian aid; (2) United States representatives are required to vote against loans for country in the multilateral development banks; and (3) certain trade sanctions, including increased tariffs and denial of preferential trade benefits, may be applied at the President’s discretion” (Storrs 2001, 5-6).

The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 requires the President to designate major drug producing and transiting countries and to withhold fifty percent of United States assistance designated to such countries until full cooperation with United States drug control efforts are met or the designated countries have taken steps to meet the directives of the 1988 United Nations Drug Convention (Storrs 2001, 1).
Legislation approved in 2001 by the United States Congress states “the President must identify the major drug transit and drug producing countries. He also is required to designate each such country that has failed demonstrably, during the previous twelve months, to make substantial efforts to adhere to its obligations under international counternarcotics agreements. United States assistance would be withheld from any of the designated worst offending countries, unless the President determines that the provision of assistance is vital to the national interest of the United States, or until the designated country makes substantial counternarcotics efforts” (Storrs 2001, 19).

The United States Foreign Assistance Act requires that the President submit an International Narcotics Control Strategy Report that identifies major illicit drug-producing and major drug-transit countries, major sources of precursor chemicals used in the production of illicit narcotics, and major money laundering countries. A major illicit drug-producing country is one in which: (1) 1,000 hectares or more of illicit opium poppy is cultivated or harvested during a year; (2) 1,000 hectares or more of illicit coca is cultivated or harvested during a year; or (3) 5,000 hectares or more of illicit cannabis is cultivated or harvested during a year, unless the President determines that such illicit cannabis production does not significantly affect the United States. A major drug-transit country is one: that is a significant direct source of illicit narcotics or psychotropic drugs or other controlled substances significantly affecting the United States; or through which such drugs or substances are transported (US Department of State 2003, 2).

The United States government has used this policy as a moderately effective tool for influencing drug-producing and transiting countries. It is reasonable to assume that the certification law will continue to be a key diplomatic instrument used by the United
States as it continues to grapple with illegal narcotics. In the Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs Raphael Perl stated:

The certification Process will continue to serve as an important mechanism through which the Congress can press its own assessment of specific nations in international narcotics policy. . . . This process and the role and influence of the Congress appear likely both to expand and to become more active. Although one can argue that the process may not always be effective in persuading foreign nations to cooperate in the Anti-drug fight, it is difficult to argue that the certification process has not proved an effective vehicle by which the Congress has been–and is-able to exert influence upon the executive branch. Congress will not soon give up the power it has acquired in this policy area, one which has become increasingly important to the United States public. It is also likely that Congress will continue to require new types of narco-related certifications. (Perl 1988, 19-52)

Storrs (2001, 2) commented extensively on past experience with and reform efforts regarding the certification process, based upon complaints from Latin American countries about the unilateral and noncooperative nature of the certification requirements. Though the process has been called “an effective, if blunt, policy instrument” (Storrs 2001, 4), there appears to be a growing sense that a multilateral approach to the process may be more effective. Among the advantages of the certification process, Storrs argued that leaving the system intact would “provide continuity with a process that has been in place for many years, and, which, arguably, has produced results” (Storrs 2001, 5). A key disadvantage is that it lowers the standards from failure of full cooperation with United States’ counternarcotics agreements to failure to “demonstrably make substantial efforts” (Storrs 2001, 5) to maintain obligations to international agreements.

Colombia was fully decertified for a second straight year on 1 March 1997. The decertification was based on several issues on which the government of Colombia was seen as not fully cooperating with United States’ counterdrug efforts. In order to be certified, Colombia would have to reestablish a policy of extradition to the United States
for narcotics-related criminals, implement more stringent antidrug legislation, accept the use of more effective herbicide to spray illicit crops, take a harder stance on corruption, and implement measures to prevent drug dealers from conducting business while in prison (Crandall 2002, 29).

Certification proved to be an effective tool to coerce the government of Colombia to comply with United States desires. The Colombian administration has attempted, or at least given the impression of attempting, to comply since its recertification in 1998. Colombia has not been decertified since 1997 and continues to support United States’ drug source reduction efforts. As long as the United States continues to grant Colombia large sums of aid money, the Colombian government will continue to support United States’ policies.

The policy of certification does not always have the desired effect on antidrug efforts in the targeted country. In the case of Colombia, decertification produced positive results in dealing with the Colombian government and negative results for the Colombian crime fighters who experienced resource shortfalls. Crandall (2002, 129-130) noted a sense of concern in the United States Congress that Colombia’s two-time decertification had been counterproductive and harmful to the overall efforts to reduce drug trafficking out of that country. The suspension of military funding and antidrug funding led to resource shortages in ammunition, explosives, and helicopter spare parts, which are essential to combating the drug trade in Colombia (Crandall 2002, 129).

Another negative impact of the decertification of Colombia, as noted by Madeleine Albright, the Secretary of State at the time, was the “unintentional disadvantage for the commercial interest of the United States . . . the continued
interruption of this assistance would mean the continuation of serious damage to the vital interest of the national interest of the United States.” This was in response to the fact that United States firms had lost an estimated $875 million in potential business to the decertification decision (Crandall 2002, 130).

Certification had the effect of “narcotizing” relations with Colombia, where the United States began to equate its success in Colombia with cooperation in counterdrug efforts. The evaluation process, based solely on the drug issue, drove the relationship between the two countries. Certification was equal to good relations and decertification was equal to bad relations, and the underlying issue revolved around extradition and the Colombian government’s reluctance to cooperate with the United States’ demands that drug lords be sent to the United States for prosecution (Crandall 2002, 128).

Extradition

Extradition is a method with which the United States puts pressure on drug traffickers; however, the extradition treaty between the United States and Colombia has been fraught with difficulties since it became Colombian law on 3 November 1980 (Crandall 2002, 28-30). Over the years Colombian presidents have honored, rejected, and amended the law (Crandall 2002, 29). Colombian political necessity, combined with threats from those who might be extradited, appears to have influenced the use, but ultimately not the effectiveness of the extradition process.

The extradition treaty was signed into law by President Julio Cesar Turbay in 1980; Turbay realized that such a treaty was vital for Colombia’s ability to fight drug trafficking even while he realized the clear signal to the Andean and international community that only the United States legal system might be capable of dealing with the
drug problem in Colombia. Further, Turbay “believed that by signing the treaty, Colombia . . . was losing its sovereignty over drug policies . . . within its borders” (Crandall 2002, 28). The subsequent administration refused to enforce the extradition law until a political assassination in 1984 prompted the extradition of fifteen drug traffickers to the United States. In 1987, the Colombian Supreme Court ruled extradition as unconstitutional; again, a political assassination in 1989 impelled then-President Virgilio Barco to use emergency measures to extradite drug traffickers to the United States for trial. In 1990, Colombian President Cesar Gaviria employed extradition as a discretionary tool, effectively using it as an inducement for drug traffickers to turn themselves in by promising a reduced prison term and no extradition to the United States. In 1991, the Colombian Constituent Assembly again banned extradition. Despite the ban, during that same year, for a guarantee of a reduced prison sentence and no possibility of extradition to the United States, almost the entire Medellin drug cartel agreed to surrender. Even the cartel’s drug lord, Pablo Escobar, turned himself in with the correct belief that he was no longer threatened with extradition to the United States. In 1997, the Colombian Constitution was amended yet again to allow for non-retroactive extradition of drug traffickers to the United States (Crandall 2002, 28-30).

That drug traffickers are panicked by the prospect of being extradited to the United States to stand trial is evidenced by the attempts to coerce Colombian lawmakers with bribes, threats of violence, and political assassinations, as well as by the actions of drug leaders when extradition was not a threat to them. In 1991, under intense pressure from drug cartels, the Colombian Constituent Assembly banned extradition; following
this ban, the infamous Medellin cartel leader, Pablo Escobar, turned himself in, as he had no reason to fear extradition to the United States for trial (Crandall 2002, 30).

Though extradition has been a source of strain between Bogotá and Washington for many years, it appears to have been an effective tool in efforts to combat drug trafficking. The United States has threatened sanctions or decertification if the Colombian government does not permit extradition of drug traffickers to the United States to stand trial. Recently the Colombian government has allowed the extradition of drug traffickers to the United States, and in September 2001 one of the leaders of the Medellin Drug Cartel, Fabio Ochoa, was indeed extradited to stand trial on charges of shipping thirty tons of cocaine a month to the United States. At that time, Colombian Ambassador Luis Alberto Moreno stated, “I think people came to realize that extradition is a very useful tool in fighting the war on drugs” (Crandall 2002, 127).

Information

The purpose of the information campaign waged by the United States government is twofold. First, the campaign is used to justify current United States counternarcotics efforts in Colombia and maintain support with the United States public to continue to execute its counternarcotics efforts. Secondly, the campaign uses perceived successes to legitimize counternarcotics efforts and current diplomatic, military, and economic policies.

Justifying Current United States Public Support

Supporters of the United States policy insist that Colombia is a friendly democracy that is being threatened by insurgents, paramilitary organizations, and drug traffickers, and that all three of these organizations are fueled by revenue from the drug
trade. Support for the United States policy in Colombia is focused on several related issues: the overall effectiveness and implementation of the programs to reduce coca cultivation and cocaine production, respect for human rights, and security for the people of Colombia (Storrs and Veillete 2003, 13). Opponents to the United States counterdrug program argue that the military approach is oppressive and does not address the needs of the population. They believe that coca farmers cannot be expected to stop coca farming voluntarily until economic alternatives are in place. They argue to bring a halt to aerial fumigation of coca crops and aid to the Colombian military, and instead support a policy that focuses largely on economic and social aid to combat the conflict’s root causes. Opponents believe that forcing coca farmers to abandon the cultivation of coca without providing a viable and sustainable economic alternative will drive them into the ranks of the armed groups or make them displaced persons dependent on the state (Storrs and Veillete 2003, 13).

There is little in the literature that defines who, precisely, are the supporters and opponents of United States counterdrug policy in Colombia. Readers are left to infer that such supporters and detractors are those who are immediately involved with policy making in some way, either through analysis, reporting to Congressional committee, or policy development. It may be safe to contend that the general public in the United States has no clear understanding of the narcotics situation in Colombia and the challenges to Colombian statehood and regional instability.

Davids suggests that narco-terrorism awareness in the United States would go a long way toward reducing demand. A survey he conducted on narco-terrorism suggests that “drug use is common across college campuses . . . drug users are not extensively
aware of narco-terrorism (even in our highest-level education institutes), and need to be informed of the harm they are causing to others, particularly if they are unconcerned about the harm they are causing to themselves” (Davids 2002, 64).

An education program that highlights the positive impact of counterdrug operations in Colombia and raises awareness of the harm that drugs cause would have three results. First, awareness about narco-terrorism reduces outside support for illegal challengers to Colombian statehood. Assuming that awareness in the United States will reduce demand and use of drugs, then the result will be diminished funds supplying both drug traffickers and insurgents. Second, education about narco-terrorism will emphasize the need for consistent outside support for a specific country from the international community. In effect, this will help to internationalize counterdrug operations. Finally, awareness and education will not only have a positive impact on the reduction of demand but also establish legitimacy to support stronger counterdrug programs (Davids 2002, 64).

Human Rights

There are gross violations of human rights abuses in Colombia; indeed, a key component of United States policy has been the address of such abuses, particularly by the Colombian military forces. A small percentage of the funding provided by the United States goes toward the promotion of human rights; however, among the conditions in the funding package is the requirement of certification that military officers facing credible allegations of human rights violations (as well as those who aid or abet those officers) are tried in civil courts (Rabasa and Chalk 2001, 63).
Efforts to instill respect for human rights are augmented by an average of ninety hours per year of training for members of the military and the police at all operational levels. Rabasa and Chalk (2001, 102) indicate that the Colombian government has prosecuted and brought to justice soldiers and police officers who have been accused of human rights violations.

In his 2003 testimony, General James T. Hill reported “Allegations of human rights violations by the military have dropped to less than two percent of all allegations, and today the Colombian military is one of the most respected organizations in the nation.” This clearly shows the success of education and training initiatives implemented by the Colombian Ministry of Defense (Hill 2003, 11).

The Andean Regional Initiative permits the distribution of up to seventy-five percent of United States military assistance funding for a given year. Figure 2 shows a map of the Andean Regional Initiative countries. Table 1 shows the Andean Regional Initiative funding requests broken down by information regarding total region and Colombia specifically. During the course of the year, the United States Secretary of State must certify that the Colombian military is continuing to meet its obligation to protect human rights. The Colombian government must show that members of its armed forces alleged to have committed human rights violations are being suspended, prosecuted, and punished. The Colombian military must also show that it is severing ties with and apprehending leaders of paramilitary organizations such as the AUC (Storrs and Veillette 2003, 5), which has been accused of gross human rights abuses and collusion with the Colombian Armed Forces in fighting insurgent organizations. The AUC is known to
coordinate the activities of paramilitary organizations and participate in narcotics trafficking (Storrs and Veillette 2003, 9).

Figure 2. Map Andean Regional Initiative Countries

Table 1. Andean Regional Initiative Funding Requests From FY 2002 through FY 2004: Allocations by Purpose and by Account (In Millions of Dollars)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total ARI Request</th>
<th>Total ARI Actual</th>
<th>Allocation for Colombia (actual)</th>
<th>Economic/ Social/ Governance</th>
<th>Counternarcotics and Security</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>882.29</td>
<td>786.40</td>
<td>373.9</td>
<td>130.40</td>
<td>243.5</td>
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<td>2003</td>
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<td>999.6</td>
<td>597.3</td>
<td>149.2</td>
<td>318.0</td>
</tr>
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* FY2004 numbers reflect requests only; actual allocations information was not available.

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* FY2004 numbers reflect requests only; actual allocations information was not available.

If the Colombian military fails certification, then funding will be withheld until compliance with the certification requirements are validated. In the event of proper certification, the remaining twenty five percent of allocated military assistance funding will be distributed incrementally, based on additional certifications (Storrs and Veillette 2003, 5).

Legitimizing Diplomatic, Military, and Economic Policies

Recognizing the threat that an agreement between the drug traffickers and guerilla insurgencies presents, in 2002 President Uribe linked the two organizations as an intertwined problem that must be addressed in a coordinated fashion. In response, the United States gave the Colombian government the flexibility to use counterdrug funds for a unified campaign to fight drug trafficking and terrorist organizations. The two largest insurgent organizations, the FARC and the ELN, and most powerful paramilitary organization, the AUC, have been designated as terrorist organizations by the State
Department and under these rules can be targeted with support provided by United-
States-funded programs (Storrs and Veillette 2003, 11).

Linking Drug Traffickers to Terrorist Organizations

The fiscal year 2002 Emergency Supplemental Request provided authority for the
use of International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement assistance and Department
of Defense funds to support a unified campaign against narcotics trafficking and the
activities of groups designated as terrorist organizations. It further goes on to say that
these actions should be to protect human health and welfare in emergency circumstances,
including the undertaking of rescue operations (Storrs and Veillete 2003, 3). This
statement in congressional funding documents is one case in which the United States
government is beginning to change its policy toward dealing with insurgents in Colombia
that use terrorist tactics to achieve their goals. Linking this funding to the protection of
human health and welfare from the threat of designated terrorist organizations in
Colombia highlights to the American public the damage that these organizations are
doing in Colombia. Showing that these groups conduct heinous human rights violations
in the conduct of their everyday business and emphasizing that the United States can help
prevent any additional violations is a method to get the United States public involved by
fostering concern with the United States public at large. This concern will ultimately lead
to continued support for efforts to assist the people of Colombia, increasing the likelihood
for continued support to attack Colombian terrorist organizations as a method to protect
human health and welfare.
Military Support

The United States has a relatively long history of military assistance to Colombia. Beginning in 1952, with the signing of the “Military Assistance Agreement,” the United States committed itself to assisting the Colombian military through efforts to promote hemispheric security. In 1961, the United States sent its first military training team to train the Colombian military in intelligence capabilities. Indeed, the sending of military training teams by the United States was seen as a valuable and suitable means of strengthening the Colombian forces against communism and guerilla subversion (Crandall 2002, 25). Currently, American aid to Colombia cannot be used to fight guerillas; indirect support is provided in the form of military training.

Role of United States Military Personnel

The primary focus of the Department of Defense activities in Colombia, through the United States Military Group (MILGP), is counternarcotics with the provision of training, equipment, infrastructure development, intelligence support, detection, and monitoring information to Colombian armed forces units engaged in counter-drug operations. This assistance increases the capabilities of Colombian land, sea, and air security forces to detect and interdict narcotrafficking operations. It also provides assistance to the Colombian National Police (CNP) in its eradication and law enforcement mission. (US Department of State 2001, 1)

In July 2000, when Congress approved funding for Plan Colombia, it also set limits on the number of United States military personnel and United States civilian contractors to support operations. The United States military is authorized up to 500 permanent and temporary duty personnel and 300 civilian contractors. These numbers are monitored by the United States embassy in Bogotá and vary as projects are begun, implemented, and completed (US Department of State 2001, 1).
The Department of Defense employs United States civilian contractors to carry out programs in Colombia to fill shortages where United States military personnel lack expertise in specific technical areas. United States contractors provide technical support to the Colombian Army at several radar sites, information for force protection and counterdrug operations, and support to Colombian helicopter operations in the form of logistical support, training, and maintenance. The average number of United States contractors supporting Plan Colombia on any given day has been in the range of 160 to 180 persons (US Department of State 2001, 2).

As part of Plan Colombia, United States military personnel in Colombia have been most recently training and equipping the second and third counternarcotics battalions and the brigade headquarters. Additionally, United States personnel have provided oversight for infrastructure improvement projects for Colombian Army Aviation operations (US Department of State 2001, 3).

Training teams also work with the Colombian military and police on short-term projects, such as human rights training, development of rules of engagement, and assistance to the Colombian military legal corps. The total number of United States military trainers has typically been between sixty and one hundred, depending on the assignment. The average number of United States military personnel on any given day is around 200 (US Department of State 2001, 3).

More recently, the fiscal year 2003 Foreign Operations Appropriations Bill relating to the ARI and Colombia, which was signed into law in February 2003, has modified the existing caps on the United States. Military and civilian contractors who can be assigned to duty in Colombia cannot exceed 400 each, except for search and rescue
operations. This cap only applies to personnel in Colombia to support the ongoing operations funded by Plan Colombia. The Bush administration has stated that it will stay within those limits except in special cases. One such case was in February 2003 when “it was reported that the number of military personnel had reached 411, with the additional personnel being deployed to search for several American contractors who were being held by the FARC after their plane crashed” (Storrs and Veillete 2003, 4-5).

United States Security Assistance to Colombia

In 2000, the United States government provided the Colombian government $519.2 million in military assistance as part of Plan Colombia; $45.3 million were dedicated to support the development of two additional counternarcotics battalions to prepare for the “push into southern Colombia.” The additional two counternarcotics battalions will join the current United-States-created counternarcotics battalion to support drug eradication efforts in southern Colombia. These battalions will be responsible to set the conditions for safe counternarcotic operations by the Colombian police in the Putumayo and Caqueta departments (Isacson 2000, 7-10).

The majority of the assistance, $328 million, was for the procurement of sixteen Blackhawk helicopters, thirty additional UH-1H helicopters, and maintenance on the eighteen existing Colombian Army UH-1H helicopters. The counternarcotics battalions will primarily use the helicopter assets to support their operations in southern Colombia. Additional funds will support the Colombian Armed Forces’ air, river, and ground interdiction operations, military human rights training, and military justice reforms (Isacson 2000, 7).
The ARI is a program designed to provide support to countries in the Andean Ridge: Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Panama, Peru, and Venezuela. The ARI built on the Clinton Administration’s 2000 Plan Colombia legislation by expanding assistance to help stem the spillover of drug trafficking to Colombia’s neighbors. In 2004, ARI legislation requested $110 million in foreign military financing and $1.6 million in international military education and training for Colombia (Storrs and Veillete 2003, 6-7).

Policy achievements have been highlighted in various reports to United States Congressional committees. In February 2003, notable policy achievements included the deployment of the Colombian Army’s first counternarcotics brigade, the destruction of 1,084 drug laboratory processing sites, and the seizure of 23,000 kilos of cocaine. The aerial fumigation program successes were noted in number of hectares of coca crop sprayed, as well as anecdotal reports from business owners about downturns in the economy and the movement of coca worker families leaving areas known to produce such crops (State Department 2003, 11; Simons 2003, 7). In 2002, spray eradication efforts reduced coca cultivation by fifteen percent and poppy cultivation by twenty-five percent (Charles 2004, 3). Furthermore, Charles reported that “as of February 29, 2004, we have sprayed over 29,000 hectares of coca and 691 hectares of poppy. This exceeds by 84 percent the amount of coca eradicated during the same timeframe in 2003” (Charles 2004, 4).

ARI funding has also been working toward strengthening democracy and security. Efforts include funding for training police, the reduction of murder rates, the opening of ‘Casas de Justicas’ (Justice Centers), and the provision of assistance to displaced persons,
as well as ongoing reforms to the judicial system and legal reform (Charles 2004, 4; State Department 2003, 11-12).

Foreign military financing requested for Colombia in 2004 is intended to support counterterrorism operations and protect key infrastructure. Support for the Colombian Army will provide training, weapons, night vision devices, and communications equipment to its elite mobile brigades and the special forces brigade. Continued funding will provide munitions, equipment, and training for the two Colombian Army brigades that protect the Cano-Limon Covenas oil pipeline. Naval support includes the provision of interdiction boats, training, and infrastructure improvements. The Colombian Air Force will receive funds to purchase two additional AC-47 gunships, and there is a C-130 support plan that will procure four C-130 aircraft and maintenance support (Storrs and Veillete 2003, 7).

Aid to Colombian National Police

The CNP received $115.6 million as part of Plan Colombia in 2000. Most of this aid contributes to one of two activities: fumigation or mobility. Twenty-seven million dollars provided for infrastructure improvement, security, and logistics support for CNP operational bases that will support the use of fumigation aircraft and helicopters. An additional $34 million was allocated to the CNP to increase aerial eradication efforts by providing for one additional air mobile eradication unit, the purchase of nine additional fumigation aircraft, upgrades and spare parts for existing aircraft, and additional pilot training. The majority of the funds were to improve the mobility of the CNP and provided $46.6 million for upgrades to existing UH-1H helicopters, a grant of two UH-60
Blackhawk helicopters, and logistical support and spare parts for helicopter operations (Isacson 2000, 12).

While military funding provides equipment and upgrades, as well as training opportunities, to the Colombian military, Manwaring notes that, “Tellingly, Latin Americans argue that help provides as much support back to the US economy as to the security and stability of Colombia and the rest of Latin America” (Manwaring 2003, 7).

**Economic Influences**

**Andean Trade Preference Act**

The ATPA is a program that provides the beneficiary countries of Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru duty-free access to United States markets. The ATPA promotes economic alternatives to drug crop production and helps strengthen the economies of countries in the Andean region, including Colombia. Since the inception of the ATPA in 1991, it has resulted in a seventy-five-percent increase in United States exports to ATPA countries in dollar terms. On the other hand, imports from participating countries have more than doubled. This trade incentive has helped to create more than 140,000 new jobs in the region that were not previously available. It has also resulted in promoting alternative development and drug crop eradication programs that eliminated more than one million acres of coca between 1995 and 2000 (US Department of State 2002b, 1).

The ATPA expired on 4 December 2001, but participating countries were given a ninety-day deferral on the collection of duties while a bill to renew and expand the program was being considered in Congress (U.S Department of State 2002b, 1). That
legislation resulted in the amended ATPA, known as the ATPDEA (US Trade Representative 2003, 3).

**Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act**

The ATPDEA was signed into law on 6 August 2002 as part of the Trade Act of 2002. This program provides enhanced trade benefits for the ATPA beneficiary countries and renewed and amended trade benefits for duty free treatment of certain products previously excluded under the ATPA. Colombia, along with Peru, Ecuador, and Bolivia, is designated as an ATPDEA beneficiary country (US Trade Representative 2003, 5).

The Colombian government estimates that the ATPDEA could generate as many as 200,000 new jobs and several hundred million dollars in exports. Foreign investors, primarily from the United States, have committed approximately $100 million in capital goods to expand capacity. New investment as a result of ATPDEA could exceed $500 million (US Trade Representative 2003, 26).

**Colombian Use of Economic Aid**

In July 2000, the United States Congress approved an emergency supplemental assistance request for fiscal year 2000-2001 that provided $1.32 billion to countries in the Andean Region to conduct counternarcotic operations. Colombia was allocated $862.3 million of the total amount as the primary source country and the area on which the United States would focus most of its efforts. Of the total amount, the vast majority, $521.2 million went to the Colombian Armed Forces, $123.1 million went to support the police, and the remaining $218 million was distributed among programs for alternative economic development, aid to displaced persons, judicial reform, law enforcement, and promotion of human rights (Rabasa and Chalk 2001, 62-63).
Alternative Development

Plan Colombia allocated $68.5 million for alternative development in Colombia. These funds were focused in four areas: the management of protected areas to offset ecological damage of coca and poppy production in southern Colombia through sustainable forestry programs; social investment for internally displaced persons to reinsert displaced families back into the economy through job training; assistance in establishing and marketing legal crops, improved community services, and improved productive infrastructure; and grants to municipalities to establish basic education, health care units, and child-care facilities. Support for voluntary eradication and social investment provides assistance in establishing and marketing licit crops, improving community services and productive infrastructure, assisting municipalities in budgeting, transparent governance, and revenue generation, and programming management funds to cover the operating costs for the United States Agency International Development Colombia Mission 2000-2001 (Isacson 2000, 1-16).

Lack of security in coca-growing areas and the Colombian government’s limited ability to carry out sustained interdiction operations are the two greatest challenges that plague the alternative development program. Since the inception of the alternative development program in December 2000, the Colombian government claims that 38,000 families have signed voluntary eradication pacts. The State Department’s annual International Narcotics Control Strategy Report for 2002 reported 20,128 families have benefited and 39,000 acres of licit crops have been planted in fields that have previously grown coca and opium (Storrs and Veillete 2003, 12).
The intention of all these programs is to encourage Colombian farmers to discontinue growing coca and begin farming legal crops. The problem is that legal crops are not as financially beneficial as coca and are difficult to transport to market from the rural areas of Colombia, where roads and transportation networks do not exist. Additional impediments to legal means of earning a living include threats and coercion by guerrilla and paramilitary organizations to continue the cultivation of illicit crops or face retribution including injury and death (Davids 2002, 93).
CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Strategic Considerations

Each of the instruments of national power is a useful tool in implementing changes desired by the United States regarding narcotics trafficking and narco-terrorism. However, each tool cannot be wholly effective on its own, and the coherent and concerted use of these by the United States is essential to achieving its policy goals. Several issues must be addressed in order to be successful in this war: demand must be lowered, viable crop substitutions for coca must be available, and capable force must be brought to bear on local guerilla and terrorist organizations (Davids 2002, 101). Additionally, the United States has a vested interest in maintaining a legitimate government in Colombia in order to promote stability in that country as well as its neighboring countries.

Lowering demand

As long as people want illegal drugs, they will be able to get them. They will pay lots of money for them. As long as there is demand, there will be supply. As long as there are buyers, there will be sellers. It’s a truth that is so unquestioned, so obvious to all, so completely and utterly proven that it is neatly ignored. Or perhaps not ignored, but made invisible, like the force of gravity. (Kirk 2003, xvii)

Davids argues that the irony of the American demand for drugs is the very vehicle by which terrorists earn their money to finance various wars and insurgencies globally and that United States drug users “are some of the largest, if not the largest, financial supporters of terrorism and warfare around the world” (Davids 2002, 67). He further suggests that curbing the drug supply from international sources, which, in turn, prevents
the return of revenues to terrorist and insurgent organizations, is not intended to completely eliminate the drug problem in America. However, restricting the American consumption of drugs from international sources significantly diminishes the base of funding from which such organizations operate. This, in turn, permits the enormous amount of capital (both human and financial) currently used for interdiction efforts to be applied to domestic counterdrug efforts. Narcotics trafficking provides insurgency groups with quick income.

Demand reduction efforts have been stymied in the past by the political stigma of being “too soft” on crime (Peavie 2001, 2, 16) by comparison to a “get-tough” approach represented by source-country interdiction efforts. Peavie noted a RAND study that presented empirical evidence that overwhelmingly supported the effectiveness of demand reduction strategies with a very small percentage of resources going toward treatment programs (Peavie 2001, 10).

Harsher punishment for casual offenders, coupled with crackdowns on dealers at all levels, may cause a reduction in demand. Casual drug users may be the most susceptible to an information campaign in accordance with the suggestions of Davids. Advertising the link between drugs bought on the streets of the United States and terrorist activities globally seems a reasonable and viable means of educating the citizens of this country. However, hard-core abusers may only benefit from research-based treatment programs in concert with punitive measures (Davids 2002, 63). Another option is to increase the cost of drug-related medical care and change policies to ensure that the full cost of care is the burden of the user. Establishing a more effective counterdrug effort in school systems, to include college students, and strategically evaluating where this
counterdrug effort can have the best impact on children is key to the success of any campaign.

Substitutions

The United States must study, evaluate, and continue to use the most effective means to eradicate crops in Colombia. This effort should remain one of the pillars of the counterdrug program and must maintain pressure on the exporters of the drug trade. However, the vast majority of economic aid to Colombia has been focused on crop eradication (Crandall 2002, 39) with rather little to show for it. Crop substitution is also riddled with problems. There is little else that seems to be as easy to cultivate as coca for the Colombian peasant farmer; that, coupled with force or threat of force from those guerillas whose insurgencies are funded by such crops, may be sufficient motivation for rural farmers in that country to balk at substitution efforts (Davids 2002, 93).

The United States must develop a more robust alternative crop program for the Colombian farmers that give up the cultivation of narcotic producing plants. This plan should be coordinated by the Colombian government and include the development of international markets for Colombian goods, beginning with the United States. The United States will initially have to guarantee the price and purchase of these goods until other markets are developed. These goods need to be plausibly profitable in a global market, not simply useless items that the United States’ markets alone purchase to prop up the Colombian farmers. Proper analysis should be undertaken to identify where Colombia has a comparative advantage in the world market and the development of such advantage globally should be the joint responsibility of Colombia and the United States.
Capable force

The United States must be prepared to dedicate its military forces to plan and conduct direct combat operations at whatever scale required to maintain the Colombian government. The United States cannot allow the Colombian government to be replaced by an illegitimate government that will not support counterdrug efforts and may even promote narcotics cultivation and exportation as a source of income and a way to finance security forces.

A more acceptable alternative to committing United States military forces to combat operations in Colombia is to empower the Colombian military to protect key governmental and economic infrastructure, weaken the guerilla threat, and reestablish control and services in rural and disputed areas. The United States seeks to achieve these goals with the support provided to Colombia through the Foreign Internal Defense operations conducted by United States military forces on land, sea, and air.

The United States needs to identify transient choke points for drug movement and attack them on land, at sea, or in the air. Interdiction efforts should be concentrated where they have the highest likelihood for success and should appear random and unpredictable to narcotics traffickers, who have shown great propensity for altering their operations in the face of interdiction.

A force capable of controlling the overland movement from Colombia to North America must be trained, equipped, and deployed to areas where the greatest likelihood for success can be expected. The national border between Colombia and Panama is an area where movement by land is canalized into a small area and the probability for intercepting ground movement of illegal narcotics is increased. Research shows that no
sufficient effort has been initiated by the Colombian or United States governments to prevent the flow of narcotics through this area. Interdiction operations in this area may yield acceptable results and would deny drug traffickers one of three options for the movement of illegal goods.

Illegal narcotics readily flow from either of Colombia’s coastlines on the Caribbean Basin or the Pacific Ocean. For effective intervention to occur, the Colombian military must be able to interdict narcotics shipments flowing through these areas. Once at sea, these shipments become more difficult to identify due to the vast expanses of water that must be controlled. A method to detect, identify, and interdict illegal shipment departing the coast of Colombia should be a Colombian military priority. On the other end, the United States maritime forces should be utilized in areas where drug traffickers seek to enter United States territory. The borders of Mexico and the United States at the Pacific Ocean and in the Gulf of Mexico are two areas that require increased interdiction. Additionally, the geographical proximity and lengthy coastline of Florida make it vulnerable to clandestine infiltration by drug traffickers and therefore require additional interdiction effort.

Aerial interdiction also needs to be addressed by a force capable of detecting, accurately assessing, and interdicting aircraft used to transport illegal narcotics. Like the interdiction of narcotics at sea, aerial interdiction should be focused where it can be most effective, that is, leaving the Colombia and entering the United States. The border with Mexico and the coast of Florida, California, and Texas present an exploitable corridor for drug trafficking organizations.
The United States and other countries impacted by illegal narcotics should develop a multinational organization to identify the locations at which narcotics traffickers are financing their drug operations. A multinational law enforcement team that is capable of enforcing money-laundering laws and seizing the assets of illegal organizations should be developed and utilized to seize any illegal revenue. Once an illegal financing operation that supports the illegal narcotics industry is identified, diplomatic pressure should be used to coerce the country in which it operates to seize those assets used to finance the illegal drug trade. If an offending country will not cooperate after diplomatic efforts, the United States should consider the informational and economic instruments to bring that country into compliance. Confiscated assets should be used as resources to finance the continued war on drugs.

Suggestions for Future Research and Policy

It is time for a change in the way the United States conducts counternarcotics operations with respect to Colombia. For years the United States has spent hundreds of millions of dollars in an effort to stop the cultivation and production of illicit drugs. These costly efforts have not had a significant impact on the flow of drugs into the United States. The instruments of national power have proved to hinder the drug flow into the United States; each has had a separate effect, and each has had limited influence.

It is necessary to achieve a well-balanced combination of the elements of national power in order to approach the problems of instability in the Andean region (Manwaring 2003, 7). Unfortunately, the approach has been “piece meal, ad hoc, and inconsistent” (Manwaring 2003, 7). Help spawned from United States policy has been directed toward the elimination of coca and drug trafficking, but not the central problems that create the
usefulness of such production and traffic—specifically, demand within the borders of the United States. As a result, each of the elements of national power has been limited in its usefulness.

One possibility for improving the usefulness of the instruments of national power is the combination of that paradigm with the application of the center of gravity concept to the war on drugs within the framework of supply and demand. In his strategy research project, Bennett noted that eradication efforts were not able to keep up with new growth in the supply side of drug trafficking (Bennett 2002, 9). Furthermore, the author noted barriers such as the reliance on local governments, militaries, and police forces that possess the will to participate in the United States’ war on drugs when indeed, a struggling government might have a “substantial interest” (Bennett 2002, 10) in turning a blind eye to the drug trade in order to maintain a lifeline of revenue from the United States’ coffers.

Bennett’s analysis concluded that demand is “obviously the true center of gravity at the strategic level” (Bennett 2002, 14) of the United States’ war on drugs, and that past performance demonstrated that America has not effectively reduced the supply of drugs, whereas the small amount of resources given in support of reducing demand has been far more successful than efforts to reduce supply (Bennett 2002, 15).

In a separate strategy research project for the United States Army War College, Colonel G. R. Dunlap also concluded that the United States war on drugs “suffers fatally from ignorance of the market relationship between supply and demand” (Dunlap 2002, iii) and that the United States is failing to achieve the desired success as a “result of a mistaken assessment of the strategic center of gravity in the drug war” (Dunlap 2002, 9).
Dunlap recommended that a demand-side strategy would offer a window of opportunity to assess the failures of current policy while providing a chance to formulate a drug policy that maintains the elements of documented successes and discards unrealistic objectives (Dunlap 2002, 17).

The security of the Colombian state and control of the government will no doubt be a topic of discussion for future analysts and researchers. Future research and analysis will continue to focus on the impact of Plan Colombia and the ARI, as well as any modifications that should be made to the United States counternarcotics policy. Future literature will address the contributions of the Andean Trade Preference Act (ATPA) and the Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act (ATPDEA) and will focus on ways to increase the economic capability of Colombia and its neighboring countries in Latin America.

The Department of Defense has indicated that the threat to the national security of the United States is posed by those who produce, transport, sell, and use illegal drugs. It is therefore necessary that the war on drugs be fought on two fronts, and necessity also dictates that the instruments of national power be put to their best use on both the supply and the demand side of this critically important danger.
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