THE USE OF EFFECTS BASED OPERATIONS IN ASYMMETRIC CONFLICTS

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by

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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)
ABSTRACT

THE USE OF EFFECTS BASED OPERATIONS IN ASYMMETRIC CONFLICTS,
by MAJ Magnus Lindstrom, 82 pages.

Effects-based operations (EBO) increase the effectiveness of military operations against an asymmetric adversary to some extent. The increased effectiveness is achieved through an increased understanding of the enemy and the effects of military actions. However, EBO promises more than it can deliver. The criticism of EBO is focused on three areas: (1) the possibility to predict indirect effects, particularly concerning the will of a population and the decisions leaders make; (2) there is no explanation of how the different national powers are supposed to work together in order to achieve a common goal; and most importantly, (3) the lack of substantive methodology used to reach the ultimate goal of EBO: behavioral change of the adversary. Positive behavioral change cannot be achieved through military means, and EBO does not address this problem in a sufficient way.

Two different conflicts are used as case studies: Operation Motorman in Northern Ireland, 1972, and The Cambodian Incursion, 1970. These conflicts were chosen because they show how the use of military means can radicalize a population and because they also show how tactical and political actions can affect each other, and thus, the outcome of a conflict.
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And finally, I would like to thank my committee, who has struggled with this foreigner to produce this thesis. The committee represented three different viewpoints that created the basis of my thinking: (1) not to state the obvious; (2) you have to explain it in a way that you don’t have to be an expert to understand; and (3) be more critical and answer the “So what?” question. I hope the committee recognizes themselves in their viewpoints because these helped shift my opinion about Effects Based Operations 180 degrees half way through writing my thesis.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE THESIS APPROVAL PAGE</td>
<td>ii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABSTRACT</td>
<td>iii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACKNOWLEDGMENTS</td>
<td>iv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACRONYMS</td>
<td>viii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ILLUSTRATIONS</td>
<td>ix</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TABLE</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purpose</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research Question</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Definitions</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Background to Effects-Based Operations</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assumptions</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limitations</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delimitations</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What Are Effects-Based Operations?</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Definitions of Effects-Based Operations</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summary of Definitions of, and Perspectives on, Effects-Based Operations</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Criticism of Effects-Based Operations</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effects and How They Affect an Adversary</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What is an Asymmetric Conflict?</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guerrilla, Insurgency, and Terrorism</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Connection between Insurgency, Guerrilla Warfare, and Terrorism</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Use of the Term “Asymmetry”</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asymmetric Conflict: A Definition</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Literature about the Conflict in Northern Ireland</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Literature about the Cambodian Incursion</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summary of Literature</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER 3 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research design and thesis methodology</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research tools</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER 4 ANALYSIS ................................................................. 38

Introduction ......................................................................................... 38
Criticism of Effects-Based Operations ................................................. 39
The Conflict in Northern Ireland in the 1960s ...................................... 40
  Background of the Conflict................................................................. 40
  Northern Ireland, an Asymmetric Conflict ........................................ 43
    The British Army in Northern Ireland, 1972 .................................. 43
    The Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) in Northern Ireland, 1972 ..... 44
  Summary of the Conflict Between British Forces and the PIRA, July 1972 .. 48
  Operation Motorman, July 1972 ....................................................... 49
    Bloody Friday, the Triggering Event ................................................ 49
    Goals and End State of the British Army ......................................... 50
    Goals and End State of the PIRA .................................................... 50
    The Conduct of Operation Motorman ............................................. 51
    Effects of Operation Motorman ..................................................... 51
    Direct and Indirect Effects of Operation Motorman and the Use of Effects-Based
    Thinking ............................................................................................. 53
  Planned result or desired end state .................................................... 53
  Conclusions of Operation Motorman ................................................. 55
The Cambodian Incursion ................................................................. 56
  Background to the Vietnam War ....................................................... 56
    The French War in Vietnam ............................................................. 58
    North and South Vietnam and the Start of US Involvement .......... 60
  The Vietnam War, an Asymmetric Conflict ...................................... 62
    The US Armed Forces in South Vietnam, 1970 ............................ 63
    North Vietnam and the VC ............................................................. 64
    Summary of the Conflict Between US forces and North Vietnamese Forces,
    1970 ................................................................................................. 66
  The US and South Vietnam Incursion into Cambodia, May 1970 .......... 68
    The Situation in the Border Area ..................................................... 68
    Goals and End State of the US Forces ............................................ 69
    Goals and End State of the North Vietnamese Forces and the VC .... 70
    The Conduct of the Incursion ......................................................... 71
    Effects of the Cambodian Incursion ................................................. 71
    Direct and Indirect Effects of the Incursion and the Use of Effects-Based
    Thinking ............................................................................................. 75
  Planned result or desired end state .................................................... 75
  Conclusions of the Cambodian Incursion ......................................... 77

CHAPTER 5 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS .................. 78

Conclusions ......................................................................................... 78
Effects Based Operations and the Contemporary Operational Environment ..........80
Recommendations and Further Research ..............................................................82

REFERENCE LIST .................................................................................................83

INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST .............................................................................87

CERTIFICATION FOR MMAS DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT ...............................88
**ACRONYMS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>COE</td>
<td>Current Operational Environment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIME</td>
<td>Diplomacy, Information, Military, Economy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EBO</td>
<td>Effects Based Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRA</td>
<td>Irish Republican Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NVA</td>
<td>North Vietnam Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PIRA</td>
<td>Provisional Irish Republican Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QDR</td>
<td>Quadrennial Defense Review Report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RDO</td>
<td>Rapid Decisive Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SVA</td>
<td>South Vietnam Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VC</td>
<td>Viet Cong</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ILLUSTRATIONS

Figure 1. Objectives-Based and Effects-Based Approaches ........................................... 17
Figure 2. Relationships between Indirect Effects and Objectives ................................. 18
Figure 3. Definition of an Asymmetric Conflict ............................................................. 27
Figure 4. Analyses Tool: Planned and Achieved Effects ................................................. 37
Figure 5. Northern Ireland an Asymmetric Conflict in July 1972 ................................. 48
Figure 6. Planned and Achieved Effects of Operation Motorman .................................. 53
Figure 7. The Vietnam War an Asymmetric Conflict in 1970 ....................................... 67
Figure 8. Planned and Achieved Effects of the Incursion into Cambodia ...................... 75
| Table 1. US Military Personnel Killed in South Vietnam, 1961-1965 | 62 |
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

The news throughout 2003 has focused on the US and coalition global war against terrorism. In addition to this war affecting the daily life of people, it also affects the policy of many nations. Simultaneously, US forces, together with their allies, are fighting an opponent in Iraq who is difficult to identify and thus difficult to defeat. This adversary, using suicide bombings and attacks on the civilian population of Iraq, makes us question how difficult it will be to create a stable and secure environment. It is apparent that winning the wars in 1991 and 2003 was much easier than winning the peace.

The US and its allies are not the first nations to face problems like this. History is full of examples of insurgencies and acts of terrorism in which a nation has faced what today is called asymmetric adversaries. Examples of this are the colonial wars during the twentieth century and the Soviet Union’s intervention in Afghanistan. This thesis will discuss asymmetry and how this term is used today when classifying conflicts.

Evidence suggests that an asymmetric adversary is more difficult to defeat than ordinary military forces. Examples of this are the Falklands War as compared to the terrorism of Northern Ireland, and the Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) compared to the war against terrorism that has followed OIF. Is it only a matter of time and more resources that are needed to defeat these undefined enemies, or is it something else? Democracies may have the resources needed but will they have the time? It is in every nation’s interest not to be trapped in conflicts where one side uses terrorism as the means
to reach its objectives. Thus, the capability for ending these asymmetric conflicts must improve.

As we see problems in defeating an asymmetric adversary, we also see an increased effectiveness among weapons used against conventional adversaries. The greatest increase in effectiveness is the technical development of various systems. These systems, such as laser-guided bombs, provide a possibility to detect, and with high precision, engage targets on the battlefield. Leading this development is the United States, and especially the US Air Force.

The increased effectiveness of the US Air Force is not only due to technical development, but due to the development of the strategic and tactical doctrine for these new systems. This development gave the US forces a great advantage against the Iraqi defense in 2003.

Winning the war and then winning the peace afterwards are two different things. With conventional Iraqi forces defeated, an asymmetric adversary remains. This brings up the question: can a new way of strategic, operational and tactical thinking be used with success in a situation like the one in Operation Iraqi Freedom? This thesis will discuss the use of Effects-Based Operations (EBO) as a method to increase the effectiveness of military operations against an asymmetric adversary.

Purpose

The purpose of this thesis is to analyze whether or not military operations, based on EBO, are an effective method against an asymmetric adversary. Why is this thesis important?
The significance of this study is that it gives the reader a perspective on the use of Effects Based Operations in the type of conflict that is prevalent in the world since the end of the cold war. The methodology of EBO and the term asymmetry is criticized in order to give a deeper understanding of what Effects Based Operations and asymmetry are. Understanding what these two concepts are, will help any commander or planner to fulfill his or her mission on the future battlefield.

Research Question

This thesis will answer the following research question: Can Effects-Based Operations increase the effectiveness of military operations against an asymmetric adversary?

The following secondary questions will be used to support the research question:

1. What are the effects of military operations on an asymmetric adversary?
2. How does one measure the effectiveness of military operations in an asymmetric conflict?
3. In which areas have planners and commanders not identified important effects of planned operations?
4. Will added knowledge and training for the staff be needed to be able to handle the problem of identifying and measuring the effects of military operations?
5. Is it possible to minimize the unknown and unwanted effects of a military operation by using EBO?

Definitions

Asymmetry. The definition and use of the term asymmetry, and its relationship to the term insurgency and guerrilla, is discussed in chapter 2.
Effect. An effect is the physical, functional, or psychological outcome, event, or consequence that results from specific military or non-military actions (JFCOM 2001, ii). A civilian definition: An effect is a change produced by an action or a cause; a result or an outcome” (Oxford Advanced Learner’s 1995).

Terrorism. The calculated use of violence or threat of violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological (JP 1-02, 2003). The UN “academic consensus definition” of terrorism is discussed in chapter 2.

Background to Effects-Based Operations

Depending on the definition of EBO, the historical background of EBO can be found in several places.

Some find their starting point in World War II and the industrial-web theory of the thinkers of the US Army Air Corps. This theory was not unlike the theories of EBO and system-of-systems of today. The idea was to bomb vital links, today referred to as critical nodes. If these were destroyed, it would lead to the collapse of the entire system and victory in the war. These planners of World War II also wanted to break the will of the people through strategic bombing (Mann, Endersby, and Searle 2002, 17).

Others find the origin of EBO in the thinking of Sun Tzu and Clausewitz and argue that good generals and statesmen always have tried to shape their opponents’ thinking rather than defeat his forces (Smith 2002, 103).

The third example can be noted as the US doctrine of AirLand Battle, through its methodology of targeting and value analyses. The doctrine can be seen as a part of the principles of EBO (Murray 2002, 126).
The term EBO comes from the planning of the air campaign against Iraq at the start of operation Desert Storm in 1991. The planners’ focus was on achieving 2d and 3d order effects, which will be discussed later in this thesis, and not only on destroying targets (Murray 2002, 3). But what was it that made it possible to fulfill these “old” ideas of the use of airpower?

Technical development of stealth airplanes and precision munitions made these theories dating back to World War II valid again. David A. Deptula shows how precision makes Effects-Based Operations possible. Deptula compares the use of World War II airpower to the use of airpower during 1991. In World War II, one thousand B-17 airplanes dropped 9,000 bombs on one target. In 1991 one F-117 airplane dropped two bombs on two targets (Deptula 2001, 8). This development of precision and effectiveness in destroying targets without the collateral damage seen during the Second World War has continued. Later during the Air War over Serbia in 1999, one B-2 airplane was capable of hitting sixteen targets with sixteen bombs (Deptula 2001, 8).

EBO is not only about precision and hitting targets. When the US Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) published the Quadrennial Defense Review Report (QDR) in the aftermath of the 11 September 2001 terrorist attack, he described the changing security environment and the need for the United States to be able to master this new environment (Rumsfeld 2001, 2-3). The development of EBO as a method or theory for Joint War fighting by the US can be part of the answer to SECDEF’s demands. The current US service proponent that is developing the concept of EBO is US Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) (Wainwright 2003, 17).
Assumptions

The assumption that it is possible to compare planned or anticipated effects to the actual effects of an operation or campaign is vital for this thesis. Another assumption is that experiences from two different cases will be enough to answer the research question of this thesis.

Limitations

This thesis will be limited to the military instrument of power, and the level will be tactical and operational with effects on the strategic and political level.

Delimitations

This thesis will not discuss EBO as a strategy for war fighting or the implications of EBO in a joint environment, because on this level all the instruments of power are used to reach strategic end states and the time and format for this thesis is not appropriate.

EBO is not seen by all theorists as an overall theory or methodology that can win wars or conflicts on its own. There are connections to other theories, such as System Theory and Network Centric Warfare (NCW). This thesis will not discuss these two theories in depth but acknowledges the following connections between the three theories or methodologies: to understand the enemy and the situation, system theory can be used in analysis; secondly, to affect this enemy-system, EBO is advertised to be the planning tool or methodology to gain desired effects or changes in the behavior of the adversary; thirdly, “In brief, network-centric operations are indeed a means to an end, and effects-based operations are that end” (Smith 2002, xx).
When studying EBO, one comes across the term Rapid Decisive Operations (RDO), and the connection between EBO and RDO is described as follows; “RDO is predicated on effects-based operations (EBO)” (JFCOM 2001, ii). RDO is defined in the same publication:

Rapid Decisive Operations (RDO) is a concept to achieve rapid victory by attacking the coherence of an enemy’s ability to fight. It is the synchronous application of the full range of our national capabilities in timely and direct effects-based operations. RDO employ our asymmetric advantages in the knowledge, precision, and mobility of the joint force against an adversary; critical functions to create maximum shock and disruption, defeating his ability and will to fight. (JFCOM 2001, 2)

RDO will not be discussed in this thesis because the concept is based on EBO, and the connection between the two concepts is not within the purpose of this thesis.
CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW

This literature review evaluates literature written about EBO, asymmetry and asymmetrical conflicts, and about the two cases used in the case study.

What Are Effects-Based Operations?

From its beginning as a US Air Force-centric principle of targeting, EBO has been taken over by US Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) as an important part of future warfare. In the draft of *A Concept Framework for Effects-based Operations*, August 2001, the concept is described as having the following place in Joint War Fighting: “Because EBO is scalable in application across the spectrum of military operations and posits potential bridges to other government and non-government entities, it has far-reaching implications in the conduct of future warfare” (JFCOM 2001, i).

A more recent US report that points to the future importance of EBO is the report of the Defense Science Board (DSB) Task Force on *Discriminate Use of Force*, July 2003. In this report, it is stated that Discriminate Use of Force (DUF) aligns with some of the thinking about EBO, and one of the task force’s recommendations addresses how the Department of Defense can implement EBO or DUF (DSB 2003, 2). Does this mean that the US armed forces are ready to implement EBO, and is there a common understanding of what EBO is?

Even if the *Joint Vision 2020* focuses the services on effects the military can create to achieve *full-spectrum dominance*, there is no commonly agreed-upon lexicon of effects-based terminology within the services (Mann, Endersby, and Searle 2002, 5). This missing lexicon, a theory and process to incorporate EBO in USAF and joint doctrine, are
proposed in the study *Thinking Effects* 2002, by Mann, Endersby, and Searle. If there is no common terminology concerning EBO, it would be interesting to examine some definitions of the term.

**Definitions of Effects-Based Operations**

In order to understand more of what EBO is and what can be achieved by using the methodology, it can be useful to examine some of the definitions given by different sources. The motive for looking at different definitions is that there is no definition agreed upon by the diverse writers on the topic. The conclusion of these definitions will be criticized to create a deeper understanding of the methodology of EBO.

The US Joint Forces Command defines EBO in the following way, 2001:

“EBO is a process for obtaining a desired strategic outcome or “effect” on the enemy through the synergistic, multiplicative, and cumulative application of the full range of military and nonmilitary capabilities at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels” (JFCOM 2001, ii). To give a background and further understanding of the definition, JFCOM presents the following hypothesis which their definition is based on: “**IF** we can anticipate with any degree of certainty how an intelligent adversary should, can or could act to compensate for our actions; and if we can plan, execute assess and adapt our actions in terms of the effects we desire, **THEN** we can identify and execute the most effective course of action in bringing about the desired change in the adversary’s behavior” (2001, ii).

Mann, Endersby, and Searle give the following definition of EBO in their lexicon of effects-based terminology, 2002: “Actions taken against enemy systems designed to
achieve specific effects that contribute directly to desired military and political outcomes” (ACC EBO white paper) (2002, 96).

A different and broader definition that includes parties other than the enemy is given by Edward A. Smith in his introduction of *Effects Based Operations Applying Network centric warfare in peace, crisis, and war*: “Effects-based operations are coordinated sets of actions directed at shaping the behavior of friends, foes, and neutrals in peace, crisis and war” (2002, xiv). As mentioned earlier, the US Air Force started to use the term EBO during the Gulf War in 1991, and one of the Air Force theorists discussing the topic is Brigadier General David A. Deptula. He gives a comprehensive connection between *parallel warfare* and EBO in his text *Effects-Based Operations, Change in the nature of warfare*, 2001. Deptula argues that any political system can be seen as a system of subsystems (2001, 5) and the larger system can be controlled, rather than destroyed, so the influence on strategic events will be dominated (Deptula 2001, 5). Deptula states two ways to achieve this control: first, the use of force to attain specific effects rather than destruction (2001, 6); second, *parallel war*. “Parallel war exploits three dimensions – time, space, and levels of war – to achieve rapid dominance” (2001, 5). The connection between *parallel war* and EBO is that EBO enables parallel war (Deptula 2001, 23). Effects-Based Operations are described as “aiming not just to impede the means of the enemy to conduct war or the will of the people to continue war, but the very ability of the enemy to control its vital functions” (2001, 8). Another source that stresses the idea of seeing the enemy or adversary as a system of systems is the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) in their study; *New Perspectives on Effects-Based Operations* 2001.
IDA states that it should be possible to focus operations more coherently if the adversary is understood as a complex, adaptive system driven by human interactions and not only as a group of physical targets (2001, 4). This system of the adversary consists of all his national powers, not only his military capability (2001, 7). Instead of providing a definition of EBO, IDA stresses the necessity of an initial development of an effects-based thinking to provide a basis for a joint definition of EBO.

Effects-based thinking emphasizes:

- the importance of linking all actions (political, diplomatic, economic, and military) to operational and strategic outcomes;
- continuous assessment of the effect and adaptation, as needed, of plans and actions to the reality of conflict;
- thinking about the implications of actions and operations in terms of their second-, third-, and nth-order effects; and
- thinking about the implications and consequences of effects over time. (2001, 6)

The Institute for Defense Analyses’ definition of effects-based thinking provides a foundation for a future US joint definition of Effects-Based Operations. The next step is to criticize the methodology of EBO, and in order to do that one must first find the common ground for the given definitions and perspectives.

Summary of Definitions of, and Perspectives on, Effects-Based Operations

A summary of the perspectives on EBO given by the five sources above provides an understanding of the foundation of EBO. This foundation consists of at least four parts. First, one can find a joint and interagency perspective that suggests that EBO are conducted by military and nonmilitary capabilities that connect all levels of war. In this context it is also written, or implied, that EBO can be used in peace, crises, and war.
Secondly, the adversary is looked upon as a system of systems and these systems will adapt and react upon actions by the other side. Knowledge of the adversary and capacity for analyzing his systems and predicting his reactions and actions are very important to be able to conduct EBO. The idea of system thinking also concludes that if critical parts of the system are destroyed, destruction of the whole system is not necessary to create paralysis and win the war or control the adversary. The third part of the EBO fundament is the use of effects and how these effects influence the adversary. Understanding effects is so fundamental to EBO that it is discussed later in this thesis. The fourth part is changing the adversary’s behavior or controlling him rather than destroying his military forces or infrastructure.

If all these four parts come together and work as the theorists think, then EBO might give the advantages listed by the Institute for Defense Analyses:

- Mission accomplished at lower cost in lives (theirs & ours)
- Campaigns with greater coherence across the tactical, operational, and strategic levels
- Lesser likelihood of catastrophic surprise or miscalculation
- Clear message of US flexibility to potential adversaries (2001, 36)

But are the theories valid? Some writers criticize EBO, and the next section of this thesis highlights criticism of EBO from different perspectives.

Criticism of Effects-Based Operations

One writer who presents a comprehensive criticism of EBO is Antulio J. Echevarria in his text *Rapid Decisive Operations: An Assumptions-based Critique*, 2001. His critique is focused on Rapid Decisive Operations (RDO) but is also valid for Effects-Based Operations because RDO are based on EBO (JFCOM 2001, ii). Echevarria’s
assessment is based on criticism of five assumptions that are essential for RDO. An understanding of Echevarria’s analysis provides a different perspective on EBO, and this thesis presents Echevarria’s most important view-points.

Echevarria suggests that the assumption that one side can have perfect or almost perfect, continuously updated knowledge about the adversary and his planned actions is faulty (Echevarria 2001, 6). He is joined in this criticism by Carl A. Barksdale who in his text *The Network Centric Operations – Effects Based Operations Marriage: Can it enable prediction of “Higher Order” Effects on the will of the Adversary*, 2002, discusses will of the adversary to fight. According to Barksdale, it is doubtful that any future system will be able to predict what happens in the mind of leaders and what it is that makes them “give up” (Barksdale 2002, 13). Another author who advocates the unreliability of strategic intelligence in the context of EBO is Paul K. Davis in his text *Effects-Based Operations, A Grand Challenge for the Analytical Community* 2001. Davis argues that strategic intelligence often is wrong and that this fact has nothing to do with lack of resources (Davis 2001, 22). He uses ten historical examples of intelligence failures to prove his point (Davis 2001, 23).

The next assumption that Echevarria challenges is that the adversary is a *system of systems* and that even if it is seen as a complex and adaptive system, this assumption might give a wrong impression. According to Echevarria, the term *system of systems* implies that adversary is primarily reactive and that the proactive capabilities are forgotten (Echevarria 2001, 8). Davis also discusses *complex adaptive systems* (CAS), and he uses words as “unpredictability” and “mysteriousness” to describe them (2001, 24-28). Davis thinks that it is difficult to find consistent and general principles
concerning CAS (2001, 27) and that adaptation is a more feasible way than prediction when it comes to operating in CASs (2001, 28)

According to Echevarria, the third faulty assumption that is fundamental for RDO is the capacity to identify and destroy what the adversary values most. This destruction, in the context of system-thinking, will break the enemy’s will to fight and is crucial to fulfilling the ideas of RDO (Echevarria 2001, 9). He means that this implies that the adversary will conform to the same rationality as, for instance, the US, something that cannot be taken for granted (Echevarria 2001, 9). Another perspective on this matter is the argument that there might not be any vulnerable “centers of gravity” in many future conflicts (Davis 2001, 24). Barksdale argues that it is very difficult to determine what it is that leads to the defeat of an adversary. It is implied in his conclusions that the mechanisms are much more complicated than destruction of certain parts of the enemy system (Barksdale 2002, 13-14).

The fourth assumption underlying RDO that is criticized by Echevarria is the capacity to coordinate all elements of national power in an operation. He means that there is no evidence to show how this can be done (Echevarria 2001, 10). A discussion of advantages and disadvantages in integrating the elements of national power under the concept of RDO is also missing (Echevarria 2001, 10).

Besides these four assumptions there is criticism of what can be called the aim of EBO, the change of the adversary’s behavior. First, there is the need to predict the behavior of the adversary in a given situation. Davis argues that this is not possible, and he finds support for this from psychologists, Ross and Nisbett, 1991 (2001, 21). Even if it is possible to predict and even change behavior it might not help in the long run.
One can argue that a change in behavior is only temporary. If the purpose of EBO is to change behavior and if one is satisfied when this change is measured, there is a risk that the wanted end state will not actually be reached. To change behavior might become a survival technique for an adversary. The enemy will change his behavior, wait, and come back when he sees opportunities to reach his goals. This development is probably most likely when the adversary is a terrorist or guerrilla organization with its base within a society that accepts and promotes it.

What is needed instead is a deeper understanding of what really changes behavior. To change behavior, one must exert influence somewhere early in this chain: beliefs – attitudes – intentions – behavior. This theory is presented in Fishbein’s and Ajzen’s research; *Belief, Attitude, Intention and Behavior: An Introduction to Theory and Research* 1975. They show that if one fails to change intention, no change in behavior can be expected (Fishbein and Azjen 1975, 405). The next step is that intentions are based on attitudes determined by salient beliefs (Fishbein and Azjen 1975, 388) and to influence, a change in salient beliefs is the most effective method (Fishbein and Azjen 1975, 387). Now the question arises: how is change in salient beliefs achieved? Two ways of directly influencing beliefs are active participation and persuasive communication (Fishbein and Azjen 1975, 388), neither of which EBO methodology discusses. On the other hand, one can find examples of how salient beliefs and attitudes, which are influenced in a negative way create, for example, terrorists.

Everybody can probably agree that belonging to a distressed group that experiences violent injustice is something that influences one’s beliefs and attitudes. But it is a fact that belonging to a group like that is also something that is a common factor
for producing many terrorists (Silke 2003, 51). Now when the fundamental parts of EBO are discussed one must understand the means. These are effects and how they influence an adversary

**Effects and How They Affect an Adversary**

What does the literature concerning Effects-Based Operations say about effects? This, and criticism of the *effect-thinking*, will be addressed in the following section and it will start with a few definitions.

An effect is defined as “a change produced by an action or a cause; a result or an outcome” (*Oxford Advanced Learner’s* 1995). It is recognized, within the concept of EBO, that one single action can produce more than one effect (JFCOM 2001, 8). This makes it important to understand how these effects are produced, and how they affect the adversary. The focus within EBO is on the effects and not directly on the objective, as shown in figure 1.
Critics of EBO say there is a risk that effects become ends in themselves if there is no clear connection to strategic and political objectives (Echevarria 2001, 7). On the other hand, many argue that EBO is a methodology that enables a comprehensive linking from planning and action to strategic ends (IDA 2001, 48; and Mann, Endersby, and Searle 2002, 51; and Smith 2002, 104).

One action can have multiple effects, and these effects influence the objective as shown in figure 2. But all effects will not act upon the objective directly; some will even affect other objectives and may be counter productive to the desired result.
Objectives only include the desired results while effects include all of the results of actions, including the unexpected and unwanted results (JFCOM 2001, 8). When effects are what influence the objective or result to be achieved, indirect effects must also be considered. This is presented by Mann, Endersby, and Searle in their development of the principles illustrated in figure 2.

![Figure 2. Relationships between Indirect Effects and Objectives](image)


It is very difficult to predict these indirect effects and how they will affect the objective. The further from the initial action, the more difficult it is to predict and measure effects (Mann, Endersby, and Searle 2002, 53). Another thing that makes prediction of effects difficult are the misjudgments that adversaries tend to make of each other. There are many examples through history where an opponent wanted to affect an adversary’s behavior through signals and these were misunderstood (Davis 2001, 22).
In addition to having more or less predictable effects, actions will create unexpected effects (IDA 2001, 48). Examples of unknown effects can be the misjudgments mentioned above. If one follows the logic that even unexpected effects creates indirect effects, then it is impossible to predict the indirect effects caused by these unexpected effects. If the methodology of EBO does not address this problem in a distinct way, it might fool planners and commanders into thinking that they will know all the effects caused by their actions. This is especially important because of what effects tend to do, and this will now be discussed.

Another peculiarity that effects have is that they will cumulate and cascade. Accumulation of effects occurs at the same or at different levels of war as the contributing lower order effects are achieved (JP 3-60 2002, I-6). It is typical for effects to cumulate from lower to higher level (Mann, Endersby, and Searle 2002, 33). The cumulative overall effect is also achieved because actions and their effects cannot be isolated. Effects from one interaction will carry over into the next interaction and there affect the outcome (Smith 2002, 215). Effects also cascade. The cascading nature of effects is that indirect effects usually flow from higher to lower levels of war (JP 3-60 2002, I-7; and Mann, Endersby, and Searle 2002, 34).

Edward A. Smith takes the cascading and cumulative nature of effects a bit further when he states the following about effects spreading:

(1) the effects of any military action undertaken would not and could not be limited to the military outcome of a specific individual engagement; and

(2) the effects of any military action might extend to anyone who could observe that action. (2002, 334)
The assumption that effects do not stay in the military system suggests that knowledge about the adversary’s total system (i.e., culture, political, religious) is crucial.

It is probably a mistake to think that total knowledge can be achieved, because the adversary’s systems are human beings and human beings are very difficult to predict (Davis 2001, 21-28). To observe effects in order to be able to assess outcomes is also difficult because the timeframe for observation can be very complicated to predict (Davis 2001, 26).

An action on the tactical level can make perfect sense, but the indirect effects of the same action can affect the strategic level in a catastrophic way. This is the challenge for the staff and the commander in a future that will include terrorism, insurgencies, guerrilla warfare, low intensity conflicts, and asymmetrical conflicts. The next part of this thesis will look into how some of these expressions are used and defined in the literature.

**What is an Asymmetric Conflict?**

Insurgencies, guerrilla wars, and terrorism have been problems that national states have fought for many years, but what do these terms really mean? Recently the terms asymmetric conflicts, methods, or attacks have been used when discussing conflicts where the two opponents are not of the same strength or organization. Do these new terms mean the same thing as the old terms does? Or are they describing something new? This part of the thesis will answer some of these questions and criticize the term asymmetry through a review of literature on the topic.

**Guerrilla, Insurgency, and Terrorism**

A starting point when trying to understand the term “asymmetry” is the meaning of the terms guerrilla, insurgency and terrorism. The difference between guerrillas and
terrorists is defined in *Terrorism, The Failed Response* 1996, by Geoffrey L. Williams and Alan L. Williams. Williams and Williams refer to Walter Laqueur, 1987 when they state that guerrillas set up military units and fight battles against government units to liberate the countryside. They set up institutions in the liberated areas and engage in open political activities (Williams and Williams 1996, 18). Terrorists operate in small units and are based in cities; they try to not get engage in battles with the government units (Williams and Williams 1996, 18). When it comes to the methods used by these groups, it can be a little more complicated, because guerrilla groups sometimes uses terrorism as a mean to achieve their goals (Williams and Williams 1996, 18). Terrorists, on the other hand, very seldom uses guerrilla tactics because of their location and, more important, lack of sufficient public support (Williams and Williams 1996, 18). This classification is a little bit too straightforward to include all terrorist and guerrilla groups. Take the examples of IRA and ETA and their bombing campaigns against civilian targets and sniping operations against the security forces in the countryside of Northern Ireland and in Spain. Are these organizations guerrillas using terrorism or terrorists using guerrilla tactics? The example of IRA and ETA is given by Bard E. O’Neill in his text *Insurgency & Terrorism: Inside Modern Revolutionary Warfare* 1990, page 26.

Another example given by O’Neill that makes drawing a clear difference between guerrillas and terrorists difficult is the case of Che Guevara. Che Guevara believed that guerrilla operations in cities can only be conducted by small units because of the threat from the government forces (O’Neill 1990, 26). This leads to the term *urban guerrilla* which ads to the confusion when classifying insurgency groups. Carlos Marighella, a leading theorist on *urban guerrillaism* (Laqueur 1977, 188), defines urban guerrilla in his
text Minimanual 1969 as: “A political revolutionary and an ardent patriot, he is a fighter for his country’s liberation, a friend of the people and of freedom” (Laqueur 1977, 219). So far, Marighella’s description falls within the common definition of guerrillas, but in his next paragraph the definition slides over to terrorism because of his choice of targets: “The urban guerrilla follows a political goal and only attacks the government, the big capitalists, and the foreign imperialists, particularly North Americans” (Laqueur 1977, 219).

The target is important for the definitions and O’Neill argues the same basic difference between guerrillas and terrorists as Williams and Williams above. He also defines the targets for terrorists as unarmed civilians (O’Neill 1990, 26). The choice of civilians as targets is a political problem for the terrorist; nobody wants to call themselves terrorists (O’Neill 1990, 27). Instead groups use the term freedom fighter, a term that refers to what they want to achieve, and not referring to the methods as the term terrorism does (O’Neill 1990, 27). If unarmed civilians are the target, what do terrorists or freedom fighters want to achieve by inflicting terror on the indigenous population or in other countries? Sharon G. Williams gives a perspective on these issues in her doctoral dissertation “Insurgency terrorism: Attitudes, Behavior and Response” (1980). First she states that insurgency stands for the use of organized violence to achieve change (1980, 13). Then she argues that terrorism falls into the psycho-political realm while guerrilla warfare belongs to the military realm of insurgency (1980, 15). She uses the term insurgency terrorism and defines it as having three dimensions: the anti regime dimension, the regulatory dimension, and the transnational dimension (1980, 16).
strategy of terrorism, used by insurgencies, has three objectives and these objectives connect to the dimensions mentioned above:

- The provocation of fear or the weakening of morale on the part of the incumbent forces.
- The mobilization of indigenous popular support for the insurgency.
- International publicity in order to foster the recognition of the legitimacy of the insurgents’ goals. (1980, 16)

The central focus of Williams’s argument is that the fear inflicted by the terrorist is used to indirectly create a military overreaction by the state and thus a reaction by the people or someone from the outside. This secondary reaction will bring about the terrorists’ desired end state (1980, 17).

The United Nations has tried to define terrorism in order to be able to use effective international countermeasures. But they have failed because one state’s terrorist is another state’s freedom fighter (UN 2004). Even if there is no agreed upon definition, the UN has an **Academic Consensus Definition** that is comprehensive:

> Terrorism is an anxiety-inspiring method of repeated violent action, employed by (semi-) clandestine individual, group or state actors, for idiosyncratic, criminal or political reasons, whereby - in contrast to assassination - the direct targets of violence are not the main targets. The immediate human victims of violence are generally chosen randomly (targets of opportunity) or selectively (representative or symbolic targets) from a target population, and serve as message generators. Threat- and violence-based communication processes between terrorist (organization), (imperiled) victims, and main targets are used to manipulate the main target (audience(s)), turning it into a target of terror, a target of demands, or a target of attention, depending on whether intimidation, coercion, or propaganda is primarily sought. (Schmid, 1988; and UN 2004, www.unodc.org)

This definition summarizes and broadens the discussion provided by Williams, and it also answers the question of why terrorists inflict terror on the indigenous population or in other countries. It is interesting to see how terrorism, guerrilla warfare and insurgency
connect to each other before asymmetry is discussed. Do other theorists agree with Williams’ supposition that terrorism and guerrilla warfare are conducted within insurgency?

The Connection between Insurgency, Guerrilla Warfare, and Terrorism

Insurgency is seen by O’Neill as the overall term that includes guerrilla warfare and terrorism (O’Neill 1990, 25). It is implied in O’Neill’s text that insurgency is connected to the goals or end state and that guerrilla warfare and terrorism are methods to reach these that depend upon the situation. A perspective on insurgency that supports this is given by Donald W. Hamilton in his text The Art of Insurgency, American Military Policy and the Failure of Strategy in Southeast Asia 1998. He identifies three major tools used in an insurgency: guerrilla operations, selective terrorism, and political subversion (Hamilton 1998, 22). When discussing the result of an insurgency he states that an almost total social change will follow the defeat of an authoritarian regime by an insurgency (Hamilton 1998, 19). The role of the people is stressed by Hamilton: “Without the support of the people there is no revolutionary intent, therefore no insurgency. Insurgency can, in and of itself, be social upheaval, and can be sponsored internally, externally, or both simultaneously” (1998, 19). The term selective terrorism, used above, is important within the context of the quotation of Hamilton. If the terrorist is targeting the people, or innocent civilians, the support for the insurgency will fade away and there will be no success.

Insurgency is an overall term including guerrilla warfare and terrorism as methods to reach a desired end state, but how do these terms connect to asymmetry?
The Use of the Term “Asymmetry”

The US definition of asymmetry found in *Joint Doctrine Encyclopedia* (1997) describes the term as based on US superiority when it comes to attacking an adversary’s vulnerabilities. The term “asymmetric threat” as it is defined in the Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States takes both parties in a conflict into consideration:

**Asymmetric Threats.** Contemporary threats share an important characteristic with past threats. A timeless and fundamental principle of the profession of arms is to avoid the strengths and focus on the vulnerabilities that will most rapidly and decisively cause the opponent’s defeat. The capabilities of American military power make it difficult for any adversary to develop a symmetrical force that mirrors that of the United States. The Armed Forces of the United States must, therefore, expect adversaries whether states or nonstate groups to seek to exploit asymmetries and focus on US vulnerabilities. Combatant commanders must anticipate asymmetric threats in preparing for and conducting joint, multinational, and interagency operations. (JP 1 2000, II-3)

Another definition that helps to explain how the term asymmetry is used is the United Kingdom’s definition of asymmetric attack:

**Asymmetric attack.** Actions undertaken by state or non-state parties (friendly or adversary), to circumvent or negate an opponent’s strengths and capitalize on perceived weaknesses through the exploitation of dissimilar values, strategies, organizations and capabilities. Such actions are capable, by design or default, of achieving disproportionate effects, thereby gaining the instigator an advantage probably not attainable through conventional means. (UK JWP 2003, 0-01.1)

Both the US and the UK definitions focus on the weaknesses or vulnerabilities of the opponent. And this is something that turns up in the criticism of the use of the term asymmetry.

To behave differently than expected by the enemy and attack his weak points can instead be seen as good tactics, operational art, and strategy (Gray 2002, 6). This statement is given by Colin S. Gray in his article “Thinking asymmetrically in times of terror” (2002). Gray argues that since asymmetrical merely means different, it is difficult
to understand why the term has risen to the “latest fashionable Big Idea” (2002, 6). He goes on and states that every one of America’s wars can be called asymmetrical contests (2002, 6).

Another writer who criticizes the widespread use of asymmetry is Stephen J. Blank in his monograph “Rethinking Asymmetrical Threats” (2003). He argues that the terms asymmetry and asymmetric should be reserved for the actual conduct of war, our enemies and their strategies (2003, 1). One of his arguments is that if the US commanders focus on asymmetrical threats, it will deflect them from understanding and countering the strategic challenges they face (2003, 49). As an example, he points to the attacks on 11 September 2001, where a lack of understanding of the enemy’s strategy led to a catastrophic strategic blunder (2003, v).

Others make the assumption that the concept of asymmetry will fade away within a couple of years because it has no utility within defense matters (Lambakis and Kiras and Kolet 2002, 40). In their text Understanding “Asymmetric” Threats to the United States 2002, they criticize the whole concept of asymmetry. They give the term political utility (Lambakis and Kiras and Kolet 2002, 39), but they argue that the use of asymmetry blurs the security picture and oversimplifies complex choices (Lambakis and Kiras and Kolet 2002, 39). Their solution is instead to think like this:

If we want to talk about particularly dangerous weapons, vulnerabilities, or different tactics, we are better served by addressing, for example, particular weapons of mass destruction, the absence of defense against long-range ballistic missiles, or the rise of suicide hijackings or terrorism. (Lambakis and Kiras and Kolet 2002, 39)

So how does insurgency connect to asymmetry? The answer must be that asymmetry is an overall definition of insurgency. The argument for this is that asymmetry
tends to be something “unusual in our eyes” (Gray 2002, 1). And insurgencies are indeed something rather unusual.

Asymmetric Conflict: A Definition

With the background established above, one can ask if an asymmetric conflict is a conflict where either parties or maybe only one party, use multiple asymmetric attacks or threats? And given the criticism of asymmetry, what would an asymmetric conflict look like? Another approach is taken by Edward A. Smith in his book *Effects Based Operations Applying Network Centric Warfare in Peace, Crises, and War* 2002. Smith includes both the level of means and will to fight a war or conflict in his definition:

Figure 3. Definition of an Asymmetric Conflict

This definition stresses the importance of will, and Smith emphasizes that will is more important than means when it comes to the probability of success in an asymmetric conflict.

Smith presents a probability equation that says: “Probability of Success = Means \times Will^2“ (2002, 39). The will is relative, and it is the perceived will of each opponent that counts. The more determined an adversary is, the smaller the means will he need to
succeed (Smith 2002, 38). This definition concludes that if the stronger part continues to fight the weaker part’s already small means, while this strengthens the will of this adversary, the stronger part will not win until all the means are eliminated. If the weaker part concentrates on weakening the will of the stronger adversary, he has a good chance to win. Smith exemplifies his definition with the US experience in Vietnam, the Soviet experience in Afghanistan and the collapse of the Western colonial empires (2002, 36-37).

Examples of means that the weaker adversary can use include all the methods of terrorism. When human beings are ready to die as suicidal bombers, it is very difficult to conquer that enemy by eliminating his means to fight. There must be a method to make his will to fight go away.

**Literature about the Conflict in Northern Ireland**

The literature used to describe Operation Motorman and the conflict in Northern Ireland consists of five books published between 1985 and 2002. The review of this literature will give a brief description of each writer and the content of his book. The main use of each source will be clarified.

David McKittrick and David McVea, authors of *Making Sense of the Troubles*, 2002, are the main contributors to the case study about the conflict in Northern Ireland. This book focuses on the background information of the situation in Northern Ireland from 1921 until today.

*Making Sense of the Troubles* is comprehensively written and gives a brief background of the time period from 1921 to 1963. It focuses on the development of the conflict between 1963 and 2001 and every major event is clearly described, with the
authors giving their explanation as to why it happened. The book includes a detailed, eighty page chronology of important events.

There are no detailed references; instead, the authors refer to their personal experiences and archives: McKittrick’s thirty years of reporting in Northern Ireland and McVea’s teaching experience, also in Northern Ireland. In their bibliographical notes, they also refer to archives in Northern Ireland and more than 500 unnamed books concerning the topic.

The Irish journalist Ed Moloney wrote the book A Secret History of the IRA (2002). This is the second most important source of this thesis because of its information concerning The Troubles. Moloney focuses on the last four decades of the conflict and on one of the leading people within the IRA, Gerry Adams.

One of the most interesting things about Moloney is that he writes about and explains the clandestine discussions that have been going on between the IRA and their opponent over the years. Another interesting section of the book is the appendices of IRA documents, which give firsthand information about the IRA strategy and organization.

More than 550 notes, many stated as information from interviews with IRA activists, republican sources, and British army sources, together with the author’s experiences as a journalist in Northern Ireland since 1978, gives the book a high level of credibility.

Another important source, especially concerning the British army and the conduct of Operation Motorman is Desmond Hamill’s Pig in the Middle. The Army in Northern Ireland 1969-1984, published in 1985. Hamill also has a background as a journalist in Northern Ireland, but in addition, he has been an officer in the British army. His
background as an officer gave him access to reliable sources within the British army when writing his book. Besides his personal experiences as an officer and a journalist, Hamill bases his book on some seventy-five books and ten official publications. He does not use notes.

In his book, *The Irish Troubles*, 1993, Dr. J. Bowyer Bell focuses on the period from 1962 to 1993. His book is very comprehensive, with more than eight hundred pages. He mainly provided information about “Bloody Friday” and the conduct of Operation Motorman to this thesis.

Dr. Bell does not use notes or a reference list, but his nineteen page essay concerning his sources gives a very thorough description of how he conducted his research and what sources he used.

Information about the effects of Operation Motorman comes mainly from Michael L. R. Smith’s *Fighting for Ireland? The Military Strategy of the Irish Republican Movement* (1995). Smith analyzes the evolution of Irish republican strategy over the years and his research is based on a variety of sources. He used almost one thousand notes for little more than two hundred pages of research.


His book’s focus is not on Northern Ireland, but the book is very interesting. At the end there is a twelve page reading list on the topic of terrorism.
Literature about the Cambodian Incursion

Five books, dated between 1972 and 2001, two theses, and a speech delivered by President Nixon in 1970 are the sources for information concerning the Cambodian incursion.


*Vietnam A History* is written without notes; instead, Karnow uses a bibliographic essay in which he describes his sources in each chapter. He also refers to his own personal notes from thirty years of being a journalist, reporting mostly from Asia. Besides being a journalist and scholar, Karnow served in the US Army in the China-Burma-India theater during World War II.

When it comes to details concerning the French and US wars in Vietnam, Edgar O’Ballance’s *The Wars in Vietnam, 1954-1973* (1975) has been a useful source. O’Ballance’s background is in the military. He was a major when he wrote *The Wars in Vietnam, 1954-1973*. His book is very detailed about the number of causalities, unit sizes, and amount of destroyed equipment. The weakness of this book, however, is that O’Ballance does not use notes. Sometimes he refers to sources, but it is done in a way that does not help the reader find the original information.

Professor Jeffrey Kimball’s *Nixon’s Vietnam War* (1998), is the main source of information on the effects in the US from the Cambodian incursion. This book focuses on
how President Nixon fought the Vietnam War, and it is very well researched. More than 1,600 notes support the 370-page manuscript. The sources include ten interviews with Vietnamese officials and a large number of published and unpublished materials.

The second most important source on the effects of the incursion is a monograph by Brigadier General Tran Dinh Tho, the Assistant Chief of Staff J3, of the Joint General Staff, Republican Vietnamese Armed Forces during the time of the incursion of Cambodia. “The Cambodian Incursion” (1983) is one of twenty monographs, in a series called “Indochina Monographs,” published by the US Army.

Besides General Tho, there are two contributing authors to the monograph; Lieutenant General Sak Sutsakhan, the last Chief of State and Chief of the Khmer Armed Forces General Staff, and Colonel Harry O. Amos, US Embassy Phnom Penh. The monograph is based on General Tho’s personal observations and interviews with former members of the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces.

In order to understand more of the background of the situation in Vietnam once the United States got involved, Bernard B. Falls’ book, *Street Without Joy* (1972), is a comprehensive source.

Dr. Fall’s background from the resistance in France during World War II and his research in Indochina during the 1950s gives his book credibility. The fact that it was first published in 1961 and the author’s preface dated 1964 make it even more interesting because it was written before anyone knew the outcome of the Vietnam War.

To more clearly understand how the Vietnamese people were thinking and how the war affected their society, *Vietnam, a Portrait of its People at War* (2001), by David Chanoff and Doan Van Toai is an interesting source. It is a book based on interviews of
people who lived through the war. The main people who can be followed through both the war against the French and the war against the US are: Xuan Vu, a revolutionary who was a combat reporter and propaganda chief; Nguyen Cong Hoan, the only person who served both the Saigon and Hanoi assemblies; and Trinh Duc, a Vietminh member during World War II and the war against the French, who fought the US forces in South Vietnam until the US withdrawal.

The other side of the conflict is the US forces fighting the war in Vietnam. There are, of course, many books telling their story. One of these, which is also about the incursion of Cambodia is, *Incursion* (1991), by J. D. Coleman. Coleman served as a major and information officer with the 1st Air Cavalry Division in Vietnam between 12 April 1969 and 15 April 1970. His tour of duty ended just two weeks before his division started operations within Cambodia. J. D. Coleman retired as a lieutenant colonel and took up a career as a journalist and writer.

**Summary of Literature**

The literature on EBO puts the methodology in its place within the context of future American strategy. It also presents different definitions and basic foundations of EBO. The basic ideas of EBO are then criticized. The criticism of EBO that is presented gives a deeper understanding of methodology; an understanding that is vital in order to be able to answer the research question of this thesis: Can EBO increase the effectiveness of military operations against an asymmetric adversary? The next part of the literature review evaluates literature on effects.

What effects are and what an *effects-based approach* is in comparison to an *objective-based approach*, are two very important distinctions that are described in the
literature on effects. How effects cumulate and cascade, and the existence of undesired effects are also addressed in the literature. The criticism of effects-based thinking consists of the difficulty in predicting and measuring effects. This critique might become more valid when the adversary concerned is asymmetric.

The literature on asymmetry starts with literature concerning insurgency, guerrillas, and terrorism. By putting the terms asymmetry and asymmetric conflict in a well described context in the literature the terms become more understandable.

After definitions of insurgency, guerilla warfare, and terrorism are discussed and put in relation to asymmetry, the use of the term asymmetry is discussed and criticized. A definition of asymmetric conflict brings the literature review on theory to an end. The final part of the review covers the two cases that connect the theory to reality.

The first case is Operation Motorman in Northern Ireland, 1972. The literature concerning this case describes the modern history of Northern Ireland, especially the time period from 1960 and onwards. Many of the chosen authors have personal experiences from living in Northern Ireland during the conflict.

The literature regarding the second case, the US incursion of Cambodia, comprises the history of Vietnam and stories from its people at war, as well as facts about the operation and its effects.

The cases place the theories concerning EBO and asymmetry in two different contexts, the conflict in Northern Ireland and the Vietnam War. The diversity of the chosen conflicts helps to understand the theories and the complexity when it comes to predicting the effects of tactical actions.
CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The methodology used in this thesis is comparative analysis. A comparison of two case studies of asymmetric conflicts against the theory of EBO will be undertaken. This chapter describes the research tools, the research design, and the methodology used in this thesis.

Research design and thesis methodology

The first phase of research was to define EBO and asymmetrical conflict. This was done by studying literature, US government papers and works on the subject.

The next phase was finding two different cases that fit the definition of asymmetrical conflict. This was accomplished by discussing different cases with experts in this subject matter. Following these discussions, relevant literature was studied. The existing literature was reviewed in chapter 2.

Within the asymmetric conflict one clearly defined operation was selected. This made it possible to analyze the cascading or cumulating effects within the weaker party’s system or organization.

The third phase was to define the stronger part’s planned military objectives in the defined operation. These were compared to the real results that were achieved in the conflict.

Following this phase, analysis was made by tracing these achieved effects back to the military operation using the EBO principle of 2d and 3d order effects. If this is possible, then it must be feasible to foresee many of these effects in the initial planning.
The fifth and final phase is a discussion of the conclusions from the analysis in the context of the ongoing conflict in Iraq.

**Research tools**

This thesis is a case study where a new methodology, EBO, is applied to analyze the effects of the use of military means. There are three sources for information. First, texts are used to find information about EBO methodology, asymmetric conflicts, and the effects of the use of military power.

Secondly, US government and other organizations’ “white papers” and in some cases, doctrine are used to find information about the development of EBO and the ongoing discussion concerning asymmetry in conflicts.

The last source of information is the plans for the military operations used as cases as found in texts.

**Analysis Tool**

The analysis tool used is developed to separate the desired result from the achieved effects of a certain military operation, see figure 4. If the achieved results differ from the anticipated results, the next step of analysis is to trace the reason for this discrepancy. The third part of the analysis is to find out if a change of methodology to EBO would have helped the planners and commanders to foresee the effects. The final part of the analysis is then to answer the research question: Can EBO increase the effectiveness of military operations against an asymmetric adversary?
The model of 2nd and 3rd order effects as showed in figure 3 will be used to follow the effects through the system of the asymmetric adversary.

The analyses of whether EBO would have helped to foresee the actual effects conclude each case study.

As showed, in figure 4, are the indirect effects gathered together and there is no distinction between 2nd and 3rd order effects. This is done because the difficulty in separating the different levels of effects.
CHAPTER 4
ANALYSIS

Introduction

The analysis is divided into two parts, first the conclusion of the criticism of Effects Based Operations will be presented, and then two case studies will be presented and analyzed.

The cases chosen for this case study are two tactical level operations in different, modern, asymmetrical conflicts. The conflicts have had a great influence on the North American, Asian, and European continents during the last decades and they are still controlling many people’s everyday lives. The asymmetrical conflicts in this case study are the Vietnam War and the conflict between the authorities and the insurgents in Northern Ireland.

The operations selected in this case study are Operation Motorman, 1972, in Northern Ireland and the Cambodian Incursion, 1970. These operations have been chosen because the conflicts are very different from each other; thus, they will provide varying insights into the discussion about Effects-Based Operations in asymmetrical conflicts. The most important difference, except the size of the operations, is that the Northern Ireland case is mostly a domestic issue while the incursion into Cambodia involved world politics between superpowers. Secondly, the support from the British and American people were different; thus, the effect of this support was also different in the two cases.

Each conflict will be briefly presented, with the focus then turning to a single operation and the planned and achieved effects of this operation. There will be no discussion or analysis concerning the outcome or solution of the conflict. Instead, the
discussion will focus on whether an effects-based methodology would have made it possible to foresee all the effects of the operation, and thus increase the effectiveness of the operation. The analysis will be made case by case and underlying conclusions will be presented. These conclusions will then be used in the concluding discussion of chapter 5 where they will be put in the framework of EBO presented in chapter 2 of this thesis.

Criticism of Effects-Based Operations

Even if some of the criticism of EBO is severe, as showed in chapter 2, *change of salient beliefs* is fundamental and thereby the desired behavioral change. The rest of the criticism will probably have to change when the problem of changing salient beliefs is solved. Until Effects-Based Operations methodology develops into a methodology that addresses change of beliefs and attitudes, it will probably not reach the desired end states. It will only attack the symptoms and not the underlying reasons. The greatest challenge when it comes to bringing about this change will probably be to adjust to new time-frames. It is implied in most of the literature that EBO, and RDO, will lead to faster conflict solutions, which must be seen as a contradiction to changing salient beliefs and attitudes. As presented in the literature and reviewed in chapter 2, the will to fight is more important than the means to fight, and the will to fight is based on salient beliefs. EBO, as described in the literature, are focused on achieving effects mainly through means. These effects then create a behavioral change. There is no connection between effects on means and “active participation” or “persuasive communication” that is the method for changing salient beliefs. Instead, the literature shows that use of military force can radicalize a group of people and thus create a situation with more violence. An example of this is the
conflict in Northern Ireland, where the use of military force quite obviously radicalized the situation.

The Conflict in Northern Ireland in the 1960s

Background of the Conflict

The most recent cycle of violence in Northern Ireland, which started in the 1960s, is referred to as *The Troubles*. By 2001, *The Troubles* had caused 3,680 deaths, of which 1,012 security forces (McKittrick and McVea 2002, 327), and had inflicted enormous economic damage to British and Northern Ireland societies. But the problems didn’t just start 1969, there is a historical context. The roots of the current troubles can be traced back to the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, when the British built a protestant garrison in catholic Ireland. The garrison was to protect the British mainland from her catholic enemies, France and Spain (McKittrick and McVea 2002, 2). During and after World War I, the Irish Republican Army (IRA) fought the War of Independence, which resulted in a treaty between Irish nationalist and the British government in 1921 (McKittrick and McVea 2002, 4); thus, the Irish Free State was born and Northern Ireland’s tumultuous history began. Between June 1920 and June 1922, 428 people were killed in Northern Ireland, two-thirds of whom were Catholic (McKittrick and McVea 2002, 4). This has greatly influenced the modern history of Northern Ireland.

The borders of Northern Ireland were drawn to create a simple protestant majority (McKittrick and McVea 2002, 5). This led to a Unionist (protestant), one-party rule (McKittrick and McVea 2002, 6) and a catholic minority that was politically and economically discriminated against during the twentieth century (Wilkinson 2002, 31). The conflict in Northern Ireland in the 1960s consisted of four basic elements: the two-
thirds protestant majority, the catholic minority, and the governments of Britain and Ireland trying to hold Northern Ireland at arm’s length (McKittrick and McVea 2002, 2).

Of Northern Ireland’s 1.5 million inhabitants in the 1960s, the protestant majority saw themselves as British and almost all voted for the Unionist party. The Protestants dreaded a development toward a united Ireland (McKittrick and McVea 2002, 2). On the other hand, the catholic minority viewed themselves as Irish and believed that the natural political solution for the island was a united Ireland (McKittrick and McVea 2002, 2). Intermarriage was rare between the groups and in the 1960s, they regarded themselves as separate entities, by which the Protestants enjoyed political and economic dominance (McKittrick and McVea 2002, 2). This situation and influences from a variety of events, including the Civil Rights Movement in the United States, was going to have a violent effect on Northern Ireland over the next three decades.

Through their political dominance, the protestant majority changed the election system in 1936, so that the Unionist party gained greater representation than the Nationalist party in the Northern Irish parliament (McKittrick and McVea 2002, 8). This system made the argument, “one man – one vote,” one of the most potent demands of the Northern Irish civil rights movement (McKittrick and McVea 2002, 38). In the late 1960s, the civil rights movement in Northern Ireland imitated American Civil Rights’ protesters and the song We Shall Overcome was sung during demonstrations (McKittrick and McVea 2002, 7 and Moloney 2002, 356). These demonstrations and the demands from the catholic population scared some Unionists, who saw it as the start of a revolution and a front for the IRA (Wilkinson 2002, 31). Protestant extremists answered these demands with the use of violence in 1966, which lead to three deaths (McKittrick
and McVea 2002, 35). On 5 October 1968, pictures showing police violence against
demonstrators were broadcast over national television; thus, radicalizing the situation
(Moloney 2002, 354). From then on the situation in Northern Ireland became more and
more violent and in 1969, the British government decided to deploy troops to calm the
situation. The arrival of British soldiers was seen by many nationalists as a huge political
victory over the Unionist government in Belfast (Moloney 2002, 356). That would soon
change, however, and lead to the most violent year during *The Troubles*, 1972, with 497
killed (McKittrick and McVea 2002, 82, 327). With an increasing number of British
soldiers in Northern Ireland the desired outcomes of the Catholics and Protestants in 1972
should be summarized.

The nationalists or republicans, most of them Catholics, wanted a united Ireland
governed by an Irish parliament in Dublin. The unionists or loyalists, most of them
Protestants, wanted a Northern Ireland governed by a unionist majority parliament at the
Stormont. The British government wanted *power-sharing* between the catholic minority
and the protestant majority. The British standpoint is articulated in the writings of British
Prime Minister Heath:

> In order to give Catholics a real stake in society, it was not enough for
> them to be protected from discrimination. They also had to be given a positive
> role in governing the country in which they lived. I also believed that the
> Republic of Ireland had to be brought into the relationship once more.
> (McKittrick and McVea 2002, 73)

Before the analysis continues with Operation Motorman, 1972, the two
belligerents; the British army and the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA), and the
situation leading up to the operation will be described.
Northern Ireland, an Asymmetric Conflict

In the early 1970s there were four belligerents in Northern Ireland; republicans (PIRA), loyalists, Northern Ireland security forces, and the British army. The case study of Operation Motorman, involves only two; the British army and the PIRA. The other two belligerents had significant influence on events leading up to July 1972, however they will only be referenced in their effects on these events.

The British army and the PIRA will be described in terms of will and military means to fight each other. This perspective was chosen in order to use Smith’s definition of an asymmetric conflict (chapter 2) in the analysis.

The British Army in Northern Ireland, 1972

Before the late 1960s the British government did not pay much attention to Northern Ireland and its growing problems (McKittrick and McVea 2002, 2). The Northern Ireland Parliament at Stormont that was responsible for internal affairs, while London dealt with defense and foreign affairs (Hamill 1985, 12). This system created an “enormous chasm of understanding between the Stormont and Westminster Governments” (Hamill 1985, 13) when it came to understanding the Northern Ireland situation and using the British army in security operations. Initially, Britain’s political will and understanding of the situation was not very good, this in spite of the British counter insurgency experiences from many colonial wars. But as the army got more and more involved, one must argue that Britain’s will to solve the problem was very strong. The British Prime Minister assumed that he had the political backing to go ahead with Operation Motorman with a maximum of 100 casualties (Hamill 1985, 115). Another evidence of Britain’s will was the ending of the Stormont Parliament on 28 March 1972.
It was obvious to the British government that the unionist majority could not master the increasing problems in Northern Ireland and London took over political leadership (McKittrick and McVea 2002, 81). The British will to solve Northern Ireland’s problems was strong in 1972, but what about their military means?

British determination to solve the conflict resulted in the increasing deployment of forces. In the spring of 1969, there were 2,500 troops at the British garrison in Northern Ireland (Hamill 1985, 12). This increased to 17,000 in the beginning of 1972, and by the end of that year, the British forces consisted of 29,000 men (McKittrick and McVea 2002, 83).

The British force had the will and means to fight an insurgency, but what about their opposition, the PIRA?

The Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) in Northern Ireland, 1972

To understand the will of the Irish Republican Army (IRA) and the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) to fight the Security Forces and the British Army in 1972, one must look into the situation in Northern Ireland during 1971 and 1972. There were three events that triggered the violence in 1972; the practice of internment without trial, the events of Bloody Sunday, and the end of the Northern Ireland Parliament (Stormont) (McKittrick and McVea 2002, 82). To these a fourth factor can be added, the no-go areas, created in Londonderry and Belfast by the PIRA. These no-go areas were to become the target for Operation Motorman.

Internment without trial was reintroduced in an operation on 9 August 1971, as a method to fight the IRA. It had been used with success in the 1950s to stop the IRA border campaign (McKittrick and McVea 2002, 65, 67, 252). This time, though, because
of bad intelligence, internment was very ineffective. This meant that 2,400 people were
arrested in six months and most of them were freed shortly thereafter (McKittrick and
McVeia 2002, 68). The result of this was increased violence. Before 9 August, 31 people
were killed in 1971; however, during the rest of August, 35 people died due to violence
between different organizations (McKittrick and McVeia 2002, 69). Internment was not
used against loyalists and, therefore, was seen as a political device by the catholic
population (McKittrick and McVeia 2002, 70). The effect of this was that many young
Catholics were radicalized and the recruitment for the IRA and the PIRA increased
(Moloney 2002, 361).

A civil rights march held against internment, on Sunday, 30 January 1972,
(Moloney 2002, 362) changed the course of the history of Northern Ireland. On this day,
known as Bloody Sunday, fourteen catholic demonstrators died as British soldiers opened
fire. Young, catholic men were driven in to paramilitary groups as a result of Bloody
Sunday (McKittrick and McVeia 2002, 76). The event paralyzed political life in Northern
Ireland as catholic politicians left (McKittrick and McVeia 2002, 77). This indirectly
caused the British government to take over the political leadership in Northern Ireland.

The Northern Ireland Parliament at Stormont could not deliver security and
political progress, and was closed on 28 March 1972. The British government took over
political leadership (McKittrick and McVeia 2002, 81-82). Losing political power and the
insecurity and uncertainty that followed, pushed thousands of Protestants toward
paramilitarism (McKittrick and McVeia 2002, 83). The situation with Catholic and
Protestant terrorism against the indigenous population, coupled with security forces
unable to protect society, led to the next step in impending violence.
The creation of barricades and no-go areas was a reaction of the paramilitary groups that tried to protect their religious group from the extremists of the other group. In the beginning of July 1972, the loyalists built barricades to protect protestant areas, but these were soon taken down because there was no real need for them and the loyalists did not want to start a shooting war with British forces (Bell 1993, 335). The republicans had used barricades since 1968 (Moloney 2002, 354), and in 1972, these barricaded areas had developed into PIRA mini-states (Smith 1995, 110). These areas protected the population against sectarian violence and assassinations by Protestant extremists. They also constituted safe areas and were important for the development of the PIRA’s military strength (Hamill 1985, 113); a military strength that consisted of the means and will to fight the British forces.

Northern Ireland’s minority of approximately 500,000, people had no political or economic power because of a system that discriminated against them. Living in a situation that got more and more violent, and with a security force they did not trust, created a strong will within the minority to change this hopeless situation. The Catholics had the will, but without a working political system some extremists turned to violence and terrorism as a solution. This group of extremists grew when the situation radicalized, but what military means did they have?

The PIRA began organizing for war in 1970, but it was in 1972, when the need for modern weaponry grew and contacts with Libya made it possible, that the organization really armed itself (Moloney 2002, 8). The PIRA weaponry in the beginning of the Troubles was mainly small arms dating back to World War II, but in 1971 this changed and IRA started to acquire AR-15s (Armalites) from the American black market.
(Moloney 2002, 114). The idea was to arm the IRA (PIRA) better than the British army. In May-June 1972, 200 Armalites arrived in Belfast; enough to arm every active-service unit (ASU) in the city (Moloney 2002, 115). Besides the Armalite, the car bomb is one of the infamous weapons of the IRA.

The car bomb was introduced early 1972, and it enabled the IRA (PIRA) to increase the amount of explosives used in each operation while decreasing the number of operatives that were exposed (Moloney 2002, 115). The explosives used in the car bombs were based on fertilizer and were easy to obtain. Fertilizer-bombs were also used as land mines and in the early summer of 1972, rural patrolling by motorized British units was very hazardous (Moloney 2002, 116). How many gunmen did the PIRA have to use this weaponry?

The number of PIRA operatives was thought to be around 500 in March 1972, and these numbers increased to around one 1,500 three months later (Hamill 1985, 113) as a result of the radicalization of the situation. The military means of the PIRA in the summer of 1972 consisted of one 1,500 operatives armed with modern automatic rifles, car bombs, and land mines.
Summary of the Conflict Between British Forces and the PIRA, July 1972

Using Edward A. Smith’s definition of an asymmetric conflict gives the figure 5 analysis of the Northern Ireland situation in the summer of 1972.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>British Forces</th>
<th>PIRA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Means</strong></td>
<td><strong>Means</strong> VS.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• &gt;20,000 soldiers</td>
<td>• App. 1,500 gunmen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• NI security forces</td>
<td>• Assault rifles (AR-15)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Armored vehicles</td>
<td>• Car-bombs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Will</strong></td>
<td><strong>Will</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Strong political will to find a political solution</td>
<td>• A long period of discrimination and violence leading to hopelessness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• The conflict taking place outside mainland Britain</td>
<td>• 500,000 Catholics supporting the “cause”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• The defense of the homes and lives of the catholic population</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 5. Northern Ireland an Asymmetric Conflict in July 1972

*Source of the model:* Edward A. Smith 2002, 34.

The British forces superiority in terms of means was overwhelming even if the PIRA believed that the Armalites would make them better armed than the British soldiers (Moloney 2002, 115,116). When it came to the will to fight, British political will was and had been strong, which was illustrated by the commitment of different British governments over the past thirty years. This will was the result of the majority of the people in Northern Ireland wanting to belong to Britain and Northern Ireland wanting to be a part of Britain and not a colony.
The catholic community, on the other hand, was pushed by the political system into a situation of hopelessness and had nothing to lose. Boosted by years of perceived discrimination and underlying hate, their will to fight was very strong.

Even if the will was strong on both sides, one can argue that the republicans had a relatively stronger will because of the hopelessness of their situation. Thus, one can state that the conflict in Northern Ireland was an asymmetrical conflict using Edward A. Smith’s definition. What happened in July 1972, when the British forces conducted a decisive operation and these two belligerents met?

Operation Motorman, July 1972

Bloody Friday, the Triggering Event

On Friday 21 July 1972, the PIRA conducted an operation that was intended to pressure the British back to the negotiation table (Moloney 2002, 117); however, it had the opposite effect. The method of choice for the operation was car bombs. In a little over an hour, the PIRA detonated twenty-two bombs in the center of Belfast, which resulted in nine deaths and about 130 injuries, the majority catholic civilians (Bell 1993, 339). The idea was to warn the Security Forces, so they could empty the streets before the explosions, but this did not happen and the operation was a catastrophe for the PIRA (Moloney 2002, 117; and Bell 1993, 339).

Due to the bombing the British government got the political support and justification it needed for overtaking the PIRA “no-go areas” in Belfast and Derry (Bell 1993, 340). Everything was set for Operation Motorman.
Goals and End State of the British Army

The security forces wanted to shift the focus from security matters to the first step in establishing a political process (Bell 1993, 340). As agreed upon the British and Irish governments, this political process would eventually lead to power-sharing between catholic and protestant groups in the province (McKittrick and McVea 2002, 73). To be able to do that, they had to dominate the areas that were in extremists’ hands and neutralize their influence on events (Hamill 1985, 115). It was made clear that the operation was neither punitive nor repressive (Hamill 1985, 115), and the fact that the army was coming to take over the no-go areas was announced on radio and television (Bell 1993, 340). The British forces wanted to be seen as a liberating force, liberating the people from the catholic and protestant extremists (Hamill 1985, 115).

The focus on terrain, instead of the enemy, meant that the PIRA gunmen could get away after the warnings, and the British army avoided a full-scale war.

Goals and End State of the PIRA

PIRA’s goal is and was a united Ireland, but they decided not to defend against a decisive British attack on the no-go areas (Bell 1993, 340). The reason for this was the overwhelming force that the British army used; there was no possibility for the PIRA gunmen to win a battle against 26,000 soldiers. However, at the same time the new Armalites, car bombs, the land mines made the PIRA very self-confident, and they thought that they could win a guerrilla war against the British forces (Moloney 2002, 116). They believed this victory would lead to their ultimate goal, a united Ireland.
The Conduct of Operation Motorman

Operation Motorman, 31 July 1972, included 26,000 troops and was the largest British military operation since the invasion of Suez, 1956 (Bell 1993, 340). Besides the army, with armor vehicles and four specialized tanks for breaching the barricades the operation involved the Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force (Bell 1993, 340 and Hamill 1985, 113,114).

Just before midnight on 31 July, the Centurion tanks were brought forward to breach the barricades in Londonderry and Belfast (Bell 1993, 341). The tanks were withdrawn and soldiers went in to occupy streets, and other key areas all over the province. The most important point when using military forces was the experiences gained from internment; this time the operation was conducted both in protestant and catholic areas alike (Hamill 1985, 117).

Even if the operation was announced beforehand in the media by British forces, and the planners tried to avoid the impression of a military occupation by armored vehicles like the Soviet operation in Czechoslovakia in 1956 (Hamill 1985, 116), it must have been quite an experience to wake up in these areas with British soldiers all over the neighborhood. What were the results and effects of the operation?

Effects of Operation Motorman

The direct effects of the operation were very few casualties and limited arms finds (Bell 1993, 341), but the indirect effects caused a decisive blow against the PIRA (Smith 1995, 110). The most important indirect effects on the PIRA were; the lost propaganda value of the no-go areas, curtailed freedom of movement, and the shattering of the hard-core operatives (Smith 1995, 110; and Moloney 2002, 128). The British security forces
did improve their intelligence on the PIRA by getting back into the no-go areas (Moloney 2002, 117). One year after Operation Motorman, approximately 500 IRA (PIRA) members were convicted in court. This had secondary effects upon the “provisionals.” Eight members were convicted to life in prison and the rest averaged four years in prison (Moloney 2002, 128). Other effects were loss of military momentum for the PIRA which lead to lower rate of attacks in the period after the operation (Smith 1995, 110). All these effects were good from a British perspective, but the operation had at least one negative indirect effect on the British government. The PIRA shifted focus from attacking the security forces in Northern Ireland to a more indirect approach and started to attack civilian targets on the British mainland using terrorism (Smith 1995, 123,124,125).
**Direct and Indirect Effects of Operation Motorman and the Use of Effects-Based Thinking**

An analysis of planned results and the actual achieved effects, mentioned above, of Operation Motorman gives the result shown in figure 6.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level</th>
<th>Before operation</th>
<th>After operation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Planned result or desired end state</td>
<td>Effects on the PIRA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Direct effects</td>
<td>2nd-Nth order effects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategic:</td>
<td>- Political power sharing between Catholics and Protestants</td>
<td>- Lost propaganda value of no-go areas</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Operational:| - Neutralize extremists influence on events  
- Operation includes protestant and catholic areas, liberation from extremists | - Lost military momentum, fewer operations  
- Areas open for British intelligence operations | - Many operatives convicted for crimes within one year after the operation |
| Tactical:   | - Occupying no-go areas  
Focus on terrain, not the enemy  
- The operation was announced  
- Show that the security forces were impartial | - Few arrested PIRA gunmen  
- Shattering of PIRA operatives  
- Few casualties and arms finds | - Curtailed freedom of movement for PIRA gunmen |

**Figure 6. Planned and Achieved Effects of Operation Motorman**

There were many desired effects of Operation Motorman. The operation had decisive effects on the republican extremists; influence on the development in Northern Ireland. The key reason for the mainly positive tactical result, was the British army’s
focus on terrain and not on the PIRA gunmen. Given their experiences with internment and Bloody Sunday, it was a very wise decision to warn the population, and thus, the PIRA gunmen of the operation.

The announcement of Operation Motorman is an example of how British forces, through an understanding of the probable secondary effects of a gun battle with the PIRA, avoided the negative political effects that many civilian causalities would have had. The numbers of PIRA gunmen casualties was very low, as few extremists were arrested, but through the secondary effects of British intelligence operations this changed.

Access to the previously closed no-go areas gave Security Forces information that lead to the conviction of many PIRA gunmen within a year of Operation Motorman. The indirect effects of these intelligence operations were probably the most important result of the operation. These two examples of positive direct and indirect effects shows that Operation Motorman can be considered as partly an EBO, but what about undesired effects?

The loss of the no-go areas limited the PIRA operations in Northern Ireland, and made them shift their focus to mainland Britain. The PIRA strategy was to make the English people take responsibility for the Irish problem and force the British Parliament to decide upon a British withdrawal plan from Northern Ireland (Smith 1995, 124). Terrorism was used to make this happen and the question, based on an EBO approach, is if this could have been foreseen?

Given the background of earlier republican bombing campaigns in Britain, the first dating back to 1860s and 1880s (Moloney 2002, 38; and Smith 1995, xiv), and the most recent in 1939 (Moloney 2002, 538 and Smith 1995, 124), it was possible to predict
the change in PIRA focus. This thesis will not discuss to what extent predictions were made by the British planners, instead, it will conclude that by using EBO methodology it would have been possible to foresee the PIRA’s change of focus from mostly military targets in Northern Ireland, to terrorism against the civilian population on mainland Britain.

**Conclusions of Operation Motorman**

Operation Motorman demonstrates both how tactical level, Effects-Based Methodology helps in achieving political goals, and how military success can have long-term negative effects on a society. The direct and indirect effects on the PIRA were devastating when it came to the means to fight the British forces and the loss of the propaganda value of the no-go areas. The effect on the will to fight was not as severe; however, as demonstrated by the continuous fighting in Northern Ireland and extension of the area of operations to include terrorism on mainland Britain. It was the knowledge and understanding of the situation that made the British Army terrain oriented and not enemy oriented during Operation Motorman. Warning the PIRA gunmen prevented decisive gun battles among the catholic population, something that would have likely caused many civilian casualties and severe political implications. This is a clear example of how Effects-Based Methodology works on a tactical level with positive effects on both the strategic and political level. On the other hand, Operation Motorman proves that military success in an asymmetric conflict can make the adversary change methods to achieve desired end state. The civilian- targeted bombing campaigns conducted by the PIRA on mainland Britain were clearly the most undesired effect of Operation Motorman. Operation Motorman illustrates that Effects-Based Operations on a tactical
level, against an asymmetrical adversary (insurgent), increases the effectiveness of military operations.

The Cambodian Incursion

Background to the Vietnam War

A brief explanation of the modern history of Vietnam and the Vietnam War will help place the Cambodian Incursion in a historical context and lead to a better understanding of why the United States decided to invade neutral Cambodia in 1970. To many people, the Vietnam War was a conflict between the United States and Communist North Vietnam during the 1960s and early 1970s. This conflict is best known for the fact that the mighty superpower lost to the small, poor nation.

The common history of Western Europe and Vietnam started in the 1400s and 1500s, as European powers needed to find their own source of spices without having to rely on their Muslim adversaries (Karnow 1997, 69). There were religious motives besides the need for spices. Memories of aborted Crusades stimulated European leaders and in the late 1700s there were plans for a Christian empire in Asia under French auspices (Karnow 1997, 68).

It took France about one hundred years to conquer Vietnam and around 1900 the country was a French colony (Karnow 1997, 68) providing rubber, coal, and rice (Karnow 1997, 129) to France. Another important source of Vietnamese income was opium and in the early 1900s opium accounted for one-third of the income of the colonial administration (Karnow 1997, 128). The French colonizers were not the first to influence the Indochinese peninsula. As the name Indochina implies, Chinese and Indian interests had influenced the area for centuries before the European powers even knew that Asia
existed (Karnow 1997, 110). Wars plagued the area for years, and the Vietnamese people evolved into “a breed of warriors” who were used to defending themselves (Karnow 1997, 111), something the French and American forces were later to find out.

The protests against French colonial rule started with Vietnamese nationalistic movements during the early 1900s. This developed into a cohesive communist movement lead by Ho Chi Minh and the creation of the Indochinese Communist Party in 1929 (Karnow 1997, 136). The creation of a communist, anticolonial movement that took over from the early nationalistic movements was the result of “primitive French capitalists that drove Vietnamese nationalists to extremes” (Karnow 1997, 130). The situation deteriorated even more as the depression during the 1930s influenced the prices on the raw materials produced in Vietnam (Karnow 1997, 136). Soon, the next invader came; the Japanese.

Japanese forces crushed Vietnam’s French administration in 1940. Ho Chi Minh aligned his movement with the Allies despite the strain it caused between Vietnam and the Soviet Union, which had an agreement with Germany not to attack Axis forces (Karnow 1997, 138). Ho Chi Minh’s only concern was Vietnam. His strategy was based on an Allied victory and the belief that Vietnam would be rewarded with independence after the war (Karnow 1997, 138). In 1941, this strategy led to the creation of the Vietminh, a guerrilla movement that fought against both Japanese and French forces (Karnow 1997, 138). The Vietminh were the only forces in Vietnam that were pro-Allied; thus, they received some support from the United States (Fall 1972, 26). Eventually, the Second World War ended and the implementation of the peace agreement in Vietnam had a significant influence on the future.
The Allies had planned the disarmament of the Japanese forces in Vietnam to be carried out by the British in the South, and Chinese forces in the North. This plan was “a formula for catastrophe” (Karnow 1997, 163). The Vietminh exploited the power vacuum created after Japan’s surrender and before the Allied forces took control (Fall 1972, 26). On 2 September 1945, Ho Chi Minh declared Vietnam an independent state, borrowing a passage from the American Declaration of Independence (Karnow 1997, 146). Despite Ho Chi Minh’s assertion, several weeks later a British commander publicly declared that “civil and military control by the French is only a question of weeks” (Karnow 1997, 163). The country was in violent chaos, and atrocities were conducted by both French soldiers, freed after captivity by the Japanese, and Vietminh terrorists (Karnow 1997, 163-165). The Communist Vietminh took over more and more of the country from Vietnamese nationalists (Karnow 1997, 165-167 and Fall 1972, 27), but in February 1946, a French expeditionary force consisting of two divisions was allowed in to Vietnam (Fall 1972, 27). The military situation in early 1946 can be described as:

The French forces sent to Indochina were too strong for France to resist the temptation of using them; yet not strong enough to keep the Viet-Minh from trying to solve the whole political problem by throwing the French into the sea. (Fall 1972, 27)

The French did indeed use their force and this was the start of a long war that the Communist Party of Vietnam saw as one war divided into two phases, one against the French and one against the US (Chanoff and Toai 1996, 3).

The French War in Vietnam

In the beginning of the war, the French tried to take on all Vietminh forces in a series of classic pincers; the Vietminh suffered heavy losses (Fall 1972, 27, 30). Despite the enemy losses, the only thing the French forces gained was vast jungle area that they
could not afford to patrol due to lack of manpower and supplies (Fall 1972, 30). The French forces were not able to engage the enemy in a decisive battle in which they could use their superior firepower; instead, in 1947, they withdrew to the lowlands and left only a string of forts on the border with China (Fall 1972, 31).

The Chinese border was very important to the outcome of the conflict. In 1949, the arrival of Chinese communists on the other side of the border was the beginning of the end of French rule in Vietnam (Fall 1972, 32). Within three weeks, in October 1950, the string of isolated French forts on the Chinese border was destroyed by General Giap’s forces. The French casualties were severe; some 6,000 troops were lost together with equipment for a whole Vietminh division (Karnow 1997, 200 and Fall 1972, 32).

The sanctuaries and training provided by communist China helped the Vietminh develop from guerrilla groups to 10,000-man divisions. Five divisions were created in 1950 (Fall 1972, 34), and within four years the French would get their decisive battle, Dien Bien Phu.

The United States’ interest in the conflict increased when Chinese Communists reached the border of Vietnam and when both the Soviet Union and Communist China recognized the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (Karnow 1997, 184). The recognition of Ho Chi Minh’s regime by the Soviet Union meant that Vietnam was seen as a “satellite in the Soviet Empire” by the West (Karnow 1997, 190). Thus, President Truman extended the policy of containment to Asia, and the United States became even more interested than France in preserving Indochina (Karnow 1997, 184). Parallel to the development in Vietnam was the Korean War. These two conflicts were seen as proof of the “domino theory,” in which country after country was at risk of being overtaken by communists
The Vietnam War was very important to the US. This was illustrated through their support of France. In 1954, America paid 80% of the French costs for the war (Karnow 1997, 185). This was also the year that ended French influence in Vietnam.

The battle at Dien Bien Phu was the decisive battle that the French wanted but their underestimation of General Giap’s capacity, to mass Vietnamese soldiers and artillery in the vast jungle terrain, was devastating. In the middle of January 1954, the Vietminh had massed 50,000 soldiers and 20,000 support troops against 13,000 French soldiers (Karnow 1997, 211). After months of preparation, the battle started on 13 March and on 7 May 1954, the red Vietminh flag flew over the French command bunker at Dien Bien Phu (Karnow 1997, 212-214). General Giap’s timing was perfect; the day after the battle ended, discussions started in Geneva to end the war in Indochina (Karnow 1997, 214).

The discussions in Geneva produced the Geneva Agreements of 1954: Laos and Cambodia were to become independent states and Vietnam was to be divided into two parts (O’Ballance 1975, 12). The division of Vietnam was an interim solution and national elections were to be held in 1956 to reunite the country under one regime (O’Ballance 1975, 12). This did not happen; instead, North and South Vietnam drifted further and further apart.

**North and South Vietnam and the Start of US Involvement**

The division of Vietnam included a time period of population exchange; some 800,000 Catholics moved south in fear of living under a communist regime and about 90,000 communists moved north (O’Ballance 1975, 12). North Vietnam developed as a
communist state with Chinese-influenced land reform that started atrocities all over the countryside (Karnow 1997, 241). South Vietnam, on the other hand, developed an anti-communist regime that employed very strict measures to find and punish communist infiltrators and sympathizers (Karnow 1997, 243). It was against this background that the national elections were held in 1956, and the result was not reunification as the North Vietnamese regime had expected (Karnow 1997, 242).

With no reunification through peaceful means, the North Vietnamese regime organized thirty-seven companies of communist guerrillas in South Vietnam during 1957 (Karnow 1997, 253). During the same period, former Vietminh fighters started to return, “infusing fresh blood and enthusiasm” (O’Ballance 1975, 24). These communist guerrillas came to be known as Viet Cong (VC) and during 1958-1959 they started a campaign of terrorism and selective killings that targeted government officials (O’Ballance 1975, 25). On 8 July 1959, an airbase was attacked; among the victims were two US advisors, the first Americans to die in the conflict that was just unfolding (O’Ballance 1975, 25).

At the same time, on the northern side of the border, the Communist Party felt that it was strong enough to resume open warfare in the South (Chanoff and Toai 2001, 72).

The North Vietnam influence in South Vietnam increased, and in April 1961, President Kennedy created a “task force to prepare economic, social, political, and military programs aimed at preventing a Communist domination of South Vietnam” (Karnow 1997, 267). The military part of this program meant advisors and helicopters were needed to increase the effectiveness of the South Vietnam armed forces. In
December 1961, the first shipment of forty-seven helicopters arrived in Saigon (Karnow 1997, 270).

A measure of the United States’ increasing engagement in Vietnam is the number of US military personnel killed each year in the early to mid 1960s.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Killed US military personnel</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>489</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>1,172</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>1,275</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Another fact that shows the United States’ support of the South Vietnamese forces was the bombing of North Vietnamese targets that began in 1964. The aim of these attacks was to force the North Vietnamese to withdraw their support of the VC (Chanoff and Toai 2001, 73). The conflict continued to develop, and 1965 ended with 180,000 US soldiers deployed in South Vietnam and the United States fully involved in the war (O’Ballance 1975, 86). One of the two superpowers in the world was involved in a war that today would be called an asymmetric conflict.

**The Vietnam War, an Asymmetric Conflict**

The Vietnam War was fought between two major belligerents; the US armed forces and the North Vietnam armed forces. On each side there were other important
allies and partners; the United States supported and led the South Vietnamese forces and North Vietnam supported and led the Communist guerrillas in South Vietnam, the VC. The Soviet Union and Communist China supported North Vietnam; however, Soviet support became the most important because the North Vietnamese leadership did not want to rely on their neighbor too much (O’Ballance 1975, 17).

This case study of the Cambodian incursion, 1970, will generalize the belligerents into two main groups of combatants: US forces versus North Vietnamese forces. These two parties will be described in terms of will and military means to fight each other. The South Vietnamese forces and the VC will be mentioned when they had significant influence on the outcome of events. This perspective was chosen in order to use Smith’s definition of an asymmetric conflict (chapter 2) in the analysis.

The US Armed Forces in South Vietnam, 1970

In 1970, the United States’ goal was to end the Vietnam War as soon as possible. The domestic pressure on President Nixon to withdraw US forces was strong and on 20 April, he announced a troop withdrawal of 150,000 men by the end of 1970 (O’Ballance 1975, 151). Nixon’s goal was “that the future of South Vietnam be determined, not by North Vietnam, and not by the United States, but by the people of South Vietnam themselves” (Speech to the nation, 30 April 1970). The method used to achieve this goal was the “Vietnamization-program” that had been reintroduced by the Johnson administration in mid-1968 (Kimball 1998, 73). The goal of the program was to increase South Vietnamese capability and responsibility for its own security and phase out US involvement in Vietnam. During 1969 and 1970, polls were showing a trend of decreasing support for the war and President Nixon’s handling of it (Kimball 1998, 220).
The antiwar movement was also loosing support in street demonstrations and campus protests, but it was still a strong movement and showed how divided American society was (Kimball 1998, 220). The political consequence of the movement was strong pressure on the administration to end the war. The will of the United States to continue to fight a war in Vietnam was weak, but what about their means to fight?

US forces in Vietnam had all the means that they could possibly need and use during an armed conflict (Karnow 1997, 452). A million tons of supplies came into South Vietnam each month and by 1967, this averaged a hundred pounds of supplies a day for each American there (Karnow 1997, 451). By April 1970, there were 429,900 US servicemen in South Vietnam (O’Ballance 1975, 151). These soldiers were supported by so many air-planes and helicopters that the airports of South Vietnam were the busiest in the world (Karnow 1997, 452).

The United States had the means, but not the will to fight a prolonged war in 1970. What about their enemy; North Vietnam and the VC?

North Vietnam and the VC

The North Vietnamese Communist Party saw the wars against France and the United States as one continuos fight divided into two phases (Chanoff and Toai 2001, 3). Even if Ho Chi Minh was Communist, many of his actions were based on nationalism. An example of this was his alliance, against the will of the Soviet Union, with the Allied during the Second World War (Karnow 1997, 138). Another example was his unwillingness to rely on Communist China too much and risk Vietnam becoming a Chinese satellite state (O’Ballance 1975, 17). Ho Chi Minh expressed his willingness to continue to fight in a speech on 17 July 1966: “The War may last another five, ten,
twenty years or longer” (O’Ballance 1975, 87). The Vietnamese people, “a breed of warriors” (Karnow 1997, 111) led by a devoted leader, could muster the will needed to fight a very long war, but was it only a product of a totalitarian regime?

Comparisons made between German, Chinese, and Vietnamese prisoners of war show that the Vietnamese were unshaken in their convictions to a much larger extent, and believed in their cause to defend their country from invading Americans, even after becoming prisoners (Karnow 1997, 474). The North Vietnamese people’s willingness to fight and to join the Communist Party was strengthened by the US strategic bombing campaign, a strategy that “backfired” (Karnow 1997, 473). The North Vietnamese will, based mainly on their culture, to fight the war was very strong, but what about their means?

The main resource that the North Vietnamese had was its people and the regime was able to mobilize and use them in the war effort (Karnow 1997, 471). When it came to the production of war materials, North Vietnam was a transit point of mostly Soviet and Communist Chinese war material (Karnow 1997, 471). An example of North Vietnam’s means shows that even though US bombing increased drastically between 1965 and 1967, the sea imports to North Vietnam doubled to about 1.4 million tons during the same time (Karnow 1997, 471). Another example that illustrates how the means for fighting differed between the two parties was the cost-effect of the American bombing campaign:

By late 1967, the United States had imposed some $300 million in damage on North Vietnam – but at a loss to the American air force of more than seven hundred aircraft valued at approximately $900 million. (Karnow 1997, 472)
The North Vietnamese means to fight against the United States consisted of people and imported weapons that could be carried or transported through the jungle along the famous Ho Chi Minh trail. It took about six weeks to reach the northern parts of South Vietnam (O’Ballance 1975, 38), and by 1967, the annual infiltration rate had reached approximately 150,000 people according to American estimates (Karnow 1997, 469). This infiltration rate was about 60,000 during 1970 and the VC and North Vietnamese strength in South Vietnam was around 250,000 that year (O’Ballance 1975, 149).

The North Vietnamese and VC units soon learned that they could not win conventional battles against the US military power, so they employed new tactics. They used hit-and-run tactics and avoided direct confrontations in an attempt to get US forces to exhaust themselves in fruitless search-and-destroy operations (Karnow 1997, 475). Their tactics were developed using a strategy of attrition. The attrition was aimed not only against US military means, but also against US will to continue to fight the war.

Summary of the Conflict Between US forces and North Vietnamese Forces, 1970

Using Edward A. Smith´s definition of an asymmetric conflict gives the following analysis, of the Vietnam War in 1970, shown in figure 7.
The North Vietnamese leadership was very aware of the importance of homeland support. During the war against the French, the “French morale at home” was something that General Giap had in mind (Fall 1972, 34). Most likely the will of the American people and political system to fight the war was more a concern for President Nixon than for the North Vietnamese leadership. According to North Vietnamese strategy in 1970, the American enemy was to be defeated, not through American or world peace movements, but through military capabilities, political change, and social reforms in South Vietnam (Kimball 1998, 222). However, after the war, North Vietnamese Politburo members did comment on the importance of the antiwar movement’s influence on the US decision to withdraw from South Vietnam (Kimball 1998, 221). If the US administration was under pressure to end the war in Vietnam in 1970, why did it invade Cambodia?
The US and South Vietnam Incursion into Cambodia, May 1970

The Situation in the Border Area

The situation in Cambodia in the 1960s was very unstable and on 18 March 1970, a coup replaced Prince Sihanouk’s regime with a much more US friendly regime (O’Ballance 1975, 154). This opened up new possibilities for US and South Vietnamese forces to operate within Cambodia, something that officially had not been done before. Soon ground operations were to be executed.

Up to that point, Cambodia’s old regime had ignored both the United States and North Vietnamese incursions during the war. Beginning in late 1967, Cambodian leadership overlooked US forces to conduct the “hot pursuit” of VC and North Vietnamese forces into Cambodia as long as no Cambodians were harmed (Karnow 1997, 605). But in March 1968, Prince Sihanouk announced his support of the other side by stating that; the imperialist American aggressors were the mutual enemy of Cambodia, North Vietnam, and the VC (Tho 1983, 21). Prince Sihanouk’s support consisted of two major factors; allowing base areas on the border with South Vietnam and importing supplies via the port of Sihanoukville (Tho 1983, 18). The base areas, but not the port of Sihanoukville, were targeted during the secret US bombing campaign of Cambodia from 1969-1970. The bombings were kept secret because the United States wanted to officially observe the neutrality of Cambodia (O’Ballance 1975, 154 and Tho 1983, 21). One wonders how more than 3,500 B-52 bombing strikes during 14 months (O’Balance 1975, 155) can be kept a secret, but the North Vietnamese could not say anything because they could not admit that they used a neutral country for basing. Meanwhile, the Cambodian leadership tried to keep Cambodia independent from Communist influence, but they
could not do it alone (Karnow 1997, 605-607). Despite the bombing campaign of the base areas in Cambodia the US did not succeed in deterring the North Vietnamese and VC from using them (Karnow 1997, 607).

The importance of the sanctuaries in Cambodia for the North Vietnamese was a result of successful operations in South Vietnam by US and South Vietnamese forces. It was even presumed that the headquarters for Communist operations in South Vietnam was somewhere in the area (Karnow 1997, 606). It was estimated that there were about forty thousand VC and another five thousand North Vietnamese soldiers in these bases in the beginning of 1970 (O’Ballance 1975, 154). There were approximately twenty bases along the borders of Laos and Vietnam and some of them were as useful to the North Vietnamese as bases in North Vietnam itself (Tho 1983, 23). These bases were used for hit-and-run attacks on US and South Vietnamese forces in South Vietnam (Nixon 30 April, 1970)

These bases were important targets for the US forces to achieve their military goals, but neither President Johnson, nor President Nixon, allowed decisive military operations into neutral Cambodia for political reasons (Karnow 1997, 605-606). This changed; however, when the new regime in Cambodia asked for assistance (Nixon 30 April, 1970).

Goals and End State of the US Forces

The political goals and end state for the US incursion in to Cambodia were made public by President Nixon on 30 April 1970, the same day US and South Vietnamese forces started to operate within Cambodia. Nixon’s speech was delivered in a TV-broadcast and consisted of the following goals and messages:
We have taken this action not for the purpose of expanding the war into Cambodia, but for the purpose of ending the war in Vietnam, and winning the just peace we all desire.

To protect our men who are in Vietnam, and to guarantee the continued success of our withdrawal and Vietnamization program. . . .

. . . only one condition: and that is that the future of South Vietnam be determined, not by North Vietnam, and not by the United States, but by the people of South Vietnam themselves. (Nixon April 30, 1970)

Besides giving these objectives and end states, President Nixon also announced military tasks and conditions to be reached before US forces would withdraw from Cambodia:

Our purpose is not to occupy the areas. Once enemy forces are driven out of these sanctuaries, and once their military supplies are destroyed, we will withdraw.

Tonight, American and South Vietnamese units will attack the headquarters for the entire Communist military operation in South Vietnam. (Nixon April 30, 1970)

The operation into Cambodia was conducted in the context of US troop withdrawal from South Vietnam and increased emphasis on Vietnamization, something that the North Vietnamese were well aware of when planning the use of their bases in Cambodia.

**Goals and End State of the North Vietnamese Forces and the VC**

The ultimate goal for the North Vietnamese leadership was to unite Vietnam, and fulfill what Ho Chi Minh stated in the declaration of independence on 2 September 1945, (Karnow 1997, 146). In 1970, the strategy for reaching this goal was to wait and prepare for US withdrawal from South Vietnam (O’Ballance 1975, 149). A part of these preparations were the establishment of bases, out of reach of US forces, in Cambodia and Laos (O’Ballance 1975, 154). Another important fact that affected the goals of the North Vietnamese forces and VC in Cambodia was the restrictions that were imposed upon the US forces. These restrictions came from US political factors because of the sensitivity of
extending military operations into another country (Tho 1983, 171). The restrictions were; all US forces had to withdraw not later then 2400 hours on 30 June, and the area of operations was limited to thirty kilometers into Cambodia (Tho 1983, 171).

Because of the overarching strategy to wait for US withdrawal and an effective intelligence network (O´Ballance 1975, 157) the main forces of North Vietnam were able to withdraw outside of the thirty kilometer line (Tho 1983, 171); thus, avoiding contact with the superior US and South Vietnamese forces.

The Conduct of the Incursion

There were 31,000 US and 19,000 South Vietnamese soldiers in Cambodia within a week of the start of the incursion (Kimball 1998, 210). The North Vietnamese tried to avoid direct contact with the US and South Vietnamese forces and it was first after three days that US forces met fierce opposition (O´Ballance 1975, 155). The operation developed into thirteen multi-battalion search-and-destroy operations through May and June 1970 (Kimball 1998, 210). The South Vietnamese forces continued when US forces had to withdraw due to the political reasons mentioned above.

The South Vietnamese Army took, as a part of the Vietnamization-process, more responsibility for planning, executing, and supervising operations (Tho 1983, 170). In fact; it was the first time in years that larger South Vietnamese units operated without US advisors (Tho 1983, 170).

Effects of the Cambodian Incursion

The effects of the Cambodian Incursion are very difficult to limit to this operation, as it is possible to argue that some events that occurred after June 1970 are effects that cumulated from different origins. This issue illustrates the complexity of
assessing how a tactical action influences higher levels. The effects of the Cambodian Incursion can be divided into four different categories; results felt by the North Vietnamese and VC, the effects on the US and US forces, the eventualities experienced by the South Vietnamese forces, and finally, the outcomes in Cambodia.

One of the direct effects on the North Vietnamese and VC was approximately 14,000 causalities (Tho 1983, 193) or a causality rate of eleven to one compared to US and South Vietnamese forces (Tho 1983, 174). The loss of equipment and supplies were also significant and US estimated the destruction of VC’s supplies in Cambodia to vary between 30 percent and 50 percent. (O’Ballance 1975, 157). On the other hand, a CIA study concluded that the lost supplies could be replaced within three months (Kimball 1998, 224). The long-term effects of these casualties and equipment losses were small; however, because the North Vietnamese Headquarters was not destroyed and the main body of North Vietnamese soldiers avoided contact and returned to the base areas after the withdrawal of US and South Vietnamese forces (O’Ballance 1975, 157; and Tho 1983, 182 and Kimball 1998, 224). At best, the incursion bought the US some time. Assessments made by Henry Kissinger and Sir Robert Thompson said that the North Vietnamese offensive was delayed fifteen to twenty-four months because of the incursion (Coleman 1991, 271).

Contrary to the lack of strategic effects on the North Vietnamese, the incursion did have decisive political results in the United States. On tactical and operational levels it was possible to see a decrease of VC and North Vietnamese activity in the central and southern part of South Vietnam during the last six months of 1970 (O’Ballance 1975, 150). Other sources state that the decreasing number of US causalities in South Vietnam
after the incursion in Cambodia had to do with troop withdrawal, as the South Vietnamese causalities increased during the same time period (Kimball 1998, 224). The most important effects of the Cambodian Incursion were felt within the United States.

Immediately after Americans found out about the incursion in Cambodia, organizations in the United States called for demonstrations; however, spontaneous demonstrations happened first, and 100,000 people rallied in Washington, D.C. (Kimball 1998, 218). The most severe incident at a demonstration happened on 4 May, at Kent State University when US National Guardsmen shot and killed four students and injured another nine (Kimball 1998, 216). This incident caused a massive, nation wide reaction with more than 4,350,000 students participating in demonstrations against the Kent State killings and the invasion of Cambodia (Kimball 1998, 216). These demonstrations greatly influenced the decision to withdraw US troops from Cambodia after two months of operations (Kimball 1998, 213). The secondary effect of this early withdrawal, in combination with restrictions in the size of the area of operation, decreased the total result of the operation (Tho 1983, 171). More time and freedom to maneuver for the US forces would have led to extensive losses in men and supplies for the NVA, due to US firepower (Tho 1983, 171)

Demonstrations and protests within the US affected American politics but on the same day Americans found out about the incursion, there was criticism from the Senate (Kimball 1998, 211). The public protests effected Congress and this influenced the whole prosecution of the war (Kimball 1998, 213). Besides the political effects in the US, there were also political effects in South Vietnam.
The most decisive political effects for South Vietnam were that Cambodia became an ally in the fight against Communism and that North Vietnamese operations within South Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos became known worldwide (Tho 1983, 181). Beside these effects, the incursion had positive effects on the morale of the South Vietnamese population and military forces (Tho 1983, 181). The operation served as a good test of the Vietnamization program and during 1970 and 1971, the South Vietnamese Army held the initiative in South Vietnam (Tho 1983, 170, 181).

There were two major effects on Cambodia. In the short term, the incursion gave Cambodian forces time to train and reequip in order to defend the country against Communist forces (Tho 1983, 182). There are different opinions, however, in regards to the long-term effects. Some believe the incursion postponed the Khmer Rouge regime in Cambodia by couple of years, while others think it facilitated the overtake in 1975 (Kimball 1998, 224). On the other hand, the incursion pressed the North Vietnamese forces and VC into Cambodia and they created new base areas deeper in the country. This was a situation that surely influenced the development of the situation in Cambodia.
Direct and Indirect Effects of the Incursion and the Use of Effects-Based Thinking

An analysis of planned results and the actually achieved effects, mentioned above, of Incursion in to Cambodia gives the result as seen in figure 8.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level</th>
<th>Before operation</th>
<th>After operation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Planned result or desired end state</td>
<td>Effects of the Incursion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Direct effects</td>
<td>2nd-Nth order effects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategic:</td>
<td>Protect US troops in South Vietnam, facilitate troop withdrawal</td>
<td>- US; Administration could not act with full political support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Test of the Vietnamization program, handover responsibility to SVA</td>
<td>- North Vietnam; no strategic effects other than information about bases in neutral Cambodia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Cambodia; the Khmer Rouge regime</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>South Vietnam; got Cambodia as an allied</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operational:</td>
<td>Destroy the headquarters for communist military operations in South Vietnam</td>
<td>- NVA and VC; delayed operations and lost military momentum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- US; early withdrawal of troops from Cambodia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- SVA; boost of morale and possibility to take the initiative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tactical:</td>
<td>Destroy supplies and drive the enemy out of sanctuaries</td>
<td>- NVA and VC; causalities and loss of equipment and supplies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- NVA and VC; regroup bases and HQ</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 8. Planned and Achieved Effects of the Incursion in to Cambodia
The only positive operational effect that the US and South Vietnam achieved was the loss of North Vietnamese military momentum. There is a possibility that this facilitated the final withdrawal of US troops and the implementation of the Vietnamization program. That eventually resulted in the North Vietnamese invasion and unification of Vietnam under Communist leadership.

The problem was that there was no long term plan for how to deal with the border areas, which is very well described by Brigadier General Tran Dinh Tho, who was the Assistant Chief of Staff J3 of the Joint General Staff during the Incursion:

There was no plan to return to the border areas to conduct operations of value to Cambodia or to keep the enemy base areas cleared out. In the absence of any such long-range repeat operations it is not difficult to explain the temporary nature of the advantage accruing to the US/RVNAF war effort from the Cambodian Incursion. (Tho 1983, 183)

The reason for not having a following operation within Cambodia was the political situation in the United States of America. It seems like a successful tactical operation was suspended before it was concluded in a decisive way, and this suspension came out of the operations indirect political effects within the United States of America. The question is if it could have been possible to foresee these negative political effects?

The months before the Incursion, there had been some student demonstrations and President Nixon had “only dimly foreseen” domestic reactions to the Incursion (Kimball 1998, 213, 214). Secretary of State, Rogers, thought that the speech that President Nixon gave to the nation to explain the operation would ‘make the students puke’ (Kimball 1998, 215). Other aides to President Nixon had predicted domestic reactions to the invasion, but they were shocked by the extent of the reactions (Kimball 1998, 217). The killing of four students at Kent State University increased the political effects of the
incursion, but before that incident there were protests from the Senate. These negative political effects should have been foreseen by the administration, though invading a neutral country ten days after announcing troop withdrawal was not accepted by the American public.

The effects of leaving the border area and not having a long term plan for how to handle the North Vietnamese presence in Cambodia would also have been possible to foresee. The knowledge and understanding of how the enemy would react, after US and South Vietnamese withdrawal, were accessible to the Allies after years of fighting North Vietnamese.

Conclusions of the Cambodian Incursion

The Cambodian Incursion shows that negative effects of a successful tactical operation can influence the strategy and policy of a nation. It also shows that the first order domestic effects of the incursion; the political division and anti-war protests were possible to predict. However, the Kent State shootings were impossible to foresee; the killings of the students is an example of how unknown and undesired effects can influence a whole nation, and the ultimate result of an otherwise successful tactical operation. One can argue that the Kent State incident was a result of poor riot control and not the incursion of Cambodia. However, it was perceived by many people as an result of the US incursion and that is the source of the political pressure. This political pressure in the United States forced the US forces to withdraw too early from Cambodia, and this left the border area to the North Vietnamese, which eventually led to a successful North Vietnamese offensive in South Vietnam.
CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Conclusions

Effects Based Operations is a methodology that promises more than it can deliver when it comes to solving asymmetric conflicts. On one hand, EBO increases the effectiveness of fighting asymmetric adversaries in two aspects; it provides a comprehensive understanding of the adversary and it is an effective method to destroy his means for fighting through precise use of military power. On the other hand, there are three fundamental assumptions, concerning EBO that are wrong. First, EBO is based on the assumption that it is possible to predict effects in several steps. This is something that history shows has been impossible to do, especially when it comes to effects on the will of a population. Secondly, all instruments of national power are supposed to work together to reach a common goal. However, it is not described how this is supposed to be done. The third and the most important false assumption is the idea of positive, and permanent, behavioral change of the adversary through the use of military means. These three false assumptions makes EBO more of a war winning methodology than a peace winning methodology, a difference that is crucial when it comes to the solution of asymmetric conflicts.

EBO emphasizes knowing and understanding the enemy and his society regarding religion, power structures, and economy. This knowledge is used in the EBO methodology in order to forecast direct and indirect effects; something that the case studies, of the Vietnam War and the conflict in Northern Ireland, show is possible to some degree. However, to predict the decisions of the adversary’s leadership, and the
influence on the will of the people, has been very difficult to do throughout history, and critics of EBO stress the unreliability of strategic intelligence and thereby the possibility of assessing all the indirect effects of one’s actions. This knowledge about the enemy is of best use when it comes to avoiding negative effects of military operations, thus avoiding an escalation of the conflict. However, this knowledge does not automatically lead to a solution of the conflict. Besides the uncertainty in the prediction of effects, there are two other weak parts, as mentioned above, of the EBO methodology. First the lack of explanation of how the different instruments of power are supposed to work together, and more important; how to achieve the ultimate goal of EBO; the positive behavioral change of the opponent.

The EBO methodology explains the importance of the different instruments of power, DIME, working together in order to solve a conflict and reaching a common goal. However, it is not described how this is supposed to be done, and EBO, being a military idea and methodology, will make it difficult to subdue the other instruments of power in a cohesive effort to achieve a common end state. One other problem with the military leading the practical execution of a cohesive operation that includes all the instruments of power is that military leaders might see only military solutions to problems. A military solution can, by itself, lead to a radicalization of the opponent’s population, and thereby a deepened conflict. Radicalization of a population, which is based on what people believe is right or wrong, brings up the core of EBO; the change of an opponent’s behavior.

To change the behavior of an opponent is described as the ultimate goal of EBO, but this is also the leading problem with the methodology when it is applied in an asymmetric conflict. The reason for this is that the will to fight is a much more important
asset than the means for fighting in an asymmetric conflict, and how this behavioral change is supposed to be achieved is not addressed in a sufficient way. The will to fight is based on what is believed to be right, and if a behavioral change is forced upon a population, especially by military means, the underlying beliefs still remain or can even become more radicalized. This fact is illustrated in this thesis by the case study of two operations, in two asymmetric conflicts: the Vietnam War and the Troubles in Northern Ireland. This behavioral change, without change of will, can become a significant problem if the success of an operation or military campaign is only measured in change of behavior. This behavioral change can be developed as a method of survival by the opponent, who will resume fighting when he thinks he can achieve his goal.

Effects Based Operations and the Contemporary Operational Environment

The situations in Afghanistan and Iraq show the difference between winning the war and winning the peace. Further development of EBO is needed in order to make the methodology suitable to end these asymmetric conflicts because continuing to attack the military means of the weaker adversary will not change his will to fight. The experiences of Operation Motorman in Northern Ireland and the Cambodian incursion in Vietnam tell us of the following possible development.

First, strong military pressure in Iraq or Afghanistan will make the insurgents change their methods of fighting, and their area of operations, in order to be able to influence the outcome of the conflict. The parallel between the PIRA’s bombing campaign on mainland Britain after being pushed away from the no-go areas in Northern Ireland and the terrorist bombs hitting Spanish society in March 2004 is not difficult to see. Both these changes of areas of operations and targets were made in order to terrorize
the population in order to influence political decisions; changes in policy that were much more difficult to achieve by available means in Northern Ireland and in Iraq.

Second, downsizing troops, by number or quality, in the operational areas of Iraq and Afghanistan after only military objectives have been reached will mean increased influence by the insurgents on the development of the situations in both countries. The similarity between the NVA and VC return to the border area of South Vietnam after the 1970 withdrawal of US forces from Cambodia, and the situation today is clear. Both in 1970 and today, the insurgents lost much of their equipment fighting a stronger enemy, however, this does not mean that their will to fight was or is lost. The reduction of troop levels is not only a tactical matter, but also it is a matter of credibility and morality. If the coalition forces in Afghanistan and Iraq leave before long term security and stability is ensured, the situation will be exploited by insurgents in order to reach their goals.

Another aspect that influences the population’s will to help fighting the insurgents, or becoming terrorists themselves, is the perception of who is right and who is wrong, or the question of which side has the moral high ground.

Recent accusations of prisoner abuse by US forces is an example of how low level actions can effect the political level by changing what people believe about US forces. The effect of losing the moral high ground was obvious in Northern Ireland when the security forces arrested innocent citizens during what became known as “the Internment.” This is seen as one of the core reasons for why the violence started in the 1960s, which still affects Northern Ireland today. It remains to be seen how the current accusations of prisoner abuse will affect the US global war against terrorism and operations in Iraq. However, one thing is clear; moral high ground is given to you by the environment where
you operate. It is something you cannot give to yourself, and it is based upon what people believe. Discussing the shortcomings of EBO and the COE brings up the question of recommendations and further research.

Recommendations and Further Research

When EBO is to be used in asymmetric conflicts, the methodology ought first be developed into a more dynamic methodology that is based on how one’s actions are perceived by the population where the adversary is based. Another recommendation to consider is the influence of time on the solution of asymmetric conflicts; time seems to be working for the weaker belligerent and this advantage must be taken away. First; one must be prepared that an asymmetric conflict most likely will take a long time to solve, and second; one must, over time, act in a way that does not increase the will of the population to support or join the adversary.

This last problem brings up the question of further research. To make EBO work in asymmetric conflicts and solve the problems that this thesis points out, there is one crucial question that needs to be answered: How can behavioral change, based on changing beliefs of an asymmetric adversary, be achieved? To change the beliefs and thereby the will of the population from which the adversary derives his support is, and will be in the future, the key to solve asymmetric conflicts.
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