UNITED STATES COUNTERINSURGENCY DOCTRINE
AND IMPLEMENTATION IN IRAQ

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE
General Studies

by

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2004

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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)
ABSTRACT

UNITED STATES COUNTERINSURGENCY DOCTRINE AND IMPLEMENTATION IN IRAQ, by Jonathan K. Graff Jr., total 94 pages.

This thesis examines the conduct of the US Army’s counterinsurgency campaign in Iraq from the end of May 2003 through March 2004. While examining how the US Army is implementing existing counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine, this thesis also addresses the topics of what the doctrine is and where it came from. The thesis will also make recommendations for improvement.

The thesis includes five chapters beginning with a brief introduction, followed by a review of the literature pertaining to US COIN doctrine, the doctrine of other nations, and the background of Iraq. A look at the history of the US COIN doctrine development through US Army operations overseas follows. Current US Army operations in Iraq are examined next, based off of interviews with participants, news reports, and reports from the Center for Army Lessons Learned. The last chapter examines how doctrine fails to adequately address the role of US forces as an occupation authority and makes recommendations. Basic principles outlined in US doctrine are still applicable, but US and coalition forces are not applying them as intended: unifying their military efforts with a comprehensive economic, social, and political reform plan.
This work would not have been possible without the guidance and expertise of the MMAS committee, namely, LTC D. Jonathan White, Dr. Bruce Menning, Geoff Babb, and LTC Mike McFarland. I would also like to thank Mr. Grau and the officers who were interviewed for sharing their experience and providing valuable help and insight. I would also like to thank Dean Burbridge, who provided considerable assistance in obtaining research material on COIN and helped proof the final document. Finally, I would like to thank my wife, whose support, patience, and forbearing during long hours at the library during “the best year of my life” made completion of this project possible.
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<td>ARVN</td>
<td>Army of the Republic of Vietnam</td>
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<td>Internal Defense and Development</td>
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<td>IED</td>
<td>Improvised Explosive Device</td>
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<td>Lieutenant Colonel</td>
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MG Major General
NCO Non Commissioned Officer
NVA North Vietnamese Army
OIF Operation Iraqi Freedom
OIFSG Operation Iraqi Freedom Study Group
PSYOP Psychological Operations
ROE Rules of Engagement
SF Special Forces
SMW United States Marine Corps’ *Small Wars Manual*
TCP Traffic Control Point
TTP Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures
US United States
VC Viet Cong
CHAPTER 1

US COUNTERINSURGENCY DOCTRINE IMPLEMENTATION IN IRAQ

It’s all very well having bombers, masses of helicopters, tremendous firepower, but none of those will eliminate a Communist cell in a High School which is producing 50 recruits a year for the insurgent movement. (1985, 16)

Sir Robert Thompson

The British counterinsurgency experience in Malaya is commonly touted as the model for defeating an armed insurgency. What is not as well understood is the fact that the British did not start out trying to win the hearts and minds of the Malayans. The British campaign began as a conventional fight employing massive amounts of firepower. Led by Chin Peng, the insurgents initially began their resistance with much the same organization that they had used to fight the Japanese occupation during World War II. Using battalion size formations and large bases in the jungle, Peng’s insurgents fought the British authorities with the objective of winning Chinese and Soviet support (Smith 1985, 7). The British engaged the communists with conventional formations augmented by aerial bombardment and heavy artillery fires. The British soon found that, while they were killing a lot of insurgents, they were not eliminating the insurgency. The communist terrorists who made up the insurgency soon broke up into even smaller units to mitigate the effects of British firepower. These units began using unconventional tactics and terrorism to subvert British control, and either turn the population to their cause or at least sow enough popular dissatisfaction to preclude active support for the British.

Sir Robert Thompson, an advisor to the British civilian authority in Malaya, concluded that the British had to come up with an alternative method. High
Commissioner Henry Gurney initiated some changes in 1950, but it was the arrival of General Gerald Templer in 1952 that led to ultimate British success. General Templer understood his role as that of preparing Malaya for self-rule, and he knew that independence would not succeed without government and military unity, as well as unity among the three major ethnic groups in Malaya--the Chinese, Malay, and Indians (Smith 1985, 22). He coined the phrase “winning hearts and minds” and developed methods for defeating not only the insurgents, but also for alleviating the causes of the insurgency. His victory came at a cost. The British Army deployed eleven battalions (three Malay, six Ghurka, two United Kingdom) in Malaya for ten years to work with and assist 60,000 full-time Malayan police and 200,000 home guards (Smith 1985, 7, 30).

Some fifty years on, the armed forces of the United States and its coalition partners are now entering their second year in Iraq. People around the world, including Americans and Iraqis, are beginning to ask how much longer coalition forces will stay. According to Paul Bremer, the head of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) in Iraq, transfer of sovereignty from the CPA to a transitional government of elected Iraqi authorities will occur around 30 June 2004. With the transfer of sovereignty to the Iraqis will come expectation that the Iraqis should provide an increased commitment to their own internal security. Some of this responsibility has already shifted, as US forces have begun to pull out of Iraqi cities. Forces are being shifted to bases on the outskirts of cities, allowing a fledging Iraqi police force to pick up the role that the Americans and their coalition previously assumed.

On 15 February 2004, there was a daylight raid on the Iraqi police headquarters in Fallujah that left fourteen policemen dead and over twenty wounded. US forces did not
reinforce the Iraqi police, and the attackers escaped after freeing approximately 100
prisoners held at the headquarters. This attack highlighted many of problems that Iraqis
have still to overcome to assume their own self-security. The US military, and especially
the Army, is faced with a difficult task of helping to introduce order in the region. After a
few weeks of fighting a successful conventional campaign during March 2003 against the
Iraqi Army (and emerging relatively unscathed), US soldiers suddenly found themselves
governing neighborhoods, policing the streets, stopping looters, and trying to restore
basic utilities. Several officers commented on lacking experience for these roles (Ritzman
Interview 2003, OIFSG). Others found themselves looking for a manual or doctrine that
explained the requirements for establishing civil government (Woempner Interview 2003,
OIFSG). Observers from the US Army Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) that
deployed to Iraq at the end of 2003 found that individual units in Iraq were employing
different methods for dealing with insurgents and reestablishing civil government (Grau
Interview 2004). The variety of techniques employed by US Army units and the
randomness of their employment raise several questions for this thesis. The primary
question is: Is the US Army implementing existing counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine in
Iraq? The secondary questions are: What is the doctrine? Where did it come from? What
is happening in Iraq? Is the doctrine being practiced, and is it effective? If the doctrine is
not practiced, then why not? And finally, is there a better way to do it?

This thesis examines whether or not the US Army is implementing its existing
doctrine in Iraq and makes recommendations for implementing changes. The
methodology employed begins with a review of literature on counterinsurgency theory
and doctrine; continues through an examination of the development of US Army
counterinsurgency doctrine from its experiences in the Philippines, Vietnam, and El Salvador; reviews US Army actions in Iraq with respect to doctrine; and offers conclusions and recommendations.

Sources for theory and doctrine include several prominent authors to gain an understanding of the background to current theory and doctrine. These include: Mao Tse Tung, Vladimir I. Lenin, General Vo Nuygen Giap, Frank Kitson, Sir Robert Thompson, LTC John J. McCuen, and Roger Trinquier. Sources for historical data include Andrew Birtle’s *US Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine, 1860-1941*, MAJ Greenberg’s *The Hukbalahap Insurrection*, Harry Summer’s *On Strategy*, Andrew Krepinevich’s *The Army and Vietnam*, and the *Casebook on Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare: 23 Summary Accounts*. The sources for current operations include Field Manual 3-07, *Stability Operations and Support Operations*, media reports, CALL reports from their October and December Initial Assessments, transcribed interviews from the Operations Iraqi Freedom Study Group (OIFSG), interviews with officers returning from duty in Iraq, and interviews with officers with experience in counterinsurgency operations.

Chapter 2 of the thesis provides a brief review of relevant findings from these sources. It defines the current US Army and Joint doctrine as described in Field Manual (FM) 3-07 *Stability Operations and Support Operations* and Joint Publication (JP) 3-07.1 *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Internal Defense*. The chapter reviews the literature that describes the development of that doctrine from 1898 to 1988. Coverage extends to interviews with Colonel Celeski, the 3rd Special Forces Group commander during Operation Enduring Freedom; Lester Grau, the editor of *The Bear*
Went over the Mountain and The Other Side of the Mountain and member of the CALL Initial Assessment Team; LTC John Russell, the C3 for Coalition Operations Operation Iraqi Freedom; LTC Blaise Cornell-d’Echert Jr., the Director of Training for the Coalition Military Assistance Training Team that was training the new Iraqi army and Civil Defense Corps; and Major Wijendra Gunatilake, an officer of the Sri Lankan Army with seventeen years of experience with counterinsurgency operations in Sri Lanka. There is also a brief review of transcriptions from the OIFSG’s interviews with several US Army officers involved in the restoration of order and the reestablishment of civil government at the end of that operation.

Chapter 3 briefly examines the historical experience of the US Army in conducting counterinsurgency operations. The Moro Rebellion in the Philippines between 1898 and 1905, the Hukbalahap Insurrection in the Philippines from 1946 to 1951, the Vietnam War from 1961 to 1975, and the El Salvador uprising between 1971 and 1988 are key focuses. The US Army conducted each of these operations in response to unique conditions in the areas of operation in insurgencies against constituted local governments that the US either established or supported.

The next chapter, Chapter 4, follows with an examination of how the US Army is implementing its current counterinsurgency doctrine in Iraq. Since the operation in Iraq is ongoing, and since the availability of new information increases every day, the time frame examined begins with the end of major combat operations in March 2003 and ends in March 2004. The analysis is based on articles available from sources such as Time, Newsweek, USA Today, US News and World Report, The New York Times, and The Washington Post. The Operation Iraqi Freedom Initial Assessments of October and
December 2003 from CALL, interviews with returning soldiers, and the unclassified interview transcripts of soldiers involved in Operation Iraqi Freedom are also referenced.

Chapter 5 compares the US Army’s historical employment in counterinsurgency operations with its current doctrinal practice in Iraq. The chapter makes recommendations for improvement based on observations and the availability of options. The thesis concludes with recommendations for further study.

Limitations

Coalition forces in Iraq and Afghanistan have conducted several counterinsurgency operations and continue to do so at the time of this writing. To limit the scope of this analysis, this thesis will only analyze those operations conducted by US Army units in Iraq from the end of major hostilities in March 2003 through March 2004. There will be no reference to classified material. There are also several historical cases available which examine the employment of the US Army in a counterinsurgency role all the way back to its first actions against the American Indians. There are a number of studies concerning the evolution of doctrine during that time, but no official doctrine was written by US Army officers other than basic tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) and principles of conducting Indian warfare. Dennis Hart Mahan printed these as a lithographic note while instructing at West Point (Birtle 2001, 12). More formal methods for dealing with insurgents that are recognizable in today’s doctrine did not appear until the US Army conducted the Philippine War in 1898. This thesis examines that war and the counterinsurgency operations the US Army subsequently conducted until its involvement in El Salvador during the 1980s.
Key Terms

For the purposes of this thesis, key terms are taken from the Field Manuals used by the US Army as doctrinal references. An insurgency is an organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through use of subversion and armed conflict (FM 3-07 2003, 3-3). The term counterinsurgency embraces those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat an insurgency (FM 3-07 2003, 3-3). Foreign Internal Defense is participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency (FM 3-07 2003, 3-0). Doctrine, as referred to throughout the thesis, will include the doctrine described in FM 3-07 and JP 3-07.1 in the conduct of Foreign Internal Defense.
CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW

There are a number of sources that discuss US Army counterinsurgency doctrine and its implementation. This chapter focuses on those sources of information that were most helpful to the author in understanding the nature and background of insurgencies, the US Army response to them, the background of the Iraqi region, and the doctrine the US Army developed to defeat insurgencies.

**Doctrine**

Since the early days of the American Army, it has been involved in a number of insurgencies. Indeed, the birth of the Continental Army was itself the result of a colonial insurgency against the empire of Great Britain. The history of the development of US Army counterinsurgency doctrine is well documented in the book, *US Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine, 1860-1941*. This study describes how leaders of the US Army, since its infancy, have made little effort to capture lessons learned or to develop effective doctrine on counterinsurgency operations (Birtle 2001, 10). Counterinsurgency operations appear to be mere diversions from the more important study of the European style of maneuver warfare. It also demonstrates that there was a long-standing oral history passed down from veterans to recruits on how to conduct these types of operations (Birtle 2001, 11). Birtle briefly describes developments before the American Civil War that led to General Order 100. General Order 100 prescribes the conduct of the Army in respect to the enemy’s army and civilian population. This document “enshrined in American military policy a practical blend of moderation and stringency that would characterize the Army’s approach to military
government, counter guerrilla, and pacification operations for the next one hundred years” (Birtle 2001, 35). The book also describes US actions in the Philippines from 1898 to 1902, after Spain had ceded the Philippines to the US. The US Army at the beginning controlled the city of Manila. The rest of the country was filled with revolutionaries whom the Army had to either fight or pacify. Overall, this book represents an excellent analysis of the counterinsurgency tradition in US operations and drives home the fact that the US Army has a predisposition to view this type of warfare as unglamorous, unwanted, and diverting. Counterinsurgency detracts from the Army’s primary role in fighting conventional wars. As a result, counterinsurgency doctrine has not received the same attention as conventional warfare and must be painfully relearned each time it recurs, usually with younger soldiers looking back to veterans for answers.

The US Army’s next big counterinsurgency fight abroad was after World War II and again in the Philippines. Greenburg’s The Hukbalahap Insurrection: A Case Study of a Successful Anti-Insurgency Operation in the Philippines, 1946-1955, provides solid background on this conflict. Although the author is obviously enamored of Ramon Magsaysay, he brings out good points on the nature of the conflict’s origin, tactics used to fight the insurgents, efforts to win the will of the people, and the assistance from the US.

While there were some counterinsurgency operations in the Korean War, the lessons learned from the Vietnam War had a far more profound effect on the national perception of insurgencies as well as the willingness of the US Army as an institution to confront the problem of conducting counterinsurgency operations. Stanley Karnow’s book, Vietnam: A History provides excellent insight on the war and its development
through all its stages. Karnow describes the background of Vietnamese nationalism and the colonial experiences with the Japanese and French that set the stage for the Vietnamese fight with the Americans. The book then describes in detail the commitment of US Forces and their attempts throughout the war to work with the South Vietnamese government, win the hearts and minds of the Vietnamese people, and bring the North to military defeat and to the bargaining table.

*The Army and Vietnam* by Andrew Krepinevich, Jr. does an even better job of outlining the different strategies that the US Army used throughout the war, and more importantly, describes the institutional Army’s refusal to see the conflict as anything other than a conventional fight to stop North Vietnam from occupying the south. Colonel Harry Summers’ book, *On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War* provides good analysis into the impact of the war on current thought in the post-Vietnam US Army concerning counterinsurgency operations. Its focus is primarily on military operations and the ability or failure of the Army to correctly apply the principles of war in those operations.

To get a feel for post-Vietnam military thought in operation, the analysis provided in *American Military Policy in Small Wars: The Case of El Salvador* is useful. Compiled by the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, this book captures how the US Army has tried to develop an effective counterinsurgency doctrine in the wake of Vietnam. It notes that Army decision makers realized there were many effective lessons learned form Vietnam that could be applied in El Salvador; however, there was still no common effort between the military and political authorities. Lack of unity hampered decisions and
prevented the massing of decisive effects in all the programs that were in effect at the time.

The most recent source for US Army counterinsurgency doctrine is Field Manual (FM) 3-07. FM 3-07, *Stability Operations and Support Operations*, was written with an emphasis on “supporting friendly nations operating in or threatened with potential hostilities” (FM 3-07 2003, 3-0). The Manual covers the categories of Foreign Internal Defense (FID) from Indirect Support, to Direct Support, to Combat Operations. The emphasis on *support* to friendly nations implies the leading role that the Army expects the host nation to play. In fact, under the heading “The Role of the Army in Counterinsurgency,” paragraph 3-23 states “Generally, US forces do not engage in combat. The threat to American interests does not support that degree of involvement, even if it were effective. An American combat role tends to undermine the legitimacy of the host government and risks converting the conflict into an American war” (FM 3-07 2003, 3-7). And again on the next page, “Planners must understand that a basic premise of the FID program is that the ultimate responsibility for IDAD [Internal Defense And Development] rests with the HN [Host Nation]” (FM 3-07 2003, 3-8).

The doctrine in the manual is very general. It describes the importance of neutralizing the insurgency by rendering it ineffective through political reform. It also addresses the importance of modifying military operations for counterinsurgency to avoid alienating the population with excessive violence: “Collateral damage destroys government legitimacy. The insurgents’ best recruiting program is indiscriminate killing and damage by government forces” (FM 3-07 2003, 3-6). The doctrine recognizes that military operations are only one facet of the strategic problem: “Military operations must
complement and reinforce political, social, and economic reform” (FM 3-07 2003, 3-4). The doctrine does not address the conduct of US forces as an occupying force that has assumed the powers of sovereignty of a foreign nation. Besides eight pages on Foreign Internal Defense, the manual also includes an Appendix titled “Characteristics of Insurgency.” This appendix outlines Leadership, Ideology, Objectives, Environment and Geography, External Support, Phasing and Timing, the Phases of insurgency, and Organizational and Operational Patterns.

JP 3-07.1, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Internal Defense*, is another standard reference. This manual reads much like FM 3-07, except that it covers all US forces and emphasizes the criticality of coordination and the integration of effort among various US agencies. The manual also emphasizes the importance of providing support to the host nation, stating:

The United States will normally consider FID support only if the following three conditions exist: 1) the existing or threatened internal disorder is such that action by the United States supports US national strategic goals; 2) the threatened nation is capable of effectively using US assistance; and 3) the threatened nation requests US assistance. (JP 3-07.1 2004, viii)

JP 3-07.1 does not address the issues of conducting FID as an occupying force or establishing a military government. It stresses the need to conduct close coordination with the US diplomatic mission and the Country Team within the Host Nation to build an effective FID program. Neither of these structures currently functions in Iraq. JP 3-07.1 also provides a framework of the Diplomatic, Economic, Informational, and Military Elements for conducting FID and stresses connectivity among these elements for an effective FID program. Like FM 3-07, it focuses on the Indirect and Direct Support Operations as those that are optimal for supporting a foreign nation’s internal defense. In
addressing combat operations, JP 3-07.1 states that US forces will only be a temporary combat force until the host nation can stabilize the situation and that,

The primary role for US military forces in combat operations is to support, advise, and assist HN forces through logistics, intelligence or other combat support, and service means. This allows the HN force to concentrate on taking the offensive against hostile elements. (JP 3-07.1 2004, I-13)

The manual also states that HN forces should conduct combat operations whenever possible to increase the legitimacy of the HN government, whereas US forces, if conducting combat operations, should concentrate on force protection (JP 3-07.1 2004, IV-22, 23). Clearly, US forces are not intended to take a leading role in combat operations, and when they do, they are intended only to conduct them insofar as required for their own protection.

There is a lot of emphasis on working with the US diplomatic effort and Country Team to build an understanding of how and when to best employ US military assets to assist in FID. JP 3-07.1 stresses the vital importance of correctly identifying the root cause of unrest so that FID efforts will apply to a long-term solution, rather than addressing a short-term symptom (JP 3-07.1 2004, III-5). Human Intelligence (HUMINT) rather than electronic or technical types of intelligence is identified in the manual as probably the most important type of intelligence for successful FID (JP 3-07.1 2004, IV-2), and it should be backed up with a significant counterintelligence and operational security effort. Part of the HUMINT effort will be supported through training soldiers expected to operate in a FID environment. The manual recommends an emphasis on language training as much as possible to enable soldiers to operate in the environment and to facilitate cultural awareness. Standards of conduct training, training on the Rules of Engagement (ROE), FID principles and force protection are also emphasized.
Background

One of the keys to understanding an insurgency is to understand the background of the people involved, to include their history, society, and the culture where the insurgency occurs. There are many ways to do this, the best of which would be to live in the area, speak the language, and conduct an in-depth study of the area’s history and culture. For someone who has never been to the Middle East or Iraq, the following works are instructive as an introduction to the region and its people.

*Islam: A Short History*, a book by Karen Armstrong offers a look at the religion’s origins and development from the birth of the prophet Mohammed to the present. Armstrong is fairly objective and makes some interesting points, the first of which is that Islam was founded on the principle of social justice, which is therefore a crucial virtue of the faith. Doctrinal teachings and theological speculation are not important; what matters is the political and social welfare of the *ummah* or community. If the community prospers, it is a sign that its members are living according to God’s will. If the community is humiliated or suffers misfortune at the hand of outsiders, the negative turn of events is considered sacrilegious (Armstrong 2002, 6). It is only through the achievements of the society that practices God’s will that the Muslim achieves redemption (Armstrong 2002, 24). While this concept may be alien to the Christian mind, in the context of Mohammed’s desire to found a religion for the feuding tribes of the Arabian Peninsula, the concept makes sense. He wanted a religion that would strengthen the ancient nomadic code of caring for weaker members of the tribe and help end the cycle of vendetta and countervendetta that fueled the blood feuds present in his time.
After describing the rise of Islam in Arabia and throughout the world through its culmination and recession, Armstrong describes the devastation of colonization. Colonization was an “invasive, disturbing, and alien” experience (Armstrong 2002, 144). Not only was it an affront to the community of Islam, but colonizers expected Muslims to adapt to the European concept of modernization. What had taken Europeans over 300 years to accomplish, Muslims were expected to absorb in a matter of months. What had been accomplished in the West through autonomy and innovation was imposed on the east through a loss of autonomy and imitation (Armstrong 2002, 145). Two societies with radically different cultures and histories could not expect to achieve similar results from the implementation of modernization even under similar conditions, and the result has been less than optimal. Reaction against this foreign penetration helps to foster the tenets of “fundamental” Islam whose proponents, when unable to cope with or disappointed with the promises of modernization, seek to reestablish the conditions that existed before the period of modernization (Armstrong 2002, 165).

For a broad understanding of the Middle East and Iraq, there is a good analysis given in *Casebook on Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare: 23 Summary Accounts*, compiled by the Special Operations Research Office at the American University. This work describes the influence of Islam on politics as promoting little interest in the government on the part of the general populous, and therefore there is a popular reluctance to take an active role in the government. Such an attitude also accounts for indifference to corruption or mismanagement. Social welfare is seen either as a personal or a community responsibility, but not a role of the government (*Casebook* 1962, 324). The leadership of the region espouses Islam since it is seen as a more effective way for
elitist rulers to communicate with their illiterate populous, (quran means “recite” in Arabic (Armstrong 2002, 4)); national pride is important but is more influential on the middle class when it takes the form of public works or progressive measures which raise the standard of living (Casebook 1962, 328). Discontent with the governments of the Middle East usually appears in the elite of society or those close to them, who then normally carry out revolutions (Casebook 1962, 329). The casebook states that these elite groups in society usually have their cultural foundations weakened by contact with the west as they are educated there and witness reforms that could better their own society. The elitists are traditionally looked on by the mass of society as conquerors, tax collectors, and other representations of government; there is always a separation between them and the mass of society, which has little experience with positive government (Casebook1962, 329). An interesting statistic given on the Middle East is that inefficiency, weakness, disorganization, and corruption led to coups within two to ten years after the withdrawal of foreign troops in Syria (1949), Egypt (1952), Iraq, Sudan, and Pakistan (1958). Military forces were the prime movers in each of the coups listed (Casebook 1962, 331).

Iraq achieved its independence from the British in 1932. Between 1932 and 1936 the government went through seven cabinets and five Prime Ministers, although the foreign minister stayed (Casebook 1962, 344). There were frequent uprisings between rival tribes and ethnic groups (Casebook 1962, 347). The military coup of 1936 sought to overthrow the government but there were no political aims other than attaining high positions in the revolutionary government. No social or economic reforms were ever proposed (Casebook 1962, 350).
The Ba’ath Party revolution in 1958 resulted from repressive internal policies, a failure to identify with a rising middle class and urban masses, and an unpopular pro-western, anti-Nasser foreign policy (Casebook 1962, 393). Other contributing factors included a better-educated urban population with no jobs for intellectuals and an increase in the number of rural residents moving to cities to find jobs with no support structure and no opportunities. These two population groups provided ready recruits for violence both among the relocated and very young rural population and among intellectuals who had no opportunity for using their education (Casebook 1962, 394). The Casebook authors also raise the point that since the regime had allowed only limited criticism in the press and had rigged the electoral system, that the opposition felt it had no outlet and turned covert (Casebook 1962, 396). The outcome of the revolution appeared to change very little, except that the new regime was no longer anti-Nasser. It continued to keep all prior agreements with Western nations. The Casebook was published in 1962 and there is no further discussion of Iraq after the 1958 revolution. The Ba’ath Party was overthrown in 1959 by another military coup whose government lasted until 1963, when the Ba’aths again took power, leading to the rise of Sadaam Hussein.

Insurgency

To further understand the causes of an insurgency and how to counter one it is instructive to read the writings of an effective insurgent. Mao Tse-Tung’s On Guerrilla Warfare gives excellent insight into how the guerrilla thinks. More importantly, many of today’s insurgents still turn to this work and follow its principles with some variation. One point Mao makes that may explain why many insurgencies fail is his statement that “Without a political goal, guerrilla warfare must fail, as it must if its political objectives
do not coincide with the aspirations of the people and their sympathy, cooperation, and assistance cannot be gained” (Mao 1992, 71). Mao realized that the support of the people is vital to an insurgency effort, so much so that they are to the insurgent as the water is to a fish. Not only does water sustain the life of the fish, it also drowns the enemy.

Discipline in the insurgency is as vital to the effort as is the ability of the insurgent to win the people to his cause. Mao aimed for a “spiritual unification” of the army and the people and a destruction of the unity of the enemy (Mao 1992, 111).

Mao’s focus was not the military strength of the enemy but the sympathy and cooperation of the population against it. There is “no such thing as a decisive battle” (Mao 1992, 78) he wrote. Decisiveness lay in the conviction and determination of the guerrilla and his support base:

The . . . idea must be an ever-present conviction, and if it is ever forgotten, we may succumb to the temptations of the enemy or be overcome with discouragements. . . . Without the general education that enables everyone to understand our goal of driving out . . . imperialism and establishing a free and happy China, the soldiers fight without conviction and lose their determination. (Mao 1992, 110)

His goal was education. Political leadership educated the army leadership, which educated the guerrillas, who educated the populous by building trust and then sharing ideology. Because this process can take time, he makes the point in his Primer on Guerrilla War that a “war of resistance cannot be quickly won and can only be a protracted war . . . as a distant journey tests the strength of a horse and a long task proves the character of a man, [so] guerrilla warfare will demonstrate its enormous power in the course of a long and ruthless war” (Mao 1992, 15). Samuel B. Griffith, who translated the work, argues that Mao actually wanted to keep the war going to allow time to win the will of the people (Mao 1992, 14). As long as the war continues, argued Mao, the specter
of defeat is forestalled and the spirit of victory can peek in (Mao 1992, 17). It also gave him more time to “educate” the populous, in which the Imperial Japanese Army had no interest.

Lenin was another notable revolutionary who wrote prodigiously. In an article titled “Partisan Warfare” published in Revolutionary Guerrilla Warfare, Lenin describes how opportunistic revolutionaries can be. He was not so concerned with educating the public, or even winning them to his cause. His concern was more about how to use their discontent and shape their violent uprising to move his own cause: “Armed struggle is waged by small groups and individuals, some of whom are members of revolutionary parties. In certain regions of Russia, however, the majority [of partisans] are not affiliated with any revolutionary organization.” He goes on to describe the two goals of these individuals as being first, to kill individuals such as high officials and members of the police or army and second, to confiscate money from the government and private persons (Lenin 1975, 189). The job of the Marxists was, in his view, to organize this effort, “Marxism does not tie the movement to any particular combat method. . . . [I]t merely organizes the tactics of strife and renders them suitable for general use” (Lenin 1975, 187). Lenin also states that terrorist acts “are recommended, but are subject to the following restrictions: (1) the popular mood must be taken into account; (2) local conditions under which the workers movement is operating must be considered; (3) care must be taken that no proletarian forces are wasted unnecessarily” (Lenin 1975, 195).

The editor’s notes at the end of the article are careful to point out “the term ‘partisan war’ or ‘partisan action’ is a euphemism . . . that stands for terrorism, holdups, and robberies” (Sarkesian 1975, 197). It also states that terrorism as described in the article was used
against soldiers, policemen, and officials, while the confiscation of money was usually carried out by professional thieves who targeted not only the wealthy and the government, but small shop owners as well. While the article does not address guerrilla warfare as understood in the modern sense, it does give insight into some of the insurgent forces currently operating in Iraq who have no common ideological affiliation other than being anti-Western, but are taking advantage of the situation to settle scores or commit common theft. These lawless elements are available to and can be used to advance the cause of those who have an agenda.

Counterinsurgency

Just as there are many types of insurgency depending on the varied terrains, cultures, economies, and politics of the world, so are there just as many theories for counterinsurgency. Generally, most experts agree that there are some basic issues which must always be addressed: the insurgents must be isolated from their source of support; there must be political reform which addresses the root cause of discontent; and government forces must win the support of the populous. The British Army probably has more continuous experience with countering insurgencies than any other army. In addition to the many colonial actions it fought both in establishing colonies and later defending them from rebellion, it has had to deal with insurgents in Scotland, Wales, and Ireland since pre-modern times and even up to the present day in Northern Ireland.

The manual *Land Operations, Volume 3, Counter-Revolutionary Operations, Parts I and II*, makes some interesting observations about the nature of urban guerrillas in particular. It states that the urban guerrilla uses tactics designed to erode the credibility and morale of the government and government forces in order to induce a “climate of
collapse” where the people, faced with the real threat of a collapse of urban life and livelihood, will rally to whatever organization seems best able to restore order out of chaos (Ministry of Defense 1977, 14).

In such a situation, the insurgent anticipates the government either to capitulate or adopt more repressive measures and associated collateral damage that will win more supporters for the insurgent. The chief weapon of the insurgent is indiscriminate terror, which helps establish feelings of insecurity in the populous. Hand in hand with terror is the media that continually broadcasts the incident adding to a picture of insecurity and government inability to protect its citizens. The principles involved in countering insurgency are laid out as operating within the rule of law, using minimum force necessary, insuring political awareness to understand the background of operations to support government intentions, and winning popular support.

Part II of Volume III addresses very specifically the procedures and techniques that the British Army uses in applying these principles with particular emphasis on obeying and maintaining the rule of law and using minimum force necessary. Soldiers are cautioned that they “must at all times rigorously observe the laws of the territory in which they are operating” (Ministry of Defense 1977, 9). Soldiers who do not obey the local laws may be subject to criminal proceedings. Their primary purpose, they are told, is to uphold the law and “practice what they preach.” This includes the use of minimum necessary force. The regulation also states up front that, soldiers who use more than the minimum necessary force may also be subject to criminal proceedings. The manual is very clear on this and provides several vignettes on situations that a soldier could be expected to encounter.
One of the more respected writers on the British counterinsurgency experience is Sir Robert Thompson. His book, *Defeating Communist Insurgency* describes lessons learned from Malaya and Vietnam and elaborates on some of the points described above, although his principles of counterinsurgency are different as they directly address the government’s responsibilities and not the military. Thompson’s first principle is that the government should have the clear political aim of establishing a free, independent, and united country that is politically and economically stable and viable. The government must function in accordance with the law. The government must have an overall plan which covers political, social, economic, administrative, and police factors, in addition to any others bearing directly on the insurgency. The government must ascribe priority to defeating political subversion, not the guerrillas. The government must secure base areas first.

He makes two points to help put his principles into proper perspective. The first is that, “any sensible government should attempt to defeat an insurgent movement during the subversive build-up phase before it enters the guerrilla phase.” The second point is that anyone having any responsibility for dealing with an insurgent movement must know his enemy and what that enemy is attempting to do at all stages (Thompson 1966, 50). He stresses that, “An insurgent war is a war for the people” (Thompson 1966, 51), and that it is absolutely critical for the government to act in accordance with the law. He acknowledges that tough laws may be necessary to control the situation, but as long as they are effective and fair, the populous will accept them (Thompson 1966, 53). He advocates public trials for criminals to show justice in action and expose the brutal, criminal nature of the insurgency (Thompson 1966, 54). He also addresses the criticality
of intelligence and of the will to win. He stresses that a western-style democracy may not be suitable for all areas of the world and that authoritarian government may be all right as long as it is based on the rule of law; has constructive, progressive policies; and can be judged favorably on its performance (Thompson 1966, 68).

The French Army also has a long history of counterinsurgency operations both at home and in its former colonies. In his book, *Modern Warfare*, Roger Trinquier elaborates on his experiences in Southeast Asia and North Africa. He makes the point up front that “We still persist in studying a type of warfare that no longer exists and that we shall never fight again, while we pay only passing attention to the war we lost in Indochina” (Trinquier 1964, 3). He views modern maneuver warfare as obsolete and holds that the military no longer plays a decisive role in warfare. Victory, he says, requires the “unconditional support of the population” (Trinquier 1964, 8). The goal of modern warfare is control of the populous. Bearing this goal in mind, the insurgent uses terrorism to sway the population to the insurgent (Trinquier 1964, 16). The insurgent’s secondary goal of creating a feeling of insecurity is to encourage government forces to withdraw into easily defended strongholds so that he may more easily move among the population in areas outside those strongholds and better track the movements of government forces (Trinquier 1964, 52). In this manner the insurgent is more easily able to win the support of the population as he continues to move among them, while the government remains isolated in its strongholds.

This picture adds to the security of the insurgents, as the side that has the population’s support can never be surprised, because there will always be someone who sees the other side’s preparations and movement. Trinquier advocates intelligence
operations down to the lowest levels and seems to condone interrogation methods that could result in the death of the insurgent (Trinquier 1964, 20-22). Trinquier encourages police units to conduct urban operations, with which they are more familiar and to focus on destruction of the terrorist organization. The army should be employed in light detachments that operate on specific intelligence with a mobile reserve (Trinquier 1964, 43-44). He outlines specific tactics for population control, cordon and search, and population support. He argues that units cannot expect to root out a insurgent organization in a village in anything less than a week. Military units should expect to stay at least long enough to identify the organization, destroy it, identify replacements, destroy them, and establish a loyal organization with local security (Trinquier 1964, 78).

Trinquier also argues that expansive support structures at isolated locations are counterproductive: “any element not in direct and permanent contact with the population is useless.” Soldiers and security forces should rent houses in neighborhoods or villages they hope to pacify and organize general defense rather than build strongholds in outlying areas (Trinquier 1964, 73). His principles for counterinsurgency are to interrupt the insurgent’s food supply, destroy the organization, and permit the population to participate in their own defense (Trinquier 1964, 64).

The US view of counterinsurgency warfare is probably best espoused in the writings of John McCuen. His book *The Art of Counter-Revolutionary War* contains many of the principles found in current US doctrine. His main point is that since every insurgency is unique, and that the government must employ the same principles used by the insurgents, but in reverse (McCuen 1965, 28-29). The government must also make an estimate of the situation, make realistic long-term plans, and commit sufficient resources
to regain the initiative. He describes the principles for insurgency as enunciated by Mao, Giap, and the French. Unlike Trinquier, he stresses the need for the government to secure safe areas from which it can operate and spread outward like “oil spots” until all are connected and the insurgency is eliminated. Part of this principle is ensuring that government troops and militia understand that they not just fighting the insurgents, but also attempting to actively mobilize the population to support the government (McCuen 1964, 60).

Indigenous populations should be used whenever possible to conduct operations with non-indigenous forces relegated to direct civic action. If they must be used in combats, they are to counter major rebel units away from populated areas (McCuen 1964, 66). A unified effort among all government agencies is also crucial as insurgents will quickly identify and exploit any rifts (McCuen 1964, 69). The government must establish sound political, economic, educational, psychological, organizational, and military policies (McCuen 1964, 71). To successfully counter the insurgency, the government must also counter insurgent organization by setting up an effective administration, which is competent and has firm control (McCuen 1964, 85). There must be a civil training program that is loyal and has close ties to the populace (McCuen 1964, 94). There must be a counter organization of the population for groups, sports, child care, agriculture, self-defense forces, and so on, to serve as an educational counter to similar insurgent organizations (McCuen 1964, 98). Self-defense forces must have authority to enforce the law, be armed and trained, have communications with the regular police, be paid for their loyalty, have a badge of authority, and be screened for reliability (McCuen 1964, 107).
Another useful document for analyzing counterinsurgency theory is the US Marine Corps’ *Small Wars Manual*, published in 1940. An accumulation of lessons learned in the Marine Corps many expeditions abroad in South and Central America, the Caribbean, China, and the Philippines, the *Small Wars Manual* is comprised mainly of TTPs that cover everything from how to care for and load various pack animals to conducting infantry patrols. Most instructive for this thesis, however, is Chapter XIII, “Military Government.” In describing the authority for exercising military government, the manual states:

Military government usually applies to territory over which the Constitution and laws of the United States have no operation. Its exercise is sanctioned because the powers of sovereignty have passed into the hands of the commander of the occupying forces and the local authority is unable to maintain order and protect life and property in the immediate theater of military operations. The duty of such protection passes to the occupying forces, they having deprived the people of the protection which the former government afforded. It is decidedly to the military advantage of the occupying forces to establish a strong and just government, such as will preserve order and, as far as possible, pacify the inhabitants. (2004, 13-3)

The manual also stresses the importance of the commander to have a thorough knowledge of the customs of the area, as “the enforcement of regulations which run counter to long-established customs is always extremely difficult” (*Small Wars Manual*, 13-10). The included checklist of necessary “political, economic, and psycologic [sic]” information provides a comprehensive base for establishing as thorough an understanding as possible for unfamiliar areas. The manual also emphasizes the importance of maintaining as much normality as possible by maintaining as many former civic officials as possible:

No other civil officials [excepting collectors of customs at all important ports] should be displaced except as may be necessary by way of removal on account of incompetency or misconduct in office. The policy should be to retain the latter in
their official positions and hold them responsible to the military officers in charge. (2004, 13-12)

Chapter XIII also provides a concept for issuing a military plan to assume charge of civil government, prescribes the roles of various staff members for military government, and stresses the importance of a separate staff to handle civil matters.

Current Operations

The available literature on current operations is somewhat limited, but readily available. In addition to numerous reports in newspapers, periodicals, broadcast media, and on the Internet, which describe the actions of coalition forces in Iraq, there are also unclassified reports from the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL), which have been recently published. Since the reports from the media all have different biases and levels of sensationalism, they can provide useful background, but the focus of this thesis will be on the official actions of the US Army as documented by CALL. Granted, there is some bias, just as there is in any Army institution, but the level of bias can be mitigated through reference to the media. The two products available for this thesis include the “OIF CAAT 01 Initial Impressions Report” published in October 2003, and “OIF CAAT 01 Initial Impressions Report” published in December 2003. These two reports document lessons learned in areas of Command and Control, Intelligence, Combat Operations, Lethal and Non-Lethal Fires, and Civil Military Operations.

Interviews

Besides many informal discussions with classmates and instructors, the following formal interviews provided essential insight into counterinsurgency operations:

Colonel Joseph Celeski, 3rd Special Forces Group Commander emphasized that the critical part of a successful counterinsurgency effort is to get the indigenous
population to take over the fight and have an ownership and interest in the outcome. One of his main concerns is that US Army officers and soldiers are not sufficiently culturally aware to avoid unintentional alienation of the indigenous population.

Lester Grau, editor of *The Bear went over the Mountain, The Other Side of the Mountain*, and member of the CALL Initial Assessment team that went to Iraq in December 2003, also provided detail on the disjointed nature of current operations in Iraq, not just between government and military actions, but between US Army units on the ground that were part of the same Corps or division.

Lieutenant Colonel John Russell who was the C3 for Coalition Operations, Operation Iraqi Freedom, provided valuable information on the day-to-day operations of coalition forces and their interaction with the Coalition Provisional Authority.

Lieutenant Colonel Blaise Cornell-d’Echert, Jr., the Director of Training for the Coalition Military Assistance Training Team assisted the author in gaining an understanding of the role of internal security forces in Iraq, specifically the police, the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps (ICDC), and the new Iraqi Army. As a recruiter and trainer for these forces, LTC Cornell-d’Echert had an intimate understanding of the motivations and culture of Iraq’s security apparatus.

Major Wijendra Gunatilake of the Army of Sri Lanka with seventeen years’ experience fighting Tamil insurgents highlighted the importance of the perceptions of the people who are neither pro-government nor pro-insurgent during an insurgency. He stressed the need for government forces to take those people away from the insurgents because even if they do not actively support the insurgent, their acquiescence makes it possible for the insurgent to continue operations. “You must drain the tank,” he said,
referring to Mao’s classic analogy for insurgents to move through the people like fish through water (Gunatilake Interview 2004).
Without warning he thrust his forefinger into the bowl of soup which had been placed before him and exclaimed, “We are like my finger. When it pushes into the bowl, the soup parts to let it in. When it comes out of the bowl, the soup closes over and no one could ever know I had had my finger in the soup.”

J. F. C. Kenney Jr., “Counterinsurgency: One Approach to Doctrine”

The US Army has a wealth of experience in dealing with insurgencies under a variety of conditions, locations, and cultures. As an institution the Army was not always concerned with or adept at capturing the lessons it learned from these operations, but it has usually performed well. This chapter does not go into the lengthy history of US Army counterinsurgency operations, which go back to the American Revolution, but instead focuses on four major insurgencies that occurred in foreign lands to which the US Army deployed either as an occupying or pacifying force. These insurgencies include the Philippine Insurrection from 1898 to 1902, or at the request of a friendly government as in the Hukbalahap Insurrection between 1946 and 1952, the Vietnam War from 1962 to 1973, and the El Salvador uprising from 1978 to 1988. The object is to review how the US Army developed and adapted its doctrine to meet unique conditions in each of these situations and examine how the Army’s experience shaped the development of later doctrine.

The Philippine Insurrection

The US Army’s first written doctrine on dealing with populations in occupied areas was General Orders 100. Written in 1863 and signed by President Lincoln, it
arguably shaped the way the US Army conducted operations in occupied territories for the next 100 years. General Orders 100 stressed the moral responsibility of commanders to treat the citizens of occupied territories humanely: “As Martial Law is executed by military force, it is incumbent upon those who administer it to be strictly guided by the principles of justice, honor, and humanity” (Art.4). Since the object of war was not to kill the enemy but to bring about a speedier peace, soldiers were to act accordingly. The emphasis was on moderation in occupied territories as well as respect for local customs and religion. The military retained certain responsibilities for the population, and it was the responsibility of the occupied peoples to yield to military authority or be treated as an aggressor: “The commander will throw the burden of the war, as much as lies within his power, on the disloyal citizens, of the revolted portion or province . . . and if he deems it appropriate . . . he may expel, transfer, imprison, or fine the revolted citizens who refuse to pledge themselves anew as citizens obedient to the law and loyal to the government” (General Orders 100, Art. 156).

It was under this policy of moderation and strict adherence to martial law that the Army prosecuted the Philippine Insurrection beginning in 1898. At the conclusion of the Spanish-American War, the United States found itself in possession of several new territories spread around the globe. While politicians in Washington debated the future status of these new possessions, the US Army settled down to nation building. President McKinley avoided giving local commanders concrete guidance, instead allowing them freedom to act as they saw fit to improve local situations. Occupation policies were based more or less on General Order 100 of 1863, the basis of which was that the “occupier had a moral obligation to protect people under its control from undue hardship and to provide
them with basic governmental services. . . . [T]he laws of war discouraged commanders from radically altering the laws and customs of an occupied territory unless military necessity mandated such changes” (Birtle 2001, 101). In the Philippines, where the US Army initially held only the city of Manila, this policy translated into local civic improvements such as building roads and schools and digging wells. Building schools was especially important, since officers at the time believed that educational reform was the key to a nation-building program (Birtle 2001, 102). The US Army did receive some guidance in this respect from Secretary of War, Elihu Root, who said that education’s greatest mission was to inculcate civic virtues since “the most difficult obstacle to introducing American style democracy was the absence of any sense of civic responsibility among the majority of Spain’s former subjects”(Birtle 2001, 103) and there were many soldiers who volunteered their time to teach in those schools (Birtle 2001, 120).

However, there were some Filipinos who objected to this effort. The revolutionary leader Emilio Aguinaldo, who had initially helped the US to fight the Spanish, led these forces. When the US took authority for the islands at the end of the war, the revolutionaries refused to recognize that authority and initiated a conventional-style war against US Army forces in Manila. The commander of American forces in the Philippines at that time was Major General (MG) Elwell Otis. He defeated Aguinaldo’s conventional forces by November 1899 and forced the revolutionaries to retreat into the mountains where Aguinaldo switched his tactics to guerrilla-type warfare, relying on his knowledge of the local terrain and the sympathy of the local population to support his forces. He established several autonomous commands with full-time guerrillas and a part-
time militia in remote villages. He also established shadow governments in towns to collect intelligence on American forces, gather supplies, and obtain new recruits. He was able to maintain control of the populations in outlying areas through a mixture of appeals to nationalism, paternalism, superstition, and terror (Birtle 2001, 111). His goal was to undermine US will through a prolonged conflict that would inflict unbearable casualties on US soldiers and force an end to US imperialist interests in the Philippines. He even timed his main offensive to coincide with the US presidential elections in order to help secure a win for William Jennings Bryan, McKinley’s anti-imperialist contender in the 1900 presidential election (Birtle 2001, 112).

The US Army countered these tactics by quickly adapting to the new situation. As the insurgents dispersed and fled to the mountains, MG Otis also deployed his forces. Recognizing that pacification required gaining control of the population and isolating the insurgents, he established over 600 outposts in remotely populated areas within two years (Birtle 2001, 113). One officer noted that the Filipinos “are in identically the same position as the Indians of our country have been for many years, and in my opinion must be subdued in much the same way, by such convincing conquest as shall make them fully realize the futility of armed resistance, and then win them by fair and just treatment” (Birtle 2001, 112). In fact many officers found that their experience on the American frontier and the Civil War provided a good foundation for operations in the Philippines where junior officer initiative, adaptability, and aggressiveness in adjusting to the situation in dispersed outposts were critical to survival. Just as the US Army erected outposts in the American West to protect the population, provide support for offensive operations and maintain a presence in troubled areas, MG Otis established outposts in the
Philippines with the same objectives in mind. An indirect outcome of this tactic was that small units were forced by the remoteness of these outposts to learn local customs and peoples, to know the terrain, and to learn their enemy.

While MG Otis was chasing the insurgents through the jungle, he realized that military efforts alone would not defeat them. At the end of 1899 he established several spy networks to identify and destroy the shadow governments that Aguinaldo had established. Population monitoring at the local level was key to this effort and the Army took a census, issued identification cards, maintained files on suspects and conducted frequent round-ups of suspects (Birtle 2001, 117). In an effort to win the population through a “policy of attraction” General Otis said that his basic formula was “simply to keep scrupulous faith with these people and teach them to trust us” (Birtle 2001, 119), and so he built roads, refurbished markets, inaugurated sanitation programs, established an amnesty program and a cash for rifles program (Birtle 2001, 120). The most effective tool for winning over a small town or village turned out to be the local commander who was able to convince the population, through his actions, that he had the means and the will to protect them from the reprisals of the guerrillas (Birtle 2001, 121).

Unfortunately, Otis’ policy of attraction was unable to defeat the insurgents’ hold on the population. General Otis underestimated the depth of the insurgency and the impact of American-Filipino friction that resulted from racism, condescension, and discipline problems within his own ranks. When General Arthur MacArthur took over command from General Otis, and with the 1900 elections a foregone conclusion, the new commander implemented the harsher articles of General Orders 100, which allowed him to levy punishments against rebellious populations. Instituting a “policy of chastisement,”
General MacArthur aimed to strike at the upper classes of Filipino society whom he suspected of supporting the insurgents. As a result, persons suspected of supporting Aguinaldo or his followers had their properties confiscated and crops burned. In some cases entire villages were burned after the inhabitants were encouraged to leave in order to deny food and shelter to the insurgents (Birtle 2001, 129).

The last effort to destroy the insurgency came under General Adna Chaffee who replaced General MacArthur as commander in the Philippines. Having served under General Sheridan during the Civil War, Chaffee was a firm believer in Sheridan’s maxim that “a short and severe war creates, in the aggregate, less loss and suffering than a benevolent war indefinitely prolonged” (Birtle 2001, 133). He put “hardliners” into command to wipe out the last two remaining insurgent strongholds. These officers resettled the populations of their respective areas into colonies and burned the rest of any infrastructure that could support the insurgents. The insurgents were forced to surrender and Aguinaldo’s insurrection was over in 1902.

The US Army in the Philippines relied on experiences gleaned from the American Civil War and administering the frontier with only the guidance from General Orders 100 to perform their pacification efforts in the Philippines. While the combined efforts of policies of “attraction” and “chastisement,” together with military efforts in the field, undoubtedly brought about an end to the insurrection, most officers concluded that the guerrillas and their supporters had to be made to feel the pain of war to give it up. The policies of attraction helped to hasten surrender (Birtle 2001, 135).
The Hukbalahap Insurrection

While the US Army continued to be involved in the Philippines for the next eleven years, helping to rebuild after the destruction of the insurrection and governing the Moros. The Army was not involved with an insurgency there again until after World War II. Following Japan’s defeat, communist insurgents who had fought against the Japanese turned on the government of the Philippines. The Hukbalahaps or Huks, as they were called, led by Luis Taruc, felt that to solve grievances of land reform and government corruption that had existed since the Spanish occupation they had to overthrow the current administration and institute communist rule. The Huks made every effort to publicize government excesses and corruption while working hard to build bonds with the people: “Many times squadrons would stay with villagers, working and playing with them, all the while developing stronger ties and indoctrinating them about the Huk/communist cause” (Valeriano quoted in Greenburg 1987, 28). Of course to a villager far from Manila, a Huk insurgent who helped gather the harvest held much more sway than the national government, of which the locals know little. As the government began to respond to the Huks, soldiers were sent to root out the insurgency with very little support. Filipino soldiers were forced to live off the land, which translated to living off the villagers (Greenburg 1987, 74). The more the government soldiers demanded villagers to support them and provide supplies, the easier it was for the Huks to portray an image that it was they and not the government who were their protectors.

In the United States there was initially little concern with occurrences in the Philippines. The newly established Philippine national government, having achieved independence in 1946, appeared to be firmly in control. It was not until late 1949 and
early 1950, when the Huks mounted a general offensive attacking several outposts, police forces, and entire towns, that the governments of the Philippines and the United States realized how much they had underestimated the problem. When the Huks ambushed and killed the wife of the late president Manuel Quezon, government criticism reached an all-time high and President Quirino appointed a new Secretary of Defense, Ramon Magsaysay. The US government did have some advisors in the Philippines but was unable to commit any sizeable force to assist the Filipino government, due to rapidly growing commitments to stop the invasion of North Korea. Recognizing the severity of the situation was a step in the right direction, but not being able to send a sizeable force of troops, the US instead sent Magsaysay more advisors, equipment, and money. The critical factor to US success in the Philippines though “were perceptive and innovative advisors who operated within the culture and tradition of the country while finding the proper level of support and assistance” (Greenburg 1987, v).

The first thing that Magsaysay did with the funds supplied from the US was to raise the pay of his soldiers so that they could buy supplies from villagers instead of taking them. As a former guerrilla himself, he understood what Turac needed in order to be successful as an insurgent: the support of the populous. Magsaysay instituted reforms in the military to instill in every soldier a dedication first to the Filipino people and second to killing guerrillas (Greenburg 1987, 146). He not only issued orders, but he traveled to the countryside often to ensure that they were carried out. He was famous for telling the villagers that the soldiers and police were there to help them and would tell them to come to him if they had any concerns. Any soldier guilty of abuses towards the civilian population was punished quickly and strictly (Greenburg 1987, 85). Magsaysay
became so popular with his effective reforms that he was later elected president of the Philippines, in which capacity he continued to push a broad socio-economic reform program to win the allegiance of peasant farmers to the government.

US advisors to Magsaysay during this time had very little formal doctrine to guide them. The US provided enormous amounts of financial and material aid to the Philippines, but advisors with the Joint US Military Assistance Group, or JUSMAG, tried to foster self-reliance in the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) in their fight against the Huks. US advisors tended to play down their own roles and treated the Filipinos as equals. Without American troops to conduct the fighting, the AFP with its American advisors was forced to develop on its own. Officers and NCOs had to grow and progress on their own merit and train their own troops. Gradually they began to fight to protect their own land and people. As one said, “Once the [Filipino] Army became convinced that they were fighting to protect their countrymen and not as an occupation force trying to subdue an unruly foreign population, they began to receive the people’s support” (Greenburg 1987, 149).

Initially JUSMAG focused on the tactical operations of the insurgency, while Magsaysay worked out a strategy based on small unit tactics instead of large maneuvers. “Whatever it was that hurt me most as a guerrilla is what we are going to do now to the Huk” he said (Greenburg 1987, 87). By 1951 JUSMAG began expanding programs for military professional education and training in an effort to increase proficiency in the officer and NCO corps. Continued aid from the US allowed the Filipino government to focus its funds on social and economic reform, and the Economic Development Corps was a major part of this effort.
Addressing the major grievance of land tenure, government-sponsored reform provided an incentive for the Huks to leave the insurrection and rejoin society. The main goal of the program was to resettle the Huks on government land away from Luzon, the location of the insurrection. As long as the former guerrillas lived on the land and developed it, they were given title to it (Greenburg 1987, 90). The program was a huge success. Another successful program to which JUSMAG contributed began in February of 1952 when the US allocated $5 million to buy weapons from the Huks and their supporters. By 1953, US advisors were finally allowed to accompany the AFP in the field, where they continued to advise and support Filipino units. By 1954 the situation had improved to the extent that Filipino farmers viewed the military as protectors and not oppressors (Greenburg 1987, 110). With the help of US provided aircraft and radios, the AFP was able to initiate a psychological operations campaign against the Huk, dropping leaflets, inserting infiltrators, and tampering with Huk caches and ammo to increase the amount of distrust and demoralize the Huks. The insurgency lost the support of the populace and, having no other outside support, ceased to have any relevance in the Philippines.

The Hukbalahap Insurrection resulted in large part from a complacent and indifferent policy in the United States towards a corrupt and self-serving government in the Philippines. When this government failed to respond appropriately to the growing insurgency of the Huk movement, the US could not send troop support other than advisors thanks to Korean commitments. Fortunately, the US advisors operating in the Philippines were sensitive to the culture and traditions of the Philippines and stressed self-reliance and professionalism within the AFP. Together with a responsive and
energetic governmental authority in the form of Ramon Magsaysay, they were able to
defeat the Huk through a closely coordinated socio-economic reform program tailored to
address the grievances of the insurgency in conjunction with an aggressive military
operation designed to win the fight for the decisive point of the campaign, the Filipino.

The Vietnam War

US entry into the Vietnam War began in a similar manner to the Hukbalahap
Insurrection. Initially a few US Army advisors bore responsibility for helping to build an
army in a newly established country, South Vietnam. However, when LTG Samuel
Williams arrived in 1956, he was tasked by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) to train
Vietnamese units to defeat an attack from the north. By this time the US Army had a
well-established doctrine on how to fight conventional battles and was focused on the
task of fighting the Soviet threat (Krepinevich 1988, 23). At the same time, some very
good theories were emerging from Sir Robert Thompson, a British advisor during the
Malaya Emergency, and others on how to successfully defeat an insurgency. There were
also manuals written for the newly established US Army Special Forces units including

The JCS and LTG Williams seemed to be unaware of the insurgent threat in South
Vietnam, despite the fact that the Viet Minh had defeated the French only a few years
before. LTG Williams discharged his mission in accordance with the conventional
doctrine of the time and even held a corps- size maneuver shortly before he left South
Vietnam, despite reservations of the Vietnamese General Staff who felt that smaller,
more flexible units than divisions would be necessary for the fight they envisioned
(Krepinevich 1988, 23).
Unlike the US advisors to the Philippines in the early 1950s, US advisors in Vietnam trained local units in US conventional doctrine with a US force structure. US advisors even disbanded the light infantry divisions of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) because they thought they would be no match for North Vietnamese Army (NVA) divisions (Krepinevich 1988, 24). During the early stages of US involvement, President Kennedy realized that an emerging role for the US Army would be counterinsurgency. He stepped up efforts to change the Army through his emphasis on Special Forces and efforts to get the “conventional” Army to incorporate more training in its professional development programs on that topic. The US Army response was that “the essence of the problem [in South Vietnam] is military” and “any good soldier can handle guerrillas” (Krepinevich 1988, 37).

The US Army was focusing only on the military aspect of the problem, and conventional wisdom was that attrition warfare that had won World War II and the Korean War. In referencing a strategy that was more familiar, not to mention planned and resourced, instead of looking back to what had worked for the US advisors and President Magsaysay in the Philippines, the US Army was in the process of forcing a large, square, conventional peg into an unconventional, small, round hole. The JCS even went so far as to say that the troops that the administration was beginning to request would be used only to “fight ‘large, formed guerrilla bands’ but would not engage in ‘small-scale’ guerrilla operations” (Krepinevich 1988, 64). The Army was beginning to form the basis for what would later become FM 3-07 and JP 3-07.1, which advocates almost verbatim the same guidance for employing US forces in Foreign Internal Defense operations.
There were some positive developments in the Darlac province where US Army Special Forces (SF) units under control of the CIA successfully established local defense forces that they integrated for mutual defense and support. Going from village to village and tying in those defenses using the “oil-spot” technique of a perpetually expanding support base, which then links into others like oil-spots on water, SF teams virtually eliminated the Viet Cong in that province (Krepinevich 1988, 70). Unfortunately, the regular Army saw this as a waste of resources and too time consuming and initiated Operation Switchback. Control of SF teams went from the CIA to the Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV), where they were detailed out other missions like special reconnaissance. The US Army SF teams were replaced by ARVN SF teams, which through negligence and mismanagement, allowed previously coordinated defenses to deteriorate, while failing to establish any other new programs. The result was an eventual return of the Viet Cong into those areas.

The next few years from 1965-1968 witnessed the build-up of US combat power in South Vietnam as the JCS tried unsuccessfully to either bring the Viet Cong insurgents to decisive battle or conduct search and attack on such a wide scale that the Viet Cong (VC) would be unable to operate. Continuing to search for a strategy to fit its doctrine, the MACV assigned more sectors to US Army units to conduct search and attack and to interdict supplies coming from outside South Vietnam. This strategy would free up more ARVN units to support civil defense forces against the Viet Cong. Westmoreland’s three-stage plan was to first secure bases, then conduct offensive operations and deep patrols with ARVN forces, and then provide a reserve for the ARVN while conducting long range offensive operations (Krepinevich 1988, 151).
Westmoreland believed that it would take about two years to demonstrate VC failure in the south and he said that his strategy for victory was to “break the will of the DRV/VC by denying them victory” (Krepinevich 1988, 149). Although General Westmoreland reportedly kept a copy of Mao Tse-tung’s book on guerrilla warfare nearby, he failed to appreciate Mao’s strategy for extending the war to win the will of the people and achieve victory for the guerrilla by denying his elimination. The Viet Cong skillfully maneuvered their forces in difficult terrain to prevent the US from massing firepower on them. Meanwhile, as the US sought decisive conventional battle in the hinterlands, the Viet Cong support infrastructure for supply and recruiting operated virtually unimpeded along the coastal plains of South Vietnam, where most of the population lived.

US Army forces in the main had very little interaction with local populations, and when interaction did occur it was usually negative, as evidenced by the thousands of refugees fleeing areas where US forces conducted operations. Operations of the 1st Cavalry Division, for example, created over 30,000 refugees during Operation Masher/White Wing between 24 January and 6 March of 1966 (Krepinevich 1988, 223).

US forces did not live in or near densely populated areas and usually conducted airmobile operations going out to and returning from an objective. In addition, rapid personnel rotations meant that soldiers had little desire to understand the culture, traditions, and people in the area. There could be no opportunity to develop contacts for information or stay in an area long enough to ensure the eradication of insurgent elements that would always return as soon as US forces would leave. As one Viet Cong expressed
it to a villager, “The government forces will soon leave, but we will be here forever” (Krepinevich 1988, 216).

The final phase of the war began with the Tet offensive in January 1968. While it dealt a deadly blow to the Viet Cong and its infrastructure as they massed in the cities of South Vietnam, where the full might of the US Army and its sister services could be brought to bear on them, the appearance of a well coordinated and effective attack destroyed the rosy picture General Westmorland had been painting of progress and eventual defeat of communist forces in South Vietnam. More than anything else, Tet left the American public with no doubt as to the resolve of the communists to carry on the fight for as long as it took, at whatever the cost, to force foreign troops out of their country. Following media commentator Walter Kronkite’s somber account of the battles, President Johnson reportedly turned and told an aide that if he had lost Walter Kronkite, he had lost the average citizen (Boot 2002, 309).

American public support for the war crumbled. Nevertheless, many officers saw Tet as a validation of their strategy and continued their operations in much the same way, although when General Abrams assumed command from General Westmoreland, he tried to place more emphasis on pacification operations. Having directed a study on US Army operations in Vietnam, General Abrams appeared to be aware of the importance of employing his forces in more of a pacification role, but in practice US Army units simply continued the same tactics of search and destroy, but with more emphasis on small unit operations and night operations (Krepinevich 1988, 253). The Army’s inability to correctly determine the decisive importance of the Vietnamese population, together with
a continual misinterpretation of events to support a conventional doctrine, ultimately forced its withdrawal from the battlefield.

**The El Salvador Uprising**

In the decade that followed the Vietnam War, the US Army tried to reexamine the nature and consequence of its experiences there. One result was FM 100-20, which was printed in January 1981. Titled *Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict*, it sought to address the painful lack of doctrine identified by many US advisors early in the war; an issue that was raised on many occasions but generally ignored by MACV and the JCS as they sought to pursue another objective. FM 100-20 identifies the fundamentals of Low Intensity Conflict, defines the nature of insurgencies and counterinsurgencies as well as potential roles for the US military in both situations. It addresses the need for government forces facing an insurgency to initiate social, economic, and political reforms to address the grievances of an insurgency. The idea was to win the support of the population under a concept called “Internal Defense and Development,” or IDAD. The Army soon had an opportunity to test this doctrine in the tiny Central-American country of El Salvador.

Several factors led to unrest and insurrection in El Salvador in 1981. An economic crisis in the 1970’s, followed by global recession and a drop in coffee prices had resulted in growing instability. Citizens were also unhappy with their inept and harsh military governments and their armed forces. Several different guerrilla bands formed in the countryside, and they eventually coalesced into the Faribundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN). Proclaiming a “final offensive” in 1981, the FMLN inflicted heavy losses on the armed forces of El Salvador (ESAF) but was unable to overthrow the government.
The FMLN was able to take control of much of the country and to operate freely in many areas, especially at night.

Unwilling to allow the situation to deteriorate further, the US decided to intervene militarily, but limited itself to a cap of 55 advisors. This decision was in keeping with FM 100-20, which describes providing advice as “an implied mission” for US military personnel operating in foreign countries. The FM goes on to say that as “problems may be unique to the host nation, it is a mistake in most instances to try to replicate US methods or forces. . . . US advisors should know the language, culture, and political and military background of their counterparts” (FM 100-20 1990, 2-19). This marked a clear improvement over the Vietnam era, when the opposite was the norm for advisors. American advisors in El Salvador concentrated on training units, providing material, and offering strategic advice and support (Bacevich et al. 1988, 5).

Using this program ESAF forces were able to hold their ground, and by 1985 had the FMLN reverting to guerrilla-style tactics. Since the ESAF seemed content in pursuing guerrillas with conventional tactics, the advisors began to look for ways to address the root causes of the insurgency. Meanwhile, the government of El Salvador made some efforts to initiate social and economic reforms under the National Campaign Plan. This plan attempted to coordinate civil improvement with military operations in an area to clear out guerrillas and provide villages with improvement programs to help win hearts and minds. In execution, however, the programs were poorly coordinated and ineffective. FMLN commander said: “If the reforms had functioned, the base of the FMLN would have been weakened and we would have lost the war. If there had been a real agrarian
reform the FMLN would not have been able to sustain a war whose theater of operations if fundamentally the countryside” (Byrne 1996, 157).

Another side of the problem was that while the US advisors saw reform as an integral part of winning hearts and minds, they had extreme difficulties in getting the US Congress to provide funds on a predictable basis to keep programs running. Without a reliable source of funds, the programs soon collapsed (Bacevich et al.1988, 22).

Even as governmental reform suffered, the Salvadorans had little trouble in acquiring high-tech equipment and training for their officers at US Army schools. A US technological approach provided numerous aircraft and helicopters to equip the Salvadoran air force. The equipment was helpful, but the average ESAF conscript was unlikely to have the requisite skills to maintain it (Bacevich et al.1988, 33). Likewise, the training given to several ESAF officers sent to US Army professional development schools centered on conventional warfare fought on the European plains, not counterinsurgency operations in the jungles of El Salvador. Therefore, much of the training and equipment provided was unsuitable to the conflict. Success remained with the dedicated, professional US advisors on the ground who were able to accurately assess what was needed at their respective locations.

There were other factors that limited the success of counterinsurgency operations in El Salvador. Despite US training and education efforts, the ESAF continued to perpetrate a high number of suspected and confirmed human rights abuses, and the military culture of the ESAF was not conducive to establishing a professional NCO corps. That the military remained under the control of the civil government seemed on many occasions to stem only from the desire for continued US aid. Although US advisors
followed doctrine, there was little to no US government effort to coordinate activities with the US advisors, nor a clear objective given to provide focus or unity of effort to the actions of either the US or Salvadorans.

Lack of focus and direction from the governments of the US and El Salvador led to a primarily military effort to counter the insurgency. The ESAF was able to deny a military victory to the FMLN, but they were unable to militarily defeat them *en toto.* After ten years of military efforts, there was a continued battlefield stalemate between the FMLN and ESAF. The FMLN also prevented economic recovery by attacking economic resources. The stalemate and continued economic stagnation prompted the US to push the Salvadoran government to negotiate with FMLN forces to end the conflict in 1989.

It was at this time that the UN became involved in the conflict, sponsoring a reduction in the armed forces, as well as social and economic reforms. The relative military parity led the Salvadoran government to make several concessions to the FMLN including dissolving several security forces, including FMLN into the new security force of the National Civilian Police (PNC), ending the dominate role of the military in society, and democratizing the political system (Byrne 1996, 193). These concessions addressed the main grievances of the FMLN and initiated reforms to bring peace to El Salvador after ten years of conflict.

Following the El Salvador insurgency, the US Army has had some other roles to play in supporting other governments in their IDAD programs, but has always sought to act in a supporting and relatively minor role. FM 100-20 evolved into FM 3-07, which continues the doctrinal trend found in FM 100-20: the host nation is responsible for providing internal security and initiating political, social, and economic reforms to
address the grievances of the insurgency and win the support of the population. The US Army does not get involved in combat operations, as it tends to detract from the legitimacy of the host nation government and alienate the population. If the Army does get involved in combat, it is to be against large enemy formations away from populated areas only as long as necessary to allow the host nation to build its security forces to handle those missions. Unfortunately, the situation during Operation Iraqi Freedom unfolded somewhat differently.
CHAPTER 4
CURRENT US ARMY COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS IN IRAQ

The Iraqi people is [sic] composed of military, civilian, and civil service people and they all need salaries. If the people do not get salaries there will be trouble, confrontations. People will use whatever means to get what they need. . . . Even if we can’t set up a (sic) establish a government right away, there is a possibility to establish popular councils and heads of tribes in Iraq. The tribal leaders have an influence and they will help establish a new government in Iraq. If you want to bring a government from the outside, even if it is made up of Iraqis from the outside, and impose it on the people, it might not bring good results.

Interview with captured Iraqi General on 24 May 2003

FM 3-07, and JP 3-07.1 provide the basis of doctrine for US forces conducting operations in “friendly nations” to help an indigenous government “free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency.” The US Army labels these operations as “Foreign Internal Defense,” or FID, and defines the purpose of these operations to be the “building of viable institutions that respond to the needs of society,” which needs are most likely economic, social, informational, or political (FM 3-07 2003, 3-0). This doctrine coincides with classic counterinsurgency doctrines that require a closely linked and unified effort among all agencies of a government threatened by internal instability.

The US military faced such a threat in the Vietnam War and responded, in the main, militarily. There was little effort to incorporate the necessary economic, social, or political reforms necessary to address the causes of the Viet Cong insurgency. By allocating the preponderance of resources to defeating the insurgent threat in Vietnam,
the US military also reaped the preponderance of the blame for the loss of Vietnam to communist forces after their withdrawal.

The doctrine outlined in FM 3-07 and JP 3-07.1 details at every opportunity the importance of unity of effort among military, political, and internal security forces to achieve success in a FID environment. Unfortunately, reports from Iraq point out a distinct lack of coordination between government and military efforts. The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) is the temporary governing body established by the US Department of Defense that the United Nations (UN) authorized to govern Iraq until that country is stable enough to assume sovereignty. Although the CPA is headed by Ambassador Bremer and although many of the ministries have civilian coalition advisors with coalition military assistants, there appears to be no clearly defined strategy for coordinating efforts between the US and Iraqi government and military organizations (Cornell-d’Echert Interview 2004). There appears to be no clearly defined end state other than enabling the creation of a “free and democratic Iraq.” The New Republic reported in March of this year that the CPA rarely coordinates its activities with military authorities operating in the same building, to say nothing of the many units scattered throughout the country (Hammer 2004). United States soldiers likewise have little understanding of the CPA’s efforts, viewing the sprawling bureaucracy more as an apostle of inertia that ignores the counsel of its military advisors and measures its effectiveness more by the number of meetings attended than by economic, social, and political reform (Cornell-d’Echert Interview 2004).

The doctrine also notes that while military elements should play an important supporting role for internal defense, “the ultimate responsibility for IDAD (Internal
Defense and Development) rests with the HN (Host Nation)” (FM 3-07 2003, 3-28). The role of US forces in such a conflict provide only a temporary solution designed to support, advise, and assist the host nation (FM 3-07 2003, 3-7) in the military aspect of governmental efforts. The manual does not describe in detail what roles the military should play in a FID environment. With the stipulation that “military operations must complement and reinforce political, social, and economic reform” and with the warning “conventional tactics that ignore the nature of the threat will exhaust government forces and provoke the people because of harm to their lives and property” (FM 3-07 2003, 3-12) US Army units are given an escalating list of options to employ in assisting a threatened foreign government. Starting with Security Assistance, which includes anything from military articles and training to cash sales, there is an option for the conduct of joint and multinational operations to strengthen relations and demonstrate US support. The next step is the implementation of a military exchange program which can further mutual understanding. These programs all fall under the category of “Indirect Support.”

There is still another category within “Direct Support.” This type of support allows US forces to provide direct assistance to the host nation population or military with a focus on Civil Military Operations (CMO) to address the root causes of unrest with becoming involved in combat operations. This support allows intelligence sharing and logistical support in cases where US forces would not be exposed to hostile fire. The final category of US support is Combat Operations.

The implementation of the doctrine as prescribed in FM 3-07 and JP 3-07.1 in Iraq is difficult, because of the incongruous nature of those forces seeking to disrupt
coalition operations there. Added to this confusion is the elimination of the government as it existed in the “host nation,” including the disbanding of the Iraqi Army and the outlawing of the Ba’ath Party that provided Iraqi militia forces for internal security. When L. Paul Bremers, the US Director of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance in Iraq, instantaneously dismembered the Iraqi security structure, he left a void which lawless, unemployed, and discontented Iraqis quickly filled. With no other force readily available for internal security, the armed forces of the United States became the default internal security provider for Iraq.

Three groups represent security forces of a nation, according to US doctrine: the police, the militia, and the military. Their collective responsibility is to protect the population from guerrilla attacks, isolate the population from the guerrillas, and to neutralize or defeat guerrilla forces. Mr. Bremer disbanded two of these three, the militia and the military, leaving only the Iraqi police partially intact, although he dismissed many senior policemen with Ba’athist ties. Those who remained fled their posts or refused to take action in the wake of looting and violence that followed the US occupation.

The role of providing internal security for a foreign nation is not desirable, as evidenced in US doctrine. The doctrine stipulates the presence of US troops as only a temporary arrangement to assist the host nation. In fact, as US Army units began to capture and occupy Iraqi cities and towns on the road to Baghdad, they also worked to reestablish the Iraqi police presence in those cities and towns (Petraeus Interview 2003, OIFSG). Unfortunately, the Iraqi image of a policeman is somewhat different than that which exists within the cultural perspective of most Americans. As one Iraqi told
Lieutenant Colonel (LTC) Blaise Cornell-d’Echert, Jr., the Director of Training for the Coalition Military Assistance Training Team that was working to train the new Iraqi Army and Civil Defense Corps (ICDC), “We have a saying about our policemen. Even if a man falls from grace, he can still be a policeman” (Cornell-d’Echert Interview 2004). The status of Iraqi policemen is below that of all other government or civil service employees. Their ability to influence the behavior of the population is as correspondingly low as the level of the respect with which they are held within the community.

The Iraqi policeman is in a very poor position to fulfill his doctrinal role as envisioned in US doctrine. According to FM 3-07, HN police are responsible for destroying the illegal infrastructure of the insurgent, and locate and identify insurgent leaders, agents, recruiters, and terrorists. In the execution of those duties, the police are to follow due process of law and eliminate corruption within their ranks (FM 3-07 2003, 3-15). While the Iraqi policeman may very well know a good deal about the insurgent infrastructure, he may be reluctant to pass it on to coalition authorities. Iraqi policemen and members of the ICDC are often seen as spies and collaborators (Williams 2003) who make easy targets for the insurgents. Coalition forces have been unable to provide protection from constant insurgent attacks that have killed many policemen and damaged their stations. The most notable example of this was the 16 February 2004 attack on the police station in Fallujah that left at least 20 policemen dead and freed about 100 prisoners. When the coalition called to ask if help was needed, the ICDC commander on the ground responded, “No, we’ve got it. Don't worry. We are not concerned at this point” (Morris 2004). This comment, in light of the gravity of the situation, suggests that the ICDC commander was not sufficiently experienced to recognize the severity of the
situation, and that coalition forces were too eager to move on to the next mission after “checking the block.”

The role of the HN militia outlined in US doctrine is similar to that of the police except that it can be either a full-time or part-time force dedicated to popular self-defense in home areas. It has light infantry capabilities but uses police techniques. It provides local defense against guerrilla attacks, and in conjunction with the police, protects and isolates the population from guerrillas (FM 3-07 2003, 3-16). There is no doubt that the ICDC knew of the February attack on the Fallujah police station while it was occurring. Whether it could have effectively responded to a coordinated assault by insurgent forces is doubtful. ICDC recruits typically have very little training, one to three weeks at best, and are also very young being mostly teenagers (Cornell-d’Echert Interview 2004). Compared to insurgents potentially composed of former regime loyalists with either military or paramilitary training, their military capability is very slight. Also, ICDC recruits signed up to protect their local areas from foreign fighters and are unwilling to engage fellow Iraqis (Cornell-d’Echert Interview 2004).

The same is true of recruits for the new Iraqi Army. Recruiting efforts center on signing up volunteers to protect Iraq from external threats. Members of the new Iraqi Army did not sign up to engage fellow Iraqis in combat. US doctrine dictates that the regular armed forces of the HN are to provide the shield behind which political, economic, and political reform can take place in a secure environment. The primary mission of the regular forces is to protect the government, police, militia, and development organizations from guerrillas (FM 3-07 2003, 3-17).
At the end of “major combat operations,” US Army units in Iraq performed this role by patrolling in the areas assigned to them and showing the population that it was safe to go out in the streets and conduct their business (Caraccilo Interview 2003, OIFSG). As time has passed, US units began relocating more to the outskirts of the cities, leaving security to the police and ICDC. The Iraqi Army, however, is not yet ready to assume responsibility as a “shield” for the government and other security forces. The soldiers and leaders are inexperienced and often unwilling to take orders from coalition advisors for a variety of reasons, including cultural. Iraqi cultural tendencies exacerbate the problem. There is a great deal of inertia regarding the acceptance of and the responsibility for taking the initiative. The Iraqi soldier requires precise guidance and direct supervision to successfully carry out a task (Cornell-d’Echert Interview 2004).

Junior leaders in the Iraqi Army are unfamiliar with US doctrine and methodology. It will take several years to develop and instill the requisite traits and skills to operate as a volunteer army under civilian control to provide an effective “shield” as described above. Cultural change can take generations; the US saw limited success in El Salvador only after over ten years of instilling similar values into the officer culture of the Armed Forces of El Salvador.

For the regular armed force providing protection to the government, US doctrine emphasizes the criticality of the defensive nature of operations to prevent government forces from harming the people. The field manual cautions that, “Collateral damage destroys government legitimacy” (FM 3-07 2003, 3-17). Since the government is an imposed entity whose legitimacy is already questioned, this statement is especially valid. Any event, which intentionally or unintentionally damages property or causes casualties,
is attributed to coalition forces and provides recruits new forces for the resistance. Even measures imposed by units to control and monitor the population, which are very effective when correctly applied, become explosively volatile when misunderstood or misused. For example, the October 2003 Initial Assessment conducted by the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) observed that there were many cases of US Army forces’ damage to private property during cordon and search operations. The consequences create “negative perceptions” of coalition forces, the Initial Assessment recommends that this damage be mitigated with Civil Military Operations (CMO) (CALL 2003a, 61).

The same report also comments on the hasty Traffic Control Points (TCPs) that were effectively employed by the British Army to help monitor and control the population (CALL 2003a, 62-65). The Initial Assessment also noted the extreme effectiveness of this technique when practiced by US Army units (CALL 2003b, A-35). Hasty TCPs were established in much the same way as a deliberate TCP with barriers, wire, signs, and vehicles to slow and stop traffic and trained soldiers who respectfully searched vehicles that came through. The whole TCP was set up in about five minutes and operated for around thirty minutes before packing up and moving to another location. The CALL report failed to mention that some units around Falluja practiced a different technique during the same time period. These units would establish a roadblock on the highway using one or two gun vehicles to block the road. There were no signs or lights to indicate that the road was blocked, but a soldier with an M-4 carbine and Surefire flashlight was stationed several meters ahead to wave down and slow traffic in the dark by waving his light up and down.
This particular technique resulted in the deaths of several innocent civilians and families as approaching Iraqi vehicles saw the flashing light from the M-4, mistook it for muzzle flashes, and swerved away from the TCP to avoid being shot. The gunners on the gun vehicle then engaged the swerving car, thinking that it must be carrying contraband or insurgents trying to get around the roadblock (Russell Interview 2004). The unintended consequences for these hasty TCPs in Falluja were hostile attitudes and additional recruits to fuel a later uprising.

Commenting on the effectiveness of the military effort to “win hearts and minds,” one company commander said, “Forget winning hearts and minds. Intimidation is the best we can hope for” (Hirsh 2004). In the frustration of trying to apply a quick solution to what will likely be a long-term fight, US soldiers are forgetting one of the basic principles of a successful counterinsurgency. Doctrine states, “Success in counterinsurgency goes to the party that achieves the greater popular support” (FM 3-07 2003, 3-10). Former congressman Newt Gingrich put it somewhat differently when addressing issues in Iraq during an interview with John Barry and Even Thomas: “The real key is not how many enemy do I kill. The real key is how many allies do I grow” (Barry and Thomas 2003).

In cases where government security forces are guilty of committing a crime, US doctrine demands that those guilty be punished quickly, fairly, and publicly (FM 3-07 2003, 3-18). The government must be seen following the same laws it purports to espouse and impose on the population. Any deviation from this conduct destroys legitimacy. Reports, and even rumors, that coalition forces commit theft while conducting cordon and search operations (Hin 2004) have fueled hostile attitudes in the local population.
Attempts to instill a western-style democracy in Iraq will ultimately fail if there is no effort to uphold due process of law.

This understanding also speaks to the assertion in US doctrine that there must be no perception of special treatment for security forces (FM 3-07 2003, 3-18). The perception of special treatment isolates security forces from the population. US Army forces operating in remote outposts in the Philippines during the Insurrection of 1898-1902 lived with the natives and shared their lot. Humanitarian assistance projects not only helped the local population, they made life bearable for the soldiers posted to that community. Completing these projects made it possible for soldiers to make contacts and get to know the natives and the area of operations. Many Iraqis feel that US soldiers who barricade themselves in fortified compounds with air-conditioning, clean water, Burger King, and a relatively secure environment care only for themselves and not the Iraqis they are there to “liberate.” The “Americans just care about protecting themselves” is a common complaint (Thomas, Nordland, and Caryl 2003). There is a terrible irony in this: the populous that was once terrorized and victimized by Saddam Hussein perceives the new occupants of his palaces as seekers of self-protection and self-absorption who remain oblivious to the real concerns of the Iraqis.

Even the conduct of operations seems to reinforce this theme as American soldiers wear full body armor and carry loaded weapons everywhere, muzzles invariably pointed at the Iraqis, an insult in their culture (CALL 2003a, A-13). Convoys speed down the center of roads at sixty miles per hour, forcing away oncoming traffic (Thomas, Nordland, and Caryl 2003). Military commanders who were once active in the communities immediately after the war now invite town leaders to meetings in their
compounds instead of going out to the community. “The Americans are afraid,” said one Iraqi police officer (Williams 2003). Every layer of armor is another layer of isolation from the population with which the security force needs to interact. Force protection is certainly an important consideration as both an operational necessity and a cultural requirement, but force protection does not always come in the form of body armor.

There is no cost analysis evident in any of the CALL reports regarding the benefits of coalition forces remaining in full combat posture when performing non-combat related tasks. The appearance of an American soldier in full combat gear represents a threatening and hostile posture to Iraqi culture (Thomas, Nordland, and Caryl 2003). Full combat gear implies distrust. There are certainly situations in which this posture should be maintained, but when it is maintained indefinitely, regardless of current events and surroundings, its use implies a lack of situational understanding, a lack of trust, and a lack of general security. American police officers, for example, wear visible force protection equipment only when conducting a raid or other tactical operation. During the conduct of their daily routine, however, there is usually no body armor visible. Everyone knows the armor is there, but its presence is implied, and the professionalism of the officer leaves no doubt to the casual observer that he secure in his surroundings but that he is also prepared to take violent action if it is required by the situation. If security forces do not feel secure, should the population have reason to fear? A fearful population supports an insurgency through acquiescence alone.

The level of isolation of security forces from the population directly corresponds to the level of identification between the two and the ability of security forces to gather vital intelligence from the population. Doctrine states, “Infantry forces must expand on
the intelligence provided by technical units to achieve contact with the enemy” (FM 3-07 2003, 3-19). CALL has already determined that foot patrols were the most efficient intelligence collection effort for HUMINT. Commanders tasked to reestablish security and assemble provisional governments immediately after the war found patrolling to be the most effective technique. In the words of one US officer, “[My soldiers] are immersed in the city. They live with and talk to the locals. There’s a lot of factions, but they go out and walk a beat like a cop would, but with a military focus” (Caraccilo Interview 2003, OIFSG). In an interesting contradiction, the CALL report for December states that the greatest intelligence assets were soldiers on foot patrol, able to quickly establish “ground truth” (CALL 2003b, 35-36), while complaining that patrols are limited by the number of vehicles available in a task force (CALL 2003b, A-103).

There is even a recommend technique for soldiers patrolling in vehicles. Soldiers in vehicles should only interact with the community from one side of the vehicle to prevent being boxed in by a crowd (CALL 2003b, A-108). The CALL report also noted that developing effective human intelligence (HUMINT) takes time and requires analysis of repeated contacts (CALL 2003a, 34). Unfortunately, is a shortage of Tactical HUMINT Teams to support collection efforts (CALL 2003a, 31), and combat soldiers are inexperienced. Poor HUMINT often results in raids and searches that target innocent civilians. Called “Jerry Springers” by US soldiers, these night raids result more from jealous or vengeful neighbors than credible evidence of wrongdoing (Hirsh 2004).

Added to these shortcomings is the constant rotation of units through cities. The Falluja area of operations was under control of five different units in the ten months between May 2003 and February 2004, including the 3rd ACR, 2-3 ID, 3rd ACR again,
the 82nd Airborne Division, and 1st MEF (Russell Interview 2004). One-year troop rotations for the country and 90-day rotations for CPA officials permit very little time to develop the intelligence resources required to identify a foe in a foreign land with a different language and culture. There is little time for coalition soldiers to get to know the physical terrain, much less the human terrain in which they have to operate.

Perhaps the greatest inhibitor to US success is simply the American presence. Paragraph 3-23 of FM 3-07 states, “An American combat role tends to undermine the legitimacy of the host government and risks converting the conflict into an American war.” The “host nation” is already perceived as American. The police, the only remaining security force of the former regime, are seen as American stooges and collaborators, and the conflict is already viewed worldwide as an American war of occupation. Planners for Operation Iraqi Freedom assembled an outstanding combat plan to eliminate the head of the Iraqi government. Unfortunately there was no apparent planning to deal with the aftermath. As one American officer put it:

A plan for phase four was never passed from CFLCC [Combined Forces Land Component Commander] to V Corps and on the 3ID [3rd Infantry Division]. There was no guidance on which targets we needed to protect once we got into Baghdad. We weren’t told to protect museums or banks and we didn’t expect the scale of the looting [we saw]. (Hylton Interview 2003, OIFSG)

Ambassador Bremer effectively eliminated what remained of Iraqi government’s body. The population of the host nation now expects the coalition forces to provide security and “quick fixes” to resolve the many issues at hand, while citing what US soldiers call the “Man-on-the-moon” principle. That is, the discontent Iraqi on the street asks, “You put a man on the moon, how come you can’t get water and electricity to my house?”
The basic FID premise for planners to understand is that the ultimate responsibility for IDAD rests with the HN (FM 3-07 2003, 3-28). Unfortunately, in Iraq coalition forces currently have assumed the role of host nation as an occupying power. The coalition also has the role of providing internal security forces while those currently being organized are incapable of independent action. Even Iraqi security units that accompany coalition forces on operations do not always follow the orders of their American advisors (Cornell-d’Echert Interview 2004). Finally, coalition forces also constitute the regular armed forces that provide the shield for the necessary economic, social, and political reforms to develop and take root in a society lacking any historical or cultural inclination to adopt such reforms. By existing doctrine, US armed forces, as the default host nation, are responsible for implementation of an Internal Defense and Development plan. So far, the emphasis has been almost purely military since the effort is almost purely military. Doctrine in effect cannot work because the conditions and assumptions for the doctrinal base are different in Iraq. There is no existing doctrine for the employment of the US Army as an army of occupation tasked to establish a civilian government for a fractious and resistant population. The doctrine assumes a correspondingly robust effort in the social, economic, and political arenas to match and complement the military effort. Based on that assumption, the next assumption necessary is for the US Government, especially organizations like the Department of State, to “buy in” to the military plan and acquire sufficient knowledge of the requirements for success. However, disconnects between the military forces and the CPA in Baghdad suggest that this has not been the case.
Historically there is some foundation to build on. Confronting insurgencies primarily with military power constitutes a trend for the US. One instance where it was successful was during the Philippine Insurrection. The US military effort in the Philippines from 1898 to 1902 was initially based on a coordinated effort between nation building and military operations. As the operation dragged on into its third year, impatient commanders in the field dramatically increased their military effort to make the cost of insurgency unbearable to its supporters. This military approach triumphed after two more years, but at great cost to Filipinos and the United States. The cost for that four-year effort was 7,000 US soldiers killed and another seven years of occupation to repair the damage done to the economy, contain banditry, and pacify the Moros.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Conclusions

The US has a rich history of successfully employing its military to solve foreign policy issues. Use of the US military in the first Gulf War was easily triumphant. Unfortunately, US perception of stability doctrine has now fallen victim to this success. Senior executives did not anticipate the complexity of the Iraqi political environment that has thus far confounded the endstate of Operation Iraqi Freedom. Senior military leaders were also victims of their experience as they prosecuted the fall of Sadaam Hussein’s regime and the destruction of his army but did not thoroughly plan to establish a new government and provide for Iraqi internal security. Historically, the US has tended towards a mainly military approach to counter insurgencies. It is continuing this trend in Iraq.

There is no doubt that the military might of the US Armed Forces and their coalition partners can theoretically finish the insurgent movement in Iraq. Given enough resources and time, they could find and neutralize significant portions of the former regime loyalists, terrorists, criminals, foreign fighters, and any other party that seeks to destabilize the coalition’s authority in Iraq. Historical perspective from the Philippine insurrections, the Vietnam War, and El Salvador, however, warns that such a mainly military solution would probably destroy the infrastructure and economic viability of Iraq. Military solutions also tend to take much more time to resolve. A purely military solution would also commit either the US or Iraqi government to years of rebuilding and a crushing financial burden. The quickest route to founding a stable, viable, and
productive government in Iraq is to correctly employ the existing doctrine for Foreign Internal Defense, to develop additional doctrinal concepts for nation building to support the pre-emptive strategy for removing non-compliant governments, and to seek more active participation from the Iraqis through self-determination.

Doctrine for Foreign Internal Defense, as laid out in FM 3-07 and JP 3-07.1, though not intended for US forces to play the role of Host Nation, is still generally applicable to the situation in Iraq. The tenets expressed provide a method for the government to win the support of its population through a persistent and unified effort involving political, social, and economic reform under the protection of a military shield. As noted in Chapter 4, the coalition has no unity of effort between the government and the military, and little energy is devoted to reform. Outside of Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP) funds, the coalition’s military forces have little influence over political, economic, or social reform. There is no consolidated plan between the CPA and coalition military forces in execution for the reform process. Even the name (Commander’s Emergency Response Program) suggests that CERP funds are allocated in a purely random fashion to alleviate symptomatic problems. Without a plan to execute reform, the military does what it is trained to do and comfortable with executing: military operations. Military operations occur daily with the focus on destroying insurgents instead of protecting the very government security forces and reform programs, which could eventually destroy the insurgent infrastructure. Speaking on the transition from combat operations that “ended” in May to SASO operations, one company commander commented,
I don’t know how you can train it[,] . . . dealing with normal everyday problems. That was about the only difference we noticed, because when we do operations, like when we do patrols. . . . they are organized from combat patrols, they move like combat patrols, and they have objectives like combat patrols. So, we really didn’t change anything, we just can’t shoot everybody. (Jacobs Interview 2003, OIFSG)

There appears to be little effort to address the grievances of the population other than token attempts to pacify them symptomatically with humanitarian assistance projects like opening schools and improving infrastructure.

An additional impediment to correct implementation of the doctrine is the absence of a constituted host nation government. While doctrine does not specifically address a situation where the US Army implements martial law, it does address operations designed to bring about a stable environment. In Iraq, a CPA under the direction of a senior Department of Defense representative (Ambassador Bremer), is acting as the HN government until transition to an Iraq government occurs, currently scheduled for 30 June 2004. The early implementation of the CPA even before the establishment of martial law served to compound the confusion and absence of unified effort (Russell Interview 2004). The absence of unified effort and centralized command and control to implement a comprehensive and coherent plan is evident not only to the soldiers on the ground, who jokingly refer to the CPA as “Certified Public Accountants,” (Hirsh 2004) but to the people of Iraq. The perceived lack of influence or power of the CPA, supposedly the “interim” government of Iraq, perpetuates the image of a power vacuum which militant leaders like the cleric Moqtada al Sadr are anxious to fill.

Power is a force which Arab cultures respect, but the cultural ignorance of the US Armed Forces often leads to misapplication of power that further alienates the Iraqis (Cornell d’Echert Interview 2004). Allowing the Iraqis to make the decisions on where
and how to apply power increases the effectiveness of its employment. An Iraqi would certainly better understand where and how to most efficiently apply force and better appreciate its second and third order effects than the average American. Allowing this type of direction in military employment also reduces the culpability of coalition forces, builds legitimacy of the Iraqi government, and increases the perception of self-determination.

The desire for self-determination is one of the primary grievances of discontent Iraqis. Their repeated calls for constituting an Iraqi government without coalition interference are repeatedly ignored. According to Lester Grau, the primary concerns of Iraqis he interviewed as a member of CALL’s initial assessment team were: security, clean water, medical care, education, and electricity (Grau Interview 2004). As long as the average Iraqi is witness to incidents of lawlessness, attacks on coalition forces, attacks on police stations, car bombings, the necessary feeling of security will not permeate the population.

While US Armed Forces in Iraq provide physical protection to the CPA, they do not provide the necessary protection to Iraqi security forces to allow them to operate without fear of reprisal. There appears to be no effort at coordinating the reform processes necessary to eliminate the root causes of unrest. The news reports as well as the initial assessments from CALL focus on on-going military operations in Iraq. There is a curious lack of reference to political, social, or economic reforms, with the exception of references to the training and establishment of Iraqi security forces, again a military operation. The expectation of doctrine is that the military supports a host nation program of internal defense and development. Doctrine assumes that the host nation government
knows what sort of programs are necessary to win the support of the population, and
makes an active effort to implement them in coordination with the military force
necessary to protect the program from interdiction by insurgent forces. There is no public
evidence that the CPA is implementing such a program. To the contrary, with CPA
advisors and personnel on ninety-day rotations through Iraq restricted mainly to the
“Green Zone,” the military perception of CPA efforts is that there is a lot of discussion
but little execution effort from the CPA (Cornell-d’Echert Interview 2004). At the same
time there is no public evidence that military advisors to the CPA are educating their
counterparts, other than rumor, on the necessary doctrinal points that would make a unity
of effort possible. There does not appear to be any CPA “buy-in” to military FID
doctrine.

Since the coalition military cannot or has not been able to effectively influence
CPA cooperation with respect to current doctrine, the coalition focuses even more on
military courses of action and solutions to perceived military problems. The results of
military actions that address problems associated with insurgency can be very costly
socially, economically, and politically. For example, in response to Improvised Explosive
Devices (IEDs) that frequent the roadways in Iraq, the US Army has bulldozed the sides
of miles of roadways, clearing trees, lampposts, guardrails, and any other physical object
that could hide such a device. While militarily desirable and a quick fix to the symptom
of IEDs, such action aggravates perceptions of Iraqis that US Forces care nothing for the
natural beauty of Iraq or the public safety of Iraqis.

The second part of this process is the coalition’s apprehension and arrest of all
military aged males located in the area of the attack. Despite the probability of the
attackers’ disappearance long before any cordon could be effectively emplaced, Iraqi males are arrested and detained for indefinite periods with no word to their families about their location or well being (Caryl 2003). In cases where the family breadwinner is detained, the resultant hardship on the family of the detainee is almost unbearable. These actions as executed by coalition forces give no apparent thought to the due process of law required in all other military operations. It is critical for coalition forces acting as the de facto government security force to be seen upholding the law. Every extra-legal action that a surrogate for government commits undermines its legitimacy as protector of the law (Thompson 1966, 235).

The apparent absence of Iraqi participation in making laws, enacting remedies, and responding to security threats, as well as Iraqi absence in security operations, provides a focus for Iraqi discontent with US and coalition forces. Even as the coalition attempts to remove all elements of the former regime to allow the building of a new one, there is no sense of allowing the Iraqis any sense of self-determination. Adnan Abu Odeh, a former advisor to King Hussein of Jordan, observed this of coalition efforts, “Ironically, even if Sadaam is killed as well as his two sons, that will accelerate the process of seeing the Americans as the real enemy” (Dickey 2003). The coalition is now attempting to solicit more participation from Iraqis in government and security. Unfortunately, the coalition’s early complete dismissal of Ba’ath party members, abolition of the Iraqi Army, and firm assertions that the coalition would allow only a constituted government meeting certain absolute expectations of democracy, irrespective of culture, have tainted Iraqis who are willing to cooperate with the coalition as “collaborators and spies”
The absence of cultural awareness that would accompany a mutual effort even farther alienates the Iraqi populous from coalition forces.

**Recommendations**

The US Army has several options open to stop, or at least slow, the downward spiral of coalition-Iraqi relations and help implement an Iraqi government that would provide a stable base on which to build further relations. The first step would be to correctly implement the doctrine found in FM 3-07 and JP 3-07.1. This includes working in concert with the provisional government as constituted by the CPA to achieve a unified effort in implementing economic, political, and social reform; working with the CPA to design a coherent IDAD program; protecting the government and its security forces from insurgent forces; minimizing those military efforts that adversely affect the population; maximizing the use of inherent capabilities in the IDAD program; continuing to train and develop internal security forces with the local police and ICDC; continuing to train and develop the Iraqi Army; increasing the presence of Iraqi security forces into coalition security operations; continuing to vet and incorporate more officials and officers from the old Ba’ath regime to help foster legitimacy; and finally, addressing the Iraqi grievance for self-determination.

The second step for providing a stable and secure environment in Iraq is to establish the requisite unity of effort among the US government agencies, the US Army, and the host nation. Such unity requires a common understanding of the doctrine that provides the foundation for the plan. US doctrine assumes that this knowledge already exists. If it does, then all parties should reaffirm it during the construction of the IDAD plan. If the knowledge does not exist, then for the US Army to be able to implement the
doctrine correctly, it needs to educate the representatives of the associated US governmental and host nation agencies to build a common foundation for unified action. Ensuring that the Iraqis play an important role in this process would also help to mitigate US-centric frames of reference that might blight otherwise solid plans.

In addition to educating the other parties involved in the IDAD process, the US Army should take an active role to incorporate the other players into the reform process, if they are not doing so already. Without the host nation and internal security forces playing prominent roles, the US Armed Forces tend to take a dominant part in the role they are most familiar with: military operations. US Military operations are the biggest contributor to alienation of the population and tend to undermine the legitimacy of the host nation government. Military operations also tend to address the external symptoms of an insurgency instead of addressing root causes and infrastructure. Economic, political, and social reforms are crucial to addressing the root causes. Developing effective Iraqi internal security forces is an essential step to identifying and eliminating insurgent infrastructure. Both civil assistance and organic security forces require time to be successful.

In an area of the world where ideas, faith, customs, and rumor condition reality more than promises and politics, the ability to accurately convey the intent of government agencies and foreign troops plays an important part. There appears to be little understanding among Iraqis of the American concept of Democracy. To the common Iraqi, American democracy equates to an acceptance of American values and customs, at the expense of tribal and Islamic customs and norms.
The perception in Islamic society is that Western, and especially American, culture is anti-Islam (Gunitilake Interview 2004). Iraqi first-hand experiences with democracy are those personified by their contact with coalition soldiers. Soldiers must fit the democratic model in appearance, in their conduct with each other and the locals, and in the standards they exhibit everyday. Soldiers’ attitudes define for the Iraqi on the street the objectives of American policy. If the only interaction an Iraqi has with a coalition soldier is during a combat operation, the Iraqi’s perception will be that the coalition military is an occupation force to support imposed foreign rule.

The fact that insurgents continue to confront coalition troops in the face of overwhelming firepower suggests that tanks and armored vehicles are not be enough to eliminate the causes of the insurgency. While firepower is useful for destroying hostile elements bent on the elimination of western society and those that refuse to negotiate on any grounds, firepower does not contribute to cultural understanding. Cultural understanding is critical to identifying the motivation that produces suicide bombers. Host nation governments and security forces should be able to identify the basis for an idea that makes a noble cause of self-destruction. People who feel they have no other options are more prone to violently attack what they perceive as the source of their frustrations. The CPA cannot possibly fathom such an understanding from inside the Green Zone, nor can coalition soldiers gain an appreciation of Iraqi culture from inside a fortified compound. There is no intense desire to improve the lot of the common Iraqi when government forces are not required to live in the environment. Iraqis feel that their governors share no lot in their plight, and this perception fuels the desire for self-determination.
One way to achieve “buy in” from the Iraqi population according to COL Celeski, the commander of the 3rd Special Forces Group, is for US forces to start locally and take ownership for a portion of the population. US troops must reduce their profile and learn to coexist in a manner that does not put their presence in the public spotlight. Taking time to learn and understand the culture, they will be able to leverage the population while isolating it from insurgent influence, build intelligence networks, and to support local security forces. Soldiers can still be just as lethal without having to be “in the face” of the local population. A local presence reduces the ability of the insurgent to operate freely and garner moral and physical support. This type of operation requires an emphasis on junior leadership and a great deal of time. It is not without historical precedent (Celeski Interview 2003). The US Army used this technique to good effect in the Philippines in 1900, in the Darlac Province of Vietnam, and with the Armed Forces of El Salvador. While each case was different, common to all was the time required to learn the culture and build positive relationships with respect to the strengths of that culture.

Another contributor to the desire for Iraqi self-determination stems from the Iraqi perception of coalition troops as occupiers instead of liberators. When the allies liberated Nazi occupied countries in Europe during World War II, there was a plan to provide for martial law if necessary, but the plan was not executed. Liberated countries were allowed to resume their normal governance as US forces pushed the Germans out. It was only in Germany that the US Army removed rulers and instituted martial law. Even in occupied Japan, General MacArthur left the original government in place but made it responsible to his military occupation officers (Pyle 1996, 214).
In Iraq, by completely removing the Ba’ath Party and all the old governmental institutions, the coalition presented itself as an occupier and not a liberating force. Granted, some of this was necessary to remove fear in the population of a Ba’athist return to power, but the process was executed wholesale with little vetting of necessary officials to keep government and security forces operating. The US Army should develop a doctrine for nation building that recognizes that positive perceptions and relationships between the US Army and the citizens of countries that it operates are required by the policy of pre-emption. A good place to start is the US Marine Corps *Small Wars Manual* (*SMW*), first published in 1939. The Marine Corps addressed the possibility of US Marines employing martial law during the conduct of their operations. Chapter 13 of the *Small Wars Manual* covers the responsibilities of the occupying force when it removes the ability of the host nation to provide for its own security and protection of life and property (*SWM* 2002, 13-3). As far as establishing a government, the Marines recognized early on that it was best to leave the majority of the old regime in place, except for persons who were incompetent or guilty of misconduct in office (*SWM* 2002, 13-12). A copy of Chapter 13 in the hands of unit commanders could have paid huge dividends during the commencement of Phase IV operations in Iraq.

The intent of coalition forces entering Iraq was to liberate the Iraqi people from a tyrannical dictator and to help build a democratic and secular state in the Middle East. Instead of liberators, the coalition forces are now seen as occupiers, seeking to impose their will on the Iraqi people for the purposes of exploiting natural resources and destroying Islamic values via the imposition of Western-style democracy. The fact that the only visible signs of “liberation” are a foreign government supported and protected by
foreign troops with token improvements to the standard of living fits the Iraqi’s historical model for Turkish and British occupation. To achieve liberation requires both an unprecedented level of Iraqi self-determination in their political process and a willingness of coalition forces to play a less dominant and more supporting public role.

Recommendations for Further Study

This thesis is only an initial assessment based on observations available through March 2004 in the public media, CALL initial assessments, and interviews with participants immediately following combat operations. There should be a yearly analysis of lessons learned and initial operations as additional data become available. Additional studies should be conducted on founding Occupation / Nation Building / Pre-emption campaign doctrine, incorporation of other governmental agencies into US Army campaign doctrine and planning, and the incorporation of host nation assets into campaign plans. Other studies could include a methodology for vetting former regime elements, a comparison of World War II occupation plans with the execution of OIF Phase IV, and the implementation of Civil Affairs, PSYOP, and Information Operations into future plans for post combat operations.
APPENDIX A

INTERVIEW QUESTIONS

1. What is your background in dealing with insurgencies?

2. Is there an insurgency in Iraq?

3. What groups are involved?

4. What are their grievances?

5. How do they operate?

6. What are their weaknesses?

7. What is your understanding of US counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine as outlined in JP 3-07.1, FM 3.0, and FM 3-07?

8. Is the US Army in Iraq following this doctrine?

9. Is the current US strategy viable according to the doctrine?

10. Would other COIN doctrine be more appropriate than the US model?

11. How do you separate insurgents from the population?

12. How do you understand a culture and society?

13. What are sources for US legitimacy and credibility?

14. Can the US achieve legitimacy/credibility among an Islamic society?

15. What must US/coalition forces do to get the Iraqis to take ownership of their own security?

16. Can the insurgency be defeated?

17. What other sources should the author consider?

18. What other factors should the author consider?
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1. Certification Date: 18 June 2004

2. Thesis Author: MAJ Jonathan K. Graff

3. Thesis Title: United States Counterinsurgency Doctrine and Implementation in Iraq

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