Name of Candidate: Lt Col Angus S. J. Fay

Thesis Title: Combating Terrorism: A Conceptual Framework for Targeting at the Operational Level

Approved by:

______________________________, Thesis Committee Chair
Bruce W. Menning, Ph.D.

______________________________, Member
LtCol Rick J. Messer, B.S.

______________________________, Member
LCol Colin G. Magee, BMSc

Accepted this 18th day of June 2004 by:

______________________________, Director, Graduate Degree Programs
Robert F. Baumann, Ph.D.

The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the US Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)
ABSTRACT

COMBATING TERRORISM: A CONCEPTUAL MODEL FOR TARGETING AT THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL, by Lt Col Angus S. J. Fay, 81 pages.

This thesis examines the relevance of the Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace (JIPB) process, as published in Joint Publication 2-01.3, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace, 24 May 2000, for its application to targeting terrorism at the operational level.

The study begins with a review of the change in the operational environment and its impact on existing doctrine that was essentially developed for high-intensity warfighting on a symmetrical basis. This study explains the significance of the terrorist phenomenon at the operational level in the modern context and goes on to review three key conceptual models for orienting on terrorist groups. Further, it analyzes the relative merits of these models to the military planner within the context of campaign design. The results are applied to Step 3 of the JIPB Process--Evaluating the Enemy.

The study concludes that the JIPB process is a relevant and effective methodology for orienting on the enemy, but that it falls short of providing military planners at the operational level with a specific template to apply when considering terrorism as a threat. It supports the inclusion of a specific adversary model in JP 2-01.3 to assist analysts, planners, and the Joint Force Commander (JFC) in campaign design and decision making.
Firstly, I would like to thank my long-suffering family for their forbearance during the production of this thesis. I have denied them a considerable amount of my time, and their patience has been greatly appreciated. Secondly, my sincere thanks goes to my committee who have all been a tremendous help and afforded me a great deal of latitude throughout the project. In particular, the Committee Chair, Dr. Bruce Menning, has been very understanding regarding the unusual circumstances under which I have pursued this project, for which I am eternally grateful.
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<tr>
<td>AOR</td>
<td>Area Of Responsibility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COA</td>
<td>Course of Action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COE</td>
<td>Contemporary Operating Environment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FARC</td>
<td>Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GWOT</td>
<td>Global War on Terror</td>
</tr>
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<td>IRA</td>
<td>Irish Republican Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>JIPB</td>
<td>Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace</td>
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<td>JOA</td>
<td>Joint Operations Area</td>
</tr>
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<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treat Organization</td>
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<td>NSCT</td>
<td><em>The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism</em></td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Know your enemy and know yourself; in a hundred battles you will never be in peril. When you are ignorant of the enemy but know yourself, your chances of winning and losing are equal. (JP 2-0 1995, IV-14)

Sun Tsu, The Art of War

Introduction

No one in the military doubts that the world has changed since the disintegration of the Soviet Union. The post-Cold War strategic environment has, thus far, been filled by complexity and uncertainty. This atmosphere has been marked with a resurgence of ideological, ethnic, tribal, nationalist, and religious aspirations and antagonisms that, on a global scale, have served to destabilize and thus transform the security environment. Accelerators, including technological, demographic, societal, environmental, and criminal factors, fuel the fire of strategic change, eroding the prerogatives of nation-states and erasing international borders. Robert D. Kaplan neatly summarized his vision of the future world order in this way:

Imagine cartography in three dimensions, as if in a hologram. In this hologram would be the overlapping sediments of group and other identities atop the merely two-dimensional color markings of city-states and the remaining nations, themselves confused in places by shadowy tentacles, hovering overhead, indicating the power of drug cartels, mafias, and private security agencies. Instead of borders, there would be moving centers of power, as in the Middle Ages. Many of these layers would be in motion. Replacing fixed and abrupt lines on a flat space would be a shifting pattern of buffer entities. . . .To this protean cartographic hologram one must add other factors, such as migrations of populations, explosions of birth rates, vectors of disease. Henceforward the map of the world will never be static. This future map—in a sense, the “Last Map”—will be an ever-mutating representation of chaos. (1994, page 25)
Globalization and technological change are increasing interdependence and interconnectedness in ways that magnify the security related impact of developmental changes around the world (Koppell 2003, 1). Against this backdrop has emerged a growing population of disaffected groups who, denied the institutions of state to voice their opinions, turn to violence as a means of expression. One of these expressions, terrorism, replaces reason with fear and danger. It manifests itself in myriad form, challenging heretofore-accepted military norms by using its unique nature to gain advantage. Indeed, so different from the conventional military is the terrorist threat that, to the wider military, it remains an undefined, complex rather mystical evil that is difficult to conceptualize and, concomitantly, problematic to orient on, and subsequently to target. Moreover, for the most part, waging so-called war against terrorism falls far outside the ethos, experience, knowledge and training of the wider conventional military. US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld saw the gap between instrument and challenge when he rhetorically asked, “DOD has been organized, trained and equipped to fight big armies, navies and air forces. . . . Does DOD need to think through new ways to organize, train, equip and focus to deal with the global war on terror?” (Rumsfeld 16 October 2003).

Yet, terrorism itself is no doubt as old as mankind. People were sufficiently terrorized by Genghis Khan, or the Spanish Inquisition, let alone the secret societies of anarchists and revolutionaries in the late nineteenth century. The period of Jacobin rule during the French Revolution was simply known as The Terror. But now terrorism pervades on a global scale and intends to destroy society. That terror is based in religious fanaticism and a hatred of the modern world in almost all of its manifestations, but
particularly the global power of the United States (Rees-Mogg 2004, 18). In the post-11 September world, the need to address nontraditional threats to stability has never been more apparent (Koppell 2003, 11).

**Problem Statement**

The events of 11 September 2001 have thrust the United States to the forefront of the international struggle against terrorism. Terror is no longer a retail business; al-Qaeda has taken it to the wholesale level. In the past, as in the earlier history of the Irish Republican Army (IRA), the purpose of terrorists was indeed to create fear, but also to achieve political aims of a limited nature. Even when they were at their most murderous, the IRA remained politicians, albeit criminal ones. They had their political objective, a united Ireland, and they had political constituencies to maintain, among Irish Roman Catholics, and among Irish Americans who misguidedely donated their dollars into Noraid’s collecting boxes. These constituencies were willing to condone attacks on soldiers, policemen, or politicians. They were even willing to condone the murder of unconnected civilians, as long as it was in penny numbers. But they balked at the bombing in Omagh, which killed scores of innocents. Al-Qaeda does not use terror as a political weapon, but as a new type of total war. They do not seek to persuade, but to destroy. President Bush has been criticized for describing the situation after 11 September 2001 as the war on terrorism. Yet that is a fair description. When people kill by the thousands they change the nature of the crime. This is the hallmark of al-Qaeda; whether in New York, Bali, or Madrid, it believes in death (Rees-Mogg 2004).

In response and over a relatively truncated period of time, the United States has: struck at the very heart of its clearest adversary, the al-Qaeda group, through its actions to
deny the group sanctuary and support in Afghanistan. Most recently, the US has taken
preemptive action in Iraq, ostensibly to prevent proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction (WMD). Notwithstanding the debate surrounding the relative long-term
merits of these actions, they are vested in an overarching strategy, The National Strategy
for Combating Terrorism (NSCT) of February 2003. However, while this document
outlines a strategic framework through which the United States intends to prosecute its
campaign against terror, it falls short to some degree in offering a methodology for
orienting on specific, prioritized threat groups, that is, those groups that pose the greatest
danger to the United States, that can be easily interpreted at the operational level. This
remains so, notwithstanding Ariel Sharon’s once famous remark, “terrorism has an
address.” Terrorists are bound by their physical nature, their structures, and ideology. The
nature of terrorism may have changed, and technology has undoubtedly made terrorists
highly mobile and well informed. However, a great deal is known about terrorism in
general, its elements and culture. It is a tangible and targetable entity and, hence, subject
to analysis, categorization, and classification. Given this understanding, in the absence of
any published military doctrine, a methodology for orienting on the enemy at the
operational level so that US forces can target this threat directly and effectively is worthy
of consideration. However, such an endeavor presents several problems to traditional
military planners. The time-honored paradigm of seeing the terrain, seeing the enemy,
and seeing yourself probably still holds true, but the battlespace is increasingly difficult
to define; the enemy is resourceful and adaptable and rarely presents himself in a
consistent pattern; and, the United States military continues to struggle with its own
structure as it transforms to meet the myriad threats of the twenty-first century.
Currently, analysis of the enemy at the operational level is doctrinally vested in the joint intelligence preparation of the battlespace (JIPB) process. This methodology for visualizing the enemy is a tried and tested approach, but probably requires review in light of the contemporary operating environment (COE). In its current form, the JIPB requires the planning staff to consider the adversary in a very symmetrical fashion using lessons drawn from the experience of an enemy who will present himself in an orderly, consistent manner within two-dimensional battlespace. The process itself is a very logical, practical approach to the analysis of the enemy, but lacks any clear consideration of asymmetrical threats, other than for the purpose of operational protection. Accordingly, a conceptual framework for targeting terrorism at the operational level is worthy of investigation.

**Thesis Question**

Is there utility within the JIPB process for a conceptual framework for targeting terrorism at the operational level of war?

**The Research Question**

This thesis will consider the current doctrinal model for interpreting the battlespace at the operational level of war. In so doing, the thesis analyzes the JIPB process, as currently published in JP 2-01.3, *Joint Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace*, in pursuit of the following question: Is the JIPB process suitable for military planners at the operational level of war to visualize and therefore target terrorism? Addressing this question requires additional secondary questions to be considered:
1. What is the nature of the terrorist threat at the operational level of war? Additionally, what national strategic direction are operational level commanders required to incorporate into campaign plans within their area of responsibility?

2. What is the JIPB process, and are its parameters wide enough to incorporate effective terrorist assessment?

3. If the JIPB model requires expansion, what is needed within the process to fully appreciate terrorism within the battlespace?

4. Are there any existing models from past experience with terrorism that might be used or adapted for incorporation within the JIPB process?

**Significance of the Study**

Intelligence dominance of the battlespace is critical to operational success (JP 2-01.3 2000, 1-1). The inherent unstable nature of the contemporary operating environment dictates that commanders must orient on new threats that, perhaps, current doctrine never envisioned when it was conceived. The intent, therefore, of this study is to evaluate current doctrine to assess its practical application in a contemporary context. The purpose is to examine the operational commander’s ability to visualize terrorism in order to gain advantage within the decision making cycle.

**Context of the Problem**

Current US joint doctrine for the operational intelligence process is vested in two key documents: JP 2-0, *Joint Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Operations* (the framework), and JP 2-01.3, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace* (the form). The former publication provides a tiered mechanism for the intelligence process at each level of war: (1) strategic level: the
intelligence estimate, (2) operational level: JIPB, and (3) tactical level: IPB. Perhaps the only anomaly within this framework occurs at the theater strategic level, where either the intelligence estimate or the JIPB process could be utilized, depending on the commander and the situation. At the operational level, the JIPB process is conceptually designed to “provide a continuous process which enables JFCs and their staffs to visualize the full spectrum of adversary capabilities and potential courses of action (COA) across all dimensions of the battlespace” (JP 2-01.3 2000, vii). The primary purpose of JIPB “is to support the JFC’s and component commander’s campaign planning and decision making needs by identifying, assessing, and estimating the adversary’s centers of gravity, critical vulnerabilities, capabilities, limitations, intentions, most likely COA, and COA most dangerous to friendly forces and mission accomplishment” (JP 2-01.3, 2000, viii). In essence the JIPB is a campaign-planning tool, integral and central to the campaign planning process, which in fusion with mission analysis provides campaign planners with a full spectrum picture of the enemy (or adversary) in relation to friendly forces and the mission. In its current form, it is a four-step process:

1. Define the battlespace environment
2. Describe the battlespace’s effects
3. Evaluate the adversary
4. Determine adversary potential COAs

However, as a tool, the JIPB’s real value rests with the ability of the campaign planner and intelligence analyst to apply it correctly by posing the right questions, establishing the facts in relation to these questions and making key assumptions where necessary. The JIPB is very much designed for use in conventional, symmetrical warfare
in which the enemy presents himself for war fighting based on his equipment, capabilities, and known doctrine. Accordingly, reasonable deductions and assumptions about the enemy’s likely intentions can be made as the process develops. This thesis takes no issue with the flow or logic of the process, which is tried, tested, and proved. The JIPB does, however, reflect on the orientation on asymmetric threats for the purposes of operational force protection, rather than on terrorist strategies. Consequently, the JIPB fails to understand the strategic nature, goals, and overall concepts of terrorist operations. The 2001 attack on the World Trade Center has tragically demonstrated, at the highest levels, our failure to understand the nature of terrorists’ strategy and hence the real threats they pose.

Assumptions

The following assumptions were made in researching this thesis: The threat of terrorism will continue to be a valid and present threat to US national security and interests. The US, its assets and personnel, will remain the principal target of transnational terrorists. The Global War on Terror (GWOT) will continue to be the key pillar of US national military strategy, both at home and abroad.

Definitions of Key Terms Used

“Send reinforcements I am going to advance,” is a phrase that has often been used in doctrinal discussions of definition. The phrase can be interpreted as “send three and fourpence, I’m going to a dance.” Definition and interpretation have long been something of both dilemma and paradox to the military community. Well known as crucial to understanding commanders’ intentions, the ability to define terms on a common basis of understanding has often proved elusive. This fact is somewhat magnified in any
discussion of terrorism, as the plethora of publications merely dealing with defining terrorism will attest. For the purposes of this thesis the following definitions have been adopted, albeit with the understanding some of the following could attract considerable debate in and of themselves:

**Battlespace:** The environment, factors, and conditions, which must be understood to successfully apply combat power, protect the force, or complete the mission. This includes the air, land, sea, space and the included enemy and friendly forces, facilities weather, terrain, the electromagnetic spectrum, and information environment within the operational areas and areas of interest (JP 1-02 2001, 51).

**Contemporary Operational Environment:** The operational environment that exists today and for clearly the foreseeable future (FM 7-100 2003).

**Doctrine:** Fundamental principles by which the military forces or elements thereof guide their actions in support of national objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgement in application (JP 1-02 2001, 132).

**Intelligence:** Information and knowledge about an adversary obtained through observation, investigation, analysis, or understanding (JP 1-02 2001, 208).

**Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace (JIPB):** The analytical process used by joint intelligence organizations to produce intelligence assessments, estimates, and other intelligence products in support of the joint force commander’s decision making process. It is a continuous process that includes defining the total battlespace environment, describing the battlespace effects, evaluating the adversary, and determining and describing adversary potential COAs. The process is used to analyze the air, land, sea space, electromagnetic, cyberspace, and human dimensions of the
environment and to determine an opponent’s capabilities to operate in each. Joint intelligence preparation of the battlespace products are used by the joint force and component command staffs in preparing their estimates and are also applied during the analysis and election of friendly courses of action (JP 1-02 2001, 224).

**Operational Environment:** A composite of conditions, circumstances and influences that affect the employment of military forces and bear on the decision of the unit commander (FM 7-100 2003).

**Operational Level of War:** The level of war at which campaigns and major operations are planned, conducted, and sustained to accomplish strategic objectives within theaters or operational areas. Activities at this level link tactics and strategy by establishing operational objectives needed to accomplish the strategic objectives, sequencing events to achieve the operational objectives, initiating actions, and applying resources to bring about and sustain these events. These activities imply a broader dimension of time or space than do tactics; they ensure the logistic and administrative support of tactical forces, and provide the means by which tactical successes are exploited to achieve strategic objectives (JP 1-02 2001, 311).

**Operational Intelligence:** Intelligence that is required for planning and conducting campaigns and major operations to accomplish strategic objectives within theaters or areas of operations (JP 1-02 2001, 311).

**Targeting:** (1) The process of selecting targets and matching the appropriate response to them, taking account of operational requirements and capabilities. And (2) The analysis of enemy situations relative to the commander’s mission, objectives, and capabilities at the commander's disposal, to identify and nominate specific vulnerabilities
that, if exploited, will accomplish the commander’s purpose through delaying, disrupting, disabling, or destroying enemy forces or resources critical to the enemy (JP 1-02 2001, 423).

**Terrorism** The calculated use of unlawful violence or threat of violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological (JP 1-02 2001, 428).

**Limitations**

This paper strictly confines itself to military aspects of orienting on terrorism. It does not address the socio-political reasons for the upsurge of terrorist activity, nor does it seek to redefine the phenomena beyond military boundaries. Equally, the thesis does not assess specific terrorist groups, or their individual threat to the USA. It accepts that acts of terror have always been a club within the golf bag of insurgency, and it seeks to qualify their relative importance, within the modern context, to command at the operational level. The author is not an intelligence expert per se; however, the intent is to reinforce the absolute importance to the operational commander of understanding the nature of a problem in order to plan his campaign effectively. Accordingly, the thesis remains within the domain of the military intelligence process at the operational level; however, it is recognized that many external agencies and factors will affect this domain, but they are not considered in detail.

**Delimitations**

In essence, this thesis is about insight and guidance. It does not seek to analyze information or intelligence, but to consider the framework under which such analysis could be considered. Intelligence analysis is a separate subject for which a large amount
of literature exists. The paper does consider several existing models for the wider consideration of terrorism that, in and of themselves, present particular challenges. However, testing the validity and reliability of these specific models falls beyond its scope. The purpose is to present recognized and trusted methodology from a broad base of expertise that forms the basis of inquiry.

**Summary**

Assessment of the threat is a critical aspect in the formulation of campaign plans and supporting doctrine. A relevant and contemporary process is essential if planners are to formulate campaigns on the basis of intelligence that is not incorrect, antiquated, or misconceived. Recognizing a fundamental change in the threat spectrum, this thesis seeks to consider current doctrine for orienting on terrorism at the operational level and asks if this methodology is specific enough to guide the uninitiated in providing the operational commander and campaign planners with sufficient depth of analysis. The thesis considers, in the round, the operational environment and identifies specific aspects of the terrorist threat that operational commanders must now consider. Subsequently, the thesis identifies the current doctrinal methodology for consideration of the threat at this level of war, puts it in context of the operational environment and, through consideration of a number of different models, suggests how the doctrinal template could be enhanced to make it more effective. In conclusion, this thesis offers an extrapolated framework, based on the models that have been presented, that intelligence analysts as well as planners at the operational level might well utilize to better illuminate “the other side of the hill.”
CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW

Today we were unlucky, but remember, we only have to be lucky once. You will have to be lucky always. (Anonymous IRA Spokesman, 1984)

Introduction

The goal of this study is to describe a useable framework for understanding how best to target terrorism militarily, specifically at the operational level of war. At first impression, it is at this level that something of a vacuum exists between clear strategic direction, contained in a number of related national strategies, and tactical actions, the execution of which is detailed in a number of joint and single service publications. Accordingly, this chapter focuses on the literature that relates to the nature of the threat environment from which emanates the national strategy. It is the strategic objectives outlined in this national strategy that must be clearly understood at the operational level if tactical actions are to be correctly formulated in focused, accurately targeted operations that will form an effective campaign plan. This chapter goes on to discuss existing joint publications developed to provide the process, or model, to formulate such a campaign plan. Finally, it will introduce alternative, contemporary models developed specifically to orient on terrorist groups, but not with the operational commander’s perspective necessarily in mind. It is these modern works, which consider the wider aspects of contemporary terrorism, that offer the most utility for adaptation for military use within the existing campaign formulation process.
Global Trends

Initially, it is necessary to return to first principles and establish current thinking as regards the United States in a post 11 September 2001 era. The fundamentals facilitate a common understanding of the issues facing operational level commanders either within their designated areas of responsibility (AOR), or within the joint operational area (JOA). Clearly, there have been fundamental changes in global dynamics, and the purpose of this paper is not to review the significant amount of information describing what has become known as the contemporary operational environment (COE), but accept it as the case. Instead, it is vital for analysts, planners, and commanders alike to understand the key elements of this environment as it relates to the operational level of war, with a focus on general world trends.

In a post-September 2001 era, pundits of international relations offer several theories about how the new global dynamic has emerged and what its impact is on the United States. In reviewing current literature, a pattern emerges centered on a growing resentment of the United States. This pattern pertains to a recognition of the impact of globalization and its relation to an increasing global economic divide, the by-product of which is a transnational community of about a billion people. Thomas Friedman views globalization as the paradigm that best describes the post-Cold War world (Friedman 2000, 7). Globalization is the ever-increasing interconnectivity of all facets of life—cultural, technological, financial, political, and even military (Friedman 2000, 17). Professor Paul Rogers of the Oxford Research Group asserts that, “the growing global socio-economic divide is leading directly to the growth of radical social movements, some of which are prepared to use violence against elites and other centers of power”
More particularly, Rogers clearly sees that the United States is at the very center of the growing global divide, “benefiting disproportionately from decades of economic growth” (2003, 12). This US supremacy is juxtaposed to the poorer divide, with the vast majority of the global community being increasingly marginalized from the world’s wealth. As Rogers states:

This majority is better educated, more literate and with better access to communications than earlier generations, and is therefore more aware of its own marginalization, leading, among other things, to the more likely development of radical social movements. . . . Not all movements embrace paramilitary action, but those that do are frequently in a position to get support from marginalized groups. . . . What seems likely is that we may now be entering a period of insurgency and paramilitarism in a number of parts of the world, driven in part by generic socio-economic trends in which inequality is increasing, and being transnational in its effect. (2003, 14).

This bipolar effect in the world dynamic is further exacerbated by the general perception that the United States, at least at the beginning of the current Bush administration, is becoming increasingly isolationist in its policy and unilateralist in its actions. This perception has been perhaps reinforced within the world community by US policy regarding issues that, on face value, represent investment in the global community. The pre-11 September 2001 US withdrawal from its undertakings under the Kyoto Accords, threats to withdraw US forces from the Balkans, refusal to accept jurisdiction of the World Court and an increasingly hard line within several of the institutions of the United Nations all indicated a desire to be less engaged in world issues. Electing not to engage further in most of these issues and, “coupled with US statements that it would pursue its ends regardless of world opinion, even that of traditional allies, all contributed to the belief that the US was at best insensitive and at worst a domineering hegemon” (Daschle 2001, 1). It is possible these perceptions “lead to greater alienation of the US
within the world community” (Keron 2001, 1). Few can argue that the US approach to the war in Iraq has done little to dispel general anti-American feeling around the world.

The common thread in all of this literature is the vacuum of ideology that has been created since the collapse of the Soviet Union coupled with the release of an number of tensions, be they political, religious, ethnic, or ideological, that the Cold War-era suppressed. The United States has emerged as the only remaining superpower, but world perception assumes self-interest, which in turn breeds distrust at one level, and open hatred at another. The importance of understanding this brief survey of the strategic environment lies in the inherent change in the nature of threats.

Nature of the Threat

The Terrorist Diaspora

The framework of this bipolar world, in effect, crystallizes into haves and have-nots. Among the have-nots, a growing number of disenfranchised people form the basis of support for those who turn to violent measures to either express their dissatisfaction, or further their own interests. The roots of this violence are based in age-old grievances; religious, ethnic-nationalist and political. These varied roots are apparent in the actions of various groups around the world. Pillar summarizes these groups into three clear divisions; religious inspired groups; ethnic-separatist groups; and ideology inspired groups. The most obvious and predominant in the modern context are the religious inspired groups, such as al-Qaeda (transnational), Hizballah (Lebanon), HAMAS (Middle East), and Jemaah Islamiya (Far East). On varying scales, these groups seek to establish Islamic states. They range from the truly extreme in the case of al-Qaeda, which seeks to transform all of society to their religious beliefs, to the more pragmatic, such as HAMAS,
which uses terrorism in the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and Israel to undermine the peace process with the ultimate aim of establishing an independent Islamic Palestinian state.

Ethnic-separatist groups can share similar aims as their religious inspired counterparts, in fact a strong religious component can be a measure of their campaign, such as the IRA (Northern Ireland) and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam (Sri Lanka). Equally, several Palestinian groups seek an independent Palestine, but do not attach religious goals to their actions; these include the Abu Nidal Organization which seeks an independent, but not Islamic Palestinian state. The activities of such groups as these are usually centered on specific geographic areas from where they draw their popular support from the disenfranchised community. While religious and ethnic-separatist groups are by far the most predominant in the current context, there remain any number of politically or ideologically inspired groups who fight for their “cause” rather than for territory or religion. A classic example of this is the 17 November Group in Greece which has a singular political agenda based on a leftist revolutionary ideology, but who nonetheless directly targeted NATO, specifically British and American, targets during the crisis in Kosovo and Macedonia.

Both Pillar and Simon agree, in general, in their many publications, that the manifestation of terrorism is constantly changing and adapting to world trends. But its roots remain varied and connected to many conflicts around the globe. Although the greatest threat currently comes from religious extremism, the connection between groups transcends cause or ideology and may be as simple as sharing of technology. As Pillar explains:
The global trends . . . facilitate this kind of terrorism by helping like-minded extremists to find each other without the aid of a larger organization and by enabling individual extremists with the necessary leadership and operational skills to travel where the operational opportunities are. The travels and personal history of Ramzi Yousef—the mastermind of the Trade Center bombing in 1993—demonstrate the trans-national aspect of this phenomenon. Yousef was of Palestinian extraction, was raised in Kuwait, acquired some of his skills at a camp in Afghanistan, received formal education at a technical institute in Britain, came to New York and organized the Trade Center bombing, left the United States on the day of the attack, and later turned up in the Philippines, where he prepared his planned attack on airliners. He was finally captured in Pakistan, where he was working on other terrorist operations in south and southeastern Asia. (2001, 49)

The challenge, therefore, is to understand that groups vary in size, shape, and motivation. They can operate locally, regionally or on an international scale, but their efforts can be mutually supporting, even if the base motivation varies widely. The transnationals offer training and support to other, less capable groups, not necessarily to further the lesser cause, but to increase the general destabilizing effect that they create. Sharing of technology is equally symptomatic. Witness to this is the capture of three known IRA operatives in Columbia who appear to have been sharing advanced bomb-making technology with the FARC for hard cash and perhaps other favors, such as safe harbor. “Threats lurk not only in states or even in established nonstate organizations but also in individuals and tiny protogroups” (Pillar 2001, 50).

State Sponsorship

Mainstream literature dealing with terrorism rounds on the fact that terrorists simply cannot operate without some form of sponsorship. They require some sort of base from which to live and operate, their money and arms have to be kept somewhere, and those who actually perpetrate the acts of terrorism must be trained, rehearsed and tested, which requires real estate. In the current global environment, these sponsors remain likely to be recognized states that use terrorism either directly as an extension of their own
foreign policy, or indirectly due to ethnic or ideological sympathy for the cause espoused by the terrorist group. Pillar categorizes these states into three principle types: Sponsors, currently listed by the US State Department as Cuba, Iran, Libya, North Korea, Sudan, and Syria; Enablers, such as Greece which until the Kosovo campaign largely ignored the activities of the leftist revolutionary groups active at the time; and Cooperators, principally the European allies but expanding as the threat becomes more poignant. These titles are self-evident as to the degree of involvement, but Pillar asserts that describing these states in terms of “good or bad” is overly simplistic. That any one state can be part of the problem and a potential part of managing the problem is true not only of those states currently on the list of state sponsors but also of some that are not. For a few of the latter, being part of the problem means not just failing to cooperate fully in countering terrorism but also doing some things that enable it to occur (Pillar 2001, 179). Similarly, the NSCT recognizes the significance of state sponsorship. It identifies four types of state: Firstly, the willing and able (willing to cooperate to defeat terrorism and able to do something about it utilizing their own resources); secondly, the weak but willing (willing to cooperate to defeat terrorism but lacking resources to do so directly); thirdly, the reluctant (require convincing of the net benefit of meeting their international obligations); and, fourthly the unwilling (which need to be compelled to cease supporting terrorism). Finally, Richardson identifies five levels of state sponsorship but approaches the issue specifically from physical sponsorship in one form or another, namely:

Level 1. Complete control, that is, a branch of the state infrastructure.
Level 2. Train and maintain a tight control of terrorist group actions.
Level 3. Maintain some control over the group. Control may be shared.
Level 4. Looks after the group but does not play any role in guiding it.

Level 5. No control over the actions of the group but gives support.

Some commonality exists between these varied points of view, but all appear to consider the involvement of states in the sponsorship of terrorism as a key element of any terrorist group’s ability to operate. While Pillar’s assertion that over simplifying the involvement of the state in terms of black and white is evidently a truism, the continuum from outright state sponsorship of terrorism, to tolerance of terrorism, to active counter-terrorism measures appears to take account of the full spectrum of involvement rather than Richardson’s viewpoint. Undoubtedly, constructing campaign plans at the operational level will inevitably have to consider the main actors within the AOR and JOA. These will be various, but will ultimately include the analysis of state actors and their part, either positive or negative, in the problem.

The Structure of Terror

While the weight of literature concerning terrorism focuses on motivation, operational capability, and attack methodology, little exists in detail on the structure of terrorist groups. Both the NSCT of February 2003 and the Davis-Jenkins RAND report, *Deterrence and Influence in Counterterrorism* 2002, deal with this issue directly and, in the round draw the same conclusions. What appears clear from both works is that military planners and analysts, through their training and disposition, understand the tangible. If they are to successfully target terrorism, they have to move beyond the “mystical” to those aspects that can be touched. To this end, Davis and Jenkins advocate adopting a systems approach to deter terrorism as, “deterring terrorism is not simply about deterring a single individual or a small group of like-minded individuals” (2002, 13). This is
supported by the NSCT, which also deals with how terrorist groups are generically structured. The relative importance both publications place on this would seem self-evident, like any organization, terrorist groups need structure in order to operate. As with any highly organized group there is a requirement for top-level management, middle management (plans and operations), training, acquisition, finance, workers or foot soldiers, and recruiters linked to an element of the population susceptible to recruitment. Simplistic maybe, but both papers view an understanding of this structure as critical to understanding the overarching scope of the problem. All of these elements become more tangible when considered in isolation, each with its own cycle that can be interrupted; for example, the recruiting cycle, or the acquisition cycle. While not considering this aspect specifically, some other works identify more indirectly the importance of this structure to the terrorist group. Pillar, Heymann, and Brauer all assert in general that governments must minimize terrorist resources, in terms of their finances, personnel, and bases of operation. Clearly, a firm understanding of this generic structure is worthy of analysis for possible inclusion in any model that is to consider effective targeting.

The Hierarchy of Policy, Doctrine, and Tactics

Having considered the nature of the problem, establishing the current methodology for orientating on the threat at the operational level is necessary. Accordingly, a clear understanding of the strategic objectives is vital. The NSCT gives clear intent as to how the United States intends to prosecute its war against terrorism. In its base form, the NSCT sets four clear strategic objectives:

Defeat – terrorist organizations of global reach by attacking their sanctuaries; leadership; command, control, and communications; material support; and finances.
Deny – further sponsorship, support, and sanctuary to terrorists by ensuring other states accept their responsibilities to take action against these international threats within their sovereign territory.

Diminish – the underlying conditions that terrorists seek to exploit by enlisting the intentional community to focus its efforts and resources on the areas most at risk.

Defend – the United States, its citizens, and interests at home and abroad by proactively protecting the homeland and extending defenses to identify and neutralize the threat as early as possible. (NSCT 2003, 11-12)

At the operational level, the JFC must have a clear understanding of these so-called “4D” objectives while in consideration of the operational task at hand. However, understanding the environment in which he is to operate and apply these objectives is the critical element in formulating his campaign plan. This process is vested in two key documents: JP 2-0 Joint Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Operations and JP 2-01.3 Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace. The key process is the JIPB which is tried and tested, offering a very logical and clear methodology for evaluating both the enemy and the environment in a general context, predominantly focused on a symmetrical threat, that is, an enemy who operates in a conventional fashion based on his capabilities applied in a known doctrinal manner. This process allows analysts to compare capabilities and forecast, based on known historical application of enemy doctrine, likely enemy courses of action. All very neat and certainly not in question as a highly effective tool for achieving exactly what it predominantly purports to do. Further, asymmetric warfare is specifically considered, but very much within context to, “counter an adversary’s asymmetric strategies by providing crucial support to joint activities such as information operations; special operations; targeting; nuclear, biological, and chemical operations, etc” (JP 2-01.3, viii). On face value, this approach is very much in line with supporting the main, conventional
campaign plan with asymmetric activity viewed as merely an element of the friction of
war rather than the main focus of the campaign plan itself. The focus of campaign
planning clearly then becomes the issue, and this is considered directly by the application
of the JIPB process to Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW), which, “can
occur unilaterally or in conjunction with other military operations” (JP 2-01.3, ix). Thus,
there is recognition that a higher level of detail is required in such circumstances.
However, MOOTW covers the 16 potential types of operations described in JP 3-07,
Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War. Rightly, this understanding
reflects the DOD’s responsibility to prepare the military forces to engage in a wide
spectrum of threats. Inevitably, the net result is that the detail required in a specific
terrorist threat environment is thin, as the base document is intentionally brief in order to
make it more generally descriptive than prescriptive. However, this is the very flaw that
this thesis intends to expose. As Blank clearly observes in his paper entitled, “Rethinking
Asymmetric Threats.”

The strategic environment has changed, dramatically and substantively. In such a
dramatically transformed environment, not only must our forces and organizations
be transformed, so too must our thinking undergo transformation. And
transformation of our thinking about the nature of the threat environment
confronting us is essential to the development of a sound defense strategy and
policy, and operational concepts that will prevent future defeats and contribute to
the ensuring victory in forthcoming contingencies. (2003,vi).

Adversary Models

The Step 3 of the JIPB advocates the creation of adversary models that “depict
how an opponent’s military forces prefer to conduct operations under ideal conditions”
(JP 2-01.3 2000, II-46). These models doctrinally consist of three major parts: graphical
depictions of adversary doctrine or patterns of operations (doctrinal templates),
descriptions of the adversary’s preferred tactics and options, and the identification of high-value targets. Wherefore then adversary models in a campaign designed specifically to combat terrorism? Most current literature does not address this issue specifically; however, a number of potential models are on offer, but appear highly inclined towards the viewpoint of their originators. They do, however, form a basis for analysis.

Model 1: Reach

Perhaps not unsurprisingly, the NSCT offers a model of contemporary terrorism oriented on its reach. In fact the whole national strategy has been formulated to confound this reach so that the threat to mainland USA is weakened and eventually nullified. The model itself is in fact a rather simple tiered scale of terrorist activity, mutually reinforcing from level to level. It suggests a network structure where common motivation, if not actual aims, is the binding catalyst for the various groups to work together across the strata of structure i.e. funding, intelligence, training, logistics, planning and the actual execution of attacks. At the lowest level (Level 1) are those groups that operate primarily within the confines of a single country. Practical constraints prevent them from reaching outside of these boundaries, however their actions may still present consequences on an international scale. The next level (Level 2) involves regional terrorists whose aims and aspirations transcend at least one international border and who seek to create the conditions of terror across a much wider spectrum. Finally, at the highest level (Level 3) are the global terrorists whose operations span several regions and aspire to transnational, even global aims. These levels are bound together by what is described as a terrorist network:

The terrorist threat is a flexible, transnational network structure, enabled by modern technology and characterized by loose connectivity both within and
between groups. In this environment, terrorists work together in funding, sharing intelligence, training, logistics, planning, and executing attacks. Terrorist groups in one country or region can draw strength and support from groups in other countries or regions (NSCT 2003, 8).

Model 2: Motivation

In their paper “Deterrence and Influence in Counterterrorism,” Davis and Jenkins, writing for the RAND Corporation, offer a different model of terrorism based on motivating ideology. They suggest that terror can in fact be categorized into two key patterns: internalists and externalists. Their specific model offers parallel types: Type A, being those we would perhaps associate most with transnational or global terrorists who are driven by the action and passion of terrorism itself. This appetite is insatiable and, in order to continue, they will change their objectives as necessary. Often, their objectives are very grandiose and therefore unachievable. This type is in contrast with Type B groups who are pragmatic, have clear political goals and will cease their activity once their objectives have been achieved. What Davis and Jenkins recognize is that simple typecasting of this nature is too simplistic. In practice, we must deal with a mix of Types A and B, “although al-Qaeda leaders are Type A terrorists, many elements of the larger al-Qaeda system fall into Type B” (Davis and Jenkins 2002, 12). This blurring of the division between types has some harmonic resonance with the reach model purported by the NSCT.

Model 3: Threat Analysis

The third model centers on threat analysis and is presented by Warren in his paper Terrorism, The Obscure Threat 2002. Five standard components are offered for classifying a terrorist group, namely: Existence, History, Capability, Intentions, and Targeting. This model is very much a “who, what, where, and when” approach in that it
deals specifically with what is known and relies heavily on giving value to intentions. Although somewhat simplistic, this model does deal with the tangible and ranges widely across several aspects of the terrorist makeup, without straying into specific agendas to suit a purpose.

Summary

The change in the strategic environment has left the United States as the only remaining superpower. However, the resultant destabilizing effect to international security that the end of the Cold War has brought emphasizes a division in the world population between those who prosper and those who do not. Within this framework, religious, ethnic, and ideological fault lines have resurfaced, serving to undermine the autonomy of the state and to offer the conditions for terrorism to prosper. The roots of terrorism are various, but in the twenty-first century terrorism has attained a higher level of significance. The so-called international terrorists, using modern technology to enhance their capability, pose a threat to society on a scale that has heretofore been unheard of. More alarmingly, these most dangerous groups have formed loose networks with regional terrorist groups and also with groups domestic to singular countries. US strategy for dealing with this threat is clear, but future JFCs must translate these strategic objectives into action on the ground.
CHAPTER 3
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

We have seen their kind before. They are the heirs of all the murderous ideologies of the twentieth century. By sacrificing human life to serve their radical visions – by abandoning every value except the will to power – they follow in the path of fascism, and Nazism, and totalitarianism. And they will follow that path all the way, to where it ends: in history’s unmarked grave of discarded lies.


Introduction

This chapter outlines the research methodology adopted for this study into determining the relevance of developing an adversary model for incorporation into Step 3 of the JIPB process when faced with a specifically terrorist based, albeit multifaceted, threat. The chapter seeks to explain how current literature and doctrine will be analyzed so that the primary and secondary questions outlined in chapter 1 can be answered. The sources of this information include a variety of books, articles and doctrinal publications that must be subjected to interpretation and analysis. Inevitably, the study lacks any vehicle through which to test any conclusions or operational interpretation. Accordingly, observations deduced from the analysis must remain subjective and be based on the relative importance of common trends identified in the literature offered for the study in light of current experience in the COE. This foundation is then used to develop an adaptive conceptual model for orienting on terrorism at the operational level, in whatever form or context it manifests itself, which has utility for use as an adversary model within the JIPB.
Description of the Study

As a first priority, this study deals directly with the threat. Establishing who the adversary is, what level and in what context he operates in, and the significance these considerations have on evaluation and planning. The paper will deconstruct terrorism to expose its tangible elements and to identify what specifically the military can target. Thereafter, the planning process itself is considered, attempting to establish the tenets of the JIPB process and to place it in context with the COE, and the strategic objectives of the United States for its war on terrorism. Some analysis of the contemporary threat from terrorism within the COE will be necessary to set the stage for any perceived gap in the JIPB process; however, the paper will not dwell on either aspect as both the threats and the process are well known and documented. Similarly, this study does not seek to review or analyze current national policy on terrorism, but accepts it in terms of its fundamental importance to the operational commander. He, in turn, must interpret it within the context of his own AOR, so that meaningful and effective campaign plans can be developed. The output of this evaluation will facilitate discussion of some of the latest academic approaches to conceptualizing the terrorist enemy. The relative importance of three contemporary models will be analyzed against both strategic direction and operational doctrine to appraise their utility to operational level analysts and planners. Historical data, available from the Defense Intelligence Agency database and the RAND Corporation is used to inform the argument through demonstration. Finally, the study will attempt to construct a conceptual adversary model.
Methodology Concept

In selecting a research methodology for this thesis, which is intrinsically linked to existing doctrine, a ‘lock-step’ approach in-line with that doctrine has been adopted. In effect, a model-based qualitative content analysis has been adopted, derived from the very JIPB process that it seeks to analyze. Specifically, the four-step approach integrated into the JIPB process has been adapted to best suit the research, namely:

1. Define the Battlespace Environment (the global environment).
2. Describe the Battlespace’s Effects (the general terrorist threat).
3. Evaluate the Adversary (specific threats).
4. Determine Adversary potential COAs (the adversary model).

In refining this four-step approach to best meet the needs of research for this thesis, the model seeks to maintain a systemic approach, in line with military planning methodology, but in an academic format. Thus, loose interpretation of Dr Bruce Menning’s “Method Shell for Qualitative Research” has been applied to the four-step model previously outlined, specifically: identification and isolation of the problem; development of a hypothesis; collection and classification of information and its sources; discussion and arguments on the information found; development of conclusions; and, presentation of the aforementioned steps in an organized form (Menning 2002).

Accordingly, this thesis is presented in the framework outlined by the Graduate Degree Program, US Army Command and General Staff College. Chapter 1 introduces the subject and sets the parameters of both research and argument. Chapter 2 singles out the specific literature from which the argument will be developed. Chapter 3 confirms the methodology for reviewing the problem. Chapter 4 encapsulates both discussion and
argument, which seek to provide direct answers to the primary and secondary questions that have been identified. Finally, Chapter 5 simply concludes the discussion and presents results.

Research Analysis

The primary question this thesis seeks to answer queries the utility of the JIPB process to analysts and planners since it was published in 2000, in light of a fundamental change in threat policy. From the outset, the study does not seek to second-guess the process itself, but questions the utility of Step 3 of the JIPB process ‘Evaluate the Enemy’ when no adversary model for combating terrorism is currently provided. From this start point, a number of secondary questions naturally fall out which deal directly with the perceived shortfall in Step 3 of the JIPB. These secondary questions begin with first principles and seek to establish the change in the operational environment in light of the strategic direction that has been issued, some three years after the last publication of JP 2-01.3. Subsequent secondary questions deal with identifying the new information requirement, leading to analysis of a number of approaches suggested in contemporary works.

This sequence is designed to produce a logical procedure that will eventually lead to answering the primary question. Analysis is limited to open-source documents, much of which emanates from key strategic studies institutes. Inevitably, much of the analysis comes from personal experience, but a basic analysis model is utilized to criticize reasoning, and the connection between concepts, as they develop, and conclusions.
Conclusion of the Study

This study concludes with the presentation of an adversary model that addresses orientation to, and targeting either of a terrorist enemy, or of an enemy utilizing terrorism as an element of his campaign. The model is offered as a basis for determining the threat within a designated operational area, orienting on the tangible aspects of that threat, and targeting that which can be targeted by military means. An element of conclusion is the obvious fact that the model can only really be tested when applied to the full JIPB process in an operational scenario.
CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

However absorbed a commander may be in the elaboration of his own thoughts, it is sometimes necessary to take the enemy into consideration. (JP 2-01.3, II-44)

Winston Churchill

Primary Research Question

Does the JIPB process require a specific adversary model for military planners at the operational level of war to visualize and therefore target terrorism?

Introduction

The considerable threat of terrorism to the United States, its citizens and interests both at home and abroad has, over the years, been well documented and afforded a degree of importance that this threat deserved. However, despite a number of attacks before 11 September 2001, the United States remained, until that point, void of an overarching policy to deal with the phenomenon in a coordinated manner. As the Gilmore Commission observed in its first annual report to the President and Congress in December 1999, the promulgation of a succession of policy documents and presidential decision directives neither equates to, nor can substitute for, a truly “comprehensive, fully coordinated national strategy” (Hoffman 2001, 2). This lack of focus fundamentally changed on that fateful September day in 2001, forcing the United States to reconsider thoroughly and radically the threat that terrorism poses. Overarching strategy now exists, combined with a reorganization of resources in pursuit of the President’s intent:
No group or nation should mistake America’s intentions: We will not rest until terrorist groups of global reach have been found, have been stopped, and have been defeated. (6 November 2001)

President George W. Bush,

This strategy provides clear focus, recognition of the problem and greater understanding of the threat. “Combating terrorism and securing the US homeland from future attacks are our top priorities” (NSCT 2003, 1). This is a difficult challenge in which the military play but an elemental part, in concert with other instruments of national power—diplomatic, economic, law enforcement, financial, information, and intelligence.

Interpreting this strategy at the operational level, therefore, requires aggressive action based on a thorough understanding of the groups engaged in terrorist activity, analysis of their common characteristics, and a predictive assessment of their relative strengths and weaknesses. Only thus can the operational commander hope to formulate campaign plans that are relative and effective. Accordingly, just as strategy has been focused, updated and revised, so must military doctrine adapt to provide the operational commander with the optimum predictive assessment on which to base his decisions.

However, any discussion of doctrine and terrorism must acknowledge the tension inherent between the role of doctrine and the nature of terrorism, which exists as a matter of operational expediency; for terrorist groups cannot hope to confront conventional military force head on. Further, the very dominance of US military power stimulates asymmetric assaults on US forces and interests.

Self-evidently, doctrine and guidance must be predictive, encapsulating the full parameters of the threat and providing a probabilistic assessment of adversary intentions. All sides will attempt to determine adversary capabilities, objectives, and operational
concepts (JP 2-0 1995, vii). However, “joint operations doctrine is built on a sound base of warfighting theory and practical experience” (JP 3-0 2001, ix). In general, it deals with fighting a conventional enemy in an operational concept structured for high-intensity warfare. But, as a recent Military Review article noted, “An enduring lesson that doctrine must emphasize is that warfare is about adaptation when confronting asymmetry” (Ancker and Burke 2003, 23). Accordingly, this chapter analyzes the threat in light of strategic policy through to operational interpretation.

**Nature of the Threat**

The 11 September attack has fundamentally changed perceptions about the threat. It demonstrated that foreign terrorists were capable of mounting major attacks on US soil without being detected (Jenkins 2002, 6). Previous attacks such as the USS Cole, the Khobar Towers, and the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania had also gone undetected but were not perpetrated within the American homeland. Similarly, the scale of the attack elevated the crime to new levels, dealing a massive blow to the US psyche and demonstrating it was vulnerable in a manner that has had lasting effect. Nevertheless, for the military, it is not so much that the threat has changed, rather the threat spectrum has become more dense with the probability of entering into certain types of operations increasing at one end of this continuum and diminishing at the other. As Rumsfeld has observed:

> There’s no question but that the fact that as you look around the world and ask yourself what countries have armies and navies and air forces that approximate ours that are going to tackle us, there are very few candidates. When one looks around the world at threats and capabilities that can impose enormous damage on our country and our forces, they tend not to be large, heavy, blue-water navies, major armored forces on the ground or major attack aircraft. Therefore, what we’ve got to do is, we’ve got to maintain those important capabilities we have to defend and deter in the event that they are needed. But we also have to migrate a
portion of this force so that we can deal more effectively with the kinds of threats – so called asymmetrical threats – that we face. I mean we face problems with ballistic missiles of all ranges, of cruise missiles. We face problems of terrorist attacks. We face problems and threats from weapons of mass destruction. Increasingly we’re going to be facing cyber-attacks and attacks on information capabilities of our country. Because we’re so dependent on satellites, we’re so dependant on information technologies, the most advanced nation in the world almost becomes the most vulnerable to attacks against those systems.

Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld
Fort Hood, Texas, 21 August 2002

Military commanders need to understand and embrace this concept. Fundamental to the concept is an understanding of the framework, in terms of the global dynamic, against which it is set. As Friedman, Nye and Kagan all assert, the international arena remains essentially anarchic. Nye’s concept of an anarchic system of states holds true, but since the end of the Cold War the United States has emerged as the only remaining superpower. The world has become inherently unstable, with non-traditional factors such as failures in governance, environmental degradation and even, potentially, health crises causing conflict and further destabilizing the general security environment. The implications of these local and regional trends assume strategic importance to the United States whose inter-dependence and connection to such regions is magnified through expanding influence, trade, and travel. Globalization and technological advance, while fundamental to US prosperity, represent the very root of the threat to global security by raising awareness of global disparities in income and influence. Technological advance has also provided terrorists with the capability to strike the US directly. Hence, expanding economic integration, the dramatic increase in international travel, and the accelerating exchange of information, technology, and communications mean that local economic, environmental, political, and social challenges often have global implications.
“Today, unrest in what once might have been considered a distant and developing country can have important domestic and foreign policy implications for the United States. . . . As a result, the threat to US security is often more direct and the likelihood of US involvement in disputes greater” (Koppell and Sharma 2003, 11). Additionally, within this changing security landscape, the United States is perceived as increasingly ethnocentric, as is evidenced in official US policy such as the National Security Strategy which states, “the great struggles of the twentieth century between liberty and totalitarianism ended with a decisive victory for the forces of freedom – and a single sustainable model for national success: freedom, democracy, and free enterprise.” (NSS 2002, 5)

This statement and its underlying mentality constitute a prime example of strategic ethnocentrism in action, and this hubris invites or risks commensurate retribution (Blank 2003, 15). The potential for terrorism originating in states with weak or unaccountable governments further underscores the potential direct threat to US security. Moreover, as an aspect of national security, globalization and technology directly accommodate the growth and support of terrorist networks. Excepting the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), terrorism now constitutes the single greatest threat to the security of the United States and combating terrorism is the first defense priority.

**Strategy of Terrorism**

Terrorism is among the most dynamic of phenomena because of the multiplicity of adversaries (and potential adversaries), the perennial emergence of new causes and different aims and motivations fuelling this violence, the adoption and evolution of new
tactics and modus operandi and the greater access and availability of increasingly sophisticated weaponry (Hoffman 2001, 6). Contemporary terrorism has become extremely complex, amorphous and transnational in nature. Our enemies study our doctrine more closely than we do ourselves. They seek to defeat us, not in open warfare, but by leveling the playing field of overwhelming combat power vested in superior technology to disrupting mobilization, to prevent deployment and to draw us into complex terrain to negate the greater effects of our weapon systems. In fact, recent wargames confirm this and show that our adversaries are prepared, under the right conditions, even to launch nuclear first-strikes and pre-emptive strikes to deny us access to the theater, thereby offsetting our overwhelming conventional advantages, which are magnified under a US doctrine of pre-emption (Blank 2003, 12). The routing of the Taliban in Afghanistan exemplifies at least some of this theory by demonstrating how easily an under equipped but resourceful enemy can negate the utility of satellites and sensors, use terrain to nullify the effect of advanced weapon systems, and reduce the battle to its most rudimentary element: soldiers fighting hand to hand with nothing more than small arms. As Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Richard Meyers confirmed, the enemy in Afghanistan has adapted to our method of warfare faster than we have adapted to his actions (Ricks and Loeb 2002, 1). This adaptation is not strictly terrorism, but demonstrative of just how easily advantage can be leveled. Such a result is exactly what the terrorist seeks to achieve. His aim is not to close with and destroy us at close quarters, but to strike at the heart of our weaknesses, where the act of terror itself is less important than the cumulative results of the secondary and tertiary effects.
An enduring truism is that terrorism’s purpose is to terrorize. But, in creating the conditions of terror, terrorist actions are encapsulated in a strategy. Deciphering and predicting this strategy begs an understanding of their history, motivation, capabilities, and intentions. Far more complex than analyzing a conventional enemy, the terrorist mindset can be difficult to fathom, often requiring analysis of unfamiliar areas of concern. Concentration on conventional, high-intensity warfare has generally meant that US military analysis of an unconventional enemy lacks depth. As Major General (Retired) Robert H. Scales, Jr. summed up during a statement to the House Armed Services Committee in October 2003:

The American military should not forget that its worst defeat resulted largely from a military and civilian leadership that prized technology over lessons of the past. Vietnam-era senior leaders were not only often contemptuous of the enemy but also largely ignorant of his motivations, culture, and ideology. Thus, it was the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese who were willing to “pay any price, bear any burden,” and who understood their American enemy far better than Americans understood themselves. If the US military does not desire to repeat the mistakes of the past, then it needs to create a learning culture, where intellectual preparation is prized as highly as tactical preparation. (Scales 2003, 4)

National Strategy

Whatever the cause of disaffection, operational commanders can expect in the current global environment to encounter terrorism as an aspect of the operational environment. It may manifest itself as the principle concern, or as an aspect of a wider issue, such as insurgency, where terrorism is employed merely as a method within a greater strategy. It is therefore incumbent upon the JFC to have a clear understanding of national policy in dealing with terrorism within his area, although other operational imperatives may have greater significance. Each situation will clearly have to be judged on its own merits, but the framework of national policy encompassed within both the
NSS and NSCT should form the basis for decision making in formulating operational objectives.

Of fundamental importance is an understanding of two key issues that the published national strategies allude to, but fall short of stating directly. Firstly, terrorism cannot be defeated. Pillar observes:

The long history of terrorism is reason enough to expect that it will always be a problem and usually a significant one. It is a product of such basic facts of human existence as the discontent that is sometimes strong enough to impel people toward violence, the asymmetries of the weak confronting the strong, and the vulnerability of almost every facet of civilization to physical harm at the hands of those who find a reason to inflict harm. If there is a “war” against terrorism, it is a war that cannot be won. (2002, 217)

This basic principle is evident within the NSCT, the strategy of which is to stop terrorist attacks on the United States by driving the operations of organizations of global reach down to a regional basis, and subsequently localizing it. In effect, it is a policy of containment, which recognizes that the probability of eradicating the threat is hollow, and the reality is reduction of it to a level that is manageable. The NSCT states, “…through the sustained effort to compress the scope and capability of terrorist organizations, isolate them regionally, and destroy them within state borders, the United States and its friends and allies will secure a world in which our children can live free from fear and where the threat of terrorist attacks does not define our daily lives” (NSCT 2003, 12). Operational commanders will be operating at the regional level and must therefore orient on those aspects of their specific terrorist threat that have greatest potential to spread beyond that region.

Secondly, the United States, despite declaring war on terrorism, cannot hope to confront all terrorism within the limits of its own resources in every country in the world.
This is where the term “war” becomes unhelpful in accurately describing American efforts against terrorism. Couching actions in terms of the Global War On Terror (GWOT) supports the right to strike at terror whenever, wherever, and in whatever manner the United States deems it appropriate to do so. “But America is not at war with terrorism, which is a phenomenon, not a foe. . . . It is trying to combat terrorism” (Jenkins 2002, 23). The aims of the policy are finite and the targets are specific. The United States is not going to destroy every terrorist group or pursue every terrorist in the world, but as a matter of self-defense, it will wage war against terrorists capable of causing casualties on the scale of 11 September (Jenkins 2002, 23). Accordingly, just as transnational terrorists must rely on a network of groups, sympathizers and supporters, so must the United States rely on its friends and allies to take the war to the terrorist, implementing so called netwar. The prescient conclusion is that networks are as important to the United States as they are to the terrorist, something to be protected and attacked from both sides of the operational coin.

The 4D strategy, therefore, forms the basic tenet for operational design by the JFC faced with terrorism within the JOA. He must decide the level at which groups operate within his area, and subsequently decide how best to tackle the issues relating to specific groups. “To wage netwar properly will require that those who are empowered operate under a theory, a set of principles, and a doctrine that is readily understood and disseminated. . . . This should include rules of engagement and an understanding of higher-level issues and trade-offs permitting rapid adaptation by actors on the scene” (Davis and Jenkins 2002, 32). The issue then for the JFC becomes one of asking the right
questions in relation to the known facts within the environment of the threat and national policy.

The Battlespace

Faced with terrorism, what then must the JFC understand about the environment, factors and conditions to successfully complete the mission? The JIPB process exists to support the JFC’s decision making. It aims to identify, estimate and assess the adversary’s centers of gravity, critical vulnerabilities, limitations, most likely COA, and the COA most dangerous to friendly accomplishment of the mission. In general terms, there is nothing new in this as a military decision making methodology, which in essence considers the aim, factors affecting the situation and development of a plan. As a framework for considering terrorism as the adversary, there is nothing to suggest that this methodology falls short of orienting successfully on the problem. However, as the 1999 Joint Strategy Review identifies, asymmetric approaches are usable at all levels of war to “circumvent or undermine US strengths while exploiting US weaknesses, using methods that significantly differ from the United States’ expected method of operations.” This approach, as Lawrence Freedman writes, “becomes synonymous with any sound strategy for fighting the United States” (Freedman 2001, 70). Equally, waging war against terrorists fundamentally alters the dimensions of the battlespace (figure 1). With no linearity the battlespace becomes three dimensional and easily spreads among multiple theaters. Thus, applying traditional methodology to an unconventional problem invites transcendent confusion and misdirection. Hence, to retain superiority we must adapt to the terrorist strategy and counter it.
Figure 1. Dimensions of the Battlespace

The Adversary Template

In Step 3 of the JIPB: Evaluating the Adversary, the use of adversary models is suggested as the best means of dealing with the specific aspects of a particular adversary (figure 2). The purpose of such a model is to identify how the adversary will conduct operations based on what is known about his organization, equipment and tactics. An adversary model, we are told, consists of three elements: doctrinal templates, description of preferred tactics, and identification of high-value targets. It is in this area, perhaps, that the JIPB becomes locked into the environment of conventional, high-intensity warfare suggesting that such elements as organization for combat, echelons, frontages, depths, engagement areas and grouping of forces should be considered. Clearly, when presented with a highly adaptive adversary who will not present himself for close combat this
methodology probably lacks the clarity of analysis required by planners to form their campaign plans. We can reasonably expect that an adversary employing a strategy of terrorism will not employ conventional threats or do so only to magnify the impact of terror attacks (Blank 2003, 8).

Figure 2. JIPB Step 3: Evaluate the Adversary

Surprisingly, JP 2-01.3 is reasonably prescriptive as to what comprises an adversary model, but lacks detail as to how this might be adapted to unconventional scenarios. Doctrinally, Combating Terrorism is an operation encapsulated within MOOTW. However, the guidance still rests on a generic MOOTW template that goes some way toward the wider issues that terrorism may present, but becomes embroiled in peacetime antiterrorism measures. The result provides little basis for the support of
decision-making and avoids identification of the key aspects of specifically orienting on terrorism.

As with any analysis model, its value rests on the pertinence of the questions that it asks. Broad questions must be asked about terrorists and their actions. However, before it is possible to ask specific questions about a particular group, it is essential to understand the generic structure of a terrorist group and its mechanistic cycles that must be interrupted in order to disrupt or curtail its operations. The NSCT offers a simple pyramid structure with the underlying conditions (poverty, corruption, religious conflict and ethnic strife) at its base, constrained by the boundaries of the international environment at the next level. Within these boundaries lie states that provide both physical (safe houses, training grounds) and virtual (reliable communications and financial networks) havens. These notions solidify at the next level into the terrorist organization’s structure, membership, and resources, which determine the group’s capabilities and reach. Finally, at the top of the structure sits the leadership providing direction and strategy. Crystallized into significant factors, this structure leaves us with the underlying conditions, the international environment, organization, structure, membership, resources, capabilities and leadership as the significant elements for consideration and analysis.

Davis and Jenkins go a step further by proposing a system perspective, advocating decomposition of the system into classes of actors. In this structure, the underlying conditions alluded to in the NSCT structure are further refined into sources of moral and religious support, and supportive population segments. Above these groups sit recruiters, then foot soldiers, and lieutenants, with top leadership at the apex. Notably, at either flank
of this structure sit external suppliers and facilitators, and supportive states. Davis and Jenkins assert that each group can be influenced, thus providing perspective in conceiving strategies and tactics. This influence takes three forms: attack, deter or influence. The rationale is that some groups, or elements of them must be destroyed because their actions, motivations, or intentions mean that they cannot be either deterred or influenced. This approach effectively becomes an operational framework, replacing conventional military operations, and has definite utility for the operational commander who must decide what he wishes to do about the terrorism that he faces and thus articulate his guidance and end state. Further, Davis and Jenkins propose decomposing their suggested structure in “life cycles” where “there are numerous places where it is possible to intervene,” specifically: external support; recruiting; motivation; planning and information gathering; acquisition (of materials and equipment for weapon production); and, weapons production, deployment, and use. Clearly, within resources, the military could only hope to physically intervene in some of these life cycles, but this method for orienting on the terrorist adversary holds significant merit. The military is comfortable with a systems approach, but this one is not overly prescriptive. The methodology of both structures overlaps and concurs to such a degree that it forms the general basis for formulating a base template, using the event matrix format, for an adversary model through which more specific questions can be identified. By combining factors with the generic actions that it may be necessary to take, the base model in table 1 evolves.
Table 1. Adversary Model: Base Template

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FACTOR</th>
<th>ATTACK</th>
<th>DETER</th>
<th>INFLUENCE</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Underlying Conditions</td>
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<td>Supportive Population</td>
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<tr>
<td>Segments</td>
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<tr>
<td>International Environment</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>• Supportive States</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organization</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structure</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Membership</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Recruiters</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>• Foot Soldiers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Lieutenants</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resources</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• External Suppliers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Facilitators</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capabilities</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leadership</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Adversary Models

To achieve conceptual clarity, we must try to get to the roots of what it is that is important to understand about a terrorist adversary. The contemporary terrorist models presented in chapter 2 all have their relative merits based on the credibility of their respective authors. The NSCT sets national policy for ultimately preventing terrorist attack on the United States homeland. It is naturally, therefore, focused on the ability of such groups to “reach” the United States and, therefore, presents a model as the basis for strategy. At the operational level, the utility of this approach derives from the inherent connection that is made between groups of varying capability and their own relationships...
to states that may directly, or indirectly offer some means of support. The relative
importance of these connections is borne out by the weight that is attached to them in
most of the literature that has been reviewed thus far. Accordingly, analysis of such
factors at the operational level should reveal some key facts about an adversary that link
directly to his support and capability. The three-tiered methodology presented in the
NSCT provides a simple technique for incorporation into a model. However, the inherent
difficulty comes with groups who do not meet the rather simplified criteria. Some groups
may be financed on a global scale, but act only on a regional basis, for example,
HAMAS. Others, such as the early days of al-Qaeda, may base themselves in a relatively
localized area, but operate on a global basis. Notwithstanding, the NSCT model allows a
number of rudimentary thresholds to be established which would enable analysts at the
operational level to identify tangible levels of activity.

The RAND model presented by Davis and Jenkins and founded on the basis of
motivation affords a different perspective in terms of its utility. When viewing terrorist
groups in terms of the strength of their motivation along the lines of this model, in effect,
the purpose would appear to be to determine just how far the group is prepared to go.
This is an important calculation for the military analyst and planner in terms of the
action-reaction-counteraction cycle. It leads to a determination of the level of tolerance
that may be afforded on the part of the military. In its simplest form, it becomes a type of
effects based warfare: if the effect of the terrorist group is negligible in terms of the
campaign design, then that group will be afforded a greater degree of tolerance by the
JFC than a group which is operating and targeting to more detrimental effect. An
example of this is the degree of tolerance afforded by the US Government to
transnational terrorism prior to 11 September 2001. By crossing the threshold of tolerance, such groups cannot now be allowed to threaten the United States. This threshold of tolerance can be applied at any level, but a calculation of the level must be made and a line drawn, and promulgated as part of the campaign.

Finally, the approach adopted by Warren reaches to the quantitative characteristics of specific groups. By seeking answers to questions of existence, history, capability, intents, and targets about specific groups, he appears to seek to map a picture that is codified in terms of a numerical feature, and hence can be subjected to measurement. This possibility lends itself to some form of predictive analysis, although Warren falls short of drawing this conclusion. However, by establishing such criteria within the bounds of his major headings, including: time, event, target, method, lethality of attack, it is possible to plot a modus operandi, both in terms of geography and scale, that comes as close to a doctrinal template as is practicable.

In a critical attempt to analyze these models, some congruence is observed that brings resonance to the relative merits of singular factors. What is at stake at the operational level, as perhaps with no other, is the requirement to codify the assessment amongst the jumble of war-fighting phraseology, characteristics, attributes, and indices. It is therefore, a combination of the factors presented in the contemporary models, combined with the structure previously outlined, which will likely afford the most complete view of the terrorist adversary. In extrapolating the key issues from each, a framework emerges that deals with aspects from the high operational (near strategic) through to the high end of the tactical level. The relative merits, discussed in operational terms present the following factors that range form history to targeting.
History

Starting with the history of a group provides empirical data from which patterns and trends can be discerned. Both the RAND and Warren models advocate review of a group’s history in terms of the significance of the group’s name, when it was founded, what were its origins, and does it have relationships with other groups? Alternatively, Warren views this aspect much more in terms of the history of a group’s actions. Both approaches have merit for the operational level analyst, because reviewing a group’s history leads to identification of base motivation, interaction with other organizations, including state sponsors, and development of an historical event matrix, which supports identification of trends.

Organization

As previously noted, the generic structure of any terrorist group is discernible and is relative to campaign design in terms of which elements of the structure can be affected by military means. Analysis of the organization reveals key issues such as the group’s physical structure, number of members, membership trends, sources of recruits and method of recruiting. The recruiting aspect is a recurring overlap between the models. Al-Qaeda is more than just an organization; it is a process, and its principal resource is its human capital. Al-Qaeda’s future ability to grow and continue operations depends very strongly on its ability to gather new recruits (Jenkins 2002, 4). Both the NSCT and the RAND models make much of the importance of how a group is organized, analysis of which is essential for visualization within the battlespace.
Leadership

Understanding the leadership of any group affords insight into a number of issues. In some cases, removal of the leader can cause the collapse of the group, but in others it may serve to strengthen resolve. Understanding the relative importance of the leadership to the group is key to targeting, since the fundamental question is whether directly targeting the leadership will or will not create the desired effect. In the case of al-Qaeda this remains to be seen, but examples, such as Peru’s Shining Path and Turkey’s Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) illustrate the importance of considering this factor. Wild-eyed recruits may be plentiful, brains are not (Jenkins 2002, 11-12).

Membership

Analysis of the membership of a terrorist group constitutes a demographic survey, which should reveal to the analyst a number of key attributes that may have significance in campaign design. By identifying such issues as nationality, mean age, social status and education, religion and ethnicity within a terrorist group, yet another graphic template can be developed which links to the relationship between the group and the sympathetic element of the general population. Such analysis will not only assist in the identification of high value targets and surveillance priorities, but also assist in shaping the information operation.

Motivation

Terrorist motivation is multi-faceted and is identified across the models presented. Most crucially, motivation appears to have a direct linkage to reach, either in terms of the degree of reach that a particular group aspires to in terms of the proximity of potential targets within a specific area of influence. Cursory examination of the Defense
Intelligence Agency terrorist database and RAND’s Chronology of International Terrorism appears to bear this out. Terrorism has become more transnational as motivation has changed. Outgrowth in particular groups has changed in direct relation to a change in their view of their enemies. Since the 1970s, world capitalism, Zionism, and even multinational corporations have become enemies in the place of a localized political regime.

Resources

The importance of resources cannot be underestimated either financially or logistically. Motivation and method are nothing without the means to carry out an action. All three models make much of this aspect, and all conclude that direct action must be taken to limit access to resources. By correctly identifying sources, planners can map life cycles for each and present intervention-oriented COA to the commander based on the prediction of relative importance. Hence, it is possible to design an operational concept that influences external contributors, deters criminal activity, and attacks holdings. Financial contributors to terrorist fronts may also be deterred by threats of negative publicity, blocked investments, asset seizures, exposure to lawsuits, or merely increased scrutiny of their financial activities (Jenkins 2002, 26).

Operations and Methods

Understanding of a terrorist group’s targeting methodology can reveal significant advantage in designing the campaign against them. While it is accepted that the range of potential terrorist targets is virtually unlimited, study of particular trends or preferences will identify those areas where operational risk for the terrorist can be increased, thus averting attack, but more importantly allocating finite resources economically and
effectively. Al-Qaeda’s strategy playbook shows certain preferences: commercial aviation, diplomatic facilities, and American (or allied) servicemen recur as targets. Naval vessels in port (or in narrow straits), government buildings, monuments, and symbolic landmarks also figure prominently (Jenkins 2002, 10). Additionally, analysis of method gives indication of the type of attack that a group is likely to perpetrate, its complexity, and the degree of planning and scale.

**External Relations**

The notion of external relations goes beyond state sponsorship alone. Jenkins purports that issues of “above ground support,” such as an affiliated political party can provide support or explain the actions of the terrorist group. At the next level, relationships with other groups again make the connection to the possibility of an active network operating within the region. In parallel, the connection to criminal activity to provide funding in the manner of the FARC or the IRA should be considered. At the highest level comes state sponsorship, previously discussed, which in terms of analysis should be considered in relation to the provision of arms, training, asylum, or technical support. Of more concern is establishing whether any particular state is guiding the actions of the terrorist group. The fate of the Taliban serves as warning to state supporters of terrorism (Jenkins 2002, 26).

**Communications**

Suspiciously absent from any of the models is the issue of communications. Having established the importance of technology to middle and high order terrorists, communications must have signal importance for operational effectiveness and command and control. Establishing how a group communicates presents another “life-cycle” where
intervention can be planned. Conventional military operations speak to the importance of this issue. Conventional planning has as one of its purposes an emphasis on the primary effects that can be achieved in limiting the enemy’s ability to communicate, thereby slowing his decision-action cycle. On face value, the issue of communications in relation to a terrorist organization does not necessarily round on hardware alone. Issues such as the language of communication, political literature, frequency, coordination and claiming of credit for an action will probably be of significance to the operational analyst.

By applying these characteristics, derived from the NSCT, RAND, and Warren models, to the base model developed from analysis of terrorist group organization, we see that the terrorist adversary becomes more tangible. By applying the expanded characteristics to the Base Model, it is possible to apply value to the results by establishing what we know (history, underlying conditions, popular support, organization, structure and resources) to make a prediction of what a group may do in the future (capabilities, intentions, and targeting). These actions, in turn, allow for visual portrayal by means of a series of templates, which portray the relative strength of each element in terms of specific life cycles. Clearly, the missing element in this expanded model is the linkage between threat and response.

**Targeting**

Establishing what is to be done as a result of applying the adversary model developed thus far presents something of a conundrum. Clearly, our understanding of conventional military operations requires redefinition and some illustration of possible action. Holding to the possible actions presented by the RAND model (attack, deter, influence) offers a neat framework for categorizing potential targeting. Davis and Jenkins
articulate this framework in terms of “threatening what the terrorists and their supporters hold dear” and provide table 2 as illustration. While far from conclusive, it does serve to go some way to indicate some of the targeting actions that can be taken once the terrorist enemy has been brought into the realm of the tangible.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Participants in Terrorism and What They Hold Dear</th>
<th>What the United States Might Do</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Leaders: Power, Cause, Family, Tribe, Brotherhood</td>
<td>• Turn leaders against each other (by disinformation, deception)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Convince them that attacking the United States undermines their cause; raise operational risks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Cause state leaders to prevent rewards to families of terrorists and even punish them by withholding privileges; cause state leaders to harass terrorist leaders and punish them economically</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foot Soldiers: Cause, Excitement, Family, Tribe, Brotherhood</td>
<td>Raise operational risks; with continuing US successes, both micro and macro, demonstrate the folly of the cause’s path</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financiers, etc: Cause, Wealth, Power, Life, Family, Tribe, Brotherhood</td>
<td>• Discredit their cause within society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Cause loss of wealth, prison, death, and dishonor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logisticians</td>
<td>Cause prison, death, and dishonor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Supporters: Power, Own Political Goals</td>
<td>• Selected strikes and incursions (preemption); impose military, political, and economic sanctions; shun supporters of terrorism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Convince them that attacks on the United States undermine their cause; provide other ways to seek goals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Populations: Survival, Bitterness, Blame, Cause</td>
<td>• Provide hope (peace process, aid, liberalization, etc.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Broaden the range of ideas and views discussed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Remind them “who rides the bigger horse” (cite US successes against al-Qaeda, local suppression)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious Leaders: Power, Status</td>
<td>Trump (discredit them), warn them off, monitor them, shut off funds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal and Family Welfare</td>
<td>Cause prison, death, and dishonor, and prevent benefits to families</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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Conclusion

In the face of horrendous circumstances in the form of an outrageous attack on the US homeland, the United States has fundamentally reconsidered its position in relation to the threat of contemporary terrorism. Focusing on the ability of transnational terrorists to “reach” the continental United States, the NSCT sets forth policy designed to mitigate the ability of these groups to operate. By identifying, linking and subsequently constricting terrorists “networks”, the national strategy aims to drive the threat of global terrorism down to a level where it can be dealt with on a regional or localized basis.

Simultaneously, states that harbor, aid or abet terrorists can expect the full weight of the powers of the world’s remaining superpower to be brought to bear. All of the instruments of national power are invoked under the terms of this strategy, and the military has an elemental, but crucial, part to play in the so-called “war” on terror.

Even now, commanders operating at the operational level are confronted with terrorism of varied capability, motivation, and intent within their areas of responsibility. In constructing their campaign plans to deal with the complex issues of terrorism, JFCs must have a detailed understanding of the overarching national policy combined with the strategic objectives that it delineates. Equally, the JFCs and their staffs need to have a clear appreciation of both the global environment that breeds the disaffection which causes the disenfranchised to turn to violence, and the manifold threats that the concomitant acts of terrorism present and the forms it manifests itself in. Methods employed in conventional, high-intensity war fighting are unrepresentative of the particular form that terrorism assumes within a battlespace that has become three-dimensional.
Contemporary doctrine falls short of providing the necessary principles for guiding actions in support of national objectives. Specifically, the JIPB while procedurally logical lacks clear methodology for consideration of terrorism as the primary or major contributory adversary. Accordingly, this gap in the current doctrine requires a specific “Adversary Template” to allow analysts, planners and commanders to visualize the terrorist adversary, thus bringing him into the realm of the tangible where the military can intervene in certain aspects of his actions. Through analysis of contemporary models, it is possible to populate an Adversary Model that could form a basis to support campaign planning and decision-making.
CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Great Advantage is drawn from knowledge of your adversary, and when you know the measure of his intelligence and character you can use it to play on his weaknesses. (JP 2-0 1995, V-1)

Frederick the Great

Introduction

This thesis has aimed to improve the way we think about terrorism at the operational level. In an attempt to establish a better methodology for appreciating the terrorist adversary within the battlespace, it has addressed a series of questions for evaluation: how this threat has emerged and adapted; how current doctrine is designed for analysts and planners to orient on the threat; and how this method might be improved so that campaign plans and decisions can be taken accurately, swiftly and effectively. Response to these issues focused on the development of a specific Adversary Model to orient on terrorism at the operational level.

Conclusions: Terrorism and Policy

In consideration of first principles, the change in the global dynamic was identified as the driving force behind the ascendancy of terrorism as the primary threat to security. Analysis revealed that the effects of globalization; the weakening of the state as an entity; and the exposure of a number of ethnic, religious, and political fault lines in a post-Cold War era have combined to energize significantly disaffected constituencies, particularly in third-world regions. Within this milieu, the United States has emerged as the only remaining superpower. Correctly or not, it has simultaneously created the
perception of being increasingly isolationist, acting in its own interests, and benefiting most signally from the economic benefits of the new global dynamic. Thus, status and perception have placed the United States at the forefront of rancor with disaffected groups around the world.

Moreover, further analysis revealed that terrorism is viewed in different ways by different entities and presents itself in a number of different forms. Localized, politically motivated terrorism still manifests itself. However, by far the most significant threat comes from the so-called transnational terrorists groups. These non-state actors exploit the effects of the new global dynamic by basing themselves in weakened states that are susceptible to their strategy. From such bases, these groups create loose ‘networks’ and are able to perpetrate acts of violence on a global scale. More worryingly, the fanatical religiously inspired groups are prepared to commit acts of violence on a scale heretofore unheard of, as tragically demonstrated in September 2001.

Faced with this significant threat, United States policy centers on denying such groups the ability to operate globally, driving them down to a regional and subsequently localized basis where they can be destroyed in detail. Notwithstanding, analysis of the current dynamic revealed that the United States cannot realistically aspire to defeat terrorism in all of its forms, nor with finite resources can it tackle all terrorism wherever it manifests itself around the world. Accordingly, current US policy, articulated in the NSCT, correctly identifies a strategy of limitation; preventing transnational terrorists from striking the continental United States as a first priority, followed by working with friends and allies to drive the threat down to a manageable level. However, no consideration of a manageable level is made.
Conclusions: Doctrine “Form and Format”

From a military perspective, analysis of the COE reveals that an enduring reality of contemporary operations will be “asymmetric” approaches against an overwhelmingly powerful United States military. The deduction from this analysis is that terrorism, at all levels of capability, will present itself as a significant threat to military operations. Further, current joint doctrine for dealing with this threat, although logical in terms of process, lacks detail for orienting on the terrorist adversary. The doctrine has been developed to deal with high-intensity, conventional warfare and makes little consideration of terrorism as a principle threat. Deeper analysis exposed a predilection to consider terrorism as something of a side issue that may possibly interfere with, or interrupt mainstream military operations. Joint publications all consider terrorism from an operational protection point of view, and accordingly offer solutions in terms of anti-terrorism measures.

More specifically, the JIPB process is designed to support campaign planning and decision-making. As a tool, it is highly adaptable and has great utility for consideration of the full dimension of the battlespace. However, review revealed that the language used and methodology presented, were best suited for the development of campaign plans in a conventional scenario against a peer, or near peer enemy. However, the logic of the process is strong and adaptable enough to be used more specifically, and recognizes this by advocating the development of bespoke Adversary Models for use in Step 3: Evaluating the Enemy. Correspondingly, it was in this area that further analysis concentrated.
Conclusions: Adversary Model

Analysis of a number of contemporary models for analyzing terrorist groups revealed a number of key conclusions. Firstly, a considerable degree of similarity and overlap existed among the three models that were presented. These similarities form the basis, in terms of common ground, for the formulation of a single template that could be adapted for military use. Principally, the models overlapped in the areas of physical features of a group, that is, history, size, organization, methods, support, and resources. For the analyst, these characteristics confirm what is known, and hence provide a measure of scale and form.

Secondly, but to a lesser degree, the models indicated that prediction is possible but extremely difficult. To be predictive, the military model would need to include consideration of capabilities, intentions, and targeting. This information can be gleaned from analysis of the known facts combined with up to date intelligence. By analysis of the scale of a terrorist attack that could be mounted, combined with the stated aims of the group and the sorts of targets they intend to hit, some sort of rudimentary prediction can take place.

Thirdly, the structure and organization of a terrorist group lends itself to breakdown into a series of “life cycles,” each of which can be templated and each of which offers opportunities for military intervention. Such areas as acquisition, funding, and recruiting are all vital to successful operational capability. If interrupted through analysis in a predictive model, terrorist operational effectiveness could be severely affected.
Fourthly, the operations in war are probably too limited in scope to properly articulate the type of action the JFC may wish to take. Accordingly, adoption of the Attack, Deter, and Influence methodology, may prove more apposite for any Adversary Model. The principle of employment holds that some groups or elements of them can only be dealt with by direct action. Other groups can be effectively deterred through increasing of operational risk, while other elements, such as supportive elements of the population, supportive states, financiers, and arms dealers can be influenced.

Areas for Further Research

It is recognized that analysis of the contents of an adversary model for orienting on terrorism contained in this thesis is cursory. Each element is worthy of further, more detailed research to establish the linkage and relevance of each to the development of campaign plans. This thesis has revealed a number of common themes that lead to the conclusion that a type specific Adversary Model would probably be of utility within Step 3 of the JIPB. However, its format and bearing require greater transparency. Equally, the issue of specific targeting methods is worthy of further research. Just as doctrine serves to provide guiding principles for the employment of military forces within specific scenarios, so further research in this area could identify similar principles and method for the employment of no specialized military forces in terrorist operations.

Recommendations

It is recommended that an adaptive and predictive Adversary Model specifically designed for orienting on terrorism, as a principle adversary, be developed for inclusion in JP 2-01.3 as an appendix for use within Step 3: Evaluate the Adversary, of the JIPB Process. In so doing, the relative importance of terrorism as an aspect of contemporary
warfare would be recognized, and commanders, planners, and analysts would be provided with a useful tool for orienting on, and subsequently targeting such an enemy. The model should be sufficiently adaptive to be used at all scales of threat, be it localized, regional, or global.


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DJMO
USACGSC
1 Reynolds Ave.
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LtCol Rick J. Messer
DJMO
USACGSC
1 Reynolds Ave.
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LCol Colin G. Magee
DJMO
USACGSC
1 Reynolds Ave.
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-1352
1. Certification Date: 18 June 2004

2. Thesis Author: Lt Col Angus S. J. Fay

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