LEADER DEVELOPMENT PROCESS IN PAKISTAN ARMY
AT THE TACTICAL LEVEL

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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)
ABSTRACT

LEADER DEVELOPMENT IN PAKISTAN ARMY, by Major Amer Ahsan Nawaz, 73 pages.

This study focuses on the leader development process of Pakistan Army at the tactical level, i.e. up to a maximum of seven years of service. It analyzes the present leader development process of Pakistan Army to see its effectiveness to train leaders at the tactical level to perform effectively in future.

The study uses the writings of a few Pakistani authors and Stephen P. Cohen, other than personal experience as the primary references to describe the influences on the present leader development model. It also uses a number of writers from Pakistani and US military to establish the requirements of future.

The study identifies the focus for the leader development process of Pakistan Army for the leaders at the tactical level by comparing the attributes and skills cultivated by the society and military culture and the requirements of future. The established focus is then used as a measure of effectiveness to assess the present leader development model to ascertain its usefulness to train leaders for future.

It concludes by providing a list of attributes and skills promoted and cultivated by the society and military culture and those that are required to meet the future environments. After concluding that the present leader development process does not train leaders at tactical level to perform effectively in future, it provides specific recommendations in all three components of the leader development process. In the end the study also identifies a few areas for further research.
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

In an organization like ours, you have to think through what it is that you are becoming. Like a marathon runner, you have to get out in front, and pull the organization to you. You have to visualize the finish line – to see yourself there – and pull yourself along – not push – pull yourself to the future.

General Gordon R. Sullivan

For most men, the matter of learning is one of personal preference. But for Army (leaders), the obligation to learn, to grow in their profession, is clearly a public duty.

General of the Army Omar N. Bradley

Organizations nurture and develop when their resources correspond to the changing environments. However, to apply the resources at the right time and place to achieve the desired effects requires someone to rally men to a common purpose. This someone is called “leader”. The military leader operates in a slightly more sensitive field. The consequences of his decision may result in loss of human life. Leadership therefore is a subject of vital importance to the profession of arms. It is an integral part of military training, operation, and administration. The combat effectiveness of a fighting force depends, to a greater degree, on the quality of its leadership.

The history of warfare is filled with examples where personal leadership has averted disasters and attained victories. Experience has also shown that under intense battle conditions, even the most highly motivated, trained, and spirited troops demand an efficient leader to field optimum results. Thus a leader is not only expected to be professionally better than led, but also he has to be sufficiently skilled to perform in unexpected situations. Leadership therefore is more than the individual accomplishment
of any great person. This places a great premium on the value of formalized efforts to learn the art of leadership. Learning leadership has to be a right blend of its theory and concept, personal and other’s experiences. It is this blend that should be sought.

The Pakistan Army on its creation inherited its concept of leadership from the British Indian Army. For a number of reasons this leadership concept was not changed but only modified as needed. At that time the Army was the only organization able to respond to the natural and national disasters facing the country following the independence. Although the Army had sufficient experience and expertise in these areas from the British colonial times but being a national Army the leadership, now was faced with a unique challenge of operating against its own people. Moreover, predicaments like political instability, economic crunch, and wide-spread corruption have haunted society since its inception. These negative trends have not only affected the quality of Army leadership but have also retarded the growth of leaders. Constantly changing politico-social environments, better educated and more aware soldiers, high speed technology, and complex nature of future warfare test the efficacy of Army and challenge its leadership across the plane especially at the execution level.

Tactical leaders therefore have to be trained methodically to respond effectively to these challenges while maintaining proficiency to respond on the conventional battlefield. In this backdrop, does the Pakistan Army’s current leader development model prepare its leaders to effectively perform at the tactical level? To analyse this question, the circumstances that shaped the current leader development model must be studied, what environmental changes have occurred in Pakistan, which affect the Army’s leader
development model must be understood? What functions future tactical leaders will be expected to perform?

Leadership is an art, which is highly progressive in nature. As remarked by Major General Moin Ud Din Haider,

The most modern equipment in the world is useless without motivated individuals, willingly drilled and cohesive unit organized by sound leadership at all levels. Expert planning, Army pamphlets, rules and regulations and field manuals will not of themselves rescue the disaffected soldier from a pathetic performance of his duty. The officers and the soldiers will not survive in the challenges of either the modern world or of the battlefield outside a climate of active and sound leadership. (1990, 133)

Therefore it is imperative to examine the leadership training models in light of new technology and environment.

At the time of partition the Pakistan Army was short of officers. Stephen P. Cohen noted that the Army assets were shared at the ratio of 64:36, which produced a shortfall in two crucial areas: technical and senior leadership. The technical and senior leadership was made up by retaining the British officers, “some of whom stayed on until the early 1950s (the first two commanders-in-chief were British)” (Cohen 1984, 7). The Pakistan Army at the time of independence therefore retained its British military culture. The inherited military culture was allowed to thrive because of another reason. The resistance to change offered to the societal norms of the newly born nation by the comparatively old history of the armed forces. The units and regiments had been working together for a long time, including taking active part in combat on various fronts before and during World War II; therefore, they had developed a culture of their own. This culture, though not corresponding to the requirements of newly established society, served the Army; therefore, the leadership of the time did not feel the need to adapt. Since most of the
manpower came from villages and was illiterate, military culture thrived upon qualities like selfless loyalty and blind obedience. Though loyalty and obedience still remain the essence of leadership, the circumstances under which these have to be extracted from the soldiers have changed over the years. This requires the Army to train its leaders differently from what it did in 1947 to cherish the same level of loyalty and devotion from its led. As reflected by Stephen P. Cohen, “Although it may be true that the Pakistani officer overnight became in 1947 a free officer of a national Army, he has yet to explicate the meaning of such a phrase in a way that fully meets his own professional standards, let alone opinion of many of his own countrymen” (Cohen 1984, 8). This thesis will therefore look into the various time frames Pakistan Army has passed through and how have these times affected the leadership development.

Another factor is that the Army is not an institution functioning in a vacuum. It is an organization which is very much part of the society from which it draws its manpower. The Pakistan Army retained its basic structure of regimentation adopted from the British as it suited its requirements and environment. As Stephen P. Cohen notes,

Many of the recruits are from remote districts and their lives have been geared to a peasant society. These young recruits are also brought together with other Pakistanis from other regions and ethnic groups – Punjabis with Balochis, different Pathan tribes, Sindhis, and even members of various Islamic sects. The regimental training centers – which form the core of the system – continue the tribe like or even family – like ambience that they had in the old Indian Army. The system which greatly increases stability and continuity, binds officers and jawans (men) together in a way rarely encountered in the West. (1984, 38)

Therefore, these recruits coming from different areas belonging to diverse ethnic groups bring with them the diverse nature of society.

The nations develop as their societies adapt to the changing environments, which affects all spheres and military is no exception to it. However, it is important to note here
that while some of these changes may be positive, quite a few are negative and detrimental to the overall development of military culture. Furthermore with the world shrunk to a global village, increased coverage of communication media and extensive civil military interaction has made troops more aware of the surrounding than ever before. With this the art of leadership has become more challenging and demanding. Due to higher educational standards and increasing social and political awareness, the Army of the future will demand more of its leadership since the soldiers do not only expect an order but may also question the rationale behind it.

The Pakistan Army in the last few years has been continuously employed on tasks of diverse nature. To mention a few are: humanitarian, internal security, operations in aid of civil power, peacekeeping operations around the world, in addition to meeting its requirements to secure the nation’s active borders with conventional deployments on variety of terrains. Since the Army is not organized to have a specialized unit and formation to conduct the above-mentioned tasks, it has to rely on the same formations and units to deliver. This means the formations and units perform these tasks either simultaneously or one after the other with little or no transitional time between tasks. The military thus needs to clearly understand its role in the big picture. It has to accept and understand its responsibilities in the tasks of nation building, which are generally common to the third world countries. Since operations other than war involve all kinds of governmental and nongovernmental organizations it is imperative for tactical commanders to translate their role in the big picture. Lack of this understanding can result in some very embarrassing and drastic consequences since the actions of one soldier at tactical level may affect the operations at the strategic level. Apart from just
understanding their role / linkage between the various tiers i.e. strategic, operational and tactical, the more important factor is whether the leaders at tactical level are prepared and trained to accept the challenge of operating in these dimensions or not? Do we require institutionalized training for leaders at tactical level to bring them to grips with this change or let them learn through experience as and when they are put through such situations?

Assumptions
The key assumptions in thesis are:

1. The overall structure of Pakistan Army will remain same in the next few years.
2. The nature of employment of Pakistan Army is not expected to change in foreseeable future.

Limitations and Delimitations
These are as follows:

1. The thesis will only discuss leadership at the tactical level as defined in the key terms below.
2. The thesis will not discuss the issues whether it is correct to employ military on tasks other than the conventional tasks.

Key Terms

Tactical Leaders. Lieutenants and captains with maximum of seven years of service.

Humanitarian Operations. The operations, such as flood relief, earthquake relief, and others conducted within Pakistan by the Army.
Internal Security Operations. Operations conducted in response to terrorist attacks, sectarian violence, insurgency etc in order to restore peace and stability in a region with in Pakistan.

Operations in Aid of Civil Power. All actions taken to assist the civil administration to accomplish its task. A few examples to explain the terminology are organizing elections, carrying out census, de-silting of canals, and training the police force.

To summarize, it is pertinent to say that leadership is the cornerstone of any military organization. Though no level of leadership is unimportant, however, it is the leaders at the tactical level who face the challenge of the final execution of orders on ground. As pointed out by Brigadier Mirza Abdul Rasheed Beg,

They are the ones who are closest to their men. They naturally form the most vital and crucial link in the chain of command. They lead their men personally under any crisis. They are with them. If they are good, humane, honest and professional, the soldiers will march with them in the valley of death with no questions asked. If they are bad, the results of any encounter may turn out to be disastrous. These are the men who form the backbone of any Army – the men at the spot. (1990, 101)

Although the Pakistan Army inherited its concept of leadership from the British colonial Army, it was the best-suited model of the time for its environment. But has the same model progressed in proportion to the changing psychosocial environments and is the present model adequate to train these “men on the spot” to perform effectively in the future environments? This thesis therefore intends to analyze the changes in the environments and how these affect the grooming of the leaders for future. After analyzing the changes it will also look at the leadership attributes and skills required to meet the challenges of the changed future environment. Thereafter, it will analyze the present
leader development model to establish if it is cultivating and promoting these attributes and skills or not. In the end it will recommend some of the features that can be adapted to suit environments particular to Pakistan to better prepare the leaders to effectively perform in future at the tactical level.
CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW

To ascertain the efficacy of the present leader development model in terms of its effectiveness to produce officers who can perform effectively in the future it is imperative to analyze the history of this model. After Pakistan’s independence in 1947 the Army’s officer corps consisted of three categories: the British officers, Muslim officers commissioned through Sandhurst, and Muslim officers commissioned through the Indian Military Academy in Dera Dhun. In 1948 the Pakistan Military Academy began training and subsequently commissioned its first class of officers. The one characteristic common to all early officers was that they were all trained by British officers.

The two major problems faced by the British in organizing the Pakistan Army were, first how to join people from different religion, diverse cultural values and dissimilar languages into one Army and second how to lead such an Army with leaders not sharing beliefs, cultural values, customs, traditions and language. They accomplished this by studying subcontinent society to ensure the Army reflected the its society and culture.

General Tanwir Hussain Naqvi identified “challenges faced by the British to establish the basis of leadership, motivation, cohesion or discipline within the Army.” In his opinion it “was based on two instruments through which the concept of relative integrity and loyalty was practically executed.” Firstly, primacy of the unit (the battalion
or the regiment) and the second was what he defines as the God image of the Leaders.

While explaining “primacy of the unit – battalion or the regiment” he writes,

To serve as a substitute for both God and the nation, the British evolved the concept of primacy of the unit. This concept preached that unit held primacy over everything else; the unit’s interest was supreme. At the altar of the unit’s interest, the soldier was to sacrifice everything, his life, his ideals, and his principles. And the unit’s interest was defined as the accomplishment of the mission or the well being of the unit as a whole . . . what constituted the well being of the unit and what tarnished the name of the unit was all decided by the Commanding Officer (CO) and his officers on the basis of the British interest and not necessarily in relation to any moral principles of right or wrong. (1990, 15)

The second instrument the British used to extract loyalty from the soldiers and officers in the command was what the General Naqvi calls, “God image of the Leaders.” He writes,

Except for the last twenty years of British rule, the British Indian Army was led entirely by the British officers, who were projected in the image of God. Even their weaknesses were projected as attributes; for example drinking was identified with high social class [drinking is regarded as a social evil and is strictly forbidden in Islam] and womanizing as a mark of the flamboyant and aggressive male. The God image demanded remoteness of the officer from the men so that the officer’s human failings were not exposed to his men. Raising units on whole ‘baradaris’ (clans) and giving the junior commissioned officer (JCO) rank to the family elders allowed the officers to stay sufficiently aloof from the rank and file, yet maintain adequate control through the JCOs. (1990, 16)

The instruments selected by the British to establish their rule reflected the prevalent culture among the soldiers’ communities. According to General Naqvi, the concept of baradari (clan) and feudal lord was exactly the same; therefore, the soldiers did not find it difficult to grasp the concepts of primacy of the unit and God image of the Leaders. As he explains, “In the baradari system the interest of baradari very often transcends all other interests. Truth, righteousness and honesty are often sacrificed at the altar of the interest of the baradari. The British merged the unit system with the baradari system by manning each unit with soldiers from a single religious-cum-ethnic entity – a single baradari interest” (Naqvi 1990, 16) As in the baradari system where the elders
were seen as protectors of their fellow baradari members, the British also practiced it by holding and displaying through their actions. A simple letter written by a company or a battalion commander to the local civil administration authority (which was again British) would release a soldier from any charge no matter how grave it may be. These gestures strengthened the unit bonds, displayed Army as an organization above law and gained the unquestionable loyalty of soldiers towards leaders. He explains God image of the leaders, when he writes,

The God image of the leaders too like the concept of the primacy of the unit, was in perfect harmony with the socio-cultural environment from which the men came. The feudal lord also projected a similar image of himself. His word was last and he rewarded loyalty to him and not to the moral code. And anyone in his fiefdom who acted against his interests was punished. So when a peasant was enrolled, he only found his feudal lord replaced by the British officer and found it quite easy to accept the officer’s God image. (Naqvi 1990, 16)

Stephen P. Cohen shares the same views of General Naqvi when he writes,

The old Indian Army motivated its soldiers through a complex blend of class pride, religious symbolism, unit tradition, the ideals of loyalty and duty, and liberal pay and service conditions as well as post-service-pension and land-grant programs. The British deliberately sought to bind the upper peasantry to the Raj by this judicious mixture of economic incentive and appeal to traditional values. For able Indians, a few limited opportunities for advancement and promotion existed, and the entire Army was divided into a series of family-like regiments that emulated traditional village and caste loyalties. (1984, 36)

Since village and caste loyalties (baradari system) were supreme it implies that the soldiers were bonded by their own culture to sacrifice any and every thing to the greater interest of the unit. Stephen P. Cohen, however, looks at the rank of junior commissioned officer as more of a bridge between the officers and men as compared to General Naqvi’s opinion of British using this rank to maintain the God image of Leaders. He writes,
The distinguishing feature of the Pakistan Army is the existence of the Junior Commissioned Officer (JCO). This type of officer was developed first by the French and then by the British, as each sought to consolidate and expand their respective positions in South India. The JCO was and is a selected member in a particular class of soldiers; he is more than a warrant officer but less than a regular commissioned officer, and his function are much cultural as military. The British found that such an officer could bridge the gap between themselves and the other ranks; the JCO was something of an older brother or village elder, who disciplined and counseled the young peasant sepoy (soldier) and served as a cultural transmission belt. (Cohen 1990, 35)

The fact that this rank was required by the British to bridge the gap also implies that it afforded sufficient opportunity to the British officers to define the level of contact with their under command.

Since the Pakistan Army was built around the sliced half of the British Army, it retained the outlook of these leaders. The influences thus inherited by the leaders of Pakistan Army at its birth were: first, that officer is a different class than the other ranks. Second, they have to maintain that difference through middle men called JCOs; third, the unit’s interest is supreme; and finally, to obtain unquestionable loyalty from the soldiers under their command the leaders have to display their fidelity by doing every thing possible to protect their men. A more important question though is whether the circumstances which shaped these influences still exist or not, which will be analyzed in chapter four.

Since partition the Pakistan Army has undergone a number of cultural changes, which affected its leader development. These changes occurred because of the change in society, which in turn affected the military culture.

Brigadier Sultan Habib in his article on junior leadership in infantry observed the effects of culture on military leaders at different historical periods. After first period was the influence of the British Army. The second period was the US military assistance
between 1954 and 1965. During this time many Pakistan officers and leaders went to the US for training. According to Habib, “They brought back with them knowledge about military art and science, tactical doctrine and concepts of leadership” (1990, 214). However, as these officers rose in rank they found a vacuum in the system because there was no compatible predecessor who was trained in military art and science. In the author’s opinion this transformed the training process, however the negative impact was that Army became centralized which compromised the training of junior leaders. The third period is between the wars, that is, 1965 to 1973. During this period the Army expanded rapidly and compromised on its standard and quality of leadership. The fourth period is what the author characterizes as the period of Petro-Dollar and Careerism (1973-1980) (Habib 1990, 214). Brigadier Habib concluded that in his opinion the Army accepted substandard manpower. Moreover, its involvement on the internal security duties in Balochistan and on the martial law duties had a deep imprint on the leaders. Brigadier Habib describes the fifth period as the decade of professional excellence at higher levels. He says that during this period the Army’s leadership at the higher level matured, but at the same time it also developed an attitude of overcentralization, personal career advancement, and a centralized training schedule. These kinds of activities took away initiative from the battalion commanders, which affected the training of junior leaders. Brigadier Habib has tried to objectively examine the various effects on the Army in these different time periods. Thus, the overall conclusion from Brigadier Habib’s studies is that over a period of time evils, like materialism, careerism and the cautious attitude or zero error syndrome, crept into the military.
Numerous other authors have described the same effects of societal change. Brigadier Mazhar Ul Haq Chaudry, for instance in his article “Junior Leader of the Future” defines the social environments as, “Social structure of Pakistan has undergone a great revolution since the days of post independence. One must accept the fact that since independence our values of life have deteriorated” (1990, 65). He further deliberates on the effects of materialism by saying, “This resulted in lot of desperation in the men in uniform and led to the lack of interest towards profession” (1990, 66).

The reason for developing careerism as a trait in the Army has been elaborated upon by Brigadier Muhammad Abdul Qayyum in his article “Junior Leader – A Linchpin in Battle.” He calls it policy of “up or out” which resulted in developing this attitude. While further explaining the same policy he writes,

Not only so prestige, position and income depend on excelling within the system, but so does long-term security which comes with the retirement at the higher rank. From historical as well as experimental point of view, it is established that; an ‘up or out’ policy results too often in the development of the ‘upward looking posture’ that requires that professionalism be subordinated to career imperatives. Thus the military ethic is reduced to an empty shell in so far as it is capable of generating the kind of overt behavior associated with long term unit/formation cohesion. (1990, 58)

Stephen P. Cohen also described the effects of post-independence events on the Pakistan Army, in general, and its leadership, in particular. In his opinion though, the present Pakistan Army is a composition of three different generations: namely, British, American and Pakistan. Although he writes in detail about all these generations, his criterion was the social influence each generation had on the Army’s development. First, the degree of representation each generation had from various classes of the society; second, whether or not the generation was subjected to foreign influence and if yes then what kind of influence was it; and last, the degree of contact with India. Officers of the
British generation were primarily the ones who were trained and commissioned officers before partition of subcontinent. British officers either at Sandhurst or after 1932 in India at Dera Dhun trained them. The British took great care in selecting these young men for training as officers, as he writes, “The British were extremely selective in whom they sent to Sandhurst and tried to choose from the most loyal, the most prestigious, and the most westernized Indian families” (1984, 57). The selection criteria itself advocates that these men were not representatives of wider society. Even from among these men the British preferred the sons of those Indian Muslims, Hindus, or Sikhs who had been serving under them as viceroy commissioned officers (a rank designated for locals of sub-continent later on replaced by Junior Commissioned Officers in both Pakistan and Indian Army).

On commissioning, these officers served in the Indian Army along with their British counterparts. However being fewer in number than the British officers made it inevitable that these men would draw on the influences from the British officers and not retain the specific values and traditions of their original society. The indoctrination was so deep that even after independence these officers continued to maintain the same bearing as the British. While referring to the changes brought by the officers of the newly independent nation, the author notes, “most of the new Pakistan officers continued to see their British predecessors as a worthy professional model” (1984, 61).

The third factor impacting the grooming of the officers of this generation was their direct and personal contact with India. Cohen states, “In the Indian Army they [the officers of British Generation] had willingly commanded troops of all castes and religions as well as Sikh and Muslim troops” (1984, 60). However, in Cohen’s eyes it was the “experience of partition-the killing, the bloodletting, the random cruelty exceeded only
by the organized variety-confirmed the worse suspicions of these officers” (1984, 59), which was that they could not trust Hindus. This mistrust also existed among the general populace of Muslims and Hindus; but it was partition that brought these officers who “regarded themselves as above crude religious communalism” (Cohen 1984, 61) close to reality. Yet, there were other officers who could see that they had no future in India and therefore opted for Pakistan. Cohen quotes an officer who gives his reasons for choosing to Pakistan, “I am a pure Rajput (one of the castes in India, which was considered fit by the British for enrollment in Army); my family has been Muslim for only two or three generations. But I felt that India had to be divided, and told Messervey (the first commander of Pakistan Army) that I would rather live in a small country as a free man than as a sweeper (janitor) in a large country.” (Cohen 1984, 59) These early influences of the officers of the newly born Pakistan officer left a “permanent impression on the present Army in that they were responsible for establishing and commanding major training and educational facilities; they also served as a model for the younger officers.” (Cohen 1984, 57)

The second generation characterized by Cohen is the American generation. Pakistan due to geo-political reasons at this time allied itself with the USA, resulting in the major exchange of military officers. This generation of officers received training from American officers either in United States or in Pakistan schools. He notes, “they were exposed to full weight of the American military”, hence “along with the American equipment and training came American military doctrines, American approaches to problem solving, and a mixed blessing – American pop culture.” (Cohen 1984, 63) Though, most of the Army got ‘Americanized’ Cohen also notes that this breed of
officers was still not representative of the Pakistan society. The system of selecting officers virtually remained the same and the Pakistan Army was only able to draw the required manpower from the same regions. As he points out, “there is no indication that they differed greatly from their predecessors in social – class origin, region, or commitment to professional duty.” (Cohen 1990, 64) The major difference between this generation and its predecessor was the degree of contact with India and its military. This generation had no direct contact with the Indians but what they had developed was “an exaggerated view of the weakness of both India and Indian military.” (Cohen 1984, 63) At the same time this generation also developed, “overblown estimate of their own and Pakistan’s martial qualities, and some came to believe implicitly the myth that one Pakistan soldier was equal to five, ten or more Indians.” (Cohen 1990, 63)

The last generation Cohen characterizes as the ‘Pakistan generation’. This generation in Cohen’s opinion is representative of wider Pakistan society because the officers and men come from almost all parts of Pakistan with its different castes and social standings. It is a generation, which has no outside influences; however it was during this time period that Afghans were fighting the Russians in Afghanistan. Pakistan during this time saw the biggest influx of refugees ever, which brought with it a number of social problems for the Pakistan society. Though Cohen is right in pointing out that there was no direct contact with foreign military as was the case in British and American generations, however Pakistan’s involvement in Afghanistan kept America attached to Pakistan and thus kept the Army involved with them to a certain extent. Lastly Cohen relates this generation as the first pure Pakistan generation, which had absolutely “no direct contact with India.” (Cohen 1984, 70)
The significance of elaborating the historical perspective of the leader development is that it has a direct relationship with the present leader development process. One of the important factors that we must also consider at this juncture is the effect of religion on the development of leaders. Pakistan was created on the basis of two-nation theory; separate states for Muslims and Hindus. Thus the basis of its creation is ideology, which is based on religion. How far though has the religion influenced the Army can be assessed through the writings of various authors. Cohen views Islam and Pakistan Officer Corps in three different relationships. First, the military view Pakistan as an Islamic state, second the application of Islamic principles within military, and last the reconciliation of Islamic and contemporary strategic doctrine. Describing the relation between Army and Islamic Pakistan, Cohen writes, “In the years prior to the creation of Pakistan, little if any attention was given to the problem of the Islamic character of the future Pakistan Army.” (1984, 88) Immediately after Pakistan independence there were no drastic measures taken to adjust the outlook of Pakistan Army to a more Islamic one. As Cohen points out, “other than relatively trivial steps, such as gradually replacing British-inspired symbols and slogans with Islamic ones, there was no outward change in the rather un-Islamic appearance of the officer corps and various installations in the Pakistan Army” (1984, 89). Furthermore describing the reasons for this he says, “This laissez-faire attitude suited most officers of the British generation and many who came to professional maturity during the American connection” (1984, 89). However as time progressed the officers started searching and drawing relationship between the military and Islam. This effort is still continuing. Cohen sums up the process very well: “If the Pakistan movement and the first twenty five years of history of Pakistan can be
characterized as a struggle to turn Indian Muslims into Pakistanis, the years since 1972 have seen as extension of the process: a struggle to turn Pakistanis into good Muslims.” (1984, 89) Most writers generally support this view. General Tanwir Hussain Naqvi, for instance, has also alluded to the fact that: “The first impact of independence that came to Pakistan’s share of the British Indian Army was almost purely its Muslim component which was now to serve the Muslim nation. Thus the entire outlook of the now Muslim Pakistan Army needed to undergo a fundamental change. Such a change could take place only through a formal study of the new environment, the identification of the new leadership needs and the formulation of the new leadership doctrine. This did not happen.” (1990, 17)

The second relationship emphasized by Stephen P. Cohen is between Islam and the military organization. He relates the effects of Islam on the officers through the various generations, which more or less take the same path; as we progress in time there is more and more realization and acceptance of Islamic values and traditions. However the author concludes that, “The officers corps cannot be characterized as ‘orthodox’ or literalist in their view of the Quran, but individual officers can; others, however (probably the great majority), are devout Muslims and would, on a pragmatic basis, like to adapt their professional lives to Islam, and they do so where it is professionally convenient” (1984, 93). This view reflects the continuous debate on the Pakistan’ Army’s adoption of Islamic values. However one thing can be safely concluded through experience that Islamic practices are much more common and regular in the present Army as compared to what they were after independence.
Last Cohen relates Islam and the strategic doctrine, which helps shape the leader development process. In Cohen’s opinion nations like Pakistan can and will not abandon the doctrine of deterrence and warfare taught at Camberley and Fort Leavenworth, as their own theories and doctrine are not significantly developed. However, there is a movement to develop a synthesis of Islamic and western theories of warfare. The second aspect alluded to by Cohen it that though Islam remains a great source of motivation for the Army certainly total war is not seen in the Pakistan Army as the only obligation of a soldier.

Thus we can conclude that though Pakistan Army failed to formalize a formal doctrine based around Islam, the religious practices has over time permeated the military. At the same time it is also true that Pakistan military has not thrown away the modern western concepts of warfare but is also trying to draw a relation in between them and Islamic theories. Islam remains a major source of motivation and its practice is becoming more and more common. Another factor contributing to the growth of the leader development process is the nature of the employment of Pakistan Army. Since independence the Army has fought three wars with India at the same time it has been continuously engaged on the line of control (undecided border – a line held by Pakistani and Indian Armies in the disputed region of Kashmir) in Kashmir. The Army has been very regular in organizing its training activities every year with training cycles and field exercises. Since the last war in 1971 the Army has occupied its battlefield positions a couple of times due to the increased tensions between Pakistan and India. However, these deployments were called off without any escalation of conflict. Apart from these engagements, field deployments, and training activities the Army has been employed
regularly on non-combat assignments. These duties fall in the realm of internal security
duties, humanitarian relief operations and nation building tasks.

The cumulative effect of the society and the nature of employment of the Pakistan
Army have shaped its leader development model. I will assess the leader development
model on the basis of its doctrine and the process of developing leaders. General Tanwir
Hussain Naqvi gives a fairly comprehensive view of the development of leadership
doctrine. He writes,

The first formal step taken to lay down leadership doctrine took place after
six years of independence with the publication of Pakistan Army pamphlet on
leadership. This seventy page document called military training pamphlet number
13, Leadership 1951, was published in 1953 and made no bones about the fact
that it was suitably modified reproduction for Pakistan, of the US Army pamphlet,
‘Leadership for commanders of Divisions and Higher units’ and US War
Department pamphlet FM 22-1…this pamphlet continued to be the Pakistan
Army’s gospel on leadership for another twelve years. In July 1975 a new Army
pamphlet on leadership, General Staff publication – 1556 called ‘Military
Leadership 1975’ was published and superseded the 1951 pamphlet…the
pamphlet too like the previous one can serve as the fundamental document on
leadership for any Army of the world regardless of nationality or creed. And this
pamphlet continues to date as our fundamental leadership manual. In 1978, an
Army pamphlet in Urdu [Pakistan Language] was ‘General Staff Publication
10260, Akhlakiat 1978’ was published. Although, this pamphlet’s title is
Akhlakiat and not leadership, yet it deals with the philosophy of leadership (1990,
17)

The obvious conclusion from General Naqvi’s description of the development of
the leadership doctrine is that the Army as an organization has never made any deliberate
efforts to formulate a comprehensive leadership doctrine. The natural effect of this failure
is the implementation of leadership doctrine at every tier as it seemed appropriate to each
implementing personality.

Brigadier Sher Afgan in his article describes the various tiers of the leadership
development process. The first tier is the selection of officer material, which is done
through the Inter Services Selection Board. Brigadier Afgan notes that the “general observation about the potential officer material is that it has a poor intellectual base because of the degeneration in our system of school and college education” (1990, 35). After the candidates are selected they proceed for two years training at Pakistan Military Academy (PMA), which is the second tier. Brigadier Afgan notes, “leadership aspects are covered in limited theoretical instructions and through an opportunity to command a sub unit of the same category of cadets during exercises” (1990, 35). On the job training is the third tier in the grooming of officers. “The acquisition of leadership skills here is through command of troops, observation of leadership style of senior officers, staff assignments and promotion examinations. This process lasts for four to six years” (Afgan 1990, 35). During their first unit assignment the officers attend various professional courses at schools of instruction, which is the next level in grooming the officers. Brigadier Afgan notes here, “an officer is exposed to some instruction of leadership but more emphasis is laid on the enhancement of his professional knowledge” (1990, 36). After these initial four to six years of service the officer is assigned to Extra Regimental Employment (ERE). During this period the officer gains wider experience of the military profession before he returns to his unit to command a company. This process of rotation to ERE followed by command appointment continues until the time the officer reaches the point where he is considered for promotion to the rank of Lieutenant Colonel and thus becomes eligible to command a battalion. This and subsequent promotions are done through selections boards. Before consideration for promotion a selected number of majors attend a staff course and the rest attend a Unit Commander Course, which is mandatory for non-staff course qualified officers to be considered for next rank.
At this juncture it is important to explain how the leader development model of Pakistan Army prepares officers at tactical level. An officer in Pakistan Army from the day he joins the service undergoes various training courses and experiences, which are to prepare him to perform effectively for future. An officer generally spends sixteen to seventeen years from his day of commissioning till he becomes eligible for promotion to the rank of LTC. An average infantry officer starts his training with two-years at the Pakistan Military Academy (PMA). On completion he is commissioned in the Army and assigned to his unit. After a couple of months of service in the unit he attends infantry school for his basic course, which lasts six months. On completion of the infantry basic course he returns to his unit and serves in battalion first as platoon commander, then as an intelligence officer to the battalion commander, and finally as a staff officer (Adjutant or Quarter Master) to the battalion commander. During this period he is also required to take his first of the two promotion exams, that is, lieutenant to captain. After putting in four to five years of service he returns to the infantry school for the mid career course. The training focuses on the junior staff course and tactics. This is a six-month course. After the course, a selected number of officers go to formations, that is, brigades, divisions and corps to serve as assistant staff officers. A few are selected as instructors and sent to various schools of instruction and the rest return to either their parent units or to Frontier Constabulary (a force comprised of troops from the local areas with the officers cadre posted from the Army on a two to three years tenure). Duties include anti smuggling and internal security specifically in the western provinces of Pakistan. The selection for these assignments is based on their personnel records. Those, for example, who have the highest rating in the mid career course are picked for staff assignments, the next level
serve as instructors, and the remaining return to their units or are assigned to Frontier Constabulary duty. This period is classified as the Extra Regimental Employment period. After serving for two to three years, officers return to their parent units as company commanders. By now the officer has an approximately eight to nine year of service. He is now eligible for Staff Course exam provided he has already cleared his second promotion exam, that is, captain to major. The entrance exam for the Command and Staff Course is a competitive. Every officer gets four chances to be selected. Subject to selection the officer attends the Command and Staff Course for one-year. Here the major distinction appears in the career tracks. Those selected to attend staff course are assigned to grade two staff appointments in formations Headquarters. After serving on staff appointment for one to two years the officers will return their parent units or are posted to another staff or instructional assignment before they become eligible for promotion to the next rank. On the other hand the officers who are not selected to attend Staff College are picked up either for the intelligence or logistic staff course. After the completion of this course they are posted on grade two staff appointments. The second category of officers must also attend a Unit Commander Course (UCC) before being considered for promotion to the next rank. Those officers selected for the Staff Course have a marked advantage over the ones not selected.

The whole process of leader development to this point consists of three components. First is learning of professional skills, second is learning through practical experience and third is the component of self-development. The first component, learning of professional skills, encompasses all the mandatory courses and the promotion examinations. The second component is spread over the skills attained through out the
officer’s service and is primarily dictated by the nature of employment which can be fairly diverse keeping with the Pakistan Army’s employment pattern, the relationship and encounter with peers and influence of senior officers. The third component of self-development is the prime responsibility of the officer himself. The individual motivation and the prevalent atmosphere around him essentially affect this component. I will analyze these components in chapter four by examining the contribution each component provides in shaping the officer as a whole and its efficacy in preparing the officer for future assignments.

This discussion has been focused on the historical perspective; the societal changes that occurred over time and the present leader development model as it is currently practiced. It is now important that we examine the views of various writers who have identified a number of shortcomings in leaders at the tactical levels.

While discussing the existing leadership problems, Brigadier Mazhar ul Haq Chaudry in his article “Junior Leader of the Future” identifies career consciousness, lack of initiative, materialistic approach to life, and lack of sufficient motivation as the key ones. To better understand his perspective, it is important to elaborate on each one of them separately. While writing about career consciousness he says, “Courses which should be in all sincerity taken to the advantage of the service, are in actual fact taken for furthering personal advancement in the career. Hypocrisy has been allowed to creep into the ranks and file with a view to advancing personal goals rather than enhancing the standard of efficiency” (1990, 67). Though the author describes lack of initiative as a separate flaw, however it seems to be the outcome of the first problem. As he notes, “seniors do not want to take risk and, therefore, leave no chance of making mistakes by
the juniors. Small / minor tasks assigned to the junior leader must be monitored and supervised by the highest level, thus badly curbing the development of junior leaders to deal with the situation independently” (1990, 67). The third problem area identified by Brigadier Chaudry is the ‘Materialistic approach.’ He notes, “right from the word ‘GO’ they look for brighter prospects not only while in service but even after the service . . . monetary benefits are taking higher priorities” (1990, 67). While writing on the final problem ‘lack of motivation’ he says, “This aspect in a soldier is at its lowest mark. It is this reason why priorities in life of a soldier have changed. Our social environments are mainly to be blamed” (1990, 68). While not agreeing in totality with the author’s explanation/interpretation of the problem areas it is understood and accepted that all these are linked with the prevalent flaws in society discussed earlier. However, these problems will be further discussed and analyzed in the light of their roots in the society to see its affect on the overall leader development model of Pakistan Army at the tactical level.

Brigadier Abdul Ghafoor Ehsan in his article “A diagnostic Approach towards Leadership” takes a more detailed look at the problem areas. The first among the problems identified by him is the lack of initiative. He further goes on to elaborate the reasons for this lack of initiative. Most prominent are socio-economic background, inappropriate grooming of officers, fear of consequences, lack of leadership training, performance oriented training and lack of motivation. The second problem area he identifies is the lack of general and professional knowledge for which he blames the young officers when he says they do make regular studies a habit. Lack of incentive is the third problem area, which he blames on the system for not providing enough inspiration to the leaders to put in their best efforts. Grading consciousness is another problem area
identified by Brigadier Ehsan, which actually conveys the same meaning as of career consciousness. He says, “A commanding officer would like to have a trouble free tenure of command for which he personally supervises the execution of all events” (1990, 123). Finally, he regards the “uneven distribution of workload” (Ehsan 1990, 123) in units as a contributing factor to hinder equal development of all officers in an establishment.

After looking at the problem areas identified by the above-mentioned authors one can safely conclude that these problems are not a product of limited time. The same problems have developed over a period of time because of a lot of contributing reasons; flaws in leader development process can be one of them. However, what seems to be left wanting is clear cut delineation between the problems which are generated by the overall atmosphere prevalent in the society and whether any are a product of our leader development process. This delineation is a must to objectively establish whether there is a flaw in our present leader development model or not. However, the authors have not done so. But they have definitely looked into the future to establish the future demands on the tactical leaders of the Pakistan Army and have suggested certain ways and means of getting there.

Brigadier Mazhar ul Haq Chaudry in his article “Junior Leader of the Future” has outlined the future structure. He says that the future leaders will be part of close combat force and will have to be in possession of compatible degree of intelligence, speed and initiative. He describes the future conditions as:

1. Battles are predicted to be longer with few and slower replacements.
2. The stand off distance provided to modern aircrafts will radiate the devastating effect of the battle to greater dimensions, enlarging not only the size of battlefield but also the quantum of degree to all involved in the conflict.

3. Disengagement from the battle will be almost impossible.

4. Third dimension of the battlefield, which is fast developing, will be highly effective causing damage beyond imagination.

5. Modern technology is going to be very expensive making replacement and repair very difficult.

6. For safety and lesser destruction, units / sub units will be away from the senior commanders and will have to work in isolation, yet in harmony with others, better than ever before.

7. Poor communications resulting from intensive interference will leave our junior leaders with lesser information on what is happening, during the periods of intense activities.

8. Battle will be full of mental and physical fatigue in view of predicted use of uncomfortable masks, suits and other equipment etc required in the field.

9. Fighting will expose the personnel for longer duration and demand extra vigilance from them.

10. More casualties will be suffered not only from conventional munitions but also from chemical attacks, which are likely to cause highly adverse effects on the mental state of troops apart from being a constant drain on manpower resources.

11. Keeping in view swift and frequent movement of troops and poor communication their exact location at a particular time will not be known. (1990, 69)
The above-mentioned picture by Birgadier Chaudry, paints the image of future battlefields to a tactical leader. However, the author has not done justice while characterizing this image as the future structure. The reasons for this will be discussed through the eyes of Brigadier Fazlur Rehman Adhami. He writes that three major effects will dominate the future battlefield. First, the lethality of current and projected weapon systems will bring in more destruction with more precise hit probability. Second, the mobility will be increased manifold resulting in requirements for faster reaction to the actions of an opposing force, for better anticipation of opposing force actions, and for better reading of the flow of the battle as it progresses. Last, there will be an increase in battlefield fluidity resulting into greater confusion. This ‘uncertainty’ factor will exacerbate the already high level of stress the tactical leaders will experience.

As noted earlier this explanation does not do justice while it describes the future. While analyzing and expressing the requirements of the future leaders it is imperative to understand the nature of the future employment of Pakistan Army. This employment of Army is not restricted to the battlefield only. The last war experience that the Army had was the war of 1971. Since then Army has been employed on a number of tasks other than war. To mention a few, conduct of general elections, numerous internal security duties in various parts of the country, humanitarian operations such as flood relief and natural disasters, peacekeeping operations around the world, nation building tasks such as de-silting of canals and monitoring of various other Government agencies. The list is long, however the point is that the Army has been, is and will be called to perform such like tasks as and when the need arises. Therefore, we can conclude that while composing a future structure where the tactical leaders will be asked to perform a comprehensive
picture is mandatory which must encompass activities besides those related to the battlefield. Chapter 4 will discuss the effects of such employments in more depth, establishing its specifics in relation to environments particular to Pakistan and the requirements of tactical leadership in such environments.

To summarize this chapter, the views of various writers on the historical influences on the leaders of the Pakistan Army, the effect of the changing society, and its effects on the military culture in general in the eyes of various writers were discussed. Also described was the existing leader development model and its shortfalls as identified by these writers and opinions of a few writers of the future for the Pakistan Army.
CHAPTER 3
METHODOLOGY

The leader development model of any Army is designed to prepare its leaders for their future employments; however, organizations have always been concerned whether their existing model will survive the next phase or not. The pace of changing environments in which the military is asked to perform is increasing with every passing day. These changing environments are a result of the rapid development in the field of technology and spread of information as the world moves towards a global village. The planners of the leader development model are thus confronted by another dilemma, which is to ensure today’s leader development process prepares officers for future environments which are rapidly changing. To avoid listening to the often-used statement we are preparing our leaders to fight the previous war we must face the toughest challenge of correctly identifying future requirements. As the world is progresses towards a global village and the distances are becoming more and more meaningless the threat is progressively becoming universal. As a result the security implications of every country are also turning into universal implications laying emphasis on operating as coalition forces. Though implications like threat, the military’s role and reflection of its society will still force each country to frame its military organization meeting its own requirements. Each country must also keep the global implications in in view.

The leader development model of the military is and will be an indispensable part of the organization. There are number of methods to determine whether the leader development model will meet future requirements. We can compare our leader
development model with that of another country. We can compare our current model of the past with the present, or we can compare it with the future requirements relevant to our own situation. The last method is the most suitable to meet the requirements of Pakistan as a country while still not overlooking the global needs.

To answer the research question, it is necessary to assess the future to establish the leadership requirements for tactical leaders to perform effectively and compare those with the current leadership attributes developed through the present leader development model. The next chapter will therefore begin by evaluating the future environment. The future environment will be sliced into two different segments. First, the nature of threat the Army is going to face on the battlefield, and second the character of the tasks assigned to the Army other than operational in nature. Each of these will be evaluated separately to establish its requirements.

A thorough evaluation of future environments will lead us into the desired attributes, knowledge and skills required to successfully meet those requirements. Each of the identified segments will be discussed separately to determine the attributes, skills and knowledge required for each. These outcomes will then be compared to the Army culture in particular and the prevalent culture in society in general. This will allow the identification of possible weaknesses and strengths of officers before entering the Army, thus establishing focus for leader development model.

The next step in the process will be to assess the present leader development model. The total time period being considered here is eighteen to nineteen years of leader development process, including the two years of training at PMA and sixteen to seventeen years of commissioned service. To understand it in greater detail it is desirable
to examine it in smaller portions. This can be accomplished by adopting two techniques. One, by analyzing each component of leader development model, that is, professional knowledge, operational experience and self development. This will include seeing the function of each one of them in the entire process. Second, by evaluating the service of tactical leaders in different segments and studying the effect of individual components of the leader development model in each segment. The second methodology is better suited for this paper, since it will divide the time period into smaller fractions making it easier for further scrutiny. The outcome of this portion will be to ascertain the ratio of emphasis on each component in the present leader development model for various rank structures.

The last portion of chapter four will compare the present leader development model with the attributes, skills and knowledge requirements of each segment in the future environment. The end state will be the establishment of the shortcomings in each element of leader development process in relation to the future environment.

The analysis will provide a platform to launch into chapter five. Chapter five consists of conclusions and recommendations. The conclusions will be outcome of the analysis where possible shortcomings were identified in the leader development model in relation to the future environment. The recommendations however will be the natural outcome of the conclusions. These will focus on the possible modifications that may be necessary in the present leader development model. It will also identify the need for further research areas based on the findings of this paper.
“Just as the diamond requires three properties for its formation – carbon, heat, and pressure – successful leaders require the interaction of three properties – character, knowledge, and application. Like carbon to the diamond, character is the basic quality of the leader... But as carbon alone does not create a diamond; neither can character alone create a leader. The diamond requires heat. Man needs knowledge; study, and preparation... The third property, pressure – acting in conjunction with carbon and heat – forms the diamond. Similarly, one’s character, attended by knowledge, blooms through application to produce a leader.”

General Edward C. Meyer
Former Army Chief of Staff, US Army

The development of a leader is a continuous process from cradle to grave. Prevalent values of society and Army culture influence the development of the leader during this time. These influences on the leader development may or may not correspond to the employment of the Army in future. The leader development process is the link between society and culture and the Army’s employment requirements. It is therefore crucial to continually analyze the changing environment of society and nature of employment of the Army to ascertain the focus for the leader development process. This process itself rests on pillars of institutional training, field experience and self-development. To maintain a stable top it is imperative that these pillars should be of equal strength while ensuring that all the pillars are used simultaneously. This will ensure achieving the desired results. The demands on the leader development process will change whenever there is a change in society or employment. Due to the fact that leader development process is part of the society, the changes in the society will slowly but
surely find their way into the process. On the other hand a deliberate effort has to be made to identify and incorporate the changes required due to the changing future environment. Therefore it is logical to look into the demands of future employment to ascertain the requirements of leadership.

This chapter will therefore begin with analyzing the future environment. The analysis of the future environment will establish the values, attributes and skills required to perform under them. These values, attributes and skills will then be separated between the ones that are cultivated and promoted by the society and military culture and the ones that are not. In the end the values, attributes and skills that are not cultivated and promoted through the society and military culture will be used as a measure for evaluating the present leader development process.

The study and analysis of the future should be a continuous process since the changing environment may or may not require change in the focus of the leader development process. Although most of the Pakistani authors have defined the future environment for Pakistan Army based on their perception, each has more or less concentrated on the future battlefield. Although there is no dispute over their description of the battlefield their descriptions fail to comprehensively describe the future environments. There is a need to take a more holistic view of the environment, which includes the Army’s likely employments and tasks. The planners of leader development process in Pakistan’s Army have a great challenge facing them. They have to frame a leader development process for the Army, which prepares its young officers to perform with the same effectiveness on both the conventional and non-conventional battlefield. On the conventional side Pakistan has a continuous threat from India. The intensity of
threat rises with the realization that both countries are declared nuclear states. On the non-conventional side, the Pakistan Army has always been called upon to perform diverse tasks such as internal security duties, nation building tasks and humanitarian missions. Since both types of environment place specific demands on the leader development process it is better to look at the future in broader perspectives to meet challenges from both. The future environment will force the units and subunits to operate independently, with incomplete information, having to deal with multifarious aspects simultaneously, while accomplishing various natures of tasks. The future therefore will present dispersed, complex, ambiguous, sensitive and diverse environments for leaders at the tactical level to manage.

Dispersion here means that the units and subunits will be separated from each other in physical and psychological dimensions. In the physical dimensions, dispersion will create a sense of isolation caused by increasing distances between units and between peers within a unit. It will influence two areas. One, it will have a direct affect on motivation of soldiers and the other that it will put leaders in a position to decide matters previously reserved for the senior commanders.

Lieutenant Colonel Steven J. Eden, in his article “Remembering the Human Factor in War” notes, “Armies today are larger than ever, yet so are the battlefields. The lethality of modern weapons forces the units to disperse, causing soldiers to become more isolated than ever before” (1999, 36). This means that the soldiers in trenches and fighting vehicles will have decreasing contact with other units and with their peers from the same unit causing isolation. Task organization will have similar effects. The soldiers due to their trades/specialties will be task organized with other units and subunits, thus
taking them away from their parent units to which they owe their primary loyalty. The Pakistan Army, which is structured around regimentation, will feel added effects since one of the drawbacks of the concept of regimentation is that it is adverse to let go of its own people or at the same time accept people from outside. In operations other than war the sense of isolation further increases as the soldiers are usually employed in much smaller groups task organized generally to the individual level.

This sense of isolation affects motivation. On one hand by reducing the ability of the soldier to draw strength from his peers while on the other hand it challenging commanders to motivate his men through their physical presence, which may become very difficult because of the increased distances. In the past an act of bravery committed by a soldier on the battlefield was visible and recognized by a large percentage of people, which increased morale. The dispersion of the battlefield will make these acts of bravery at the lowest level go unobserved by a larger percentage of troops. This means loosing an aspect of building morale to a certain degree.

Isolation increases the responsibility of junior leaders by distancing him from his senior leaders. It forces the junior leaders to take decisions previously reserved for the commanders with more experience. Influencing the battle and motivating the undercommands would thus be the biggest hurdle presented by dispersion for leaders especially those at the tactical level who would be dealing with the live situations.

The psychological dimension of battlefield dispersion affects both the leader and the led. For soldiers the influence of commanders is extremely essential to overcome their fears, whereas for leaders it is extremely important to continually feel the pulse of their soldiers. The presence of the leaders with their soldiers gives them the confidence to
perform effectively. As S.L.A. Marshall points out; “On the field of fire, it is the touch of human nature which gives men courage and enables them to make proper use of their weapons. By the same token, it is the loss of their touch which freezes men and impairs all action” (1978, 41). In earlier days the commanders from squad to Army were physically present on the battlefield so their actions were visible to each and every soldier. With the ongoing development of warfare it has become difficult for leaders at every tier to show their presence to soldiers and thus exert influence through their physical actions. Operations other than war further increase this gap between the soldiers and their commanders due to the nature of employment.

This gap will also distance the commanders to get the feel of their soldiers’ pulse that is crucial for commanders at all levels engaged in combat. This feel of pulse allows commanders to plan and execute maneuvers by exploiting the potentials of their soldiers. Dispersion makes it difficult for the commanders to get the first hand feel of that pulse. Ignorance to this fact may result in a faulty decision or indecision.

Some argue that the advancement in communications will nullify the effects of dispersion, thereby concluding that the physical presence of a leader can be replaced by communications. However, this may not be true for every situation and every Army. There are so many other factors that contribute towards effective leadership other than efficient communications. Communications can probably give a commander a lot of information but it can neither give the feeling of his presence to his men nor convey the feelings of his men to him. There is probably no alternative other than the leader’s physical presence with his troops. Lieutenant Colonel Steven J. Eden argues the
importance of the presence of leader with his men over getting reports through air by saying,

From a practical standpoint, the digitized battlefield will severely overload the electromagnetic spectrum, leaving only a very narrow bandwidth for voice communications. Another digital reality is that leaders can neither personalize the messages nor discuss their subordinates’ psychological problems in any depth over the air – the enemy’s electromagnetic warfare efforts will make it impossible. Finally, digital link cannot give the effective leader what he needs most – a sensing of his soldiers’ moods. No computerized icon has been developed as yet to signal the leader that his troops are ‘freezing up’, cowering or simply needing assurance. For that, the leader must be with his soldiers. (1999, 37)

To summarize, battlefield dispersion will isolate troops more and more, making commanders and fellow soldiers less and less visible, creating difficulties for commanders to influence troops and impact morale, forcing commanders to make decisions divorced from the mind-set of soldiers, and soldiers being unable to draw strength from the heroic acts of colleagues. To successfully overcome these areas the Army requires energetic leaders who should be equipped with qualities of initiative, confidence, ability to think analytically, and ability to influence subordinates through innovative means.

The future battlefield/operating environment will be complex in many ways. It will not be an environment where the fate of nations is decided by two armies meeting on the battlefield with one emerging as victor at the end of the day. Various changing facets of the operating environment will increase complexity with every passing day. Major contributing factors to the complex environment are technological advancements, involvement of multiple players on the battlefield, dimensions of the operating environment and the role of media.
Amongst the most obvious is the continuous development of technology. The pace at which the technology is developing contrasts with the time required to master the same. Though the advancement in technology does present a challenge to the armies of developed countries, it seriously threatens the armies of the developing countries who have no control over its growth. Non-possession of the latest technology is one thing; however ignorance to the fact of the development is another factor, which makes the situation even more dangerous, since the enemy may acquire it and surprise you by using it. Therefore the leaders in the Army of developing countries are challenged with the fact that not only must they stay in touch with the latest developments around the world and translate them into their own environments to see and understand its effects, but also explain the same to their men who have never seen it.

The changing nature of military employment has brought with it other players involved either directly or indirectly with the happenings of events on ground. The composition of these players may change for each situation but these organizations (governmental and non-governmental) have their own specific agenda, which may or may not match the one assigned to the military. Examples of such organizations are various global humanitarian aid groups, UN sponsored organizations, regional, social and political organizations and many more. The involvement of these players is not new, however what is different is the degree of involvement of these organizations with the military and the interdependency of all players in bringing the conflict to an acceptable conclusion. In the present operating environment where the Pakistan Army is not only looked upon as a tool to win the nation’s wars but also as an organization to contribute positively towards nation building and reconstruction it must also work very closely with
these organizations. The task of the tactical leader becomes more complex since he does not only have to plan, coordinate and execute his military mission but also to incorporate these organizations – who certainly have different modus operandi – in his plan to make it a success. The Pakistan Army has to confront this operating environment when it is employed on internal security and nation building tasks. This requires leaders at the tactical level who are able to think clearly across these complex demands. They should have the ability to innovate, be confident, have initiative to operate and most of all should have the capability of ‘system thinking’. In his book The Fifth Discipline, Peter Senge describes system thinking as crucial to the success of the organization. He describes it as an understanding that an organization is made up of many parts and that these parts are interrelated. An action in one part of the system has implications for other parts of the system. He further says, “Doing the obvious thing does not produce the obvious, desired result”(1990, 71).

The third factor increasing complexity is the dimension of the battlefield. One of the biggest dilemmas of the future environment is that operating space will not be linear in style. Both the conventional and non-conventional operating environments will be non-linear and non-contiguous in dimension. This implies that the level of threat will be the same in every part of the battlefield and can be executed from any or all of the directions. Thus the opponents will be capable of reaching vulnerable areas of an opponent much more easily as compared to the linear battlefield. This will change the way the tactical leader views the battlefield. He will not only have to look in front to find the enemy but also in the rear and sideways to protect his outfit. This particular phenomenon is seen while operating in internal security environment where the opponent
does not identify himself by uniform or any apparent distinction. In such a complex situation one does not even know that the person living next door may be the one you are looking for.

Finally the role of media adds on to the complexity of the future operating environment. The technological advancement of media has brought the battlefield inside the living room of every family thus linking everyone to the battlefield. This has effects on both ends of the wire. On one end it makes or breaks peoples’ will to continue the fight whereas, on the other hand it also has significant effects on the soldier on the battlefield. First, the tactical leader is now subject to divergent views on the rationale and manner of employment of the military in the situation that he is a part of. This may have a positive or negative bearing on his resolve. Second, the live coverage of his actions take away the natural shield provided by the military hierarchy and makes him susceptible to criticism. Finally the media is also responsible for reducing the gap between the time the decision is made and its translation on ground, thereby making the environment much more fluid in nature. The tactical leaders therefore, will not only have to stay abreast with the latest happenings but also should be able to think in advance to be prepared before time. They will have to be self motivated and should have the ability to motivate their subordinates at the same time. The tactical leaders should be bold in execution and be able to articulate the interrelationships.

Armies are generally trained to fight in a clear and defined environment. However, as armies become more and more involved in peacekeeping operations, humanitarian missions, and internal security tasks the well-defined environment becomes more ambiguous. For instance, it is likely under such circumstances for a unit to receive a
mission stating proceed and establish peace in location (A). This does leave a lot to be
desired to qualify for a mission statement that a military mind is accustomed to. As
Lieutenant Colonel Wray R. Johnson quotes Major General William Nash, 1st Armored
Division commander operating in Bosnia noted that he had trained for 30 years to read
the ‘battlefield’, the implementation force (IFOR) mission in Bosnia now required him to
read a ‘peace field’. Therefore it can be safely concluded that under these environments
the missions assigned to the units are vaguely defined, have unclear timelines with no
clear demarcation between phases, no distinguishable enemy, and no physical objectives
to capture to acclaim and display victory.

These vaguely defined missions with unclear time lines and phases present a great
challenge for leaders. For a leader at the tactical level this means that he has to
understand his role in the overall game be able to system think, and then to define a
mission for his own outfit, which fits in the overall scheme of operations. He has to be
capable of comprehending the broad timeline and appreciate his actions and their effects
on others.

A leader at tactical level should be able to distinguish friend from foe when in an
unclear and dynamic environment. In peace and humanitarian operations at times there
may be no enemy but the different organizations operating together may just have
conflicting interests at a certain point in time. It will be a great challenge for the leaders at
tactical level to de-conflict these contradictory demands.

Though success of the military has always been related to capturing geographic
objectives, however the definition of objectives is quite different in terms of peace,
humanitarian and internal security operations. Successfully enforcing peace by
establishing security perimeter, delivering food and supplies to the needy, or keeping two warring factions from fighting are not the objectives that can be defined geographically. The need for a clear geographical objective is pronounced at the tactical level, where it becomes extremely difficult for the leader to motivate his men to give their best. In other words no one can deny the fact that there is difference between motivation of soldiers charging on the battlefield under fire and those standing outside polling booth watching people vote. As a whole in the last ten years, the Pakistan Army has performed more tasks with unclear geographical objectives as compared to conventional war-fighting tasks. A few examples include, conducting general elections, performing public census, carrying out de-silting of canals, monitoring government agencies, running some semi-governmental organizations, flood relief operations.

These ambiguous environments are an outcome of the tasks that the Army is assigned. Since the nature of tasks is not likely to change in near future, we should not expect any reduction, but must plan for an increased degree of ambiguity.

As the media is reducing the distances in terms of time and affects the world that the military will be operating is becoming more and more sensitive. Sensitivity here means that military actions will come under more and more scrutiny. Its freedom to operate freely under broad parameters is reduced. Thus with every passing day the military will be walking a tight rope between its own motivations, aspirations and the expectations of both the local populace, and the global requirements. No matter how just the cause may be and how important is the employment of military in a given scenario, it can and will be politicized. Whether it is sending forces as part of the UN contingent or employing them in its own country for a nation-building task it will attract criticism. One
of the examples related to the Pakistan Army is its employment on election duties. Though the basic reason for its employment is the unstable security situation and inability of police to handle it effectively, but still the loosing side can politicize it. This is, however at the strategic level. At the tactical level it will also have significant effects.

First it will require the leaders at tactical level to remain focused on the job themselves as well as controlling their men under these sensitive environments. Secondly it will also require them to operate with surgical accuracy so that they do not disturb the delicate balance between the three divergent factors listed above. Furthermore the leaders at the tactical level will have to realize that their actions and those committed by their soldiers can have global implications. These are the outcomes of the globalization, which is best described by Thomas Friedman who says,

I define globalization as the integration of markets, finance, technology, and telecommunications in a way that is enabling each one of us to reach around the world farther, faster, deeper, and cheaper than ever before. And at the same time is enabling the world to reach into each one of us farther, faster, deeper, and cheaper than ever before. (2000, 70)

The leader at the tactical level will not only have to realize the fact, of his actions having global implications but will also have to be competent enough to ensure his actions are in concert with the government’s policy.

Finally another practical aspect adding sensitivity to the whole operating picture is the interpretation of rules of engagement. The rules of engagement (ROE) are drafted deliberately and after thorough debates by highly experienced individuals; however they still cannot be specific enough to address variety of situations. At one hand though it provides a certain degree of liberty to the tactical commander operating on ground, but on the other hand it also puts heavy burden of correct interpretation of rules in a given
situation. The situation becomes even more challenging for the tactical leader in operations other than war. Under such circumstances the command is further distributed to smaller levels, i.e. squad/section level. Hence it will probably be the squad/section commander interpreting the ROE based on the guidance provided to him by the tactical leader; however the tactical leader will still have to accept responsibility of the decisions made by his squad/section commander. For example the actions of soldiers at one particular polling station – who are employed independently or in small groups – can seriously affect the overall reputation of the Army no matter how justified his action was.

Keeping in view the present trend it is safe to conclude that the leaders at tactical level will have to deal with more and more sensitive situations with every passing day. They would thus require the skills of general awareness and understanding of rules, regulations and cultures. They should have intelligence and initiative to operate, innovate where desired while keeping the ultimate goal in mind.

The final characteristic of the future is diversity. What it means here is that military will be dealing with different nature of threat and task every time. The nature of the threat and task may at times change within a given situation. The recent employment of US forces in Iraq is the closest example of diversity. The US originally had prepared to fight the Iraqi regular Army; however after they fought their way through the conventional threat, the threat changed altogether and the US forces found themselves involved in guerilla warfare. The forces had to shift gears while ensuring peace and security of the local populace and at the same time contribute towards the process of rebuilding Iraq, which reflects the diversity of tasks.
Asymmetry of various types adds further complexity to the whole diverse situation. Steven Metz describes different types of asymmetries in his article on the ‘Strategic Asymmetry’. According to him asymmetry can be in terms of using different operational concepts and tactical doctrine, it can be in technology, or in terms of will, organizations, and finally in patience or time perspectives. The bottom line is that the leaders do not only have to deal with the diversity of tasks and threat but within each one of them they may also encounter unevenness of some type. The drawback of the diverse nature of tasks and threat is that it makes difficult for leaders, especially at the tactical level, to stay focused. The Pakistan Army has been employed with regular intervals on tasks in aid of civil power. These tasks range across a wide spectrum. At times the interval between deployments on one task to the other has not been very much. Occasionally there have been dual tasks assigned to the force, such as combining internal security with the nation building tasks. This diversity of tasks frustrates the junior leaders who find it difficult to focus on every assignment with the same zeal and enthusiasm. This frustration also affects their performance in the conventional training, which understandably cannot be organized regularly due to the other non-operational commitments of the Army. Keeping in view the primary assumption that the employment of the Pakistan Army is not going to change in next ten years or so, it can be concluded that the frustration amongst the tactical leaders is going to grow further if appropriate steps are not taken to check this trend.

After describing the future environments it is possible to ascertain the various values, attributes and skills needed to overcome these challenges. A number of Pakistani authors have discussed the required values of a leader. Generally each one of them agrees
on the values of faith, integrity, honor, honesty and truthfulness, devotion and sacrifice, patience and perseverance, dependability and loyalty, and courage. Being values these are not listed in any order since each one of them has equal importance. Although each one of them is self explanatory, however for better clarification I will describe faith. Faith is commonly related to religion only, which is not entirely correct. Brigadier Mirza Abdul Rasheed Beg defines it as “a trust or a feeling that a force, a person or a thing will not fail in duty, service and loyalty” (1990, 102). He further adds, “On the intangible side, one’s trust in God, system, country or the conviction in the righteousness of the cause, singly or in a combinational form would constitute faith” (1990, 102). One can safely conclude that faith is therefore the driving force, which makes men fight. It can be religion; system or whatever cause, but is a value that is required for the profession of arms.

The US Army outlines its values in FM 22-100. Accordingly these are loyalty, duty, respect, selfless service, honor, integrity, and personal courage. In my opinion the closest value to ‘faith’ outlined by the US doctrine is ‘duty’. The manual defines ‘duty’ as fulfillment of obligations. These obligations can never be fulfilled until and unless it is supported by strong belief. Therefore though the definition does not state the belief but it definitely implies believe in cause. The similarities in the values listed by the Pakistani authors and those in the US doctrine dictate that all these values are general in nature and are the essence of profession of arms irrespective of country of origin and day and age of the Army being discussed. Therefore it can be safely assumed that the required values of the leaders are a constant and will remain so. However, what is variable is the extent of these values found in different societies at any given point in time. These values form the basis of acceptance in the military and are professed during the Army service through
various means and actions. They are made part of the symbols, slogans, culture traditions and laws. Since the promotion of these values is not only limited to the leader development process and falls into a bigger spectrum, they will not be discussed being out of the realm of this paper.

Though the values demanded of a soldier remain the same in militaries all over the world, it is the attributes and skills of a leader required by each military that differ from time to time and with dissimilar environment. These attributes and skills also change with the level of leadership being considered. This thesis has focused on the tactical leaders up to the rank of captain in the Pakistan Army and their development process starting from induction into the Pakistan Military Academy (PMA) until they complete seven years of service. The future environments of dispersion, complexity, ambiguity, sensitivity, and diversity requires a leader at tactical level to have initiative, innovation, discipline, motivation, confidence, physical strength, and boldness as the general attributes for success. Comparing these attributes with the prevalent conditions of the society in general and military in particular will help us differentiate between the attributes that are cultivated and promoted by the society and the military culture and the ones that are not. This will make it easier to develop focus for the leader development process.

As discussed earlier in chapter two, the Pakistan Army retained the structure of old British Army, which was organized around tribes and clans baradari. This concept known as ‘regimentation’ means that each soldier and officer is assigned a particular unit on induction into the Army which he serves till he is promoted to the rank of lieutenant colonel. During his service he may be employed on certain staff and instructional
appointments away from his parent unit but then he always returns to the same battalion on completion of tenure. The association of the officers and men with their units does not end at the rank of lieutenant colonel. This affiliation remains for the rest of life as they are always regarded as mentors for the unit, their sons joining the Army – with the exception of a few – opt for the same units, and they are a permanent part of unit reunions and gatherings. This implies that though, a unit or subunit is no more organized around clans and tribes as in the British times, but still functions on the basic structure of *baradari*. The fact that the system was not changed in the last fifty-five years, rather was encouraged to flourish proves that it provides certain strengths: first that members of a unit can be motivated easily; second it is easier to enforce discipline keeping in view the pressures and bindings of system; third to build confidence by generating the feeling in the righteousness of cause; and finally to help overcoming fear and perform acts of bravery. Noticeably from amongst the traits listed above, the regimentation system derives attributes of discipline, confidence, boldness, and motivation. The officers and men of the Pakistan Army either directly come from the villages or have strong links with them. The villages in Pakistan still function as a very closely-knit community. This close knit society helps build the same attributes that are promoted through the regimentation. Moreover, since the luxuries of life are not very common the men selected for the Army have the requisite physical strength. The required physical standards are also enforced through the system. The system of regimentation however, does not provide freedom for initiative. That is because in the joint family system we always look to the elders of the family to take major decisions. After making decisions these are communicated to the younger members of the family who are in fact told how to go and do it. This practice
works against promoting initiative as pointed out by General George S. Patton, Jr in his book war as I knew it, “Never tell people how to do things. Tell them what to do and they will surprise you with their ingenuity” (1947,34). The reasons for lack of initiative also have roots in society as pointed out by various authors and noted in chapter two. Finally the regimentation system does provide capability to adapt but does not encourage innovation. This may be a result of group think, because with every change in command one does see some changes and innovations, however as the time progresses the innovations become less and less visible. Brigadier Fazlur Rahman Adhami wrote, “Current Army culture tends to produce leaders at junior levels who are more reactive than proactive (adaptors rather than innovators)” (1990, 229). Furthermore the trends of the society, like materialistic approach, careerism, as indicated in chapter two, also contribute in forcing leaders to follow a beaten path. The traditional nature of the society also restricts innovation where most of the activities are performed every time in the same pattern on the grounds of tradition.

To sum up the discussion on the traits drawn out of the Pakistan society and regimentation system of the Army, it can be concluded that it cultivates and promotes attributes of confidence, discipline, motivation, physical strength, and boldness. What it does not nurture though to a great extent is the initiative and innovation needed in a tactical leader. Although the attributes are very important, it is the homogenous blend of traits and skills that prepare leaders to perform effectively in the future environment.

Leadership skills needed in the future operating environments fall into two categories. First are those skills, which a leader can apply to all kinds of situations therefore, which we can call ‘all purpose skills’. Thinking and reasoning analytically,
general awareness, and the ability to influence people are the all purpose skills. The other
category consists of the ‘specific skills’, required for a specific time and employment.
The examples of such skills are tactical skills; skills to work in or with a certain non-
military organization, such as the Pakistan Army officers and men tasked to work in
WAPDA (water and power development authority); skills to operate under internal
security environment; skills to conduct humanitarian mission; etc. Society and culture
have a greater influence on the first category of skills as compared to the second. The
degree of intellectually active environment experienced by the individual while growing
would influence his awareness and ability to critically analyze a certain situation.
However, it is a given that at the time of induction the Army will acquire individuals with
different degrees of intellectual ability. Though the selection system of the Army does
guarantee that individuals with certain levels of skills are selected, it is up to the Army
culture and its leader development process to ensure further development of these skills.
From amongst the flaws indicated by the authors in chapter two of this thesis, career
consciousness and materialistic approach of the society are the ones that have hindered
the development of these skills within the Army culture. These skills of intellect are also
related proportionally to the attributes of initiative and innovation. An environment,
which discourages initiative and innovation, can never promote analytical thinking and
awareness since it prevents the learner to apply whatever he has learned through his
research and analysis. As a result a leader may focus more on action rather than learning
and thinking. Since we have already established that the society in general and the culture
of the Army in particular are adverse to the development of initiative and innovation,
therefore skills like general awareness and analytical thinking are generally found
wanting. On the other hand the regimentation system promotes and cultivates the third ‘all-purpose skill’, which is the ability to influence people. It creates a greater degree of familiarity, it places the leader in a position of respect and authority, and it also creates an extremely high degree of sense of belonging; which drives all possible energies towards success. All these factors favor the leader to influence people.

To summarize it can be said that the society in general and the Army culture in particular promotes an environment, which cultivates attributes and skills of confidence, motivation, boldness, physical robustness and discipline. On the other hand it restrains initiative and innovation, and discourages building skills of general awareness and critical thinking. However, a combination of all the attributes and skills is the recipe of success for the leader to perform effectively in future. Though society and Army culture can be held accountable to a certain degree for encouraging or discouraging certain attributes and skills, it is the process of leader development, which should take on the task where they leave off. Therefore, at this point it is pertinent to analyze the leader development process to ascertain the level of training, which it promotes those attributes and skills, which the society and the Army culture fail to cultivate.

As mentioned in chapter two the leader development process consists of three pillars: institutional development, field experience and self–development. Analysis of the first the component of institutional development, which includes various courses, attendance at the school of instructions and promotions exams showed that an infantry officer goes to a school of instruction at least twice in the first five years of commissioning for approximately six months each. These two mandatory courses are the infantry officer’s basic course and the mid career course which occurs at approximately
the fifth year. Apart from these two courses the officer is not required to attend any other course until the time he qualifies for the staff course after eight years of service. These courses are purely professional in nature and Army pamphlets of doctrine form the syllabi. The basic course trains the officer in the tactical skills for the immediate next appointment as platoon commander or staff officer at the battalion level. The mid career course trains the officer in the specific tactical skills required as a company commander and in staff functions at grade three level (equivalent to assistant S3 or S4 in the US Army) in a formation, i.e. brigade, division and corps. Since these courses concentrate only on doctrine they therefore sponsor an environment of certainty in the classroom where student discussions mostly revolve around doctrine to drive home certain tactical lessons and prepare for exams. Moreover it also enforces uniformity. This is seen in the lesson plans, the daily routine, and the teaching methods. There are instructors’ solutions made for every class whether it is a lecture or practical exercise, and the student officer closest to the solution is recognized and rewarded. Both elements of certainty and uniformity are not conducive for promoting initiative and innovation. “The test of fitness of command is the ability to think clearly in the face of unexpected contingency or opportunity” (Marshall 1947, 99). Since the environment does not breed initiative and innovation, therefore, it also does not favor analytical thinking and awareness. Officers can secure better grades and results through the assessment and grading system by reproducing the textbook solutions rather than original and improvised ones. The discussions in the classrooms mainly focus on understanding the tactical doctrine through textbooks rather than evaluating history to reach a certain conclusion. As a consequence the school of instruction guides the student on what to think. Brigadier Gul Zaman,
writes, “The guiding principle should be to teach a student, how to think and not what to think. A junior leader trained in what to think will run out of solutions very fast in the fluid battlefield conditions” (1990, 188). Furthermore since the aim is to equip the officers with tactical skills needed for the immediate next assignment the scenarios chosen are simplistic in nature and not ideally suited to give them wisdom of sensitivity and complexity in the actual environment outside the classroom atmosphere.

In summary we conclude that while preparing these officers for their subsequent assignments the school of instruction equips them with the ‘specific skills’ but it does not concentrate much on the ‘all-purpose skills’. It fails to exploit the full potential of the individual by not developing the ability to think and evaluate. Since a more rational result, can be expected from a more open mind that is ready to accept new impressions and experiences. At the same time the current curriculum works in synchronization with the Army culture and society in not promoting and cultivating the attributes of initiative and innovation. It can be said that at this stage of young officers’ training the school of instruction is doing exactly what Brigadier General S.L.A. Marshall cautioned against: “The fundamental purpose of all training is to develop the natural faculties and stimulate the brain of the individual rather than to treat him as a cog that has to be fitted into a great machine” (1950, 105).

The second component of leader development process is the field experience, which mainly depends on the nature of employment of the officer, the relationship and interaction with peers, and quality and influence of senior officers. There is no dispute that experience is the best trainer, as Major General Aubrey “Red” Newman says that
“Given time and adequate guidance, junior officers are forged into mature professional soldiers in the only way possible: by experience” (1981, 56).

It is a fact that there is no better way to learn than by experience; however the downside is that ‘learning through experience’ can work both ways depending on the conclusions drawn. Since the officers—due to the norms of society and the Army culture—are not equipped with the proper tools of critical thinking and general awareness; therefore it is quite natural that they bank upon their seniors and peers to guide them through. These seniors and peers are also driven by the experiences and expertise that they have and their working climate. As a result the conclusions drawn may or may not contribute towards developing required attributes and skills.

This attitude is pointed out by Brigadier Mazhar ul Haq, who says, “seniors do not want to take risk and therefore leave no chance of making mistakes by the juniors” (1990, 67). This leads to directed functions, where nothing is left at the liberty of the juniors to decide. Hence they generally prefer detailed orders to mission type orders. Consequently, by not forcing the young officers to decide the Army climate is unable to force the officers to think and analyze. Perhaps one of the causes of this kind of climate is the reality that the Army has not fought any major scale war in last thirty-three years. Though, the aim is not to suggest that Army should go to war but to express that there are certain consequences to its action. One is that it promotes an atmosphere of certainty. The other is that it cultivates the trend to display perfection. In short it promotes the environment of acting rather than responding.

However the forces working against this climate is the employment of the Army on a diverse nature of tasks and operating tempo. The internal security environment,
humanitarian missions, and nation building tasks necessitate employment of troops in smaller groups with decentralized control. The tempo of these employments is also increasing with time. These two factors continuously force the decision makers to give away control and decentralize because that is the only way of achieving success; however at the same time the fear of failure restricts the decision maker to do so. Norman F. Dixon describes these motivations of decision makers as, “The fear of failure rather than hope for success tends to be more dominant motive force in decision making, and higher the rank the stronger this motive, because there is farther to fall” (1978, 58). Hence there is a continuous battle in the decision maker’s mind between the desire to succeed and the fear of failure. The nature of the employment in due course of time will, however force the Army culture to change but then the decision to change may not be result of a conscious decision, and may have unforeseen consequences.

To summarize, the field experience at present does not promote and cultivate initiative, innovation and critical thinking, however the employment of Pakistan Army on multiple and diverse tasks simultaneously is forcing the senior leadership to loose control and provide room for initiative and innovation. It does provide an opportunity to young officers to learn from it and fill their kit bags with attributes and skills required for future. However, the quality and type of conclusions drawn from their field experience is entirely dependant on the climate and interactions. The Army can utilize this opportunity provided it embraces the change and takes certain concrete steps in the direction of improving the general climate because it also affects the third component of leader development process, that is, self–development.
The component of self-development primarily focuses on attaining knowledge through study and observation with the objective to refine the attributes and skills attained through the institutional training and field experience. Lieutenant Colonel Dean A. Nowowiejski indicated, “Only self-development can allow leaders to keep up with changes that occur when they are away from operational assignments and during intervals between institutional development” (1995, 73). However the driving force behind seeking self-development is personal inquisitiveness or obligation. A cadet joining the Pakistan Military Academy (PMA) comes from an education system, which is theory based instead of being research based. Therefore, the cadets have very little if any interest to gain knowledge through personal studies. This limits the reservoir of general knowledge and the ability to think, as students do not compare various sources. On becoming part of the leader development process of the Pakistan Army at PMA he is educated in the basic skills and also provided opportunity to apply those skills on the ground. However, since he has not been trained to think out of the box, throughout the educational career he reverts back to the textbook for easy answers. His actions are reinforced by the system, which tends to appreciate the textbook solutions. The exams held at the academy mainly are based on textbook knowledge rather than forcing students to think of innovative and creative ideas. As a whole the Military Academy fails to inculcate the desire of attaining extra knowledge.

After commissioning the syllabi of the schools of instruction and the promotion exams in the first five to seven years of service is structured in the same way and therefore, do not contribute in creating a desire amongst officers to acquire knowledge through reading. Officers study hard before and during the courses but the mere fact that
they are required to reproduce the textbook answers limits their desire for research. An
effort to inculcate the habit of reading, however, is made in the units by the senior
officers but it is limited by time that they can devote, and the quality of officers present in
the unit. As a net result officers seek self-development only through observation, which is
dictated by the outcome of events. Therefore it can be said that learning through self-
development is mostly impressionistic in nature rather than analytical.

A number of officers are of the opinion that the aspect of self-development is
totally and solely the responsibility of individual officer. For example while identifying
the problem areas of officers in chapter two of this thesis Brigadier Abdul Ghafoor Ehsan
blames the young officers for lack of general and professional knowledge. This argument
dissolves the responsibility of Army to contribute towards building this pillar, which is
not justified. Keeping in view the educational background that officers come from the
onus of responsibility does not entirely rest on the individual officer. Part of it can be
related to the academic environment provided after their induction into the Army, which
does not invite them to pursue further knowledge and enhance their ability to think and
draw logical conclusions. The lack of self-development can be associated to the inability
of senior officers—who are crucial to the link between education, experience and logical
interpretation—to provide sufficient direction and incentives to the junior officers.

The pillar of self-development therefore does not appropriately equip the officer
with sufficient tools to refine his attributes and skills. The two components of the pillar,
i.e., study and observation are equally important and not one component can contribute
positively in building the leadership attributes and skills without the other. This
component has to be realized as a part of leader development process, which requires
equal amount of effort and direction from the Army as the other two.

To conclude this chapter, I discussed the future environments and their effects to
ascertain the required values, attributes and skills. A number of values attribute and skills
emerged as outcome of this discussion. The values being absolute were then excluded
from discussion, which then focused around the attributes and skills officers needed. Next
the effects of society and the Army culture on junior officers were analyzed. This
analysis identified the attributes and skills that can be drawn from the culture and those
that are required to be developed by the leader development process. As a result of this
process I identified that the attributes of initiative and innovation and the skills of
analytical thinking and general awareness are not promoted and cultivated by the culture
and society. This analysis determined the focus for the leader development process. The
required attributes and skills, which are not developed by the society or the Army culture,
were used to examine the three pillars of the leader development process. This analysis
concluded that leader development process for junior officers through their eighth year of
service does not promote and cultivate these attributes and skills. The bottom line is that
the leader development process of the Pakistan Army through the first eight years of
service does not prepare leaders to perform effectively in the future environments. The
specific conclusions with recommendations and areas suggested for further studies are
discussed in chapter five.
CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This chapter lists the conclusions reached during the course of this research. Also included are recommendations for further research. The conclusions arrived at during the research are listed under the relevant secondary research questions. The conclusions reached for each secondary question will lead to the primary question. This will allow development of related recommendations and identification of areas for further study.

This research began with the primary question, is the present leader development process of the Pakistan Army preparing the leaders at the tactical level to perform effectively in the future? To answer the primary question, a few secondary questions had to be addressed. These were: What circumstances shaped the present leader development process, what are the environmental changes in the future, and finally what are the requirements to fulfill these requirements of future?

The conclusions from three areas established the circumstances that shaped the present leader development process. These areas are the society, military culture, and the employment of the Pakistan Army. The Pakistani society is organized around the *baradari* system, which has certain strengths and weaknesses. The research concluded that this structure promotes various aspects of leadership, such as motivation, confidence, boldness, and ability to influence people, whereas initiative, innovation, analytical thinking, and general awareness are not cultivated. Various characteristics of this system are responsible in encouraging or discouraging a certain attribute. Cohesion between the *baradari* creates a sense of belonging and promotes *esprit-de-corps* thereby building
confidence and motivation. The peculiar position of elders in the joint family system
promotes dependency of the community or *baradari* on them for decisions. It was
therefore concluded that this arrangement absolves the individual’s responsibility to seek
knowledge, which hindered growth and development of analytical thinking. The same
characteristic also promotes centralized control, which restricts the community in general
to be creative and take initiative. Whereas the fundamental position of elders in the
*baradari* system does lead to centralized control, at the same time the respect and
authority attached to it facilitates the leaders to influence people easily.

As a whole it was concluded that the society at large, which still follows the
*baradari* system, does not promote the attributes of initiative, innovation, and skills of
creative thinking and general awareness. However, it does promote confidence,
motivation, boldness and assists leaders to influence people. It was the strengths of the
system that convinced the British—who had a great influence in structuring Pakistan
Army—to shape the Army around the same system.

The British implemented the regimentation system to translate the strengths of the
*baradari* system in the Army. The successful implementation of this system allowed the
British to rule huge armies of the subcontinent drawn from different ethnic groups and
religions. The dominance of *baradari* was replicated by primacy of the unit while the
leaders enjoyed the easiness of leading their men facilitated by the concept of elders in
the society. Due to the strong resemblance of the two systems, the regimentation does not
cultivate any other attribute or skill rather it functions in perfect harmony with the
*baradari* system by encouraging and discouraging the same attributes and skills. The
strong resemblance of the two systems is one of the reasons that the army is accepted in the present society.

The final aspect considered the circumstances that shaped the leader development process is the employment of Pakistan Army. As a consequence of general lack of war experience in the Pakistan Army, it was concluded that the Army’s culture is becoming more rigid and promoting certainty. The expected outcome is the desire of perfection and fear of going wrong. The natural conclusion is the suppression of initiative, innovation, which in turn curbs the ability to reason and think analytically. On the other hand, however, the recent employment of the Pakistan Army does provide an opportunity to the army to promote and cultivate the attributes of initiative and innovation. The diversity of tasks and expansion of responsibilities force the senior leaders to give away control, thus providing room for tactical leaders to innovate and take initiative. Furthermore, the situation also requires the tactical leaders to develop skills of system thinking and general awareness to understand their place and focus. To maintain focus, it was also concluded that such an employment forces the leaders at all levels and especially the tactical leaders to develop the skills of system thinking and analytical thinking.

To summarize the answer to the first secondary question concluded that circumstance that shaped the leader development process did not promote the attributes of initiative and innovation and skills of analytical thinking and general awareness. It can also be concluded that while the current employment of the Pakistan Army does provide an opportunity to develop these attributes and skills the society and military culture do not. However, since the research focused on the tactical leaders of the future, the question that emerges is whether the lack of these attributes and skills will affect the leaders’
performance in the future or not? This can only be established through the analysis of the future environment, which led to the next secondary question.

The requirements of one situation may differ from the other that is why the future environments were analyzed broadly to suit different circumstances. Keeping in view the nature of tasks assigned to the Pakistan Army in the last few years and the battlefield picture painted by various authors, it was concluded that the future will present a more dispersed battlefield which will be complex, ambiguous, sensitive, and diverse.

The dispersion caused by the increased lethality of weapons and the nature of tasks will affect both physical and psychological dimensions. It will isolate troops making commanders and fellow soldiers less visible, creating difficulties for commanders to influence troops and impact morale, forcing commanders to make decisions divorced from the mind-set of soldiers. To effectively perform in this type of environment the leaders must be confident, able to take initiative, think analytically, and influence subordinates through innovative means.

Complexity of the future environment is a result of technological advancements, the increased involvement of multiple players on the battlefield, expanded dimensions of the battlefield, and the enhanced role of media. An analysis of the elements that contribute to the future environment’s complexity leads one to conclude that future leaders must be knowledgeable, capable of system thinking, aware of the threat(s) they face and their affects, and prepared to deal with and to effectively use the media. In essence future leaders must be innovative, have a general awareness, and the ability to reason analytically.
The employment of the Pakistan Army on peacekeeping operations, humanitarian missions, and internal security tasks creates an ambiguous environment with vague mission statements, unclear timelines and phases, not focused on a distinguishable enemy, and no physical objectives to capture. Since such an environment is not likely to improve, therefore as a consequence the leader at the tactical level will have to find an answer to deal with each one of the above-mentioned challenges. The first step in this direction is correctly appreciating and understanding one’s position in the whole system. Therefore it was concluded that while the leader must be confident and bold with sufficient professional ability to execute a task, he should be trained to recognize his role in the broad picture.

The future environment will be sensitive in terms of pressure on leaders to strike the right balance between their own motivations and the aspirations and expectations of both the local and global populace. To be successful in this realm the leader must be able to diagnose and comprehend the local cultures. He should understand his own position and be able to explain the same to others. Therefore a leader should, be motivated, confident, aware, and capable of system thinking.

Finally the future environments will pose the challenge of a diversity of tasks. The analysis concluded that it is very easy for a young leader to get distracted in such an environment. The leaders will therefore require a great reservoir of energy and motivation to stay on course. They will also require the mental skills, such as general awareness and system thinking, to focus on the right task at the right time.

As a whole, a future environment that is dispersed, complex, ambiguous, sensitive and diverse will challenge leaders at the tactical level. To perform effectively they should
be innovative, confident, motivated, physically robust, bold, self-starters, knowledgeable, capable of thinking analytically, and able to influence people.

Up till this stage the research was focused in two areas. First is the identification of attributes and skills promoted and cultivated by the society and culture, and the second is the attributes and skills required by the tactical leaders in future environments. The need for concentrating in these areas was to create a list of attributes and skills that are required by tactical leaders in the future that are not promoted and cultivated by the society. This will allow the leader development process to focus on attributes and skills, which are general weaknesses of potential leaders at the time of joining the army while building on those strengths that are already possessed.

The last secondary research question is therefore aimed at identifying the attributes and skills which should form the focus for the leader development process by relating the attributes and skills required for the future and those promoted and cultivated by the society and military culture. Those attributes and skills that are promoted by the society and the military culture were identified and separated from those that are not promoted by the society and the military culture. It was concluded that the leader development process should focus on initiative, innovation, analytical thinking, and general awareness to prepare tactical leaders for future. Thereafter these attributes and skills were used as a measure of effectiveness for answering the primary research question, that is, is the present leader development process of the Pakistan Army preparing the leaders at the tactical level to perform effectively in the future? These attributes and skills were used to see whether or not they are promoted in the three
different components of leader development process, that is, institutional training, field experience, and self-development.

Analysis concluded that since the institutional training in the Pakistan Army promotes textbook answers and concentrates on teaching specific skills for the immediate employment of the officer, it does not generate the officer’s desire for research and extra knowledge. The system further discourages the officer’s desire for research by rewarding the students following the beaten path. As a result the institutional training fails to prepare the leaders in the all-purpose skills of analytical thinking and general awareness, which in turn also limits the ability of the leader to innovate and take initiative.

An analysis of the second component of leader development process, that is, field experience, led to the conclusion that at present, due to the fear of going wrong and unwillingness to loose control, the attributes of initiative and innovation are not promoted. Since the junior leaders are mostly told to follow a directed path it inhibits their desire to attain knowledge or to reason analytically. However, at the same time it was also pointed out that the present employment of the Pakistan Army on diverse and multiple tasks is forcing the senior leaders to relax control and afford opportunity to tactical leaders to practice initiative and innovation. It will also force tactical leaders to seek self-improvement and develop analytical thinking skills since they will have to make important decisions with less and less guidance.

The analysis of the third pillar, that is, self-development, proves that it fails to cultivate a desire amongst the leaders to develop their skills of general awareness and critical thinking. The development of this component is incomplete as it is only seen through observation. Furthermore since the institutional training does not promote a
research culture it also affects the component of self-development, as the leaders do not find sufficient motivation to explore and learn. The research also pointed out the flaw in the system, which generally presumes self-development as the individual’s responsibility. Keeping in view the education system of Pakistan and the institutional training of the army, it was concluded that the senior leaders have to play a more prominent role to utilize this pillar as an effective component of leader development process.

As a final analysis it was concluded that the leader development process does not prepare the tactical leaders to perform effectively in the future. While the expectation prevails that leaders are equipped with attributes and skills of initiative, innovation, critical thinking, and general awareness, none of the components of the leader development process promotes it. To effectively prepare the leaders there is a need for a reorientation of leader development process in the different direction. A few recommendations are offered in this regard.

These recommendations focus on the different components of leader development process:

1. Cultivating research-oriented atmosphere in the institutional training as a whole by incorporating research projects as part of the syllabi, such as finding historical examples to prove or disapprove doctrine. However, to cultivate this type of atmosphere it must be ensured that in the beginning of military service, it is the research process that is rewarded rather than the end product, the emphasis can later gradually shift to the end product as the officer progresses in his service. Forcing leaders to explore through extra studies will increase their general awareness and also induce a desire to learn more.
2. The historical examples are generally used in syllabi to explain and prove a doctrine; however, it is recommended that historical examples should also be used to show variance in implementation of doctrine. This will help remove certainty that is normally attached with teaching doctrine. It will also force the leaders to explore and try different techniques. Taking initiative and innovating will be the logical outcomes of this method.

3. The syllabi at schools of instructions should be modified in how the assignments are given and completed during class time. This will make the process transparent to the instructor who can provide guidance during it as well as steer the students’ thinking in the right direction. In the whole process the instructor will play a very crucial role. If appropriately executed it can have numerous benefits. Being a transparent process it will eliminate the expectations of the instructors and the students’ fear that the end product has to be perfect. Appropriate input from the instructor is likely to spark a desire amongst students to learn more. Instructor can also demonstrate practical implementation of analytical reasoning.

4. The evaluation system should focus on assessing the individual’s ability to apply attained knowledge rather than the ability to remember it. The application based evaluation system will expand the base of knowledge and promote the students’ critical thinking and reasoning skills. A few steps recommended in this regard are described below. It must, however, be remembered that shifting the emphasis of evaluation is a gigantic task requiring a balanced approach in all the facets of the process.

   a. In-class discussions form a significant portion of evaluation process. The readings for the class and the discussion itself should encourage the thinking process. For
instance while discussing doctrine the focus of discussion should be on appreciating the reason for its origin and how did its application over the years shape it rather than just understanding it in its present form. This apart from developing a base of knowledge will also improve the critical reasoning skills.

b. There should be increased emphasis on evaluating through both indoor and outdoor practical exercises. Two aspects must however be built into the process. One is that the practical exercises should be designed to provide multiple solutions and second that the emphasis of evaluation should be on the thinking and reasoning process rather than the product.

c. Open book exams are a good way of demonstrating that the emphasis of examination is not on knowledge but its application. Such type of exams should be adopted in all military schools of instructions. The leaders, however, need extensive instruction on how to implement the system since most of them have never experienced it before.

5. One of the biggest challenges of institutional training is reducing the gap between idealism and realism. Idealism breeds certainty while reality is ambiguous. Certainty suppresses innovation and initiative while reality begs for it. While passing through institutional training if the leaders are not exposed to reality then they are likely to draw wrong lessons; therefore, every effort should be made to portray the actual picture. A few recommended steps in this regard are.

a. Generating a system of attaining effective feedback from the field army and adjusting the institutional training process accordingly. The effectiveness of the whole
system is however dependent on maintaining a balance between timely adjustment of the system and the reality.

b. The guest speakers bring an element of realism as they talk of their own experience. The frequency of guest speaker programs should be increased during the courses at the schools of instructions. It is also recommended that young commanders should be invited as guest speakers apart from senior officers. This will provide the most recent and realistic picture to the students.

c. Evaluation of ongoing operations and assignments of the army through discussion should be encouraged.

6. One conclusion is that simultaneous employment on multiple and diverse nature of tasks like internal security duties, humanitarian assistance operations, and nation building disorientates young officers. The same employment if positively utilized can cultivate initiative, innovation, system thinking, and analytical reasoning among young leaders. It is recommended that senior leadership take the opportunity and decentralize affairs to effectively manage the pressure of tempo and diversity of tasks. This will provide the senior leadership a holistic approach to delegating, guiding, respecting subordinates decisions, and acknowledging their achievements. This approach will not only focus the young leaders on their responsibilities but also make them think and innovate.

7. Units should make deliberate efforts to educate young leaders on aspects related to the task at hand before their employment. For instance before employing them on internal security duties, humanitarian missions, and nation-building tasks they must be educated on the customs, traditions, beliefs, and expectations of the local society.
Similarly, the knowledge and experience attained should be documented and circulated widely during and at the end of an operation. This type of education will enhance the base of knowledge while sparking the desire for attaining more.

8. The prime responsibility of self-development remains that of the individual himself. However, since the education system of Pakistan never encourages the students to seek additional knowledge through extra studies the young leaders on joining army are likely to never realize the importance and necessity of this component. It is therefore crucial for senior and midlevel leadership of the Pakistan Army to influence this component of leader development process. The senior and midlevel leadership while acting as mentors should adopt a three-step strategy, which is, identification, direction, and discussion. In the first step the mentor should identify the areas that the young leader is required to work on. In the second step he gives direction by either recommending a list of books to read, actions to perform, or a combination of both. In the third step the mentor discusses the observations gathered by the young leader as a result of step two. This strategy will slowly but surely creates a realization of the importance of self-development amongst the young leaders.

To conclude it is crucial to realize that the demands of the future are constantly changing. A present assessment of future demands concludes that the present leader development process of the Pakistan Army does not prepare the leaders at the tactical level to perform effectively in future. This also signifies the need for a regular study of future requirements through constant research.

While maintaining focus on requirements and needs of future it is also important to ensure that all three components of leader development process, that is, institutional
training, field experience, and self-development contribute simultaneously in building the leaders’ abilities to perform effectively in the future. It is this homogenous blend of all three components that can build leaders to meet the upcoming challenges. A detailed research is therefore recommended on how each component of leader development process can be modified to meet the future demands.

Finally by studying the effects of society and military culture the research highlighted their importance in shaping the leader development process. This opens another avenue of research, which is to look at the society and military culture separately from macro level to suggest measures to shape it according to the future requirements.

Development of a leader is a regular and ongoing process and so is the system of leader development. It is through the cycle of realization, evaluation, and modifications that the systems have to be kept updated. The leader development process of the Pakistan Army must realize this. The future holds a variety of challenges for the leaders at the tactical level. These challenges are great but none of them is unachievable. It only demands concerted and well thought out efforts. The Pakistan Army has a depth of experience and of strong traditions to draw strengths from. It is part of a society, which has some very solid values and attributes best suited for the profession of arms. It is up to the leader development process of the Pakistan Army to build on these strengths and equip the tactical leaders with the required attributes and skills so that they are ready and prepared to meet the challenges of future.


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