

UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING
IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY

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Strategy

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ABSTRACT

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This study objectively analyzes, within a systemic approach, the causes that undermined the responsiveness and legitimacy of the United Nations peace operations in four case studies: Korea, the Suez Canal crisis, the Persian Gulf War, and UNPROFOR. The focus of the analysis is the Security Council and its decision-making process. The study was accomplished by submitting the historical facts regarding the four case studies to the analytical questions that were established in order to frame the two screening criteria: responsiveness and legitimacy. The literature review established the main conceptual principles and three mainstream schools of thought were defined: realism, liberalism, and constructivism. The findings point out that in order to face the challenges of the current operational environment, the United Nations needs to reform its Security Council and its decision-making process so that it better reflects the current geopolitical realities and it more effectively achieves the objectives of the complex peacekeeping operations of the twenty-first century.

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I remain solely responsible for any errors or faults in this thesis.

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ACRONYMS

BSA	Bosnian Serb Army
CENTCOM	United States Central Command
EU	European Union
IFOR	Implementation Force
IGO	International Governmental Organization
INGO	International Non-governmental Organization
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
JNA	Yugoslav National Army
MSC	Military Staff Committee
NGO	Non-governmental Organization
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
OAS	Organization of American States
OAU	Organization of African Union
SFOR	Stabilization Force
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNPKO	United Nations Peacekeeping Operations
UNPREDEP	United Nations Preventive Deployment
UNPROFOR	United Nations Protection Force
US	United States
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The current operational environment poses a number of challenges to the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (UNPKO) that not only demand a better-trained and doctrinally homogeneous force, but also indicate that the 58 year-old organization might need some structural reform so that its decision-making process could become more expeditious.

From the four great powers, the Big Four (China, the United Kingdom, the United States of America, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics), that emerged from the Second World War and the other existing forty-six countries in 1945 in the UN forum “by the end of the century there were four times that many [countries] with more to come. More important than the number of states is the rise of non-state actors.”¹ Multinational companies, international investment conglomerates, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), transnational ethnic groups like the Kurds and the Armenians, terrorist groups, drug cartels, and mafia organizations “transcend national borders, and add a further dimension.”²

“The structure of the United Nations reflects essentially the world of 1945, not the world at the turn of the millennium.”³ The twenty-first century is a multifaceted and complex environment that reflects the post-Cold War geopolitical realities.

Does the UN Security Council structure reflect the current international system’s geopolitical realities?

Is its decision-making process responsive enough to tackle today's threats to peacetime operations?

Does the Security Council's control of peace operations ensure its mandates' provisions, therefore assuring their legitimacy?

This paper aims at discussing the subject at the strategic and geopolitical level, in order to both, analyze the causes that undermine the primary reason for establishing the UN and provide feasible recommendations to overcome or at least decrease the hurdles to the UN efforts due to conflicting national interests.

This subject is currently researched not only by the UN, but also by a number of centers for strategic studies all over the world under topics such as peace operations, peace building, nation building, peacekeeping operations, peacetime engagements, collective security, regional stability, UN Reform, UN Security Council Reform and many others. Its discussion is all over the media today, mainly because of the unilateral decision of the United States and the United Kingdom regarding the invasion of Iraq and the troublesome transitional phase in operation Iraqi Freedom which has been more complex and costly than previously anticipated by the current US Administration.

The established UN structure should prevent the main reason of failure of the League of Nations. "UN founders deliberately divided member rights and roles by establishing a universal General Assembly with the most general functions and a restricted Security Council with executing authority for maintaining the peace – unanimity among the great powers was a prerequisite for action."⁴

The World War II victors – the United States, the Soviet Union, France, the United Kingdom, and China – then the great powers, secured eternal seats in the Security Council, with the right to veto decisions on the most relevant matters.

The delegates at the San Francisco conference, where the UN Charter was drafted, expected that the possibility of its revision, stated in Article 109, would later assure a more equitable organization that would reflect the principle of sovereign equality of all member states. But, needless to say, the so called Permanent 5 (P-5) not only defused the attempts to such discussions, but also stated that they would do their utmost efforts to safeguard their veto prerogative.⁵

From the beginning of the United Nations, the five members of the Security Council could not reach agreement on how to operate, and on which forces would enforce the concept of collective security.

During the Cold War era, the UN managed to accomplish a number of peacekeeping operations. From 1948 until 1988, the UN blue helmets deployed six times in the Middle East; three times in the India-Pakistan conflict area; twice in Africa, and once each in different regions ranging from Cyprus, in Europe; to West New Guinea, in the South Pacific, and the Dominican Republic, in the Caribbean. Such missions mostly aimed at supporting peace agreements. Lightly armed troops and unarmed UN military observers (UNMOs), who worked on the diplomatic mechanisms of mediation, negotiation, and reported any cease-fire violations to the UN Headquarters in New York, carried out these missions.⁶

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, a number of conflicts arose whose complexities proved too risky to address by the same UN modus operandi. UN personnel

were killed, taken hostage, and the terrible events in Srebrenica and Rwanda finally showed the need to reform the way the UN was carrying on its mission.

During the last two years, within the context of the Global War on Terrorism, the challenges have reached even higher stakes.

“New and potentially more virulent forms of terrorism, the proliferation of non-conventional weapons, the spread of transnational criminal networks, and ways in which all these things may be coming together to reinforce one another, are viewed in some parts of the world as the dominant threats to peace and security in our time.”⁷

Despite becoming targets for terrorist attacks, UN personnel still need to perform their duties and provide assistance to a number of humanitarian efforts.

Is it possible to meet such challenges with ad-hoc forces that do not share a common doctrine, lack joint training, and the command, control, communications, and intelligence (C3I) structure that would enhance their performance, and therefore increase their chance of successfully accomplishing their mission?

Will the member states be willing to commit forces to such conflict areas, and at such high costs, without being able to actively discuss and plan the UN operation?

According to Thomas G. Weiss, “more than lip service must be paid to the interests of other countries.”⁸

Prior to the 1990s, most of the UN missions would operate with no more than 7,000 troops and civilians. In 1994, UNPROFOR had 35,000 peacekeepers in Bosnia and the UN peacekeeping budget was US\$ 3.46 billion.⁹ These numbers show that the UNPKO will likely increase in this century, and of utmost importance is the understanding of the highly complex and hostile environment of such operations.

Therefore, it may be required that the UN establish a PKO doctrine, not only providing common ground for planning and training but also increasing the probability of success at the lowest cost and at the fastest pace possible.

On 21 August 00, the Secretary General of the UN, Kofi A. Annan, published a guide for strategic, operational, and doctrinal changes needed for UN peace missions, known as the “Brahimi Report.”¹⁰ The document provides the results of a comprehensive review of UNPKO by a panel of experts chaired by the Algerian ambassador, Lakhdar Brahimi.

The Brahimi panel proposed radical changes from usual UN policies, but acknowledged that its implementation would require a relevant change of the UN culture. The report proposes measures that range from the planning, logistics, at the operational and strategic levels, to the rules of engagement of the peacekeeping forces, but it does not address a Security Council structure reform that would permit a broader representation of the current geopolitical environment.

Since the first days of the foundation of the UN, the permanent members of the Security Council have exerted a strong and rarely cooperative and harmonic diplomacy. From 1945 until 1990 there were 193 vetoes in the Security Council forum.¹¹ Recently, the United States could not secure an agreement on the need of a UN operation to address the Iraqi problem related to terrorism and weapons of mass destruction proliferation.

According to the UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan, the consensus on world peace and security, and the vision for the twenty-first century outlined in the millennium declaration “looks less solid than it did three years ago.”¹²

Such problems led to a unilateral intervention that, once more, proved combat operations are feasible outside the UN community, but it has also showed that even the coalition of rich and powerful nations would welcome the experience, coordination, and legitimacy of the UN, in order to provide a smooth transition into the nation building phase. “As the heads of government met for the annual opening of the General Assembly in New York in late September, [2003], Bush told the assembled delegates that the US would welcome a greater UN role, additional troops and money to assist in the stabilization and rebuilding of Iraq.”¹³

This research aims at finding patterns of the decision-making and the command and control of UNPKO, focused on diagnosing how the interactions within the Security Council decision-making process provided the conditions for both successful and unsuccessful missions.

In order to achieve such goals within the available research time, we will analyze the UN involvement in the Korean War, the liberation of Kuwait in the Persian Gulf War, and the UNPROFOR in Bosnia.

The Open Systems model within the Systems Analysis approach will be the methodology of our analysis in order to examine the UN Security Council structure, procedures, and its internal and external relationships that critically affect the establishment and conduct of peacekeeping operations.

¹Joseph S. Nye, Jr., *Understanding International Conflicts, An Introduction to Theory and History*, Harvard University (2003): 8.

²*Ibid.*, 9.

³Sam Daws, Hasmy Agam, Terence O'Brien, and Ramesh Takur, *What is Equitable Geographic Representation in the Twenty-first Century, Report of a Seminar held by the United Nations University* (26 March 1999): 2.

⁴Thomas G. Weiss, *The Illusion of UN Security Council Reform, The Washington Quarterly* (Autumn 2003): 148.

⁵*Ibid.*, 148.

⁶Marjorie Ann Browne, *Congressional Research Service Issue Brief for Congress*, Appendix 1.

⁷MSNBC News, "Annan says UN must bury divisions over Iraq", *Associated Press* (08 Sep 2003): 3; available from <http://stacks.msnbc.com/news/955406.asp?cp1=1>; Internet; accessed 15 October 2003.

⁸Thomas G. Weiss, *The Illusion of UN Security Council Reform, The Washington Quarterly* (Autumn 2003): 158.

⁹Marjorie Ann Browne, *Congressional Research Service Issue Brief for Congress*, Appendix 1.

¹⁰United Nations, *Secretary General Letter, Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations*, A/55/305-S/200/809.

¹¹Thomas G. Weiss, *The Illusion of UN Security Council Reform, The Washington Quarterly* (Autumn 2003): 150.

¹²MSNBC News, "Annan says UN must bury divisions over Iraq", *Associated Press* (08 Sep 2003): 3; available from <http://stacks.msnbc.com/news/955406.asp?cp1=1>; Internet; accessed 15 October 2003.

¹³IISS Strategic Comments, "The UN and Iraq. A 'fork in the road'?" *International Institute for Strategic Studies Strategic Comments* (volume 9 issue 7): 1; available from <http://www.iiss.org/stratcomfree.php?scID=287&KarisD&iissTo>; Internet; accessed 24 October 2003.

CHAPTER 2

WORLD POLITICS AND THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM

Each of the realist assumptions can be challenged. If we challenge them all simultaneously, we can imagine a world in which actors other than states participate directly in world politics, in which a clear hierarchy of issues does not exist, and in which force is an ineffective instrument of policy. Under these conditions – which we call the characteristics of complex interdependence – one would expect the world politics to be very different than under realist conditions.¹

Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, *Power and Interdependence*

World Politics

The world has seen major changes in the roughly 5,000 years of History. The appearance of agriculture brought about the first settlements of large human groups and the development of what we call civilization. The ongoing cropping and harvesting generated a surplus that enabled the construction of monuments, the development of the fine Arts, and the inevitable fielding of armies to protect such a lifestyle from the greed of warring nomad tribes.

The cities or “polis” started to trade their surplus production, merchant ships enlarged the known boundaries, new and wealthy kingdoms were discovered, and economics started to play an important role in everyday life.

Conflicting interests prompted battles between the one time mostly defensive armies, and trading fleets gave place to warships of the first navies. It would not take long for localized battles to unfold into regional wars.

The developing communities realized that treaties and alliances could contribute to their security and consequently provide the needed stability to increase their trade and growth and politics broke up the limits of the “polis.”

Science and technology led to new economic activities, the one time “polis” developed into nation-states, and waging war became a prerogative of the state.

The evolution of civilization brought about many developments but still mankind could not get rid off the savagery of war. New weapons and tactics made the battlefield more and more lethal and war started to affect not only combatants but entire nations, continents, and in the last century we witnessed two world wars. The two great wars in the twentieth century claimed more than 50 million lives and left the once wealthy and mighty European continent in ruins.

Before the end of WW II, once more led by the U.S, the Allied Nations embarked on one more attempt to provide for an organization that would foster World Peace and understanding: the United Nations (UN).

According to the English historian John Keegan, “four times in the modern age, men have sat down to reorder the world – at the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 after the Thirty Years War, at the Congress of Vienna in 1815 after the Napoleonic Wars, in Paris in 1919 after World War I, and in San Francisco in 1945 after World War II.”²

Studying how world politics is carried on and the dynamics of international relations, one comes to face many principles and concepts that, although largely known, are sometimes misinterpreted and misunderstood. This chapter aims at analyzing the development and the dynamics of the so called international system while clarifying key concepts and definitions that lay the foundation for further discussions and analysis.

The Development of the International System

As aforementioned, politics surpassed the limits of the “polis.” The Greek city-states of Athens and Sparta formed an alliance to fight and defeat the Persian Empire (480 B.C.). After the victory over the Persians, the two-city alliance evolved into two distinct regional alliances. The Delian League, led by Athens, intended to defend the city-states around the Aegean Sea from the Persians while the Peloponnesian defensive alliance was organized and led by Sparta. In 461 B.C. the first Peloponnesian war broke out because of the expansion of the Athenian Empire that started to oppress its one-time allies and to threaten the Spartan regional alliance.³

This historical example illustrates the dynamics of the politics amongst the Greek city-states some 2,500 years ago and shows how such interactions led to peace and prosperity, as well as war and widespread destruction.

Since then philosophers, historians, scholars, diplomats and politicians have tried to explain and to understand the processes that operate within the so-called international system.

The international system has changed throughout history. The ancient Persian and Roman Empires, predecessors of the Ottoman, Spanish and British Empires, provided for a stable world imperial system. During the middle Ages feudalism accounted for an unstable system when sometimes dukes and counts were more powerful than princes and kings, territorial boundaries would be changed by arranged political weddings, and wars would occur according to a chaotic web of loyalties that would be responsible for a number of never ending conflicts due to family ties and succession interests. The need for

stability for the ever-growing trade led to the nation-states structure that has established the scenery of the last 500 years. How did this last and significant change occur?⁴

It is relevant to note that the chaotic feudal environment led to the formation of what can be considered one of the first examples of an international non-governmental organization (INGO) that came to play an important role in the then international system that was mainly oriented towards economic goals. “The complex array of competing political units and the low level of systemic political links across medieval Europe [have] often obscured the fact that by the end of the Middle Ages, Europe formed a coherent international economic system (Jones 1988: 168). At that juncture, cities were still the dominant economic units in the system.”⁵

A number of trading cities formed the “Hanseatic League (German *Hanse*), [a] commercial alliance of German merchants and cities, active from the mid-12th century to the midseventeenth century that at its peak, in the midfifteenth century, comprised at least 80 cities and another 100 or so affiliated towns. It monopolized all trade in the North and Baltic seas. During the 1360s, however, the league came into fierce competition with Flemish and Danish merchants. Its greatest opposition came from King Waldemar IV of Denmark, who wanted to establish Danish control over the Baltic area. Threatened with losing control of the region, the league declared war, defeating Denmark decisively in 1368. With the Peace of Stralsund in 1370, Waldemar was forced to recognize Hanseatic supremacy in Scandinavian trade.”⁶

The trading cities somehow realized that supporting the king with their financial resources would enable a more powerful centralized government that would be in charge of fielding an army and building a navy to provide the needed security for the economic

activities that were not being fulfilled by the feudal system. Buzan and Little emphasize that this “complex dialectic between the power of capital and the power of coercion, . . . gave rise to the modern state [that] is characterized by a combination of military, extractive, administrative, redistributive, and productive organizations, governing multiple contiguous regions and their cities,” and mixing capital and coercion both in its formative process and in its empire-building style. The key synthesis in such states is that the holders of capital provide financial resources for the state, while the holders of coercion allow capital a significant role in government.”⁷

The developing modern states were struggling for power and sovereignty and after decades of devastating wars within today’s Germany and the Czech Republic amongst the Holy Roman Empire, Denmark, Sweden, France and Spain, in 1648 the Peace of Westphalia ended the Thirty Years’ War and recognized an international system based on “the sovereign territorial state as the dominant form of international organization.”⁸

“Although the modern state had, by the nineteenth century, clearly created a revolution by becoming the new dominant unit of the international system, a global system of modern states did not emerge clearly until the process of decolonization was complete. The European empires can thus be seen as the nursery, or mechanism, by which the political form of the modern state was transposed onto the rest of the world.”⁹

Therefore most of the scholars and policy makers consider the international system sometimes also referred simply as international politics as “politics in the absence of a common sovereign, politics among entities with no ruler above them. International

politics is often called anarchic. As monarchy means one ruler, anarchy – “an-archy” – means the absence of any ruler.”¹⁰

The Open System Model applied to International Relations

The relationship between sovereign states is a complex system that involves political, diplomatic, military, economic, and social interests. In order to understand the international relations and to analyze its interactions and outcomes, different schools of thought have used the systemic approach.

A system is a set of interrelated units.¹¹ A system, by definition, is any collection of component elements that work together to perform a task.¹² From the previous definitions, it is clear that any system develops from a common need that prompts its units to interrelate rather in a cooperative way than in a competitive one. Therefore the Greek city-states interrelated for security reasons; the trading Baltic cities and their partners joined into an economic system, and the formation of the nation-state was ultimately the association of security and economic needs into one unified and centralized system.¹³

According to Buzan and Little, “international relations represents a subject of such immense size and complexity that it is best approached from a systemic or general perspective rather than an event-driven or [particularistic] one. A systemic perspective presupposes that from the myriad events constituting international relations it is possible to abstract patterns and regularities that reveal the existence of international systems. To understand international relations, therefore, we need to start by looking at systems as a whole, rather than by opening with an examination of their component parts.”¹⁴

It is relevant to emphasize that the differences between the two mainstream schools of thought, realism and liberalism, derive from their modeling of international relations. Realism considers the states as the dominant units within the system and the use of force as the central problem of international politics. “According to the realist, the beginning and the end of international politics is the individual state in interaction with other states. . . . Liberals see a global society that functions alongside the states and sets part of the context for states. Trade crosses borders, . . . and international institutions such as the United Nations create a context in which the realist view of pure anarchy is insufficient.”¹⁵

It is paramount to understand that different actors or units have different levels and means of influencing the system, this is the reason why through history there were periods when the international system was imperial or hegemonic like the age of the Roman Empire; bipolar as in the European system during the almost 45 years between the German unification in 1871 and WW I, and the almost 50 years of the Cold War era; or multipolar as during the time of the concert of the European powers that defeated Napoleon and modeled the international relations according to the principles established by the Congress of Vienna. This concept drives us towards two important definitions: structure and process.

Structure is defined according to the distribution of power within the system and process refers to patterns and types of interactions among its units.¹⁶

It is relevant to point that during the two different periods of bipolar structure, from 1871 to 1914, and from 1945 to 1990 the international system outcomes varied significantly. Why the two opposing blocs did not go to war? What kept the Cold War

from becoming hot? Only a high degree of interaction prevented WW III. What made a difference was the way that countries and alliances interacted, the patterns and types of interaction, the processes within the system. “When states communicate with one another and reach mutually beneficial agreements, or create well-understood norms and institutions they add to the repertoire of state strategies and can thus alter political outcomes.”¹⁷

The systemic approach must consider that within the international system the interacting units are dynamic subsystems that are composed of complex social, cultural, political, and economical interactions.

The historical evolution of the nation-state explains the creation of these non-state units: the international institutions. “As more civic and legal space opened up within and between states, the governments of the leading modern states found it to their advantage to create, or make room for, other types of organization to operate with a degree of independence defined by the state, and to undertake tasks that the state either could not do, or did not want to do.”¹⁸

Buzan and Little describe such units as international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) that are neither economic nor governmental, but address a wide spectrum of political and social interests; and the international governmental organizations (IGOs), that

although [they] do not have sufficient autonomous actor quality to count as units . . . are standing bodies set up by groups of states to serve particular collective interests. An IGO like the UN can only be characterized as an independent actor in the weakest sense. It is barely more than the sum of its parts, and exists much more to serve its members than to become an independent actor. It is important primarily as an institutionalized forum and network[,] which facilitates communication between states. The UN Secretary General has a little bit of

autonomy to speak on behalf of the world, but not much. The question about the actor quality of such IGOs comes into clearer perspective if they are seen as a kind of permanent conference. Conferences do not generally have actor quality. Some IGOs such as the IMF and the WTO may be moving towards more robust forms of actor quality, but even they are still essentially slaves to their state members. Amongst the IGOs, only the EU has clearly crossed the divide and begun to acquire status (albeit still ambiguous) as a unit with actor quality in its own right in the international system.¹⁹

In this work the open systems model will be applied both to the international system and to the units that interact within it, so that the conceptual model constitutes the general frame from which to analyze and discuss the interactions and outcomes.

We have already defined some elements that are fundamental, but there are still some to define. Any open system relies on the inputs it receives from its environment in order to produce the desired outputs; such inputs include funding, human resources, information, and knowledge. The desired outputs may be products, services, and ideas that are given back to the environment and also feedback the system. The environment includes all the units and conditions that are directly related to the system's operations and have not only an immediate impact on it, but also long-term effects. The purpose includes the strategies, the desired end-states (goals), the objectives (indicators), and the interests of the dominant units. The culture is made of shared norms, beliefs, values, symbols, and rituals; these are ultimately the identity or the nature of the system.²⁰

Power and the International System

The important point about any system, however, is that the whole pattern is greater than the sum of the parts. . . . Systems can create consequences not intended by any of their constituent actors.²¹

Joseph S. Nye, Jr., *Understanding International Conflicts, An Introduction to Theory and History*

In order to analyze the balance of power approach to the international system it is paramount to perceive that different units have different interaction capacities within the system. Some will be dominant, while others will have marginal impact on the system's outputs.

Theories based on power application and balances are state-centric and emphasize the political-military dominance on the interactions within the international system, disregarding other capacities as secondary. Realism is the main school based on such an approach, traditional and long-standing. It dates back to prominent statesmen and scholars like Machiavelli, Hamilton, Napoleon, Bismarck, Lenin, Morgenthau, and Kissinger, to mention a few.²²

Power is usually described as the "ability to get others to do what they otherwise would not do."²³ According to Thomas Hobbes, "Power is what people think it is until tested."²⁴ Such definitions clearly convey the high level of subjectivity and the difficulty to make it quantifiable, once one cannot be certain of others interests and strategies, nor on the validity of his own assumptions. Power is also highly situational and relative depending on whatever opposes it.

Innumerable scholars have attempted to measure potential power and such equations usually consider the possession of resources like population, territory, raw material, military forces, organization, economic magnitude, and political stability. From the analysis of such variables it is clear that power-based theories are state-centric.

Realism has been overly criticized for having failed to consider transnational units and the increasingly growing globalization and its consequent interdependence. It also disregards what today is defined as soft power, which is based on the social, political, and

diplomatic ability to set the stage and frame the debate on the conflicting issues. Soft power grows in importance in the postindustrial era due to the overarching informational environment which enhances the interaction capacity of international organizations and transnational units. “The twenty-first century will certainly see a greater role for informational and institutional power.”²⁵

Power Distribution and Balance of Power

The balance of power design never was truly a world system, since it was largely played in Europe by what were the major powers of the time. For a number of reasons, it is inapplicable to the modern world.²⁶

Amos A. Jordan, William J. Taylor, Jr., and Michael J. Mazarr, *American National Security*

The international system is dynamically structured according to the interactions amongst its units. The distribution of power within the system may characterize it as hegemonic, imperial or unipolar, as it was the time of the Roman Empire and the so called ‘Pax Romana’ that led to the idea that there is peace and stability when there is a dominant unit, a strong dominant Empire in this case. It may be bipolar as it was during the ascension of the British Empire and the decline of the Spanish Empire, during the struggle for hegemony between France and England, and during the Cold War era when the US and the Soviet Union played their global chess and developed the domino theory, when NATO and the Warsaw Pact alliances were for decades in the brink of WW III and the nuclear Armageddon; or it may be multipolar as it was the case of the Concert of Europe, agreed upon in 1815 in the Congress of Vienna, by the powers that defeated Napoleon in his quest for hegemony.

Such structural arrangements have in common the main belief that international relations are state-centric and are based on a model that renders hard power as the utmost factor to determine a unit's interaction capacity. Furthermore, some schools of thought just as the Realism and its new breed the Neorealism, advocate that such an arrangement is desirable because it provides stability and peace supported by arguments based on historical examples that might as well be used to illustrate oppression, imperialism, and times of a complete absence of ethics and morality in the interactions within the international system.

Other arguments used to criticize the conceptualization of the international system solely based on balance of power are: the foreign policies of France and Britain within the Western bloc, the breakaway actions of Yugoslavia and China in the Communist bloc, and the considerable number of states that tried to develop a nonaligned foreign policy in the Cold War era; facts that somehow shaped the current environment of the international system during the last sixty years.²⁷

We have previously emphasized the contrast between the bipolar periods of the Concert of Europe and the Cold War era, when despite the great propensity to confrontation, the processes established through the creation of the United Nations allowed the accommodation of the two conflicting superpowers. According to Constructivism this fact derives from the cultural, diplomatic, and social realms of international politics that shape the processes of the international system. Thus “constructivists have focused on important questions about identities, norms, culture, national interests, and international governance.”²⁸

World War I and the Concept of Collective Security

The international system in Europe during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was structured by the balance of power politics. The concerting powers would align to each other based on a power distribution aimed at preventing the hegemony of a single state or empire within the continent. It was in fact a mutually agreed structure and it relied upon a set of well defined rules or postulates of “realpolitik” that in summary stated that: power is amoral, thus there is no right or wrong once “the ends justify the means”; self-preservation of the state is the overriding rule; “there is no eternal allied nor perpetual enemy”; the unwillingness to act prompts others to action, therefore applied power is the driving force of international relations.²⁹

In the closing decade of the nineteenth century, history once more showed that the establishment of alliances and coalitions within two opposing blocs reduces the flexibility of the individual state diplomacy since it restrains the allied behaviors to a set of regulated patterns of interaction. Once the shifting actors, firstly Great Britain and secondly Germany, stopped swinging along the structured system and it changed from a multipolar to a bipolar one, the road to large scale war was clearly perceived but it was considered to be inevitable.

“World War I killed more than 15 million people . . . it destroyed three European empires, . . . the United States and Japan had become major powers, . . . it ushered in the Russian Revolution and the beginning of the ideological battles that racked the twentieth century.”³⁰

The League of Nations

My concept of the League of Nations is just this, it shall operate as the organized moral force of men throughout the world, and that whenever or wherever wrong and aggression are planned or contemplated, this searching light of conscience shall be turned upon them.³¹

Woodrow Wilson, *The Public Papers of Woodrow Wilson: War and Peace*

Balance of power politics was rendered responsible for the brutal and senseless slaughter. The social layer would not accept another crime to humanity and pacifism was the word of order. Liberals all over the world blamed the immorality of the former structure and under the leadership of Woodrow Wilson proposed to develop international institutions that would assure that law and democratic procedures could be applied at the resolution of international conflicts. President Wilson proclaimed that “The balance of power is the great game now forever discredited. The balance of power is the thing that we can do without in the future.”³²

Woodrow Wilson believed and applied the American power in order to forge an international security arrangement that would enable the practice of collective security. Such a concept advanced the principle that all states should unite against aggression, peace should be the foremost interest and any threat to a peaceful world should trigger the coalition of the willing. Collective security was the guardian of international law and the new structure had a bedrock principle that established the limits of sovereignty to peace and arbitration of conflicts.

President Wilson submitted to the US Congress on January 8, 1918 a peace program constituted of the historical Fourteen Points that should lead the world to the creation of the League of Nations “a general association of nations [that] must be formed

under specific covenants for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to great and small powers alike.”³³

Reality proved stronger than ideals and the American Senate, based on the Founding Fathers' advice to stay away from European contests of power and entangling alliances, refused to ratify the Covenant of the League of Nations that was part of the treaties that ended WWI and had been signed by the president. The foundation of such a structure was doomed to failure once the leading power at the time did not support it.

Once more balance of power should be played. France aimed at keeping German power checked, Britain turned to keep its colonial empire, and the United States refrained to play its role as a major power keeping its isolation in the Western Hemisphere.

Despite such setbacks the League became the diplomatic forum it was meant to be and for 12 years it fulfilled the world's expectations. Although when times demanded the dominant units' commitment to peace in order to deter the Japanese aggressive expansion, Italian late colonialism, and the Nazi threat, France and Britain chose appeasement at the expense of the smaller powers and the United States kept its isolationism. Such politics stimulated the application of realpolitik and finally to the formation of the two blocs that should confront each other at the cost of more than 50 million lives: the Axis Powers and the United Nations.

Power Politics, Disillusion and the Creation of the United Nations

The United Nations is not in any respect a [super state], able to act outside the framework of decisions by its member governments. It is an instrument for negotiation among, and to some extent for, governments. It is also an instrument for concerting action by governments in support of the Charter. Thus the United Nations can serve, but not substitute itself for, the efforts of its member governments.³⁴

Creating the United Nations

International organizations embody laws and norms that impose certain limits to nation-states sovereignty. “The exclusive aspects of the territorial states reinforce go-it-alone posturing and it is not without considerable reluctance that they seek community in organizations that transcend their unique character and peculiar stated purposes.”³⁵

The League of Nations, without the resolute support of France and Great Britain, and the participation of the United States, could not prevent Hitler’s Germany thrust towards conquest and expansion, nor could it stop Mussolini’s dream of reviving Rome’s glory at the expense of the sovereignty of small countries like Austria, Czechoslovakia, and Ethiopia.

The major weakness of the League was the fact that it could at best “recommend” to its members the employment of military forces, such provision that rested upon Article 10 “proved ineffectual because countries were not willing to place their troops at risk in battles that did not relate directly to their national interests, they refused to get involved.”³⁶

International organizations are as effective as their member-states want and allow them to be, according to the former UN Secretary-General, U Thant: “It is not surprising that the organization should often be blamed for failing to solve problems that have already been found to be insoluble by governments.”³⁷

In January, 1941, “at his State of the Union address to a joint session of Congress, Roosevelt began to outline his aims for a global peace.” The term United Nations was coined by President Roosevelt and on New Year’s Day, 1942, twenty-six nations signed the UN Declaration.

President Roosevelt was in doubt about two key issues: regionalism, a position favored by Winston Churchill who was a balance of power advocate, and the idea that “the four major powers, China, the Soviet Union, Great Britain and the United States, should act as policemen and provide the security for any world organization”³⁸ The other issue that accounted for much discussion and studies regarded the veto power of the so-called Big Four. In May 1942, the American policy was clearly established when Roosevelt reiterated to the Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov his “Four Policemen” philosophy. The veto power would remain a question for further discussion.

In 1944, at Dumbarton Oaks, Washington, D.C., Secretary of State Cordell Hull, Undersecretary Stettinius, and Leo Pasvolosky, a Russian-born economist who directed most of the State Department’s committees preparing the UN Charter since 1939, led the American delegation and managed to reach consensus on the basic framework for the world organization: “an eleven-member Security Council (with five permanent seats), a General Assembly, a Secretariat and various subagencies – as well as a Military Staff Committee composed of officers from the five permanent states to direct all UN enforcement actions.”³⁹

The role of regional organizations, the Security Council’s composition and the veto power were issues arduously discussed. The United States needed to accommodate its Western Hemisphere allies of the Pan-American Congress and the British position which favored a higher profile for regional organizations. Regarding the Security Council, President Roosevelt pressed for Brazil’s admission as a sixth permanent member and opposed the Russian proposal to give an absolute veto power to the five permanent members; fearing to be outvoted by the Western democracies Stalin proposed

membership for each of the sixteen Soviet republics. In September, after three months of discussion, Roosevelt “asked his officials to bring Dumbarton Oaks to a close and hold all unsettled questions in abeyance until his own get-together with Stalin and Churchill.”⁴⁰

Yalta and Roosevelt’s Legacy

Despite his fragile health, Roosevelt made “the hard, perhaps fatal trip to Yalta . . . [T]his [the UN creation] was the thing he was straining his strength to accomplish.”⁴¹ By the time the Yalta talks began Roosevelt’s spirits had revived, and he took the lead of the discussions. The UN membership, after much discussion, would be granted for those nations which had declared war on at least one of the Axis powers by 01 March. Argentina and the Soviet Republics membership, and the question of trusteeships were questions still to be solved. On February 11, President Roosevelt announced the UN Conference to be held in San Francisco, on 25 April.

Roosevelt “was intensely aware of the public yearning for some sort of an international body. The polls had shown it. Since Roosevelt’s Yalta meeting, over 80 percent of the American people had expressed a desire for US participation in a world assembly with the power to assure the peace.”⁴² He wanted the UN established right away and stated: “This time we shall not make the mistake of waiting until the end of the war to set up the machinery of peace. This time, as we fight together to get the war over quickly, we work together to keep it from happening again.”⁴³ Just thirteen days before the San Francisco Conference, Franklin Delano Roosevelt died.

Some four months later, Harry Truman would address the United Nations plenary and say: “Upon all of us, in all our countries, is now laid the duty of transforming into

action these words which you have written. Upon our decisive action rests the hope of those who have fallen, those now living, and those yet unborn--the hope for a world of free countries--with decent standards of living--which will work and cooperate in friendly, civilized community of nations.”⁴⁴

The Security Council and the Veto Power

The primary responsibility of the United Nations was to maintain the peace; therefore, the planning and writing of the UN Charter assumed the primacy of the Security Council, in which the great powers would have a privileged status. Initially composed of eleven members, currently fifteen, five were to be permanent: China, France, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and the United States. The other ten (originally six) were elected, by the General Assembly, for staggered two-year terms.

The UN Charter states, in its Article 23, that in the selection process for the Security Council, “due regard be specially paid, in the first instance to the contributions of members of the United Nations to the maintenance of international peace and security and to other purposes of the organization, and also to equitable geographical distribution.” In 1946, two elective Council seats were assigned to Latin America, and one each to Western Europe, Eastern Europe, the Middle East, and the British Commonwealth, an arrangement that assured the West a majority on the Council. Today, the ten permanent seats are allotted as follows: five seats to Asia and Africa, one to Eastern Europe, two to Latin America, and two to Western European and other states.⁴⁵

According to the UN Charter, the Security Council has two main functions: to settle disputes peacefully (Chapter VI) and to face threats to peace with the coordinated action of the organization (Chapter VII). The Council will preferably handle situations

under Chapter VI, rather than undertaking collective security actions under Chapter VII. The Korean War and the Persian Gulf War were two exceptions to this general rule. In order to apply either Chapter VI or VII, the Council deals with conflict through the following techniques: deliberations, investigations, recommendations, exhortations, mediation, conciliation, interposition of a peacekeeping presence, and in extreme cases economic sanctions and military operations.

There are a number of variables that determine what techniques are to be employed: “the political considerations involved the degree of unity on the Council, the extent of the danger to peace, and the relationship of the dispute and the disputants to Council members, especially the permanent members.”⁴⁶

It is important to highlight some of the processes of the Security Council decision-making process: its presidency rotates each month among its members. Any state, whether a UN member or not, must be invited to the discussions if it is a party to a dispute under the Council’s consideration. the decisions are considered to be either procedural, in which case it must be reached by the affirmative vote of nine of the Council’s members with equal voting power, or substantive, when the nine affirmative votes need the concurrence of the permanent members who are granted the veto power, if a Council’s member is a party to a dispute, it must abstain from voting.

During the efforts to create the United Nations the veto power became a sensitive issue. The Soviet Union, under Stalin, had major concerns about the possibility that a new world organization might turn into an alliance against its interests. In January 1943, the US Undersecretary of State Sumner Wells proposed to President Roosevelt a less than

absolute veto power to the Big Four, “by including representatives from global regions (this time seven regions, not five).”⁴⁷

At the San Francisco conference the major powers insisted on the veto power in reciprocity to their responsibility for maintaining the peace. The veto power issue involved concerns far greater than just great power status. “Without the concurrence of all the major powers the United Nations could conceivably find itself in the position of starting enforcement action that it could not finish for lack of cooperation from an essential collaborator. Worse yet, a decision to use force in the name of the United Nations over the objection of a state controlling large military forces could be the means of turning localized conflict into world war.”⁴⁸

Actually the UN has not had the military enforcement role anticipated by the major powers, but nevertheless all of the permanent members value its protection. The use of the veto has had a varying standard related to the international system power distribution and the UN General Assembly political blocs’ alignment.

In order to veto a substantive decision that is supported by at least nine Council’s members, a permanent member must cast a negative vote; a permanent member’s abstention from voting is not considered to constitute a veto.

Table 1. Vetoes in the Security Council, 1946 - 1997						
PERIOD	CHINA	FRANCE	BRITAIN	US	USSR/RUSSIA	TOTAL
1946-55	1	2	-	-	79	82
1956-65	-	2	3	-	26	31
1966-75	2	2	10	12	7	33
1976-85	-	9	11	34	6	60
1986-95	-	3	8	24	2	37
1996	-	-	-	-	-	-
1997*	1	-	-	2	-	3
TOTAL	4	18	32	72	120	246

*until 21 March 1997

Source: Office of the ASG for the Security Council, The United Nations, International Organizations and World Politics (Orlando: Harcourt College Publishers, 2000): 87.

The Chinese veto to the continuation of the United Nations Preventive Deployment Force (UNPREDEP) in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, in 1999, showed that the veto power could prevent the functioning of the UN due to political issues not related to the subject of a specific decision.

The UN General Assembly, in its resolution 48/26 of 03 December 93, established an Open-ended Working Group to study the questions of increase of the membership of the Security Council and other related matters. Regarding the veto power the Working group has proposed that the veto should be excluded when: discussing matters deemed as procedural as listed in the annex to General Assembly resolution 267 (III) of 14 April 1949; decisions are taken under Chapter VI of the Charter; calling upon parties to a conflict to abide by the rules of international humanitarian law; establishing consultations with troop contributing countries; deliberating about timing and modalities of submitting the report of the Security Council to the General Assembly; making recommendations in accordance with Articles 4, 5, 6 and 97 of the Charter; making

decisions taken under Article 40 relating to provisional measures; and implementing Article 50.⁴⁹

The General Assembly and the Equality Principle

The General Assembly has been designed to assure “the traditional equality of all states, large and small, under international law and as participants in international conferences” in order to provide the legitimacy of the other fundamental principle of majority rule, established on Article 18 of the UN Charter, that demands a two-thirds majority of members present and voting on decisions about important questions.

Since the framing of the UN Charter, the equality of voting rights has been the most persistent reason for dissatisfaction amongst larger states. The expansion of the United Nations after 1945 has enlarged the voting disparity of small states over large ones. Complainants argue that a two-thirds majority could be obtained by states representing less than 15 per cent of the world’s population.

The General Assembly has two main functions: a quasi-legislative role carried on through the adoption of resolutions, declarations, and conventions, seeking to develop and codify international law; and a budgetary function resembling national legislatures that approves and supervises all UN programs and activities.⁵⁰

Although the Security Council has the primary responsibility for international peace and security, the General Assembly also has a role: since 1950, when the Soviet Union veto power paralyzed the Security Council during the Korean War, the US Secretary of State Dean Acheson proposed the “Uniting for Peace” principle, which allowed to call an emergency meeting of the General Assembly if at least seven members of the Security Council or a majority of the members of the UN so wanted, authorizing

the General Assembly to make recommendations for economic or military sanctions if the Security Council is unable to deal with the threat to peace or act of aggression.⁵¹

New Hopes! New Challenges! The United Nations in the post-Cold War Era

The analysis of the number of vetoes cast from 1946 to 1997 clearly shows that the end of the Cold War represented an unparalleled era of cooperation amongst the permanent members of the Security Council.

Former Secretary of State and US Ambassador to the United Nations, Madeleine Albright recognized that by the beginning of the 1990s there were hopes that with the end of the Cold War no more games of global diplomacy would be played. It was a matter now of two sides, “one the good guys, the other the bad, in direct competition.”

The old time competing blocs now would work together to ensure stability. The crumbling Iron Curtain and the Soviet Union disintegration would account for most of the new challenges. But the United Nations was not capable of handling its expanding responsibilities.

Madeleine Albright states in her memoirs that the US administration “realized, well before Somalia, that if we were going to turn to UN peacekeeping more often, we needed to make it work better. By the time I took office, planners from the Pentagon, NSC, and State Department were hard at work on a detailed policy. The proposal, ultimately known as Presidential Decision Directive 25 (PDD-25) endorsed UN peacekeeping as an option. Its purpose was to put America squarely on the side of strengthening UN peacekeeping operations, with the understanding that we would henceforth make the chain of command clearer, and insist that such missions be carefully

planned, with a precise mandate, efficiently implemented, and preceded by a significant period of consultation with the Congress.”⁵²

Pérez de Cuéllar described the Security Council as “unable to take decisive action to resolve international conflicts.” He said that its resolutions, even when passed unanimously, “are increasingly defied or ignored by those that feel themselves strong enough to do so.”⁵³

The overwhelming 1990s proved that the United Nations had entered a new era of international cooperation, but a lot of work should be done to increase its capabilities and procedures to address the new challenges of worldwide instability and new threats.

Is the United Nations Effective? The Need to Reform!

We may be frustrated some times by the way the UN works, but at least for all its imperfections, it is a force for good and our desire is that it does more not less. If it did not exist, we would need to invent it.⁵⁴

Tony Blair, *UN Millennium Summit*

The reform of the Security Council has been extensively addressed and the UN General Assembly, in its resolution 48/26 of 03 December 93, established an Open-ended Working Group to study the questions of increase of the membership of the Security Council and other related matters.

The Open-ended Working Group’s report on the question of equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council makes proposals ranging from maintaining the veto power to establishing a time limit to the right of veto, which, by nature, should not be perpetual.⁵⁵

In 1995, “The official American position calls for: no change in the status and prerogatives of the current five permanent members; . . . Germany and Japan, because of

their global political and economic influence and their capacity for contributing to peace and security by concrete measures . . . should become permanent members of the Security Council; other states may aspire to permanent membership, but their qualifications do not equal those of Germany, Japan, and the P-5; . . . to preserve the effectiveness of the Council there should be a modest enlargement to no more than 20; . . . finally the US takes no position on extending the veto power to new permanent members.”⁵⁶

During the Millennium Summit, “the most frequently discussed issue for UN reform was the Security Council. It was mentioned 186 times by 94 countries.”⁵⁷ The Japanese Prime Minister, Mr. Yoshiro Mori stated: “I am convinced that a large majority of member states already support the expansion of the permanent and non-permanent membership of the Council, as well as the inclusion of both developing and developed countries in the expanded permanent membership.”⁵⁸

Thomas G. Weiss argues that while states like India, Brazil, Nigeria, and Egypt “believe that they deserve a greater say in the council’s decision-making; . . . countries like Canada that contribute troops routinely to all UN operations complain of being left out of decisions that affect their soldiers.” He further highlights that “Possibilities for long-term reform involve changes in the Security Council’s permanent membership; shorter-term changes involve longer and more frequent terms on the council for influential countries such as Japan, Germany, Nigeria, India, Egypt, and Brazil.” He brings about some instigating questions, which definitely must be thoroughly discussed and addressed while deciding on such issues: “Which developing countries should be added? Why should they be the most powerful or populous? Why should economic

powers whose constitutions impede overseas military involvement be given a seat?

Should there be three European members? What about the European Union (EU)? Which countries should wield vetoes?⁵⁹

¹Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, *Power and Interdependence* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1977): 24.

²Quoted in Stephen Schlesinger, *Act of Creation: The Founding of the United Nations* (Boulder: Westview Press, 2003): xv.

³Joseph S. Nye, Jr., *Understanding International Conflicts, An Introduction to Theory and History, Harvard University* (2003): 13.

⁴*Ibid.*, 3.

⁵Barry Buzan and Richard Little, *International Systems in World History: Remaking the Study of International Relations* (Oxford: New York Oxford University Press (UK), 2000): 248.

⁶Microsoft Encarta Reference Library, 2004 ed., “Hanseatic League.”

⁷Barry Buzan and Richard Little, *International Systems in World History: Remaking the Study of International Relations* (Oxford, UK: New York Oxford University Press, 2000): 246.

⁸*Ibid.*, 2.

⁹*Ibid.*, 264.

¹⁰Joseph S. Nye, Jr., *Understanding International Conflicts: An Introduction to Theory and History, Harvard University* (2003): 3.

¹¹*Ibid.*, 32.

¹²Microsoft Encarta Reference Library, 2004 ed., “System.”

¹³Barry Buzan and Richard Little, *International Systems in World History: Remaking the Study of International Relations* (Oxford: New York Oxford University Press (UK), 2000): 2.

¹⁴*Ibid.*, 34.

¹⁵Joseph S. Nye, Jr., *Understanding International Conflicts, An Introduction to Theory and History, Harvard University* (2003): 5.

¹⁶Ibid., 36.

¹⁷Ibid., 37.

¹⁸Barry Buzan and Richard Little, *International Systems in World History : Remaking the Study of International Relations* (Oxford: New York Oxford University Press (UK), 2000): 267.

¹⁹Ibid., 267.

²⁰Michael I. Harrison, *Diagnosing Organizations: Methods, Models, and Processes* (Newbury Park: SAGE Publications Ltd. (USA), 1991): 23.

²¹Joseph S. Nye, Jr., *Understanding International Conflicts, An Introduction to Theory and History, Harvard University* (2003): 33.

²²Amos A. Jordan, William J. Taylor, Jr., and Michael J. Mazarr, *American National Security* (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1999): 13.

²³Joseph S. Nye, Jr., *Understanding International Conflict, An Introduction to Theory and History* (New York: Harvard University, 2003): 59.

²⁴Quoted in Jordan, Taylor, and Mazarr, *American National Security* (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1999): 9.

²⁵Joseph S. Nye, Jr., *Understanding International Conflict, An Introduction to Theory and History* (New York: Harvard University, 2003): 61.

²⁶Quoted in Joseph S. Nye, Jr., *Understanding International Conflict, An Introduction to Theory and History* (New York: Harvard University, 2003): 88.

²⁷Amos A. Jordan, William J. Taylor, Jr., and Michael J. Mazarr, *American National Security* (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1999): 7.

²⁸Quoted in Joseph S. Nye, Jr., *Understanding International Conflict, An Introduction to Theory and History* (New York: Harvard University, 2003): 7.

²⁹Amos A. Jordan, William J. Taylor, Jr., and Michael J. Mazarr, *American National Security* (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1999): 14.

³⁰Joseph S. Nye, Jr., *Understanding International Conflict, An Introduction to Theory and History* (New York: Harvard University, 2003): 67.

³¹Quoted in Joseph S. Nye, Jr., *Understanding International Conflict, An Introduction to Theory and History* (New York: Harvard University, 2003): 88.

³²Ibid., 85.

³³Quoted in Ziring, Riggs, and Plano, *The United Nations, International Organizations and World Politics* (Orlando: Harcourt College Publishers, 2000):10.

³⁴Quoted in Ziring, Riggs, and Plano, *The United Nations, International Organizations and World Politics* (Orlando: Harcourt College Publishers, 2000): 7.

³⁵Lawrence Ziring, Robert E. Riggs, and Jack C. Plano, *The United Nations: International Organization and World Politics* (Orlando: Harcourt College Publishers, 2000): 1.

³⁶Stephen Schlesinger, *Act of Creation: the founding of the United Nations* (Boulder: Westview Press, 2003): 26.

³⁷Quoted in Thomas G. Weiss, David P. Forsythe, and Roger A. Coate, *The United Nations and Changing World Politics* (Boulder: Westview Press, 2001): 75.

³⁸Stephen Schlesinger, *Act of Creation: the founding of the United Nations* (Boulder: Westview Press, 2003): 37.

³⁹*Ibid.*, 45.

⁴⁰*Ibid.*, 47.

⁴¹Quoted in Stephen Schlesinger, *Act of Creation: The founding of the United Nations* (Boulder: Westview Press, 2003): 53.

⁴²*Ibid.*, 7.

⁴³Quoted in Stephen Schlesinger, *Act of Creation: the founding of the United Nations* (Boulder: Westview Press, 2003): 59.

⁴⁴*Ibid.*, 264.

⁴⁵Lawrence Ziring, Robert E. Riggs, and Jack C. Plano, *The United Nations: International Organization and World Politics* (Orlando: Harcourt College Publishers, 2000): 49.

⁴⁶*Ibid.*, 50.

⁴⁷Stephen Schlesinger, *Act of Creation: the founding of the United Nations* (Boulder: Westview Press, 2003): 38.

⁴⁸Lawrence Ziring, Robert E. Riggs, and Jack C. Plano, *The United Nations: International Organization and World Politics* (Orlando: Harcourt College Publishers, 2000): 86.

⁴⁹United Nations, *Report of the General Assembly Working Group on SC Reform for 2000*, available from: <http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/reform/oewg/scref00.htm>; Internet; accessed 15 October 2003.

⁵⁰Lawrence Ziring, Robert E. Riggs, and Jack C. Plano, *The United Nations: International Organization and World Politics* (Orlando: Harcourt College Publishers, 2000): 46.

⁵¹*Ibid.*, 45.

⁵²Madeleine Albright, *Madam Secretary: a memoir* (New York: Miramax Books, 2003): 147.

⁵³Quoted in Stanley Meisler, *United Nations: The First Fifty Years* (New York: The Atlantic Monthly Press, 1995): 239.

⁵⁴Jerome C. Glenn, Elizabeth Florescu, and Theodore J. Gordon, *Analysis of the UN Millennium Summit Speeches* (Atlanta: US Army Environmental Policy Institute, 2001): 27.

⁵⁵United Nations, *Report of the General Assembly Working Group on SC Reform for 2000*, available on the internet: <http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/reform/oewg/scref00.htm>; Internet; accessed on 10/15/2003.

⁵⁶Benjamin Rivlin, *UN Reform from the Standpoint of the United States*, available from: <http://www.unu.edu/unupress/lecture11.html>; Internet; accessed 15 October 2003.

⁵⁷United Nations, *Report of the General Assembly Working Group on SC Reform for 2000*, available on the internet: <http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/reform/oewg/scref00.htm>; Internet; accessed on 10/15/2003.

⁵⁸Quoted in United Nations, *Report of the General Assembly Working Group on SC Reform for 2000*, available on the internet: <http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/reform/oewg/scref00.htm>; Internet; accessed on 10/15/2003.

⁵⁹Thomas G. Weiss, David P. Forsythe, and Roger A. Coate, *The United Nations and Changing World Politics* (Boulder: Westview Press, 2001): 123.

CHAPTER 3

ASSESSING THE UNITED NATIONS INTERVENTIONS

The United Nations is not in any respect a [super state], able to act outside the framework of decisions by its member governments. It is an instrument for negotiation among, and to some extent for, governments. It is also an instrument for concerting action by governments in support of the Charter. Thus the United Nations can serve, but not substitute itself for, the efforts of its member governments.¹

New York Times Magazine

Methodology

The United Nations is a system within the international system. Its structure, processes, and member states interact within the environment which is constituted by the organization itself and the whole world. Therefore, the organizational diagnosis methodology, which is successfully used to diagnose both public and private organizations, can be applied in order to analyze the interaction capacity of the United Nations (UN) system and its different units within the international system. It is paramount to keep in mind that some units will be dominant, while others will just have a marginal impact on the system's inputs, processes, and outputs.

This methodology fits our research because it is practically-oriented and effectiveness-focused, once it analyzes how the organizations outcomes (services, products, or ideas) are tied to the organizations inputs, processes, and how the environment impacts them. Therefore, it is possible to objectively assess the successes and failures of past UN operations and diagnose the relevant causes for such outcomes.

Organizational diagnosis uses the knowledge of behavioral science not only to assess the present status of an institution, but also to recommend structural changes and procedural improvements.

The open-systems approach permits an objective analyses of the interactions amongst key players of the UN decision-making process, of their political relationship within the international system and within the UN, of how different members' interdependencies play during a conflict resolution and the UN functioning, and on the impacts of structural factors such as the Security Council constituency and decision-making process.²

This work will focus on the preferred or desired UN level of responsiveness and legitimacy, while conducting a diagnosis on how the UN system performed in the four case studies, based on an objective assessment of the analytical questions that lead to the established criteria.³

The Conceptual Model

The open-systems model is especially suitable for organizational diagnosis, because its features enable analyses of a system within a broader context. It takes into account several characteristics that better reflect not only the dynamic interactions within the system's units, but also the impacts the system suffers from its environment.

Organizations are influenced by external conditions on a number of different ways. The environment affects the flow of inputs or resources, the decision-making process, and the organizations outputs.

The more effective the organization is in attaining its goals, the less effort and resources are consumed to keep it working. The organization effectiveness will contribute

to the way the environment perceives it, therefore impacting on the continued flow of resources and increasing its interaction capacity.

The system's elements: its inputs and outputs or outcomes; its structure; its members; its processes; its culture; and its surrounding environment all are interconnected and influence one another. Any structural change will affect the different units' interaction capacity. The environment may prompt the need for structural change. Structural changes will impact the internal and external relationships as well as the organization's culture and processes.

It is also important to keep in mind that systems are always changing. The international system has evolved from tribes and city-states until it finally reached the chaotic nation-state environment. The power distribution alternated from the imperial system, to bipolar and multipolar systems dynamically evolving and influencing all its units.

The paramount reason for the system's existence is its effectiveness. A system that is no longer capable of functioning accordingly will inevitably disappear or will be gradually replaced by another system or concurring processes. Therefore, the United Nations must be able to assess its weaknesses and strengths, and adapt to the new demands of today's world.

Research Design

In order to answer the primary research questions of whether the present UN Security Council structure reflects the current international system geopolitical realities, if its decision-making process is responsive enough to tackle today's threats to peacetime operations, and if its control of peace operations assures the legitimacy of the United

Nations interventions, this work will analyze the UN operations in the Korean War; the Suez Canal crisis; the operations in Bosnia performed by UNPROFOR; and the liberation of Kuwait in the Gulf War I.

These analyses will be based on screening criteria that will assess the responsiveness and legitimacy of the UN system, so that the reasons for success and setbacks can be objectively diagnosed. Therefore, the screening criteria were further divided into the following analytical questions:

1. How did the Security Council interact to come to one or more resolutions to allow UN intervention?
2. Did the veto power of the Security Council permanent members block its functioning?
3. How many members contributed to the UN force and how relevant were their contributions?
4. Was there any leading nation or major contributor to the UN force? Did its national interest cause any deviation to the UN mandate from its initial purposes?
5. Was there any UN member supporting the opposing forces?
6. Were there combat operations between the UN forces and any of the warring parties? How many casualties resulted from the UN intervention?

Screening Criteria

The goal of this research is to objectively assess the UN operations and to diagnose the reasons for the success or setbacks. The screening criteria are closely related to the answers of the analytical questions.

Criterion one is related to the responsiveness of the Security Council decision-making process. The answers to questions 1 and 2 will establish if the resolutions were achieved through consensus or if any permanent member applied its veto power. It will also address the length of time that was necessary to come to the final resolution. This criterion assumes that the more difficult and the longer the process for the UN Security Council to reach a resolution, the less responsive was the decision-making process; and if the UN resolution had to be approved by the General Assembly, the Security Council did not perform the function it was designed for, demonstrating the need for reform of its structure and decision-making process

Criterion two is concerned with the legitimacy of the UN operation. The bigger the commitment of the UN members, and the more independent from member states' national interests the more legitimate the UN intervention. Therefore this criterion relies on the findings of questions number 3, 4, 5, and 6.

Conclusions

The success of a UN intervention mainly relies on the findings related to the second criterion, once its main purpose is to preserve world peace according to international law and fostering the multilateral cooperation.

The evidence collected regarding the first criterion will determine the needs for structural and procedural reforms, so that the Security Council structure and processes will be less vulnerable to conflicting national interests, therefore shielding the organization from member states' biased diplomacy and power politics.

The findings regarding criterion two will be the foundations for recommendations aiming at ensuring the United Nations' necessary degree of command and control of its

operations, so that the organization's military enforcements of its resolutions are thoroughly planned and legitimately executed.

¹Quoted in Ziring, Riggs, and Plano, *The United Nations, International Organizations and World Politics* (Orlando: Harcourt College Publishers, 2000): 7.

²Michael I. Harrison, *Diagnosing Organizations, Methods, Models, and Processes* (Newbury Park: Sage Publications, 1987): vii.

³*Ibid.*, 3.

CHAPTER 4

ANALYZING THE UNITED NATIONS PEACE OPERATIONS

The UN in the Beginning Years of the Cold War

The final days of WW II led to the division of the Korean peninsula along the thirty-eighth parallel due to a military control measure. In August 1945, just two days after the atomic bombing of Hiroshima, and three days before the Japanese surrender, the Soviet Union declared war against Japan. The US forces would land in Korea only in September, therefore, “the dividing line was picked by Colonel Dean Rusk and another young officer in the Pentagon only because it was easy to make out on a map.”¹

The Allies agreed on the US proposal that the Japanese troops north of the dividing line should surrender to the Soviet troops, while those on the south ought to do so to the Americans. During the war the allies envisaged Korea as a united and independent country, but the military control measure was bound to become a border between two hostile countries.

Americans and Russians could not come to an agreement on how the country's reunification should unfold. The main issue concerned the sharing of power between the northern and the southern portions of Korea. The Russians wanted an equally shared power, whereas the Americans pressed for elections under UN supervision. The former allies took the impasse to the UN in 1947. The General Assembly passed a resolution establishing separate UN-supervised elections to constitute a unified national assembly. These elections, supervised by a UN Commission, put in power a conservative in the

south and a communist in the north. There were now two governments claiming to represent a unified Korea.

American and Soviet troops withdrew, but the UN Commission stayed along with observers stationed along the thirty-eighth parallel in order to prevent conflict between the two hostile governments.

Analyzing the UN Operation in the Korean War

The first coercive action taken in the name of the United Nations concerned the Korean peninsula. UN involvement in this crisis merits careful attention because some observers consider the UN to have engaged in a type of collective security there between 1950 and 1953. Others call UN involvement in Korea a police action. Still others consider the UN role in Korea a unique experience defying standard definition.²

Thomas G. Weiss, *The United Nations and Changing World Politics*

In June 1950, North Korean (the Democratic Republic of Korea) forces attacked South Korea (the Republic of Korea). The UN Commission and its observers provided immediate confirmation on the North Korean aggression would trigger the first major test of the voluntary collective security international organism.

The Americans perceived the attack as a clear Soviet sponsored test of the US resolve to contain the spread of Communism. “They believed in a strong United Nations and intended to act with UN approval and under a UN umbrella.”³

A Security Council emergency meeting called upon its eleven members to deliberate about the US sponsored resolution. On Sunday, 25 June, at 6 p.m., within eighteen hours of the first warning to the UN Secretary-General Trygve Lie about the North Korean aggression, the Security Council had approved a resolution that considered North Korea guilty of a breach of peace, and demanded its forces withdrawal north of the

thirty-eighth parallel and an immediate cessation of hostilities. The resolution called on all members to help carry it on and asked the UN members to deny any assistance to North Korea.

It is important to note that the Soviet Union representative to the Security Council, Jacob Malik, had been boycotting the Security Council during the last six months because China's seat was occupied by the Chiang Kai-shek Nationalist government that escaped to Formosa, instead of the Communist government of Mao Tse-tung. Therefore the Security Council members that approved the US sponsored resolution were: Cuba, Ecuador, Egypt, France, India, Norway, the UK, the USA, and the Chinese Nationalist government of Formosa; Yugoslavia abstained from voting.

The American resolve to respond to such an attempt to expand Communism was clearly stated by the Secretary of State Dean Acheson: "If he had appeared [the Soviet representative to the Security Council] we would immediately have adjusted ourselves to that and taken some other action, either through the General Assembly or unilaterally."⁴ Furthermore, the US embassy in Moscow described the North Korean aggression as a "clear-cut Soviet challenge which in our considered opinion [the] US should answer firmly and swiftly as it constitutes a direct threat [to] our leadership of [the] free world against the Soviet communist imperialism."⁵

By Monday, 26 June, the South Korean forces were fleeing southwards. The government of the Republic of Korea was transferred to a port near Pusan on the southeast tip of the Korean Peninsula. General MacArthur informed Washington that the South Korean forces were on the verge of a total collapse. President Truman decided to commit fully the US military in support of the Republic of Korea, to station the Seventh

Fleet between China and Formosa, and “to submit a resolution to the Security Council that would call on all members of the UN to come to the military aid of South Korea.”⁶

On Tuesday, 27 June, the Security Council adopted one more US-proposed resolution calling on all the UN members to provide “assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the attack and to restore international peace and security in the area.”⁷ This resolution granted the US president the legal authority to commit troops to defend South Korea. It was approved by seven votes, the USSR was still absent, and Egypt, India, and Yugoslavia abstained. Therefore, the resolution was passed with the bare majority needed for approval.

On 7 July, the Security Council once more approved a resolution by seven to nothing, establishing a unified UN command in Korea under American leadership. The next day President Truman announced that he had assigned General MacArthur as UN commander.

How did the Security Council interact to come to one or more resolutions to allow UN intervention?

Initially the Security Council worked perfectly and approved, within eighteen hours of the first warnings, a resolution condemning the North Korean aggression; within the next forty-eight hours a second resolution was approved calling for the UN members’ assistance to the Republic of Korea to restore international peace and security in the area, and in ten more days, a third resolution was approved establishing a unified UN command under US leadership. These three resolutions were approved in a timely manner and provided the necessary Security Council’s initiatives to allow the execution of the UN mission.

It is important to highlight that at the time of the approval of the aforementioned resolutions, neither the Soviet Union, nor continental China were represented in the Security Council.

By the end of July the Soviet representative informed that not only would he return to his seat at the Security Council on August 1, but also would he take over the council's presidency, for it was the Soviet Union's turn for that month-long duty. This event would trigger the Security Council paralysis once the Soviet Union veto power obstructed any resolution condemning North Korea.

Did the veto power of the Security Council permanent members' block its functioning?

Once the Soviet representative had returned to the Security Council and started to block its functioning based on the Soviet Union veto power, subsequent resolutions had to be approved by the UN General Assembly. Therefore, it is clear that the initial responsiveness of the Security Council was later to prove anomalous, the Security Council would settle into its usual structure and process where it could not function at all, due to the diverging national interests of two of its permanent members: the Soviet Union and the US.

In order to overcome the Soviet-imposed paralysis of the Security Council, the US Secretary of State Dean Acheson proposed the "Uniting for Peace" plan prescribing that seven members of the Security Council or a majority of the members of the UN could call an emergency meeting of the General Assembly whenever a veto blocked action by the Security Council. The United States controlled two-thirds of the General Assembly votes.

According to the UN Charter, a General Assembly resolution, unlike a Security Council one is not legally binding on all members. Such constraint did not matter to the US once it was the main contributor and the leader of the UN forces in Korea. The US proposition was adopted by a vote of fifty-two to five, with two abstentions.

The legitimacy of the UN operation is tied to its members' commitment, and to its operations' independence from member states' national interests.

How many members contributed to the UN force and how relevant were their contributions?

Only sixteen countries contributed to the UN force either with ground troops or air support units. The US was the major contributor and the other fifteen countries accounted for less than 10 percent of the troops. Besides seven NATO countries and two members of the Commonwealth, only Colombia from Latin America, Thailand and the Philippines from Asia, and Ethiopia and South Africa from Africa provided troops.

At that time there were sixty member-states in the United Nations, therefore roughly 25 percent of the UN members joined the first UN effort to restore peace and stability.

Despite US diplomatic efforts during the three years of war to get more UN members on board, only fifteen countries sent ground troops or air support units: Britain, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand formed a Commonwealth Division; Turkey contributed with 6,000 troops that "earned a reputation of relentless courage"; Greece, Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands were the other NATO contributing countries; Colombia was the only contributor in Latin America; Thailand and the Philippines were the only Asian countries to join the UN effort; from Africa came ground troops from

Ethiopia and an air squadron from South Africa. The Korean War was mainly “an American crusade against Communist aggression.”⁸

The UN Secretary-General Trygve Lie believed that the American rejection of his proposal to create a UN committee to coordinate the offers of military assistance and to monitor the pace of the fighting, ensuring the Security Council control of the operations through the supervision of its Military Staff Committee in accordance with Article 43 of the UN Charter that prescribed “agreements transferring national military units to the UN”⁹, hindered the American appeal to other UN members. “For the Pentagon, the proposal smacked too much of UN meddling. In practice, the American disdain for any responsibility to the UN was so great that General MacArthur’s reports to the Security Council were released to the press in Tokyo before they showed up in New York.”¹⁰

Another reason that prevented the UN members from contributing to the fight, according to Max Hastings, was “Washington’s determination to justify the war as an anti-Communist crusade only made allies skittish about taking part in an adventure that could lead to world war with the Soviet Union. To make matters worse, General MacArthur’s defiance of Washington with bellicose pronouncements about the need to take the war to China made officials wary of putting their troops under his command.”¹¹

It is important to understand that the world was in the beginning years of the Cold War that divided it into a Western capitalist bloc, mainly represented by the NATO alliance, and the Communist bloc that encompassed Eastern Europe, continental China, and the Soviet Union.

Another relevant analytical question that addresses the legitimacy of a UN peace operation concerns the interference of a more powerful member-state, that according to

the open systems model is a unit of action which is also a system in itself, regarding the resources available, the UN processes, and the outputs of the organization. Therefore, I have established the following analytical questions: Was there any leading nation or major contributor to the UN force? Did its national interest cause any deviation to the UN mandate from its initial purposes? Was there any UN member supporting the opposing forces?

The US provided the bulk of the UN troops and the commander of the UN unified command. The Truman administration referred to the Korean War as “an American crusade against Communist aggression.” Undoubtedly the US leadership not only established the military objectives of the whole operation, but also the overall strategic objectives.

Overall the US provided “more than half of the ground forces, 85 percent of the naval forces, and nearly 95 percent of the air contingents, with South Korea providing most of the remaining personnel. Less than 10 percent came from the other contributors.”¹²

The bold military landing in Inchon reversed the odds of the Korean War. By 1 October 50, the UN forces controlled all of South Korea and massed at the thirty-eighth parallel in less than three months from the beginning of the combat operations. At the UN, according to Trygve Lie, there was a feeling of elation and high and successful purpose. “This was Korea, not Manchuria. . . . This was the United Nations, not the League of Nations.”¹³

The military success was too tempting for the Americans to stop at the thirty-eighth parallel. “Korea would be united just the way the United States had promised during World War II.

The Truman administration changed its war aims: The UN would not just repel an invasion but would destroy the North Korean army and unite the country.”¹⁴ The US Secretary of State addressed the General Assembly demanding that the North Korean forces should not be granted a refuge north of the thirty-eighth parallel, “because that would recreate a threat to the peace of Korea and of the world.”

A British-sponsored resolution was approved by a vote of forty-five to five, with seven abstentions, “recommending that appropriate steps be taken to ensure conditions of stability throughout Korea.”¹⁵ This twist in the initial objective, almost already achieved, led to the Chinese intervention in the Korean War with 260,000 troops and to three more years of war and mounting casualties on both sides.

The Truman administration realized that the stakes were too high, but General MacArthur was out of control and close to insubordination. “British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin cabled the British ambassador in Washington, Our principal difficulty is General MacArthur. His policy is different from the policy of UN He seems to want a war with China. We do not.”¹⁶

General MacArthur’s ultimate challenge to President Truman’s strategy to end the Korean War occurred in March 1951. At that time the opposing forces reached a stalemate along the thirty-eighth parallel, where 365,000 UN troops faced 486,000 Chinese and North Korean troops; President Truman had decided to drive towards a peace settlement, “the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the State Department prepared a draft for

a declaration noting that, since the “aggressors have been driven back . . . to the general vicinity from which the unlawful attack was first launched,” the UN was ready to enter negotiations for a settlement that could include [the] withdrawal of all foreign troops from Korea.”¹⁷ While the draft declaration was circulating amongst the contributing countries and other key players including General MacArthur, the UN commander arrogated the declaration by issuing his own ultimatum to the Chinese that doomed any chance for a negotiated settlement and prolonged the war for more two years.

Finally, after “MacArthur’s letter to Congress advocating the use of Chiang Kai-shek’s troops in Korea and insisting that if the UN failed to defeat Communism in all-out war in Asia, . . . the fall of Europe is inevitable.”¹⁸ On 10 April, President Truman dismissed him from the UN command. The dismissal “pleased many of America’s UN allies. In Paris, Premier Robert Schuman expressed his “heartfelt thankfulness” at the dismissal, for he feared that the Truman administration “had almost lost control of the situation.” Truman said years later, “I fired him because he wouldn’t respect the authority of the President.”¹⁹

General Matthew B. Ridgway took over from MacArthur with the orders to hold the position along the thirty-eighth parallel to allow the political attempts to negotiate a settlement to the Korean War. The first peaceful talks occurred in July 1951. Although negotiations were underway the fighting did not stop, and an armistice was finally signed on July 27, 1953, three years after the North Korean aggression.

As aforementioned these were the initial years of the Cold War and the Soviet Union, although without directly involving troops in the war, was supporting North

Korea both diplomatically and politically. Its position at the UN Security Council as a permanent member with veto power blocked the council's functioning.

Were there combat operations between the UN forces and any of the warring parties? How many casualties resulted from the UN intervention?

The Korean War was a long and bloody conflict that accounted for more than 2 million casualties, "almost half coming after negotiations began"²⁰: on the UN side 85 per cent of the casualties were South Korean troops that had 415,000 soldiers killed and 429,000 wounded, American troops accounted for 10 per cent with 33,629 killed and 105,785 wounded, and the remaining 5 per cent were troops from the other fifteen contributing UN; the British Commonwealth Division had 1,263 killed and 4,817 wounded; and the other UN troops suffered 1,800 killed and 8,000 wounded; it has been estimated that between 500,000 and 1.5 million North Korean and Chinese were killed during the war.

The Suez Canal Crisis and the Birth of UN Peacekeeping Operations

"In major conflicts of interest, international law may not restrain states, but it often helps to shape the flow of policy. Law is part of the power struggle. Cynics may say these are just games that lawyers play; but the very fact that governments find it important to make legal arguments or to take the resolutions of international organizations into account shows they are not completely insignificant. To put it in an aphorism: "When claims to virtue are made by vice, then at least we know virtue has a price."²¹ (2003, 166)

Joseph S. Nye, Jr., *Understanding International Conflicts*

Built by the British and the French in the nineteenth century, in 1956 the Suez Canal accounted for "a quarter of the British imports."²² The Suez Canal carried twice as much business as the Panama Canal. British ships were the leading transporters of all the

goods that passed through the canal and the United States was second. French shareholders were the majority in the company that explored the canal's revenues.

“The Suez Canal has proved to be a profitable enterprise for its original investors. In 1955 gross receipts amounted to \$92,730,574, while all expenses amounted to \$43,208,171. It is estimated that Great Britain's original investment has been repaid eight times.”²³

The crisis started when the military coup that dethroned King Farouk in 1951 brought to the political scene a lieutenant-colonel that would become the Prime Minister in 1954, Gamal Abdel Nasser, who longed to be the hero of Pan-Arabism.

Nasser's nationalism and anti-western rhetoric infuriated not only the British and French prime ministers, but also the US Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles. Nasser also had a clear political objective: “One of my goals is to destroy Israel.”²⁴

Eisenhower did not condemn Nasser's nationalization of the Suez Canal. Differing from Britain and France, he believed and stated, “All countries have the right to take over property on their territory so long as they compensate the owners.” Eisenhower further “argued that resorting to force at such a stage . . . would weaken, perhaps even destroy, the United Nations.” He did not rule out a military intervention but stressed that it should be used as a last resort. “The step you contemplate should not be undertaken until every peaceful means of protecting the rights and the livelihood of great portions of the world had been thoroughly explored and exhausted.”²⁵

Although the British Prime Minister Sir Anthony Eden firmly believed that “the United Nations was founded as a means to an end, to keep the peace” he also perceived the problems with the Security Council processes. “The abuse of the veto in the Council

has restricted the opportunities of the greater powers to exercise diplomatic leadership.” In a meeting in Paris, both the United Kingdom and France “agreed that we must not allow our case to be submerged or manoeuvred [*sic*] into a backwater at the United Nations.”²⁶

Analyzing the United Nations Response

In August and early September of 1956, the British and Americans proposed the establishment of a Suez Canal user’s association that would control a nationalized canal; Nasser rejected the proposal.

In pursuance of his goal of destroying Israel, Nasser instigated cross-border guerrilla attacks that led to the Israeli appeal to Article 51 of the UN Charter claiming that it would resort to force in self-defense.

On 29 October 1956, Israeli troops attacked across the Sinai Peninsula to join with their paratroopers that landed near Suez. Meanwhile, the British Prime Minister Anthony Eden informed the British Parliament “that he [*sic*] and the French Premier Guy Mollet had issued an ultimatum to both Israel and Egypt to halt their fighting or face a British-French seizure of the Suez Canal.”²⁷

“The collusion of Britain, France, and Israel was officially sealed in a series of secret meetings at a villa in the Parisian suburb of Sèvres for three days from October 22 to October 24. Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion and Army Chief of Staff Moshe Dayan flew in from Israel aboard a French military plane. Ben-Gurion, Pineau, and Dean signed a secret protocol on 24 October. The proceedings were so secret that Eden was upset when he heard that an actual document had been signed.”²⁸

How did the Security Council interact to come to one or more resolutions to allow UN intervention?

The Security Council Ambassadors as well as the US President Eisenhower perceived that the former colonial powers were acting in complicity with Israel, and that the Israeli attack was just a pretext for the Franco-British intervention. Such suspicion would later be proved right, and the UN reaction backed by both the United States and the Soviet Union set the principles for future peacekeeping operations.

The following day Mr. Henry Cabot Lodge, supported by the Soviet Union, introduced a resolution demanding that Israeli forces withdraw to the armistice lines of 1949. The British Ambassador Pierson Dixon stated to Lodge that he would not support the resolution. The Security Council action was prevented by the British and the French vetoes. It was the first time that the British had ever used the veto. Yugoslavia invoked the Uniting for Peace Resolution devised by Dean Acheson during the Korean War to bypass Soviet vetoes.

On 31 October, the UN Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld made a statement at the Security Council: “The principles of the Charter are, by far, greater than the Organization in which they are embodied, and the aims which they are to safeguard are holier than the policies of any single nation or people.”²⁹

On 1 November, in the opening of the emergency session of the General Assembly, US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles said “We speak on a matter of vital importance where the United States finds itself unable to agree with the three nations with which it has ties of deep friendship, and two of which constitute our oldest and most trusted and reliable allies.”³⁰ Secretary Dulles then introduced the American resolution

demanding a withdrawal of all forces which was passed by a vote of sixty-four to five, with six abstentions; only Australia and New Zealand joined Britain, France, and Israel. During the debates the Canadian Prime Minister Lester Pearson, who abstained from voting the American resolution, called for a cease-fire and prompted the United Nations to plan for an international emergency force.

On 7 November, the General Assembly accepted the Secretary General's report and instructed him to establish the first UN peacekeeping operation in history: the UN Emergency Force (UNEF I). Hammarskjöld named the Canadian Lieutenant General E. L. M. Burns, Chief of Staff for the UN observers assigned to UNEF I.

How many members contributed to the UN force and how relevant were their contributions? Was there any leading nation or major contributor to the UN force? Did its national interest cause any deviation to the UN mandate from its initial purposes? Was there any UN member supporting the opposing forces?

The legitimacy of the UN operation was so clear that the member-states commitment was overwhelming: the UN effort was so welcomed by its members that there were more offers of troops than needed. There was neither a major contributor nor any leading nation: "UNEF I fielded six thousand troops from ten countries: Brazil, Canada, Colombia, Denmark, Finland, India, Indonesia, Norway, Sweden, and Yugoslavia."³¹

On 15 November, the first Danish "Blue Helmets" arrived in Egypt, followed by the first Colombians the next day who were accompanied by Hammarskjöld "who would spend three days in Egypt negotiating the conditions for the stay of the troops with Nasser and Foreign Minister Fawzi."³² They agreed that though the UNEF I forces would

replace the Franco-British forces in the Suez Canal area they would have nothing to deal with the canal zone after the withdrawal of the European forces. On 22 December 1956, the last British and French forces were evacuated from Port Said, and six days later salvage work on the Canal was begun. Thirty-two salvage vessels under United Nations direction undertook removal of the hulks of sunken vessels and shattered bridges that blocked passage of traffic through the waterway.

Were there combat operations between the UN forces and any of the warring parties? How many casualties resulted from the UN intervention?

There were minimal incidents throughout the execution of the UNEF mission. It proved valid the concept of a non-fighting UN military presence whose objective would be defusing international violence and establishing conditions for the renewal of peaceful negotiations on conflicting national interests.

The United Nations Emergency Force moved eastward into the Sinai Peninsula, supervising the gradual withdrawal of the Israeli forces, occupying positions of the retiring Israeli troops, and monitoring the border between Egypt and Israel. “UNEF units entered the Gaza Strip on 7 March, and a few days later other units took over at Sharm el Sheikh on the Gulf of Aqaba. On 8 March, Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld reported to the General Assembly that Israel had completed its withdrawal as called for by the resolution of 2 February.”³³

On 8 April, five weeks ahead of schedule, Gen. Raymond A. Wheeler, in charge of the clearance on behalf of the United Nations, announced that the last of 41 obstructions had been removed and that the Canal was ready for full navigation.

The questions of Egyptian administration and compensation for the nationalized Suez Canal were still of concern to many countries. On 24 April, Egypt submitted to the United Nations a declaration spelling out its arrangements for the Canal's operation, reaffirming its intention to abide by the Constantinople Convention of 1888 and by the United Nations Charter. It stipulated that tolls would be levied in accordance with the April 1936 agreement and the Egyptian Government further agreed that differences of view over the interpretation of applicability of the Constantinople Convention would be referred to the International Court of Justice if not otherwise resolved.³⁴

The UNEF mission established enduring principles for UN peacekeeping operations, such as: a peace force could be established only if authorized either by the Security Council or the General Assembly; such a force should be administratively integrated to the UN Secretariat under the political control of the Secretary-General; the great powers should not contribute troops for the UN force; the UN should remain politically neutral; it should limit its actions to non-fighting functions always performed with the consent or acquiescence of all the governments concerned, weapons might be used in self-defense; and the UN would bear the expenditures due to the mission demands while the contributing nations should pay the costs that would be incurred if their forces remained in national service.³⁵

The aforementioned principles remain valid, although, with the end of the Cold War, troop contributions from the US and Russia are no longer excluded; and the UN assessment for more costly peacekeeping operations attempts to minimize developing countries contributions.

The Gulf Crisis and the Resurgence of Collective Security

The Persian Gulf [War] expanded the horizon of the Security Council and, in fact, made election to it one of the grand prizes of UN membership. The newly found power probably led the Security Council to attempt far more than it could manage. But even when some failures tempered a good deal of optimism, there was little doubt that the Security Council had become what Roosevelt wanted – the heart of the UN.³⁶

Joseph S. Nye, Jr., *Understanding International Conflicts*

Although some argue that there were circumstances which most unlikely would be replicated in the future, the Persian Gulf War is considered to be the closest example of a classic case of collective security.

On 2 August 90, Saddam Hussein ordered some one hundred thousand troops of his elite, battle-tested Republican Guard Divisions, across the border to seize the oil wealthy emirate of Kuwait. His troops reached the capital, Kuwait City, in less than four hours. The whole country would be under Iraqi control within forty-eight hours.

Iraq's 80 billion dollars foreign debt owed mainly to Saudi Arabia and Kuwait and the falling oil prices were a dangerous combination. The disappointing outcomes of the Baghdad Summit in May 1990, when Saddam failed to extort the writing off of his debts and renewed credit from his Arab creditors, and the dropping oil prices due to OPEC members' overproduction prompted an ever threatening Iraqi rhetoric.³⁷

Iraq accused Kuwait of pumping oil from a field alongside the Iraqi-Kuwaiti border without sharing the revenue and also claimed that the Kuwaiti oil production surpassed the quotas set by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC).

The urgent need of financial resources and the regime's intent of reasserting Iraq's dominant role in the region, combined with a flawed perception of what the

international reaction might be, swiftly led Saddam Hussein to decide for a strong display of power.

Despite previous intelligence reports on the possible aggression, US President George H. Bush and his close advisers were shocked by the sudden Iraqi invasion. The Bush administration had been trying to improve Iraq's respectability within the international system; it even pressured a number of international agencies to approve suspicious exports to Iraq.

Analyzing the United Nations Response

On 2 August, at 10 P.M., the US Ambassador to the UN, Thomas R. Pickering received a phone call from Undersecretary of State Robert M. Kimmitt directing him to submit to the UN Security Council a resolution condemning the aggression. Pickering had built a respectable and leading role within the UN forum due to his outstanding diplomatic skills. While on the way to the US mission, he started to make urgent calls to his fellow ambassadors: Romanian Ambassador Aurel-Dragos Munteanu, then the president of the Security Council, and the Kuwaiti Ambassador Mohammad Abulhasan.

Just twelve hours into the Iraqi aggression, the UN responded, the American-proposed resolution was "approved by a vote of fourteen to nothing, with Yemen not taking part. Even Cuba voted in favor of the American resolution. Never in the history of the UN had aggression been condemned more swiftly."³⁸ The UN Security Council Resolution 660 was clear and simple: it condemned the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, demanded the unconditional withdrawal of the Iraqi troops, and called upon both countries to immediately resume negotiations over their differences.

The Security Council acted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, therefore economic sanctions could be imposed over the aggressor and the use of force was admitted to remove the invading troops should Iraq ignore the United Nations demands.

On 6 August, UN Security Council Resolution 661 imposed a worldwide trade embargo on Iraq and occupied Kuwait, allowing only medical and food supplies.

On 9 August, UN Security Council Resolution 662, passed unanimously, declared null and void under international law Saddam Hussein's claim that Kuwait was now Iraq's 19th province.

Meanwhile President Bush dispatched 230,000 troops to Saudi Arabia, launching Operation Desert Shield stating: "I took this action to assist the Saudi Arabian government in the defense of its homeland. The mission of our troops is wholly defensive."³⁹ The chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell was the top advisor "who had argued within the Bush administration and, surprisingly, outside administration councils with allied officials, against even going to war to liberate Kuwait."⁴⁰

In addition to the American troops deployed to Saudi Arabia the US and a number of countries sent warships to the Persian Gulf and surrounding waters. The Bush administration raised the issue of imposing a naval blockade in order to enforce the UN imposed trade embargo. Secretary-General Pérez de Cuéllar stated "Only the United Nations, through its Security Council resolutions, can really decide about a blockade." On 25 August, UN Security Council Resolution 665 authorized the use of force to enforce the economic embargo.

On 25 September, UN Security Council Resolution 670 demanded that all member states abide by an embargo on all air cargo traffic, other than food and medicine for humanitarian purposes; it also provided for sanctions against any country violating the ban. It was approved by a vote of fourteen to one, with Cuba casting the one negative vote. In order to underscore the importance of the resolution, 13 of the delegations were headed by their foreign ministers.⁴¹

After three months of economic sanctions, in early November, the British Prime Minister Thatcher made a strong statement to the House of Commons: "Either he [Saddam Hussein] gets out of Kuwait soon or we and our allies will remove him by force, and he will go down to defeat with all its consequences. He has been warned." President Bush stated at a news conference that, although the US already had the right to use force to remove the Iraqi troops from Kuwait "we've been great believers in going to the United Nations."⁴²

On 29 November, US Secretary of State James Baker presided over the Security Council, thirteen delegations were represented by their foreign ministers for the second time in 1990, in the preceding forty-five years only in two occasions the majority of the council was represented by foreign ministers, in 1970 and in 1985 respectively on the ceremonies of the twenty-fifth and the fortieth anniversaries of the UN. The UN Security Council Resolution 678 passed by a vote of twelve to two, China abstained, and Cuba and Yemen voted against it. The resolution authorized "member states cooperating with the Government of Kuwait . . . to use all necessary means" to implement UN Security Council Resolution 660 that demanded an unconditional Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait by 15 January 1991.⁴³

At this point all the facts concerning the responsiveness of the Security Council have been laid down. It is now possible to start answering the analytical questions.

How did the Security Council interact to come to one or more resolutions to allow UN intervention?

The Security Council, from 2 August until 29 November, passed twelve resolutions addressing the Iraqi aggression against Kuwait invoking Chapter VII, Articles 39 through 42. Five of them were unanimously approved, Cuba voted against three resolutions, Yemen did so against two, and China abstained once. The UN Security Council Resolution 660 was passed within twelve hours of the Iraqi aggression, becoming the swiftest resolution to be approved in the forty-five years of the United Nations.

The UN Security Council approved Resolutions 661, 665 and 670 which imposed an economic embargo, authorized a naval blockade to enforce the sanctions, as well as demanded all UN members to abide to the restrictions, therefore providing the necessary resolutions to fulfill the principles established on Articles 41 and 42 of Chapter VII of the UN Charter.

Although UN Security Council Resolution 678 authorized the use of force to achieve the Iraqi unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait, there was no further resolution establishing a UN command and control structure and no provisions to fulfill the principles stated on Articles 43, 44, 45, and mainly Articles 46 and 47 that establish that “plans for the application of armed force shall be made by the Security Council with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee.” Furthermore, “the Military Staff Committee

shall be responsible under the Security Council for the strategic direction of any armed forces placed at the disposal of the Security Council.”⁴⁴

Did the veto power of the Security Council permanent members’ block its functioning?

Throughout the discussions of the twelve resolutions only China abstained once during the approval of the UN Security Council Resolution 678. None of the five permanent members of the Security Council blocked the Security Council decision-making process. Gorbachev’s Soviet Union supported the US led international response to Iraq’s aggression even when it had to vote for economic sanctions that affected “a whole set of relationships between us and Iraq that have been developing for many years now.”⁴⁵

“Continuous UN decision-making was conducted through the Security Council, but the Article 42 variety of collective security was impossible because the UN troops and command structures foreseen in Article 43 had not been previously agreed upon.”⁴⁶

The Security Council addressed the Iraqi aggression in a responsive manner; some critics think that the UN should have waited longer to overtake the economic sanctions with the authorization to use force since only three months would not be enough time for such sanctions to take full effect over Iraq.

It is rather complex and difficult to label Operation Desert Storm as a UN operation. The Security Council did not approve a resolution establishing the command and control structure foreseen in Article 43 to ensure that the military enforcement operation would be directed and controlled by the Military Staff Committee (MSC), therefore the UN could not exercise the command and control of the assembled forces.

The UN Secretary-General's public appeal for Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait, made a few hours before the January 15 deadline, had no answer. Force was the only option left. "The White House wanted the anti-Iraq coalition's forces to fly the UN flag, but Pérez de Cuéllar refused. He reportedly did not want a repeat of the Korean War model where the American-led troops invoked the name of the UN but tolerated no interference from the UN."⁴⁷

The absence of complete UN command and control of the military forces and operations raised criticisms about the legitimacy of Operation Desert Storm. "The Security Council was essentially a spectator, but US control appeared necessary for reasons of efficiency as well as political support."⁴⁸ Despite such problems UN Security Council Resolution 678 provided the legitimacy for the use of force to reestablish the Kuwaiti sovereignty and territorial integrity.

How many members contributed to the UN force and how relevant were their contributions? Was there any leading nation or major contributor to the UN force?

"By 21 September 24 countries had made force commitments, including 12 Arab-Islamic nations. These ranged from 27 ships, 100,000 ground troops, and 600 combat aircraft from the United States, to 2,000 Afghan mujahadeen."⁴⁹

By December there were 580,000 ground troops, 3,485 tanks, 2,400 combat aircraft, and more than 120 ships. The US was the major contributor of forces, providing 400,000 troops, 2,100 tanks, 1,900 combat aircraft, and 50 warships. The combined thirteen Arab-Islamic (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Egypt, Syria, Senegal, Niger, Morocco, Bangladesh, Pakistan, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Oman, and Bahrain) forces amounted to 150,000 ground troops, 1,150 tanks, 380 combat aircraft, and 35 warships.

Amongst the non-Arab nations, the UK and France were the major contributors: Britain fielded 35,000 ground troops, 163 tanks, 96 combat aircraft, and 26 warships; France provided 5,500 ground troops, 72 tanks, 42 combat aircraft, and 8 warships.⁵⁰

Canada, Italy, Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Denmark, Greece, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Czechoslovakia, New Zealand, the Netherlands, Poland, and South Korea contributed with medical units, aircraft, and ships. Turkey allowed coalition planes to use air bases on its territory, and Japan and Germany gave financial support.

Did its national interest cause any deviation to the UN mandate from its initial purposes?

The military coalition faced an array of problems that caused some friction, ranging from the arrangement of all Arab Forces under the Saudi Joint Force Command to the more complex situation concerning the French political acceptance of placing its forces under the US command. The French friction was finally resolved after the change of the French Minister of Defense, then it was decided that the French land forces would be under tactical control of the US Army component of CENTCOM (ARCENT) and their air component would be tasked by the US Air Force component (AFCENT). (“Tactical control (TACON)” is a command and control relationship on which once a unit is placed under a receiving command no changes are allowed to the organization of that unit nor further subordination to other subordinate commands.)

The causes of such friction were mainly two: the fact that although under the provisions of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 678, Operation Desert Storm was a US military operation, who undoubtedly would have the “casting vote in grand strategical [*sic*] decisions...”, and most of all, according to most analysts who

emphasized it as the center of gravity of the military coalition: “the effect of the domestic pressures and national aspirations on each coalition member. These will colour [sic] its perceptions of the plans and actions of other partners; its willingness to fall with them, its degree of commitment; and may even lead to its conducting its own strategy in defiance of other members.”⁵¹ (“Center of gravity” is a concept first stated by the Prussian military and scholar Carl von Clausewitz which establishes that it is the hub of all power and movement.)

During Operation Desert Shield, the defensive and build-up phases, all forces were under Saudi command and control, a situation that persisted until the beginning of the air campaign on January 17, 1991 when Operation Desert Storm started. Throughout all the campaign General Schwarzkopf, commander of the United States Central Command (USCENTCOM) reported directly to the US Secretary of Defense, who reported to the US President.

The provisions of UN Security Council Resolution 678 were too broad. It authorized “all necessary means” and made no restrictions on how much, how long, or what kind of force could be used. Critics say that Resolution 678 was a *carte blanche* to Washington that in pursue of Iraq expulsion from Kuwait caused extensive damage inside Iraq.⁵²

Initially, the US objective was to avoid Iraqi aggression towards Saudi Arabia and to be capable of a limited action to reverse the invasion of Kuwait. However, by November, President Bush started to adopt an offensive posture. At a news conference “on November 8 – three weeks before the Security Council resolution authorizing the use of “all necessary means” to push out Iraq – the president announced the dispatch of more

American troops to Saudi Arabia.”⁵³ UN Security Council Resolution 678 aimed at the unconditional Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait. “However, once military action had begun it became clear to all but the most blinkered of observers that the American intention was also to destroy Iraq’s military capability and the economic infrastructure upon which the military depended. This objective engaged the Allies in an aerial campaign the scale of which had not been seen since the Second World War.”⁵⁴

The UN had no control over the war operations conducted under its Security Council Resolution 678, “but some UN officials and ambassadors hoped for a brief moment that they might bring it to a close in February and avert the carnage of an American-led ground offensive.” Yevgeny Primakov, a Soviet special envoy to Baghdad, returned to Moscow with a withdrawal plan to be executed by Iraq one day after a cease-fire; such a plan would be approved by the Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz. “The Iraqis promised to complete their withdrawal from Kuwait City within four days and the rest of the country within twenty-one days. According to Primakov, Iraq was sick of the bombing and ready to surrender.”⁵⁵

President Bush was informed of the plan on February 21; the Security Council met in a closed session the next morning to discuss the Soviet-brokered plan; the Secretary-General ordered the undersecretary for political affairs and the chief of peacekeeping to engage several governments requesting troops to monitor the withdrawal. “President Bush did not like the Primakov plan. . . . Bush preempted any UN consideration of the plan by proclaiming an ultimatum to Saddam Hussein to start leaving Kuwait City within twenty-four hours or face annihilation.”⁵⁶

Was there any UN member supporting the opposing forces?

The Iraq aggression was so clear-cut that no country supported it. The United Nations gathered in order to restore peace and to enforce international law and norms. Even Cuba voted in favor of the US sponsored resolution 660 condemning the Iraqi aggression.

Were there combat operations between the UN forces and any of the warring parties? How many casualties resulted from the UN intervention?

“After five and a half weeks of intense bombing and more than 100,000 flights by coalition planes, Iraq’s forces were severely damaged.”⁵⁷ The ground offensive started before dawn on February 24, a few hours after the ultimatum expired. The Iraqi troops fled from Kuwait City, trying to seek refuge in the southern Iraqi Shiite city of Basra, in any way they could: tanks, military trucks, stolen civilian trucks and cars. “Allied planes bombarded the retreating Iraqis. The bombing left one long Iraqi column of more than a thousand burned-out cars, trucks, tanks, and other vehicles with the bodies of Iraqis lying nearby. [*sic*] American television and newspapers ran fearful images of the devastation and dubbed the scene “the highway of death.”⁵⁸

“Almost all of the casualties occurred on the Iraqi side. While estimates during the war had ranged from 10,000 to 100,000 Iraqis killed, Western military experts now agree that Iraq sustained between 20,000 and 35,000 casualties. The coalition losses were extremely light by comparison: 240 were killed, 148 of whom were [*sic*] American, the number of wounded totaled 776, of whom 458 were American.”⁵⁹

The US-led coalition suffered a relatively low number of casualties, but the Iraqi forces endured tens of thousands of killed troops, there was also a considerable number

of Iraqi civilian casualties, and extensive damage to Iraq's infrastructure. Due to such facts "questions were raised about the proportionality of UN-sponsored action."⁶⁰

The Dissolution of Yugoslavia and the New Challenges to the United Nations

Yugoslavia was the only Axis-occupied country that managed to restore its sovereignty without large Allied troops supporting its indigenous forces. In fact, during WWII, besides fighting the invaders, the Yugoslavs were also fighting a civil war. There were three warring factions: the Serb-monarchist Chetniks, the Nazi-backed Croat Ustasha, and the communist Tito's partisans. After the liberation, the communist forces of Josip Broz Tito controlled the country.

Marshall Tito was a Yugoslav nationalist of Croat origin who stubbornly defied the Soviet Union. Fearful of a Soviet invasion, Tito established "universal military service, intensive guerrilla training, and decentralized command and control within the Serb-dominated Yugoslav National Army (JNA). When the crisis erupted in the 1990s, Bosnia and the rest of Yugoslavia were awash with weaponry and crowded with trained warriors. This made it easy to organize paramilitary bands of peasants and workers and to transform the JNA units of General Ratko Mladic into the Bosnian Serb Army (BSA)."⁶¹

The crisis that led Yugoslavia into disintegration and chaos was rooted in nationalistic demagogues' personal agendas. After Tito's death, in 1981, such individuals started to pursue an ever-growing appetite for power through the manipulation of old fears, the worst of them: Slobodan Milosevic, the leader of the Serbian League of Communists, who was elected President of Serbia. "Milosevic's demagogic appeals to Serbian nationalism led the Croats to elect an extreme nationalist of their own in 1990 – Franjo Tudjman, a former communist and general."⁶² The radicalism of both men,

combined with the sensitive question of the Krajina Serbs, raised old Balkan ghosts like the Ustasha genocide of Serbs and Gypsies during WWII. (“Krajina” means military frontier in Serbo-Croatian. These areas bordered Bosnia and Herzegovina, accounted for 12 percent of Croatia’s population, and were mostly populated by Serbs who pledged to block the Ottoman Turk Empire expansion towards Europe in the fourteenth century.)

In June 1991, Tudjman answered Milosevic’s statements that the Serbs had the right to control the lands where they lived even though they were in Croatia, by seceding from the Yugoslav Federation and declaring independence. Slovenia, another former Yugoslav Republic, accompanied Croatia in the secession. The Serb-dominated JNA fought the Slovenian secessionists for only ten days, but since more than 95% of the population in Slovenia was composed of ethnic Slovenians they were not able to hold longer. Things would be different in Croatia where the JNA would join the Krajina Serbs and end up controlling a quarter of the country’s territory.

Bosnia and Herzegovina, henceforth referred to with its shortened and widely known form of just Bosnia, was another Yugoslav Republic on the brink of political chaos. The most mixed region of the whole Federation, long known for much intermarriage and considered to be the ideal Yugoslav communist melting pot, had an ethnically diverse population of “40% Muslim, 32% Serb, and 18% Croat.”⁶³ The Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic, although a moderate Muslim, was painted by Tudjman as a dangerous fundamentalist who planned to make Bosnia the springboard for his Muslim ideology conquest of Europe. Fearing the spread of the war in Croatia Izetbegovic asked for UN peacekeepers. The US ambassador to Yugoslavia from 1989 to 1992, Warren Zimmermann, backed the request in a cable to Washington “but did not

press for it as hard as I should have.”⁶⁴ The United States did not support the request assuming that the proper time for peacekeepers would be after the war.

In February 1992, after a referendum boycotted by the Serbs in which 64% of the Bosnian Muslims and Croats voted in favor of secession, Izetbegovic declared Bosnian independence. Radovan Karadzic, a psychiatrist who led the Bosnian Serbs supported by Milosevic, declared the Bosnian Serb Republic’s independence. In April, the JNA launched an offensive operation from Serbia in order to prevent the secession of Bosnia. Under international pressure the JNA officially withdrew from Bosnia in June, but enough troops, materiel, and leadership were left behind to the newly created Bosnian Serb Army (BSA). The Bosnian war had started, while the Bosnian Muslims fought for survival. The Bosnian Serbs and the Bosnian Croats fought respectively for a Greater Serbia and a Greater Croatia, created by the union of Serbia and Croatia large chunks of the former Bosnia and Herze govina.

Although the whole world was outraged by the violence and lawlessness in Bosnia, no European or American government wanted to commit troops and risk hundreds of casualties in a long and dangerous UN operation. The wounds of the Somali nightmare were still healing.

Analyzing the United Nations Response

The once dynamic and consensus-building US ambassador to the UN, Thomas R. Pickering, who so brilliantly worked during the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, described the American policy on Bosnia in mid-1992: “If Europe leads, we will follow. If Europe does not lead, we will also follow.”⁶⁵

On 25 September 1991, UN Security Council Resolution 713 called on all countries to apply a general and complete arms embargo on the former Yugoslavia.

The UN involvement in the Yugoslav civil war started in Croatia. In February 1992, the Security Council voted unanimously for Resolution 743 establishing the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR), a 14,000-troop whose mandate was to keep the peace and ensure that former combat zones in Croatia remained demilitarized. An advance contingent arrived in the region on 8 March, to monitor the withdrawal from Croatia of the pro-Serbian federal army and Serbian irregulars. The UN troops were fully deployed by July and the UNPROFOR Headquarters was set up in the Bosnian capital, Sarajevo.

The United Nations faced a challenge of enormous proportions. Differently from the Cold War era UN missions, the peacekeeping operation would attempt to keep peace where there was no peace to keep, where there was no consent from the warring factions; the lightly armed peacekeepers would face dangers and demands far beyond the standard established in Suez, in 1960, by UNEF and its 6,000 peacekeepers.

When the war spread the Security Council was reluctant to expand the UNPROFOR mandate to Bosnia, but on the understanding that the troop contributors (Britain, France, Italy, and Canada) would meet the additional costs, UNPROFOR was expanded to over 23,000 becoming the largest ever UN peacekeeping force. The lightly armed UNPROFOR troops' mission was to interpose themselves between the warring factions in an attempt to reduce the intensity of combat so that peace talks could be resumed.

In 1992, UNPROFOR had close air support provided by NATO, “as well as airlift capabilities for food and medicine drops [*sic*] in battle areas cut off from normal supply routes.”⁶⁶ There were additions to the original contributors and France with 3,493; Britain with 3,283 troops; Pakistan with 2,973 troops; Malaysia with 1,539; the Netherlands with 1,485; Turkey with 1,468; Spain with 1,402; and Bangladesh with 1,239 troops, provided the largest contingents to UNPROFOR. Ten other countries also contributed forces and up until the end of the mission further contributions turned UNPROFOR into the major UN peacekeeping operation ever executed.

In August 1992, the Security Council approved a resolution calling on all member states to take “all measures necessary” to support the humanitarian aid to besieged Sarajevo and other areas in Bosnia; this same wording legitimized the Persian Gulf War, but no world leader led a military operation against the Serb aggressor. “The resolution was never implemented.”⁶⁷

Air relief of Sarajevo ceased for a month after a plane was shot down in September, and concern spread for some 500,000 Muslims displaced by the Serb-led “ethnic cleansing,” who were increasingly at risk from hunger and winter exposure. By the end of October, Croatian irregulars in Bosnia had joined in the “ethnic cleansing” of Muslims in some areas. The Security Council then voted unanimously to establish a war crimes commission to collect evidence of atrocities committed in the former Yugoslavia and subsequently voted to ban all military flights over Bosnia-Herzegovina except for UN and humanitarian missions.⁶⁸

Despite its neutrality UN forces and military observers were attacked militarily, politically, and in the media. Lightly armed and operating in small units they were easy

targets for the warring factions, mainly the Serbs who repeatedly seized UNPROFOR troops and military observers declaring them to be prisoners of war.

In Bosnia, UNPROFOR was operating under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, but the international community did not want to make a strong military stand until August 1995. “Bound by the traditional rules of engagement (fire only in self-defense and only after being fired upon), UN troops never fought a single battle with any of the factions in Bosnia that routinely disrupted relief convoys. The rules of engagement led to the appeasement of local forces rather than to the enforcement of UN mandates.”⁶⁹

The facts described up to this point accurately describe the environment under which the UN was operating.

How did the Security Council interact to come to one or more resolutions to allow UN intervention? Did the veto power of the Security Council permanent members’ block its functioning?

“By the end of 1994, the Security Council had issued well over a hundred resolutions and official statements on the crisis in the former Yugoslavia. . . . Governments often whipped the Security Council into a resolution, in fact, mainly to assuage public opinion at home.”⁷⁰

The United Nations Security Council decision-making process posed no obstacles to the international community’s response to the crimes that accompanied the disintegration of Yugoslavia, but the new challenges to world peace would demand a new whole new set of norms and a great amount of resolve from the UN member states to intervene in what by previous international law would be considered internal affairs of a

sovereign country. “The real failure, here again, was not that of the UN as an institution but that of Council members to back their sentiments with the right actions.”⁷¹

“After 1992, the Bosnian Muslims were subject to a campaign of ethnic cleansing by both Croatian and Serb forces. Yet, for much of the conflict, the United Nations, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the European Union were divided over how to respond. Part of what made the war in Bosnia so difficult for the international community was the problem of assessing how much of the conflict was a civil war among Bosnian Croats, Serbs, and Muslims and how much of it was intervention by Serbia.”⁷²

In early 1994, according to the US Ambassador to the UN, Madeleine Albright, the Clinton Administration was struggling with basic dilemmas in its policy towards Bosnia: “We couldn’t lift the arms embargo because we didn’t have the votes on the Security Council, and we could not achieve a permanent cease-fire because that was unacceptable to the Bosniaks and would reward ethnic cleansing. Nor could we use significant force to punish the Bosnian Serbs because UN peacekeepers might be taken hostage and the humanitarian mission derailed.”⁷³

How many members contributed to the UN force and how relevant were their contributions? (See table 2.)

Table 2. UNPROFOR Contributing Countries as of 30 November 1994

Country	Police	Troops	Military Observers
Argentina	23	854	5
Bangladesh	40	1, 235	43
Belgium		1, 038	6
Brazil	6		34
Canada	45	2,091	15
Colombia	12		
Czech Republic		971	37
Denmark	45	1, 230	14
Egypt		427	27
Finland	10	463	12
France	41	4,493	11
Ghana			32
Indonesia	15	220	29
Ireland	20		9
Jordan	71	3,367	48
Kenya	50	967	47
Lithuania		32	
Malaysia	26	1,550	27
Nepal	49	899	5
Netherlands	10	1,803	48
New Zealand		249	9
Nigeria	48		10
Norway	31	826	39
Pakistan	19	3,017	34
Poland	29	1,109	30
Portugal	39		12
Russian Federation	36	1,464	22
Slovak Republic		582	
Spain		1,267	19
Sweden	35	1,212	19
Switzerland	6		6
Tunisia	12		
Turkey		1,464	
Ukraine	9	1,147	10
United Kingdom		3,405	19
United States		748	
Venezuela			2
Total	727	38,130	680

Was there any leading nation or major contributor to the UN force? Did its national interest cause any deviation to the UN mandate from its initial purposes? Was there any UN member supporting the opposing forces?

There was no leading nation; the Security Council assigned a force commander to the overall UNPROFOR who would be directly subordinated to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General Mr. Yasushi Akashi.

This command and control arrangement proved flawed mainly concerning the enforcement of UN mandates through the threat of NATO bombings. In more than one occasion Mr. Akashi drew the criticism of his field commanders: once when he allowed the Bosnian Serbs to ignore the deadline of a NATO-issued ultimatum demanding the withdrawal of heavy weapons from the exclusion zone around Sarajevo, and in another opportunity he put on hold for more than four hours a request for air bombing a Serb tank and artillery piece that were threatening a French peacekeeping battalion in Bihac.

No national interests changed the original objectives of the UN mission, but balance of power politics played a fundamental role in enticing the secession of Slovenia and Croatia, as well as made a peaceful solution to the conflict a never-ending discussion with different world powers siding with different warring factions. “The so-called contact group (the United States, Britain, France, Germany, and Russia) sponsored negotiations to end the Bosnian conflict, but the UN was largely excluded from a political role in those talks.”⁷⁴

Were there combat operations between the UN forces and any of the warring parties? How many casualties resulted from the UN intervention?

There was no combat between UNPROFOR and any of the warring factions, however, “by the end of March 1995, 149 peacekeepers had been killed and 1,366 wounded in the former Yugoslavia.”⁷⁵

In August 1995, right after the Croatian Army imposed a humbling defeat over the Krajina rebel Serbs “and forced local Serbs to flee in massive ethnic cleansing operation,”⁷⁶ the United States, bypassing both the UN and the contact group, launched a new diplomatic campaign, backed by a large scale NATO air campaign. “Given the ferocity of the bombing, in October 1995, the Serbs agreed to a cease-fire. The peace talks begun in early November in Dayton, Ohio, and a peace agreement was signed by December, in Paris, by the Bosnian, Serbian, and Croatian leaders.

“Bosnia-Herzegovina would remain one country with an elected group presidency, but its territory would be divided more or less in half between the Muslim-Croat federation and a Bosnian Serb republic. The peace agreement was to be enforced by 60,000 NATO troops, under Article 53, Chapter VIII, of the UN Charter. Although the UN had been excluded from the diplomatic process, it would help rebuild the economy and resettle the area's hundreds of thousands of refugees, as well as to continue the work of the war crimes tribunal in The Hague.”⁷⁷

After the agreement, the Security Council lifted most economic sanctions against Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) immediately and the arms embargo against all six republics of the former Yugoslavia.

The UN troops and observers were removed from Bosnia and Croatia in January 1996 and military authority in Bosnia was transferred to NATO on December 20.

¹Stanley Meisler, *United Nations: The First Fifty Years* (New York: The Atlantic Monthly Press, 1995): 56.

²Thomas G. Weiss, David P. Forsythe, and Roger A. Coate, *The United Nations and Changing World Politics* (Boulder: Westview Press, 2001): 48.

³Stanley Meisler, *United Nations: The First Fifty Years* (New York: The Atlantic Monthly Press, 1995): 58.

⁴*Ibid.*, 58.

⁵Quoted in Stanley Meisler, *United Nations: The First Fifty Years* (New York: The Atlantic Monthly Press, 1995): 60.

⁶*Ibid.*, 61.

⁷*Ibid.*, 62.

⁸*Ibid.*, 63.

⁹Thomas G. Weiss, David P. Forsythe, and Roger A. Coate, *The United Nations and Changing World Politics* (Boulder: Westview Press, 2001): 50.

¹⁰Stanley Meisler, *United Nations: The First Fifty Years* (New York: The Atlantic Monthly Press, 1995): 63.

¹¹*Ibid.*, 63.

¹²Lawrence Ziring, Robert E. Riggs, and Jack C. Plano, *The United Nations: International Organization and World Politics* (Orlando: Harcourt College Publishers, 2000): 151.

¹³Quoted in Stanley Meisler, *United Nations: The First Fifty Years* (New York: The Atlantic Monthly Press, 1995): 65.

¹⁴Stanley Meisler, *United Nations: The First Fifty Years* (New York: The Atlantic Monthly Press, 1995): 67.

¹⁵*Ibid.*, 67.

¹⁶Quoted in Stanley Meisler, *United Nations: The First Fifty Years* (New York: The Atlantic Monthly Press, 1995): 68.

¹⁷Stanley Meisler, *United Nations: The First Fifty Years* (New York: The Atlantic Monthly Press, 1995): 68.

¹⁸Quoted in Stanley Meisler, *United Nations: The First Fifty Years* (New York: The Atlantic Monthly Press, 1995): 69.

¹⁹*Ibid.*, 69.

²⁰*Ibid.*, 71.

²¹Joseph S. Nye, Jr., *Understanding International Conflicts, An Introduction to Theory and History* (New York: Harvard University, 2003): 166.

²²*Ibid.*, 164.

²³Microsoft Encarta Reference Library, 2004 ed., "Suez Canal: 1956."

²⁴Stanley Meisler, *United Nations: The First Fifty Years* (New York: The Atlantic Monthly Press, 1995): 97.

²⁵Quoted in Stanley Meisler, *United Nations: The First Fifty Years* (New York: The Atlantic Monthly Press, 1995): 103.

²⁶Anthony Eden, *The Memoirs of Anthony Eden: Full Circle* (Massachusetts: The Riverside Press, 1960): 553.

²⁷Stanley Meisler, *United Nations: The First Fifty Years* (New York: The Atlantic Monthly Press, 1995): 95.

²⁸*Ibid.*, 105.

²⁹Quoted in Stanley Meisler, *United Nations: The First Fifty Years* (New York: The Atlantic Monthly Press, 1995): 109.

³⁰*Ibid.*, 109.

³¹Lawrence Ziring, Robert E. Riggs, and Jack C. Plano, *The United Nations: International Organization and World Politics* (Orlando: Harcourt College Publishers, 2000): 178.

³²Stanley Meisler, *United Nations: The First Fifty Years* (New York: The Atlantic Monthly Press, 1995): 112.

³³Microsoft Encarta Reference Library, 2004 ed., "1957: United Nations."

³⁴*Ibid.*, "1957: United Nations."

³⁵Lawrence Ziring, Robert E. Riggs, and Jack C. Plano, *The United Nations: International Organization and World Politics* (Orlando: Harcourt College Publishers, 2000): 178.

³⁶Joseph S. Nye, Jr., *Understanding International Conflicts, An Introduction to Theory and History* (New York: Harvard University, 2003): 166.

³⁷James Gow, *Iraq, the Gulf Conflict and the World Community* (London: Brassey's (UK) Ltd, 1993): 19.

³⁸Stanley Meisler, *United Nations: The First Fifty Years* (New York: The Atlantic Monthly Press, 1995): 261.

³⁹Quoted in Stanley Meisler, *United Nations: The First Fifty Years* (New York: The Atlantic Monthly Press, 1995): 261.

⁴⁰Michael R. Gordon and General Bernard E. Trainor, *The Generals' War: the inside story of the conflict in the Gulf* (New York: Little, Brown & Company Limited, 1995): ix.

⁴¹*Microsoft Encarta Reference Library*, 2004 ed., "1957: United Nations."

⁴²Quoted in Stanley Meisler, *United Nations: The First Fifty Years* (New York: The Atlantic Monthly Press, 1995): 264.

⁴³*Ibid.*, 265.

⁴⁴Lawrence Ziring, Robert E. Riggs, and Jack C. Plano, *The United Nations: International Organization and World Politics* (Orlando: Harcourt College Publishers, 2000): 509

⁴⁵Quoted in Stanley Meisler, *United Nations: The First Fifty Years* (New York: The Atlantic Monthly Press, 1995): 263.

⁴⁶Thomas G. Weiss, David P. Forsythe, and Roger A. Coate, *The United Nations and Changing World Politics* (Boulder: Westview Press, 2001): 76.

⁴⁷Stanley Meisler, *United Nations: The First Fifty Years* (New York: The Atlantic Monthly Press, 1995): 268.

⁴⁸Thomas G. Weiss, David P. Forsythe, and Roger A. Coate, *The United Nations and Changing World Politics* (Boulder: Westview Press, 2001): 76.

⁴⁹James Gow, *Iraq, the Gulf Conflict and the World Community* (London: Brassey's (UK) Ltd, 1993): 140.

⁵⁰*Ibid.*, 140.

⁵¹*Ibid.*, 138.

⁵²Thomas G. Weiss, David P. Forsythe, and Roger A. Coate, *The United Nations and Changing World Politics* (Boulder: Westview Press, 2001): 76.

⁵³Quoted in Stanley Meisler, *United Nations: The First Fifty Years* (New York: The Atlantic Monthly Press, 1995): 266.

⁵⁴James Gow, *Iraq, the Gulf Conflict, and the World Community* (London: Brassey's (UK) Ltd, 1993): 172.

⁵⁵Stanley Meisler, *United Nations: The First Fifty Years* (New York: The Atlantic Monthly Press, 1995): 270.

⁵⁶*Ibid.*, 270.

⁵⁷*Microsoft Encarta Reference Library*, 2004 ed., "Persian Gulf War."

⁵⁸Stanley Meisler, *United Nations: The First Fifty Years* (New York: The Atlantic Monthly Press, 1995): 271.

⁵⁹*Microsoft Encarta Reference Library*, 2004 ed., "Persian Gulf War."

⁶⁰Thomas G. Weiss, David P. Forsythe, and Roger A. Coate, *The United Nations and Changing World Politics* (Boulder: Westview Press, 2001): 75.

⁶¹Stanley Meisler, *United Nations: The First Fifty Years* (New York: The Atlantic Monthly Press, 1995): 316.

⁶²*Ibid.*, 314.

⁶³Stanley Meisler, *United Nations: The First Fifty Years* (New York: The Atlantic Monthly Press, 1995): 315.

⁶⁴Quoted in Stanley Meisler, *United Nations: The First Fifty Years* (New York: The Atlantic Monthly Press, 1995): 315.

⁶⁵*Ibid.*, 312.

⁶⁶Lawrence Ziring, Robert E. Riggs, and Jack C. Plano, *The United Nations: International Organization and World Politics* (Orlando: Harcourt College Publishers, 2000): 191.

⁶⁷*Ibid.*, 313.

⁶⁸*Microsoft Encarta Reference Library*, 2004 ed., "1992:United Nations."

⁶⁹Thomas G. Weiss, David P. Forsythe, and Roger A. Coate, *The United Nations and Changing World Politics* (Boulder: Westview Press, 2001): 89.

⁷⁰Stanley Meisler, *United Nations: The First Fifty Years* (New York: The Atlantic Monthly Press, 1995): 312.

⁷¹Madeleine Albright, *Madam Secretary* (New York: Miramax Books, 2003): 135.

⁷²Joseph S. Nye Jr., *Understanding International Conflicts, An Introduction to Theory and History* (New York: Harvard University, 2003): 159.

⁷³Madeleine Albright, *Madam Secretary* (New York: Miramax Books, 2003): 184.

⁷⁴*Microsoft Encarta Reference Library*, 2004 ed., “1995: United Nations.”

⁷⁵Stanley Meisler, *United Nations: The First Fifty Years* (New York: The Atlantic Monthly Press, 1995): 313.

⁷⁶Joseph S. Nye Jr., *Understanding International Conflicts: An Introduction to Theory and History* (New York: Harvard University, 2003): 152.

⁷⁷*Microsoft Encarta Reference Library*, 2004 ed., “1995: United Nations.”

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

Even though the original doctrines of collective security do not fit as nearly as once thought, it would be a mistake to dismiss international law and the United Nations. They are part of the political reality of the anarchic state system. It is a mistake to be too cynical or too naïve about international organization and law. States do not live by law alone, but they do not live completely without it. (2003, 170)

Joseph S. Nye, Jr., *Understanding International Conflicts*

The International System Dynamics and the United Nations Peace Operations

The international system has always attempted to evolve towards stability and peace. The differences amongst its units have led to several power distribution arrangements throughout history: the hegemonic imperial unipolar rule of Rome and Great Britain, the multipolar concert of Europe's Holy Alliance that defeated Napoleon and attempted to keep monarchic regimes, and the bipolar arrangement first seen amongst the Greek city-states and later on during the Cold War era.

The quest for peace and stability in the last century witnessed two world wars that were responsible for tens of millions of dead and millions of displaced people, the Cold War era when regional wars spread from Korea to Africa and insurgencies destabilized countries from South America to Southeast Asia. Twice the anarchic international system attempted to tailor a more organized and cooperative system of sovereign nation-states establishing two international government organizations: the League of Nations and the United Nations.

Both organizations pursued the establishment of the rule of law in order to set the stage for international cooperation and for peaceful settlement of conflicting interests. Such processes must not only have a forum for discussion, but also a system of representation and decision making that provides the needed structure and norms for the envisioned framework designed to keep peace and foster cooperation in the international system.

Findings from the Analyses of the Four Case Studies

The UN intervention in the Korean peninsula in 1950 and the reestablishment of Kuwaiti sovereignty after Iraq's aggression in 1991, clearly demonstrate how significant the impacts of the environment are over the institutional processes, operations, and the pursuit of its principles.

The beginning years of the Cold War not only led to the Korean War, but also proved how complex it would be to keep peace in a world divided into two opposing blocs and the superpowers' game of containment versus expansion. On the other hand, by the end of the Cold War, the new Soviet Union posture under Mikhail Gorbachev provided the stage for the resurgence of collective security.

The United Nations had been created on the basic assumption that the so-called Big Four would cooperate and provide the necessary military assets to enforce peace. President Roosevelt's Four Policemen¹ theory established the principle that the burden of keeping peace throughout the world would be upon the shoulders of China, the UK, the US, and the USSR. On the other hand, they would be assured that the organization could never become an alliance against their own interests. Therefore, the structure of a Security Council whose resolutions had to be observed by all the UN members was

composed of the WW II victors who were invested with a veto power. The Maoist revolution would be the first move towards competition instead of cooperation.

The answers to the first two analytical questions reveal that the Security Council could not effectively work once one of the permanent members would exercise its veto power: during the Korean War, the Soviet Union used its veto power to block any resolutions against its communist allies and during the Suez Canal crisis, France and Britain would also block any resolutions against their interests. The US devised principle of Uniting for Peace, which established provisions that accounted for the bypassing of the Security Council, would allow the UN to carry on its functions, but it challenged the basic premises of the United Nations concept.

Such facts constitute the first evidence that the Security Council can not perform its functions once the great powers are in disagreement and that the veto power has no assurance of preventing the organization from challenging its Security Council permanent member's interests.

Besides demonstrating the lack of consensus among the Security Council permanent members regarding the Korean conflict, the veto power consequently forced important resolutions to be discussed at the General Assembly, where, due to the number of participants it becomes a longer and less responsive process more vulnerable to political games. The bipolar international system of that time had long lasting consequences and, in the short term, prevented the participation of a more significant number of UN members.

The findings related to the remaining four analytical questions, which frame the legitimacy criterion, clearly demonstrate the need for effective UN control and the fulfillment of the UN Charter provisions regarding the Military Staff Committee.

The enormous American interaction capacity allowed the US to ignore and prevent the application of established provisions of the UN Charter: the United States rejected the Secretary General's proposal to create a UN committee to coordinate the offers of military assistance and to monitor the pace of the fighting, ensuring the Security Council's control of the operations through the supervision of its Military Staff Committee. It is important to highlight that such a policy caused many UN members to avoid participating in what was perceived as an American crusade against Communism, therefore damaging the legitimacy of the peace operation. Furthermore, such nations could not have an active role either in the planning, or in the execution of the combat operations.²

It also validates the principle that such operations should be performed under the exact degree of UN command and control in order to assure that no national interest will influence the original mandate for the UN peace operation. Although prescribed in Article 47, the Military Staff Committee is yet to fulfill its provision on the UN Charter: "The Military Staff Committee shall be responsible under the Security Council for the strategic direction of any armed forces placed at the disposal of the Security Council. Questions relating to the command of such forces shall be worked out subsequently."

The US leadership of the UN forces allowed the UN to stand by its principle of peaceful negotiation of conflicts, both in Korea and in the Persian Gulf. As described in the first case study, it permitted the enforcement of the U.N condemnation of North

Korea's aggression. But it also led to the brink of complete failure of its original intent of restoring peace due to the actions of General MacArthur that caused an undesired escalation of the Korean conflict with the Chinese intervention, unnecessarily prolonging the fight.³ In the latter case it prevented the UN from exerting a more effective control of the military operations in the Persian Gulf War that would be fought to enforce the Security Council resolutions, but not under the control of the Military Staff Committee.⁴

In Korea, the UN's effectiveness was ultimately questionable once the initially designed operation to restore peace turned out to be a coalition war between Communist forces and a democratic alliance under US leadership that almost broke up the United Nations and compromised its impartiality and arbitration role. While in the Persian Gulf War, it led to the Secretary-General's decision to deny the use of the UN flag during Operation Desert Storm.⁵

Although the UN Security Council Resolution 678 authorized the use of force to achieve the Iraqi unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait, there was no further resolution establishing a UN command and control structure. There were no provisions to fulfill the principles stated on Articles 43, 44, 45, and mainly Articles 46 and 47 which establish that "plans for the application of armed force shall be made by the Security Council with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee" and furthermore "the Military Staff Committee shall be responsible under the Security Council for the strategic direction of any armed forces placed at the disposal of the Security Council."⁶

The Western domination of the General Assembly would end with the decolonization process in the following years and the non-aligned movement of Third World countries, but the Uniting for Peace Resolution would endure and be used ten

more times formally affirming “the responsibility of the General Assembly for dealing with international violence when the Security Council was unable to act.”⁷

The Korean War proved that “Chapter VII of the UN Charter could not be applied in its collective security mode during the decades of the Cold War, and indeed it was only revived when Mikhail Gorbachev voiced renewed interest in its application.”⁸

The UN experience of collective security in the Korean Conflict led to the establishment of principles for peacekeeping operations that would be consolidated in the Suez Canal crisis. The answers to the analytical questions that constitute the framework for analyzing the UN operation’s legitimacy clearly demonstrate that the more legitimate the objectives, the planning, and the execution of a peace operation, the greater is the member states’ commitment to it.

The UNEF experience highlighted the principles that in order to be safe from any national interest manipulation, the UN force should be administratively integrated to the UN Secretariat under the political control of the Secretary General, and that the UN should remain politically neutral, so that the negotiating forum would always be available. The troop contributors should not be directly involved in the questions that escalated into conflict in order to assure the UN impartiality and neutrality. It further proved that the use of force should be limited to self-defense, so that the UN forces would not be involved in an all out war and would limit its actions to non-fighting functions always performed with the consent or acquiescence of all the governments concerned.

The UN intervention in the former Yugoslavia proved that despite its legitimacy and moral framework, more than Security Council resolutions are needed to enforce the

peace when the major powers see no interest in committing their troops and national assets. The initial European leadership demonstrated that the regional approach to peacekeeping operations is feasible, but it took strong US commitment through NATO to really implement the UN mandates. Pérez de Cuéllar criticizes the UN process highlighting the Security Council's inability "to take decisive action to resolve international conflicts." It is clear when even unanimously passed resolutions, "are increasingly defied or ignored by those that feel themselves strong enough to do so"⁹ or have no perceived interest at stake.

The new challenge to UNPROFOR was to keep peace where there was no peace to keep, where although the recognized governments consented on the UN presence, allegedly uncontrolled warring factions carried on power politics through ethnic cleansing and harassment of UN forces. The lightly armed peacekeepers would face dangers and demands far beyond the standard established in Suez, in 1960, by UNEF and its 6,000 peacekeepers.

The findings derived from the UNPROFOR experience prove that once the major powers have no national interest at stake, they can contribute to the UN forces on the ground; both the Russian Federation and the United States had troops deployed under UN command and control.

President Clinton's PDD 25, issued on May 3, 1994, was a serious attempt to support the improvement of the United Nations peacekeeping capabilities. Former Ambassador to the UN and Secretary of State Madeleine Albright stressed the need for more effective UN command and control of the peacekeeping operations as well as the concern with mandates aimed at regions where armed opposition might be anticipated.¹⁰

These findings point to the importance of a fully operational and empowered Military Staff Committee, capable of planning and guiding at the strategic level the UN forces operational and tactical activities.

The final deployment of NATO to the former UNPROFOR area of operations proved that in order to face the new challenges to peacekeeping, a more robust force and a tougher set of rules of engagement were mandatory. The political and diplomatic influence on the ground was still fundamental. It is interesting to note that the NATO mission change of name from Implementation Force (IFOR) to Stabilization Force (SFOR) was not merely semantic. It stressed the concept that peacekeeping forces are able to stabilize a conflict area, but in order to implement the provisions of mandates and agreements more than just military actions are needed.¹¹

Does the World Need the United Nations?

The UN system fulfills the need to provide a structured system and a body of organizations, laws, rules and norms that allow nation-states to interact and cooperate to maintain peace and foster progress, whatever their interaction capacity is based on their economic, military, or political power.

The Suez Canal crisis demonstrated that the United Nations was a moral and ethical force, with the strength to restrain the world powers from resorting to war as a means of conflict resolution. Its significance was threefold: first, it set the standard for the newly assertive attitude animating many so-called Third World nations, which would no longer be content to follow the demands of their former colonial masters; second, it showed that the two Cold War superpowers could intervene decisively--despite their ideological rivalry--to curb what they perceived as dangerous and unnecessary conflicts

among third parties; and it finally demonstrated that the UN could act effectively when the United States and the USSR pursued the same goal.

The current structure and processes of the Security Council are based on the WWII Allied interests, which since the 1990s no longer represent the world's geopolitical and economic realities. There must be a reform that allows new and important actors like Germany, Japan, a number of developing countries, and regional organizations that already heavily influence and contribute to the UN efforts, to actively and institutionally participate on the decision-making process.¹²

On the other hand, the UNPROFOR evidence clearly demonstrates that more than moral obligation is needed to prompt nation-states to commit troops and other national assets to peacekeeping, that ad-hoc coalitions take too long to become effective and that regional organizations are capable of making up for UN shortfalls on the operational and tactical levels.¹³

During the Persian Gulf crisis, the UN Security Council approved Resolutions 661, 665, and 670 which imposed an economic embargo, authorized a naval blockade to enforce the sanctions, as well as demanded all UN members abide by the restrictions, therefore providing the necessary resolutions to fulfill the principles established in Articles 41 and 42 of Chapter VII of the UN Charter.

Although the UN Security Council Resolution 678 authorized the use of force to achieve the Iraqi unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait, there was no further resolution establishing a UN command and control structure and no provisions to fulfill the principles stated on Articles 43, 44, 45, and mainly Articles 46 and 47 that established that “plans for the application of armed force shall be made by the Security Council with

the assistance of the Military Staff Committee.” Furthermore, “the Military Staff Committee shall be responsible under the Security Council for the strategic direction of any armed forces placed at the disposal of the Security Council.”¹⁴

Just as in the Korean intervention, the overwhelming ability of the US to lead the organization and to provide the needed resources to give power to UN resolutions poses a sensitive challenge in maintaining the organization’s neutrality and impartiality, without either alienating the world’s only superpower, or becoming a resource to serve US strategies and goals.

In the Persian Gulf, the decision to replace economic sanctions with force as the dominant means of ensuring Iraq’s compliance with the organization’s wishes, the extensive use of force that ensued, and the UN’s inability to command and control the operation, raised important questions about the UN’s collective-security apparatus to function impartially.¹⁵

It is paramount to understand that funding is closely related to the ability of the United Nations to perform its duties and is also one of the most influential factors affecting the decisions to support UN peacekeeping missions. The nations and regions that are responsible for more than half of the UN budget clearly want to see the organization favor their views and interests. Any UN reform must address the principle of equality amongst sovereign states without missing the more pragmatic and realistic views on the differing interaction capacities of the various actors.¹⁶

During the 50th anniversary celebrations, virtually every member country spoke in favor of reforming the UN, but no agreement was reached during the year on the scope and nature of reform. Suggestions ranged from adding Germany and Japan as permanent

members of the Security Council to eliminating the Council's veto power and expanding the Council to include much broader representation of the developing countries. Other ideas were proposed for reforming UN agencies, peacekeeping operations, and virtually all other areas of UN work. Few of the proposals, with the exception of US-initiated demands for financial and managerial reforms, made it onto any official UN agendas.

In summary, the four case studies present enough evidence that any UN reform should address the following issues: a new structure for the Security Council that better represents the interaction capacity of new actors like Australia, Bangladesh, Brazil, Germany, India, Japan, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, and others; the revision of the veto power related to the principle of equality of all members and the appraisal of its usage along the almost sixty years of the organizations existence; and the need to implement the provisions of the UN Charter regarding the Military Staff Committee.¹⁷

The present challenges of global terrorism and the inevitability of the UN involvement in such matters demand that the organization embarks on an urgent reform that assures its effectiveness without compromising its legitimacy. Reforming without losing its credibility is paramount in addressing today's conflicts from the highest moral ground. Terrorism denies any rules, norms, and laws, but the international community must abide by ethics and morality in order to withstand savage and inhumane acts that attempt to impose the goals of radical and criminal groups on the whole world.

Recommendations

The following recommendations are based on the findings of this study and are basically broad and general, so that further studies may be done to transform them into practical and feasible actions.

The Security Council does not represent today's geopolitical realities. Globalization brought about many new actors that either have a powerful regional interaction capacity, or are already globally important players. In 1945, fifty-one member-states were represented in the Security Council by five permanent and six non-permanent members. Today's 185 members are represented by the same five permanent members and ten non-permanent members. It is clear that the increased membership was not followed by a proportional representation in the Security Council.

The principle of equitable regional distribution demands that regions like South America, Central America and the Caribbean, East Asia and Oceania, the Middle East and North Africa, and Sub-Saharan Africa, are represented in the decision-making process of the Security Council, as well as North America and Europe. The current regional UN groups show artificialities such as placing Turkey and the United States together with the Western European countries, and splits into East and West a united Europe under the expanding European Union and NATO.

It is important that any expansion of the Security Council truly assures the observance of the principle of equitable representation. One issue of great concern today is the growing gap between the have and the have-nots; currently there are four out of five permanent members that are also members of the G8, the group of the seven richest countries plus Russia. If Japan and Germany are also admitted to the Security Council, it will need only Italy and the European Union representatives to assemble a G8 forum.

It is also paramount that any expansion takes into account a balanced regional representation. Currently it is clear that the permanent members of the Security Council have a westernized perspective of the world's problems and how to approach them;

China is the only member that is completely of an Asiatic culture. Also related to the regional approach is the factor that military alliances should be represented in a balanced manner. Today the membership is mostly from NATO countries with three out of five permanent members belonging to the North Atlantic alliance.¹⁸

The Security Council should be expanded to twenty-five members, who would represent the following ten geographical regions, taking into account the number of countries of that region, and based on a population proportional distribution: North America (2), Central America and the Caribbean (1), South America (3), Western Europe (3), Eastern Europe (3), North Africa (2), Sub-Saharan Africa (2), East Asia and Oceania (4), the Middle East (2), and Central Asia (3). Each region would be represented in the Security Council by one permanent member without veto power.

At its thirty-second meeting, on 21 July 2000, the Open-ended Working Group submitted two main recommendations regarding the veto power and the expansion of the Security Council. It recommended that the veto power should be maintained as a voting instrument, but “the permanent members of the Security Council, mindful of the fact that they are acting on behalf of the United Nations as a whole, should exercise the veto only when they consider the question to be of vital importance, taking into account the interest of the United Nations as a whole.”¹⁹

It further recommended that the veto should be excluded when: discussing matters deemed as procedural as listed in the annex to General Assembly resolution 267 (III) of 14 April 1949; decisions are taken under Chapter VI of the Charter; calling upon parties to a conflict to abide by the rules of international humanitarian law; establishing consultations with troop contributing countries; deliberating about timing and modalities

of submitting the report of the Security Council to the General Assembly; making recommendations in accordance with Articles 4, 5, 6 and 97 of the Charter; making decisions taken under Article 40 relating to provisional measures; and implementing Article 50.

Based on the case studies' analyses, the veto power has proved ineffective and paralyzing to the Security Council; its application virtually hindered the UN functioning during the Cold War era and led to the Uniting for Peace approach, which in fact took to the General Assembly the responsibilities of the Security Council. It did not prevent the organization from going against its permanent members' interests as occurred in Korea and the Suez Canal crisis.

Therefore, based on the veto power's ineffectiveness and inequality, it is recommended that it is subject to studies to conclude on how to observe the national interest of the permanent members without granting privileges that go against the principle of equality and threaten the normal functioning of the organization during major crises.²⁰

Regarding the Security Council expansion, the Working Group recommended options ranging from twenty or twenty-one members to no less than twenty-six members, but it stressed the need for "a more equitable representation taking into account the substantial increase in the membership of the UN, especially of developing countries as well as changes in international relations."²¹

This study has also found evidence that it was feasible for an influential member, or group of members, to change initial resolutions or to execute military operations under the United Nations' mandates, despite the veto of other permanent members. This was

possible mainly due to the fact that Security Council resolutions were broad and general by design, and because the UN could not exert the necessary supervision of the military operational planning, nor the command and control of its execution.²²

It is unreal to expect that in the near-term the Military Staff Committee will develop the capability to command and control complex multinational operations, but as the UN Charter states, it is basically an advisory, supervising and planning staff. There are currently some thirty officers assigned to the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, obviously not enough to develop contingency plans for all the world's hot spots. Although given the stated attribution and constituency, the Military Staff Committee, is capable of advising on how to employ military force in order to achieve the Security Council Resolution's strategic and political objectives and should be used for this purpose.²³

Last but not least, the issue on troop availability and common doctrine, training, and interoperability is a recommendation that in fact is already being implemented by many regional organizations that have already supported UN peace operations: NATO and the Scandinavian battalions in UNPROFOR, and the peacekeeping operations in Africa by OAU members are some examples.²⁴

The study cases highlight that the Security Council structure and decision-making process, in fact have led to an expansion of the General Assembly responsibilities, regarding decision-making, which it was not supposed to have by design. The findings also lead to the conclusion that United Nations operations are more effective, and in some instances only feasible, under the leadership of a more powerful member or a regional organization.²⁵

After almost sixty years since its creation, the United Nations has proved its importance and ever evolving role in the international system. The current operational environment poses new challenges and threats that demand a more responsive organization which, besides providing an institutionalized forum for conflict resolution and world cooperation, is also capable of enforcing its resolutions aimed at maintaining peace and stability with the utmost levels of impartiality and legitimacy.

The four case studies' analyses thoroughly answer the research questions: Does the UN Security Council structure reflect the current international system geopolitical realities? Is its decision-making process responsive enough to tackle today's threats to peacetime operations? Does the Security Council control of UN operations ensure its mandates provisions, therefore assuring their legitimacy?

In order to assure the continuing United Nations relevance and its legitimate and responsive interventions within the international system, this work has found evidence that the Security Council needs to be reformed, so that it better reflects the current geopolitical realities which demand a structure and decision-making process different from what could be designed in the aftermath of WWII and the beginning years of the Cold War.

The UN peacekeeping operations in the twenty-first century can no longer depend on slowly assembled and heterogeneous ad-hoc coalitions, which reflect the lack of resolve due to the absence of UN members' commitment to solving conflicts when there is no immediate national interest at stake. Such missions must be undertaken by interoperable and effective forces, under clear rules of engagement, executing a carefully planned operation under the supervision of the Military Staff Committee that provide the

military expertise to ensure that the UN Security Council Resolutions are thoroughly and legitimately enforced.

¹Stephen Schlesinger, *Act of Creation: The founding of the United Nations* (Boulder: Westview Press, 2003): 37.

²Thomas G. Weiss, David P. Forsythe, and Roger A. Coate, *The United Nations and Changing World Politics* (Boulder: Westview Press, 2001): 50.

³Quoted in Stanley Meisler, *United Nations: The First Fifty Years* (New York: The Atlantic Monthly Press, 1995): 68.

⁴Lawrence Ziring, Robert E. Riggs, and Jack C. Plano, *The United Nations: International Organization and World Politics* (Orlando: Harcourt College Publishers, 2000): 509

⁵Stanley Meisler, *United Nations: The First Fifty Years* (New York: The Atlantic Monthly Press, 1995): 268.

⁶Lawrence Ziring, Robert E. Riggs, and Jack C. Plano, *The United Nations: International Organization and World Politics* (Orlando: Harcourt College Publishers, 2000): 509

⁷Lawrence Ziring, Robert E. Riggs, and Jack C. Plano, *The United Nations: International Organization and World Politics* (Orlando: Harcourt College Publishers, 2000): 152.

⁸Lawrence Ziring, Robert E. Riggs, and Jack C. Plano, *The United Nations: International Organization and World Politics* (Orlando: Harcourt College Publishers, 2000): 153.

⁹Quoted in Stanley Meisler, *United Nations: The First Fifty Years* (New York: The Atlantic Monthly Press, 1995): 239.

¹⁰Madeleine Albright, *Madam Secretary: A memoir* (New York: Miramax Books, 2003): 147.

¹¹*Microsoft Encarta Reference Library*, 2004 ed., “1995: United Nations.”

¹²*Ibid.*, 47.

¹³*Microsoft Encarta Reference Library*, 2004 ed., “1995: United Nations.”

¹⁴Lawrence Ziring, Robert E. Riggs, and Jack C. Plano, *The United Nations: International Organization and World Politics* (Orlando: Harcourt College Publishers, 2000): 509.

¹⁵Thomas G. Weiss, David P. Forsythe, and Roger A. Coate, *The United Nations and Changing World Politics* (Boulder: Westview Press, 2001): 75.

¹⁶Lawrence Ziring, Robert E. Riggs, and Jack C. Plano, *The United Nations: International Organization and World Politics* (Orlando: Harcourt College Publishers, 2000): 46.

¹⁷Thomas G. Weiss, David P. Forsythe, and Roger A. Coate, *The United Nations and Changing World Politics* (Boulder: Westview Press, 2001): 123.

¹⁸Lawrence Ziring, Robert E. Riggs, and Jack C. Plano, *The United Nations: International Organization and World Politics* (Orlando: Harcourt College Publishers, 2000): 49.

¹⁹United Nations, *Report of the General Assembly Working Group on SC Reform for 2000*, available on the internet: <http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/reform/oewg/scref00.htm>; Internet; accessed on 10/15/2003.

²⁰Lawrence Ziring, Robert E. Riggs, and Jack C. Plano, *The United Nations: International Organization and World Politics* (Orlando: Harcourt College Publishers, 2000): 45.

²¹United Nations, *Report of the General Assembly Working Group on SC Reform for 2000*, available on the internet: <http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/reform/oewg/scref00.htm>; Internet; accessed on 10/15/2003.

²²Madeleine Albright, *Madam Secretary: a memoir* (New York: Miramax Books, 2003): 147.

²³Thomas G. Weiss, David P. Forsythe, and Roger A. Coate, *The United Nations and Changing World Politics* (Boulder: Westview Press, 2001): 123.

²⁴*Microsoft Encarta Reference Library*, 2004 ed., "1995: United Nations."

²⁵Lawrence Ziring, Robert E. Riggs, and Jack C. Plano, *The United Nations: International Organization and World Politics* (Orlando: Harcourt College Publishers, 2000): 45.

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