THE UNITED STATES AND RISING REGIONAL POWERS
A CASE STUDY OF INDIA, 1991-2003

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by

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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)
# United States and rising regional powers: A case study of India 1991-2003

**ABSTRACT**

The United States has a vested interest in defending its homeland, advancing its economy, developing a favorable world order, and advancing its values in the world. How can the United States, as a hegemonic power, effectively engage rising regional nuclear powers to further American national interests? Countries such as India, Pakistan, Indonesia, Turkey, Nigeria, Brazil, Mexico, and a host of others have grown rapidly in economic terms over the last ten years and desire to remain members in good standing in the international community. The strategy the United States employs to effectively engage with new regional powers with their potential global influence will be crucial to the future of the United States. The first issue of concern with is how the United States will deal with new nuclear regional powers. The pervious treaty-based and sanction-enforced regime to control nuclear nonproliferation may need to be revisited. The second issue of concern with is how the United States will deal with new economic regional powers. The significance of this study is if the United States is able to devise effective methods of engaging rising regional powers, this will greatly enhance our ability to secure American national interests both at home and overseas.
ABSTRACT


The United States has a vested interest in defending its homeland, advancing its economy, developing a favorable world order, and advancing its values in the world. How can the United States, as a hegemonic power, effectively engage rising regional nuclear powers to further American national interests? Countries such as India, Pakistan, Indonesia, Turkey, Nigeria, Brazil, Mexico, and a host of others have grown rapidly in economic terms over the last ten years and desire to remain members in good standing in the international community. The strategy the United States employs to effectively engage with new regional powers with their potential global influence will be crucial to the future of the United States. The first issue of concern with is how the United States will deal with new nuclear regional powers. The previous treaty-based and sanction-enforced regime to control nuclear nonproliferation may need to be revisited. The second issue of concern with is how the United States will deal with new economic regional powers. The significance of this study is if the United States is able to devise effective methods of engaging rising regional powers, this will greatly enhance our ability to secure American national interests both at home and overseas.
I sincerely wish to express my thanks and gratitude to everyone who helped me in completing this study. Without their assistance, this thesis would not have been possible. A special thanks to my committee COL (Ret.) Jack Kem, Ph.D., LTC (Ret.) Clay Easterling, and MAJ Jeff Maxcy. Their guidance, patience, and devotion of their personal time helped me immensely. The completion of this study is attributed largely to them.

I also wish to thank the many mentors that I have been fortunate to have during my stay at CGSC, including my colleagues and the teaching team of Staff Group 5B, the faculty of the Joint Advanced Warfighting Studies, and the faculty of the Strategist program.

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<tr>
<td>CBM</td>
<td>Confidence Building Measures</td>
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<tr>
<td>C4I</td>
<td>Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence</td>
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<tr>
<td>CEP</td>
<td>Circular Error of Probability</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIA</td>
<td>Central Intelligence Agency</td>
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<td>CTBT</td>
<td>Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty</td>
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<td>DOD</td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
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<td>DOE</td>
<td>Department of Energy</td>
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<td>DOS</td>
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<td>IAEA</td>
<td>International Atomic Energy Agency</td>
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<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<td>ISI</td>
<td>Inter-Services Intelligence</td>
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<td>MAD</td>
<td>Mutually Assured Destruction</td>
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<td>MTCR</td>
<td>Missile Technology Control Regime</td>
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<td>NACO</td>
<td>National AIDS Control Organization</td>
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<td>NATO</td>
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<td>NBER</td>
<td>National Bureau of Economic Research</td>
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<td>NNWS</td>
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<td>NSS</td>
<td>National Security Strategy</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>NWS</td>
<td>Nuclear Weapons States</td>
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<td>People’s Republic of China</td>
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<td>US</td>
<td>United States</td>
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<td>WMD</td>
<td>Weapons of Mass Destruction</td>
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

On 11 May 1998, India detonated three nuclear devices at the Phokhran Range in Rajasthan, India. Over the next seventeen days, India went on to test two more nuclear devices, and Pakistan tested six nuclear devices. The world entered into a new and uncertain future due to both India and Pakistan discarding their undeclared nuclear weapon state status and moving to a declared nuclear weapon state status.

Notwithstanding the legalisms in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1965, which stated that nuclear weapons states are only those who tested before 1967, the world now faced the reality that nations not only could, but also would go nuclear in the post-Cold War era (Perkovich 1999, 444-445).

The United States has a vested interest in defending its homeland, advancing its economy, developing a favorable world order, and advancing its values in the world as the most powerful nation on the earth. United States’ policy makers have long subscribed to the logic of nonproliferation, which posits that, the fewer states that have nuclear weapons; the safer it is for both the United States and the rest of the world (Hagerty 1998, 11 and 16). Under President Clinton, the stated United States policy was unsuccessfully implemented for the first time in twenty-four years. India and Pakistan openly tested their nuclear weapons and declared their status as openly weaponized nuclear states. At first glance, it might be tempting to blame the Clinton administration on its diplomacy which in part led to the decision of Prime Minister Vajpayee of India to conduct the nuclear tests. However, a deeper and more thoughtful analysis of the situation must be taken into
account before making assessments on the nuclear issue so conclusions about the future of American policy can be made.

The key question to be answered is how the United States, as a hegemonic power, effectively engages rising regional nuclear powers to further the American national interests? A hegemonic power is one that can both set and enforce the rules of international relations due to its preponderant political, military, and economic position in the world. There are a number of questions that support this overall issue. The former second-tier nations of the Cold War have all benefited significantly from the reduction of tension between the superpowers and the resultant increase in trade and technology growth. Regionally powerful countries, such as India, Pakistan, Indonesia, Brazil, Mexico, and others, have grown rapidly at a rate of 3.5 percent to 6.5 percent annually over the last ten years, with the United States often being their leading trade partner (IMF 2000). These developing nations have the desire to remain members in good standing in the international community, yet have desires to expand their influence and international prestige. Economic growth and development can build potential political and military capability. The strategy the United States employs to effectively engage with the new regional powers will be crucial to the future of the United States and the protection and advancement of its interests. The failure to do so could lead to a situation much like what was in Europe from 1871 to 1945, where Germany was not adequately integrated into the European political system, which led to multiple wars and great human suffering.

The first issue of concern is how the United States will deal with new nuclear regional powers. It is clear from the behavior of the declared nuclear powers that they all subscribe to the position that having nuclear weapons both ensures the security of their
homelands, and gives them an asymmetrical advantage in relationship to other nations. Charles de Gaulle once remarked that “France cannot be France without greatness” (De Gaulle 1955), and the idea of France remaining a great power provided inspiration for developing nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons have been viewed since the end of World War II as a totem of national power. The end of the Cold War significantly changed the strategic landscape both for the United States and for the rest of the world. The primary reason for the reduction in tension was due to the collapse of the Soviet Union, which symbolized the clear victory for both democracy and capitalism as the governmental value most durable and attractive in the world. This created a significant change in international order from a bipolar order to either a unipolar or multipolar environment, depending upon the definition used. The elimination of the US-Soviet nuclear competition led some utopians to believe that the threat of nuclear weapons and other major uses of force was no longer a major international issue. However, the aftereffects of the demise of the Soviet Union and the perceived or feared reduction of American international interest deprived various countries of their great power patron, leaving these countries on their own to look after their security interests.

Some regional powers, such as India and Iraq, viewed their regional situation as unstable, and felt the need to either assert themselves as the regional hegemon. Germany from 1871 to 1945 and Japan from 1905 to 1945 also faced similar issues about their place in regional and global international structures and ultimately went to war to resolve these issues. Some regional powers also feel that unless they develop weapons of mass destruction and change the international political dynamic, the current five members of the United Nations Security Council will be able to conduct policies not in their interest
and will not be able to effectively have hope for recourse if a great power decides to impose its will on the regional power. India has long pursued a permanent seat at the United Nations Security Council to address this issue. The United States response to these concerns will significantly affect the course of how these nations respond to the changing international environment.

The second issue of concern is how the United States will deal with new economic regional powers. The world order changed from a bipolar three-tier system of the First World of economically developed democracies, the Second World of industrialized Communist countries, and the Third World of nonaligned developing countries to a two-tier system of developed and developing countries with the United States as the sole remaining superpower. Countries that had centrally controlled economies, such as China, Russia, and to a lesser extent, India all converted to a modified form of capitalism, and most ideological issues became functionally irrelevant due to greater emphasis of democracy and human rights. What is now known as global interdependence grew at a rapid rate after the end of the Cold War. The global economy, in terms of volume of international trade, nearly quadrupled between 1990 and 2000 in this relatively benign international environment (CIA 2003). The developed world did very well economically, and the developing world also benefited. In 1970 the top five economies in the world were the United States, Japan, Germany, France, and the United Kingdom. Eighteen of the top twenty economies were in what is considered the developed world.

In 2002 the top five economies were the United States, China, Japan, India, and Germany. By expanding the list to the top twenty economies, nine of the top twenty
economies in 2002 were not on the list in 1970 (CIA 2003), with all of the newcomers rising from the ranks of the developing countries. An indicator of this growth is the reduction in poverty in the last twenty years. Poverty in China has been reduced from 28 percent in 1978 to 9 percent in 1998 and in India from 51 percent in 1978 to 26 percent in 1999. This reduction in poverty indicates a fairly broad base of economic growth in developing countries (Bhagwati 2002). The change to the world economic order requires that the United States undertake new approaches to ensure its future economic prosperity and effectively engage with the new economic powers to achieve these goals.

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<th>Table 1. Impact of Economic Reforms in India 1990-2001</th>
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<td>Growth of exports</td>
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Source: Srinivasan and Tendulkar 2003; 28, 31, 41.

Why is this subject important? It is in the United States’ interest to protect itself, to advance its economic growth, and to maintain a favorable world order and export its democratic values. These interests have been enduring since the founding of the republic.
The effective engagement of rising regional nuclear powers is crucial to this question. India is the subject of the case study of how the United States in the post-Cold War environment engages rising regional nuclear powers.

One of the most important developing states in the next ten years is India. Robert Chase, Emily Hill, and Paul Kennedy call India a “pivotal state” for American foreign policy in the twenty-first century due to the rising power of India and the broadening American interests in the South Asian region. India is a power with significant potential and accomplishments, yet seems to always be “emerging,” yet not arriving (Chase 1999, 41). Based on the behavior and statements of President George W. Bush and President Bill Clinton, the United States does view India as a major power that has arrived, one worthy of respect and interest by the United States. However, significant diplomatic and historical baggage has consistently separated India and the United States from effectively engaging. The end of the Cold War, coupled with the decision of the Indian elites to fully engage in the global economy and the discovery of common security interests in Central Asia after 2001 provides an opportunity for both the United States and India to more effectively engage with each other in a strategic dialogue. These characteristics are why India has been chosen as the subject of this case study.

**Organization of the Study**

Chapter 1, as the introduction, provides the setting for the study and poses the research question. A brief analysis of United States and Indian perspectives of each other is provided as well as a history of the nature of the relationship between the United States and India during the Cold War.
Chapter 2 is the literature review which provides through a survey of the literature background on international relations theory, United States strategy development, regional security, rising regional powers, the South-Asian security complex, and key works addressing the development of nuclear weapons in India.

Chapter 3 is the methodology chapter, in which the division of the research question by time and case study is explored. The study will use the time period 1991-2003, divided into four blocks. Nuechterlein’s methodology of determining the intensity of United States’ interests in South Asia is applied for each time period. The published United States security strategies for each time period are also applied. The effectiveness of the security strategies, using Nuechterlein’s model, in regards to advancing American foreign policy objectives in the South Asia region is then assessed and conclusions drawn.

Chapter 4 is the historical chapter, explaining the historical Indo-American relationship, its foundations, and both the limitations and the opportunities this relationship brings to the future. The primary focus for the history chapter is to provide context to the decisions made by American decision makers from 1991 to 2003.

Chapter 5 is the application of United States foreign policy objectives to the United States-Indian relationship compared over time, using the analytical framework published by Donald Nuechterlein as the basis for determining the strength or weakness of the policy, the published American security strategies as the indicator of intent, and then completing with the actual application of the national security strategies in relation to the enduring interests of the United States in respect to India. The feasibility,
acceptability, and suitability of each national security strategy in achieving America’s interests in South Asia will be assessed, and conclusions drawn.

Chapter 6 is conclusions drawn from the research, and possible recommendations specifically for South Asia, and if warranted, broader commentary on American policy on rising regional nuclear powers.

**Assumptions**

Three key assumptions are made for this study. First, that the published documents of the United States government that make claims to delineate American policy and strategy are in fact true and authoritative statements of American policy. Next, the development and implementation of American foreign policy and strategy can be improved upon in the area of American engagement with rising regional nuclear powers. Lastly, the necessary information that underlies this study is available publicly.

**Definitions**

Before the study goes much further, a few definitions are in order. First, definitions are required to describe the elements of international power. A hegemonic state is a state that has three attributes: the capability to enforce the rules of the international system it defines, the will to enforce the rules of the system, and the commitment to a system which is perceived as beneficial to the state and the powers that accede to its system (Gilpin 2001, 93-100). Globalism is defined as economic, political, and militarily significant networked interdependence at multicontinental distances. Globalization and deglobalization refers to the increase or decrease of globalism (Keohane and Nye 2001, 229). Lastly, regional security complexes are “a set of units whose processes of securitization, desecuritization, or both are so interlinked that their
security problems cannot reasonably be analyzed or resolved apart from one another” (Buzan 1998, 201). In this framework, there are two patterns of analysis, one focusing on the regional subsystem, and then on the states themselves. These definitions are important because the United States, as the world hegemonic power, is a de facto member of the South Asian regional security complex. In addition, the effect of globalization has far reaching impacts both on the United States and the members of the South Asian regional security complex.

Next, issues regarding nuclear weapons and their potential use must be defined to provide boundaries to the study. Nuclear nonproliferation strategies are strategies designed to stop the spread of unsafeguarded nuclear technology to smaller, less technologically developed states. It is based on the premise that nonnuclear powers must pursue materials or expertise outside their country to develop nuclear weapons, and that these activities can be controlled through export controls, customs interdictions, end-use checks, diplomatic demarches, nonproliferation pledges and treaties, and protecting sensitive nuclear activities. Non-proliferation strategies are external in nature to the nonnuclear power.

Counterproliferation strategies are more invasive strategies, which state that potential nuclear proliferators must rollback existing indigenous nuclear capabilities and capacities. In order to verify this strategy, intrusive inspection and monitoring regimes must be set up to satisfy the counterproliferation regime that the target country developing nuclear weapons is no longer developing nuclear weapons capabilities. In the Clinton administration national security strategies, this policy is often referred to as roll-back. Additionally, the potential nuclear proliferators must eliminate what nuclear
capabilities it has already acquired. George Perkovich defines counterproliferation in terms of “unproliferation,” otherwise known as nuclear disarmament (Perkovich 1999, 445).

Treaties are important for the purposes of this study. The current nuclear weapons control regime is heavily dependent on treaties for management and enforcement. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) requires that the acknowledged nuclear weapons states of the United States, United Kingdom, France, China, and the Russian Federation, not to transfer nuclear weapons and nuclear devices, nor nuclear weapons technology and know-how to nonnuclear states. Nonnuclear weapons states that are party to the treaty agree not to pursue or acquire nuclear weapons. Nonnuclear states agree to accept safeguards on their nuclear activities, such as inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to detect diversions from peaceful nuclear programs, such as nuclear power programs. The acknowledged nuclear weapons states are to assist nonnuclear weapons states in developing nuclear power for peaceful purposes, as well as in good faith dismantle their nuclear weapons stockpiles. The NPT is the most successful arms control treaty devised so far, with 189 countries participating according to the United Nations (United Nations 2004b). Only India, Israel, Pakistan, and Cuba have not signed the treaty. The treaty was opened for signature on 1 July 1968, and brought into effect on 5 March 1970 when the United States ratified the treaty (United Nations 2004a). On 11 May 1995, the signatories of the NPT met to review and extend the treaty. The NPT was extended indefinitely without modification or conditions. This last element is important to this study, because the indefinite extension of the NPT was a major foreign policy goal of the Clinton administration.
The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) is the second critical nuclear treaty that is pertinent to this study. The CTBT was opened for signature on 24 September 1996. This treaty prohibits the testing of nuclear devices for either peaceful or military purposes. Forty-one of forty-four nations have signed the CTBT, and thirty-one of the forty-four nations that have nuclear weapons or nuclear facilities identified in the treaty have ratified it as of 2004. India, Pakistan, and North Korea have not signed the treaty and of the countries that signed, but did not ratify the treaty, the United States and the People’s Republic of China are the major exceptions (United Nations 2004c). The CTBT is important to understanding the international environment, because the CTBT would have prevented less developed powers like India or Pakistan from testing nuclear weapons, while the United States could test nuclear devices using computer simulations.

Testing is important because the crucial technological challenge for potential nuclear weapons designers is weapon miniaturization. The atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima produced 15,000 tons of explosive power, and weighed 4.5 tons. The first deployable hydrogen, or thermonuclear, bomb was the US Mark 17, which produced 10 megatons of explosive force and weighed 21 tons (Globalsecurity 2004). In order to develop a thermonuclear weapon that is light enough to put on a ballistic missile, extensive testing is very likely required. Countries that have already conducted this testing, or have powerful enough computer simulators to virtually test nuclear weapons, are at a significant advantage over countries that have not had the opportunity. Without miniaturization, atomic or nuclear weapons must be delivered overtly by air or clandestinely overland or by ship.
The World Trade Organization (WTO) agreements are the culmination of 1986-1994 Uruguay Round negotiations, which are a collection of 60 agreements. The WTO supercedes the Global Act on Tariffs and Trade and has 146 countries as its members. “The World Trade Organization (WTO) is the only international organization dealing with the global rules of trade between nations. Its main function is to ensure that trade flows as smoothly, predictably and freely as possible” (World Trade Organization 2004). The Final Act, signed by the signatory countries in Marrakech in 1994, is an umbrella agreement that establishes the WTO, and includes agreements on goods, services, intellectual property, dispute settlement, trade policy review mechanisms, and plurilateral agreements (World Trade Organization 2004). The WTO agreement is important to this study because when India and other rising powers accede to this agreement, they are brought into to the international economic order.

Limitations

The limitations of this study are that there are American, Indian, and Pakistani documents that are not publicly available that are applicable to the subject matter of this study. Specifically, internal documents recording the deliberations within the Indian and Pakistani governments are not available for public research due to being classified. Likewise, certain American documents pertaining to intelligence on India and Pakistan, as well as overall policy discussions remain classified. Therefore, all sources for this study are unclassified. Lastly, the study author does not speak nor write neither Hindi nor Urdu, but this limitation is ameliorated by the fact that most Indian and Pakistani official documents are in English. English is also the language of Indian state elites, the press, and for the official language for the administration of the country. English is also the
most common second language in India, making India the third largest country of English
speakers in the world, after the US and UK (Hohenthal 2003), so this limitation is
somewhat mitigated. Lastly, this is in part an advocacy study, and the author’s position
on the importance of the effective engagement of India by the United States is a theme
throughout the study.

Delimitations

The scope of this study is from 1991 to 2003, specifically to analyze the policies
and actions of the United States in relation to a given regional power, India in the post-
Cold War international environment. Activity that occurred during the Cold War will be
addressed only to establish foundations for analysis or claims during the post-Cold War
era. The South Asia regional security complex is defined as India, Pakistan, Bhutan, Sri
Lanka, Nepal, and Bangladesh. It is acknowledged directly that the definition of the RSC,
as defined by Buzan, is not always a clear delineation, and this “fuzziness” of the
boundaries is accepted. Major out of area actors that interact with the South Asia RSC are
the United States, China, Russia, North Korea, the member states of the European Union,
and international organizations, such as the United Nations, the IAEA, and the WTO.

Significance of the Study

The significance of this study is if the United States is able to devise effective
methods of engaging rising regional powers, this will greatly advance American national
interests both at home and overseas. The failure of major powers to accommodate and
incorporate rising powers can be seen from the world community’s experience with
Bismarckian Germany in Europe at the end of the nineteenth century, and the rise of
Japan between the First and Second World Wars. The United States is now the status quo
hegemonic power. International norms and rules are currently designed to protect and promote American interests. The failure to keep these up to date in the face of a changed international environment potentially threatens America’s future. By answering the question of how the United States, as the hegemonic power, effectively engages rising regional powers to further our national interests will depend on how the United States addresses the nuclear and economic issues. This study will focus on India in specific; however, some conclusions may be applicable in a more general context. The United States has a very strong record of success in protecting and promoting its interests and this challenge can be met. In the next chapter, a comprehensive review of the literature will explain the theoretical and historical background of this case study.
CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW

For this study, a comprehensive review of the literature is required. First, a review of the international relations literature is necessary to establish a theoretical basis for the discussion. The debate was viewed by decision makers and advisors through different theoretical lenses as to how to chart the future of Indo-American relations. Robert Jervis writes that decision-makers’ perceptions of their environment are profoundly affected by the theoretical concepts that they chose to apply to issues and situations, so a background of the various theoretical schools of international relations thought is important for this study (Jervis 1976, 410). At various times, policy makers in the United States, India, Pakistan, and other countries frame their solutions in realist, idealist, and constructivist terms, so explanations are in order.

Regional orders theory must be reviewed to open the space in which to explore the South Asian state security system. This is relevant because the states of South Asia are interconnected with each other, both with their immediate neighbors, as well as with great powers that are outside the regional structure itself. This literature is not as well developed as the literature for the overarching system-level international relations theories. However, it is useful because Pakistan and India has often couched its definition of national interest in terms of regional security, whereas the United States, India, China, and the former Soviet Union often describe their national interests as being more international in nature.
The literature on rising regional powers is important to the understanding of both regional order and international relations theory constructs, because this issue reflects upon the all-important issue of change within an international system. For this study, how a great power reflects upon changes in regional dynamics while grappling with global foreign policy objectives is a key question.

Associated with this issue is the overarching question about United States security strategy and about how the United States publicly planned to achieve its national security. The National Security Strategy developmental process is important to understand, so valid conclusions can be drawn from the available evidence. The development process of the strategies, their relationship to the enduring American national interests, and the implementation of these policies are central to this study.

Nuclear strategy is important to this study because how the United States and India view nuclear weapons is a key difference in perspectives. The United States has used the concept of nuclear deterrence as a cornerstone of its national security policy for the last fifty years. United States policy makers have also subscribed to the policy of nuclear nonproliferation insofar as the rest of the world is concerned. In the 1990s, India and Pakistan both believed that the concept of nuclear deterrence was applicable to their security situation and acted in accordance with their perceptions of their security environment. Many of the clashes between the United States and both India and Pakistan involve the differences in perception of how to solve the strategic problems of the three countries.

Some discussion of international economics is in order, especially the concept of the international political economy (Gilpin 2001, 3-4). This is important because one of
the enduring interests of the United States is the promotion of its economy overseas. Conversely, for the first forty-five years of India’s independence, India undertook an autarkic economic development policy by focusing on internal development and import substitution. The United States and India have had longstanding fundamental differences over how trade could be conducted between the two of them. To analyze this situation, an understanding of the international political economy is important. Gilpin posits that the role of power and the management of power by the hegemonic state are crucial to understanding the international economy. His model of how the liberal trading order depends on the action of the state is one explanation of how the international economy operates (Gilpin 2001, 24).

Lastly, the development of nuclear weapons in South Asia is an area of the literature that is quite interesting. The literature chronicles how India, primarily through indigenous development, and Pakistan, primarily through technology transfer, developed nuclear weapons. The debate in India and Pakistan as to whether or not to openly declare their nuclear capabilities, and what type of nuclear capability is required is vital to this study. The literature is of extremely variable quality, especially from India and Pakistan due to their very strong biases. Authors like Perkovich, Tellis, and Menon appear to be the most balanced and comprehensive in the field.

International Relations Theory

The international relations theory field is a well-developed body of literature, dominated by Western authors and scholars. Much of the literature focuses on core issues, such as power, the structure of the international system, and the likelihood of
conflict or cooperation between states. It is important to review the theoretical lenses through which international conflict and competition can be viewed.

Realism has historically been the preponderant theoretical framework used to interpret international relations. National security experts and policy makers in both the United States and India have often used realism as a guiding principle in their deliberations. The reason for realism’s prominence is because it focuses on the issues of war and peace, with primary emphasis on the importance of power. To realists, the international environment is described as anarchic, or one in which there is not a higher power than the state. The primary actor is the sovereign state. States are similar in nature but not in capability, having territory, political unity, sovereignty, economic unity, and are recognized as international personalities. All states are similar by having some inherent offensive military capability which makes all states potentially dangerous to all others. States can never be completely sure about the intentions of other states due to each state having its own self-interests, the basic motivation for states is their survival or the maintenance of sovereignty; states are instrumentally rational and think strategically about how to survive (Morganthau 1993, 4-16).

In the 1980s, neorealism, as defined by Kenneth Waltz, began to take a more prominent place in American foreign policy decision making. Neorealism is a system-level, balance-of-power theoretical model in which states do not attempt to maximize power, only to balance against the rise of hegemonic powers. The world system can be described as unipolar, bipolar, or multipolar. To Waltz, a bipolar world is the most stable type of system. Indian and other second-tier powers were at a disadvantage in this structural framework, because if the world is bipolar, than there are only two major
decision making powers. All others must, in some way, subsume their national interests to the superpowers. For states like India, France, China, and the United Kingdom, the desire to maintain their national freedom of action required steps to demonstrate their independence. The development of nuclear weapons is one means that the second-rank powers during the cold war were able to demonstrate their independence from the superpowers (Waltz 1979, 129).

John Mearsheimer posits that offensive realism is the way great powers remain great. He argues that anarchy provides powerful incentives for expansionism. Every powerful state strives to become at the very least a regional hegemon, thereby securing its position and security by achieving relative gains in power. Expansion is required to maximize power. The power elites in the second tier countries often describe their fears of a superpower in these terms, and defend policies like the development of nuclear weapons or economic protectionism using these terms (Mearsheimer 2001, 22).

Defensive realism, as the corollary to offensive realism, holds that the international system provides incentives for expansion only under certain conditions. Every powerful state that is at least a regional hegemon is primarily defensive, concerned more about maintaining and protecting its position. Protection of position is more important than power maximization, and moderate policies are crucial to achieving security. American foreign policy makers, and sometimes their critics as well, often phrase their concerns in these terms. As the status quo power in the world, the United States has powerful incentives to protect its privileged position, and its policies reflect this through many of the National Security Strategies (Mearsheimer 2001, 22).
Liberalism and Idealism have actually been the overarching theoretical concepts for United States foreign policy since President Woodrow Wilson. The basic concept of liberalism is that international relations can be changed from conflictual to cooperative, and peace is more likely in a cooperative environment. States are one of many actors in international politics. Unlike realism, liberalism emphasizes international cooperation through international agreements, regimes, or law to maintain order. The interdependence of states is crucial to the workings of this system. President Wilson, with his Fourteen Points agenda at the end of World War I, epitomized this theoretical heritage. Critics of the United States policy argue that while the United States publicly promotes its liberal concepts of international relations, its practice is one based on realism. India has been consistently critical of the United States of this dichotomy since Indian independence in 1947. In some cases, these charges have been true, but the United States has normatively been fairly consistent in advancing the idea of an international civil society (Griffiths 2003, 97).

Liberalism has its roots in Immanuel Kant’s concept of what contributes to peace. Kant argues that if states are democratic, economically interdependent, and are members of an international civil society reflected by international organizations, peace will be the result (Kant 1795). All American presidents since Woodrow Wilson have broadly subscribed to this concept. Bruce Russett and John Oneal argue that this assertion can now be supported with evidence. They found that military and economic factors are not the only factors that effect countries relations with each other. Russett and Oneal argue that the character of their domestic politics, the level to which they share economic interests, and the extent to which they cooperate in international and nongovernmental
organizations also matters significantly. India and the United States, during the Cold War, were not militarily or economically significantly interdependent, and this is one of the reasons given as to why the relationship between India and the United States was not a close one. However, after the Cold War, this changes and how the United States and India perceive each other does change (Russett and Oneal 2001, 271).

Neoliberal institutionalism is a theory developed by Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye in 1977 that posits that states focus more on absolute gains versus relative gains, and are willing to cooperate in a benign international environment to achieve absolute gains. International institutions and regimes matter in building a peaceful international environment by taming the anarchic system of the realist school of thought of the conflictual self-help state system. Additionally, actor expectations about future interaction affect their willingness to cooperate, often described as the “shadow of the future.” States that expect to have a long relationship with each other tend to negotiate in good faith and cooperate, whereas states that only expect to have limited interactions will tend to cheat. In Keohane and Nye, the characteristics of complex interdependence are the multiple channels that networks form at, the absence of a hierarchy among national issues, and the minor role of military force (Keohane and Nye 2001, 21-23). This theory has been more applicable in non-existential threat international environments.

The role of power in an interdependence environment has two dimensions: sensitivity and vulnerability. Sensitivity indicates how responsive actors are within a given power framework. The degree that actors are sensitive to changes in their environment is based on the potential of alternatives to the given situation. Vulnerability is when the overall framework of the system changes and alternatives are available. The
example that Keohane and Nye use is if there are two countries equally importing oil, then both would equally sensitive to price changes. However, if one country had alternatives and the other did not, then the second country would be considerably more vulnerable (Keohane and Nye 2001, 10-12). These definitions are important to this study because how responsive rising regional powers are to sanction is directly related to the sensitivity and vulnerability of the country.

The study of the international political economy (IPE) reflects the increasing importance economic development and competition is having on international relations in the post-Cold War environment. Analysis of the international political economy generally focuses on “the social, political and economic arrangements affecting the global systems of production, exchange and distribution, and the mix of values reflected therein.” As an analytical method, political economy is based on the assumption that what occurs in the economy reflects, and affects, social power relations (Strange 1988, 16). Robert Gilpin is one of the leading theorists in IPE, and he attempts to integrate the study of international politics with the study of international economics. He argues that economic power is managed by the state just as military power is. States are important because without states, the liberal economic economy cannot be managed effectively. States set the terms under which they participate in the global economy. Gilpin also argues that without a hegemonic power to build an international regime to provide direction and ‘public goods’ such as peace and stability, the international economy is significantly weakened (Gilpin 2001, 24). Richard Rosecrance supports this perspective in *The Rise of the Virtual State*, but expands this to include the importance of cooperation in the international community to manage the flows of goods and services (Rosecrance 1999, 211). The liberalization of
trade between India and the United States in the 1990s fundamentally changed the relationship between these two powers and has doubled the flow of goods and services between the two countries (Government of India 2002). The economic ties between the United States and India are an increasingly important influence on US-Indian relations.

The last lens to view international relations through that is pertinent to this study is constructivism. Alexander Wendt argues that both liberals and realists approach international relations from the same ontological and epistemological position, which limits their ability to explain or predict events. To Wendt, constructivism is a structural theory of the international system that asserts that the structures of human association are determined primarily by shared ideas rather than material forces, and that the identities and interests of the actors are constructed by these shared ideas rather than given by nature (Wendt 2001,1). Ideas and culture can powerfully affect the importance of physical capabilities to the actors. He argues that the distribution of the material capacity of states does not necessarily provide automatic uniform meanings and intentions. Ultimately, it is the shared ideas about the material and human capabilities that influences actor perceptions and decisions about the nature and structure of the international system. Ideas can then become a basis for creating change in the structure of the international environment. This also opens the intellectual space for discussions of nuclear weapons being symbols of national power and prestige, rather than simply weapons useful in defense and security endeavors.

The writings of United States, Indian, and other strategists tend to support the realist and neorealist schools of thought; however the political leadership in both the Untied States and India often made its arguments about security and the nature of the
international economy in liberal and neoliberal terms. The nature of the international system was also debated, with differing emphasis being placed on the international system. The change in Indian ideas about centrally-planned economies and the relationship between India and the United States is a critical movement that profoundly influences US-Indian relations from 1991 onward. The continued importance Indian leaders placed on maintaining a nuclear capability increased during this period as well. All the various theories of international relations, as well as the constructivist approach, were used by both Indian and American decision makers from 1991 to 2003.

American National Security Strategy

The various United States national security strategy documents are the public policy statements of the United States as to what the President believes is the strategic environment the United States is in and the policies to advance the security of the United States interests. A review of selected national security strategies of Presidents George H. W. Bush, Bill Clinton, and George W. Bush are instructive as to the direction and tone of how the United States planned on interacting with regional powers, as well as to provide insight as to their perceived relative importance.

The last George H.W. Bush National Security Strategy was published in 1991, and focused on how to transition the United States and the Soviet Union to the post-Cold War era. It addressed the major security issues between the superpowers, such as arms control and the fate of Eastern Europe. Its focus on South Asia was slight, even though the Bush administration could no longer certify that Pakistan did not possess nuclear weapons.
The Clinton national security strategies of 1995 and 1998 are useful because they provide a framework for American strategy leading into the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty extension of 1996 and immediately following the Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests in 1998. The Clinton strategy tended to focus on regional engagement, economic development, and a belief that major conflicts would not threaten the United States or its major regional allies. The Clinton 1995 *A National Security Strategy for Engagement and Enlargement* attempted to “cap, reduce, and eliminate” the Indian and Pakistani nuclear capabilities by engaging with the two nations, while seeking an indefinite extension of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (White House 1995, 14). Later, engagement is couched in terms of rolling back Indian and Pakistani nuclear capabilities and demanding the two nations sign and comply with the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (White House 1998, 11). This activism helped corner India into being cast as a rogue state in some quarters of the administration, and was a part of why the policy positions of the Clinton security strategy actually contributed to the failure of the strategy to limit the public proliferation of nuclear weapons.

The 2002 George W. Bush *National Security Strategy of the United States* is a strategy of returning to power politics. The focus of defeating transnational terrorist organizations that can threaten American interests is high on the agenda. The Bush 2002 strategy states that the United States desires to build an international community of prosperous nations, and by doing so, create an environment that terrorism cannot strike the United States. This strategy was written in the wake of the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001 and is crucial for understanding the vision and direction of United States
policy during the Global War on Terrorism. India is recognized as a great power, and is accorded much higher status than in previous NSS.

This study uses the American national security strategy documents as a basis for understanding the stated objectives of the various administrations, and how they perceive both their international environment and how they envision advancing American interests within this environment. The NSS tend to address issues either topically or by region, so it is important to then determine what a region means insofar as its relationship to the NSS.

**Regional Orders**

Regional orders appear to be taking on greater importance in the post-Cold War environment due to the elimination of the bipolar world order. The South Asian region is one of many, so an exploration of the literature is important to understand regional dynamics. This is relevant because the states of South Asia are interconnected with each other, both with their immediate neighbors, as well as with great powers that are outside the regional structure itself. This literature is not as well developed as the literature for the overarching international relations theories.

The most important contribution to regional security was made by Barry Buzan in his work *People, States, and Fear* in 1991, followed by *Security: A New Framework for Analysis* in 1998. He argues that “security is a relational phenomenon, so one cannot understand the national security of a state without understanding the international pattern of security interdependence in which it is embedded” (Buzan 1991, 187). To fully understand a region, one must focus on how political interaction at the regional level mediates between individual states and the international system as a whole (Buzan 1991,
He admits that the boundaries of a regional security complex are difficult to determine because on different issues, different actors are interested parties. The regional system is important because it effects how the United States engages with regional powers. The four ways that a regional security system handle different issues or changes to the system are either that they maintain the status quo, internally transform, externally transform, or accept superpower overlay (Buzan 1998, 13-14). In the South Asia region, military, political, economic, societal, and environmental conflicts all connect to create an environment where linkages between states like India and Pakistan create significant challenges to resolving security issues.

David Lake and Patrick Morgan’s *Regional Orders: Building Security in a New World* (1997) builds on Buzan’s work, and makes the argument that regional orders are reasserting themselves as the superpowers ended their competition, and that instability may continue to grow due to the lack of a superpower overlay. Lake and Morgan assert that the Cold War superpower competition overlaid regional tensions, and now that the superpower competition is no more, regional issues are now being addressed by the regional powers.

The state-building process has created perceived security predicaments in the developing world, and Indian-Pakistani-Chinese triangle is an example of this. Ayoob defines the process of state making in terms of the consolidation of all territory and population under a central political authority, the maintenance of order in that territory, and the extraction of resources from that population and territory to support the state (Ayoob 1995, 22-23). Both India and Pakistan maintain large armies, but one of the major missions of their armies is internal security against secessionist elements. The
majority of their strength is siphoned off due to internal security threats, not external security threats. Muhammad Ayoob argues the state-building process can create a security predicament for developing nations, but that regional systems may be of overstated importance in the developing world. Ayoob argues that developing states rarely have the central governmental strength to project power successfully against its neighbors, but the growth of a developing state’s military power may create the external security dilemma that the developing state does not want to create (Ayoob 1995, 191-193). This dynamic creates challenges for the United States in supporting either India or Pakistan, because support by the United States in strengthening either government’s capability to increase its internal security often spills over into perceptions of increasing their ability to externally threaten their neighbors.

Samuel Huntington’s *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (1997) is a very influential book that provides another perspective on how to analyze regional conflicts. Huntington is useful in describing the South Asian cultural and regional order system, in which Huntington divides the world into regions defined by culture and religion. Civilizations are cultural entities and groupings that groups of people identify themselves with. The cultural clash between the primarily Muslim Pakistan and increasingly Hindu India interacting with the western United States is another way to view the security dynamics of the South Asian region.

Lastly, Max Singer and Aaron Wildavsky, in *The Real World Order* (1996) provide an alternative method of defining regions by focusing on economic development. Singer and Wildavsky define regions as areas of developed nations and developing nations. All these works help define the nature of regional systems, and provide different
ways to evaluate regions. The South Asian region is affected by many pressures, some developmental, some cultural, and some based on power and prestige. Most importantly, it helps describe the multiple ways that policy makers can approach the challenges of the South Asian region.

**Rising Regional Powers**

The literature on rising regional powers is important to the understanding of both regional order and international relations theory constructs, because this issue reflects upon the all important issue of change within an international system. For this study, how a great power reflects upon changes in regional dynamics while grappling with global foreign policy objectives is a key sub-question.

The nature of the challenge in the post-Cold War environment is still being defined. Robert Chase, Emily Hill, and Paul Kennedy make the argument in *The Pivotal States* (1999) that there are ten second tier countries that have the capability to move from having a regional to global influence. These powers are not rogue states, but developing major powers in their own right. The second tier non-European countries are important due to their rise to power in the post-Cold War economic and political system, and by the fact that they were not part of the older world decision-making structure. By applying the theoretical prisms of either neorealism or neoliberalism, it is clear that the structure and the relative rank-structure of states are undeniably changing. Of the world’s top twenty economies in 1970, eighteen were considered in the developed world. In 2002, only twelve of the top twenty economies were from what was considered during the Cold War as the developed world (CIA 2003). The United States is the predominant status quo power, and how it adapts to the rising regional powers will be crucial for America’s
national security. The combination of the transition of the Asian economies from the centrally-planned model to a capitalist model, combined with the growth of the global market and the reduction in global tensions provides insight into the potential of the rising Asian powers. The economic growth in India has doubled from 3 to 4 percent annual growth to 6 to 7 percent annually. The shedding of Nehru’s economic policies by Prime Minister Rao opened the way for India to experience an economic revolution. (Kristoff and WuDann 2000, 331-335).

India is one of the rising powers identified in all the major works on either regional powers or as an emerging power on the global scale. Steven Cohen’s *India: Emerging Power* (2001) is an excellent evaluation of India as it emerged from the Cold War period. Cohen addresses in great detail the interaction between the United States, India, Pakistan, and China. India is identified as a rising regional power, and Cohen’s assessment is an excellent starting point for assessing the Indo-American relationship during the post-Cold War era.

**Indo-American Relations**

The history of Indo-American relations has often been characterized as one of estrangement. The United States and India did not have a single armed conflict during the Cold War, but neither passed on many opportunities to criticize each other diplomatically (Bertesh 1999, 24). The divergence between the world’s most powerful democracy and the world’s largest democracy requires explanation.

One of the best researchers on this issue is Andrew Rotter. His book *Comrades at Odds: The United States and India, 1947-1964* (2000) and Robert McMahon’s *The Cold War on the Periphery: The United States, India, and Pakistan* (1994) provides the
cultural context of the often strained relationship between the United States and India. The relationship between the world’s most powerful democracy and the world’s largest democracy was a prickly one during the Cold War due to cultural miscommunication, disagreements over decolonization and Third World development, and the nature of the superpower competition during the Cold War. India, starting with Prime Minister Nehru, believed that the United States over militarized its approach to the Soviet Union. America’s support for Pakistan as an ally then becomes unacceptable because it was viewed as unnecessary by the Indians. Any strengthening of Pakistani military strength was then viewed as a threat by India. The support of Pakistan reinforced in the Indian elite’s minds that the United States is actually conducting a containment policy toward India on the South Asian subcontinent. The American rapprochement with China in 1972 doubly reinforced the Indian perception that the United States in attempting to contain it by supporting the two countries India had fought wars with since its independence. These perceptions remain strong in the Indian policy-making elites throughout the 1990s (Thomas and Gupta 2000, 21-23).

Gary Bertsch’s Engaging India: U.S. Strategic Relations with the World’s Largest Democracy (1999) provides recommendations to how best constructively engage with India, so as not to exacerbate pre-existing Indian concerns about the great North American power. Central to his argument is the necessity for pragmatism on WMD issues, the importance of the political and economic convergence of the United States and India, and the divergence between the two countries on technological issues (Bertsch 1999, 261-268).
Lastly, the changing role of South Asia in respect to the United States is illustrated in the speeches in 2003 by Ambassador to India Robert Blackwill and Richard Haass, Director of the State Department Policy Planning Staff, which address the India and its relationship to the United States after the 11 September 2001 attacks. After the terrorist attacks of 2003, India and the United States were able to find common strategic interests, which helped ease Indian concerns about American intentions to use its power.

The history of Indian and American interaction is important to the study because it sets the tone for the dialogue between India and the United States on regional and international issues. The end of the Cold War significantly changes the strategic environment for both countries, and requires adjustment from both sides. How well this is done will be covered in greater detail later in the thesis.

**Nuclear Strategy**

The nuclear strategy body of literature is a mature and prolific one. American and other major power strategists are steeped in it, and the implications and recommendations it has for national policy. During the Cold War, India tested a “peaceful nuclear explosion” in 1974 and continued with their development for the past three decades. Pakistan, spurred to action by the Indian nuclear test, spent the 1970s and 1980s conducting research and development to produce nuclear weapons. What neither country developed nor published were policies on what nuclear weapons would do for their country. After observing that there would not be a “uniquely Asian” perspective or consensus developed toward nuclear strategy, both India and Pakistan has borrowed heavily from the Western nuclear strategy literature to develop their nascent nuclear policies.
Bernard Brodie was the father of nuclear strategy as we know it. In *The Absolute Weapon* (1946), he asserts that nuclear weapons have no other purpose than avoiding war. Nuclear weapons are uniquely destructive, and thereby change the nature of warfare (Brodie 1946, 52). He asks the question of how does a nation deter another, which may require the threat of the imposition of ultimate destructiveness, while at the same time maintaining maximum control so destruction does not occur? Brodie was a supporter of limited nuclear war when one side had a nuclear monopoly or when the number of nuclear weapons was small, but he feared that with the development of thermonuclear weapons, the possible damage that could be caused would outstrip any real utility.

Albert Wohlstetter, in *The Delicate Balance of Terror* (1957) states that for deterrence to be effective, credibility is as important as capability (Wohlstetter 1957, 212-232). A state in a deteriorating position may take risks that would be unacceptable in normal peacetime. If a state faces an existential threat, then attacking can be less risky than not attacking at times. He supports the concept of stable nuclear deterrence as a reasonable policy. Interestingly, his wife wrote influential analysis of Pearl Harbor attack, and was sensitive to the potential for first strike successes due to the difficulties in determining intent (Wohlstetter 1962, 296, 393). Wohlstetter was the first academic to develop a comprehensive requirement for an actual deterrence system: survivability of the nuclear deterrent, a survivable C2 structure, ensuring the deterrent has the necessary reach, and that the deterrent force can penetrate enemy defenses and strike the designated targets. His analysis has become the basis of all nations that have nuclear weapons. Concerns over the development of these comprehensive deterrent systems in India and
Pakistan were major issues between the two new nuclear powers and the United States after the nuclear tests of 1998.

While not directly in the nuclear theory field, Ephraim Kam’s analysis of surprise in *Surprise Attack* is relevant due to the importance nuclear powers place on deterring a first strike by their opponent. Kam concludes that surprise attacks have three main elements. The first is that the attack is not consistent with the expectations of the attacked. Second, the assumptions and expectations of attack determine the clarity of advanced warning. Lastly, the decision maker’s expectations and the clarity of warning directly impact on the victim’s level of preparedness (Kam 1988, 8-9). However, Kam finds there are constraints on decision makers to respond. First, decision makers conduct their own assessments, and may disregard information that contradicts their pre-conceived opinions. Second, decision makers are dependent on intelligence agencies estimates. Third, decision makers often demand the intelligence estimates are simplified due to the pressure and demand for action they are under. Lastly, decision makers will pay both a domestic and international price for implementing countermeasures prematurely (Kam 1988, 211-212). For these reasons, nuclear deterrence must be durable and work in all circumstances, not just in situations where the threat is clear and expected.

Game theory is important to consider with the development and fielding of nuclear weapons in South Asia. One of the best authors in this field is Thomas Schelling. In the *Strategy of Conflict* (1960), he focuses on games of strategy and variable sum games. Rational behavior is central feature of game theory. Shelling writes that conflict is both endemic and pervasive, but protagonists tend to behave rationally. In conflict
situations where there is both hostility and cooperation (such as in deterrent relationships), coercive bargaining is of central importance. The central paradox of coercive diplomacy is that threats sometimes “leave something to chance” (Schelling 1960, 188). Coercive bargaining is chancy because the side making the threat and the side responding to the threat cannot ensure that the entirety of their deterrent force won’t fire. Arms control is important because it limits the infinite number of possibilities to something useful. American fears over nuclear war in South Asia after the 1998 tests were often couched in terms of either India or Pakistan either not behaving rationally, or that there was a chance that even with the best of intentions, nuclear weapons could be used in a limited conflict between the two countries.

One of the most controversial figures in nuclear strategic theory development is Herman Kahn. Kahn writes in *Thinking about the Unthinkable* (1962) that since nuclear weapons cannot be uninvented, how does one live with them, devise policies to accommodate them, and turn them into tools of statecraft (Kahn 1962, 37)? The reality of nuclear weapons raises three questions for policy makers: How do you avoid nuclear war? If you can’t avoid it, how do you survive it? Lastly, how do you fight it without destroying yourself? Kahn developed three types of deterrence – Type I: deterring attacks against your own country, Type 2: Deterring very provocative acts against allies, and Type 3: Deterring minor provocations. Kahn posits that deterrence must be durable and work in all situations (Khan 1960, 8-13). He built his theory on Schelling’s bargaining principles with the concept of the “escalation ladder,” which is a policy of deliberately taking more robust deterrent actions to reduce the possibility that a war will turn nuclear. In the South Asian environment, neither India nor Pakistan has the strategic
depth that the United States and the Soviet Union enjoyed. The Kargil border crisis of 1999 was an exercise of Type 3 deterrence when Pakistan tried to infiltrate guerillas into the Kargil region of Kashmir to attack Indian forces. Pakistan took greater risks because it felt it had the protection of a nuclear deterrent force, but pressure from the United States combined with a robust Indian conventional counterattack forced Pakistan to withdraw.

Henry Kissinger in *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy* (1957) believed that policies of nuclear “massive retaliation” were deficient because a policy based on nuclear weapons generally fails to translate this overwhelming power into useful tools of diplomacy. Since all-out war is now unthinkable when both sides had nuclear weapons, the Soviets switched to achieving USSR foreign policy objectives through limited and indirect means. Kissinger was searching for a credible military policy, and he believed that using nuclear weapons at a low threshold was not credible. This conundrum was proven true in South Asia in both 1999 and 2001, when India and Pakistan fought first a small war, then threatened a general war. India and Pakistan were now faced with the problem of how to be both credible and restrained in the new nuclear environment.

India and Pakistan, up to 1998, pursued a policy of “opaque proliferation.” Devin Hagerty defines this environment being based on existential deterrence. McGeorge Bundy is credited with developing the concept of “existential deterrence.” Bundy argued during the Cold War that any nuclear conflict between the superpowers would be fraught with “terrible and unavoidable uncertainties” which have “great meaning for the theory of deterrence” (Bundy 1983, 4). Opaque proliferants pursue nuclear capabilities at least in part for the deterrent effect they will have on adversaries, and capitalize upon both the
uncertain nature of opaque forces, while at the same time basing their deterrence upon it. The new nuclear powers deter aggression while at the same time deny deploying nuclear weapons with the intent of using existential deterrence as their policy. The basic requirement for stable nuclear deterrence is the survivability, not the size of a country’s nuclear force. Once a nuclear capability is established, opaque proliferants behave like other nuclear powers through strategic bargaining and communications. This includes both verbal and non-verbal communications such as displaying one’s military might. Tacit bargaining is when a state signals to its opponent using the actions of its forces. This type of communication is often incomplete or impossible to completely verify. Interestingly, opaque proliferants have used other means of verification, specifically the United States and nuclear monitoring groups, to signal to their opponent their actual nuclear capabilities without having to declare them (Hagerty 1995, 55).

The best Indian attempt to develop a stated nuclear strategy was Raja Menon’s *A Nuclear Strategy for India* (2000) in which he states that India must declare its nuclear deterrent policy in the wake of the 1998 testing (Menon 2000, 20-21). Menon reviewed the underpinnings of Western nuclear theory with the intent of being able to apply the relevant portions of Western thought to the Indian situation. He explicitly rejects that there is an “Indian” specific methodology to nuclear war, which was a popular belief among the Indian policy elites. He argues that the Indian government failed to develop a nuclear strategy, and that the lack of a strategy combined with actually having nuclear weapons was a dangerous environment to be in. Menon’s work is the first Indian writer to comprehensively address nuclear weapon strategy in a rational manner. He argues that
India will have to develop the same Western-style nuclear triad, with its associated Western deterrent-type policy in order to be a responsible, credible nuclear power.

The need for nuclear weapons is a two-sided issue. On one hand, more nuclear weapons may be more useful. Scott Sagan and Kenneth Waltz debated in the book *The Spread of Nuclear Weapons* (1995) on the proliferation issue. Waltz argued that more nuclear weapon states may be better, because international politics are a self-help system. If it is impossible to destroy enough of the other side’s nuclear capabilities to make a retaliatory strike bearable, then the balance of terror is indestructible. Nuclear weapons make miscalculation difficult because it is hard not to be aware of how much damage even a small number of nuclear weapons can do. Waltz states that nuclear weapons reduced the actual chance of war between the United States and the Soviets, as well as the Chinese and the Soviets. He believes that it is reasonable to expect that new nuclear powers will feel the same constraints that the present nuclear states felt, and will behave accordingly (Sagan and Waltz 1995, 44-45). Sagan disagrees with Waltz’s assessment that more nuclear states are better. He believes that it is optimistic that developing states will have the strategic patience not to launch pre-emptive strikes, that civil control will be able to be maintained over nuclear weapons in developing nations, and that catastrophic nuclear accidents will be avoided (Sagan and Waltz 1995, 86). In the South Asian experience, both sides of this issue have been borne out. It does appear that once both India and Pakistan declared their nuclear capabilities, even though it was highly probable that fighting between the two of them could have escalated in 1999 and 2001, the fighting and posturing rapidly declined the closer to major war they came as Waltz said it would. However, when the first Islamic state to develop weapons declared it after President
Musharraf engineered a coup to take control of Pakistan; Sagan’s concerns appear to be justified.

The last issue is one of nuclear disarmament. Mitchell Reiss wrote an outstanding book in 1995, *Bridled Ambition*, on why states slow, stop, or reverse their nuclear capabilities. The five factors he determined were the following: first, the change in the international system after the Cold War and its influence on the value of nuclear weapons. Once the international system became less conflictual, the relative value of nuclear weapons was reduced. Second, nuclear disarmament became a new type of “dollar diplomacy,” where countries that desired aid from the West or wanted to reallocate funding at home found that it paid to disarm. Third, American leadership in nonproliferation efforts proved critical to enable countries at the end of the Cold War transition from new nuclear powers to nonnuclear powers. Fourth, the quality of the local political leadership is crucial to nonproliferation success. Lastly, the global nuclear nonproliferation regime has proven to be a powerful normative influence for those countries that wanted to remain within the international community and did not face existential threats (Reiss 1995, 321). Countries such as South Africa, Argentina, and Brazil gave up their nuclear weapons or the pursuit for nuclear weapons on their own accord once they ceased to face nuclear or conventional threats (Reiss 1995, 324). Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan eliminated their nuclear capabilities due to the joint leadership efforts and aid provided by the United States and Russia. By joining the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, former Soviet states and South Africa demonstrated their desire to be members of good standing in the international community. However, India and Pakistan were not members of the nonproliferation regime, and both felt that
they faced existential threats from the other. In fact, India specifically states that the nuclear nonproliferation regime led by the United States is “nuclear apartheid,” designed to prevent India from achieving its rightful place as a major power. The reasons why other states gave up their nuclear weapons do not appear to apply to either India or Pakistan.

The strategic nuclear literature is a well developed body of knowledge. It is clear that concepts such as deterrence and the need for a durable and survivable second-strike capability are useful not only in relations between the United States and Russia, but in nuclear dyads in general. Nuclear weapons cannot be uninvented, and they must be dealt with as long as powerful nations perceive that their security environment is a conflictual one.

**Development of Nuclear Weapons in South Asia**

Lastly, the development of nuclear weapons in South Asia is an area of the literature that is quite interesting. How India, Pakistan, and China developed and fielded nuclear weapons is a subject that has generated a body of literature of extremely variable quality. The variable quality is due to many South Asian commentators or researchers becoming closely tied to their position, extolling the virtues of their side and condemning those of their opponent.

The key works that addresses the nuclear issue in south Asia is George Perkovich’s seminal work *India’s Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation* (1999) which is an exceptionally detailed work on the development of the Indian nuclear weapons program. He challenges the conventional wisdom holding that countries pursue nuclear power mainly for security reasons (Perkovich 1999, 445). Perkovich says the
motives in India’s case were complex. The desire by Prime Minister Vajpayee for global recognition of India as a major power and to instill national pride outweighed all other considerations. Perkovich suggests that the United States could have done more to ameliorate the situation in South Asia if it had pursued a coherent policy toward South Asia.

This master work is complemented by Ashley Tellis’ *The Changing Political-Military Environment in South Asia* (2001), which provides an outstanding portrayal of the Indian nuclear weapons program in both its regional and global context. Tellis writes that India is now on the threshold of adopting a nuclear posture that has the goal of the establishment of a “minimum but credible deterrent,” known as a “force-in-being.” It is unlikely that India will develop a ready launch arsenal that is established as a “launch on warning” force, but India will develop one that will be credible to both Pakistan and China (Tellis 2001, 753).

The competition between India and Pakistan, and the secondary competition between India and China are crucial to understanding the region. Neil Joeck’s Adelphi Paper *Maintaining Nuclear Stability in South Asia* (1997) is a good synopsis of the logic process in American foreign policy before the Indian nuclear tests of 1998, and complements Tellis and Perkovich’s works. Hilary Synnott’s Adelphi Paper *The Causes and Consequences of South Asia’s Nuclear Tests* (1999) is a helpful post-nuclear testing paper that lays out the potential ways ahead for American foreign policy.

The Pressler Amendment is crucial for understanding American policy in South Asia. This was an amendment on the American Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, which prohibited the sale of military equipment to a country attempting to build nuclear
weapons. The Reagan administration wanted to sell weapons to Pakistan in 1985 to counteract the Soviet operations in Afghanistan. Senator Larry Pressler of South Dakota sponsored a bill that would allow the military aid to proceed as long as the President certified that Pakistan did not possess nuclear weapons. This amendment later became a nonproliferation sanction against Pakistan in the 1990s (Perkovich 1999, 270).

Devin Hagerty’s *The Consequences of Nuclear Proliferation* (1998) is useful because it examines the concept of opaque nuclear proliferation in South Asia. When published, the author did not realize that overt nuclear testing would occur within the year. Hagerty examines the relationship between Pakistan and India and then evaluates their actions using the logic of nuclear nonproliferation and nuclear deterrence. He finds that both India and Pakistan subscribe to the logic of nuclear deterrence for their policy and their production of arms, and that this decision has in essence created a nuclear deterrent relationship (Hagerty 1998, 177-196).

Lastly, the letters and speeches by Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee from 1998 and 2002 are useful in providing the Indian perspective. Prime Minister Vajpayee, when visiting the Indian nuclear test site on 20 May 1998, stated that “We had to conduct the nuclear tests to show our strength after these countries did not pay any heed to our pleadings to stop manufacturing nuclear weapons and intimidating others” and that “We are prepared to pay any price and sacrifices for preserving the national security and nothing is more supreme to us” (Press Trust India 1998). Prime Minister Vajpayee had been a long-time supporter of India becoming a declared nuclear power.

The review of the literature is important to establish a base from which analysis of the research question can thence commence. After reviewing the relevant international
relations theories, American national security strategies, regional studies, rising regional powers, Indo-American relations, the development of nuclear strategy, and the development of nuclear weapons in South Asia, the theoretical and factual basis for this study is now laid. The next chapter is the methodological chapter, which then provides the framework for analysis to view the Cold War historical relationship of India and the United States in context before moving on to the following analytical chapter.
CHAPTER 3
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

In order to answer the question of how can a more effective policy be developed for the United States to engage rising regional nuclear powers to further American national interests, a research design of longitudinal study over time will be used. The purpose of this design is to permit the observation of the actor in the case study over an extended period of time (Babbie 2001, 102). The design of the project assists in exploring the decisions made by American decision makers in order to provide insight into how global American foreign policy translates into regional applicability.

The level of analysis is at the state level. The countries that are considered pertinent to the study are the United States, India, Pakistan, China, and Russia. The United States is the primary actor in the study, and its relationship with India is the case study. The United Nations, the International Atomic Energy Agency, and the World Trade Organization are the primary international organizations and regimes in the study. The two treaties that are most critical to the study are the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), first signed in 1968 and extended in 1995; and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) of 1996. The NPT is the world’s most widely accepted arms control agreement, signed by 189 countries. Only Cuba, India, Pakistan, and Israel are not signatories to the NPT (United Nations 2004). The CTBT is signed by 171 countries, but only by 32 of the 44 countries required for it to go into force (United Nations 2004).

The research design is the application of United States foreign policy objectives to the United States-Indian relationship compared over time, using the analytical framework
published by Donald Nuechterlein as the basis for determining the strength or weakness of the policy. The time period chosen for analysis is from 1991 to 2003. The time period is further subdivided into four time blocks of 1991-1994, 1995-1997, 1998-2001 and 2001-2003. These time periods correspond to the changes in the security environment for both the United States and India, and by doing so, provides boundaries for analysis. The United States publishes, by law, the National Security Strategy annually, and this document will be the basis for determining the stated American foreign policy security objectives for each time period. Published by three different presidents, the periods of time help set the stage for analysis.

American National Security Strategies

The National Security Strategy of President George H.W. Bush, published in 1991, is a strategy that focuses primarily on the transition of the world from a bipolar conflictual world to one that was based more on cooperation and agreement. The United States deemed as a vital interest the “soft landing” of the Soviet Union, and the protection and control of the Soviet nuclear arms inventory was crucial to this effort. The Indo-Pakistani nuclear rivalry was mentioned but once in the NSS published in 1991, and only in terms of promoting restraint in India and Pakistan conducting attacks against each others nuclear facilities (White House 1991, 17). The Bush administration could not guarantee that Pakistan did not have a nuclear weapons program after 1990, which invoked the embargo on weapons to Pakistan per the US law. The United States worked with other members of the non-proliferation regime to limit the sale, transfer, or development of nuclear weapons materials to both India and Pakistan.
The National Security Strategy promulgated by President Bill Clinton in 1995 is interesting because this is the year when the Nuclear Non-Proliferation extension negotiations occurred. The Clinton administration took a more confrontational tone with both India and Pakistan, seeking to “cap, reduce and, ultimately, eliminate the nuclear and missile capabilities of India and Pakistan” (White House 1995, 14). The United States policy had shifted from maintaining the nuclear non-proliferation regime espoused in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty to one where nuclear roll-back was desired. Both India and Pakistan protested American pressure, arguing that they each had real and significant security concerns in the South Asia region. Neither country acceded to either the NPT or the CTBT. No security guarantees were given to either India or Pakistan by any of the nuclear-armed powers, and their security dilemma was not ameliorated.

In 1998, India and Pakistan conducted nuclear tests, and the Clinton administration was placed on the defensive. The nuclear tests damaged the administration’s policy of advocating for the NPT and the CTBT, and forced a revision to policy. The United States invoked broad economic sanctions against both India and Pakistan. The 1998 NSS now sought to “bring their nuclear and missile programs into conformity with international nonproliferation standards” (White House 1998, 10) rather than the more invasive “cap, reduce, and eventually eliminate” policies previously held. The Indian nuclear tests paid dividends in the form of beginning a sustained, in-depth series of talks between the United States and Indian governments which led to the 2000 visit by President Clinton to India and the broadening and deepening of the relationship between the United States and India. Pakistan was chastised during this visit by President Clinton, and was admonished not to provoke India.
On 11 September 2001, the terror attacks on the United States provided an opportunity for the United States to engage with the South Asian powers in a deeper manner. Islamic terror attacks on the Indian Parliament in September 2001 provided an opening for the United States and India to identify common security interests. The Bush 2002 NSS reflects this change in orientation. In the NSS, “Differences remain, including over the development of India’s nuclear and missile programs, and the pace of India’s economic reforms. But while in the past these concerns may have dominated our thinking about India, today we start with a view of India as a growing world power with which we have common strategic interests” (White House 2002, 27). The United States recognition of the growing power of India is an important development, one that has the potential to reshape American security policy in Asia.

American National Interests

Nuechterlein provides an analytical framework for determining national interests based on a four-by-four analytical frame, with the two axes being enduring national interests and the intensity of the interest. The basic national interest axis in descending importance the physical defense of the United States territorial and its constitutional system, the enhancement of the United States’ economic development and the promotion of American commerce abroad, the creation of a favorable world order, and lastly the promotion of American democratic values and the free market system (Nuechterlein 2001, 16).
Table 2. National Interest Matrix

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Basic National Interest</th>
<th>Intensity of International Interest</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Survival (critical)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defense of Homeland</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic well-being</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Favorable World Order</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promotion of Values</td>
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Nuechterlein further defines these basic national interests by broadening the definition of the United States territorial system to include the states of Canada, Mexico, Iceland, Greenland, and the seas surrounding them. The American economic interest includes the freedom to trade abroad, unfettered access to foreign markets, defending the value of the dollar, and the maintenance of the American standard of living. The interest of a favorable world order included during the Cold War the containment of Communism, and now focuses on the development of a positive collective security environment with the other major powers. Lastly, the promotion of democratic values has increased in importance since the Cold War. During the Cold War, the United States supported a number of non-democratic regimes in its bid to contain Communism, but in the post-Cold War environment, this is no longer acceptable. The promotion of human rights and democratic systems of government has taken on a much greater importance (Nuechterlein 2001, 16).

The second important issue in the national interest framework is the determination of the intensity of interest the actor has in the conflict. Nuechterlein uses four terms to describe the intensity of the interest involved: survival, vital, major, and peripheral.
Survival interests address issues where there is an “imminent, credible threat of massive destruction to the homeland if the enemy state’s demands are not countered quickly” (Nuechterlein 2001, 17). Survival interests are fairly obvious. Vital interests are of similar importance to survival interests, but there is not the threat of imminent destruction. The tools of national power can be applied to protect the state’s interests, but in a vital interest, the issue is deemed so important that the leadership is willing to face significant military, economic, or diplomatic sanctions to defend its interests. Major interests are those issues that are deemed important, but not crucial to the nation (Nuechterlein 2001, 19). Negotiation and compromise are preferable to conflict, even if this causes some damage to American national interests domestically or overseas. Lastly, peripheral interests are those issues that do not seriously affect the overall well being of the United States, even though they may be uncomfortable. Nuechterlein states that the most difficult problem facing policymakers are issues that fall between the intensity levels of vital and major, due to the difficulty of effectively determining the tipping point between the two (Nuechterlein 2001, 25).

The various Clinton administration *National Security Strategy* documents use a slightly different framework for determining national interests. The three categories are vital, important, and humanitarian. Vital interests are those that are directly connected to the survival and vitality of the nation. Most notably, these are issues that may involve the unilateral use of force. The second category is important interests. These are issues that affect the national well-being. The *National Security Strategy* 1998 uses the American intervention in Bosnia as an example (White House 1998, 5), and the *National Security Strategy* 2000 uses the Kosovo conflict as an example as an important interest (White
House 2000, 4). Lastly, the humanitarian interest includes addressing violations of human
rights, support to new democracies, promoting sustainable development, and assisting in
disaster relief. This study will use the four-intensity model used by Nuechterlein.

Nuechterlein provides a framework for policy makers so the instruments of
foreign and national security that can be utilized to advance or defend national interests.
Nations may employ any of these policy instruments to attempt to influence other nations
to support their objectives.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 3. Instruments of Foreign and National Security Strategy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political/Economic Instruments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Diplomatic relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Scientific and cultural exchanges</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Humanitarian assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Technical assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Information and propaganda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Economic and financial assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Economic and trade policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Military assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Covert actions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Trade embargo and economic sanctions</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Nations have the option to use any and all of the above instruments of policy to
achieve their policy objectives. This listing is not comprehensive, but it is a useful tool to
evaluate what instruments of policy can be utilized to implement national security policy.

50
American Foreign Policy Traditions

Another important method to consider when evaluating American foreign policy is the four traditions of American foreign policy, as defined by Walter Russell Mead in his book *Special Providence* (2001). Mead posits that there are four traditions at work in American foreign policy, and he bases them on the four presidents that best represented these traditions.

The Hamiltonian tradition is primarily concerned with the United States economic well being at home and abroad, and supports international engagement to advance these interests. The Wilsonian tradition promulgates American values through the world through international engagement. It also supports strongly international organizations like the League of Nations and the United Nations. The Jacksonian tradition is a populist tradition, which supports maintaining a strong military that is only to be used sparingly, but if necessary, then used overwhelmingly. The Jacksonian tradition is more circumspect toward international organizations and believes that the United States should not become entangled overseas. Lastly, the Jeffersonian tradition is concerned with liberty at home, is suspicious of large militaries and large-scale international projects, and is more isolationist and low profile in its outlook. Mead argues that all four traditions are active simultaneously, which gives American foreign policy the flexibility to take advantage of the international environment it finds itself in (Mead 2001, 87-89).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tradition</th>
<th>Military</th>
<th>Economic</th>
<th>International Organizations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hamiltonian</td>
<td>Use military to protect economic prosperity, work with other powers to maintain balance</td>
<td>Strong support of business</td>
<td>Moderate support in order to further American prosperity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wilsonian</td>
<td>Use military to support the export of our values</td>
<td>Supports the middle and lower class</td>
<td>Strong support in order to further the development of an international civil society of democratic states</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jacksonian</td>
<td>Reluctant, but once committed, will use overwhelming force</td>
<td>Populist, supports the middle class</td>
<td>Moderate support in order to further American prosperity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jeffersonian</td>
<td>Suspicious of large militaries, isolationist</td>
<td>Protectionist, sees alliance of big business and government as imperialistic</td>
<td>Little support due to fears of loss of liberty at home</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Mead 2001, 87-89.

This study will utilize Nuechterlein’s national interest framework as an assessment tool to each of the major United States Security Strategies identified earlier as a way to measure how effective the policy was constructed to support the national interests identified in the *National Security Strategies*. The study will then consider the actual events of each time period, determine how feasible, acceptable, and suitable the policy was to the regional environment at the time, and then conclude with evaluating how effective the implementation of the *National Security Strategies* were in protecting American national interests in the case study area. Lastly, conclusions will be drawn to determine possible alternative policies to more effectively support American national
interests in a regional context. Where applicable, the American foreign policy traditions as defined by Walter Russell Mead will also be used to illustrate how the United States is drawing upon its diplomatic traditions to solve present day challenges.

The historical relationship between the United States and India during the Cold War has a significant impact on how the two countries engaged with each other after 1991. The background is important in understanding both the opportunities and constraints that decision makers had in both countries in developing a closer relationship between India and the United States. Chapter Four provides the historical context for the study.
In order to accurately portray US-Indian relations in the post-Cold War environment, a review of the Cold War history is necessary to provide the appropriate context for the study. It is important to understand what the American strategic perspectives on India was through the Cold War, the Indian perspective toward the United States, and the events of the Cold War that have an impact on the interaction between the United States and India to today.

**American Strategic Perspectives**

The United States has viewed India since its independence in 1947 with the hope of India’s long term promise, but fearful of India’s short-term disintegration. American policy makers have consistently thought of India as a state that may “become” a power, but not has arrived yet. After the end of World War II, India was widely perceived by Western leaders as a vast, poor country, riven by internal turmoil. The strongest evidence for this perception was the necessity to have a partition between Hindu India and Islamic Pakistan from the original British colonial boundaries of India. India rapidly demonstrated its desire for independence by becoming a leader in the non-aligned movement in the developing world and distancing itself from its former colonial masters. India often demonstrated this independence by antagonizing the United States on issues it considered neo-colonial due to its perception of the United States as the natural successor to the British Empire. India’s economy during the Cold War was strongly protectionist, and could not project power militarily beyond its immediate borders.
The American policy toward India was generally benign. American policymakers viewed India as the great diplomatic prize in Southern Asia, sometimes to the surprise to the Indians. The concept of the largest democracy and the most powerful democracy working together has always been an attractive goal to the United States. Unfortunately, global American policies often detracted from the attainment of this objective. India was more often either an adjunct to American policies of containment toward the Soviet Union or China, or the target of the American global nuclear nonproliferation strategy (Bertch 1999, 24). India was rarely viewed as a strategic partner in itself. Often, American interest in India was driven by fears that the disintegration of India would be a potential source of destabilizing chaos. “It was India’s collapse, not the possibility of strategic cooperation, which generated American interest” (Chase 1999, 53).

However, this perspective is beginning to change. American hegemony during the 1990s has been established as a fact, with no peer global competitor. In the post-Cold War environment, India has begun to take on a greater value to the United States for a variety of reasons. The end of the Cold War removed the global ideological competition between the United States and Soviet Union, providing an opportunity to review long-standing relationships. The United States has revisited all its bilateral relationships, and has been able to improve many of them. India has also changed significantly from the Cold War, making efforts to reduce economic barriers and liberalizing its political process.

Diplomatic progress was made between the United States and India in the 1990s, but the most dramatic progress in the relationship did not occur until 1998. India resumed nuclear testing in 1998, which was a contributing factor to the visit to India by President
Bill Clinton in March 2000, the first by an American President since President Carter in January 1978. The second event was the terrorist attack against the United States on 11 September 2001. The United States embraced India as a key ally in the Global War on Terrorism, as evidenced by the visit by Prime Minister Vajpayee to the United States in November 2001. The United States and India have been able to overcome significant diplomatic obstacles such as years of mistrust and misunderstanding, and have been able to improve their relationship significantly. Secretary of State Colin Powell characterized the relationship with India in July 2002 as “perhaps better then at any time in the last quarter century” (Powell 2002). The United States and India have been able to find common economic, political, and security interests in the new post-Cold War security environment.

Separated Powers

How did India and the United States become so separated in the first place? At first glance, it appears there were many issues that could have been used to build a strong relationship upon. Both India and the United States share commitments to democracy, decolonization, and share a common official language. Unfortunately, distance, misperception, and a lack of pressing mutual interests militated against this relationship. There are differing perspectives on American foreign policy toward India during the Cold War, but two conclusions have been consistent. The United States often pursued policies that were global in nature that did not fit well with the South-Asian regional dynamic. Rarely has there been an American foreign policy toward India in specific. The preponderant American foreign policy was one focused on the Soviet Union or China, with India as an adjunct to that greater policy.
Stephen Cohen writes that the United States and India are “distanced powers” (Cohen 2001, 269). He argues that the strategic distancing between the United States and India occurred before the Cold War, because neither side saw each other as vital to their national interests. American liberals supported the Indian independence movement during the early 1940s. However, this support waned when nationalist Indian leaders in 1942 chose not to support the war against Japan and Germany. Few Indian leaders of the 1940s, such as Nehru, had either been to the United States or had extensive dealings with Americans. The lack of personal experience, combined with the lukewarm support of Indian nationalists by the United States led the new Indian ruling elites to view the loss of American support was viewed as nonessential.

Cohen argues that there are four major themes in the Indo-American relationship. The first theme was the negative consequences of the American containment policy applied in South Asia by American support to Pakistan, India’s rival. The second theme is one of the United States commitment to enforcing the global nuclear nonproliferation regime, and India’s commitment to maintain a nuclear deterrence capability for its own security requirements. Third, American desires to support Indian democracy, and the unshakable concept that democracies should be able to find common interests. Lastly, the United States has always judged India worthy of developmental and economic aid due to its poverty (Cohen 2001, 282).

Chase, Hill, and Kennedy assert that American foreign policy has generally focused on India in terms of its weakness and disintegrative potential, not on its strength. Each administration has supported Indian economic and social development, with India being the largest recipient of developmental assistance over the last fifty years. Growth
was viewed as essential for sustainable Indian democracy, something that was a long-term goal for the United States. Indian strategic elites have consistently viewed India as a great power, not as one on the verge of failure. The Indian strategic elite has consistently pursued a policy of autarky, or self-reliance, believing that great states are not dependant states (Chase 1999, 53). They have been more concerned about how weaker states around India’s periphery could be used against India, specifically Pakistan. Indians fear that the United State’s support of Pakistan and China is actually a policy of suppressing Indian regional dominance (Chase 1999, 54). The Indian strategic elite was small, stable, and homogeneous in its outlook during the Cold War due to the Indian caste system and the dominance of the Congress Party. The American assessment of where India stands in relation to its neighbors is often at odds with the Indian assessment. While the Indian leaders perspectives may, in fact, be wrong in some cases, that issue is irrelevant to them. Domestic considerations and pre-existing Indian elite perceptions will continue to influence Indian leader’s actions.

**US-Indian History during the Cold War**

At the beginning of the Cold War, the Indian subcontinent was viewed as an area of major, but not vital, importance to the United States. Many of the estimates in the 1940s focused on the physical factors of the subcontinent. India had one-fifth of the world’s population, a landmass equal to Europe, and was a leading producer of raw materials and goods, such as cotton and manganese. The strategic location of India was important, with the subcontinent not only sitting astride the major sea lanes between Europe and the Far East, but directly next to the strategically vital oil fields in the Middle East (McMahon 1994, 13). However, India was viewed as a future potential power, not a
currently important power. As a result, a 1947 CIA report placed the Indian sub-continent last in importance to the United States, after Europe, the Middle East, and Northeast Asia. Europe and Northeast Asia had developed industrial and technological infrastructure, with well-trained populations and access to raw materials. The Middle East had the vital energy resources needed for post-war development. The Indian-subcontinent was important due to its future potential, not is current value in 1947.

American interest in India was renewed with the onset of the Cold War. Washington reviewed its position in each of the world’s regions, and assessed the potential threat to southern Asia by Soviet and Chinese forces. The concept of the containment policy in southern Asia was to enable Pakistan and India to defend them against external aggression, to establish bases and other support for American forces to launch strikes against the Soviet Union, if necessary, and to assist both countries in defeating Communist-led insurgencies within their borders (Rotter 2000, 56). India did not see the Cold War in American terms. Nehru was apposed to it, but was willing to accept assistance from both superpowers to aid India. India’s perspective was that the Cold War was excessively militarized. The division of the world diverted resources that could have been used for support and economic development of the Third World. India’s perspective was that the Soviet Union was not a colonial power, and as such did not carry historical baggage, as the United States did. The Indians also believed that the Cold War was generated by the aggressive containment policy of the Americans, and the Soviets were focused defensively (Cohen 2001, 272). Soviet anticolonial claims resonated with the Indian elites, whom still responded positively to these ideas. The United States was viewed by Nehru and others as a unfriendly, if not colonial, power because it had
supported the British during World War II, armed Pakistan in the 1950s and 1960s, allied with China in the 1970s, and brought down India’s patron, the Soviet Union, in the 1980s (Cohen 2001, 42).

Robert McMahon writes that the Truman administration adopted two distinct strategies to the subcontinent. The first is that the United States sought to establish the most constructive bilateral relationships as possible with both India and Pakistan. At the same time, the United States has also tried to follow a regionally-based approach. American policy makers, especially at the time of the partition, viewed both countries as interdependent. Pursuing a regional strategy that attempted to be even-handed between India and Pakistan often antagonized both (McMahon 1994, 12).

Pakistan was more willing to accept American aid than India was. Pakistan’s economic aid flowed from 1954 to 1965 because it jointed the Baghdad Pact and SEATO, after which it was cut off because of the Indo-Pakistani war of 1965 (Cohen 2001, 270). India prized its non-aligned status, and until the disastrous 1962 war with China, did not accept much military aid from the United States. Even when threatened by China, India refused to join any American-led security pacts. India did accept considerably more economic aid from the United States than did Pakistan. American attitudes were driven by the desire for both India and Pakistan to become stable partners in the effort against Communism. The United States provided food, economic aid, and agricultural programs in order to assist India’s stability and growth. American policymakers made the correlation between poverty and the fertility of opportunity for Communist insurgencies to develop. Therefore, by encouraging economic growth, American policies would defeat Communist insurgencies before they developed in India.
The United States also conducted information campaigns in India to improve the perception of the United States to Indians, and to defeat Soviet disinformation (Cohen 2001, 271). However, on numerous occasions, American generosity offended the proud sensitivities of the Indian decision making elites, engendering distrust and resentment (Rotter 2000, 264).

To American policy makers, India was always the focus of the effort in south Asia. Pakistan was useful due to its proximity to the Soviet Union, but a democratic India as a counterweight to either Communist China or the Soviet Union was the goal (Cohen 2001, 271). Unfortunately for the United States, this was not the perspective from India. American officials had difficulties understanding India’s non-aligned stance, reasoning that democracies should support each other in the crusade against Communism. However, by the late-1960s, it was accepted that the Indian position of non-alignment was not going to change, and that India would continue to stubbornly maintain its position.

Consistent with the overall American policy of the early 1970s, the United States began to withdraw its interest from the region. During the 1971 Indo-Pakistani war over Bangladesh, the United States embargoed further military aid to Pakistan and India. In 1974, the United States ended nuclear cooperation with India over India’s first nuclear testing. Détente was American policy at this time, but containment of the Soviet Union remained the guide to the overall American foreign policy. Cohen writes that American decision makers had decided by the mid-1970s that India did not need to be allied with the United States as long as it did not become an enemy of the United States (Cohen 2001, 271). C. Raja Mohan wrote, “While Indian and American troops have never had an
occasion to exchange fire; their diplomats never missed a chance for a verbal duel. The Cold War saw a steady accumulation of distrust, and permanent irritation resulted in the utter inability of the two governments to conduct their relations in a reasonable manner” (Bertch 1999, 24).

The Indian criticism of containment continued up until the point of the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The invasion was shocking to the Indian leadership, because it contradicted their long held views that the Soviet Union was essentially defensive and benign. India had become dependant upon the Soviet Union for military equipment and political support, and the invasion placed India in a quandary. The invasion of Afghanistan began the “second Cold War,” and reinvigorated the moribund US-Pakistani relationship. The United States provided $7 billion to Pakistan in military and economic assistance after the invasion, raising fears in India of the aid being turned on India, rather than against Afghanistan. Indians publicly focused most of their criticism on the failure of the United States to solve the Afghanistan through diplomatic means, while privately admitting the illegality of the Soviet action (Cohen 2001, 273).

The relationship between the United States and Pakistan has been the most contentious issue between the United States and India. India’s perspective of its northern neighbor is that it is a dangerous, authoritarian regime, opposed to peace, and unaccepting of Indian authority. India also believed that United States support for Pakistan forced India into a costly and unnecessary arms race (Cohen 2001, 273). Starting in 1954, American arms sales to Pakistan, including tanks and jets, ensured that India would not be able to dominate Pakistan. After the American-Pakistani rapprochement in 1980, the United States provided to Pakistan F-16 fighters and other
military equipment, which offended the Indians. These arms transfers neutralized Indian modernization gains in the Indian military.

India believes that American support gave Pakistan both the means and the will to defy India. This support, coupled with Indian perceptions of Pakistani arrogance, made Pakistan an intractable foe (Cohen 2001, 274). Therefore, American support to Pakistan is tantamount to an anti-Indian policy, which then prevented India from assuming its rightful place as a regional, if not great power.

India has also had issues with American foreign policy toward China. During the early Cold War, the United States attempted to gain support from India against the Chinese Communists. Nehru rejected this approach, was neutral during the Korean conflict, and tried to appease China over Tibet (Thomas and Gupta 2000, 40). However, when China invaded India in 1962, India did re-evaluate its position after suffering a humiliating battlefield defeat (Bertch 1999, 5). Because of this event, from 1963 to 1965, the security relationship between the United States and India grew closer, with American military equipment being shipped to India to arm its mountain defense forces (McMahon 1994, 292-300).

The budding early Indian-American relationship was damaged by three major events. First, the ending of American military assistance to India in 1965 in response to the Indo-Pakistani War implied equal culpability in this war, offending the Indians. Second, the dispatch of the American nuclear aircraft carrier Enterprise to the region during the 1971 Indo-Pakistani war was interpreted by India as nuclear gunboat diplomacy by the Americans attempting to threaten India. It was actually intended to be a signal of American resolve to China to stay out of the conflict, but that intention was not
made clear to the Indians (Cohen 2001, 275). Lastly, the American opening to China in 1971 was the final break in the security relationship. The American intention was to use China to balance against the Soviet Union. India perceived this as the most powerful democracy in the world supporting the largest Communist nation against the world’s largest democracy. American support to both Pakistan and China threatened India’s regional dominance. Additionally, using China to balance against India’s ally, the Soviet Union, was viewed as an unfriendly act. This cast a chill over US-Indian relations for the remainder of the 1970s.

The United States has never viewed India as a threat to its interests, and has attempted to engage India on a number of issues over the past fifty years. America has attempted to make a positive contribution to resolving the Indo-Pakistani dispute over Kashmir, primarily from the perspective that conflict between India and Pakistan made both vulnerable to communist pressure (Cohen 2001, 276). The Truman administration attempted to assist in the resolution of the dispute through a United Nations peacekeeping mission to the disputed territory. President Truman first suggested on 30 August 1949 that the situation be settled by arbitration, recognizing the difficulties the two parties were having in solving the dispute (Rahman 2001, 86). India has consistently rejected superpower intervention due to the implication that India was not powerful enough to resolve its own security problems. The Eisenhower administration also attempted to bring India and Pakistan together to resolve the conflict. Lastly, the Kennedy administration also raised the issue during the Indo-Chinese war in 1962 as a means of relieving pressure on India while they fought the Chinese. India, belatedly recognizing the value of the containment policy to the United States, pressed the United States for more support based
on the threat of China (Rahman 2001, 105). This request was done quietly so as not to imply Indian “tilting” toward the United States.

During the 1965 Indo-Pakistani war, the United States was concerned about the potential for Pakistan to draw closer to China if Pakistan was decisively defeated by India (Rahman 2001, 12). Sanctions were applied evenly to both warring parties, offending the Indians because of the perception that they were equal to the Pakistanis. After the conclusion of the war, President Johnson broke with the previous American involvement with mediating the Indo-Pakistani conflict and focused on the emerging concerns about Vietnam.

**Nuclear Nonproliferation**

The United States has pursued policies of nuclear nonproliferation and economic liberalization with India. The first significant attempt of the United States to influence Indian trade policies was by President Johnson in July, 1965. He placed pressure on India’s protectionist agricultural trade policies by suspending long-term American food aid in the middle of a severe famine in India. By 1967, India had changed its agricultural policy to a limited extent, and the United States resumed its food shipments to India. Unfortunately, this coercion damaged Indo-American relations. Indira Ghandi and others felt that this was an assault upon Indian sovereignty at the very time that the United States had lost its moral standing by its involvement in Vietnam (Cohen 2001, 279).

India diminished in value to the United States for the remainder of the Johnson administration and into the Nixon administration. This was evidenced by the lack of concern the United States showed during its rapprochement with China in July 1971. The Soviet Union and India signed a Treaty of Friendship on 9 August 1971, cementing
Soviet support for India in the face of potential American support for China against India (Rahman 2001, 127). The Soviet support was a supporting factor in India’s decision to launch the third Indo-Pakistani War in late November, 1971.

President Nixon tried to intercede to defuse the Indo-Pakistan war in December 1971, but the dispatch of the nuclear powered and armed aircraft carrier Enterprise soured relations between the United States and India (Cohen 2001, 277). Nixon was attempting to influence China and the Soviet Union to stay out of the war, yet ended up offending the Indians by their perception of the United States conducting an exercise in “gunboat diplomacy” (Perkovich 1999, 165-166). For the remainder of the Cold War, India did not significantly impact on the American foreign policy objective of the containment of the Soviet Union and international communism.

India and the United States had been sparring during the late 1960s over the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. The United States had undertaken a policy of political and economic persuasion to try to convince the Indians to join the NPT. The Indians viewed the NPT as a treaty that would consign India to a second-class power status, and refused to sign. The first Indian nuclear test in 1974 caused a change in American nonproliferation policy from one of persuasion to one of sanction and controls. Technology export controls became the preferred tool of this policy. The United States reduced, and then halted, the transfer of nuclear-related technology to nations not participating in the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. In 1978, the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act was passed by Congress, which made further American exports predicated upon the purchaser’s acceptance of safeguards and oversight (Cohen 2001, 279).
President Carter attempted to influence India through the promise of significant economic aid to India for regional development programs as a means of combating nuclear proliferation. India refused, because it felt that the offer from the United States did not protect its vital and real security interests (Cohen 2001, 279). Carter waived the nuclear nonproliferation controls in 1980 to supply 32 tons of uranium for the Indian reactor at Tarapur as an attempt to improve relations between the United States and India. Carter did not eliminate the export controls, and the Reagan administration generally benignly ignored the Indo-American relationship.

As the Cold War drew to a close, the conflict between India and Pakistan appeared to be on the rise. Pakistan had an unstable civilian government that was often deposed by military coup. American concern about the potential for the conflict to become nuclear drove the American interest. The United States intervened diplomatically in the Indo-Pakistani conflict in 1987. This crisis was generated by the Indian military exercise Brasstacks. This exercise was the largest peacetime exercise in Indian history, involving Indian strategic armor units operating near the Pakistani border. Perceiving this threat, the Pakistani military mobilized (Perkovich 1999, 278). Pakistani scientists made claims that nuclear weapons would be used if Pakistan were threatened (Joeck 1997, 21). American negotiators assisted in defusing the situation, stressing that neither side intended to conduct aggressive operations against each other. India may have been attempting to pressure Pakistan, but was unaware of the possibility that Pakistan had nuclear weapons at that time. In 1990, the United States diplomatically interceded during an uprising in Kashmir, threatening to cut off aid to Pakistan if they did not refrain from supporting the Kashmiri militants (Rahman 2001, 147). The American concern was that
India would strike at Pakistani militants, potentially triggering a nuclear war. The conflict was averted, but not fully resolved.

The political change on the South Asian subcontinent as dramatic as the Cold War wound down in 1988 and 1989. Democratically elected governments were established in both Pakistan and India with the electoral victories of Prime Ministers Benazir Bhutto of Pakistan in 1988 and V. P. Singh of India. These elections were significant because with Bhutto’s election, democracy was restored to Pakistan, and Singh’s election in India was only the second time that the Congress party had been removed from office. However, both Bhutto and Singh were constrained because of the weakness of their ruling coalitions (Hagerty 1998, 135).

Kashmir became a flashpoint again in 1989 when fraudulent elections were conducted in the Indian-controlled portion of Kashmir. These flawed elections incited a spontaneous insurgency by Kashmiri Muslims against the Indian central government. The Indian central government failed to resolve the conflict and decided to impose direct presidential rule on Kashmir and bring in thousands of Indian paramilitaries to pacify Kashmir (Hagerty 1998, 140). Pakistan was not directly supporting the Kashmiri insurgents initially, but after Indian police fired on a crowd in Srinagar, Pakistan, Pakistani support to the insurgents began. The Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) agency began to provide support to the Kashmiri insurgents. One of the ways Pakistan provided support was by exercising the Pakistani Army along the Kashmir border, ultimately deploying eight infantry divisions to the region. India responded by conducting maneuvers with local armored units on the Indian side of the border. Neither country was willing to deploy its major offensive operations, but both Pakistani and Indian
politicians both called for action to resolve the issue. Pakistan’s General Beg and India’s Prime Minister V. P. Singh of India both alluded to having nuclear weapons as deterrent statements to each other.

The escalation of both action and rhetoric increased until by April 1990, Pakistan had deployed 100,000 troops to Kashmir, and India had deployed upwards of 200,000 (Hagerty 1998, 147). President Bush dispatched Deputy National Security Adviser Robert Gates to both New Dehli and Islamabad to send the message to both belligerents that it was in neither country’s best interests to go to war. Gates stated that India would win, but the long-term costs to both India and Pakistan would greatly exceed any short term benefits by going to war over Kashmir. Shortly thereafter, the Indians and Pakistanis reduced their military activities in the region to precrisis levels (Hagerty 1998, 151). It is a widely held interpretation that the timely intervention of the United States averted a potential nuclear catastrophe. Seymour Hersh of the New Yorker reported that Pakistan specifically put its nuclear forces on alert to be used against India. Hagerty does note that the American Ambassadors to both Pakistan and India both publicly refute Hersh’s claim (Hagerty 1998, 156). However, Ambassador Oakley does state that the Pakistani freeze on its nuclear program ended in 1990, providing support to Hersh’s assertion. Regardless of whether the Gates mission in 1990 was to deflect the potential use of nuclear weapons or not, the fact remains that both India and Pakistan both viewed each other have having nuclear weapons, and the United States was concerned.

In October 1990, the Bush administration declared that it could no longer certify that Pakistan did not have nuclear weapons under the Pressler Amendment, and suspended the remaining three years of economic and military aid to Pakistan that was
promised under the 1986 agreement (Reiss 1995, 187). By declaring that the United States could no longer certify that Pakistan did not have nuclear weapons, it provided tacit confirmation to the Indians that Pakistan did have nuclear weapons.

After President Bush’s October 1990 decision, the Pakistani leadership thought itself badly wronged by the United States. It thought that it had reached a tacit understanding with the United States about its nuclear program. As early as 1987, there is evidence that the United States knew that Pakistan had acquired a nuclear weapons capability. In May 1990, the US government concluded that Pakistan had progressed to having fully assembled nuclear weapons. Robert Oakley, the American ambassador to Pakistan, later stated, “We had ascertained beyond a shadow of a doubt that the promises that Prime Minster Bhutto had made and kept in 1989 had been broken and the nuclear program had been reactivated” (Reiss 1995, 188). General Beg, the chief of staff of the Pakistani Army, was probably made the decision to weaponize the Pakistani nuclear capability. “With the Soviet forces out of Afghanistan and with Pakistan’s strategic significance receding, Islamabad’s long-standing fear of American unreliability and its suspicions of a U.S. “tilt” toward India resurfaced” (Reiss 1995, 188).

U.S. officials entered into discussions with Pakistan to attempt to bring Pakistan into accordance with the Pressler standard, which included no production of uranium enriched above 20 percent U-235, no conversion of highly enriched uranium hexafluoride gas into metal, and no working of the metal into weapons cores (Reiss 1995, 188). Pakistan agreed to the first two conditions, but refused on the third condition, citing concerns about the Indian nuclear arsenal and India’s continued research and development. When President Bush did not certify Pakistan in October 1990, he
inadvertently provided independent verification of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons capability to India (Reiss 1995, 189).

The history of US-Indian relations in the post-Cold War environment is important to understand from what point of departure the United States and India began from. The lessons and behaviors both countries had learned had a significant impact on how they perceived each other. The United States firmly believed that it did not maintain a conflictual relationship with India, but saw that India could be a most difficult country to engage with. India firmly believed that the United States desired to prevent it from achieving its rightful place as a great power. Regardless of the actual facts of the matter, both countries perceptions affected how they would work with each other in the post-Cold War era. The history of US-Indian relations, as well as the relationship of the various states in the South Asian region, is important background leading up to the analysis of the post-Cold War relationships between the US and India. Without the historical background, the decisions made between 1991 and 2003 cannot be put into context. In the next chapter, the analysis of the post-Cold War security and economic relationships will occur.
CHAPTER 5
ANALYSIS

The analysis of the relationship of the United States Security Strategies in the post-Cold War environment to the American enduring national interests will use Nuechterlein’s national interest framework as the assessment tool. Each of the major United States Security Strategies identified earlier will be evaluated and measured on how relatively effective the policy was constructed to support the national interests identified in the National Security Strategies in regards to India. The study will then consider the actual events of each time period, determine how feasible, acceptable, and suitable the policy was to the regional environment at the time, and then conclude with evaluating how effective the implementation of the National Security Strategies were in protecting American national interests in regard to India. Lastly, conclusions will be drawn to determine possible alternative policies to more effectively support American national interests in a regional context.

India does not have a corollary to the American national security strategy. The Indian foreign policy and nuclear elites are generally a small, enclosed group that has historically not published its positions. No significant public debate on the issue of developing nuclear weapons occurred until after they were tested in 1998. The basis for determining the relative importance and direction of Indian interests must be determined from public statements by Indian leaders and assessments by scholars on the region.

The first question to answer before evaluating the National Security Strategies is to determine if India, or South Asia for that matter, was identified by the American
national policy making elites at the beginning of the decade as being a raising regional power. It appears that it was generally accepted that India would grow in regional importance after the Cold War in 1991. The consensus position was that India would increase in relative power in South Asia because it was assumed that the United States and the Soviet Union would significantly reduce their military capabilities in the region as a function of the “peace dividend.” Additionally, authors like Nuechterlein did identify that the Indian perspective was that India desired to be the regional hegemon for South Asia, but did not seem concerned if India took the lead to protect some of its lesser interests in the region (Nuechterlein 2001, 153-154). India did have a viable, democratically elected government and a fairly stable, if underperforming economy. Some authors expressed concerns that India would disintegrate in a series of secessionist uprisings, but these did not come to pass.

Pakistan had been an ally of the United States in countering the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in the 1980s. Pakistan had also fought against India three times and lost each time since the Partition of the Raj into India and Pakistan. Pakistan grew increasingly concerned at the growing power and ambition of India. The Kashmir conflict continued to be a major irritant to the Indo-Pakistani relationship, and it was possible that open warfare could break out over this region. Nuechterlein states that the United States had an important, but “not vital, interest in the continued viability of Pakistan and would bring strong pressure to bear on New Dehli if it were to initiate hostilities against its neighbor” (Nuechterlein 2001, 156).

At the end of the 1980s, the previous evaluations of American interests in East Asia were being reassessed. The reduction in global tensions reduced the importance
policy makers placed on the potential military capabilities of various countries, and began to evaluate countries using broader measures of merit, such as openness to trade. It was clear at that point that the United States had a vital interest in the economic and political relationship with Japan. China was a major, not a vital interest because the Chinese economy was fully open to trade yet. The events of Tiananmen Square in 1989 effectively ended the rapprochement between the Chinese and the West. Until the Chinese government was able to devise the strategic direction it wanted to take, it was relegated to major interest status.

Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean basin were also areas of major interest to the United States from an economic well being and favorable world-order basis due to the developing economic relationships between the United States and the newly industrializing Asian economies. The sea lines of communication across the Indian Ocean were a major interest to the United States both for our own purposes, as well as the primary shipping route for oil from the Middle East to our allies in the Northeast-Asian region (Nuechterlein 2001, 166).

1991 to the End of the Cold War

The end of the Cold War provided the first time in half a century when American national strategy was under serious revision. The domestic political consensus that powered the containment policy of the Soviet Union faded away. A key issue that the first Bush administration was concerned with at the end of the Cold War was the role that America would take as an alliance leader. In the 1991 National Security Strategy, the document was prescient in forecasting that even as the world moves toward a more democratic future, the potential for differences between allies would increase as the
previously unified perception of threat decreases. Using Mead’s characterizations of American foreign policy traditions, the Wilsonian-Hamiltonian tradition of building a favorable world order and promoting American economic growth came to the forefront.

President Bush argued that newly forming and ambiguous threats emanating from power vacuum areas and regional instabilities would challenge defense policy makers. The administration confirmed its commitment to an open international economic system and the growth of free societies. The United States was also committed to successfully closing the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations (which later became the basis for the World Trade Organization) (White House 1991, 24).

**Defense of the Homeland**

The primary interest of the United States government at this time was still the survival of the country as a free and independent nation, with its democratic values and institutions intact and secure. This was still not a forgone conclusion as the Cold War waned, and was viewed with vital interest by President Bush. He was greatly concerned by the potential of the Soviet Union becoming unstable, and actively pursued policies to assist the Soviets to have a post-Communist “soft-landing.” As stated in the 1991 *National Security Strategy*, the United States still maintained the policy of deterrence against aggression that would threaten the United States or its allies. Transitional issues like terrorism are addressed, but are not considered a vital interest in the defense of the homeland. The promotion of values and favorable world order interests are also a part of the defense of the homeland by promoting democratic change in the Soviet Union, thereby removing the greatest threat to the United States. Lastly, issues such as arms control and nuclear proliferation were viewed as vital to ensuring the defense of the
American homeland is secured. The United States had concerns about the Indian nuclear program, but did not deem that India posed an existential threat to the United States or its interests (White House 1991, 13).

The Indian perspective is more varied. India did not face existential threats from either Pakistan or China, but the long history of tension needed to be addressed. India was faced with domestic political crisis with the assassination of Prime Minister Rajiv Ghandi on 21 May 1991. India was also suffering from economic crisis at home and the decline of the Soviet Union as its major patron. The economic crisis in India threatened to create significant internal instability due to economic dislocation. The long-standing conflict with Pakistan over the disputed state of Kashmir continued, but at fairly low levels.

At the end of 1991, India, Pakistan, and China demonstrated that they were interested in stability and relative peace in the South Asian region. None of the regional powers were either publicly or privately threatening each other in such a manner to be construed as an existential threat. Neither the United States nor India perceived each other as a threat to their respective homelands.

**Economic Well Being**

The 1991 *National Security Strategy* states that “economic strength and national security are indivisible.” The 1991 strategy identifies the free trade, unfettered access to foreign markets, a strong dollar, and the maintenance of the high American standard of living as crucial to the success of the American Economy. Interestingly, the promotion of international agreements on the protection of the environment and the development of sustainable development are also considered important to the U.S. economy.
The United States was in a short recession when the 1991 NSS was published (NBER 2004). The administration was acutely aware of the importance of ensuring the American economy was prosperous. To this end, the United States promoted both the European Union as both a broadening and deepening of the political and economic unity of Europe as a mechanism to ensure peace in Europe and build upon our most important trade links. The Uruguay Round was viewed as an important forum to continue to foster an “open and expanding international economic system, based on market principles, with minimal distortions to trade and investment, stable currencies, and broadly respected rules for managing and resolving economic disputes” (WTO 2004). The Uruguay Round would open more markets for the United States and by doing so, strengthen the American economy.

India entered the 1990s with severe macroeconomic and balance of payments crisis. The inflation rate was more than 10 percent, and foreign exchange reserves were below two weeks worth of imports. GDP growth was 1.3 in crisis year 1991-92 (Srinivasan and Tendulkar 2003, 1-2). Prime Minister Rao made it clear that the most important issue facing India was the economy, indicating its vital intensity level. “The economic content of diplomacy will now outstrip anything else” (Perkovich 1999, 323). India needed loans from the International Monetary Fund and other sources to remain fiscally solvent, and this need placed great pressure on the Indian government to overtly go nuclear and to cooperate with the international community. The economic crisis, occurring at the same time as the collapse of the Soviet Union and the growth of China and the other newly industrialized Asian economies, provided the spur to Indian policy makers to change their orientation. They rejected the centrally-planned economic model
and instituted reforms that covered “foreign trade and investment, exchange rate management, and industrial policies, as well as the role of the public sector in production and distribution” (Srinivasan and Tendulkar 2003, 1-2).

The change in the Indian economic policy was dramatic. India rejected the “1950s’ legacy of public-sector-dominated, centrally planned, autarkic industrialization has given way to promarket, prointernational trade policies designed to promote the cross-border flow of goods, services, and factors of production” (Srinivasan and Tendulkar 2003, 9). This change was welcome to the United States, because it was exactly the policy position that the United States had been promoting since India became independent. The economic relationship between the United States and India was very limited due to the protectionist policies of previous Indian governments. India desired to integrate into the global economic in general, and the United States economy in specific, to overcome years of failed economic policy. The United States was pleased to have India move away from its previously protectionist policies, but elected to maintain export controls on India on specific high-technology products that could be used to further India’s nuclear capabilities.

**Favorable World Order**

The development of a favorable world order was very important to the United States in 1991. The Gulf War of 1990-91 against Saddam Hussein reinforced to the Bush administration the vital importance of regional and global stability and security. The United States committed to achieving this by encouraging other countries to reduce their military spending and discourage military aggression. The means of aggression would be restrained by preventing the transfer of weapons of mass destruction technology. Lastly,
the promotion of the American economy was also viewed as both a contributor to and a beneficiary of a favorable world order (White House 1991, 22-24).

In the 1991 National Security Strategy, the two issues that are identified as threatening a favorable world order for the United States in South Asia are the deployment of Indian and Pakistani intermediate-range missile deployments and the proliferation of nuclear capabilities. The United States effectively signaled to India that nuclear proliferation in the subcontinent persisted by stating that the US was unable to certify Pakistan's nuclear program under the Pressler Amendment. The Bush administration stated that it would continue to encourage Indo-Pakistani rapprochement and the adoption of confidence-building measures between the two countries (White House 1991, 22).

From the United States perspective, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty was a major means by which a favorable world order is maintained. The Indian delegation to the NPT review conference in 1991 blocked the unanimous support for the NPT. Agreement by India and Pakistan to ban attacks on each other's nuclear facilities also helped ease the tense nuclear rivalry in that part of the world (White House 1991).

From the Indian perspective, there was significant debate as to what type of world order there should be. Ideally, India preferred a multipolar world in which regional powers would manage their own areas and coordinate their activities at the United Nations Security Council. India had conducted a policy of attempting to reduce American influence in South Asia for forty years in order to increase its own over Pakistan and its other neighbors. This struggle had been supported by the Soviet Union during the Cold War. However, the Soviet Union after the Cold War ceased to be a reliable patron due to
internal weakness and instability, leaving India on its own to determine its place in the international community.

The Congress Party, which had been the dominant political party in India since its independence, argued for India to continue its position of non-alignment. However, when Iraq attacked Kuwait and the United States led a coalition to defeat Iraq, the Indian leadership vacillated between support of the international community and striking a position of anti-Americanism and anti-colonialism. The BJP, as the opposition, began to argue that India should take on the trappings of power that other great powers had, such as nuclear weapons, to form a multi-polar world. The NPT is characterized in India as a mechanism to keep India from gaining its rightful place as a great power. At this time, India still resented American interference in what it deemed its sphere of influence. India also campaigned for a seat on the United Nations Security Council, but was rejected.

Against this background, in January 1991, India and Pakistan exchanged documents promising not to attack each other’s nuclear facilities, indicating the importance both countries placed on protecting their respective nuclear programs. Pakistan did propose five-party talks to resolve the South Asian tensions, but India rejected this on the basis that China had supplied short-range ballistic missile technology to Pakistan. Pakistan also sponsored a UN General Assembly Resolution declaring South Asia a nuclear weapons-free zone. India was politically damaged when the Soviets voted for it, indicating their waning support for India. The loss of the Soviet’s capability to support India, combined with fact that the United States was the only remaining superpower, encouraged Indian leaders to decide to “coexist with dignity with the US” (Perkovich 1999, 223). Perkovich writes that the Bush administration realized that India
was not going to sign the NPT in the foreseeable future, and tacitly acknowledged that
neither India nor Pakistan were going to give up their nuclear weapons capabilities soon
(Perkovich 1999, 324).

The United States indicated that it was interested in accommodating the Indian
and Pakistani refusal to eliminate their nuclear weapons capabilities, but was interested in
more modest and regional solutions to the problem (Perkovich, 2001, 325).

Promotion of Values

The United States was in the best position in to promote the values of liberal
democracy in fifty years in 1991. The Bush administration stated that the promotion of
human rights and democratic systems of government has taken on a much greater
importance due to the less conflictual international environment. A key concern stated in
the 1991 NSS was the importance of the transition of the former Warsaw Pact countries
to democracies. The focus was primarily on the European continent, with statements
specifically about the importance of the Atlantic Alliance, the importance of a closer
relationship between the United States and the European Community, the need to
strengthen the United Nations, and to strengthen other democracies around the world
(White House 1991).

In India, the promotion of values was not as important as in the United States. The
most important values the Indian government supported in the early 1990s were the
importance of the nonaligned movement and the importance of international
organizations such as the United Nations. It was critical for India to have these
organizations to remain strong because these were forums in which India could be a
major power, even if its actual military and economic power would not merit it.
1991 to the End of the Cold War Conclusions

The end of the Cold War created an opening for India and the United States to reassess their relationship. Neither country viewed each other as a threat to their homeland. India and the United States both saw the importance of improving their economic well-being, and the potential of trade between the two. In 1991, the United States deemed that it was in their vital interest to maintain a favorable world order, but only had a major interest in South Asia. The United States also had major interests in developing trade with India, ensuring that nuclear proliferation would not threaten the American homeland, and in promoting American democratic values. India had vital interests in developing its economy, and major interests in defending against Muslim incursions into Kashmir, maintaining a favorable world order, and promoting its values. India was vulnerable because of the loss of its patron, the Soviet Union. Pakistan had vital interests in defense of its homeland through the use of nuclear weapons and unconventional warfare, and major interests in developing its economy, maintaining a favorable world order, and promoting its values. Pakistan was also vulnerable because of its perception that its relative importance was declining with the end of the war in Afghanistan. China and Russia both had major interests in the region, but none that impinged on vital interests.
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<th>Basic National Interest</th>
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<td>Promotion of Values</td>
<td>US, India, Pakistan</td>
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India addressed its vital interest by beginning the economic reform process by significantly revising its domestic and international trade laws. The United States supported these actions by promoting free trade at the Uruguay Round of the GATT. The world order was more favorable to the United States at this time because it was the pre-eminent power. India was a supplicant due to the loss of support from the Soviet Union. Lastly, the promotion of values was important to both countries, with it being a major concern of the United States and a peripheral concern for the Indians.

1995 Prelude to the NPT/CTBT Debates

President Clinton took office in 1992. Clinton had criticized President Bush during the election campaign as moving away from a strict nonproliferation stance and argued for a sanction-led approach to dealing with the Indian nuclear capability.

“Nonproliferation is the major issue in our relationship with India and Pakistan” (Perkovich 1999, 335). In March 1993, the Clinton administration announced that it its “objective is first to cap, then over time reduce, and finally eliminate the possession of
weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery” (Perkovich 1999, 335). This policy was significantly different and more invasive than President Bush’s policy of tacit acceptance. The Clinton administration statement did tacitly indicate that it expected for nuclear capabilities to remain in South Asia over an extended period of time. The 1995 national security strategy, written during the NPT extension conference and published before the CTBT, is a good measure of the perspective of the Clinton administration toward nuclear nonproliferation and rising regional powers. It maintained the Wilsonian-Hamiltonian approach toward foreign policy by highlighting the importance of the promotion of trade and the development of an international civil society. The challenge was that India had already declared that the NPT and CTBT regime was neither acceptable nor suitable to its perception of its interests.

**Defense of the Homeland**

In the 1995 national security strategy, no imminent threats to the territorial integrity of the United States were identified. “The primary security imperative of the past half century -- containing communist expansion while preventing nuclear war -- was gone. We no longer face massive Soviet forces across an East-West divide, nor Soviet missiles targeted on the United States” (White House 1995, 8). The Clinton administration viewed issues such as nuclear proliferation, regional instability, and unfair trade practices requiring selective collective action to resolve. Nuclear nonproliferation is stated as a critical priority for the United States, and the United States would use countries levels of cooperation in supporting the nuclear nonproliferation regime as a criterion for bilateral relations (White House 1995, 13). However, there is no single pressing threat identified as a direct threat to the homeland (White House 1995, 33).
India had more concerns about regional threats. India was becoming more concerned about the Pakistani nuclear capabilities, specifically its ballistic missile development. Additionally, the revelation that China had provided M-11 short-range ballistic missiles to Pakistan enhanced the concerns India had about her strategic environment. The upcoming extension of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaties concerned the Indian strategic elite. If the NPT and the CTBT were ratified, it would codify India as a second-class power because the treaties would prevent India from having a declared nuclear arsenal. Nuclear arsenals are perceived as a totem of great power prowess. The NPT and CTBT were not a direct threat against the Indian homeland; however, it would put India in a position of long-term vulnerability. Nuclear weapons were perceived as a means that the prestige of a great power was expressed.

**Economic Well Being**

The 1995 strategy stated that a major goal of the administration was to improve the economic health and sustainability of the United States through an export-focused strategy. The 1995 NSS that the passage of the North American Free Trade Agreement and the acceptance of the World Trade Organization will be critical to the economic future of the United States (White House 1995, 11). The Uruguay Round for the GATT led to the WTO, and its forming was a major policy objective of the Clinton administration. Additionally, the Clinton administration was focusing on the ten “Big Emerging Markets,” that is, China, India, Mexico, Argentina, Brazil, Indonesia, Poland, South Africa, South Korea, and Turkey (Garten 1998, 1). The administration continued to
defend the freedom to trade abroad, unfettered access to foreign markets, defending the value of the dollar, and the maintenance of the American standard of living.

India was also interested in advancing its economic interests. The economic reforms instituted in 1991 were beginning to have a significant positive impact on the Indian economy. Prime Minister Rao visited President Clinton on 17 May 1994, the first Indian state visit since 1985. Both sides emphasized the positive. Prime Minister Rao focused on India’s concentration on economic development and the joint US-Indian interest in bilateral trade and investment. The Clinton administration officials thought that India’s future security and well-being depended on an economics-first strategy, not a military-first strategy toward Pakistan or China. The Clinton administration wanted to encourage the Indian policy both on its own merit and in the hope that it would reduce the importance of nuclear weapons in the Indian strategic elite’s interests (Perkovich 1999, 347).

Favorable World Order

The 1995 Clinton strategy places nuclear nonproliferation in the major, but not vital intensity of interest category. The *Strategy for Engagement and Enlargement* states that the United States wanted India and Pakistan to agree to “cap, reduce and ultimately eliminate their capabilities for weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles” (White House 1995, 21). The strategy of capping nuclear weapons capabilities in South Asia, rather than seeking complete elimination, represented a major shift in U.S. nonproliferation policy. The Pressler Amendment’s restriction on U.S. aid to Pakistan appeared to be ineffective and counterproductive in practice because it reduced the leverage the United States had with Pakistan. Moreover, the nuclear programs in India
and Pakistan were too advanced to abolish completely, so the administration attempted to manage the situation by proposing a halt, then a roll-back of Indian and Pakistani nuclear capability (Reiss 1995, 202). The indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995, and the signing of the CTBT in 1996 represented victories for the Clinton administration’s policy of reinforcing the nuclear nonproliferation regime.

India was less enthused with this world order. The Indian government viewed the NPT as a document that discriminated against developing powers by dividing the world into legitimate and illegitimate nuclear weapons states. The primary criterion, in India’s opinion, was on the basis of when the country acquired the nuclear capability. Indian leaders viewed as unjust that China’s 1964 nuclear test gained Beijing membership in the nuclear club, while India’s 1974 test caused it to be sanctioned as a nuclear outlaw. More concerning, Pakistan continued to claim it will sign the NPT if and when India does, but not a moment sooner (Hagerty 1998, 176).

In 1995 and 1996, India strenuously campaigned against the indefinite extension of the NPT. India argued that the existing nuclear powers had not fulfilled their requirements to significantly reduce their nuclear weapons arsenals. If the NPT were extended without holding the sanctioned nuclear powers to task for not disarming, then the NPT would put India at an indefinite structural disadvantage in comparison to other powers. The United States and the other nuclear powers supported the indefinite extension of the NPT, and world body as a whole agreed to the indefinite extension of the NPT without conditions. This was a significant blow to India’s attempts at creating a favorable world order.
Having lost against the extension of the NPT, India then challenged the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). India argued that the CTBT would solidify the division of the world into legitimate and illegitimate nuclear powers to India’s detriment. India fought for a timetable for total nuclear disarmament, and the five acknowledged nuclear weapon states resolutely opposed this requirement. India was successful in stipulating that the CTBT’s entry into force was made contingent on the adherence of the “threshold” nuclear states of India, Israel, and Pakistan. India was successful in blocking passage of the treaty at the United Nations Conference on Disarmament, but the UN General Assembly adopted the CTBT overwhelmingly.

While India was successful in stopping the treaty, the vote in the General Assembly was another diplomatic and moral defeat for India (Hagerty 1998, 177). The push for the NPT and the CTBT left India few, if any options about its nuclear program. Neither the United States nor any of the other acknowledged nuclear powers offered any security assurances to India to persuade India to sign either the NPT or the CTBT. Facing an increasing Pakistani nuclear threat, and with evidence of Chinese collusion with the Pakistanis, India’s position was eroding. It was clear that under this environment, the opaque proliferation that India subscribed to would no longer suffice. Prime Minister Vajpayee, leader of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and long time supporter of India having a declared nuclear capability, ordered his scientists to resume nuclear testing and demonstrate India’s nuclear weapons capabilities. On 11 May 1998, India tested its first nuclear devices since 1974.
Promotion of Values

The Clinton administration elevated human rights to be at least a major, if not a vital interest. Setting aside the administration’s failure to intervene in Rwanda to halt the genocide, the promotion of democratic values and human rights was a high priority for the administration. This did not significantly conflict with India’s position.

In India, the promotion of values was not as important as in the United States. The most important values the Indian government supported in the early 1990s were the importance of the nonaligned movement and the importance of international organizations such as the United Nations. It was critical for India to have these organizations to remain strong because these were forums in which India could be a major power, even if its actual military and economic power would not merit it.

1995 NPT/CTBT Debate Conclusion

The indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995, and the signing of the CTBT in 1996 represented victories for the Clinton administration’s policy of reinforcing the nuclear nonproliferation regime. The push for the NPT and the CTBT left India few, if any options about its nuclear program. It was clear that under this environment, the opaque proliferation that India subscribed to would no longer suffice.

Leading up to the extension of the NPT and the inauguration of the CTBT, the positions of the major powers had changed from 1991. The United States deemed it vital to advance its vision of a favorable world order and to promote its values by pressing for the indefinite extension of the NPT. The United States had major interests in defending the homeland by rolling back nuclear proliferation, terrorism, and international crime and
improving its economic well being. The founding of the WTO was of vital importance to
the United States, but its impact on South Asia was still limited at this time.

India deemed its economic well being and the development of a favorable world
order to be vital to its future. India continued to aggressively restructure its economy to
become competitive, while at the same time fought vigorously against the NPT and the
CTBT. The promotion of values and defense of the homeland were of major intensity
during this time, due to a lack of an imminent threat from either Pakistan or China. India
was sensitive to the prospects of sanctions by the world for going nuclear, but deemed
that it was not vulnerable. Pakistan had a vital interest in maintaining its position as an
“opaque” nuclear power, thereby deterring India. Pakistan was much more vulnerable to
economic sanction than India due to its poor economy; however, the Pakistani leadership
determined that it would incur the costs to maintaining nuclear parity with India.

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<td>Favorable World Order</td>
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China and Russia both defended their unique positions as nuclear-armed UN Security Council members and campaigned against India either receiving a seat at the Security Council or going nuclear. The concept of either offering India a security guarantee or negotiating in good faith with India to resolve some of its concerns does not appear to be taken seriously by the Security Council.

Looking forward, in 1998, the Congress party in India was voted out of office, and the BJP under the leadership of Prime Minister Vajpayee took control of India. Vajpayee was a long-term advocate of India having a declared nuclear force. On 11 May 1998, India tested its first nuclear devices since 1974. The three Indian nuclear detonations were followed by two more on 13 May 1998. Pakistan followed shortly with its own nuclear tests, detonating five weapons on 28 May 1998. Even though the administration had identified that India and Pakistan had nuclear capabilities, and had probably weaponized, they had pushed India to accept a nuclear regime that had no incentives for India. No offers of the extension of the American nuclear deterrent to India, nor other security or economic incentives were offered by the Clinton administration to India.

1998 The Indian Nuclear Decision

The Indian nuclear testing surprised the Clinton administration. They were embarrassed by the failure of the administration to anticipate or detect the Indian nuclear tests (Perkovich 1999, 417). President Clinton was immediately critical of the Indian testing, to which the BJP spokesman stated, “Who are the Americans to tell us how to take care of our security concerns?” (Perkovich 1999, 417). The combination of the Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests damaged significantly the success the administration
had in 1995 and 1996 in getting the NPT and CTBT signed. The Clinton administration maintained its Wilsonian-Hamiltonian perspective of promoting values through international organizations and regimes such as the NPT and CTBT.

**Defense of the Homeland**

The 1998 NSS still did not identify a vital threat to the defense of the homeland. Defense was couched in terms of economic development and the development of a favorable world order. The beginnings of concern about the world environment are begun to be seen in the 1998 NSS. The major concern at this time was the Asian Economic crisis of 1997. This meltdown of the economy, starting in Thailand in 1997, and leading to the economic collapse of Russia in 1998, concerned the administration. While the economic turmoil did not threaten the territorial safety of the United States, the instability it wrought caused concerns about how it affected other countries, especially Russia. The Indian and Pakistani nuclear weapons tests were not addressed as specific threats to the homeland of the United States, but more in terms of disrupting the world order.

India did view the nuclear weapons as a means of defending the homeland. India had improved and undermined its national security through the detonation of the nuclear weapons in May 1998. India had improved its security situation in relation to China and Pakistan by openly declaring its nuclear capability. Before the testing, the region was dominated by the Chinese nuclear force, and threatened by the opaque deterrent force of Pakistan. Now, both China and Pakistan were placed on notice that India now had that capability. The India strategic elites claimed that they went nuclear to offset Chinese nuclear forces, not Pakistani nuclear capabilities (Perkovich 1999, 422). However, India also undercut its national security by removing the opaque nature of its
own capabilities. All the permanent members of the Security Council condemned India’s actions, and sanctions, led by the United States, were placed on both India and Pakistan for the actions. In the 1998 NSS, the administration claimed that India and Pakistan were in a self-destructive cycle of escalation that did not increase the security of either country. The United States, on behalf of the other Security Council members, called on both India and Pakistan to cease further nuclear testing, sign the CTBT immediately and without conditions, and open negotiations to reduce tension in South Asia (White House 1998, 53).

**Economic Well Being**

The 1998 NSS indicated that the United States recognized the potential downside of further global integration. The United States economy was described as being vulnerable to financial or other economic disturbances outside the borders of the United States (White House 1998, 27). The Asian Economic Crisis of 1997-1998 was a disturbing harbinger of what could happen if the United States does not quickly intervene monetarily to ensure the stability of the international market. (Kristoff and DuWann 2000, 91-99) President Clinton had to go to the 1997 Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum (APEC) meeting to meet with other national leaders to attempt to stop the financial crisis in Asia. Over $117 billion dollars in bailouts to Thailand, South Korea, and Indonesia were necessary to stop the meltdown (Blustein 1998, A01). In the wake of this crisis, the administration does argue in the NSS that the United States needed to protect the American economy by working with other nations and international organizations like the International Monetary Fund. The devastating effects of the economic crisis, and the resultant shocks to the world economy, made that point clear.
The table below illustrates the impact of foreign direct investment in various developing countries, and the impact of the financial crisis in 1997 and 1998.

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<tr>
<td>All</td>
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<td>47.1</td>
<td>66.6</td>
<td>90.0</td>
<td>106.8</td>
<td>130.8</td>
<td>172.5</td>
<td>178.3</td>
<td>184.4</td>
<td>166.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>.16</td>
<td>.27</td>
<td>.55</td>
<td>.97</td>
<td>2.14</td>
<td>2.42</td>
<td>3.57</td>
<td>2.63</td>
<td>2.17</td>
<td>2.31</td>
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<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>3.49</td>
<td>11.15</td>
<td>27.51</td>
<td>33.79</td>
<td>35.85</td>
<td>40.18</td>
<td>44.23</td>
<td>43.75</td>
<td>38.75</td>
<td>38.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>1.09</td>
<td>1.78</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>2.11</td>
<td>4.34</td>
<td>6.20</td>
<td>4.67</td>
<td>-.35</td>
<td>-2.74</td>
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<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>2.44</td>
<td>2.11</td>
<td>1.80</td>
<td>1.36</td>
<td>2.06</td>
<td>2.33</td>
<td>3.89</td>
<td>7.31</td>
<td>6.21</td>
<td>3.37</td>
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<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>2.33</td>
<td>5.18</td>
<td>5.00</td>
<td>4.34</td>
<td>4.18</td>
<td>5.08</td>
<td>5.14</td>
<td>2.16</td>
<td>1.53</td>
<td>1.66</td>
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<tr>
<td>S. Korea</td>
<td>.78</td>
<td>.72</td>
<td>.59</td>
<td>.81</td>
<td>1.77</td>
<td>2.32</td>
<td>2.87</td>
<td>5.41</td>
<td>9.33</td>
<td>9.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India % of all developing</td>
<td>.67</td>
<td>.59</td>
<td>.83</td>
<td>1.08</td>
<td>2.01</td>
<td>1.85</td>
<td>2.07</td>
<td>1.48</td>
<td>1.18</td>
<td>1.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China % of all developing</td>
<td>14.35</td>
<td>23.68</td>
<td>41.31</td>
<td>34.72</td>
<td>33.57</td>
<td>30.72</td>
<td>25.64</td>
<td>24.54</td>
<td>21.02</td>
<td>23.03</td>
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Source: Srinivasan and Tendulkar 2003, 43.

India was not as affected by the Asian financial meltdown of 1997-98 because its economy was not as interdependent on the global international economy. “It is arguable that the lesson of India’s escaping the Asian currency crisis is not that tight capital controls and an absence of CAC were appropriate but rather that because of both, India was not a player in the market for capital flows and, not being a major player, did not experience the crisis” (Srinivasan and Tendulkar 2003, 66). However, India did aggressively continue to build economic ties with the United States, especially in the high-technology field.
Favorable World Order

The 1998 NSS is somewhat a statement of closing the door after the horse left the barn. In the NSS, the United States called upon both India and Pakistan to halt further nuclear tests, to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty immediately and without conditions, and to resume direct negotiations over nuclear weapons and Kashmir, and to implement confidence building measures to reduce tensions in South Asia. The economic sanctions placed on India and Pakistan by the United States was designed to punish the two countries for going nuclear. President Clinton, through the NSS, also strongly urged these states to refrain from any actions, such as the testing, deployment or weaponization of ballistic missiles, which would further undermine regional and global stability (White House 1998, 53). This normative directive from Washington is interesting both by what it says, and what it doesn’t. The United States still was of the opinion that it could force India and Pakistan to eliminate their nuclear weapons without significant inducements.

India was both satisfied and disappointed with its attempts at reshaping a favorable world order in the wake of the nuclear testing. On the negative, the United States and all the other major powers censured India for the nuclear tests. President Clinton enacted a series of sanctions against India to punish India for the nuclear tests. These sanctions were based upon American domestic laws, not on India breaking a treaty. India expected this, and was not surprised. More importantly, Pakistan had also tested and declared its nuclear capabilities, incurring the same sanctions India did. The Pakistani economy was much weaker than India’s, and the sanctions had a much greater deleterious effect on Pakistan than on India. This improved India’s position relative to Pakistan. Lastly, India was able to draw out of the Clinton administration the sustained,
high level strategic dialogue that India had coveted for many years. Headed by Undersecretary of State Strobe Talbott, the United States embarked on a dialogue that was different from the “treaty-dominated, sanction-enforced strategy to one of more careful strategic management.” This caused agreement between the two countries that India was becoming a more significant power, explore the limits of their mutual cooperation, and potentially restructure their relationship (Cohen 2001, 292).

Promotion of Values

The United States and India continued to share their common commitment to democracy. The Clinton administration continued to promote democratic values a major objective. The promotion of human rights was viewed as a vehicle to defeat terrorism. Sustainable development is viewed as improving the possibilities for democracy in developing countries (White House 1998, 33). Support to emerging democracies, the promotion of the adherence to universal human rights, and support of humanitarian initiatives were centerpieces of the promotion of American values. India was supportive of democracy in the more “abstract” role but did not want to be put in the position that it would have to speak or act out against undemocratic nations (Cohen 2001, 292). India and the United States continued to share the commitment to democracy and the importance of the international community, but differed significantly on the character of their participation.

1998 The Nuclear Debate Conclusion

The Indian and Pakistani nuclear testing of 1998 destroyed the Clinton administration’s narrowly focused policy on nuclear nonproliferation and demonstrated the limits of a sanction and treaties based regime. The Indian experience demonstrates
that unless the issues that great or near-great powers identify as vital or a survival level issue, then levers of diplomatic power may be ineffective. India sought out recognition that it was considered a major regional power on par with China from the United States in the 1990s, and did not receive it. Moreover, the Indian policy making elites felt that unless they went nuclear, Pakistan and China would remain having an asymmetrical advantage over India. This was unacceptable to India, and the testing occurred. Unless the United States was going to modify its nuclear nonproliferation policy to take into account local conditions, and to recognize the rising power of potential regional hegemons, then outcomes such as the India and Pakistan nuclear testing will occur in the future in other regions.

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\begin{array}{|c|c|c|c|}
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\text{Basic National Interest} & \text{Survival (critical)} & \text{Vital (dangerous)} & \text{Major (serious)} & \text{Peripheral (bothersome)} \\
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\text{Defense of Homeland} & \text{Pakistan} & \text{India, China} & \text{US, Russia} & \\
\hline
\text{Economic well-being} & \text{Pakistan} & \text{India, China, US, Russia} & & \\
\hline
\text{Favorable World Order} & \text{US, India, Pakistan} & \text{Russia, China} & & \\
\hline
\text{Promotion of Values} & \text{US, India, Pakistan} & \text{China} & \text{Russia} & \\
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\end{array}
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The intensity of the interests of the actors in South Asia increased significantly from 1995 to 1998. India proved most vulnerable to the impending change of the international environment with the indefinite extension of the NPT. India was willing to
suffer international sanction to go nuclear because it deemed that it was in its vital national interests to defend its homeland, revise the world order, and promote its value of great power independence. This was done with the full knowledge there would be an economic cost. Pakistan responded to the Indian nuclear testing with testing of its own, because it deemed that it was a survival and prestige issue. Pakistan had a vital interest in maintaining the world order of parity with India and promoting its values as the world’s first Muslim nuclear power. In both cases, American efforts to roll back nuclear proliferation failed.

The United States maintained its vital interests in maintaining a favorable world order and promoting its values through insisting on the acceptance and ratification of the NPT and the CTBT. The economic well being of the United States was being served by the success of the WTO and other agreements, so it was not a vital concern with South Asia. China had a vital interest in defending its homeland against Indian nuclear capabilities, especially after the India strategic elites claimed that they went nuclear to offset Chinese nuclear forces, not Pakistani nuclear capabilities. Russia was beginning to pull itself out of the economic depression of 1991-1998, and was beginning to have major interests in exports to India.

The nuclear test period of 1998 transformed the global strategic environment from a world of five acknowledged nuclear powers all represented at the National Security Council, to one where there were two major powers outside the international regimes that guided international relations. India, as the world’s largest democracy, had also passed into the top ten world economies, measured in terms of purchasing power parity. Pakistan had a population larger than Russia and was now the world’s first Muslim nuclear power.
Ironically, India’s decision to go nuclear began a process of high-level negotiations between the United States and India that would reap significant benefits later. India, in the end, got what it wanted.

**2002 Strategic Partnership**

The nuclear tests of May 1998 sounded the death knell to the concept that the United States could demand compliance with the nuclear nonproliferation regime of the South Asian nuclear powers. It became clear after President Clinton put the sanctions in place that neither India nor Pakistan were going to roll back their nuclear forces due to external pressure. Undersecretary of State Strobe Talbot was dispatched to India to begin high level negotiations with the Indians. The initial purpose was to restrain further Indian nuclear testing and the development of confidence building measures between India and Pakistan. Interestingly, this strategic dialogue expanded rapidly into other areas of shared interest, such as terrorism, trade, and cultural exchanges. The intense strategic dialogue after the nuclear testing set the conditions for the reciprocal visits of President Bill Clinton to India in March 2000 and Prime Minister Atal Vajpayee to the United States in September 2000. This was only the second time that India and the United States exchanged state visits in the same year.

The strategic relationship between India and Pakistan was placed under greater stress in 1999 by the Pakistanis supporting 1500 Kashmiri militants in occupying key terrain across the Line of Control in the Kargil region of Kashmir. This was a test of the nuclear restraint of both countries, and a way for the Pakistanis to determine what the new boundaries for operations were. India was initially defeated tactically, but then
achieved operational and strategic success by ejecting the Pakistanis and persuading the United States to brand Pakistan as the aggressor (Cohen 2001, 60).

The new strategic dialogue opened in the wake of the 1998 nuclear testing was maintained under the new Bush administration. High-level political, military, and economic meetings occurred in New Dehli and Washington to strengthen the strategic relationship between the two countries. This dialogue was found to be crucial after the Al Quida attacks on the United States on 11 September 2001 and the resultant counterattack by the United States on the Al Quida and Taliban strongholds in Afghanistan.

**Defense of the Homeland**

The United States viewed the Al Quida attacks on New York and Washington, DC as vital concern. While the survival of the United States was not seriously threatened, the United States declared that it would destroy international terrorism. The United States needed access to Afghanistan to prosecute its war on the terrorists. Pakistan was initially opposed to the idea, because it had been a supporter of the Taliban. President Bush applied tremendous pressure on President Musharraf to allow the United States to have bases and overflight rights over Pakistan, as well as withdraw its support from the Taliban. A shaken President Musharref replaced half of the senior military commanders in Pakistan to eliminate internal opposition before agreeing to support the American demands. In October 2001, armed Muslim militants attacked the Kashmir state assembly in Srinagar. This attack raised tensions between India and Pakistan. This attack occurred while the United States began its combat operations in Afghanistan against Al Quida and the Taliban. More concerning, on 13 December 2001, Muslim paramilitaries attacked the
Indian Parliament building in New Dehli. India and the United States had finally found the shared strategic interest that had eluded them during the Cold War.

India changed its policy from deterrence to compellence, demanding that Pakistan end its support for the Kashmiri militants. Taking advantage of the American Global War on Terror, India fully mobilized its forces and kept its army in the field until mid-June 2002. Nuclear saber-rattling began in May 2002 between India and Pakistan, with India attempting to force the United States to apply pressure on its ally, Pakistan, to end its support for Kashmiri militant attacks on India. Pakistan was now in a position where the two largest powers in the region were both demanding its compliance and potentially threatening its survival. The United States and India began the first joint military exercises in May 2002 at the same time India began to signal its determination to use nuclear weapons. Pakistan backed down due to the pressure.

**Economic Well-Being**

The trade between India and the United States continued to grow significantly. Bilateral trade was up to $15 billion in 2002. This was one-ninth the trade that the United States had with China over the same period, but it was up significantly from 1991. The fastest growing sectors between the United States and India were in software and services areas, topping $3 billion in 2002. India had also grown in 2002 as one of the top twenty exporters to the United States (Embassy of India 2003). The United States remained India’s largest trading partner, with the United States absorbing 23 percent of India’s total exports as well as being India’s largest supplier of foreign goods (Economist 2004).
Favorable World Order

The terrorist attacks on the United States in 2001 provided an opportunity for the United States to address the challenges that had been building during the 1990s. The United States built a coalition of countries to cooperate against international terrorism and to attempt to resolve some of the more intractable issues left over since the Cold War. India was pleased that the United States now explicitly identifies India as a major power (White House 2002, 27). Notably, in the National Security Strategy 2002, Pakistan is not accorded the same status.

Promotion of Values

The United States and India continue to share their common interest in the promotion of democracy in the world. The values of the defense of liberty and justice, and the defense of human dignity are prominently stated in the 2002 National Security Strategy (White House 2002, 3). One of the major influences on the development of shared values is the 1.7 million-strong Indian American community in the US provides a strong bond between India and the US. In the 1990s and into the twenty-first century, the Indian American community has begun to both organize itself and make its presence known. The average per capita income of Indian Americans is now double the American average due to the high percentage of medial and information technology professionals in the community. The increasing tie between the Indian-American community and the American political community provides a stronger conduit for communication between India and the United States. Indian Americans have organized themselves into a large number of associations and organizations mainly on the basis of language and, occasionally, profession. With increasing wealth particularly from the IT and
biotechnology sectors, the community has been playing an increasingly active role in the political field. The interest that the United States and India have in defeating international terrorism and the promotion of democracy has begun to open the possibility of closer aligned values in the future.

**2002 Strategic Partnership Conclusion**

The new strategic dialogue opened in the wake of the 1998 nuclear testing continued to be maintained under the new Bush administration. The high-level political, military, and economic meetings occurred in New Dehli and Washington continued strengthening the strategic relationship between the two countries. In the wake of the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, the relationship between the United States and India moved from one of confrontation, as during the Clinton administration, to one of strategic partnership. Christina B. Rocca, Assistant Secretary of State for South Asian Affairs, stated in 2002 that the relationship between the United States and India had made tremendous strides forward.

The beginning of the Global War on Terrorism in 2001 marked another significant change in the intensity of interests in South Asia. The United States was absolutely determined to hunt down Al Quida and the Taliban. The defense of the homeland, economic well being, the development of a favorable world order, and the promotion of values were all at the vital level. India also faced vital-level challenges to all four of its interests, and proved willing to go to the brink of nuclear war with Pakistan to force Pakistan to stop supporting Muslim militants in Kashmir. Pakistan also faced vital challenges to its interests, primarily due to poor choices as to whom to support in Afghanistan and Kashmir. China and Russia faced vital challenges in the issue area of
developing a favorable world order and supported the American offensive against the Taliban and Al Quida.

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**Conclusion**

The relationship between the United States and India during the Cold War was one first of distanced powers in 1991 and gradually became a relationship of strategic partnership in 2002. The international environment also changed from one that was focused on the waning of the superpower competition and the rise of the unmatched power of the United States to an environment where nonstate actors such as Al Quida and its supporters could strike at the international community. The United States in 1991 was focused on its efforts to ensure that the falling Soviet Union made a soft landing and building a new world order to ensure peace in Europe.

India focused on recovering from the loss of its superpower patron and reinvented itself by moving away from centralized economic planning to a market driven economy.
India also identified as a vital interest the maintenance of its nuclear capability, and when pressed by the United States to commit to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, India chose to exercise its right as a sovereign nation not party to those treaties and test its nuclear weapons. The strategic dialogue started by the Clinton administration in the wake of the nuclear testing led to dialogue on a much broader set of issues, and this strategic dialogue was maintained and strengthened by the Bush administration. The Bush administration’s explicit acknowledgement of India as a rising power that the United States has a strategic partnership with indicates that the relationship between India and the United States is a growing relationship. In the next chapter, the conclusions and recommendations based on the analysis conducted will be presented.
CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Conclusions

This project sought to answer the question, “How can the United States, as a hegemonic power, effectively engage rising nuclear and economic regional powers to further our national interests?” Although further research may be needed to determine if the findings from the US-Indian experience of the 1990s is applicable to other nations such as Brazil, Nigeria, Indonesia, and other rising regional powers, it appears clear that a new outlook is required for the future.

The first issue of concern with is how the United States will deal with new nuclear regional powers. It is clear from the behavior of the declared nuclear powers that they all subscribe to the position that having nuclear weapons both ensures the security of their homelands, as well as gives them an asymmetrical advantage in relationship to other nations. It is also clear that nations such as India and Pakistan have the technological expertise to build nuclear weapons, and the United States can do little using sanctions or other coercive methods to prevent them from going nuclear if the nation determines it is weapon system that will provide the ultimate defense against an existential threat to its homeland. President Bush and Prime Minister Vajpayee in 2002 spoke of the developing strategic relationship between the two countries, and this should be encouraged.

The second issue of concern is how the United States will deal with new economic regional powers. The change to the world economic order requires that the United States undertake new approaches to ensure its future economic prosperity and effectively engage with the new economic powers to achieve these goals. The United
States is the pre-eminent economy in the world today, and is expected to be for decades to come. The need for the United States to broaden its economic horizon from a Euro-centric trade regime to more fully incorporate the new economic powers is clear. The dismantling of centralized command economies in India and other developing countries will continue to improve their integration into the global international economy. India will take advantage of its English-speaking population, combined with the liberalized economic regulations of India and the large Indian diaspora in the United States to continue to build its economic relationship with the United States.

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Assuming that India continues to maintain its nuclear arsenal, and continues to grow its economic ties with the United States, it is imperative that the United State effectively engages with India at this critical moment in time. The United States is India’s largest trade partner, and we should encourage this relationship as much as possible. Fifty years of prickly animosity between the world’s most powerful democracy and the world’s
largest democracy will not go away over night, but sustained engagement in areas such as security, counterterrorism, trade, and technology will pay large dividends in the end.

**Recommendations**

The Bush administration sees India’s potential to become one of the great democratic powers of the twenty-first century and is working to transform the relationship accordingly (White House 2002). The experience of the two Bush administrations and the Clinton administration shows that unless the concerns of rising regional powers that desire to remain within the international community are met, then they will attempt to resolve their concerns themselves. India is an excellent example of a regional power that sought resolution to its vital defense of homeland interests through requesting the protection of the remaining superpower or changing the international regime to eliminate the nuclear threat it perceived. If the United States wants the next group of rising regional powers to remain within the norms of the international community in respect to nuclear weapons or trade, it will need to provide assurances that their concerns will be met.

The United States must improve the unity of its foreign policy system so it can become a more effective force to advance our national interests. Laws passed in Congress that individually target certain countries over issues such as nuclear technology can significantly hamper the ability for the United States to fruitfully engage with countries in a rapidly changing international environment. The executive branch, including the Secretaries of State, Defense, Treasury, and Commerce, should lobby strongly for the repeal of laws that unduly restrict the ability of the United States to engage with countries such as India.
The United States must review its policy on nonproliferation and counterproliferation. These are two significantly different perspectives, and they require dramatically different implementation strategies. Our policy must be firm enough so rogue states such as North Korea and Iran, which are in many ways outside the norms of the international community, are appropriately contained. However, our policy must also be nuanced enough to accommodate nations that we want to improve our relations with. It does not further our national interests to place major regional powers such as India, Brazil, Nigeria, and Indonesia in the same category as North Korea. As the most powerful country in the world, the United States has tremendous positive leverage to shape the international environment. The Clinton administration focus on sanctions without providing positive inducements was proven a failure, and this lesson learned can be applied in numerous regions. The post-Cold War world international environment is primarily non-conflictual at the state level. This broadens the opportunities for creative American foreign policy to engage with rising regional powers and form strong economic, and potentially political and military bonds.

The American trade policies with India can also be improved. President Bush and Prime Minister Vajpayee have conducted talks on the growth in trade in the high technology and service sectors. The opening of the India markets provides the potential to rapidly develop a trade relationship on the order of the New Industrializing Countries (NIC) such as Singapore and Thailand in the short term. The trade relationship between India and the United States could very well be as strong as the US-Chinese bilateral trade relationship in the longer term. By encouraging India to continue to liberalize its economy, while at the same time reducing the domestic trade restrictions that are on India
that are not on China, the United States can make a significant contribution to the growth of the economic relationship.

**Suggestions for Further Study**

An area that warrants additional study includes examining the relationship at the policy development and implementation level between the United States and other rising regional powers during the period of this study. The United States has well developed policies for engaging with its allies and long-term trading partners, as well as dealing with the very small subset of nations that are threats to our national interests. We do not have well developed policies to engage the relatively highly developed states of the second tier, such as Brazil, Nigeria, and Indonesia. The most explosive economic and potentially military growth from a relative perspective will occur in these states over the next ten to fifteen years. How the United States addresses these countries will be very important to our future.

Another area that is fertile ground for study is the impact of the change from nuclear nonproliferation to counterproliferation. Nuclear weapons technology is an over sixty year old technology. As more and more states gain the capability to produce nuclear weapons indigenously, the nuclear nonproliferation regime may require modification.

The impact of the health care crisis in India is a third area to study. The Indian National AIDS Control Organization (NACO) estimates that India has the second highest number of HIV-infected people. Only South Africa has a higher number of HIV-infected people. In 2002, the CIA estimated that India would have between 20 and 25 million AIDS cases by 2010. The impact of HIV upon the social fabric of India just as India will
be transitioning from a developing to a developed economic and military power bears further study (Avert 2004).

**Summary**

If the United States is able to devise effective methods of engaging rising regional powers, this will go a long way toward securing American national interests both at home and overseas. The failure of major powers to accommodate and incorporate rising powers can be seen from the world community’s experience with Bismarckian Germany in Europe at the end of the nineteenth century, and the rise of Japan between the First and Second World Wars. The United States is the status quo hegemonic power now. International norms and rules are currently designed to protect and promote American interests. The failure to keep these up to date in the face of a changed international environment potentially threatens our nation’s future. By answering the question of how the United States, as the hegemonic power, effectively engages rising regional powers to further our national interests will depend on how the United States addresses the nuclear and economic issues. The United States has a very strong record of success in protecting and promoting its interests and this challenge can be met.
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