AMERICA'S LAST BATTLES: ORGANIZING BRIGADES TO WIN THE PEACE
LESSONS FROM EAST TIMOR, AFGHANISTAN, AND IRAQ

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This study strives to determine the most effective way to organize and train a military force at the brigade level and below to build peace during contested peace operations. The thesis investigates three organizational models for military forces. In the East Timor case, the New Zealand Defense Force employs their unitŸs internal civil affairs teams to focus a battalionŸs resources on village-level security, governance, and economy simultaneously. In the Afghanistan case, the U.S. Army employs a light infantry brigade combat team to focus exclusively on security, and separate civil affairs elements to conduct very minimal local governance and economy operations. In the Iraq case, an Airborne brigade combat team employs its attached civil affairs teams internal to the brigade and functionally organizes the entire brigade to tackle security, governance, and economic challenges at the city and village level. Findings suggest that brigades must have an internal organization that facilitates simultaneous promotion of security, governance, and economy. The recommendations include the use of field artillery and air defense artillery units in a multifunctional civil affairs role within the new units of action. Further, evidence indicates that the resource focus should be at the local rather than the national level. Lastly, the conclusion recommends how to change Army culture as a necessary prerequisite to lasting reorganization.

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ABSTRACT

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ACRONYMS

ACR	Armored Cavalry Regiment
BATT	New Zealand Defense Force Battalion
BCT	Brigade Combat Team
CA	Civil Affairs
CALL	Center for Army Lessons Learned
CDF	Commander's Discretionary Fund
CERP	Commander's Emergency Relief Program
CJTF	Combined Joint Task Force
CMA	Civil Military Affairs
CMO	Civil Military Operations
CMTC	Combined Maneuver Training Center
COE	Contemporary Operating Environment
COIN	Counterinsurgency
EOKA	*Ethniki Organosis Kyprion Agoniston* - National Organization of Cypriot Fighters
ETA	*Euskadi ta Askatasuna* - Basque Fatherland and Liberty
FID	Foreign Internal Defense
FM	Field Manual
GO	Governmental Organization
INTERFET	International Force, East Timor
IO	International Organization; Information Operations
IRA	Irish Republican Army
JP	Joint Publication

JRTC	Joint Readiness Training Center
JTF	Joint Task Force
MOOTW	Military Operations Other Than War
NBC	Nuclear, Biological, Chemical
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NTC	National Training Center
NZDF	New Zealand Defense Force
PA	Public Affairs
PRT	Provincial Reconstruction Team
PSYOP	Psychological Operations
PVO	Private Volunteer Organization
SASO	Stability Operations and Support Operations
TF	Task Force
UA	Unit of Action
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
UNAMET	United Nations Assistance Mission, East Timor
UNTAET	United Nations Transition Authority, East Timor
USAREUR	United States Army Europe

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

> It used to be that if you defeated the enemy's forces in the field, what was left was just mopping up or restructuring, and the war was won on the battlefield. That hasn't happened [lately]. It hasn't happened in the time I served, for 39 years. It probably hasn't happened since the end of the Second World War. There's a difference between winning battles, or defeating the enemy in battle, and winning the war. . . . And it's going to continue to be that way. . . . Right now the question that has to be answered is: does our military expand its role beyond the military aspect, or will we continue to stick it with this [peace building] mission without the resources, the training, the cooperation from others, or the lack of authority needed to get the job done?
>
> General Anthony Zinni, USMC, Retired
> Speech to the U.S. Naval Institute and
> The Marine Corps Association, 2003

General Tony Zinni made this observation in a September 2003 speech to the U.S. Naval Institute and the Marine Corps Association. The speech addresses well-publicized efforts to transform the Armed Forces, challenging the military to focus on fixing weaknesses rather than continuously upgrading strengths. As Zinni says, "What strikes me is that we are constantly redesigning the military to do something it already does pretty well. . . . The military does a damn good job of killing people and breaking things." This pattern of ignoring what is broken and tweaking the status quo has a long history in the U.S. military. It is a costly history, filled with many failures that prove to be painfully obvious in hindsight. Some mistakes reflect a discounting of relatively evident tactical and operational trends in equipment and doctrine, or more ominously, a military institutional culture unwilling to change. Others spotlight a misreading of strategic trends. History shows that these omissions cause the military often to lose the first battles of wars, or in the case of Iraq, the last battles--those to secure the peace. Prior to examining

what changes the military must make to win contested peace operations--America's Last

Battles--like those ongoing in Iraq and destined to be a part of future military operations

for years to come, this thesis examines some of the factors that retard military innovation.

<u>A Military Slow to Change</u>

The U.S. military with its mixed record of innovation has been known to look the

other way when something that it does not want to see is lurking on the horizon. Often it

has proven incapable of overcoming its own cultural bias toward the status quo, not to

mention the inner-military bureaucratic politics that blocks change. These very dynamics

play a critical role in generating or retarding innovation. Study of innovations in

combined arms maneuver warfare between World War I and World War II illuminates

this causal relationship.

In this interwar period, the German Army was more effective at developing tank-

focused combined arms maneuver warfare than the American Army, because the

Reichswehr's leadership, dominated by its general staff, was internally reflective and

focused on the greater army, while the U.S. Army was fraught with bureaucratic turf

struggles among the branches. For instance, it was not until after the Louisiana

Maneuvers in May 1940, in which separate Infantry branch and Cavalry branch

experimentation was combined into corps level maneuver, that branch rivalries were

trumped by the obvious utility of combined arms maneuver centered on a combined arms

tank corps (Hofmann 2001, 12). It is worth noting that even after the highly successful

Louisiana Maneuvers the chiefs of Infantry and Cavalry branches objected to this new

corps. It is also worth noting that four years earlier, in 1936, the Germans had already

fielded close to 400 medium tanks and 1,600 light tanks primarily reorganized into the

first three panzer divisions of the Reichswehr (Cavaleri 1997, 10). This reorganization

was done over initial complaints from German branches. Major General F.W. Von

Mellenthin said, in reporting that his cavalry regiment was chosen to convert, "As

passionate cavalrymen we all felt rather sore at having to bid farewell to our horses, but

we were determined to maintain the great traditions of Seidlitz and Zithen and pass them

on to the new armored corps" (Von Mellenthin 1956, xvi). In that same year, Colonel

Heinz Guderian, writing in the German Military Science Review, criticized the U.S.

Army's branch system for not putting tanks and combined arms doctrine under a

consolidated authority (Hofmann 2001, 9).

The actions of another famous cavalryman, George Patton, were representative of

the U.S. Army's branch rivalry problem. Patton, unlike Von Mellethin, did not give up on

his horse so easily--well into the 1930s he was defending horse cavalry as vital. Patton

had transferred back to Cavalry after the dissolution of the Tank Corps. While his

arguments, like the fact that horses needed no lines of supply, were in part correct, they

were also grounded in the branch competition with Infantry, which had gained

proponency over the tank. Reflecting that competition, in 1930 Patton reversed course

from an article he had published in *Infantry Journal* just before the National Defense Act

of 1920, in which he had argued that, "The tank is new and, for the fulfillment of its

destiny, it must remain independent" (Wilson 1989, 226). In his published rebuttal to an

Infantry tank officer, Colonel James Kelly Parsons, Patton attacked the idea of an

independent tank corps. Instead, Patton counter proposed that each branch experiment

with mechanization. "To the chagrin of [the] chief of infantry who had hoped to protect

his monopoly on tracked armored fighting vehicles," Patton's suggestions were adopted

(Daley 1997, 14-15). Because of bureaucratic battling and the military's long-standing desire to maintain the status quo, the American officer most often recognized as the leading proponent of tank corps combined arms warfare, led the charge to keep the branches separate.

This lesson remains vitally important to a U.S. military trying to transform itself to defeat the enemy in the global war on terrorism. The nation dedicates significant financial and human resources toward transforming the armed forces. Leaders need to be certain that these limited resources produce tangible results. Failure in this effort could lead to another Fallujah or another Kasserine (Patton 1947, 3). In speaking of the battles around Kasserine, Rommel said, "In Tunisia the Americans had to pay a stiff price for their experience, but it brought rich dividends" (Rommel 1953, 523). It is both saddening and encouraging that within a year of the North Africa campaign, the Americans were more than a match for the Germans and were innovating at a pace that the Reichswehr could not equal. Rommel called the American adaptive pace, "astonishing" (Rommel 1953, 407, 521).

A Military Very Slow to Change: Ignoring Small Wars

The outcome of these Interwar mistakes, born primarily of tactical and operational misreads, was exceptionally painful. Today, our lack of preparation for operations in post-war Iraq and post-war Afghanistan reflect a misreading of strategic trends, the emergence of small wars as equal in importance to decisive large-scale war. This willful ignorance is not new: during the entire twentieth century, the Army for the most part, ignored small wars. The turning of a blind eye to these "adventures" occurred for many reasons. Contributing factors included the difficulty in predicting specifics of the next

small war--it has proved easier to read the build-up of conventional military power. Perhaps the more enduring reason, though, is the desire of the Army not to be caught up in these wars. The Army is culturally opposed to small wars. They do little for service prestige and even less for a service's budget, as they require little of the high tech equipment that is so attractive. Not to be underestimated, a part of the past rationale for the Army's reluctance is that it rightfully sees its role as defending the nation, winning the nation's wars. The calculation used to be easy: little wars are likely but threaten few casualties and probably do not affect the nation's vital interests; large wars are infrequent, but even this infrequency multiplied by massive casualty possibilities and a threat to the nation outweighs the small war total.

Today the likelihood of a large war that threatens the American way of life is miniscule--the United States has no peer competitor. At the same time, with the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the possibility that a small war may affect America has grown exponentially. Small wars, and their influence on terrorists among others, matter. These wars take place in failing or failed states where insurgent groups, and terrorists, take advantage of the government's lack of capacity to secure the populace. Enemy groups live among the populace, thriving proportional to the government's inability to provide the basic needs of the people. Unfortunately, in America's unipolar moment, where enemy groups will rarely face the U.S. military head on in a conventional manner, our military has proven itself to be more capable at winning large land wars than these increasingly prevalent small wars.

The emerging pattern is a military comfortable with exceptionally rapid maneuver and the precision use of firepower to destroy targets that can be found, but lacking the

capacity to find and destroy an enemy that lies hidden until he has the numerical or situational advantage. In short, we have updated our Cold War focused military to take advantage of a revolution in military affairs that employs digital systems to exponentially increase lethality at just the time that the enemy has cleverly chosen to fight where precision weaponry is least effective. Regarding near and medium term threats, we have ridden an RMA to nowhere. It is only in the long term that our revolutionary capacity will act as a strategic deterrent. In the short term, we have a quick strike military capable of winning tactical victories.

That same military may lack the large numbers and staying power for the long term strategic victory our nation requires. For the vital lesson of the small war, as General Zinni and countless other experts point out, is that the military needs to stop thinking of winning the peace as a separate part of the war. As Nadia Schadlow astutely identified, "The Iraq situation is only the most recent example of the reluctance of civilian and military leaders, as well as most outside experts, to consider the establishment of political and economic order as a part of war itself" (Schadlow 2003, 85). Given that the military must maintain the capacity to win the war first, whether the nation employs that capacity as a liberator of people or in a peace enforcement mode, the first step in correcting the military's strategic vulnerability is generating a force that can successfully transition from combat to peace operations.

<u>Organizing to Win Small Wars</u>

The U.S. Army's keystone doctrinal operations manual, FM 3-0, implies that need in defining the role of the Army: "If deterrence fails, Army forces defeat the enemy, end the conflict on terms that achieve national objectives, and establish self-sustaining

postconflict stability" (2001, 1-3). Events in Iraq and Afghanistan make it increasingly

clear that the military must be able to handle the political, economic, and security aspects

of this transition. Enemy insurgents will prevent civilian peace building professionals

from taking an active role. Again, FM 3-0 identifies this need: "Army operational level

organizations [including] corps . . . control vast land areas, temporarily govern occupied

areas, and control populations and resources" (2001, 1-6--1-7).

But it is not at corps level or Joint Task Force level that most of the vital nation

building work occurs. As the case studies will demonstrate, it is at the brigade level and

below where meaningful policies that influence the local conditions that determine

quality of life are made. This lesson is particularly true of efforts at improving political

and economic conditions. Due to the trend in terrorists attacking "soft targets," like

NGOs and IOs, many vital peace building tasks, formerly identified exclusively the

civilian realm of peace building, now often fall under the realm of the military. The silver

lining in these increased responsibilities is that successful counterinsurgency relies on

local information sources. Case after case shows that security is not just dependent on the

quantity of forces on the ground. It requires mutually supporting local conditions. Critical

is an economy that employs the young men that are the most volatile members of a

community. Equally important is a political-economic situation that convinces locals that

things are better now and that a way to continue advancement is to turn in terrorist

elements trying to disrupt progress. These terrorists live among them. To aid in

accomplishing this mission, this study strives to solve the following question: what is the

most effective way to organize and train a military force at the brigade level and below to

build peace after conflict?

To this end, the study must ascertain the answers to three subordinate questions. First, what critical tasks at the local level must the military accomplish at the beginning of post-conflict operations in order to set the stage for eventual handover to civilian agencies? Second, in the post-conflict contemporary operating environment, where battalions and companies have extraordinarily important roles as "mayors" of towns, does the current civil affairs capability meet commanders' need at the tactical level? (If not, have post--World War II cases shown us other ways to organize?) Third, in a military that has proven to be wed to preparing for decisive war, how does the leadership change the professional culture to accept the organizational changes that emerge from the first two questions? To answer these questions in a logical evidence-based manner, the organization of the paper will include an introduction; an outline of the design and execution of the research plan; a review of pertinent literature; an evidence section focusing on three case studies; and a concluding section that draws together the implications and makes recommendations.

<u>Building the Case</u>

The primary research method this study will follow is the case study method as outlined in Robert K. Yin's, *Case Study Research: Design and Methods*. By using the case study method this paper seeks to isolate on the hypothesis examined, but does so in the context of the events that surround the particular events studied. Each case study examined in this paper focuses on how military organizations organized for and conducted contested peace building operations. Each case study does so through isolating on gaining security, building governance capacity, and improving the economy; however, the case studies clearly articulate the distinct environments in which the forces conducted

the operations. In other words, the examination centers on the key peace building tasks identified in the literature review--chapter 3--but does not ignore the outside events that influenced how those tasks were executed or which tasks received priority of planning and resources.

The heart of the literature review is an investigation of the vital components of successful peace operations in the transition phase. Pre-Cold War and Cold War cases help in this task, as does a review of civilian and military scholarship. In an important extension to the research justification, the literature review also shows that there is a knowledge gap in why military operations fail in the long term. Regardless of this gap, the military and civilian literature on this topic provides important input on steps a military force need take to succeed.

The evidence and implications section centers on three case studies: East Timor, Afghanistan, and Iraq. They demonstrate situations in which peace building operations were undertaken while bullets were still flying. These cases include geographical dispersion as well as varying degrees of resistance to the peace operation. Most importantly, units in these cases each employed a different organizational structure in conducting nation building operations. This variance allows a generalization of findings to apply to future operations. In other words, the conclusion will not be Iraq or Afghanistan specific. The cases also show some degree of evolution in U.S. doctrine and operations. East Timor provides a view outside of the U.S. focused efforts in the other two cases. The implications of the trends identified in this section will lead to the conclusion of the paper. The conclusion will compare the findings of the evidence section to the research and subordinate questions originally asked. Importantly, this concluding

chapter will accomplish two goals: recommend how to change the military culture to accept small wars as a mission of equal importance to decisive war--a vital prerequisite to the necessary lasting organizational change the Army requires--and outline organizational changes to prepare U.S. Armed Forces for the next operations they have to undertake.

<u>Setting and Defending the Boundaries of the Study</u>

The topic is one of significant scope. Thus, assumptions, definitions, limitations, and delimitations are necessary to define the boundaries of the question this study aims to answer. Two critical assumptions underlie this study. First, this paper assumes that the U.S. military will continue to have too many operational requirements to allow it to have specialized forces designed to exclusively peace build. Because this study aims to answer the research and supporting questions in the context of a world in which no peer competitors exist for the United States, this assumption requires some evidentiary support. National security threats in this contemporary operating environment of no peer competitor increasingly come from the nexus of failed states and hostile non-state actors. The contemporary operating environment, then, outlines two main requirements for the U.S. Armed Forces: do everything possible to keep a true peer competitor from arriving on the world scene in the future and defeat current threats.

To maintain the lack of a peer competitor, the U.S. military must preserve significant war fighting might. As the National Security Strategy (*NSS*) says, "Our forces will be strong enough to dissuade potential adversaries from pursuing a military build-up in hopes of surpassing, or equaling, the power of the United States" (Bush 2002, 30). This strength requires a military trained and equipped to decisively win, which requires money and people. Limited money and military manpower are the constraints that make

this study necessary; with unlimited amounts of both, the U.S. military could have a force--or two separate forces--capable of defeating enemies and building peace after conflict. Instead, the force that the nation uses to defeat enemies is the same force that must build the peace. The concluding chapter will provide additional support for this key assumption.

From a strategic perspective, if America's military deterred *all* enemies, this study again would not be necessary. The strategic reality, though, is different. While the strength of the American military may deter potential peer military competitors, it has not stopped all attacks on America. It has only forced those who disagree with the U.S. worldview, and the actions the country takes in supporting its position, to seek asymmetric ways to defeat the U.S. As the *NSS* outlines, the Bush administration's view is that pre-emptive or preventative military action is the primary way to defeat these asymmetric threats (Bush 2002). Precision weaponry allows the military to destroy an enemy's center of gravity, after which time a democratic form of government can be put into place.

For the military, the practical ramifications of the evolving Bush Doctrine, though, have been far different than most pundits had predicted. The transformation of the military to one with the advanced remote sensing and precision strike capabilities that the *NSS* called for continues apace. Moreover, the nation has seen the use of these capabilities in Afghanistan and Iraq to remove regimes. What the military has been unable to master is the installment of a democratic government with clear staying power in a safe, secure, stable state. So while our military continues to try to transform itself to a

more lethal, powerful force on the battlefield, it fails to address the post-conflict tasks that keep the nation from winning wars.

A key component of this assumption is that the contemporary operating environment (COE) will continue along the current trend line. Namely, the COE will place military forces in a high operating tempo centered on a number of contingency operations. These missions will include the transition from combat to contested peace operations that initially include guerrilla-based terror. Army FM 3-0 supports this notion, when it explains that generally adversaries will "use terrorist tactics and other attacks to erode public support, alliances or coalition cohesion, and the will to fight" (2001, 1-9). Given the important contributions of NGOs, IOs, and PVOs, the terrorist attacks seen in Iraq have been effective at eroding the civil-military peace building coalition. Additionally, based on the large number of forces needed for these full spectrum operations, developing a few "peacekeeping divisions" as specialized forces will not be practical. In other words, the first assumption is that U.S. military forces must be generalists--not an Army that as a whole can conduct full spectrum operations, but instead an Army in which each brigade-sized combat unit must be capable of conducting full spectrum operations.

The second assumption that the study makes is that civilian governmental organizations (GOs) and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) will continue to be unwilling to engage in peace building while guerrilla based terror attacks persist. This assumption is an evolving assumption and does not have the quantity of evidence in support that the first assumption does. Nonetheless, operations in Afghanistan and Iraq show that NGOs have been unwilling to stay in areas in which they are in danger. Given

the nature of contemporary operations and the lesson that enemy forces are likely to gain from recent operations, the attacks that keep NGOs away will continue in the future. The concluding chapter again provides more evidentiary support for this key assumption. Together these assumptions force the military to continue its evolving role as the primary executors for initial peace building efforts. To further narrow the area of research, some definitions are necessary.

The use of "peace building," a term very similar to the contentious "nation building," (note: the paper uses the two terms in an interchangeable manner) requires a few vital doctrinal definitions to refine the topic. First, Joint Publication 3-07 defines the *Relationship of Peace Operations to Diplomatic Activities* in the following way: "US military peace operations support political objectives and diplomatic objectives. Military support improves the chances for success in the peace process by lending credibility to diplomatic actions and demonstrating resolve to achieve viable political settlements. In addition to PO, the military may conduct operations in support of Peace Building" (JP 3-07 1995, III-13). Second, JP 3-07 defines *Peace Building* in the following way: "Peace building consists of post-conflict actions, predominantly diplomatic and economic, that strengthen and rebuild governmental infrastructure and institutions in order to avoid a relapse into conflict. Military support to peace building may include, for example, units rebuilding roads, reestablishing or creating government, entities, or the training of defense forces" (JP 3-07 1995, III-13). These two definitions are noted because there are no other specific doctrinal definitions that elucidate the transition from combat to contested peace operations that more closely match U.S. operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. However, there are broader definitions that encompass peace building activities.

These definitions are found in the emerging doctrine of Stability and Support Operations (SASO) to include FM 3-0, Operations, FM 3-07, Stability and Support Operations, and a number of the Joint Publications. The broader definitions are a vital component of the literature review in that many of the operations the military undertakes borrow aspects of a number of SASO missions. In particular, the challenging security environment requires effective counter-insurgency operations (COIN) in the short-run and effective foreign internal defense operations (FID) in the long-run. The literature review supplements this discussion with a broader treatment of military doctrine.

There are other doctrinal terms that require further definition, as their use in this paper will provide either background texture or specific detail. This paper contends that the post-Cold War U.S. military has been effective at winning tactical engagements, battles, and to a lesser extent campaigns, but has not won wars. An engagement is a small tactical engagement normally conducted at brigade or lower level. A battle is made up of a series of engagements and involves larger forces. Battles make up a campaign (FM 3-0, 2001). A war is made up by a series of campaigns. For instance, one could consider the offensive combat actions in Iraq in the spring of 2003 as engagements that made up a battle. Those battles--Basra, Najaf, Karbala, Northern Iraq, and Baghdad--made up the offensive campaign to remove the regime. This campaign was distinct from the follow on campaign, and the battles within, being waged against terrorists and insurgents as the coalition tries to reconstruct and stabilize Iraq. Without winning this campaign for peace in Iraq, the coalition will lose the Iraq war. Counterinsurgency operations and civil-military peace building operations to include FID are a large part of the plan to defeat the Ba'athist insurgency and the foreign terrorists operating in Iraq.

Based on the assumptions and definitions, this study's delimitation is time period. Specifically, the author has chosen to constrain the time frame examined to include only the transition period from combat to contested peace operations when military organizations have not yet been able to hand over traditionally civil functions to GOs and NGOs. It is not possible to put a time on this period--for instance, in the case of Iraq it may last only 6 months for the 101st Airborne Division in Mosul, but could last a year or more for the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment and 82nd Airborne Division units in the vicinity of Fallujah. Given this finite period of time, this study's limitation is the amount of first-hand sources that address the transition from combat to contested peace operations in the COE or a period similar to our COE. The importance and urgency of this study justifies what may be incomplete data to analyze.

CHAPTER 2

RESEARCH DESIGN

The research design for this paper follows a pyramid-shaped model of evidentiary support. The introductory chapter--the broad base of the pyramid--establishes the importance of the topic through analysis of global strategic trends at the macro level, and an examination of the Army's role in current and future strategic challenges at the micro level. The first chapter also establishes limits on the size of the topic by employing necessary assumptions, limitations, and delimitations, as well as setting the stage for analysis by defining critical terms. The second floor of the pyramid is the literature review, which provides an overview of research on the general topics of nation building and counterinsurgency. This review generates details necessary to correctly examine three recent cases, East Timor, Afghanistan, and Iraq.

The crux of the research involves a multiple case study of the three cases, each of which is analogous to a separate experiment. The case study method is particularly appropriate for this paper as it helps to explain, in operations that are too complex for analysis by surveys or experiments, the causal links that exist between the military or NGO actions and the ultimate operational outcomes. Moreover, the case study method allows analysis and extraction of these links even in the cases where no clear, single set of outcomes existed (Yin 1989, 25). The outcome of this multiple case study analysis is the top floor of the pyramid, the answer to the research question: how to reorganize and train army forces at brigade level and below to be more effective in contested peace operations. In perhaps a more illuminating analogy, the research design is akin to focusing a broad base of light through a series of lenses until a final sharp beam of light

can shine on the answer to the research question. The sharpness of the light comes from a logical linking of data to the research question to generate a logical model of proof (Yin 1989).

For that proof to be credible, the research design must include relevant data. That pertinent data comes from examining three different case studies that employ three dissimilar organizations to solve the problems associated with effective counterinsurgency and reconstruction actions in an environment where the peace is actively contested. Beyond having relevant data, this study derives from the literature review a hypothesis identifying factors that are theoretically and historically sound predictors of success in these types of operations. This process allows analysis of the data in a way that permits the researcher to draw a reasonable causal relationship between the dependent and independent variables. The method is also policy relevant as it generates lessons relevant to different situations. In Robert K. Yin's words, "An important step . . . is the development of a rich theoretical framework . . . [which] later becomes the vehicle for generalizing to new cases" (Yin 1989, 54).

The first sharpening of light and the first point at which this study seeks to gain policy relevance to future situations occurs in the literature review. Beyond supporting the relevance of the topic, the literature review for this study will take a broad look at tasks that correlate with success in contested peace operations. This use of theory and past cases in the literature review to generate criteria for interpreting findings is necessary because of the incomplete nature of the Afghanistan and Iraq case studies. It is also vital because ultimately the three different organizations examined in the three cases need to

have results analyzed through the same lens to accurately measure effectiveness of counterinsurgency and reconstruction efforts.

The literature review uses general academic writing, particularly from the NGO community, to pull out those reconstruction tasks that correlate with successful peace building. As already identified in the introduction, completion of those tasks by the NGO and IGO community has preponderantly occurred in a stable peaceful environment. The literature review also examines military writing, both from doctrinal manuals and from military journals, to identify those counterinsurgency and nation building tasks upon which the military focuses. These tasks, for the most part, fall under the rubric of building a secure environment either through the direct activities of military units or via the training they often provide to local police and military forces.

Rarely does the military literature address areas outside of security. When it does stray, reconstruction oriented tasks are often written about from the Civil Affairs community perspective and in the light of coordinating with NGOs. Unfortunately, those military sources that do focus on U.S. military security efforts do not adequately address tasks necessary to defeat the relatively new threat of terrorists rather than classic military insurgency. As such, it was necessary to substitute foreign military experiences in Ireland, Greece, Italy, Spain, and Uruguay in combating terrorists in order to mine those tasks unique to political violence. In sum, through the use of varied sources, the literature review provides a solid picture of key tasks involved in generating a sustainable peace in contested peace operations.

In combining these varied sources, however, an additional problem emerges. Might the environment in which NGOs and the military tackle their heretofore separate

tasks dramatically affect the success of each type of operation? For instance, if a secure environment is necessary for reconstruction tasks to take hold, does it make sense to tackle these tasks when insurgents and terrorists are still attacking targets? More to the point, does the academic literature on reconstruction tasks remain credible for use in an environment that is not yet secure? A similar example holds for military security operations, which often rely on information derived from the good will locals feel for foreign forces; good will that in some part comes from the identification of foreign NGO projects to rebuild schools or hospitals, with the also foreign military forces keeping the peace. In short, some check must exist to ensure that the lens derived from the literature review is not refracting light in the wrong direction. The final part of the literature review--an examination of two older cases where American military forces saw peace operations contested by insurgents--serves as that check to ensure that the derived tasks remain legitimate in the complex operating environments the U.S. military is likely to continue facing.

The five non-U.S. terrorism cases coupled with the two historic U.S. interventions provide soundness to the literature review that a more obvious solution, analyzing U.S. military operations in Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq, could not provide. The environment that currently exists in Afghanistan and Iraq, and that U.S. forces and NGOs are likely to face in the future, is quite different from the Bosnia or Kosovo environment in which U.S. forces developed most of their current peace operations tactics, techniques and procedures. In those operations, forces that challenged the peace did not carry out an insurgency or terror campaign like that seen in Afghanistan and Iraq. Regarding those two cases, the literature on recent complex peace operations in Afghanistan and Iraq is

too immature to fully analyze. By mirroring the complex environment that U.S. forces are now operating in, these seven older cases lend credence to the final categories of tasks upon which the three modern cases will be examined. Moreover, each of these seven cases provides a different look at vital tasks.

The U.S. military's presence in the Philippines from 1899-1907 and Haiti from 1915-1934 provided 27 years of nation building experience for the American armed forces before that term became popular (Boot 2002). More importantly, for this study, in both cases the U.S. military faced significant resistance from local forces. Over 100 years before American armed forces were accused of conducting a war of territorial conquest in Iraq for economic reasons, similar accusations buttressed the fierce, organized resistance in the Philippines, where rebels killed over 4,000 U.S. soldiers in three years (Boot 2002). And in response to the guerrilla campaign, just as the U.S. Army finds itself conducting reconstruction tasks to win the trust of local Iraqis, the Army built schools and hospitals in the Philippines for the same reasons. The Marine campaign in Haiti provides another check to the task list. Distinctive from the Philippines campaign, the Haiti operation lasted a significant amount of time and allowed for maturity of counterinsurgency and reconstruction operations. The lessons from these two campaigns provide a broad spectrum of experience to certify and fill-in the initial literature review.

Nonetheless, even these case studies, which hold a number of fascinating parallels with current operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, lack one major element--terrorism. While the definition of terrorism varies according to the source, it is clear that violence against "innocent civilians" for "political aims" is the major differentiation from insurgents who target military forces. Both insurgent operations and terrorist operations

are underway in Iraq and Afghanistan. Terrorist attacks, like the one on the International

Committee of the Red Cross in Baghdad, arguably form the one major difference

between what the military and their civilian reconstruction partners faced in the

Philippines and Haiti and what the U.S. military now faces. As such, this section of the

literature review examines cases where nations attempted to counter terrorists using

military, economic, diplomatic, and information activities. To provide depth, the five

cases examined are split between investigating counterterrorism policies directed toward

revolutionary terrorists, like the Red Brigade, and those aimed at ethno-nationalist

terrorists, like the Irish Republican Army (IRA), who seek their own land.

The literature review, then, sets up the method of data collection and analysis by

examining academic and military literature as well as a broad array of historical case

studies to determine vital tasks, grouped into categories, indicative of success in post-

conflict contested peace operations. These key categories of success focus the data

collection interviews and archival and journal data collection in each case study, and

establish a framework to measure initial success in operations that are still ongoing.

Using case studies to gather data is particularly appropriate for analyzing ongoing

operations, because, as Yin defines it, the case study strategy, "investigates a

contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context; when the boundaries between

phenomenon and context are not clearly evident; and in which multiple sources of

evidence are used" (1989, 23). This method does not allow for a complete controlling of

outside factors as one would see in an experiment conducted in a laboratory, but it does

allow for a plausible and rigorous examination of the success of peace building task

accomplishment and success of the overall operation. In doing so, the case study method

will help clarify the military organizational structure best suited to successfully conduct the myriad of tasks inherent to successful stabilization and reconstruction in post conflict peace building.

To that end, the three cases studied have the useful distinction of employing three different organizational structures at the brigade level and below. It is the military unit and its civilian counterparts in these post conflict peace building operations that are the unit of analysis for the case studies. Employing the military-civil team for peace operations as the unit of analysis allows the study to focus data collection and limit the scope of the study. For example, with this unit of analysis it will be unnecessary to explore in detail whether the existence of a United Nations resolution influences the success of peace building operations. While a UN resolution may influence which NGOs decide to participate in the operation, it does not influence the success of actual tactical task completion on the ground.

As the purpose of the study is to answer the research question focused on developing an improved organizational structure, the data coming from the case study selection is an excellent fit. This technique, changing the key independent variable to analyze the impact on the dependent variable, success in contested peace operations, avoids what Yin class the fatal flaw of the case study method, selecting cases as sampling units (Yin 1989). Instead, as Yin suggests, the research design uses the three cases as three separate experiments to create "analytical generalization." In this type of generalization, "a previously developed theory is used as a template with which to compare the empirical results of the case study" (Yin 1989, 38). This type of research design creates *external validity* through the use of replication logic--each case will be

examined from similar perspectives. The empirical results of this technique will be particularly powerful if all three cases support a similar outcome where one particular type of organization proves to be more effective, resulting in what researchers refer to as Level One Inference (Yin 1989).

Data collection on the cases will come from multiple sources in order to help gain *construct validity*, which is along with *reliability* are the two tests that increase the quality of the research. The data collected on the New Zealand Army's operations in East Timor comes from three major sources. Initial background data regarding operational details and success of different strategies in creating a stable environment comes from the academic and military literature on the topic. More detailed accounts of the New Zealand Army's efforts come from archival data gained from the New Zealand Defense Headquarters in Wellington, New Zealand, during a research trip in December 2003. This material consists primarily of official documents covering East Timor operations as well as the personal papers of some of the leaders involved in the operation. The most detailed and focused material comes from interviews with a number of the New Zealand Army battalion (referred to as BATT, or in the case of the second battalion group to conduct operations in East Timor, BATT 2) commanders and company commanders.

Data collected for operations in Afghanistan will also rely on three sources, professional writing, archival data, and interviews, though in the case of Afghanistan the interviews will come from the Center for Army Lessons Learned database. Iraq data differs from the other two cases not in terms of use of interviews, archival sources and professional writing, but in that the author spent 75 days taking part in operations in Iraq and hence has a good deal of first hand observational evidence. As in all participant-

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observer situations, caution has been taken to avoid or minimize the bias inherent in participating in an event.

Interviews played an important part of each case study. The author conducted the interviews in a generally open ended way, though elements of the interview focused in on critical aspects of the operations. In each case, when the material that came out of the interview was not the respondents opinion, but instead an important input or outcome fact, that material was corroborated using other sources. The researcher gained data reliability by employing the same technique to check any bias inherent in the Iraq participant-observer data. To ensure reliability, the author will catalog and make available on request any unique participant-observer or interview data.

In analyzing the data, the research plan seeks *internal validity* through extensive use of a pattern matching strategy (Yin 1989). Making each case study an embedded case design, where the research looks at both a sense of overall success of the operation and looks in detail at the success of different component parts of the operation, for instance job creation within an "economy" category or the demobilization of former combatants within both the "economy" and "security" categories, enables pattern matching. Pattern matching requires Yin's fifth and last component of research design, establishing criteria to interpret the patterns or findings of the case studies. Component one is the research question; component two is the propositions or subordinate questions of the study; component three is the unit of analysis; component four is linking the case study data to the research and supporting questions (Yin 1989, 35). These criteria will center on the stability of the state in which the military force intervened. While some would try to measure stability in numeric terms, this technique is not likely to give an accurate read of

the effectiveness of each organization given the different environments in which the operations occurred. In other words, given the relatively more stable surroundings, just because New Zealand Defense Force operations in East Timor led to the lowest number of post conflict deaths among the local citizens and the least post conflict deaths among the military and civil peace building team does not in its own right make their operations the clear model. Likewise, successful efforts by U.S. Army to introduce and help operate a new political system in Iraq and their success jump-starting the post conflict economy in some cities does not mean the 173rd Airborne Brigade model is the best. As such, the concluding chapter will try to subjectively interpret the findings over the three key categories of security, governance and economy.

To carefully use pattern matching in gaining internal validity the study looks at the same component parts for each contested peace operation. As indicated earlier, these component parts emerged from the literature review. The three carefully selected cases should produce different results but for a theoretically sound reason (*theoretical replication* instead of *literal replication*)--each of the cases uses a different organizational structure at the brigade level and below (Yin 1989). For example, if the theory that civil affairs assets must operate at the lowest possible level over a consistently long period of time holds, results from the East Timor and Iraq cases, both at the macro and component program micro level should exceed the results in Afghanistan. If on the other hand, the results from Afghanistan exceeded those of the other two cases, having controlled or taken account of the obviously different situations, then the theoretical replication would not hold. Instead, a rival explanation might hold (Yin 1989). For instance, some theory would hypothesize that the U.S. focus in Afghanistan on national level governance versus

local community civil affairs efforts, pays off in setting conditions for long term success instead of the short term gain possibly engendered by a local focus. Beyond subjectively measuring success, the conclusions and recommendations chapter will consider these very questions and in turn make recommendations on future organizational make-ups for U.S. forces at the brigade level and below. This chapter will also explore how to change the U.S. Army's professional culture so that it accepts small wars as of equal importance to decisive war, and in turn accepts the organizational changes recommended.

CHAPTER 3

LITERATURE REVIEW

Writing on nation building, to include counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, and reconstruction, fits into three broad categories. First, many pieces describe the importance of the topic. These pieces outline the post-11 September world and analyze the implications of the U.S.'s near hegemonic status. Some of them directly cite the importance of the U.S. military's post-conflict stabilization role. Second, a number of articles and books examine different aspects of peace operations and peace building. These works attempt to identify factors that lead to success or failure for both military and civilian organizations. A particular subcategory of these works is the Joint and Army publications that define strategy, operations, and tactics of peace operations or stability and support operations. The last category of literature is those works that examine particular cases of nation building.

Regardless of category, these works contribute to the military's understanding of contested peace operations. In an era when the U.S. is certain to face more of these daunting missions, this literature is vital to our winning the nation's wars. Given the changing nature of the world and the morphing operational environment that the U.S. military operates in, it is not surprising that this body of literature is incomplete and has important gaps in it.

This study fills a clear gap in the literature, as none of these works have examined the reality of the early peace building operations associated with the transition from combat to contested peace operations: the military works ignore peace building except to define it and say that it is the realm of civilians, while civilian works investigate their

actual experiences, all of which occur after the environment has been made permissive. Ignored are the vital months after conflict when the military fills the political and economic development vacuum and sets the conditions--good or bad--for civilian organizations to take over.

For instance, from the military side there are extended reviews of Desert Storm and of military operations in Somalia and Kosovo. These reviews speak of the importance of firepower and maneuver and command and control of ground and air forces. Military authors have also reviewed the role of military forces in patrolling and separating combatants within peacekeeping operations after forces have consolidated the peace. But there are very few examinations of peace building operations--winning the hearts and minds (and hence gaining intelligence from locals)--when the Armed Forces remain under fire and NGOs, PVOs, and IOs remain out of the sector. At the opposite extreme, there is a great deal of literature on how NGOs build the peace after conflict has completely ceased. There is little discussion of how to build the peace in the vital initial phase when enemy remnants and insurgents still make the battlefield and peace-field a dangerous place. In other words, literature on the transition from combat to peace operations does not exist; literature on these operations is like a trilogy where the author failed to write the vital middle book.

Regarding how to conduct peace building operations as well as the operations that create the environment for peace building, military doctrine defines only some of the tasks to complete at different organizational levels. This incomplete doctrine tends to avoid those tasks that military units do not want to perform. Many aspects of peace building, to include reconstruction activities fall into this category. Nonetheless, for

military professionals and those that work with the military, the current doctrinal underpinnings are a necessary jumping off point. Likewise, it is necessary to examine academic writing about peace building, even though this writing assumes a secure environment that likely will not exist in the vital initial phases of building sustainable peace.

More complete are the historical cases of peace building in an insurgency or terrorist environment. The cases of U.S. military interventions, to include operations in the Philippines and Haiti, provide insight on critical tasks that need completion. Likewise, cases of counterterrorism efforts in Uruguay, Northern Ireland, Spain, Greece, and Italy deserve attention as they demonstrate effective and ineffective efforts using political, economic, and military/police means. Combining doctrine, academic literature, and historical cases, the literature review concludes with an extraction of those tasks that theory indicates are vital to successful peace building. These tasks are the starting point to developing a hypothesis on what organization and training plan the military should adopt to better transition between combat and peace operations.

Academic Writing on Nation Building

Civilian writing on nation building from members of the academic, NGO, and IO communities varies from the theoretical to the concrete and from focusing at state level to village level. The review of this body of literature begins with an examination of root causes of conflict and peace, and concludes with an investigation into the specific steps advised to reduce root problems or grow roots of peace at both the national and local level.

In addressing conditions which can cause conflict in a state, widen a conflict, or prevent it from being settled, political scientists, David Lake and Donald Rothchild argue that groups that fear the future generate intense ethnic conflict; it is not the past but the future for which people fight (Lake and Rothchild 1996). They go on to hypothesize that competition for resources and the possibility of losing out on scarce resources lies at the heart of that fear. In these conditions, "politics matter because the state controls access to scarce resources. Individuals and groups that possess political power can often gain privileged access to these goods, and thus increase their welfare" (Lake and Rothchild 1996, 45).

While a "collective fear of the future," serves as the germinating seed to ethnic conflict, Lake and Rothchild say that the existence of three conditions exacerbates that fear. They postulate that the first condition that increases the chance for violent conflict is information failure. Perception drives decisions: "To provoke conflict, one group need not believe that the other really is aggressive, only fear that it might be" (Lake and Rothchild 1996, 51). The second of Lake and Rothchild's three conditions are problems of credible commitment. Often opposing sides find it impossible to maintain mutually beneficial contracts. "In other words, at least one group cannot effectively reassure the other that it will not renege on an agreement and exploit it at some future date" (Lake and Rothchild 1996, 48). The third condition, security dilemmas, in the absence of carefully crafted preventive institutions, almost always exacerbates already significant lasting enmity. Security dilemmas, which provide incentives to use force preemptively, can cause a vicious cycle that increases violence.

Lake and Rothchild's work provides solid learning points towards preventing and resolving intrastate conflict. Clearly security dilemmas must at all cost be prevented. If for no other reason than to avoid giving one of the former warring parties the excuse to renew hostilities. That conclusion leads one to a more important conclusion for resolving civil wars that include at least one actor that has historically been the economic, societal, and power minority, and through numbers is becoming the heir apparent to the current majority. The rising minority can either wait their turn, which inevitably will involve harassment, servitude, and likely massacre from the people currently in power, or an outside body can set and enforce conditions that give the minority a chance to far more quickly and far less painfully become an equal. A valuable rule for military forces tasked with creating a secure environment.

Addressing the step after resolving war, eminent peace theorist I. William Zartman defines the conditions that lead to a lasting peace: "If human agents can help time resolve by providing post conflict outcomes that at least address the question of durability - producing solutions that are processes and mechanisms, not judgments and awards - they will have made a respectable contribution to the well being of the conflict's inheritor generation, which will be thereafter on its own" (Zartman 1997, 13). Zartman goes on to say that eliminating only violence from conflict may do little other than allow the conflict to simmer, making it economically feasible for warring factions, insurgents, or terrorists to continue their fight. Instead he recommends creating a "hurting stalemate," where peace seems a better option than continuing to fight. In other words, some insurgents are fanatical and will have to be killed or capture; their less zealous supporters need to see continuing the guerrilla campaign as too costly relative to peace.

J. Lewis Rasmussen approaches the problem from a slightly less theoretical perspective by addressing a specific root cause. As Rasmussen says, "we have learned from Angola, Cambodia, El Salvador, Rwanda, and numerous other examples, [that] peace beyond the accord is difficult to achieve but is of paramount importance. This dimension of peacebuilding becomes preventive, defending against the calamity of a backslide into renewed fighting" (Rasmussen 1997, 40). He continues on saying, "Peace cannot be enforced where social and economic conditions fail to maintain it; it must instead be built. . . . Societies incapable of meeting their citizens' needs are most vulnerable to breakdown and conflict; conflict, in turn, does lasting damage to the political, social, and economic foundations of stable and prosperous societies" (Rasmussen 1997, 40).

Providing much greater fidelity to the task of constructing peace, Andrew S. Natsios, currently head of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), emphasizes the role of NGOs. He recognizes that NGOs have come to prominence in complex emergencies at both the national and local level that "involve the destruction of the economy, including the currency and banking system; the collapse of food security; the dislocation of a large portion of the civilian population; and the erosion or complete failure of the apparatus of government itself, including its criminal justice and public safety functions" (Natsios 1997, 338). These groups, though rarely coordinated, have the expertise and experience to aid reconstruction efforts. Perhaps providing warning to those controlling the peace effort, and considering the lack of coordination that comes with the NGOs that Natsios emphasizes, Mary Anderson suggests that, "introducing resources into a resource-scarce environment where there is

conflict usually increases competition and suspicion among warring parties" (Natsios 1997, 340). She goes on to suggest that relief aid can strengthen the resolve of the warriors. For instance, in the cases of Aidid in Somalia and Taylor in Liberia, the young fighters who had recently left the countryside to man each warlord's militia used weapons to hijack aid and increase their standard of living as well as their local stature and power. In essence, they joined a gang masquerading as a political movement. With this new found status comes little motivation to negotiate for peace. They have found themselves better off in war than in any possible future peace.

Regardless of the downside of aid shipments, as reported by many observers, NGOs often play the vital role in situations where a power vacuum exists for any period of time. For example in the Angolan case, "the [critical task of] demobilization and resettlement of soldiers is being carried out primarily by NGOs because of the failure of the United Nations and the Angolan government to perform this function after the first peace accord" (Natsios 1997, 342). Among the several diverse approaches the NGO approach to conflict resolution includes: "economic interventions to employ young men in constructive work to reduce the likelihood of their recruitment into military or paramilitary groups, and through the efforts to create incentives for the indigenous merchant class to become advocates of peace" (Natsios 1997, 352).

Given that demobilization and reintegration of former combatants is such a vital task--they clearly are the most likely group to cause problems for the peace effort-- additional details to successful implementation are necessary. Regarding demobilization, evidence from El Salvador and Namibia adds credence to notion that the body conducting the mobilization must provide support equally (and if possible, identically) for both

armies in the case of a civil war. This rule of thumb should be employed until soldiers no longer primarily identify themselves with their armies as two distinct groups, but instead call themselves Namibian or Salvadoran or Iraqi (instead of Kurd or Shiite or Ba'athist) or Afghani (instead of Pashtun or Tajik). Moving from the philosophical to the concrete, from the perspective of one donor agency, it is evident that demobilization "assembly areas require a minimal amount of assistance to ensure adequate living standards, that soldiers should be processed in and out as quickly as possible, and that military observers must collect and secure weapons to prevent unauthorized access" (Clark 1995, 59). Donor agencies also realize that a cash "carrot" helps convince soldiers to stop fighting.

To stop weapons and soldiers from crossing borders, the agencies in charge of demobilizing armies must work hand-in-hand with states in the region. The goal has to be cooperation and changing the demilitarization focus from a local to a regional one. For example, "an increase in cross-border surveillance would, it is to be hoped, act to stem the traffic in small arms" (Alden 1996, 65). Moreover, a regional effort helps keep ex-combatants from crossing borders and fighting for the next opposition army that tries to overthrow a state in the region (Marley 1997). This phenomenon of "refugee warriors," as Aristide Zolberg, Astri Suhke, and Sergio Aguayo called them, is a critical component of fighting and instability in a region--spreading dissent from the country they left to the country they find refuge in (Adelman 1997). It is also a key concern in defeating an insurgency. The insurgency must be isolated, and cross-border sanctuary denied, if it is to be defeated.

Not yet mentioned, but intertwined in every issue within the demobilization and reintegration phase is the question of resources. None of these programs have any real

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chance without outside financing. Reintegration is particularly difficult without aid, as these programs normally tackle issues in the midst of a stagnant economy. Once funding is in place, reintegration agencies must concern themselves with other dilemmas. For example, planners of reintegration efforts must draw a fine line between targeting former combatants too exclusively and ignoring them. In the first instance, a planner risks re-affirming the ex-combatants identity as one who did his duty and risked his life for his country. Though that is an accurate take, if it is not tempered it can lead to an overblown sense of entitlement and expectations of the government that they can not hope to meet.

In the second instance, ignoring the potential critical problem group, planners must recognize that most soldiers know no other occupation than bearing arms. As many of these conflicts have lasted for years, the children who grew into men and women while carrying an AK-47 have never experienced any other occupation. Without training, then, it is natural for them to turn to banditry or to soldiering again. Therefore, the ideal is "a program which actively responds to the immediate financial and employment needs of former combatants while recognizing the longer-term imperative of social integration" (Alden 1996, 67).

Moving the discussion beyond security and local economic and labor conditions, Roy Licklider uses disarmament to emphasize the role of governance. Licklider says "The post war problems of disarmament, demobilization of at least two armies, and the likely collapse of the winning coalition in an environment where resources will be scarce and demands will be high mean that effectively the state will have to be recreated, even if the government has won the conflict" (Licklider 1993, 19). Relevant to operations in Iraq in particular, it seems, "the desperation of the power asymmetry reinforces the rebels'

commitment, makes them economize their resources, and counterbalances capabilities.

Theirs is not just a romantic attachment to life in the marquis, to the lifestyle of an outlaw. It is the starting point for their cost/benefit calculations. Anything less than their goal is an unacceptable cost, whereas total and ongoing struggle is not a cost but simply the normal condition of life" (Licklider 1993, 25).

Robert Wagner provides us a simple notion to help capture the lessons of the academic, NGO, and IO community, when he says that, "A closer look at the way wars end, teaches us . . . groups that decide to begin a war can decide to end it" (Wagner 1993, 242). The question that emerges from this literature, then, is which specific programs targeted toward root causes--and at what level, state or local--reduce the attractiveness of the insurgency for both guerrillas and the local populace, and increases the legitimacy of the new government and its supporting military force. In short, how do military and civilian forces increase the cost of insurgency while increasing the benefit of peace to a point where peace is more attractive than war?

Military Writing on Nation Building and U.S. Military Nation Building Cases

Military writing on this question includes both journal and monograph contributions and military doctrinal writings. For the most part, the military writing focuses less on reducing the attractiveness of the insurgency to the local populace, and more on defeating the insurgents and on classic notions of securing the peace. Of those few that do deal primarily with reducing the attractiveness, perhaps the best known of the recent monographs is the Army War College Strategic Studies Institute's impressive work, *America's role in Nation-Building from Germany to Iraq*. In this monograph, authors Conrad Crane and Andrew Terrill, do an exceptional job of outlining those tasks

that led to success and failure in Germany, Japan, Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan. Unfortunately, their work has two shortcomings. First, the monograph deals almost exclusively with work to be done at the national level rather than at the local level. Evidence of this limitation can be seen in their comparative statistics which include inputs of national level military and police presence numbers, as well as national level totals of dollars spent in external assistance, and on the output side, which examines national level post-conflict casualty figures, timing of national elections, national refugee numbers, and changes in national level gross domestic product (Crane and Terrill 2003, xv-xvi). While some of their task list applies to the local commander, much does not. Second, like most of the military doctrinal writing, the authors separate the war and the peace, focusing the great majority of their work on post-conflict governance. These weaknesses are emblematic of the military's approach to counter-insurgency: a clear separation between war fighter-dominated combat and security operations and civil affairs governance work; and, regarding governance, a bias toward correctly setting national rather than local conditions.

Concerning doctrine, in the U.S. Army Center of Military History publication, *U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine, 1860-1941*, Andrew Birtle points out that while the U.S. Army did not have official "written doctrine for the conduct of counterguerrilla, pacification, and nation-building activities prior to World War II. . . . [American soldiers did] develop concepts and theories about such activities" (Birtle 1998, vii). In fact, the Army and the Marine Corps had extensive experience in what by WWII came to be called by soldiers and marines alike, small wars: "the interrelated fields of counterguerrilla warfare, pacification, and overseas

constabulary and contingency operations" (Birtle 1998, viii). The breadth of that experience becomes evident in naming just a few of the operations undertaken by the U.S. Armed Forces prior to World War II: the Indian Wars (1877-1898), the Boxer Uprising (1900), the Philippine War (1899-1907), the second Cuban Intervention (1906-1909), operations in Haiti and the Dominican Republic (1915-1934), and operations in Nicaragua (1926-1933). While these experiences did not lead to comprehensive Army doctrine (famously, the Marine Corps, which culturally accepted the contested peace operation mission, did capture their lessons in their *Small Wars Manual* of 1940--more on the Army's continued inability to overcome the cultural obstacle of fighting small wars is included in the concluding chapter), they were not ignored.

Attention was paid in the school house to these missions, but primarily to the tactics of fighting insurgents because as Army officials said, "all savage people respect power and are quick to detect weakness" (Birtle 1998, 249). Finally outside pressure form Secretary of War Newton Baker, among others, forced the Army to recognize that combat was only one aspect of the problem. Reflective of the change, a Command and General Staff College text said at the time, "Any officer can rapidly adapt himself to the [military] details of this type of warfare. What is more difficult is to understand the exact relation between political and military action, and the amount of each that should be used as the operation progresses" (Birtle 1998, 249). To support this role, twenty years after being directed to do so by Secretary Baker, the Army published Field Manual 27-5, *Basic Field Manual, Military Government*, in 1940 (Birtle 1998, 250). It is illuminating to note that the Army chose to publish a field manual that separated military governance from war fighting. Instead of seeing security, governance, and economy as interrelated, the

Army chose to leave security to the war fighters and governance and economy to civil affairs soldiers. To a large degree this same doctrinal separation continues to this day.

Nearly sixty years after World War II, current Army and Joint doctrine on contested peace operations has improved--but, not by much. In fact, it is instructive to see how little attention our Army has paid to this topic. Though the nation has engaged in many more small wars than large wars, the Army's capstone Operations doctrine has virtually ignored the topic. It was not until the 1993 version of FM 100-5 Operations (now FM 3-0) that a chapter on Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW), the Army's term for small wars, was included. Even this relatively minor inclusion of a single chapter was not without debate (McNaugher 2002, 156, 175). The most recent version of the Operations field manual, published in June 2001, contains two chapters on MOOTW. While increasing its coverage of MOOTW, the capstone doctrinal manual "maintains the argument, although in more sophisticated form, that such operations are not the Army's primary business" (Blackwell 2002, 113-114).

It is outside of the scope of this literature review to examine all doctrinal mentions of small war type operations. Yet, it is worth noting that Army Field Manual 3-07, *Stability and Support Operations*, which had a draft copy released in February 2002, has only limited applicability to the type of operations the army is conducting in Iraq. Most of this FM deals with an enemy environment that the military grew comfortable with in the Balkans. It is unlikely that the armed forces will conduct uncontested stability and support operations in the foreseeable future. Instead, the likeliest environment will require countering both terrorists insurgents--to which FM 3-07 dedicates ten pages on the nature of insurgencies and less than two pages to the role of the U.S. Army in

counterinsurgency operations (albeit, well-written and informative pages) and emphasizes that in these operations, "generally, US forces do not engage in combat" (FM 3-07 Draft 2002, 3-7). For the most part, then, Army and Joint doctrine (the exception is some special operations doctrine) continue to separate combat and governance operations keeping the war distinct from the peace. Examining the Army's experience in the Philippines from 1899-1907 and the Marine Corps experience in Haiti from 1915-1934 demonstrates the senselessness of this divorce.

"You may fire when ready, Gridley." With these words began the American defeat of Spain in 1898. Within seven hours all but one Spanish vessel was sunk, and the U.S. was left in possession of the Philippines, though it remained occupied by Spanish soldiers. The 15,000 Spanish soldiers in garrison in the Philippines had been ineffectively fighting a Filipino insurgency for three years (Boot 2002, 103). Stuck between two evils, the Spanish leadership chose the lesser and arranged for U.S. troops to lob a few shells into Manila so that they could surrender "under fire" to a major power, rather than to an insurgency. Unfortunately, the Spanish leadership failed to inform their troops who responded by firing back--six U.S. and 49 Spaniards died before order was restored (Boot 2002, 104).

Now in possession of the Philippines, instead of backing rebel calls for independence, the U.S. chose to follow Rudyard Kipling's directive and "'take up the white man's burden,' in a poem of the same name, subtitled 'The United States and the Philippine Islands'" (Boot 2002, 107). Unfortunately for the U.S. Army, most Filipinos did not want to be assimilated. They preferred self-rule, a notion that President McKinley never seriously considered, even though there was substantial opposition in the U.S. to

the administration's annexation plans. McKinley believed the rebel leader, Aguinaldo, to be unpopular and feared an ethnic civil war in the island chain (Boot 2002, 105). Moreover, he certainly desired the foothold the U.S. would gain in the Asian market.

In the period between U.S. entry and Spanish departure, Aguinaldo's Filipino Army had gained control of most of the main island leaving the U.S. portions of Manila, some areas of which remained contested. On February 4, 1899 a firefight in one of the disputed areas formally began the U.S. war to subdue the Filipino insurrection. The 11,000 U.S. troops were dramatically outnumbered by the 20,000 dug-in men, part of a force that included an additional 60,000 troops outside of Manila (Boot 2002, 108). Nonetheless, lack of Filipino training and equipment damned them to defeat in battle after battle. Fortunately for the insurgents, even after U.S. Army forces increased to 30,000 the U.S. only had enough troops to win battles, not to garrison the islands. At last, by November 1899, the U.S. commander, General Elwell Otis was able to gain enough manpower to conduct a four month offensive across Luzon that scattered Aguinaldo's Army (Boot 2002, 110-111). Recognizing his defeat, Aguinaldo and his top commanders chose to dissolve the army and take up guerrilla warfare. While this tactic weakened Aguinaldo's control, it strengthened the capacity of the army. The small groups of *insurrectos*, capably hidden by the local populace, who either through fear or appreciation largely supported their parallel village governments, "could strike any time at any of the U.S. garrisons thinly sprinkled about the archipelago" (Boot 2002, 112-113).

In response the U.S. countered with a two-prong strategy. The new U.S. civilian head, William Howard Taft, "emphasized a policy of 'attraction' that, from the very beginning, had been an integral part of the army's occupation strategy. Soldiers built

schools, ran sanitation campaigns, vaccinated people . . . and generally administered governmental functions efficiently and honestly" (Boot 2002, 115). General Arthur McArthur, the new military commander, on the other hand, stiffened what he viewed as overly lenient treatment of the Filipinos (Boot 2002, 114). On December 20, 1900 he invoked General Order 100, first used by President Lincoln in 1863, declaring martial law over the islands. The gist of the order compelled the Army to treat civilians humanely unless they resisted Army demands, in which case they were subject to the death penalty. McArthur's toughness coupled with Taft's compassionate approach weakened the insurgency; the March 1901 capture of Aguinaldo followed by his subsequent proclamation accepting U.S. sovereignty nearly destroyed it (Boot 2002, 119).

In August 1901, though, the insurgency regained life. In a daring raid on the island of Samar, insurgents killed 38 U.S. soldiers. Included in the grisly total were a number of beheadings. The news of the massacre was front-page news in the U.S. Writing of the incident, historian Max Boot uses words that could just as easily be written about U.S. operations in Iraq in 2004: "As they read the gruesome details, more than a few Americans must have wondered what their sons were doing, 7,000 miles from home, still fighting and dying in a war whose conclusion had been officially announced more than once" (Boot 2002, 102). Ultimately, though, the U.S. Army did succeed, but at no small cost. 128,468 American soldiers served in the Philippines between 1898 and 1902. Over 4,000 died and close to 3,000 more were wounded. For most of the four years, U.S. troops fought outmanned by more than three to one. What the U.S. was able to take advantage of, though, was effective use of "carrots." After the failed experiment with McArthur's brutal treatment of Filipinos, the U.S. turned to offering rewards to those

who would cooperate, treating rebels well, and running schools, hospitals, and other facilities in the garrisoned villages (Boot 2002, 126). Completely opposite from Vietnam, where "the army squandered its resources on fruitless search-and-destroy missions, [in the Philippines] it concentrated on cutting off guerrillas from civilian assistance by garrisoning the countryside . . . [which] in turn gave them good intelligence, the prerequisite for effective counterinsurgency operations" (Boot 2002, 127).

On 28 July 1915, 340 sailors and marines landed in Port-au-Prince, Haiti to resolve the same sort of political turmoil that had gripped the Philippines in 1898. Haiti's political turmoil, though, had a much more dramatic history. Between 1843 and 1915 the country had suffered through 102 civil wars, coup d'etat, or revolts, with 22 separate rulers holding power (Boot 2002, 157). For the most part these events were relatively genteel affairs involving the passing of public money between corrupt officials; however, on 27 July 1915, a bloody revolt included the massacre of at least 160 Haitians by the President's police chief and henchmen. Furious Haitian rose up and hacked to death first the police chief and then on July 28, 1915, President Sam himself (Boot 2002, 158). "American, British, and French ministers journeyed out to [the U.S. Navy flagship anchored just outside Port-au-Prince] and begged [them] to land troops to restore order" (Boot 2002, 158). The U.S. State Department acquiesced to the request and directed that U.S. Marines land in Haiti for the twentieth time since 1857. Much as was the case the other times, President Woodrow Wilson's Secretary of State Robert Lansing directed the Marines to land for two reasons: "to terminate the appalling conditions of anarchy, savagery, and oppression which had been prevalent in Haiti for decades," and "to

forestall any attempt by a foreign power to obtain a foothold on the territory of an American nation" (Boot 2002, 160).

A brigade of over 2,000 Marines were on-shore by early August 1915 under the command of Colonel Littleton W.T. Waller who had significant small wars experience including fighting in the Philippines. "Tony Waller's men disarmed the remnants of the Haitian army, paying them off at $2 per head . . . [and then his] marines took over the administration of Port-au-Prince, offering free food to the hungry, free medical care to the sick--and a free kick in the backside to troublemakers" (Boot 2002, 160). Additionally, under direction of President Wilson and Admiral Caperton, the Marines hand-picked a new president and, literally walking the floor of the National Assembly with fixed bayonets, ensured that there were enough votes. As historian Max Boot says, "It was no more brazen a usurpation than that of any previous Haitian president, but neither was it quite the democratic election that the U.S. pretended at the time" (Boot 2002, 161). By early September, the Marines had occupied Haiti's remaining coastal towns and had declared martial law to control the growing hostility Haitians felt toward them.

The Haitian insurgents responded by ambushing Marine patrols in the coastal towns. Colonel Waller directed his deputy, Major Smedley Butler to put down the insurrection. Butler, a Medal of Honor holder, also had significant experience in counterinsurgency warfare. "His background convinced him that a small number of well-trained Western troops could disperse a large number of guerrillas, as long as they displayed considerable élan and never gave up the initiative" (Boot 2002, 163). Butler set out to prove his theory with only four officers and 37 enlisted men. His aggressive band

destroyed Haitian stronghold after stronghold--by November 17, 1915, Butler had won

his second Medal of Honor and destroyed the initial uprising. Within a few months of

that time, the 2,000 Marines ashore on Haiti, having suffered three killed and 18

wounded, had firm control over 2 million Haitians. "The marines' success may be

attributed to daring patrolling combined with generous treatment of *cacos* who

surrendered; they were given amnesty, money to turn in their guns, and consideration for

government employment" (Boot 2002, 165).

The Marines consolidated power by establishing a native constabulary force,

officered by Americans, to serve as the police and army. By December 1915 Butler and

114 other men had trained over 2500 Haitians. Eventually this Gendarme would

administer Haiti's separate districts, providing direction over infrastructure improvement,

local finances and taxation, and the legal code. At the national level the Marines pushed a

U.S.-written constitution through a plebiscite. As one Marine wrote at the time, "I blush

at the transparent maneuvers to which we resorted to make it appear that the Haitians

were accomplishing their own regeneration in accordance with democratic principles as

understood in the United States" (Boot 2002, 167). Regardless of embarrassment, "it was

a virtuoso display of counterinsurgency warfare," and gave the U.S. complete control

over the island by mid-June 1918 (Boot 2002, 165, 167).

Complete control came at a cost. The Marines had emplaced systems that while

efficient for running the country led to considerable discontent among some Haitians.

Worst among these administrative decisions was applying an 1863 Haitian law to force

peasants to work on road gangs instead of paying their taxes. Smedley Butler's decision

to use this system, known as the *corvee*, caused considerable resentment particularly as

the Haitian peasants, working under the guns of white Marines, began to believe the rumor that the U.S. intended to reestablish slavery (Boot 2002, 172). By April 1919, the unrest became a full-out revolt. The Marines reacted slowly, having lost the experienced leadership of Butler and others that had moved on to new duties. Nonetheless, by May 1920 the second insurgency had been defeated. Over 2,000 Haitians were killed while the Marines lost only 13 men and their Gendarmerie lost 27 men (Boot 2002, 175).

Historians attribute much of the Marines ability to rapidly put down the insurgency to their nonmilitary strategy. By the time the Marines left in 1934, 1,000 miles of roads and over 200 bridges were constructed, as were 11 hospitals, 147 rural clinics, and many other facilities (Boot 2002, 180). This exceptional progress makes it of little surprise, given the disarray of the island prior to 1915, that most of the Haitian population did not join the revolt either physically or by giving the insurgents safe harbor. Thus the Marines were rapidly able to hunt out insurgents that could not hide among the people--in the end, "a couple thousand marines succeeded where a century earlier 27,000 of Napoleon's crack troops had failed" (Boot 2002, 176).

Counterterrorism Cases

While the U.S. Armed Forces have significant nation building and counterinsurgency experience, they lack comparable familiarity in countering terrorism. A number of other countries, however, have applied coercive and non-coercive measures to try to defeat terrorist groups. From these cases it is possible to draw lessons that have clear applicability to current and future U.S. operations against groups that will employ both insurgent tactics against our own and host nation military forces and terrorist tactics against political and civil targets including innocent civilians. Because every contested

peace operation will be in a different environment against different minded groups, it is necessary to examine the motivation and tactics of the two major terrorist group types the U.S. can expect to face--revolutionary terrorists and nationalist terrorists. This review examines two counter-revolutionary terrorism efforts, those by Uruguay and Italy, and three counter-nationalist terrorism efforts, those by the United Kingdom, Greece, and Spain.

Noted terrorism scholar Christopher Hewitt finds that revolutionary terrorist groups, like the Italian leftists and the Tupamaros, purposefully target civilians. The civilians--businessmen and judges, and conservative politicians--are seen as symbolic of the establishment these terrorist groups are trying to revolt against. For leftist (and religious) terrorist groups, international elements fit into this establishment. For example, in Uruguay, 37 of the Tupamaros' attacks were on American businesses or the American Embassy property (Hewitt 1984, 33). Nationalist groups may be more hesitant to attack civilians, unless they are clearly seen as representative of the opposing group's power base. Nationalist groups derive their power from a strong civilian base of support; actions that put that support at risk are unlikely.

In more recent revolutionary group cases, Al-Qaeda's attacks on the American Embassies in Tanzania and Kenya, the USS *Cole*, and the World Trade Center and Pentagon, as well as Armed Islamic Group's (GIA) hijacking of a French airliner in 1994 and its plan to crash land the plane in Paris, demonstrate that revolutionary religious groups look to attack perceived symbols of repression and cultural domination. Foreign targets are attractive to revolutionary terrorist groups because of ideological considerations. For instance, the Tupamaros felt that Western capitalism had come to

dominate Latin America. Likewise, Al-Qaeda sees the American led West, and more particularly the government's they support, as preventing a fundamentalist Islamic state.

It is probable, given the mixed bag of groups that seem to oppose U.S. actions, that the U.S. will face nationalist and revolutionary oriented terrorists within the same operation. Iraq and Afghanistan both show groups with different motivations contesting the peace in different parts of the country. With these notions in mind, Hewitt reports on efforts to combat terrorism, particularly on: the use of negotiations and cease fires; attempting political reform to meet unequal representation; instituting economic reform to generate employment; collectively punishing local residents for not turning in terrorists; enacting emergency powers; and, increasing the size of the security force.

Hewitt finds that cease-fires benefit the state in the short run, as they tend to save lives during the actual cease-fire period (Hewitt 1984, 37). Unfortunately, negotiations undertaken during cease-fires ultimately tend to fail since terrorist demands are often too radical for the state to accept. Moreover, the period immediately following the end of the cease-fire is often more violent than the time frame prior to the cease-fire (Hewitt 1984, 37). For example, the British army had nearly defeated the provisional Irish Republican Army (IRA) prior to the February 1975 truce. IRA killings and bombings resumed at a higher level after the cease-fire ended (Hewitt 1984, 37). A cease-fire, then, will benefit both the state and the terrorist group in the short run, but may only benefit the terrorist group in the long run.

Political reform strives to eliminate the grievance upon which the terrorist group anchors. These reforms aim to win over terrorists' supporters to, paraphrasing a well-known Maoist line, dry up the water in which terrorist fish swim. Grievance based theory

would indicate that these reforms should lead to a decrease in violence. Counter-intuitively, Hewitt found that such reforms initially only increased the level of violence in Northern Ireland and Spain. However, after several years, when reforms credibly took hold, violence did drop in Spain.

A state's efforts to improve economic conditions center on convincing a terrorist group's supporters to defect from the cause, with the goal of eliminating safe havens and recruitment pools. A good deal of evidence indicates that economic conditions are an important factor in causing social conflict. (Although economic conditions can create ripe circumstances for terrorism, poor economic conditions are neither a necessary nor a sufficient cause of terrorism.) For instance, anecdotal evidence indicates that relative economic deprivation drove working-class supporters towards the IRA in Northern Ireland, and a stagnant economy drove middle-class supporters toward the Tupamaros in Uruguay and the Red Brigades in Italy. Recognizing this relationship, the British government put programs in place to improve economic conditions in Northern Ireland. Hewitt's examination of terrorist violence levels after economic reforms show that these policies had little effect. Unfortunately, in the other four cases, the states involved did not attempt economic reforms.

States rarely implement collective punishment against terrorist group supporter's writ large. Instead, most states prefer to provide carrots to help shape public opinion. However, in the case of Cyprus, the only one of the five cases where the state employed collective punishment, the government fined the populace, closed businesses temporarily, and closed dwelling houses in towns with a record of terrorist activity (Hewitt 1984, 88). Surprisingly, given the predicted backlash, Hewitt notes that these policies initially

decreased the incidence of terrorism. Eventually the policies turned the populace against the government and increased support for the terrorist group, which in turn made it more difficult to track the terrorist down.

To support the effort to capture terrorists, states often employ emergency measures. These measures typically reduce civil liberties, but allow security forces to operate more effectively and demonstrate government resolve. Many believe that the populous reacts against the government and supports terrorists' efforts to evade capture upon the implementation of repressive means. Hewitt's evidence from case studies in Cyprus, Spain, Italy, Northern Ireland, and Uruguay indicates no relation between imposition of emergency powers and a drop in terrorist activity (Hewitt 1984, 89).

Increasing the size of security forces or expanding their capabilities directly targets terrorist groups. Amplified capabilities for these forces come from special training, special equipment, and / or administrative reorganization. The increase in capabilities may result in increased patrols or increased house searches. Hewitt's evidence shows that in Northern Ireland, Spain, and Greece none of these activities quantifiably reduced terrorism in the months that followed (Hewitt 1984, 89). Similar increases in use of security forces occurred in Uruguay when the United States assisted that country in its fight against the Tupamaros by providing aid dollars and training help. While the Uruguayan government defeated the Tupamaros, it is unclear whether the dictatorial regime or the U.S. assistance was more critical. Evidence from Northern Ireland indicates that the only security force related activity that reduces terrorist incidents is an increase in the rate of imprisonment. Imprisonment reduces the number of terrorists available for the campaign and takes the initiative away from the terrorist

groups, as they focus more on sustaining their base and their personal security than planning future operations (Hewitt 1984, 86). This finding can change if the imprisonment conditions are notorious enough to serve as an insurgent cause in their own right.

Consequently, an increase in the effectiveness of police and army activities depends on the improved intelligence that leads to important arrests. This implies that a robust domestic intelligence capability is required to effectively target and defeat the terrorist groups. Unfortunately, in the case of modern revolutionary groups like Al-Qaeda, their horizontally networked structure makes criminal investigation and intelligence gathering very difficult. Similarly, the FLN of Algeria evolved their organization into a cell system (although hierarchical and not horizontal) when the French Army successfully identified the membership of FLN through its formal military structure. The IRA soon followed the FLN's lead and its membership became much more difficult to identify (Smith 1995, 16).

In summary, case studies of ETA in Spain, the IRA in Northern Ireland, the Tupamaros in Uruguay, the Red Brigades in Italy, and the EOKA in Cyprus demonstrate that different means of combating terrorism are required for success. Of the five groups, only the revolutionary terrorist groups in Uruguay and in Italy were defeated. Ultimately in these revolutionary cases, the respective authorities employed very different measures to defeat the terrorists. Uruguay instituted excessively repressive means, ranging from torture to invasive police measures. In fact during this period, Uruguay tortured more people per capita than any other country in Latin America (Gillespie 1995, 243). Italy's early repressive measures, including the use of the neo-fascists to combat the left wing

movements, failed because Italy did not adopt a totally repressive regime. Instead, there was simply a backlash against the government, which strengthened the terrorists. In the end, Italy adopted a policy of employing "Pentitos," who received reduced sentences and amnesty in some cases for divulging critical information about their fellow Red Brigade members (Della Porta 1995, 119). Political reforms and improved economic conditions may slightly decrease support for revolutionary terrorist groups. However, given that their existence does not depend on popular support, reducing their less-than-universal popular support may provide a chink in their armor, but it will not lead to their immediate defeat.

Unlike the two cases of revolutionary terrorism, Cyprus, Spain and Ireland employed a relatively similar range of measures designed to defeat their respective nationalist terrorist groups. Evidence from Cyprus indicates that coercive activities that affect the entire population typically cause the populace to side with terrorists. Additionally, neither improved economic conditions nor political reforms led to decreases in popular support in Spain or Ireland. Ethnic or religious ties between the populace and the nationalist terrorist groups appear unaffected by economic growth. For nationalist terrorist groups, then, steps that lead to a decrease in operator strength, for example, increased arrests are critical. That said, in some cultures or environments, particularly when the insurgent group lacks wide popular support, economic and governance improvements may act as catalysts to gaining intelligence from local citizens. That intelligence, in turn, allows targeted raids that appear to be far more effective than broad coercive measures.

Conclusion: Essential Tasks and Hypothesis

In examining academic and military writing and historical cases of nation building and counter terrorism efforts, a few certainties emerge. First, every contested peace operation occurs in a different environment, and hence the military can not take an identical approach to each problem. As Steven Metz identifies, in Iraq alone there are a number of different sub-insurgencies. This means that, "Actions that prove effective against one part of it might very well inflame another part. For example, an increased and heavy-handed U.S. presence might eradicate the Ba'thist remnants and at the same time inflame Shi'ite radicals and foreign jihadists. The insurgency is like a multiheaded snake, unable to decide on a single course of action but difficult to kill" (Metz 2004, 30).

Second, while the specific tasks may not be identical, successful nation building in a contested peace operation requires a relatively balanced focus on three categories of tasks. Military and civilian forces must balance their effort between improving the physical security of the people, bettering the quality of life of local citizens through increased governance capacity, and generating employment to take the young men most likely to spoil the peace off of the streets. Third, nation-building may be a misnomer. It is necessary to pay near equal attention to national level considerations and local level problems. The next chapter tests this three-part hypothesis on three modern case studies, operations in East Timor, Afghanistan, and Iraq, to determine if the hypothesis holds and to investigate what organizational structure at the local level the military should adopt to best effect the transition between combat and peace operations.

CHAPTER 4

CASE STUDY EVIDENCE

Successful stability efforts in contested peace operations require a mix of initiatives aimed at both short-term and long-term outcomes. Unfortunately, at times these initiatives conflict with each other. Actions employing force designed to break an insurgency by capturing or killing leaders, for instance, can generate long run hostile feelings toward the military elements, which in employing necessary combat power destroy structures or kill or wound innocent by-standers. Exacerbating the matter, host nation security forces, whose actions are less likely to breed resentment, often must be built from the ground up. They do not have the initial capacity to provide real security for local citizens. In fashioning post-conflict policy, then, military leaders must achieve a precarious balance between a long run perspective that builds the capacity of the nation and the legitimacy of the government and a short-term effort that provides enough security to prevent further conflict.

Previous scholarship and past case studies on nation building, counterinsurgency, and counterterrorism illuminate the severity of this challenge when an active enemy element contests security. Gaining the right mix of coercive and attractive policies is difficult business. Nonetheless, military forces cannot fail to act. They must fill the security and governance vacuum left in the immediate aftermath of conflict. And, they must create jobs to keep idle citizens--particularly young men--from siding with the insurgents. Moreover, actions in these two areas and in the governance area must eventually be done in a way that smoothes the transition to local government control. In short, during the transition from conventional combat to nation building, military forces

and their civilian partners must take steps to provide immediate and long-term solutions to security problems, governance concerns, and economic troubles.

Establishing a secure environment has a significant number of facets to it. Of pressing concern, the military force must disarm and probably demobilize the former combatant force (unless an operational decision is made to purge the force of enemy sympathizers and keep the force as a host nation mechanism for sharing the security burden). U.S. forces must secure weapons--all weapons if possible, but more likely, given prevalent cultural considerations, non-small arms weapons. Additionally, the military force must establish a physical presence in as many areas as possible and must prevent lawlessness from emerging. The final high priority security consideration is to begin counterinsurgency efforts to weaken those who wish to "spoil" the peace, and to secure the borders to prevent foreign fighters from strengthening the insurgent force through increased manpower or supplies. Establishing longer-term security --the initial step toward an exit of U.S. forces--includes training and equipping a police force and a national army. Additionally, the counterinsurgency campaign must continue and strengthen over time, based on U.S. Forces' ability to gain intelligence about the insurgent or terrorist network and to conduct precise raids to destroy the insurgency.

This actionable intelligence is a by product of an effective effort at establishing governance--with "governance" defined as provision of basic electric, water, and health services, as well as development of a government structure to provide the citizens a voice within villages, cities, and eventually the country at large. Provision of basic services is of immediate importance. Improvement of these same services, particularly if this improvement comes in geographically and tribally diverse area is of long run concern.

These improvements help build local national quality of life and trust in the U.S. military and when handled properly, they increase the legitimacy of the local government. At the very least, they maintain momentum by meeting growing expectations.

Legitimacy begins with the initial selection/election of the local government. This action is of immediate importance for the U.S. military forces, which should swear in the new local government as soon after the resumption of provision of services as possible. The legitimacy will grow by having the local government show that it is responsive to emerging local problems. Importantly, the trust that citizens feel in this government, and the U.S. military force that supports it, ultimately leads to the citizenry believing in the direction that the country is taking and providing intelligence about fellow citizens or foreigners who are trying to disrupt the nation building effort. Without this intelligence, it is extraordinarily difficult to destroy the insurgency and return the state to normalcy. It follows that governance and security efforts are two points in a virtuous cycle that improves state capacity. Security allows for infrastructure improvements to be made. These quality of life projects build a trust-momentum that encourages local citizens to provide the information that leads to a weakening of the insurgency and greater security.

Economic efforts fit into both governance and security initiatives. Unlike the two other categories of action, however, local microeconomic efforts are not strictly under the control of the military or the host nation governance entity. Markets will operate regardless of situation--the same is not true of security and government. It is worth noting that at the national level (which is not the focus of this study) the government must set correct macroeconomic conditions: a stable common currency, control of inflation, government revenue collection, and management of a national budget to name a few vital

national level requirements. With the exception of a stable local currency for transactions, these macroeconomic actions are all of longer run concern.

Of short run concern, coalition forces can still have an impact on the local economy, even as they recognize that they do not have complete control over this sector. In particular, governance projects that target local infrastructure can reduce unemployment at the city and village level. Use of this lever to raise the employment level of young men is of immediate interest as they are the citizens most likely to challenge security. Many of these young men will be former soldiers. In a further link to security, the employment status of these ex-combatants must be carefully managed. Of longer run interest, if the military is given investment funds to spend, beyond just labor intensive projects it also should focus on building up those sectors of the economy that have long run growth potential. It should also closely consider industries, like cement, that increase the supply of a much needed input to another sector and increase the demand for a locally produced raw material.

The military force working to transition a state from war to peace, then, must put resources toward improving security, governance, and economic conditions--both in the short and long run. The great challenge is that failure by the liberating or peace implementation force in any of these three vital areas in the end will cause the other two to follow. For instance, a lack of security unravels the local economy, and a lack of effective governance prods citizens to support the insurgency undermining security. The remainder of this chapter examines three organizational models for military forces to tackle this complex operational challenge. Each case study begins with an overview of the situation faced by the brigade or battalion and the organizational construct employed

by the commander. Each case study then examines the resultant performance across security, governance, and economy sectors.

The first two sections of the chapter, case studies on East Timor and then Afghanistan, explore two extremes in organizational method. In the East Timor case, three New Zealand Defense Force (NZDF) Battalions (BATT 2, 3, 5) separately conducted contested peace operations in an evolving environment from May 2000 to May 2002. Because the availability of greater quantities of data on the activities of the NZDF in East Timor and the subsequent outcomes, this case involves a longer time period than the other two cases. These battalions reorganized internally to employ their unit's just-created internal civil affairs teams to simultaneously focus a battalion task force's energy and resources on village-level security, governance, and economy in the Cova Lima region. This village level effort was nearly independent from central control as the region had very few ties to the nascent efforts at the East Timor state level.

In the Afghanistan case, which centers on observations of a brigade sized unit from December 2002 to September 2003 and includes follow-up observations through May 2004, the U.S. Army initially employed a light infantry brigade combat team to focus exclusively on security, while civil affairs elements occasionally visited villages to conduct very minimal local governance and economy operations. Most of the civil affairs operations followed raids and served as a salve to help heal wounds. In a very limited number of areas prior to early 2004, Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) lived on-site and completed more permanent village level tasks. (As will be discussed later, the PRT initiative grows dramatically as the U.S. reorients its strategy in early 2004.) These efforts are limited and not closely tied to combat security operations. Instead, in

Afghanistan, the U.S. government initially focused its governance and economic resources heavily at building national level capacity.

In the third case study, the organizational middle ground between East Timor and Afghanistan, an Airborne Brigade Combat Team (BCT) from the U.S. Army conducted contested peace operations in Kirkuk, Iraq, from April 2003 to March 2004. The BCT employed its attached civil affairs teams internal to the brigade and functionally organized the entire brigade to near-simultaneously tackle security, governance, and economic challenges at the city and village level.

<u>East Timor: The New Zealand Defense Force in Cova Lima</u>

Timor has been divided between Portuguese East Timor and Dutch West Timor for centuries. Following the April 1974 coup in Lisbon, Portugal encouraged the East Timorese to form political parties as a first step toward free elections and independence. After a short civil war between two East Timorese groups attempting to gain ascendancy in the emerging state, one of the two groups had to withdraw to West Timor, where they were coerced into backing Indonesian plans to invade East Timor. Soon thereafter, Indonesian forces attacked the victorious East Timorese group, the Fretelin, and attempted to destroy their army, the Falintil. The Falintil kept up a guerrilla campaign for five years, forcing significant casualties on the Indonesian army, which had to raise its troop strength from 2,000 to 35,000 to defeat the rebels. By mid 1976, however, Indonesia had gained de facto control of East Timor and on 17 July 1976 Indonesia made East Timor its twenty-seventh province.

Over the next two decades, only Australia recognized the Indonesian occupation as semi-legitimate. The UN continued to see East Timor as under the legal authority of its

colonial master, Portugal. Regardless or these outside concerns, Indonesia maintained its

annexation of East Timor and ran the province as a police state (Crawford and Harper

2001, 18). By 1999, following growing global awareness of ethnic cleansing and race

hatred through the wars in the former Yugoslavia, Indonesia recognized it was in an

untenable position, and their new President, B.J. Habibie unexpectedly offered the people

of East Timor the option of autonomy or perhaps independence based on a referendum

run by the UN.

The United Nations created UNAMET, the United Nations Assistance Mission in

East Timor, to conduct the referendum. UNAMET faced the considerable challenge of

running the referendum without the protection of a peacekeeping force to disarm political

groups and guard polling stations (Crawford and Harper 2001, 26). By the time of the 30

August 1999 referendum more than a dozen militia-type groups were operating in East

Timor. These groups acted to intimidate those citizens favoring independence and

included as many as 25,000 young men, many of them unemployed youth from

neighboring West Timor (Crawford and Harper 2001, 28). Surprisingly, given the

immense turnout for the referendum, 30 August 1999 was a relatively peaceful day. On 3

September 1999, the results were announced--78 percent had voted for independence

from Indonesia. Immediately violence, led by pro-Indonesian militia groups, swept the

province, to include significant violence against UNAMET personnel, which were

evacuated over the next week. On 15 September 1999, the Security Council adopted

Resolution 1264 authorizing the establishment of a Chapter 7 peace enforcement force,

titled the International Force East Timor (Interfet) under Australian Defense Force

leadership (Crawford and Harper 2001, 48). The New Zealand Defense Force provided a battalion of troops to support Interfet, their largest commitment since the Korean War.

Interfet forces landed on East Timor on 20 September 1999 under the command of Australian Major General Peter Cosgrove. They entered a situation of turmoil: "gangs and militia controlled the towns and cities, and had destroyed much of the territories' infrastructure. Thousands of East Timorese had fled their homes and were scattered across the island. There was also a significant [Indonesian Army] presence which was certain to be hostile to any foreign soldiers in East Timor" (Crawford and Harper 2001, 59). Alleviating many leaders' concerns, the militia and the Indonesian Army chose not to fight Interfet on 20 September and initial forces gained a foothold in Dili without many problems. With a few exceptions, Interfet was able to keep the peace and convince the Indonesian armed forces to leave Dili by late October. Likewise, the militias had only caused minor problems. Recognizing the relative calm, the UN adopted Resolution 1272 forming the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor, UNTAET.

It was in this environment that NZDF Battalion 1 (BATT 1) moved to the Cova Lima region and headquartered in the city of Suai in late October 1999 (NZDF 2003, 1). This southwestern region of East Timor was vitally important as it bordered Indonesian West Timor and served as a key crossing point for refugees and militia members moving between the two states (Hayward 2002, 1). The BATT 1 deployment into Cova Lima occurred in an unstable environment characterized by the initial cleaving of the Timorese society and the resultant refugee exodus, as well as and evidence of militia activity and past evidence of past massacres. Prior to their departure in May 2000, BATT 1 constructed a forward operating base in Suai and made initial inroads into the Cova Lima

region (NZDF 2003, 13). The region itself "had been largely destroyed in 1999 with some estimates stating that 95 percent of all structures had been burnt or destroyed" (Hayward 2002, 3). While the population of the region returned after the UN intervention, the infrastructure remained problematic with little electricity, no sanitation, and primarily well-based drinking water. Likewise schools and health facilities were operating but had inconsistent standards and facilities.

NZDF BATT 2 began their preparations for deployment to the Cova Lima region in January 2000, conducted a reconnaissance mission in April 2000 that indicated the threat level was low, and replaced BATT 1 in May 2000. Based on the expected low-threat situation, prior to deployment Colonel Martin Dransfield converted his mortar platoon into a Civil Military Affairs (CMA) section to provide a near-permanent presence in Cova Lima's villages. Counter to the expectation, BATT 2's operating environment most approximated that seen by the U.S. military in Afghanistan and Iraq. By late July 2000 armed militia began actively reentering East Timor resulting in three separate combat engagements, in which three militia members and one BATT 2 soldier were killed (Dransfield 2004, 1). Nonetheless, recognizing their utility as an information and legitimacy source, BATT 2 and follow-on battalions maintained the use of CMA organizations, though they employed them in different ways. For instance, Colonel David Gawn, commander of BATT 3, used his CMA mortar element in the battalion intelligence shop to coordinate the focus of the battalion's civil-military operations. He saw CMA as a battalion wide effort rather than the effort of one section of soldiers. Colonel Lofty Hayward, commander of BATT 5, melded the BATT 2 and BATT 3 concept together by focusing his entire battalion on redeveloping the district's

infrastructure, while he employed his CMA section in both working this effort and, importantly, advertising positive results through aggressive information operations. Regardless of organization, each unit reported that security remained their primary focus.

BATT 2 placed the majority of its combat power in the form of infantry platoons along the East Timor--West Timor border. They then used the mortar platoon in its CMA role to cover the villages. The mortar platoon generated three CMA detachments, each with a senior sergeant, two corporals, and three privates. These detachments, who had not received in-depth training on CMA, received training from the battalion's intelligence cell on gathering information (Gawn, Dan 2003, 1). They then moved into the villages. When the security situation worsened in July, BATT 2 gained initial actionable intelligence from their border platoons that large militia groups were crossing the border. In turn COL Dransfield conducted a two-company clearing action as a show of force. Unfortunately, these actions were always too late to catch the groups, so the battalion had to change its intelligence gathering from being based on observation posts to being based on human intelligence (Dransfield 2004, 1). It was in this effort that the CMA sections proved truly valuable as they "related easily with local community groups . . . [and] provided a passive information gathering source" (NZDF 2003, 22). These CMAs, along with aggressive reporting of NZDF successes--particularly the three killed militiamen-- reassured the local populace that they were secure enough to provide information to the NZDF. In short, as Major Dan Gawn, the company commander responsible for the CMA section in NZ BATT 2, said, "our focus was on using the local people as the first line of security, as our early warning" (Gawn, Dan 2003, 3).

As outright physical security from the militias became less of a concern, the NZDF was able to focus more of their capacity on improving governance--and hence gaining further trust (and actionable intelligence) from the citizens of the Cova Lima region. As Mike Hull reported from his interviews with NZDF officers, this philosophy of "Wider security may be seen in contrast to the more minimalist role that peacekeepers may be seen to have in the eye of the public . . . of a 'physical' military presence between protagonists. The rationale behind this wider notion of security appears to hinge on the belief that if the local people (of the Cova Lima district) have a stake in their community, . . . then they will be less likely to be influenced by elements within the community that may have a vested interest in stirring up trouble" (Hull 2003, 14). Reflecting this focus on improving quality of life in the villages of Cova Lima, the CMA sections attempted to coordinate and organize NGO and IO efforts in the region. For instance, having learned a great deal about the needs of each village and the culture of the people in the villages, BATT 2's CMA detachment was able to convince the World Bank that money should not be allocated to projects through a democratic choice system. Instead, local culture believes in decision making through the church and other respected community organizations (Gawn, Dan 2003, 2). This small win gained both development dollars and legitimacy for village leaders.

BATT 3, which had the same severe resource and funding constraints that each NZDF battalion had to deal with in trying to redevelop the governance of the Cova Lima region, focused their efforts not only on NGO funding, but also on projects that were low cost and that involved the community. In particular, Colonel Gawn "targeted kids, as everyone wants a future for their kids," by putting together a play that emphasized mine

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awareness and putting out a kids and parents newsletter with puzzles and games (Gawn, David 2003, 2). BATT 5 was able to dramatically increase the focus on governance as the security situation had settled quite a bit by late 2001. In turn, they focused on what they termed "realization issues" (Hayward 2003, 2). These issues outlined governance weaknesses in Cova Lima. In the words of Colonel Hayward, "Its utility was that it gave the battalion something it could give to the UNTAET civil administration, serve to attract NGOs into the district, as well as reach back to national structures who were willing to focus their humanitarian assistance in the area" (Hayward 2002, 5). The necessity of this task was well beyond organizational--Operations in East Timor had very limited resources for governance outside of the capital, Dili. In the end, the BATT 5 efforts proved very successful as classrooms, medical clinics, water sources, the courthouse, and other areas were rebuilt through various funds, and importantly, primarily by East Timorese hands. For the NZDF their efforts at improving governance had a common thrust: "to make the unit irrelevant in the reconstruction effort and to place responsibility where it would normally reside once the international presence was withdrawn" (Hayward 2002, 8).

Given the limited funds available for these projects, the NZDF was unable to make much headway in improving the economy. This failure was emblematic of the way the UN mission approached East Timor specifically and nation building in general. The UN's mandates "tend to focus on security, governance, and humanitarian issues, and to underplay economic and social development, even though public security and the sustainability of government itself depend on minimizing the resentment that often flows

from misery. Gangs of unemployed youths were already congregating menacingly in Dili and other towns as Independence Day drew near" (Steele 2002, 6).

Afghanistan: 1st Brigade Combat Team, 82nd Airborne Division

American forces began to attack Taliban and Al-Qaeda targets in Afghanistan on 7 October 2001. Using airpower and U.S. and British special operations forces, the coalition teamed with Northern Alliance forces to systematically build combat power and reduce enemy capacity over the first month of the war (Maloney 2004, 7). By the beginning of November, preparations were nearly complete for the first major operations. On 9 November 2001, coalition forces attacked and quickly took the key city of Mazar-i-Sharif. By 12 November, the Afghan capital, Kabul, had fallen. Finally on 7 December, Kandahar, the last remaining Taliban stronghold fell; however, key Taliban and Al-Qaeda leaders as well as a number of soldiers had escaped. Nonetheless, in an effort to consolidate gains the coalition moved quickly to emplace an Afghan government. With the national political process developing, as spring approached, the coalition returned its attention to the terrorist threat. In March 2002, fighting recommenced with Operation Anaconda in the Shahi-Kot valley. While not as large in scope as Anaconda, throughout the remainder of 2002 coalition forces continued to conduct combat and stability operations in various pockets of Afghanistan. They focused on destroying Al-Qaeda and Taliban remnants and on increasing the legitimacy of the Karzai-led Afghan government.

It was in this environment that the 1st Brigade, 82nd Airborne Division, along with other combat and combat support elements deployed to Afghanistan in December 2002. From December 2002 to August 2003, this force, coined Task Force Devil, conducted combat and stability operation in an area equivalent in size to the distance

from New Orleans to Washington, D.C. (CALL January 2004, iii). As the only combat brigade in Afghanistan, the TF Devil brigade combat team (BCT) reported directly to a Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) headquarters. This headquarters pushed joint, interagency, and multinational assets down to the BCT. Much of the impact was felt at lower levels as, "units, down to company size, operated at the combined arms, joint, and interagency level" (CALL January 2004, 2).

The BCT organization included Psychological Operations (PSYOP), Public Affairs (PA), and Civil Affairs (CA) personnel. These elements combined with the combat units to form "Team Village" teams. "Team Village conducted information operations by gathering information from local nationals and providing a pro U.S. coalition image. These patrols helped by identifying areas in need of assistance, providing medical aid to local nationals, and providing school supplies for local youth" (CALL January 2004, 10). The Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL), which spent considerable time in Afghanistan interviewing TF Devil leaders and soldiers, sees the Team Village patrols and similar efforts like the provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs) as having a positive impact. In fact CALL recommends that the Army should, "Write the Team Village concept as practiced in support of Brigade CMO and IO efforts into doctrinal manual. Leaders found this to be an effective way to focus efforts and provide maximum impact with limited assets" (CALL January 2004, 13). However, these organizations, the PRT and Team Village, are not analogous.

Team Village, the TF Devil CA and PSYOPS effort, involved occasional visits to towns. They generally engaged in a "hearts and minds" operation *after* a combat mission in a local town. They would "address local populace concerns immediately following

cordon and search and personnel seizure operations" (CALL January 2004: 12). This

setup was reactive rather than proactive, and did not maximize the ability to get

actionable intelligence. PRTs operate in a much more proactive manner by living in a

local area rather than in a forward operating base. However, unlike Team Village, they

are not married to a combat force like TF Devil--they are not overtly an organizational

part of the counterinsurgency chain. By early 2004, seeing the effectiveness of the PRTs,

and noting the need to synchronize their activities with the combat forces, the coalition

command increased the number of PRTs and put the majority of them under the control

of combat forces, who now have ownership of geographical areas and have moved from

forward operating bases to living in towns and villages (Barno 2004).

While TF Devil employed "Team Village" operations, which, at the brigade level

were akin to constrained efforts to improve local governance and economy, their clear

focus was on security operations. These security operations had a similar character.

Intelligence provided by higher headquarters or by Special Forces would lead to raids and

cordon and search missions by the brigade, which upon completion would return to their

forward operating base. Typical of these operations was Operation Mongoose, in which

TF Devil killed 18 enemy insurgents after being tipped off by Special Forces soldiers

(Steele 2003, 1). The problem, though, has been the lack of intelligence to drive these

operations. Security operations, particularly by limited forces fighting a

counterinsurgency, require actionable intelligence to preempt the enemy's attack. These

small forces can not cover every where at once.

After TF Devil turned over their mission to a follow on brigade, recognition of

this concern fueled a sea change in operations for coalition troops in Afghanistan. Instead

of relying on intelligence from others, American units began developing their own sources by dispatching platoon and company sized forces to villages. There "they can forge ties with tribal elders and glean better information about the location and activities of guerrillas" (Eric Schmitt, *New York Times*, 18 February 2004). This evolved strategy, devised by the new commander of coalition forces, LTG Barno, is more in line with classic counterinsurgency strategy. Beyond just providing presence, the troops bring money to the villages--the Pentagon has earmarked $40 million for village projects. The quid-pro-quo expectations are overt (David Rohde, *New York Times*, 30 March 2004). Lieutenant Reid Finn explained the incentive structure in Dwamanda, Afghanistan like this: "The more they help us find the bad guys, the more good stuff they get" (David Rohde, *New York Times*, 30 March 2004).

Part of the post-TF Devil shift in strategy came about due to a change in the capacity of the coalition to promote governance at the local level. NGOs, which the coalition had relied upon, suddenly became the target of terrorist attacks. A November 2003 murder of a 29-year-old French relief worker "prompted aid groups to dramatically scale back their work in southeastern Afghanistan" (Pamela Constable, *Washington Post*, 20 November 2003). Prior to the change in strategy, TF Devil had done little governance work. That which was done had much more to do with humanitarian assistance, then with building the capacity of the local government. Nonetheless, as CALL reports, "by efficiently employing humanitarian assistance resources and incorporating them on tactical missions, CA personnel created a positive impression with [local nationals] concerning coalition forces" (CALL January 2004, 13). In a reflection of how useful these minimal governance operations became, TF Devil eventually came to run "Team

Village" patrols six days a week in some parts of their area of operation (CALL January 2004, 13). In effect, these operations became the surrogate for battalion and other level commanders' efforts to both build village capacity and buy information, as unlike the Special Forces Operational Detachment--Alpha commanders, TF Devil commanders could not pay a low level Human Intelligence source for his information (CALL January 2004, 17).

These "Team Village" operations could have provided even greater impact, particularly in the region of the country with some allegiance to the Taliban, had the money available to commanders been substantial enough to create work, rather than just provide a band aid to a wound created by a raid or cordon and search mission. This realization became policy in late 2003 and early 2004, as PRTs hired local laborers to "repave roads, rebuild bridges, repair schools and clinics, and drill wells" (Richard Sater, *Army News Service*, 4 December 2003). Unfortunately, these local efforts have been hamstrung by centralization of resources, particularly money, which for the most part has been kept at the national level. In fact, "much of the money will go to build a road from Kabul to Kandahar and Heart, a joint effort by the United States, Saudi Arabia and Japan" (Kennedy 2003, 36). While this project will undoubtedly boost Afghan employment and provide a much need transportation infrastructure, a precondition to intra-Afghanistan trade, it is unlikely to provide a major benefit to the towns and villages where the Taliban and Al-Qaeda insurgency draws its strength. In short, when TF Devil was conducting operations at the village level, the governance and economy legs to our three-legged nation building and counterinsurgency stool were far too short, making the overall effort likely to topple.

TF Devil's focus on security over economy and governance in their region is understandable--they were not given the assets to improve local governance or local economic conditions. In Afghanistan, their situation was not unique. Initially, the Pentagon chose to focus the brigade combat teams' efforts on security while slowly building up the capacity of Provincial Reconstruction Teams to improve governance and economy in key regions. The unfortunate outcome, though, was a BCT commander with only a very blunt tool--military force--in his kit bag. This decision was analogous to sending a unit into combat operations with just direct fires; keeping from them the battlefield shapers that allow a commander to mass effects. Money and expertise, as applied to local village governance and economy concerns, are the indirect artillery of contested peace operations. To understand the proximate cause of the initial decision to limit BCT resources, it is necessary to examine resource availability at the national level; there were no layers of command between the combined joint task force command and the brigade combat team.

Former CJTF-180 commander LTG Dan McNeill indicated that resources were a national issue when he characterized the Pentagon's dilemma as "a 'chicken-and-egg question: whether to concentrate first on security or reconstruction.' His conclusion: reconstruction, via the PRT plan, 'could lead the process because it would pull an improvement in security along'" (Ahmed Rashid, *Wall Street Journal,* 4 February 2003). This statement indicates that the "security first" approach of earlier units had been deemed relatively ineffective. Moreover, the proportion of U.S. dollars dedicated to standing up the Kabul government and funding national level projects was much greater than local funding to support local reconstruction (Kennedy 2003, 36). Solidifying this

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conclusion, soon after making this statement LTG McNeill successor, LTG Barno, ordered coalition units that had been living in forward operating bases to dramatically alter their operations and move to living in villages. Simultaneously, the number of PRTs has grown exponentially. LTG McNeil characterized these organizational and strategic changes as akin to "a trial-and-error operation: 'We had nothing in any book that said this is the way to do it. It's all new for us" (Ahmed Rashid, *Wall Street Journal*, 4 February 2003). Operations in Iraq have provided iteration in this experimentation.

<u>Iraq: 173rd Airborne Brigade Combat Team in Kirkuk</u>

The 173rd Airborne Brigade parachuted into Northern Iraq on the night of 26 March 2003. On 10 April 2003, the Brigade along with American Special Forces units and Kurdish Peshmerga liberated Kirkuk (Caraccilo and Rohling 2004, 11). By 15 May 2003, the Economist magazine was calling Kirkuk, "something of an American success" ("Kirkuk's fortunes: Success Story"). Yet, even after the successes reported by the Economist and others, insurgent attacks and violent outbreaks continued throughout the Kirkuk area in the summer and fall of 2003. Some incidents were reflective of the Baathist and foreign fighter insurgency evident in Fallujah and the Sunni triangle; other violence was born of the ethnic fault lines that cross the city--Kurds, Arabs, and Turkomen all have a significant population in Kirkuk and the surrounding area. Representative of the depth of those tensions, on 1 January 2004, five Arab and Turkomen protestors were killed as they demonstrated against Kurdish demands for federalism. It was in this environment of permanently gestating violence that the 173rd Airborne BCT conducted their counterinsurgency campaign. Mindful of the need to go beyond just providing security patrols, the 173rd Airborne Brigade Commander, Colonel

Bill Mayville, dramatically changed his brigade combat team's organizational structure in mid-June 2003, soon after the UN had declared Kirkuk to have a permissive security environment.

Mayville functionally aligned his available assets to create a brigade that maintained focus on security, governance, and economy (Ken Dilanian, *Philadelphia Inquirer*, 4 October 2003). Specifically, he retained an Airborne battalion, the 2nd Battalion, 503rd Airborne Regiment, along with local police and the Civil Affairs policing experts to provide presence patrols and law enforcement. The BCT termed this organization "TF Security." The brigade commander employed his other Airborne battalion, 1st Battalion, 508th Airborne Regiment, to generate long term security improvements through running a police academy and building up the fire and EMT services of the city. Eventually, when growing local police competence allowed the brigade to expand its holistic security approach, he transferred these "TF Safety" responsibilities to TF Security. He then moved the 1-508th completely to their other responsibility, conducting counterinsurgency operations in the problem villages to the south and east of the city. With their ability to focus their resources on this geographic area, the 1-508th evolved their efforts to developing local security and governance capacity. Perhaps most importantly, COL Mayville shifted the brigade's main effort from security operations to improving government capacity and local economy. To this end, he employed his tank battalion and the majority of his civil affairs detachment in what he termed, "Task Force Civil." Lastly, he took the remainder of his available assets, notably his deputy brigade commander, his fire support team, and some civil affairs expertise to

create, "Task Force Government," which focused on coaching the newly elected city government in the ways of democracy and in proper oversight of the city's agencies.

The recently reactivated 2nd Battalion, 503rd Airborne Regiment, conducted the majority of the immediate security operations in the Kirkuk area. The following section describes operations conducted by the 2-503rd; however, it could just as easily describe the 1-508th efforts outside of Kirkuk proper. The 2-503rd lived primarily outside of the airbase that served as the secure home of the 173rd Airborne Brigade and the U.S. Air Force element in Kirkuk. The battalion's companies lived among the local citizens by establishing company safe-houses in separate sectors of Kirkuk. These companies worked side-by-side with the police stationed in their respective areas of Kirkuk. Moreover, the brigade commander employed a considerable portion of his brigade commander's discretionary funds (CDF) to properly equip and train these police. Some of these funds had the additional impact of employing local contractors to reconstruct dilapidated or looted police stations. The result, as the *Philadelphia Inquirer* reported, is that "while many once-looted police stations in Baghdad remain sparsely furnished shells, the ones in Kirkuk, which also were gutted, are freshly painted and sparkling with renovations . . . and while police in the capital struggle with shortages, Kirkuk's force is among the best equipped in the country" (Ken Dilanian, *Philadelphia Inquirer*, 4 October 2003). Three major pillars--establishing close ties to the community, employing discretionary funds to win support and increase local capacity, and working with the police so that they could take over the primary local security effort--were the foundation of the brigade's security efforts in Kirkuk and the surrounding villages.

In addition to employing these CDF funds on the police and on the fire department and EMS, which also fell under the purview of TF Security, the 2nd of the 503rd actively used funds to hire local citizens to help clean up the neighborhood parks and common areas like squares. This effort won the battalion the allegiance of many local citizens who in turn provided the intelligence that drove the battalion's night-time raids. As the Battalion Commander and Operations Officer recently reported, "ROE dictated that patrols interact with the population and mandated that an interpreter accompany each patrol. Soldiers could thus talk with Kirkuk residents and other locals, determine their problems, and understand their culture. Because misunderstanding breeds mistrust, no other action at such a low cost has done more to improve U.S.-Iraqi relations" (Caraccilo and Rohling 2004, 12).

Beyond building trust, the battalion operated in a joint manner with the newly equipped local police to ensure that their capacity continuously grew. Initial steps beyond joint patrolling involved changing the unit's ROE to only allow local police to confiscate weapons. Soon that change led to "the 2-503rd turn[ing] over more and more TCPs to [local police]. This handover limited the exposure of U.S. troops to danger and brought the 2-503rd closer to accomplishing one of its goals, creating an independent police force" (Caraccilo and Rohling 2004, 12). This goal involved three critical components: manning, equipping, and training the police force.

The 2-503rd manned the police force initially with volunteers and then transitioned the force to a more permanent professional force that was fully vetted. Importantly, the battalion ensured an ethnically proportional force, something Kirkuk had not seen under Saddam's rule. As mentioned, the battalion equipped the force using

commander's discretionary funds from the Commanders Emergency Relief Program. It is worth noting that while NGOs contributed funding and expertise to a number of the governance sectors, they were unwilling to contribute money to the police force. As such, Colonel Mayville gave priority use of his CDF to the police sector. The battalion trained the local police by starting a 13-day police academy. Employing the expertise of the Civil Affairs policing experts, the program of instruction (POI) focused on fundamental policing skills and on ethics. Eventually the local police leadership to reflect Iraqi policing methods tweaked this POI. This change fit in well with the brigade's philosophy of turn-over of responsibility to local agencies. As the 2-503rd's leadership said in January 2004, after having been in Kirkuk for nine months: "Today Kirkuk's police operate with a sense of autonomy that was previously unimaginable. The police routinely investigate and prevent crimes; respond to calls for assistance throughout the city; coordinate across precinct and other boundaries; and act on orders from higher headquarters. While continued coalition oversight and resources are still required, coalition forces are on the way to complete disengagement" (Caraccilo and Rohling 2004, 18).

As previously mentioned, COL Mayville realigned his resources in mid-June 2003 to match what he saw as the brigade's new main effort, generating viable civil governance for Kirkuk. Governance operations had two interrelated elements. First, basic needs of the citizens had to be met through improved electric, water, sanitation, and health operations. Second, a representative city government had to emerge to manage these operations and to serve as the medium for voicing citizens' concerns.

After meeting immediate humanitarian considerations for food, water, and shelter--particularly for the approximately 1,000 displaced persons who came to Kirkuk--the brigade began meeting the first objective, improved quality of life. While this area had initially been primarily the purview of the 40 soldier Civil Affairs detachment, COL Mayville strongly felt that showing increased capacity to deliver these tangible benefits to citizens would improve security. Moreover, in a city of 800,000 he felt that the CA detachment did not have the means to accomplish this aim. To remedy this shortfall, COL Mayville assigned LTC Ken Riddle's 1st Battalion, 63rd Armor Regiment to head TF Civil. LTC Riddle organized his task force of one tank heavy team, one mechanized heavy team, mortars, scouts, and the preponderance of CA assets into functional teams each headed by a CA or 1-63rd officer. He then assigned his manpower, under the control of platoon leaders and company commanders to meet the rotating needs of these teams. For instance, when liquid petroleum gas (LPG) deliveries were slow to reach the city, causing potential riot conditions at distribution sites, a mechanized platoon would help secure the site. Likewise, when a cement factory needed operational supervision or the pay location for Former Iraqi Military needed initial security, a platoon or company was given the mission.

TF Civil organized into a Public Health Team, an Infrastructure Team, a Fuel Team, and an Economic Development Team. This organization worked in the city government building and continuously operated alongside the city departments that ran sewage and water and health, etc. As the TF Civil Operations Officer, MAJ Brian Maddox explained, "Each of my guys is matched up with a local government official. Our motto around her is to put an Iraqi between us and the problem" (Ken Dilanian,

Philadelphia Inquirer, 4 October 2003). Three vital pillars structured TF Civil's efforts. First, team leaders established a joint plan for near-term and long-term future projects with their respective Iraqi departments. Second, funds requests were submitted to the brigade's funding cell to allow the BCT to prioritize projects across need areas and throughout the different ethnic sections of town by using a funding board of battalion and brigade representative. Additionally, this system allowed the BCT to run a competitive and relatively transparent bidding system via the city chamber of commerce. As different funding sources emerged, particularly money from NGOs and IOs, as well as from Iraqi national budget funds, this system allowed the funding cell to prevent redundant projects from occurring. The third pillar of TF Civil's effort was to rapidly turn-over management and oversight of the quality of life improvement efforts to the city government and city departments.

This last effort not only allowed the brigade to reduce its presence in city affairs, but also built the legitimacy of the city government. The government had been selected through an ethnically representative city delegate convention of 300 local leaders. These local leaders had selected 30 of their own to serve as the city council. While the U.S. military placed no ethnic requirements on the selection, this ethnically proportional city council then selected a Kurd mayor, an Arab deputy mayor, and three assistant mayors to oversee De-Baathification, land disputes, and government design. Because they had no experience with democracy, COL Mayville created TF Government to coach and mentor them. This organization, made up of brigade staff leadership, the brigade's long range surveillance detachment and field artillery section, and CA, with significant help from the USAID contractor Research Triangle Institute, ran city government seminars and helped

run initial city council and city committee meetings. Within three months, nearly all city government operations were primarily managed and overseen by Iraqis.

Among the most important decisions that this city government had to make was the allocation of budgetary funds to city departments. These funds replaced CDF funds as the most effective way to stimulate the economy, particularly in generating employment. Regarding the economy, the 173rd Airborne focused its initial efforts on stimulating the economy to create jobs. This priority matched up with the brigade commander's philosophy that hiring young men off of the streets was a clear way to reduce attacks. Moreover, if these young men were completing very visible projects in different sectors of town, citizens were more likely to trust both the U.S. military and the selected local government. An example of a local sewage project demonstrates the relationship; a relationship that was pursued further through the establishment of a city labor office and through the focused hiring of former Iraqi military to run security companies.

Sewage projects were an immediate priority for the brigade as several streets where children played were filled with backed-up sewage. Fortunately, the city sewage department was competent, though they had limited resources and had not put together a comprehensive city plan to correct sewage problems since 1979. As such, TF Civil employing CA expertise and the US Army Corps of Engineers, worked with the sewage department to prioritize projects. The city sewage department was then budgeted using CPA and brigade CDF funds to hire local Iraqis to begin digging sewers in Arab, Kurd, and Turkomen sectors of the city. While these projects could have been done rapidly with construction equipment, the BCT chose to correct problem substituting a great deal of labor for machinery. This conscious effort to treat unemployment reflected an

understanding of the "large pockets of dissatisfaction and resentment" that remain among

unemployed Iraqis (Dan Murphy, *Christian Science Monitor*, 19 March 2004).

Ultimately these projects, upon which the brigade spent several hundred thousand dollars,

came under the oversight of the city council. Similar projects for water, health, schools,

and electricity existed. Beyond short-term projects, the brigade also spent considerable

effort positioning the city for long-term growth. Notably, the brigade ran Kirkuk

economic and business conferences that involved regional investors interested in building

hotels, restaurants, and other businesses in town. While not an overriding priority for the

brigade, these investors had the potential to dampen the potential economic downturn

when US military funds dried up. They also were the likeliest source to keep momentum

going in Kirkuk, given the paucity of large-scale Bechtel type projects approved for the

city. In other words, this long-term, non-coalition dependent effort to take advantage of

Kirkuk's internal and external comparative advantages would stabilize the economy and,

in turn, the city.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Case studies of East Timor, Afghanistan, and Iraq demonstrate the varied ways to organize for contested peace operations. Each case and the organizational model employed provide data on how best to organize our forces to win the peace in the vital months following the end of conventional combat. This chapter provides organizational recommendations arrived at after studying the outcomes related to focusing a unit's operational effort at the village level as done in East Timor by the New Zealand Defense Force, at the city level as done in Kirkuk, Iraq, by the U.S. Army's 173rd Airborne Brigade, and at the national level as done by U.S. Army forces participating in Operation Enduring Freedom. Prior to that synthesis, this chapter provides recommendations on how to change the U.S. Army's professional culture. This change is a prerequisite to organizational alterations as it makes the profession accepting of the strategic decision to organize the force effectively for small wars, even at the cost of reducing the army's initial capacity to fight large scale conventional wars.

A Necessary Precursor: Changing Culture

As outlined in the Introductory Chapter, the Army must transform to meet our nation's needs in the emerging twenty-first century strategic environment. While the military has begun the process of structural transformation, to include updating equipment and re-organizing forces, and while the final part of this chapter outlines recommendations for equally significant organizational change, the military has not yet

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taken a necessary initial step. The Army's leadership must engender a cultural change towards an acceptance of our multiple roles of war fighter and peacemaker.

The Army is still organized and oriented towards meeting and decisively defeating an enemy army in a massive land battle. Some leaders in the force have resisted the shift in professional jurisdiction that goes along with accepting Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) as part of our mission, complaining "about the detrimental effects of peacekeeping or operations other than war . . . on the Army" (Wong 2002, 69). The Army cannot continue with this entrenched "business as usual" attitude that portrays contested stability and support operations (SASO), like those missions the military is conducting in Iraq and Afghanistan, as "lesser included cases" of the major theater wars we expect and prepare to fight (McNaugher 2002, 155). To emphasize that point, and to provide clarity, this chapter uses the terms contested peace operations and "small wars," differentiating these terms from the uncontested SASO / MOOTW missions (acronyms used interchangeably to reflect their similar use in the 1993 and 2001 versions of FM 3-0) conducted by the Army in Bosnia and Kosovo (Blackwell 2002, 113). Some observers will argue that a decisive war attitude will not continue to exist in an Army engaged in small war environments in Iraq and Afghanistan. These observers have forgotten history--the Army's involvement in stability and support operations spans well over a century, yet time and again it has had to relearn how to conduct these operations because of the Army's entrenched "decisive war" culture.

Four measures are vital in the Army's evolution into a ready *and* responsive force capable of fighting and winning *all* our nation's wars: a recognition by the Army's leaders that small wars are with us to stay and deserve equal billing with decisive

conventional war; a change in the Army's vision; a change in the structure of the army; and, most importantly, a broad shift in the Army's culture accomplished through a reformulation of the education and training system. General Schoomaker, the Chief of Staff of the Army, has already started a structural reorganization of the Army. The Chief of Staff's changes provide his implicit vision for the Army's future (though this chapter will argue for an explicit vision statement). Importantly, this structural transformation, and the ones recommended later in this chapter, will only be truly successful when it is integrated with cultural change.

Our doctrine, education, and training, all mirrors of the Army's cultural values and professional jurisdiction, have long treated Military Operations Other Than War as a non-essential function. The literature review outlined just how little doctrinal attention our Army has paid to this topic. This effort to partially ignore the problem occurred in an operational environment dominated by these types of missions. Taking a different lens to the problem, the extraordinary number of SASO deployments the Army has undertaken in the 1990s, has resulted in a slow incremental change in the education system that parallels the evolution of the capstone Operations field manual. While the Army War College for colonels and the Command and General Staff Officers Course for majors have incorporated MOOTW and SASO into the curriculum, they have done so in a half-hearted manor. In the War College, for instance, most of the material that deals with these complex operations is taught via electives (McNaugher 2002, 168). While majors at the CGSOC receive regular instruction in SASO and MOOTW during each phase of the course--Corps operations, Division operations, and Brigade operations, the instruction on the topic is nearly independent of the major exercises that cement the student's learning.

Though doctrinal writing and education are not the only signals that Army leaders provide to their organization, they are the most important ones. Doctrine defines the Army's professional body of knowledge (or jurisdiction) and education is where that body of knowledge is transmitted to future leaders. Topics addressed in the capstone Operations manual delineate the Army's professional jurisdiction. This unique knowledge defines the boundaries of the Army's expertise, providing the intellectual and cultural foundation for the organization. In an environment characterized by a fast-paced operating tempo, the education system is where the Army inculcates its leaders with its doctrine and culture. Importantly, these leaders soon return to units to create training based on learned doctrinal concepts; they will emphasize what was emphasized to them in the schoolhouses.

If the service's leaders outline the profession's knowledge and jurisdiction exclusively as those tasks involved in winning a decisive war, then the Army's mentality will mirror that warrior image. More realistically, if service leaders pay little attention to small wars, units will only train for these operations after being alerted for a small war mission. The outcome will be, and has been, a focus on decisive war at the leader education and unit training levels. In other words, unless the strategic vision moves the Army toward a culture where small wars and MOOTW are emphasized in the education provided to Colonels, Majors, Lieutenants, and Sergeants, then it will not be trained at the unit level. The Army cannot be successful at the operational level--leader education--or the tactical level--unit training--without a change in culture to embrace the missions the Army is most often called upon perform.

Through his speeches and actions, most notably the reorganization of the 3rd Infantry Division into four modular brigades, General Schoomaker has implied an evolved vision for the Army. He has expanded on General Shinseki's efforts to create a more rapidly deployable force by focusing on the entire Army instead of just the Stryker Brigades. The Army under General Schoomaker will be a more expeditionary force. This will move the Army forward organizationally, but he must explicitly articulate his vision, including the clear placement of small wars on equal footing with large wars. This unambiguous statement will go far in shifting the Army culture to an acceptance of our changed role.

This change is necessary, because, as RAND's Tom McNaugher articulated, "In a sense, the Army has bet on war not only as its core mission, but as its likely future mission." He added that, "In terms of national politics as well as the Army's own deeply ingrained ethos, this looks like a reasonable bet" (McNaugher 2002, 173). For the Army, the math has been simple: small wars and MOOTW are more frequent but threaten few casualties and generally do not affect the nation's vital interests; large wars are infrequent, but this infrequency multiplied by the likelihood of massive casualties and a (presumed) greater threat to the nation outweighed the small war/MOOTW total threat.

Today the likelihood of a large war, which threatens the American way of life, is miniscule--any reasonable examination of the global context finds no peer competitor. It is not rare to see the U.S. described as a hegemon atop a unipolar world (Boot 2002, 349). At the same time, with the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the possibility that a small war may directly affect America has grown exponentially. As noted historian Max Boot says in The Savage Wars of Peace, "This [punitive and

protective small war] role for the armed forces is likely to grow in importance, since the world is littered with American targets--civilian, diplomatic, military--sure to tempt any young man with a gun and a grudge. It is likely that the September 11, 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon are only a taste of what American can expect in the future" (Boot 2002, 348).

Even in the unlikely scenario that the U.S. does fight a conventional ground war, the military should count on our enemy using the classic notion of a compound war, much as Wellington did against Napoleon in Spain from 1808 to 1814. Wellington employed irregular Spanish forces, guerrillas, to harass French supply routes. This strategy kept the French from being able to concentrate forces on the British army, while simultaneously his regular forces maintained enough pressure on the French that they were unable to concentrate on defeating the insurgency. Napoleon ultimately said of Spain, "That unfortunate war destroyed me. . . . All . . . my disasters are bound up in that fatal knot" (Huber 2003, 91). A knot that French soldiers trained only in conventional warfare could not untie.

Nonetheless, skeptics, and there are plenty, would point out that with only minimal training the U.S. military succeeded in stability and support operations in Bosnia and Kosovo. The Army was able to conduct these "lesser included" missions without radically disturbing the training that prepares us for a major theater war. As Tom McNaugher pointed out, some believe that "If what the Army has done amounts to treating MOOTW as a peripheral concern, then perhaps that is the way they should be treated" (McNaugher 2002, 172). He goes on to disagree with this assessment, saying that the argument may have short term legitimacy, but lacks long term credibility.

Nevertheless, when he wrote his essay, recent Army success in the Balkans greatly weakened the case for greater emphasis on small war.

It is important to point out that even McNaugher, an advocate for a greater emphasis on small wars, misread history. U.S. success in Balkans peacekeeping was largely dependent upon the conditions under which the operations took place. The Balkan peacekeeping efforts were not small wars; they were unopposed peacekeeping operations. The U.S. was not nearly as successful in an opposed SASO effort in Somalia. The broader lesson is evident: the Army's "just in time" training may work in relatively easy, unopposed operations, but it has not and does not work for contested peace operations, and small wars. As Iraq and Afghanistan show, and any thoughtful enemy has clearly noticed, the military has not learned how to win these wars, in part because the Army has treated them as lesser included cases of the "real wars" it prefers to fight.

To change the Army's strategic dissonance--the fact that it expends an extraordinary amount of operational energy on small wars, but is unwilling to give them equal billing in the professional jurisdiction--the Chief of Staff must explicitly outline a new vision for the Army and sell it to the organization's leaders. Only then will the education and training system follow the vision and dedicate real-time and intellectual energy to contested stability and support operations. An explicit *and accepted* vision for an organization is vital in focusing organizational resources. Noted leadership theorist John Kotter identified underestimating the power of vision and undercommunicating the vision as two major errors in trying to direct change. More particularly, he grouped these steps as vital in defrosting a hardened status quo (Kotter 1996). General Schoomaker has implicitly outlined parts of his vision by directing a reorganization of divisions into more

capable and deployable brigades. He has shown the importance he places on an expeditionary mindset by directing that 3rd Infantry Division and the 101st Airborne Division initiate the changes immediately, and by calling for the entire Army to wear the American flag on our uniforms. Yet he has not made his complete vision for the Army clear--as Kotter points out, observers should be careful not to underestimate the importance of a vision to an organization, particularly one that is resistant to change. Beyond the organizational changes, the Chief's other clear Army-wide emphasis has been on the Warrior Ethos.

Current operations in Iraq, which are likely indicative of future battlefields, demonstrate the difficulty of separating the two notions of war and peace at any point in time or space. Yet, a close look at the Soldiers Creed and writing on the Warrior Ethos shows little appreciation for the complexity of operations involved in winning the peace. The Warrior Ethos as captured in the Soldiers Creed focuses on standard notions of war fighting. More precisely, it orients on improving the "close combat" battlefield skills of *all* soldiers regardless of military occupational skill to ensure a force that can "destroy the enemies of the United States of America." While there is little doubt that the Warrior Ethos aims to harden soldiers for the exceptionally challenging situations they will face, it does little to emphasize the culture the Army must engender if it is to successfully win not just tactical battles but strategic wars. Destroying enemies is only a small part of the strategic battlefield in the COE. Our enemies have learned the hard way, not to fight us conventionally, but to attack using unconventional tactics. The Chief of Staff should clearly articulate in his vision what he is telling the Army in emphasizing the Warrior

Ethos. That will be a vital step in clearly communicating his vision; just as important will be the related refashioning of focal points in the Army's education system.

Pursuing a strategic vision that openly embraces small wars as an Army core competency will require a balancing in educational system that prepares officers and NCOs for their next leadership position. The Army must maintain a leader corps that possesses both war fighting and SASO skills. This competency mix will lean toward war fighting skills as the majority of tasks in MOOTW consist of the same competencies as needed in combat operations. Former USAREUR Commander, General Montgomery Meigs, estimated that 70 percent of the tasks performed are the same as in combat (McNaugher 2002, 160). Arguably, as Meigs made his comment in May 2000 he was more right and wrong than he knew. Meigs's experience in SASO operations had centered on operations in Bosnia and Kosovo. In these operations the SASO environment was permissive. If the current trend of contested peace operations continues into the future, the Army will increasingly have to conduct counterinsurgency operations as part of constructing a stabile peace. These operations necessarily involve raids and other proactive offensive measures similar to combat operations. They require similar leadership skills as well. Yet the bread and butter of Counterinsurgency operations involve gathering "actionable" intelligence. This process requires a set of skills for leaders and soldiers that is very different from combat--and more refined than those outlined in the Soldiers Creed.

The education system as it currently stands does not do enough to train officers to manage the complex operations involved in winning the peace. Little attention is paid to teaching negotiation and conflict resolution skills, establishing a political and judicial

system, conducting fundamental economic development tasks, and neighborhood policing, as well as working with non-military organizations (McNaugher 2002, 162). A study of the Army's peacekeeping deployment to Bosnia, for example, determined that not only was doctrine insufficient, but also highlighted the need for military education of these skills at the War College and Basic Course levels. "Nor is this leader development challenge confined merely to senior commanders, junior officers and NCOs occasionally even junior enlisted personnel, can take on tasks in MOOTW that are more common to mayors or police chiefs than to soldiers" (McNaugher 2002, 162). Even two years into operations in Afghanistan and a nearly a year into Operation Iraqi Freedom, the Army provides this education in a "just in time" manor employing not the schoolhouse but the training center. Rapid train-ups that include classes on culture and other SASO foundational skills form the paradigm for Army MOOTW readiness. The officer and NCO education system have been replaced by JRTC, NTC, and CMTC.

The solution is clear. Aggressively introduce SASO into the curriculum at the Army's leadership schoolhouses. For instance, in conducting the practical exercises that make-up the CGSOC concrete learning environment, focus a week, not an hour, of time on post-conflict stability. In that time, both teach and practice the skills vital to effective counterinsurgency to include economic development and policing. Provide an eight-hour block of instruction on the fundamentals of economic development, followed by a trip to inner-city Kansas City and a meeting with neighborhood development officials and chamber of commerce members. Have CGSC students conduct right seat rides and walk the beat with local police. The CGSOC and the Army War College can continue to teach "how to think" creatively and critically, while changing the curriculum to meet the

challenges involved in winning small wars. While there is a challenge in balancing the need to produce competent war fighters, the Army must do more to educate their leaders on winning the peace. Fixing the education system is the first step. It will generate leaders capable of returning to their units and crafting small wars training strategies.

To a lesser degree, the training centers have also replaced home station training as the primary means to conduct fundamental skills and collective training for MOOTW. Any move toward increased SASO training at the unit level, though, has happened as a result of increased MOOTW and small wars deployment OPTEMPO and concomitant efforts to improve predictability regarding when units will conduct operational rotations. In other words, units are conducting SASO training to prepare for a planned deployment, not as a matter of course like tank gunnery or NBC training. Moreover, junior leaders conduct this training based on their experiences instead of on doctrine or the schooling they have received. Doctrinal Battle Drills that apply across conflicts, instead of being deployment specific, do not exist. Training in the SASO version of "Action Right" does not occur.

This system results in units entering a small wars train-up period as untrained (U) and leaving these programmed train-ups as barely practiced (P). They do not reach trained (T) status until several months into the deployment. This weakness points out the fundamental flaw in the Army's "just in time" SASO training philosophy. It is the same defect that permeates our preparation for the vital tasks of small wars. The Army treats them as lesser included cases.

In his Arrival Message, the Army Chief of Staff, General Schoomaker spoke of his experience in the failed hostage rescue, Desert One, as a defining moment:

There were some important things we did not know about the future that night. We did not recognize that this was a watershed event . . . that the military services would begin a great period of renewal that continues to this day. **We did not know that we were at the start of an unprecedented movement *to jointness* in every aspect of our military culture, structure, and operations . . . a movement that must continue** [emphasis mine]. We also did not realize that we were in one of the opening engagements of this country's long struggle against terrorism . . . a struggle that would reach our homeland and become known as the Global War on Terror. (Schoomaker 2003)

Army leaders at every level must couple the strategic trends facing the nation with our experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan and respond in kind. Future Chiefs of Staff should be able to make the same speech that General Schoomaker made five or ten years from now and replace "to jointness" with "toward winning the peace as part of winning the war." This change in culture would go far in building an Army that wins wars, not just battles. Institutional level leaders owe this directional shift to the junior leaders that are in the schoolhouse now or will go into it in the future. More importantly, our soldiers need these future leaders grounded in MOOTW fundamentals to generate the sustained training programs that have made our Army the most fearsome fighting force on earth. And, these training programs will be far more effective in an Army reorganized to win the peace.

The Crux of the Matter: Changing the Organization to Win Small Wars

Winning the peace has become the decisive operation for the U.S. military. Years of preparation to defeat the enemy on the conventional battlefield will mean little if the military cannot secure the peace after the traditional combat mission is over. And no thinking enemy will face the U.S. military without some semblance of an insurgent campaign. At the very least, our enemies will pursue compound warfare forcing us to fight both an insurgency and a conventional force; at the most likely--and most

dangerous--extreme, they will avoid decisive war and fight us almost exclusively with an insurgency, forcing us into protracted warfare, particularly if the armed forces lack the capacity to win the peace. Some would say that winning the peace is someone else's fight. Perhaps they would say that it belongs to USAID or NGOs. Looking at those organizations it is clear that they do not have the capacity for this mission, particularly in light of the increasingly hazardous post-combat environment. The U.S. military is all there is--it prides itself on winning the nation's wars. The armed forces need to recognize that the war does not end when the last enemy tank is destroyed.

Gaining that capacity in today's military requires not only a change in mindset, as argued previously, but also a change in organizational structure. Both the literature review and the case studies demonstrated the unquestionable link between securing the peace, improving governance capacity, and positively influencing the economy. Moreover, these cases--past and present--showed the need to conduct these operations at the local level. Based on the cell-style organization of the insurgents and terrorists the U.S. will fight, the national level, where the majority of resources and skilled manpower have traditionally gone, has become less important than the local level. That is not to say that national conditions need not be set correctly in a number of areas, to include the macroeconomy. Instead, it is to point out that for the most part, initial priority actions in the transition between war and peace occur at the local level. The priority of resources should follow this shift. As Command Sergeant Major Rory L. Malloy, with the 2nd Battalion, 187th Infantry said, "The average Iraqi sees this clinic, not the port or sanitation plan built to capacity by American standards" (Ariana Eunjung Cha, *Washington Post,* 30 October 2003). Exacerbating the fact that the U.S. military has

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focused the majority of its resources at the national level, it has also spent far more time creating a workable national-level military organization to manage these operations, the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF). Inherently capable of tackling governance and economic issues through its interagency and multinational capacity, CJTFs are structured for success in creating national level governance capacity.

Not nearly as well structured is today's brigade combat team, the CJTF equivalent at the city and village level. While the BCT brings together a host of battlefield shapers, and increasingly is capable of working with Special Forces and civil affairs, it is neither organized nor practiced at sustaining this coordination. The move to units of action will reduce this problem. However, as currently configured, UAs will lack much of the internal capacity needed to accomplish the myriad of local governance and economy tasks necessary to win the counterinsurgency fight. Some would say that they should not be. They call for a split in our military capacity. They hear and herald the sirens call of peacekeeping/nation-building divisions, and point to the Pentagon's own Office of Force Transformation report recommending the creation of this separate force (Greg Jaffe, *Wall Street Journal*, 12 December 2003).

Prominent Pentagon advisor Thomas Barnett, whose ideas are often echoed by Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld and the Pentagon senior leadership team, is one such voice. To his great credit, Barnett's depiction of the world, now accepted by the Defense Department, is "one that many in the Pentagon brass had struggled against for years. Instead of girding for a high-tech war with a competitor like China, the U.S. military must play the role of global enforcer, taking out terrorists and rogue regimes in the Gap and sticking around to help connect those countries to the global marketplace of goods,

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services, information and ideas" (Matt Kelley, *Philadelphia Inquirer*, 20 May 2004). The outcome is evident: "a lot of smaller conflicts and long-term nation-building of the sort Pentagon generals had worked to avoid and Bush administration officials derided in the years leading up to the 2001 attacks" (Matt Kelley, *Philadelphia Inquirer*, 20 May 2004). Unfortunately, as alluded to earlier, Barnett believes that to tackle this challenge, "the U.S. military needs to split into two forces: One traditional military force, and another, larger corps of troops to help with reconstruction - what the Pentagon calls 'civil affairs'" (Matt Kelley, *Philadelphia Inquirer*, 20 May 2004).

Barnett bases his call to split into two different forces on simple math and probability. As he has said, "The United States has no military rival 'in the same Zip code' but has nowhere near enough resources to stabilize and rebuild a country after winning combat" (Matt Kelley, *Philadelphia Inquirer*, 20 May 2004). Regrettably, his math does not add up. For his reconstruction troops to be effective in the very world that he has described, they must have the capacity to win battles. Increasingly creative and technologically savvy insurgents, blessed with a world awash in small arms, explosives, and digital technology, will be able to defeat any reconstruction force that fails to bring significant firepower to bear. Army Chief of Staff Schoomaker, "insisting that a highly specialized force would be vulnerable to attack," opposes the creation of a separate force for just this reason (Greg Jaffe, *Wall Street Journal*, 12 December 2003). And, in the cities of this new battlefield, faced with the task of winning the support of the populace, the oft-used Defense Department argument of combat capacity via air-delivered precision munitions fails.

Of equal importance, Barnett's and other's call for peacekeeping divisions assumes a clear separation between the end of ground combat and the beginning of peace building. There is no such break--in fact, the contemporary operating environment, as shown in Iraq and Afghanistan, forces troops to conduct what the Marines call the three-block war, simultaneous operations spanning from combat to humanitarian assistance, particularly during the vital initial months of the transition from war to near-peace. The last reason that peacekeeping divisions will not work revisits the very same resource constraint that Barnett referenced in his argument. Counterinsurgency requires long time periods to succeed. To meet the kind of rotational requirements necessary in the All-Volunteer Force, the number of peacekeepers would have to be enormous. Even in a nation blessed with the resources of the United States, the budget does not support these numbers given that the nation must maintain a powerful enough armed forces to deter (and, thus, by rule, defeat) potential adversaries. In turn, the military must heed the call of the Secretary of Defense and Army Chief of Staff to do more with less. In the words of General Schoomaker, "We are very good in the army in developing single-event people. . . . But what we really need right now are decathletes that are just good enough at everything" (Greg Jaffe, *Wall Street Journal,* 12 December 2003).

The three case studies provide us three major lessons to do just that. First, the New Zealand Defense Force's operations in East Timor suggest to us how to reorient the forces that the Army has at the brigade and battalion level to do effective village and city level contested peace operations. The case suggests that the Army must make its troops multi-functional. Implicit in the lessons are a directive to consider whether more soldiers are need to conduct security patrols, or more expertise is needed in the governance and

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economy sectors of contested nation building. The NZDF move to change their mortar platoon to CMA detachments proved effective in gaining the type of actionable intelligence upon which counterinsurgency campaigns rely.

Second, Afghanistan has taught us that the Army cannot divorce combat operations from reconstruction at the local level, and it has highlighted the imperative to not focus the majority of our resources at the national level. TF Devil was forced to near exclusive combat-type missions by the limited resources they were given to conduct counterinsurgency operations. Instead, regarding governance and economy, the decision was made to focus reconstruction at the national level. The result was a lack of actionable intelligence, as villagers saw no reason to support coalition efforts. Coalition forces changed this policy. They reoriented forces to conduct classic counterinsurgency operations by putting battalions and brigades in charge of a geographic area and assigning Provincial Reconstruction Teams to these commanders. Operations in Afghanistan now marry up the inviolable trinity of security, governance, and economy. The outcome has been much better intelligence, with the battalion commanders responsible for area security roundly praising the change (Barno 2004).

Third, operations in Iraq taught us that the civil affairs assets at the brigade level are not sufficient for contemporary operating environment activities. Additionally, the 173rd Airborne's adaptability to the mission shows that combat troops can conduct simultaneously effective security, governance and economy operations. Moreover, by employing subject matter expertise to pick where to target reconstruction effects, and then handing over the project to battalions and companies, lower level units efficiently used manpower to oversee the completion of projects and gathered the intelligence spill-

off gained from increased local community trust. Meanwhile, this use of soldiers allowed the BCT to use CA and in-house expertise to put in place long-term development plans. In other words, the 173rd Airborne's functional reorganization provides a model for how to meet short-term security and reconstruction needs, while putting a city on a sustainable development path that allows the U.S. military unit to turn over operations to local nation authorities.

In crafting a final organizational recommendation, it is to lesson one that this thesis turns first. Fortunately, given the Army's reorganization to units of action, brigades now will have what the New Zealand Defense Force called "excess capacity" during contested peace operations. While our Field Artillery units and our Air Defense Artillery units play a vital role in conventional combat, it is clear that for the most part, these two capabilities are not often employed in contested peace operations. As General Schoomaker recently said, "An artillery piece does me no good if I don't have a role for artillery" (Greg Jaffe, *Wall Street Journal*, 12 December 2003). The New Zealand Defense Force quickly realized this during their operations in East Timor, and by the time NZ BATT 2 arrived in country they had converted their mortar platoon into a civil military affairs element. In the opinion of the three battalion commanders interviewed, the CMA sections provided far more utility than the mortars would have.

This model is fundamentally different than the current effort to convert excess artillery units into MPs and CA, though it has a similar philosophy behind it. The big difference is that under this recommended course of action, artillery and ADA units would retain their traditional role in conventional combat. This change is in line with the move to UAs, but goes further, creating intra-UA modularity. In effect, by giving them an

additional skill set, the army would convert these units from being just a bayonet, to being a Leatherman tool. Anyone who has ever tried to cut something tough with a Leatherman tool will recognize the cost of this move; likewise, anyone who has ever tried to turn a Phillips-head screw with a knife will see the benefit. The Army should take a risk here. It is a reasonable bet that the U.S. military's deterrent capability is strong enough to prevent a major land war in which the nation will have little warning. Army UAs can mitigate the risk of this assumption being false by spending a majority of the training year working on artillery operations. Nonetheless, our Unit of Action field artillery units ought to train on civil affairs type missions, and in so doing, dramatically improve our capacity to manage governance and economy operations. It is worth noting that this change fits with the Artillery community's move toward effects-based planning. This shift takes our excess capacity and applies it to a weak point. It also reduces the burden placed on civil affairs, which should return to working at a brigade (UA) and higher (UE) level advisory role. In turn, this organizational change brings us to both lessons two and three gleaned from the cases.

Based on lesson two, the requirement to provide resources at the local level, the army needs the aforementioned organizational change, but given the locations the army is likely to fight, it requires this capacity not at brigade level, but at battalion (village) level. As such, two moves should occur. First, UAs should task organize an artillery battery to each maneuver battalion. Second, the military and its civilian bosses must give a significant amount of financial resources to the battalion and company level leadership, and then use bottom-up nomination of reconstruction projects to manage limited resources. General Ray Odierno, commander of the 4th Infantry Division pointed out the

impact of losing CERP funding for local projects in October 2003, when he said, "We were just beginning to see people reacting to the successes we were having with the water treatment projects, with the school projects, with the sewage projects, with the police buildings and the courthouses being developed. We were really starting to see some positive response to all of that" (Smith 2004). Middle Eastern expert Anthony Cordesman supports this notion and adds that decentralized programs are vital: "the ability of commanders to directly support the economic side to counterinsurgency . . . is clear" (Dan Murphy, *Christian Science Monitor*, 29 January 2004). As former 101st Airborne Division Commander, General Dave Petraeus said of his unit's work in Mosul, "Money is the most powerful ammunition we have" (Ariana Eunjung Cha, *Washington Post*, 30 October 2003). And, just as senior leaders do not force theater level headquarters to resupply a platoon or company with traditional ammunition, so to should the leadership not force the CPA to directly give money to a village. This decoupling avoids CPA-type organizations tying-up the process, particularly when the CPA does not have the local level manpower to manage these vital programs. Over six-months after the war's end, "the authority [had] posted only one official in the entire Anbar province, which takes up a third of Iraq" (Yaroslav Trofimov, *Wall Street Journal,* 5 November 2003).

It is at village level and city level that insurgents and terrorists hide--the populace of these areas is the key to winning the counterinsurgency. Coupling commander's discretionary fund type resources, with the increased expertise at battalion level will pay extraordinary dividends in the form of actionable intelligence. As one command sergeant major deployed in Iraq recently said in a circulated e-mail regarding the effectiveness of this method, "Most of our Intel comes from locals talking with us." The

counterinsurgency contested peace operation is not one in which top-down intelligence

from national (or even division) level assets is useful. Lesson three from the experience

of the 173rd Airborne Brigade in Kirkuk, Iraq, reminds the army that it must make long

term progress as well as winning the immediate counterinsurgency fight. If forces

fighting an insurgency do not make this progress, the problem will forever remain a

military problem, instead of transitioning to a host nation problem. In all cases, in the

contemporary operating environment, the challenge will fall to the military. As Colonel

Bill Mayville said in responding to a PBS Frontline question on whether the military had

been abandoned by the other U.S. government agencies, the UN, and NGOs: "I think it's

kind of like you get in a situation, and you suddenly find a mountain that you've got to

negotiate to get to your objective. Does the military say, 'Oh, I'm sorry, we don't do

mountains?' You know, 'We do streams, we do valleys, we do jungles. We just don't do

mountains?' The mountains here are the social and political issues that we're facing. The

military is, if it is nothing else, an adaptive force. We have adapted to the terrain to

accomplish the missions that we have. So I think what you have here is a morphing of an

organization, and an application of what its capabilities are in a new spectrum; but one

that ultimately gets to accomplishing a very military tradition, an objective -- which is

stability and security" (Smith 2004). Thus, military units must dedicate assets to capacity

building. With CA teams freed from conducting local level reconstruction, they can

dedicate their efforts under the UA commander or UE commander to building up the

police force, the legal system, and the local government. In so doing, the Army will

finally have organized our forces in a manner that best meets the contested peace

operations challenge of meeting security, governance, and economy needs at the local

level, and through the CJTF's joint, interagency, and multinational resources, at the

national level.

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