A RAND NOTE

Five Models for European Security: Implications for the United States

Nanette Gantz, James B. Steinberg

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Five Models for European Security: Implications for the United States

Nanette Gantz, James B. Steinberg

Prepared for the United States Army
PREFACE

With the end of the bloc-to-bloc system, Europe is likely to face the renewal of many historical tensions that were temporarily suppressed in the postwar era, as well as new sources of instability. To maintain peace and stability in the future, there is a need to adopt security arrangements to respond to these challenges. This Note defines a set of alternative security models that could emerge in the next five to ten years, examines the models’ strengths and weaknesses, and assesses the implications for U.S. policy in Europe.

The Note contributes to a larger project on the future U.S. role in Europe and implications for the Army, conducted within the Strategy and Doctrine Program of RAND’s Arroyo Center. The broader project examines Europe’s evolution since the end of the bloc-to-bloc system and the future U.S. and U.S. Army role in and contribution to European security. The Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations (DCSOPS) and the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) are the sponsoring offices within the U.S. Army.

The Note should be of interest to U.S. military and government officials and analysts working on European security issues.

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SUMMARY

The purpose of this Note is to define a set of alternative security models that could emerge in the next five to ten years, examine the models’ strengths and weaknesses, and assess the implications for U.S. policy in Europe. The models are not necessarily the most likely outcomes, but rather five “ideal types”—heuristic constructions designed to illustrate some of the competing concepts for building a new security order.

TRANSNATIONAL STABILITY IN EUROPE

Although the United States has many objectives in its policy toward Europe, the principal goal analyzed in this Note is ensuring transnational stability. We define transnational stability, or simply stability, as preserving international borders and established governments against forcible change by other nations.

The former Soviet Union continues to pose a threat to transnational stability, if for no other reason than it retains formidable conventional and nuclear forces. At the same time, new threats to stability are emerging as the collapse of the Soviet empire and the erosion of the bipolar system unleash long-suppressed tensions and conflicts throughout Europe.

These threats can be characterized by the likelihood and the seriousness of the threat. Judged by this standard, the residual threat from the former Soviet Union to the West is the most serious threat to stability but the least likely to occur; internal conflicts are the most likely to occur but least disruptive to stability.

Whether a security system will ensure transnational stability is a complex interplay of many component objectives:

- Comprehensiveness. A security arrangement that, by design, addresses the range of threats is more likely to contribute to overall stability.
- Reliability. The companion to comprehensiveness is reliability—whether the system will in fact control threats to stability. In many respects, this is the most important component of stability, yet the one least capable of ex ante objective measurement.
- A secure U.S. political and military role in Europe. The threshold question in judging how well a security system meets this subobjective is whether the United States is explicitly included or not. A second question relates to the quality and durability of the transatlantic relationship.
- vi -

- **Constructive participation of the former Soviet Union.** History, geography, and the possession of powerful conventional and nuclear forces ensure that Russia alone or a successor state to the Soviet Union will continue to play an important role in shaping Europe’s security in the next century. Stability will be enhanced if the ex-Soviet republics are participating members of a new security arrangement.

- **German integration into the broader political and security framework.** German unification has inevitably raised the issue of whether a strong, united Germany could pose a threat to European stability in the future. Integration serves stability both by reducing the need for Germany to act independently (since other powerful countries are committed to Germany’s security) and by constraining Germany’s ability to act independently (through transnational and supranational institutions that constrain national sovereignty).

- **Enhanced prospects for successful democratic transition in Central and Eastern Europe.** A successful political and economic transition away from communism toward free markets and democracy can help to alleviate many of the sources of instability in Central and Eastern Europe. Security arrangements are only a part of what is necessary to achieve successful transitions in these countries, but they can make an important contribution.

- **Political acceptability.** Two features fall into this category: fairer burdensharing (a better match of means, interests, and responsibilities) and the degree to which publics will view the new arrangement as politically desirable.

**MODELS FOR EUROPEAN SECURITY**

Below are five models for addressing European security problems.

**Ad hoc alliances.** An ad hoc alliances arrangement is the most familiar of our five models, because it reflects the prevailing system in Europe prior to the two-bloc arrangement of the Cold War. It assumes that no viable formal institutions are constructed to take the place of the two blocs. Security is “re-nationalized” as nations try to maintain their security through their own military, economic, and political capabilities, and through ad hoc alliances to prevent any nation (or group of nations) from threatening or coercing another.
**NATO dominant.** The NATO-dominant arrangement is organized around the idea of maintaining the status quo in transatlantic/West European security relationships as much as possible in the face of the Warsaw Pact’s collapse. Broadly, this approach continues a bipolar orientation in Europe, with the Eastern pole radically weakened by the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the loss of its military allies. NATO, however, does adapt to some degree.

**United Europe.** United Europe is based on a tripolar concept of security. It is the product of Europeans’ search for a third way between the United States and the former Soviet Union—in part to enhance European political independence and in part as a result of growing inwardness and isolationism in the United States and among the Soviet republics. The European Community (EC) serves as the basis for this model, but the Community has accelerated the process of broadening and deepening.

**Collective security.** Collective security is designed to give all parties with a stake in European stability (including the United States and Canada) a formal role in a pan-European/Atlantic security system. All member countries are committed to resolve their differences peaceably and guarantee each other’s security.

**Overlapping security institutions.** The overlapping security institutions model rests on the premise that no one system is ideally suited to respond to all contingencies. Existing institutions are maintained or adapted where possible, and new ones may be grafted on to fill gaps and respond to changing requirements. Security is provided by the overlapping nature of the institutions and associated commitments.

**ASSESSMENT OF THE SECURITY MODELS**

Table S.1 summarizes how well the security models meet the U.S. objective of transnational stability in Europe.

Of the five models, the overlapping security institutions model does best. The overlapping security institutions model scores high on most of the component objectives that support stability, both in absolute terms and relative to the other models. A key uncertainty is whether the system is truly reliable and will in fact be able to control the range of threats to stability.
Table S.1
Assessment of Security Models

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model</th>
<th>Comprehensiveness</th>
<th>Reliability</th>
<th>U.S. Role</th>
<th>Former Soviet Union</th>
<th>German Integration</th>
<th>Eastern Europe</th>
<th>Stability</th>
<th>Acceptability</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ad hoc alliances</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO dominant</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>United Europe</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collective security</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overlapping institutions</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTE: 1 = fails to achieve; 5 = fully achieves.

CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

With the end of the Cold War, the United States is in the process of reexamining its role in Europe. Our analysis suggests that the United States should not prematurely abandon its commitment to Europe, especially NATO, in order to protect U.S. interests and maintain stability, and that the United States must seek to secure its role in Europe by working through other institutions that complement NATO.

These two general conclusions underscore the advantages to the United States of the overlapping institutions model, which

- Preserves a political and military role for the United States
- Creates alternative links for U.S. involvement in Europe beyond NATO
- Demonstrates U.S. willingness to adapt to a stronger European role in security arrangements
- Maintains flexibility to move to a number of different security models

The United States could take several steps that would dovetail with activities already under way.

- NATO is still the best institution for ensuring a secure political and military link between the United States and Europe and for deterring large-scale military threats. NATO needs to continue to make its forces more defensive, transparent, and European. The challenge is to develop a credible rationale for maintaining an integrated military command, especially as other institutions
such as the EC, Western European Union (WEU), and Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) assume more responsibilities.

- The member countries of the WEU are pivotal to the shape of the European security identity since they are also members of NATO and the EC. Expanding the WEU's role to act as a bridge between NATO and the EC, as opposed to acting exclusively as the security and defense arm of the EC, would help minimize duplication of effort, foster a more effective European role both within NATO and for non-NATO contingencies, and provide the United States with a mechanism for influencing European security policy.

- The integration process in the EC has developed a momentum of its own, irrespective of U.S. preferences. An obstructionist approach would most likely close the door on any U.S. influence over the process. For that reason, the United States should support the process of European economic and political integration.

- The CSCE process can provide a pan-European forum for addressing the security concerns of the newly emerging democracies in the East. While operating within the constraints of a consensus-based organization, CSCE can serve important functions in the areas of norm setting, arms control, and perhaps mediation and conciliation. Institutions that command military or peacekeeping forces (NATO and, possibly in the future, the WEU) can act as the agent of the CSCE in a crisis.

Taken together, these recommendations are elements of a revised U.S. strategy toward Europe. The policy would allow the United States to respond to domestic U.S. pressures to reduce overseas military commitments while ensuring a U.S. role in Europe's evolution.

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1See James Steinberg, Integration and Security in an All-European Order, RAND, P-7733, 1991.
CONTENTS

PREFACE .......................................................... iii

SUMMARY ........................................................ v

FIGURES AND TABLES ........................................... xiii

TABLES .......................................................... xv

Section

1. INTRODUCTION ............................................... 1
   Background and Objectives .................................. 1
   Research Approach ......................................... 2
   Organization of This Document .............................. 4

2. ENSURING STABILITY: THE KEY OBJECTIVE .................. 5
   The Objective ................................................ 5
   Components of Stability .................................... 6

3. FIVE MODELS FOR EUROPEAN SECURITY ..................... 11
   Ad Hoc Alliances ........................................... 12
   NATO Dominant ............................................. 15
   United Europe .............................................. 18
   Collective Security ........................................ 20
   Overlapping Security Institutions ......................... 22

4. ASSESSING THE SECURITY MODELS .......................... 25
   Comprehensiveness ......................................... 26
   Reliability .................................................. 26
   U.S. Role ................................................... 28
   Constructive Participation of the Former Soviet Union .. 29
   German Integration ......................................... 30
   Successful Transition in the East .......................... 31
   Acceptability ............................................... 32

5. CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS ................... 34
FIGURE

1. Sources of Instability in Europe .................................................. 7

TABLES

S.1. Assessment of Security Models .................................................... viii
1. Assessment of Security Models .................................................... 25
1. INTRODUCTION

BACKGROUND AND OBJECTIVES

The end of Soviet domination of Eastern Europe triggered a wave of euphoria throughout the West—hope that a new era of peace and freedom would emerge. However, this euphoria was short-lived; recent events in Yugoslavia and in the former Soviet Union have made clear that the profound political, economic, and military changes sweeping through Europe will not necessarily result in a more peaceful continent. The bipolar Cold War security system posed great dangers, but it also produced what John Lewis Gaddis has called the "Long Peace," a rare period of Europe free from large-scale military conflict. Europe is likely to face the renewal of many historical conflicts that the bloc-to-bloc system temporarily suppressed in the postwar era, as well as new sources of instability. If peace and stability are to be maintained in the future, security arrangements in Europe must adapt to meet the evolving challenges.

Over the past two years, analysts and policymakers have put forward a number of concepts for adapting security relationships and institutions to the new European realities. The objective of this Note is to construct an analytical framework for examining some of these possible adaptations and their potential consequences for European security in the future. To crystallize the competing concepts, we have defined a set of five alternative security models\(^1\) that could emerge in the next five to ten years. We examine the strengths and weaknesses of each of the models. These models are not necessarily the five most likely outcomes. Rather, they are "ideal types," and hence somewhat artificial constructs designed to draw out some of the competing concepts. Although they are not "predictions" or forecasts of what will happen, we have used a rough reality test designed to ensure that the systems we analyze are plausible, given the underlying political, economic, social, and historical forces at work in Europe. Because these models are analytic tools, we do not examine in detail the difficult issue of "transition" (how to get from today to the fully realized model).

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\(^1\)Security model refers here to a set of arrangements by which nations manage relations with one another. The geographic focus is the European continent, although the nations involved include the United States and the former Soviet Union. The arrangements can be formal (institutions play a central role) or can be based on no formal agreements. Throughout the Note, model is used interchangeably with system, arrangement, and order.
Although the basic organizing principles that distinguish the five systems from each other are reasonably clear (ad hoc, bipolar, tripolar, multi-polar collective, and overlapping), there is room for considerable variation in the details of each system. We recognize that other analysts might define these systems differently, which would result in some of them appearing in a more or less favorable light. We seek to understand the key variables that policymakers should take into account in shaping the security order of the future by analyzing a range of different models.

RESEARCH APPROACH

To understand the strengths and weaknesses of the models, we assess each against the principal objective, as seen from a U.S. perspective, of maintaining “transnational stability”—defined as preserving international borders and established governments against forcible change by other nations.\(^2\) This includes not only military threats or actions, but also economic or political coercion. Internal (domestic) revolution or strife does not per se fall within our definition of threats to transnational stability that a security system is designed to prevent or control, except insofar as such a conflict threatens to spill over to other nations or lead other nations to intervene on behalf of one of the competing domestic factions.

There are compelling reasons for adopting transnational stability as the principal U.S. objective: it reflects the guiding concept embedded in the Helsinki Final Act and the concept which supported the United Nations and allied forces actions in the Persian Gulf. In addition, transnational stability can contribute to achieving other desirable policy objectives (such as promoting economic prosperity). However, policymakers may choose to pursue other objectives, such as promoting human rights and democracy, which (at least in the short run) might come into conflict with the objective of stability (although the emergence of democracy in Eastern Europe has been accomplished within the framework of the Helsinki principles). The point of the analysis is not to make the normative case for preferring stability as the principal objective (that of course is a political judgment), but rather to assess the ability of the systems to achieve stability, should that be accepted as the, or at least one, desired objective.

Whether a security arrangement promotes stability is of course a complex question, composed of many elements, some analytic and some empirical. We have identified a number of subobjectives or components of stability which we believe contribute to overall

\(^2\)For simplicity, we use “transnational stability” and “stability” interchangeably.
system stability: comprehensiveness, reliability, a U.S. role, constructive participation of the former Soviet Union, German integration, successful transition in Central and Eastern Europe, and political acceptability. Some of these subobjectives themselves could come into conflict, and an element of judgment is involved in assessing the relative importance of each. Thus, other things being equal, we believe that participation by the former Soviet Union in a security system will improve the prospects for stability (for reasons outlined in some detail below). However, nonconstructive participation could paralyze a security organization, particularly if the former Soviet Union itself posed the principal perceived threat.

The subobjective of preserving a U.S. political and military role in Europe plays a dual role in our analysis. Historical experience suggests that an ongoing U.S. role contributes to overall European stability. However, for U.S. policymakers, securing a U.S. role will have significant independent value and could be considered an objective in itself, since it will also serve vital U.S. political and economic interests in addition to maintaining European security. Thus, from the U.S. perspective, this factor will have special weight in assessing whether a security arrangement is desirable.

The dynamic forces that have eroded the old security system provide the context for a new future security system. For the most part, our analysis is not based on predictions of the future, but we do make several underlying assumptions:

- The former Soviet Union has undergone fundamental political change but its future configuration remains uncertain. Whether this will culminate in a liberal, capitalist democracy or a totalitarian reaction, and how much further the fragmentation will proceed, is unknown, but there is no likelihood of restoring a centralized, united USSR operating under the Stalinist/Leninist principles of the Brezhnev years.
- The Soviet "Empire," which spanned half of the European continent, has vanished. Whereas elements of the former Soviet Union may seek to restore

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3In the following analysis, we assume that any reconfigured grouping of the former Soviet republics or Russia alone will be major forces on the European continent. However, because of the continued uncertainty, we use "the former Soviet Union" as a surrogate for whatever the final political, military and economic configuration in that region will be.

4Depending on the perspective taken, other subobjectives such as West European integration could be added to the list. What we have tried to do here is list the key issues, from a U.S. perspective, that promote stability in Europe.
influence in the future, and may even use military force to do so, the newly “independent” countries in Central and Eastern Europe will not return of their own volition. Instead, they are embarked on a process of self-determination and political and economic reform, the results of which are uncertain.

- German unification is a reality, and for the purposes of our analysis, the boundaries of Germany are those set as a result of the 2+4 talks and the Poland-Germany Treaty.
- The United States maintains strong interests in Europe, but its role has changed and will continue to change. For much of the postwar period, the United States has been the principal guarantor of West European security and the dominant political force in West European security policymaking. Because the military threats have diminished, U.S. domestic pressures and the growing economic strength of Western Europe will contribute to declining U.S. dominance. How far this process will proceed is a variable in the following discussion.

ORGANIZATION OF THIS DOCUMENT

Section 2 will define the objective of transnational stability in more detail. Section 3 presents five alternative security models. We then assess in Sec. 4 how well the models meet the objective of stability as defined in Sec. 2. Finally, Sec. 5 presents conclusions and policy implications of the assessment.
THE OBJECTIVE

Before describing alternative security models, it is important to define the U.S. objective in constructing new security arrangements. This objective then can be used to assess the merits of each of the five models discussed in Sec. 3.

The key U.S. objective in this analysis is to ensure transnational stability in Europe, defined as preserving international borders and established governments against forcible change by other nations.¹ The bloc-to-bloc system, whatever its faults, did guarantee a certain kind of stability by countering the principal threat to stability—Soviet military and political expansionism—with potent and ready military forces and the threat of deliberate escalation. The NATO-Warsaw Pact (WP) standoff kept peace in Europe, but at substantial human cost to those living in Central and Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Soviet control suppressed ethnic and national rivalries within the USSR and throughout the Warsaw Pact. The importance of maintaining Western cohesion in the face of a potential Soviet threat contained potentially damaging intra-West European conflicts (Greece and Turkey, for example) or helped eliminate them—at least as military rivalries—almost entirely (France and Germany).

The political and military changes throughout the European continent over the past two years have radically altered the likely sources of instability. The former Soviet Union continues to pose a threat to stability, if for no other reason than their possession of formidable conventional and nuclear forces, but the character of that threat has changed in many ways. These forces are being drawn down (as a result of unilateral actions and Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) treaty) and the loss of the WP and the disintegration of the Soviet Union have deprived the former USSR of potent military allies and structurally important forward basing. If the former USSR is a threat to stability, it is more likely a threat growing out of internal chaos and conflict within and among the republics rather than from deliberate expansionist policies of the central government.

¹Although stability is defined in terms of U.S. interests, it is an objective broadly shared by Europeans, including NATO allies. Indeed, it is implicit in the discussion that the United States will pursue its interests in a way that promotes Alliance solidarity.
At the same time, new threats to stability are emerging as the collapse of Soviet control and the erosion of the bipolar system unleash long-suppressed animosities and conflicts throughout Europe. Deep-seated tensions have broken out into conflict (as in the case of Yugoslavia) or threaten to increase, especially as the former Soviet Union continues to dissolve (Moldavia is a case at point). These sources of instability run the gamut from irredentist aspirations, to military intervention on behalf of nationals residing outside national territory (or on behalf of secessionist movements), to civil wars that threaten to spill beyond national borders.

These threats can be represented graphically, as in Fig. 1; the likelihood of the threat runs along the x axis and the seriousness of the threat to stability along the y axis. The residual nuclear and conventional threat from the former Soviet Union to Western Europe or the United States is the most serious threat to stability because of the remaining military capability, but it is the least likely to occur; internal conflicts are the most likely to occur but least serious in terms of involving other countries. An optimal security system should be capable of managing the complete range.

COMPONENTS OF STABILITY

Whether a security system ensures stability is a complex assessment. From a U.S. perspective, there are seven main subobjectives that contribute to stability.

1. Comprehensiveness

Post-Cold War Europe faces a range of long-standing and newly emerging threats to stability, as discussed above. Other things being equal, a security arrangement that is designed to address a broader range of threats is more likely to contribute to overall stability than one which is narrower in its focus. For example, if by treaty a security structure is designed to respond to only the residual threat posed by the former Soviet Union, then it scores low with regard to comprehensiveness.

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3 The most serious threat is not inherently the least likely; in the earlier years of the Cold War (e.g., at the time of the Berlin crisis or Cuban missile crisis), the most serious threat appeared highly likely.
2. Reliability of the System

In assessing the merits of a security system, it is important not only that the system cover the range of potential threats in principle, but also that it cope in practice. In many respects, this is the most important component of stability, yet the one least capable of ex ante objective measurement. For this reason, evaluating the alternative systems under this criterion is potentially most controversial. We believe that a system that builds on existing, proven institutions and relationships is likely to be more reliable than one which does not.\(^4\) A system that draws on common interests is also more likely to be reliable.\(^5\) More diffuse

\(^4\)Some would contend that building a “new” model for security based on old structures would ensure the failure, not success, of a future order. This contention is based on the notion that, in order to command support, the publics and governments need a new institution that is untainted by Cold War associations. Although this point may have some validity, all of the five models (including NATO dominant, which is closest to current arrangements) would represent a real transition from the Cold War structure.

\(^5\)NATO is a case in point. NATO’s strength derives from the shared values, political systems, and economic interdependence of its members, which give credibility to the promise of mutual defense embedded in Article 5 of the NATO Treaty. But potentially divergent interests in military strategy (particularly the willingness of the United States to
commitments seem less reliable than more specific ones (this principle is in part the basis for the maxim that when each country is allied to every other, no commitment is really assured).

Thus, comprehensiveness and reliability are closely related and some tradeoffs occur when comparing the two components. For example, a collective security system covers a broader range of threats than a NATO dominant system focused almost exclusively on the threat from the former Soviet Union. But because a collective security system is based on weak bonds among its members, it could be less reliable than the NATO dominant system when confronted with a crisis. In this case, NATO would be more effective in deterring the threat it was designed to counter (even though it neglected other sources of instability) and in reaching consensus among its members (where interests are shared).

3. A Secure U.S. Political and Military Role in Europe

Twice in the past century, the United States emerged from relative isolation to help restore order to war-torn Europe. With the emergence of a potential Soviet threat to Western democracies in the aftermath of the Second World War, the United States made an open-ended political commitment (the 1949 NATO Treaty), an economic commitment (the Marshall Plan and Bretton Woods) and ultimately a military commitment (the 1951 decision to station military forces in Europe), all of which established an ongoing U.S. role in Europe. This role contributed to stability in a number of ways, including resisting potential Soviet expansionism, mediating political rivalries (e.g., between Greece and Turkey), and fostering a climate that promoted West European economic and political integration. The absence of U.S. territorial or irredentist interests in Europe, and its ability to act (in at least some cases) as an honest broker, suggests that a continued U.S. role is likely to contribute to stability in Europe.6

In the past, the Europeans' desire to maintain a U.S. presence to balance the Soviet military strength guaranteed the United States a voice in European affairs, predominantly through NATO. With the end of the bloc-to-bloc approach to security, new arrangements will be needed to secure a U.S. role in Europe. Although all but the most extreme American neo-isolationists accept the value of maintaining some influence over Europe's risk a strategic nuclear exchange in order to defend against a conventional attack on Western Europe) required extraordinary efforts to maintain "coupling" and thus the reliability of the United States nuclear commitment.

6The absence of pressure (from NATO allies, East Europeans, or other countries) for a total pullout of U.S. troops from Europe tends to support the view that an ongoing U.S. role is valued in the new security climate.
decisionmaking, there is considerable disagreement over the degree of influence (or even
direct control) needed and the best means to secure it. We assess the security models
presented below in terms of how well they promote U.S. involvement in European security
affairs.

4. **Promote the Constructive Participation of the former Soviet Union**

Constructive participation by the former Soviet Union is likely to promote European
stability for two reasons. First, including the republics of the former Soviet Union will give
these countries a stake in the successful functioning of the system, and thus they would be
less likely to behave in ways that threaten stability. Second, including the ex-Soviet
republics is more likely to provide a climate for developing democratic and free market
institutions by reducing their political insecurity (which could otherwise form a pretext for
authoritarianism) and associating them with a community that broadly shares these values.
More democracy is desirable in its own right (for the sake of the citizens) but is also less
likely to threaten European stability. Thus, we judge that, other things being equal,
constructive participation is a desirable feature of any security system.⁷

5. **Ensure German Integration into a Broader Political and Security Framework**

Stability in Europe will also depend on a secure united Germany. Germany's history,
geography, and economic strength have raised concerns that it might once again prove a
threat to stability. A Germany strongly dependent on other nations (economically,
politically, and militarily) is less likely to take actions adverse to its neighbors' interests.
Conversely, stability would be threatened should Germany feel the need to ensure its
security unilaterally.

6. **Enhance Prospects for Successful Democratic Transition in Central and Eastern Europe**

The collapse of the Soviet empire has opened the door to instability in Central and
Eastern Europe arising out of ethnic, national, religious and economic rivalries. As with
promoting constructive participation by the former Soviet Union, encouraging the successful

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⁷This is not to assume that all things are equal; if, for example, Russian participation
means paralyzing security institutions in the face of a serious threat to stability, the value of
that participation would be far outweighed by the negative effects of Russian involvement.
(The U.N. Security Council throughout much of its history comes to mind.)
transition to democracy has twin values—it is inherently desirable from a human rights perspective and it is likely to promote stability. To achieve this objective, new security arrangements must address the new democracies' need for military, economic, and political guarantees.

7. Achieve Broad Political Acceptability

A future security model will be more stable if it accounts for basic political “facts of life” in the United States and Europe. Whereas governments can lead, as well as be led by, public opinion, the viability of any arrangement must be judged in light of several important political trends: the U.S. public’s desire to shift the defense burden to Western Europe, European support for political and economic integration, an interest in broader security frameworks in Europe, and a less “military” approach to security.

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8There is a considerable literature on whether democracies are less likely to go to war with each other than with other political systems. Although democracy per se does not guarantee against conflict in East Central Europe (driven, for example, by popularly inspired irredentism), we believe, in the specific context of today's Europe, that prosperous democracies are more likely to accept nonmilitary conflict resolution.

9A similar interest would extend to the newly independent Soviet republics and those that become independent as the process of transformation continues. This would depend on the commitment of these republics to political and economic transformation. To date, commitment to these principles remains uncertain.
3. FIVE MODELS FOR EUROPEAN SECURITY

As the events of 1989-1990 unfolded, observers of European affairs began to assess the implications of the demise of the bloc-to-bloc system and to struggle with the challenge of constructing a new security order for the continent. Most were optimistic about managing relations in the “new” Europe, and a number of alternative approaches were suggested.¹ Our intent is not to describe any of these specific proposals, but to construct an analytic framework to capture the range of options.

Five models are presented here.

- Ad hoc alliances
- NATO dominant
- United Europe
- Collective security
- Overlapping security institutions

For each model, we present (1) a general characterization of the organizing principle and assumptions around which the system is based, including the nature of the threat(s) to which the security system is designed to respond, and the principal institutions that would make up the security structure; (2) the role and posture of conventional and nuclear forces under the security system, including arms control regimes, as appropriate; (3) the system’s relationship to out-of-area threats; and (4) the role of the United States in the system, including the role of U.S. forces and their posture within Europe.

AD HOC ALLIANCES
Organizing Principle

An "ad hoc alliances" arrangement is the most familiar of our five models because it reflects the prevailing system in Europe prior to the two-bloc arrangement of the Cold War. An ad hoc alliances system is the "default" case in the post-Cold War era; it assumes that no viable formal institutions emerge to take the place of the two blocs. As a result, security is "re-nationalized"; nations try to maintain their security and prevent any nation (or group of nations) from threatening or coercing another through ad hoc alliances and through their own military, economic, and political capabilities. This system does not provide a means for ensuring the participation or integration of any European power, because each state acts independently and has maximum control over its actions.

The principal "threat" in such a system is the emergence of non-status quo powers seeking to change national boundaries for irredentist or hegemonic reasons. This threat is not limited to military aggression; the possibility of political or economic coercion also might lead to the formation of counterbalancing alliances.

An ad hoc system is by nature fluid. Alliances shift and re-form as the political, economic, and military power of individual nations and groups change and as the geopolitical ambitions of its leaders change. There is no ideological component to the alliances, which means that any nation can be a potential adversary or ally. Although fluid, the system does not preclude the emergence of a "Concert of Europe" type of arrangement where several of the powers collectively agree to deter aggressive actions by one state against another. By definition, however, this arrangement is not institutionalized, and so it must adapt to changes in individual nations' relative strength as well as shifting national interests.

For this reason, it is impossible to specify a priori the composition of the European alliances that might emerge in a Europe that has reverted to an ad hoc alliances system; alliance participation depends on who is perceived as a potential "non-status quo power." Some conceivable variants include recreating the World War II alignment (United States-United Kingdom-France-Russia and Germany-Italy), a Rapallo-type alignment with Germany and Russia allied against the United States-France-United Kingdom, or a United States-Germany alignment against France-United Kingdom-Russia.

Although an ad hoc system is typically expressed in alignments involving major powers, their subsidiary allies may play an important role in the success or failure of the system, as small and medium-sized powers seek larger "champions" to balance threats from
other small and medium-sized powers. For instance, the newly emerging democracies in Central and Eastern Europe may seek to establish alliances with other nations to ensure their security in the center of Europe—perhaps with Germany for economic assistance and the United States or Russia or other ex-Soviet republics for military guarantees. This could be crucial in Southeastern Europe, where the potential for conflict is highest and where alliances (e.g., Germany with Hungary to counter a perceived threat from Romania) could either provide stability, or (as is clear from 1914) could lead to small conflicts escalating into larger confrontations.

By definition, this model implies that all current security institutions—such as NATO, the Western European Union (WEU), the political component of the Economic Community (EC), and Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE)—either become ineffective or fail to evolve in a way that is relevant to the new European realities.

**Military Forces**

The size of national military forces will vary as perceptions of the identity and nature of the threat change.\(^2\) No external constraints (such as arms control agreements) form the basis for limiting national force levels, since individual countries want to maintain flexibility to counter new and threatening alliances.\(^3\) Without some dramatic change in European states' political aspirations, force levels are likely to remain at current levels or below. However, maintaining a military balance at current levels may prove very fragile; there is a high propensity in this system for a new arms race to break out within a region (e.g., Southeastern Europe) or theaterwide, since there are no institutions to dampen a spiral of build-up followed by counter build-up.\(^4\)

If there is no predetermined "enemy," nations are likely to restructure their forces to emphasize flexibility and mobility, although this too might change if an identifiable non-status quo power emerges that can conduct heavily armored offensive military action.

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\(^2\)This, of course, is not the only, or indeed necessarily the dominant, factor in generating a nation's military forces. Factors such as the health of the economy and other budget priorities play an important role.

\(^3\)In an ad hoc alliances world, attempts at arms control are likely to prove futile: the ineffectiveness of arms control and disarmament efforts (such as the Washington and London naval treaties) in the interwar period is a case in point.

Nuclear weapons also play a crucial role, since nuclear weapons allow smaller powers, with less potent military forces, to balance larger powers at relatively low cost. Thus, this arrangement might lead to nuclear proliferation in Europe; absent durable alliances based on enduring common interests, a nonnuclear country will have little confidence in the protection of another country's nuclear umbrella. Nuclear proliferation does not necessarily imply instability, however; depending on the identity of the new nuclear states and the security of nuclear weapons control, limited proliferation could arguably enhance stability.

Out-of-Area Threats

In the past, out-of-area contingencies including European powers were often a proxy for intra-European conflicts. In the post-colonial and post-Cold War era, the risks of such conflicts are much smaller, primarily because direct European involvement out-of-area is much less. Nevertheless, faced with out-of-area conflicts, there remains considerable potential for European states' interests to diverge. For example, should there be a repeat of the Iraq crisis, it is possible to imagine some European nations concluding that a softer line on Iraq's invasion of Kuwait might give them an advantage over others. (Iraq attempted to play on this potential for divergent interests in its approach to the USSR and France.) In some cases (e.g., a Libyan terrorist attack on Italy), European nations may be inclined to act together independent of their "continent-based" alignments (although they would lack any institutional arrangement to coordinate a common response), while in other cases, continental rivalries are transferred to out-of-area conflict.

The Role of the United States

The extent of the U.S. role depends to some degree on its perceived stake in European stability and the extent of the threat to stability. History suggests that, without a direct threat (particularly a threat based on ideology), the United States is likely to withdraw from Europe's "quarrels," playing the role of a balancer—but at a distance. Thus, the United States is not committed to any one nation or group of nations, but rather to maintaining a balance against potential aggression or coercion by any non-status quo power. The United States retains forces in the continental United States (CONUS) to respond to a European military contingency and to engage in joint exercises with allies, whereas force deployments (including nuclear weapons) in Europe decline considerably or end completely. In addition, the U.S. nuclear guarantee becomes much less firm, as a result of the need to retain flexibility to adjust commitments in order to "balance" any emerging threats.
NATO DOMINANT
Organizing Principle

The NATO dominant arrangement maintains the status quo in transatlantic/West European security relationships as much as possible given the collapse of the Warsaw Pact. Broadly, this approach continues a bipolar orientation in Europe, with the Eastern pole radically weakened by the Soviet Union's dissolution, the loss of its military allies and its defensive territorial glacis, and unilateral and multilateral force reductions. However, NATO adapts its objectives and structure to take into account the security vacuum created by the Soviet withdrawal from Eastern Europe and to maintain its viability as its original raison d'être (deterring Soviet expansion and political coercion) is eroded.

In the pure NATO dominant model, NATO's security guarantees apply only to the current NATO members. Central and East European countries retain diplomatic links with NATO and some bilateral security ties with each other or with the former Soviet republics as a hedge against, for example, German irredentism. An important variant of this model involves NATO extending its security guarantee to these countries and perhaps some former Soviet republics such as Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia.

This system is designed primarily to counter the threat posed by the residual military capability of the former Soviet Union. Although all concede that unilateral actions and the conventional arms control treaty substantially reduce the likelihood that the former Soviet Union will launch a massive invasion of the West, the republics continue to possess conventional and nuclear forces that might threaten Western interests, including threats to NATO flanks and efforts to reassert influence/hegemony over the Central and East European nations.

\[5\] The NATO dominant model depends critically on the future character of the former Soviet Union. The orientation of NATO toward deterring threats emanating from the former Soviet Union assumes that these republics have not integrated themselves into the West and still pose some uncertainty for military planners. If the former Soviet Union is not a threat, then a variation on this model would be one in which NATO assumes responsibility for managing lesser threats.

\[6\] It is possible to imagine a variant of the NATO dominant system in which membership is restricted to the current 16, but they agree to act together in a range of out-of-area contingencies, including conflicts in Europe that do not directly threaten member states. This would enhance the "comprehensiveness" of the system. Absent radical change of views by key NATO members, especially France, however, this development seems unlikely unless NATO is acting as a military component to other organizations (most probably the CSCE), which would bring this variant within the ambit of the collective security approach discussed below.
In this model, NATO is the dominant security institution. The 16 current members form the core. NATO’s security charter (Articles V and VI of the Washington Treaty) remains limited to the European theater, although, as today, attacks on a member state from outside of Europe also trigger the security guarantees. The NATO integrated military command remains an ongoing component of the security arrangement. France, Spain, and Iceland continue to have special arrangements with respect to their military commitment to NATO.

Other institutions play secondary and supporting roles. The WEU continues as a forum for intra-European consultation, but does not act as an alternative military forum for organizing West Europe’s defense. The EC through intergovernmental consultation continues to discuss “foreign policy” matters, especially those touching on out-of-area and diplomatic/economic issues, but no true security dimension emerges. (This necessarily implies that deep political integration is not fully achieved.) The EC fails to broaden sufficiently to integrate fully the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. CSCE is “institutionalized,” but plays a limited security role similar to the UN—useful as a forum for discussion, mobilizing European-wide opinion, and setting norms, but acting only through consensus and without committed military forces.

Military Forces

The NATO integrated military command and Defense Planning Committee are retained, principally oriented toward the residual military capability possessed by the former Soviet republics. This means that as the former Soviet military completes its withdrawal from Eastern Europe and warning time of any large-scale military threat to the West increases, NATO draws down its forces and keeps those remaining at lower levels of readiness. The Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) treaty governs the level of forces—as a practical matter, force levels are likely to be much lower than in CFE, as a result of domestic political factors in the West and East. Force structure is organized around three components: a small number of highly ready and mobile forces to respond to unforeseen and rapidly developing contingencies; infrastructure and manning to support force reconstitution in the event of a drawn out crisis that provides an enemy with time to mobilize; and reserve forces to permit such a mobilization.

7If NATO’s security guarantee is extended beyond the 16, closer association, up to and including full membership, would be available to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe.
In support of both political and military objectives, NATO moves extensively to multinational forces, which reinforces the solidarity of the Alliance. Stationed allied forces remain in the western part of Germany but at substantially reduced levels. After the complete withdrawal of ex-Soviet forces from the eastern part of Germany, NATO stations forces there as well.\(^8\) The cross-stationing of NATO multinational units addresses the problem of German "singularization" (i.e., some multinational units that include German forces are stationed in the UK, Italy, etc.). France still does not permit NATO units on its territory, but other arrangements (such as the Franco-German corps) evolve to connect French military forces with other European countries.

NATO strategy continues to rely on nuclear weapons, although the nations reduce force levels and eliminate all short-range land systems. Air-delivered systems remain based throughout the Alliance. NATO reduces its reliance on nuclear weapons, while reserving the possibility of first use of nuclear weapons in response to a conventional attack.\(^9\)

**Out-of-Area Threats**

NATO security guarantees are geographically limited by Article VI of the Washington Treaty; out-of-area threats are dealt with informally and ad hoc by nations with a common interest (as was the case in the Gulf war). NATO is not directly involved, and there are no formal procedures or institutions to meet this category of threat.\(^10\)

**The Role of the United States**

The United States continues to play a central role in a NATO dominant Europe. The dramatic decline in the threat from the former Soviet Union reduces European military reliance on the United States, but the United States remains the only country that counterbalances the remaining strategic nuclear force of the former Soviet Union, as well as the only country that can respond to its remaining global projection capabilities. The United

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\(^8\)In the variant where NATO extends security guarantees, NATO forces exercise with (and may even be stationed in) the Central and East European countries.

\(^9\)To the extent that Central and East European countries join NATO, they fall under the U.S. nuclear umbrella. Even without formal membership, NATO implicitly reserves the option of using nuclear weapons in response to aggression by any former Soviet republic against an East European democracy.

\(^10\)We exclude out-of-area from the "base case" of NATO dominant because an explicit out-of-area role could introduce tensions into NATO that might undermine the solidarity needed to achieve what we have defined here as the principal objective—European security. A possible variant of NATO dominant could include a more explicit out-of-area mission.
States also continues to play a role as the honest broker in intra-NATO relations, a role that remains important with the failure of Western Europe to achieve true political union.

U.S. military forces remain stationed in Europe—at levels well below current forces, but still in operationally significant numbers—to function both as national units and as part of multinational units. Initially, U.S. force levels are set at CFE levels. Over time, this number is reduced.

**UNITED EUROPE**

**Organizing Principle**

United Europe is based on a tripolar concept of security. It is the product of Europeans' search for a third way between the United States and the former Soviet Union—in part to enhance European political independence and in part as a result of growing inwardness and isolationism in both the United States and the former Soviet republics. A deeper and wider EC serves as the centerpiece of this third pole.

This system addresses the range of internal stabilities in Europe that are likely to arise over the next decades, including historical, ethnic, and national conflict. Although a united Europe possesses considerable conventional and nuclear forces to counter the remaining military power of the ex-Soviet republics, it is less capable and effective than an alliance that includes the United States. As a result, the united Europe system is oriented more toward insulating the rest of Europe from instability that might arise from the continued break-up of the former Soviet Union than toward protecting against concerted political/military action by the ex-Soviet republics against one or more neighbors.

This Europe-based arrangement is extended to include virtually all democratic European states (with the exception of what remains of the Soviet Union), though it may include some of the former Soviet republics as they establish market democracies.¹¹

Political and economic ties among the EC members are “deepened,” and Europe approaches a federation (if not a “United States of Europe”). Integration by itself reduces the likelihood of military conflict between members of the enhanced EC, while remaining conflicts are handled as internal or “civil” matters, with the EC empowered to act politically and militarily as necessary to respond to such internal conflict, as well as to external aggression.

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¹¹At the point that all the European republics of the former Soviet Union (including Russia) become acceptable candidates for EC membership, the relevance of this model disappears and collapses into a variant of the collective security system minus the United States and Canada.
The EC takes on an explicit security dimension, with the right to call on member states' military forces in aid of commonly agreed objectives. Some type of West European defense union could serve as the core security mechanism during the transition phase. To handle internal conflict, this model would require either a more supranational executive arm or an extension of some kind of qualified majority voting. Otherwise, one or more participant states could block “federal” action to resolve the conflict.

NATO continues as a political forum for transatlantic consultation and the Washington Treaty remains intact, but the military component of NATO diminishes drastically and the integrated military command is dissolved. Other regional political groupings (the Nordic Council, the Hexagonale) remain to address regional issues, but they are subordinate to the EC. The CSCE provides formal links to both the United States and the former Soviet Union, but it remains an organization that acts only on consensus, and without a military dimension.

**Military Forces**

European national military forces function somewhat analogously to the U.S. National Guard—trained by and available to individual nations under normal circumstances, but subject to being “federalized” by the EC when necessary. National force size and structure limits are negotiated internally within the EC, with the EC representing member states in broader multilateral fora (as the EC speaks for all member states in the General Agreement on Tariff and Trade (GATT) negotiations today). A small “federalized” multinational force exists in peacetime to respond to rapid contingencies; otherwise, forces are designed around mobilization of individual national units that act under collective direction.

The French and British nuclear systems provide a European nuclear umbrella under the collective direction of the EC (although each retains some “supreme national interest” control over the decision to use nuclear weapons). Nuclear weapons are not stationed outside France and the United Kingdom during peacetime, but could be deployed beyond their borders if necessary.
Out-of-Area Threats

The EC's security responsibilities extend equally to out-of-area contingencies. Although individual nations likely retain some right to act independently when an out-of-area problem involves an interest not shared broadly by the EC (France in Chad, for example), the EC has the right to call on all members to contribute when a collective decision to use military force is reached.

The Role of the United States

The U.S. role is sharply diminished in the united Europe system, even more than in the ad hoc alliances model. Although the United States maintains bilateral relations with individual European countries, political ties through NATO, and a more direct bilateral relation with the EC, the United States distances itself from European security affairs. A resurgent post-Soviet threat sufficient to require the United States to add its political and military might to the EC to preserve a European balance is the only development that brings U.S. forces back into Europe, but the United States does retain some capability in CONUS to deploy to Europe in a crisis.

COLLECTIVE SECURITY

Organizing Principle

Collective security is designed to give all parties with a stake in European stability (including the United States and Canada) a formal role in a pan-European/Atlantic security system. All member countries are committed to resolve their differences peaceably and to guarantee each other's security.

This system is designed to respond to any of the threats discussed above. The model does not explicitly authorize intervention in domestic conflict, although it does provide political guarantees for individual and minority rights and political freedom (democratic processes), which may contribute to reducing internal conflict.

A collective security order requires a new international legal framework and institution(s) (though they could arise out of the current CSCE structure). A successful collective security framework requires the ability to decide issues and to act without unanimous consent (a European Security Council is one model). A Security Council might consist of eight members—five permanent (United States, Russia, France, United Kingdom, and Germany), and three rotating. The Helsinki Final Act provides a starting point for creating a treaty that commits all member nations to respect existing national boundaries and to respond collectively to any violation of the treaty.
All European powers including the United States and Canada are members. The competence of the organization extends to security, economics, and human rights.

NATO continues as a political organization or “caucus” of the Western countries within the collective security framework, but has no independent military competence. Other regional “caucuses,” such as the Nordic states, Mediterranean nations, etc., also function at the margins. The EC broadens and deepens, but leaves security matters to the CSCE.

Military Forces

The collective security order provides the forum for negotiating substantial reductions in conventional forces throughout the continent, based on collectively agreed sufficiency rules for overall force levels. These arms control rules are supplemented by confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs) designed to enhance warning and restrict the ability to conduct offensive operations. A verification and monitoring center is established under the treaty to inspect and enforce limits.

In peacetime, most military forces remain under national control and training. A skeletal “blue-hatted force” is available to respond rapidly to small contingencies, to conduct peacekeeping activities, to form the command/infrastructure in the event it is necessary to mobilize large-scale forces under collective command, and to plan in peacetime. Conflict prevention and arbitration institutions function under the mantle of the CSCE.

Existing nuclear states retain their nuclear weapons, but no nuclear weapons are stationed on other nationals’ territory. (The United States retains sea-based systems committed to collective security.) All nuclear weapon states are committed by the treaty to a no-first-use pledge against any other member state of the collective security system.

Out-of-Area

The collective security system has no responsibility for out-of-area contingencies.12 Individual nations might agree collectively to act together, but this would be outside the formal treaty or institutional framework.

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12States agree not to assist third countries in attacks on member states, but do not necessarily commit to come to the assistance of a member state in a conflict with non-member nations.
The Role of the United States

The United States plays a central political and modest military role in the collective security model, as a stabilizing force outside Europe committed to use political, economic, and military force to enforce the treaty's non-aggression pact. A small number of U.S. forces are maintained in Europe in peacetime as a part of the CSCE rapid action, peacekeeping, and reconstitution base. Additional mobilization capability in CONUS is available for use in theater as necessary.

OVERLAPPING SECURITY INSTITUTIONS

Organizing Principle

Because potential threats to European security in the coming decades are diverse and difficult to predict, all existing European institutions vie for a role, and no one system is ideally suited to respond to all contingencies. Existing institutions are maintained or adapted where possible, whereas new ones may be grafted on to fill gaps and respond to changing requirements. Security is provided by the overlapping nature of the institutions and associated commitments.

This system is designed to respond to all the potential sources of instability identified above, including the former Soviet Union's further dissolution, ethnic or national conflict, irredentism, and spillovers from out-of-area conflict (Middle East and North Africa).

NATO is retained with its current membership as the principal hedge against reversion and military aggression by the former Soviet republics, as well as the key political link between the United States and Western Europe. Other institutions rival NATO for the principal role in ensuring European security. The WEU becomes the key military bridge between NATO and the EC, available to its members when they wish to act independently from the United States or when they wish to coordinate military activities with France. The EC broadens and deepens (full economic integration of the 12 by the end of 1992 and movement toward political union, with new members and associate members, after 1992), expanding the scope of political and economic integration (especially to the emerging democracies of Central and Eastern Europe), and thus reducing the prospects for conflict. The CSCE is institutionalized and serves as the principal arms control and norm-setting forum; the role of unanimity is modified and consensual peacekeeping activities undertaken, but no European security council (with the authority to mobilize military forces) is established.
Other ad hoc groupings, especially regional groupings, proliferate; these groupings have little institutional structure, but they are available to respond to regional crises on a political level. The Council of Europe is folded into the CSCE, which assumes responsibility for the Human Rights Court.

**Military Forces**

NATO, the CSCE, and the WEU are the three principal institutions with military functions. NATO maintains an integrated military command much along the lines of the NATO dominant system, except that the European allies have greater defense responsibilities. NATO's command structure is reoriented to place European commanders in senior positions—this might mean a European Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR), and definitely entails revamping the old system. This and other alterations to NATO strategy and doctrine meet the twin objectives of making the institution more acceptable to its members (Europeans and Americans) and less threatening to the East.

The CSCE is institutionalized and is responsible for arms control beyond CFE and providing some security guarantees to the member countries—especially Central and East European countries and republics of the former Soviet Union. In this respect, CSCE expands its current functions to include mediation, conciliation, and peacekeeping. In an arrangement similar to the United Nations, nations agree to contribute national forces to CSCE-agreed actions. The norm-setting functions are expanded to assist emerging democracies and ensure individual, national, and ethnic rights. The WEU is strengthened both to serve as the European military pillar of the Alliance to act in Europe when NATO does not choose to become involved and to coordinate European out-of-area activities. Over time, the WEU might merge with the EC.

NATO nuclear strategy is altered to account for nuclear force reductions in Europe. The United States does not station any nuclear forces in the theater, but maintains sea-based systems committed to NATO and makes air- and land-based systems available in case of a crisis. Britain and France remain nuclear powers, but they do not extend their guarantees to other countries—except in the British case through NATO.
Out-of-Area Threats

The nations coordinate out-of-area policies through ad hoc, bilateral, and multilateral means. The EC and WEU assume formal responsibility for organizing any unified European response. The United States works bilaterally with allies through NATO and, in some cases, directly with the EC and the WEU.

U.S. Role

The overlapping security institutions model provides the United States with a range of mechanisms to pursue its objectives, which in the end allow it to play a significant military and political role. In this model, responsibilities are shared with European institutions and countries. The United States no longer has a dominant role in any institution; the U.S. role is strongest in NATO. NATO still provides the most effective way for the United States to maintain a small force presence in Europe, tailored to respond to crises and to provide a mobilization and reinforcement base. U.S. support for other European initiatives lends credibility to institutions like CSCE and ensures a U.S. voice in fora like the EC. In short, stability is guaranteed by the United States and by a strong Western Europe.
4. ASSESSING THE SECURITY MODELS

As noted at the outset, the models presented here are ideal types constructed to evaluate the merits of different approaches to European security. We have intentionally exaggerated the differences among the systems (with the exception of the overlapping security institutions system, which stems from a mix of the others) to enhance their analytic utility. Building models that too closely resemble one another would make it difficult to understand the strengths and weaknesses of the various approaches. Having described the models in general terms, we can now assess how well they meet the overall objective of stability, as defined earlier in Sec. 2. Table 1 summarizes our assessment of the models, which are described in more detail below.¹

Table 1
Assessment of Security Models

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model</th>
<th>Comprehensiveness</th>
<th>Reliability</th>
<th>Role of U.S.</th>
<th>Role of Former Soviet Union</th>
<th>Role of Integration</th>
<th>Eastern Europe</th>
<th>Acceptability</th>
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<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>2</td>
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<tr>
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<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTE: 1 = fails to achieve; 5 = fully achieves.

¹These assessments may change if either the models or the components of stability are modified. For instance, the NATO dominant model scores low on fostering democracy in Central and Eastern Europe; extending the security guarantee to these countries would raise that score, while at the same time lowering the rating for ensuring the constructive participation of the former Soviet Union. Our intent is to present a framework for thinking through the problem, based on several key assumptions about the shape of the security arrangements. From this, the reader is free to make individual judgments about how well each system meets the identified objectives and to construct an optimal security model accordingly.
COMPREHENSIVENESS

The political and military changes that are taking place have expanded the range of potential threats to transnational stability. Thus a key attribute of a successful security arrangement for Europe will be the degree to which the security system is designed to cover the full range of threats. The method we have used for constructing the alternative security models makes this primarily a definitional issue (e.g., the NATO dominant system is by definition structured to respond to the threat of aggression from the former Soviet Union against the West, but not aggression against Eastern Europe or conflict between non-NATO states).

United Europe, collective security, and overlapping security institutions models by definition are designed to respond to the full range of threats to stability in Europe. The overlapping institutions model provides the most comprehensive coverage of the three; collective security is slightly less comprehensive because it does not by itself provide a framework for responding to out-of-area attacks on a member of the security system. The united Europe model, without the support of the United States to balance the former Soviet Union's conventional and strategic nuclear capabilities, has limited coverage. NATO dominant coverage is skewed toward one end of the spectrum, although coverage would be greater if NATO were to extend security guarantees to the emerging democracies in Eastern Europe and former Soviet republics or adopt an out-of-area role. Applying "comprehensiveness" to the ad hoc alliances is problematic, but in principle such an arrangement could cover all contingencies if small states can win the support of powerful backers against aggression by either small or large states. Unlike the first three, however, there is nothing in the ad hoc arrangement that necessarily entails such broad coverage of threats.

RELIABILITY

On the whole, the reliability of the alternative security systems is inversely related to coverage. NATO dominant ranks high on reliability, given the allied nations' long-standing successful collaboration in the NATO framework and the broad commonality of interests. There is an important question, however, about the reliability of the NATO guarantee with respect to attacks on members from out of region: for example, a Middle Eastern war involving Turkey or a conflict involving both NATO and non-NATO states on the Mediterranean littoral. Extending NATO's guarantee to the emerging democracies improves coverage but probably decreases reliability, since the willingness of the Alliance to
defend Poland against an attack is likely to be more problematic than the willingness to
defend Germany against aggression by the former Soviet Union.2

The overlapping security systems and united Europe models both fall somewhat
below NATO on the scale of reliability. Under the overlapping security systems
arrangement, there is a risk that complex arrangements will leave important gaps, create
conflicts among institutions and approaches (including divided loyalties), or weaken
attachment to the heretofore most reliable security element, NATO. Its strength stems from
the fact that it builds on existing arrangements and contains enough flexibility—and even
duplication—to allow for a variety of possible responses to threats to stability.3 United
Europe, too, builds on an institution with a growing track record, the EC, including, in recent
years, a greater involvement in security issues through European Political Cooperation and
the WEU, and is based on strong common economic and political interests. However,
without a significantly deeper political union, national views diverge sufficiently to raise
doubts about this system’s reliability. A further weakness is an expanded EC’s limited
ability to meet a serious military challenge from the former Soviet Union without the support
of U.S. nuclear and conventional forces, although the seriousness of this criticism depends
on the domestic and international orientation as well as the military capability of what
remains of the former Soviet Union.

Both ad hoc alliances and collective security have serious weaknesses from the point
of view of reliability and are the most prone to catastrophic failure.

History documents the ad hoc alliance system’s weakness. Because the great powers
define what instabilities they will tolerate, conflicts among smaller states might not be
deterred and large states may be unwilling to risk general war to defend small
allies.4 Conversely, small conflicts could escalate to Europe-wide war as a result of interlocking
alliances.

2Similarly, if NATO assumes responsibility for lesser threats, then its reliability
would also be in question. As the Yugoslavian crisis suggests, the divergent interests of the
NATO countries may become more apparent when the threat is less than an all-out invasion
by the former Soviet Union.

3The Yugoslav crisis is again a good test for the reliability of security systems.
Given that the current system is closest to the overlapping institutions model, these pros and
cons are apparent in how NATO, the EC, and CSCE have managed the crisis. See James
Steinberg, The Role of European Institutions in Balkan Security: Some Lessons from
Yugoslavia, RAND, N-3445-FF, forthcoming, for a more complete discussion.

4One solution for small states’ insecurity in this arrangement would be to acquire
nuclear weapons. It is an open question whether the broad proliferation of nuclear weapons
throughout Europe would raise the threshold against aggression (and act as a stabilizing
force, as nuclear weapons have arguably done in the bipolar world) or whether it would
increase the prospects for nuclear conflict.
The experience of the League of Nations and United Nations raises doubts about the reliability of a collective security system, especially where a large power threatens stability. But there is an important caveat here: the reliability of a collective security system could improve over time if slow but steady CSCE institutionalization developed new habits of pan-European cooperation, and if political reform in the East proceeded successfully, thereby creating a stronger identity of interests among all European states.\textsuperscript{5}

**U.S. ROLE**

The threshold question for this subobjective is whether the United States is explicitly included or not. Both the ad hoc alliance and the united Europe models provide the United States with only tenuous European ties, and with little control or influence over events. Any U.S. guarantee or commitment to allies would be of limited effectiveness and reliability. This assessment could change under the ad hoc alliance model, depending on the nature of the particular alliance configuration at any point in time.

The second question relates to the quality of the transatlantic relationship. In some ways, the NATO dominant model provides the most solid basis for a continued U.S. political/military role in Europe, and indirectly constrains the likelihood of reviving old intra-European antagonisms. However, U.S. dominance of NATO is not sustainable over the long run, since European economic and political success will lead Europeans to seek a more equal relationship with the United States, and U.S. domestic pressure is even now calling for shifting defense burdens beyond what this model envisions. Whereas some adaptation within NATO is possible, disputes over key issues (such as the nationality of SACEUR) could prove highly divisive. Collective security engages the United States in European affairs, but provides a weak or uncertain mechanism for ensuring U.S. political and military involvement should the need arise. It is unclear whether the United States would agree to direct involvement in lesser European crises or whether the small U.S. crisis prevention force would be adequate to deter a large nation’s hostile intentions or to provide the basis for a mobilization force. A higher score goes to the overlapping institutions model because the United States plays a constructive role in connection with all the existing institutions,

\textsuperscript{5}Of course, this would be the least stressing case. If the former Soviet Union and East European countries become successful capitalist democracies, the potential threats to European stability would be substantially diminished. Although the argument is nearly circular, a case can be made that moving toward a collective security order (at least in a step-by-step approach) fosters this process of convergence, and should not be made dependent on convergence occurring in the first place.
allowing it varying degrees of political influence while providing the rationale for somewhat larger conventional forces, thus enhancing deterrence.

**CONSTRUCTIVE PARTICIPATION OF THE FORMER SOVIET UNION**

History, geography, and the possession of powerful conventional and nuclear forces ensure that the former Soviet Union or even Russia alone will continue to play an important role in shaping Europe’s security in the next century. Whether it will be a force for stability or a threat to others depends in large part on the course of internal developments, including the outcome of political and economic reform and the continuing break-up of the former Soviet Union into constituent republics and regional groupings. At the same time, the prospects for liberal reform are likely to be enhanced if the external environment is relatively benign; conversely, if the former Soviet Union or Russia feels threatened by events in Europe, it will be more inclined to adopt a defensive and potentially heavily armed posture. Thus, a stable Europe will promote reform, and successful reform in turn is likely to lead to greater European stability.

Including the elements of the former Soviet Union as participating members of a new European security arrangement also enhances stability by giving the leadership a means to advance and protect their interests other than through the use of military force or coercion based on the threat of force.

Measured against this standard, the NATO dominant and united Europe systems fail, because both are specifically designed to exclude the former Soviet republics from directly participating in the central security mechanism. NATO dominant is perhaps most deficient because it confronts the republics with a large, capable U.S.-Western Europe military alliance. The situation would pose even greater difficulties if the East European nations or former Soviet republics joined NATO (or at least benefited from NATO security guarantees). Because the united Europe arrangement entails looser ties with the United States and does not call for large European forces, it would prove less threatening.

In the ad hoc alliance system, the former Soviet Union is no more nor less “involved” in the system than other powers, and so can be considered neutral on the question of participation.

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6NATO arguably does offer an element of security assurance to Europe as a whole — its ability to constrain independent military activity by Germany. This point is covered as an element of the “German integration” component discussed below.
Both the overlapping institutions and collective security models assume participation by the former Soviet republics. The collective security model is the most positive in this respect, because the central institution accords the former Soviet Union an equal role. The overlapping model, which continues a military role for NATO at a time when the Warsaw Pact has dissolved, is less favorable.7

GERMAN INTEGRATION

German unification has inevitably raised the issue of whether a strong, united Germany could pose a threat to European stability in the future. There is a broad consensus that Germany’s membership in NATO, coupled with the absence of a general staff or large, independent armed forces, has allayed fears that Germany might act militarily against the interests of its neighbors. Similarly, embedding Germany in the EC has reduced (though not entirely eliminated) fears of Germany acting against the political and economic interests of its 11 partners. Integration serves stability both by reducing the need for Germany to act independently (since other powerful countries are committed to Germany’s security) and by constraining Germany’s ability to act independently (through transnational and supranational institutions that constrain national sovereignty).

The ad hoc alliances arrangement is clearly the worst in this respect, since on its face it replicates the geopolitical situations of the 19th and first half of the 20th century, giving rise to fear of German resurgence.

The NATO dominant, united Europe, and collective security models all provide for integrating Germany, although each has strengths and weaknesses. United Europe is perhaps the best of the three because it achieves strong linkages in the political and economic dimension, and some in the military (as a European defense entity emerges through the EC/WEU), but the absence of the U.S. nuclear umbrella and the need to rely on French and United Kingdom nuclear forces (albeit under Europe-wide control) could lead to German insecurity. For NATO dominant, German integration is ensured primarily through the military dimension, with the strong link to the United States the best assurance against Germany’s need to develop its own nuclear capability or more powerful conventional forces.

7A related issue is how well the system deals with the continued break-up of the former Soviet Union. Although we do not provide separate rankings on this dimension, our analysis suggests that the united Europe, collective security, and overlapping institutions models have some mechanisms for accommodating the needs and interests of newly independent republics, whereas the ad hoc alliance and NATO dominant models are less able to deal with potential instabilities from the continued fracturing of the USSR.
The weakness of this approach is its failure to develop more intimate political and economic links among West European nations (as in the united Europe system) as well as the lack of a formal mechanism to associate Germany with its neighbors to the East. Collective security does give Germany formal linkage with all European states as well as the United States and the ex-Soviet republics, but is subject to the now familiar objection that when each nation is allied to every other, there are no special relations that can provide a sure grounding for security.

The overlapping institutions model cures each of these defects, and so provides the best means for integrating Germany politically, economically, and militarily.

SUCCESSFUL TRANSITION IN THE EAST

With the end of the two-bloc system, instabilities in (and among) the Central and East European countries and on the periphery of the former Soviet Union are the most likely sources of conflict in the new Europe. A successful political and economic transition to free markets and open democracy can help to alleviate many of the sources of instability, although democracy is no guarantee against ethnic rivalries and national tensions.

Security arrangements are only a part of what is necessary to achieve successful transitions in Central and Eastern Europe. But they can make an important contribution, not only by creating a more stable external environment, but also by facilitating reduced military spending (which will help economic development) and by creating political links that can lead to enhanced trade, technology transfer, economic assistance, and the like.

An ad hoc alliances arrangement is clearly the least desirable system in this regard because it leaves these nations to fend for themselves or to seek larger champions who may prove less than fully reliable. NATO dominant does not address East European security needs, leaving them more vulnerable to influence or coercion from powerful neighbors. The variant of NATO dominant that includes extending NATO’s umbrella to the East is better suited to meeting some of Eastern Europe’s security concerns, but it lacks economic and political dimensions. NATO’s role in addressing national and ethnic tensions is limited, but it could help mediate security disputes between East European countries if they became NATO members (as NATO has modulated the conflict between Greece and Turkey). The security commitment under the collective security model may prove frail, although it must be acknowledged that these countries have been among the foremost proponents of collective security arrangements. It is also weak in the economic dimension.
United Europe offers the best prospects for providing economic and political support for Eastern Europe's successful transition, as is evident from the role of EC membership in the transitions of Spain and Portugal. The united Europe arrangement would convert inter-East European disputes into internal conflicts, which would be subject to the enhanced community's political and military jurisdiction. The overlapping systems model, with a broader and deeper EC, would offer similar benefits and, in addition, would have stronger security guarantees because of the continued existence of NATO.

ACCEPTABILITY

Although this Note does not address problems of transition as such, nations are more likely to adopt a security arrangement that commands broad public support. Acceptability may be less important in relative terms but it is a desirable property.

We have identified two features that fall into this category: fairer burdensharing (a better match of means, interests, and responsibilities) and the degree to which publics will view the new arrangement as politically desirable.

The ad hoc system scores well in principle on burdensharing, since each country must look out for itself and the possibility for free riding is diminished. But it scores badly on the other element: despite some residual national sentiment in most European countries, there is growing popular support for systems that reflect an emerging sense of European identity. (This, of course, varies from country to country.)

The NATO dominant system is problematic. As the threat from the former Soviet Union diminishes, it will become increasingly difficult to persuade European and U.S. publics to maintain an elaborate and costly security mechanism oriented primarily against a highly unlikely, residual threat. Although the NATO described by our model does include some shift in defense responsibilities, the problem of burdensharing is likely to remain serious under this system.

The united Europe and collective security systems are likely to score high in public acceptability, especially in Eastern Europe. The principal public objections are (as voiced by some in the UK and elsewhere) that united Europe requires relinquishing valued prerogatives of sovereignty and (as voiced by the smaller EC states) that their influence will decline. This is slightly less of a problem for the collective security system, at least in economic and political, if not military, affairs. United Europe offers an excellent answer to the burdensharing problem, since Europe is responsible for its own security and the costs of defense (like the EC budget in general) will be negotiated to reflect wealth and resources.
Both, however, require a substantial change in national attitudes and the development of new institutions, the prospects of which remain uncertain. The overlapping institutions system offers considerable benefits in each of these areas, especially from a short-term perspective.
5. CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS

In assessing the competing security systems’ overall merits, two overarching principles stand out. First, to ensure stability, any new security structure should be designed to address the full range of threats. The conflicts associated with the dissolution of the former Soviet Union and the continuing hostilities in Yugoslavia emphasize the need to develop mechanisms for managing lesser threats. This poses a considerable challenge, especially since these threats are the most difficult to manage in an international context. In the Yugoslavian case, the difficulties have stemmed from several factors. Some existing institutions are inappropriate for playing a direct role while others are unable to reach consensus on what actions to take, or lack mechanisms to execute and enforce decisions taken. Thus, providing some means to mediate internal disputes and ethnic conflicts could be one of the new order’s most useful functions. At the same time, Europe and the United States cannot dismiss entirely the need to deter possible aggression from the former Soviet Union. Continuing to balance the former Soviet Union in Europe not only enhances Western security but also the security of the emerging democracies in the East.¹

The second principle is the growing importance of economic and political factors relative to the military dimension in creating stability. The changes that have occurred in Europe over the last two years underscore that instability is more likely to arise from weak political and economic institutions. Although we have focused here primarily on the military aspects of security, we have also tried to indicate the degree to which the different security models have the ability to enhance economic and political stability.

With the end of the Cold War, the United States is in the process of reexamining its role in Europe. While few doubt that the United States has a continued interest and stake in Europe, there is considerable disagreement about the appropriate extent of U.S. involvement and the best way to secure a continuing role over the long term. Our analysis suggests two general conclusions.

¹Although some have suggested that arms control is of decreasing importance in the new Europe (see, e.g., John Mueller, “A New Concert of Europe,” Foreign Policy, Fall 1989, p. 3), our analysis suggests that for many of the models, especially for collective security and overlapping institutions, arms control is central to their success. At a minimum, arms control in the form of numerical ceilings and confidence-building measures is a useful device to codify the force balances and to put in place a verification regime that would increase transparency and reduce the chance of miscalculation.
First, the United States should not prematurely abandon its commitment to Europe, especially NATO. Although NATO's traditional raison d'être (the Soviet threat) has eroded, NATO still helps ensure a secure transatlantic link and guards against renationalizing defense through reversion to an ad hoc alliances system. Continuing NATO in some form is thus desirable not only to protect U.S. interests, but also to maintain stability.

Second, the United States should seek to secure its role in Europe by working through other institutions that complement NATO. This will allow the United States to hedge its bets against NATO's possible dissolution and may, in some way, prolong NATO's life by ensuring that maintaining NATO is consistent with developing other less NATO-centric security models, such as united Europe or collective security.

These two general conclusions underscore the advantages to the United States of pursuing a course along the lines of the overlapping institutions model. That model

- Preserves a political and military role for the United States. Although the United States plays a less central role than in the NATO dominant model, it is more sustainable over time given the vanishing Soviet threat and the likelihood of further West European integration;
- Creates alternative links for U.S. involvement in Europe beyond NATO;
- Demonstrates U.S. willingness to adapt to a stronger European role in security arrangements; and
- Maintains flexibility to move to a number of different security models in the future as the nature of potential threats to security become clearer.

Although the overlapping institutions model is inherently something of an interim approach (modifying existing institutions and a gradual evolution of new arrangements) and most closely describes the current system of security in Europe, a transitional strategy is still needed. How can the United States and the West further facilitate a stable transition to the overlapping institutions security order? Although we have not analyzed transition in detail in our analysis, several steps seem fairly obvious and, in some instances, dovetail with what is already under way.²

²These recommendations are drawn from more detailed analysis documented elsewhere. See James Steinberg, "An Ever Closer Union": European Political and Economic Integration and the United States, RAND, R-4160-A, forthcoming.
NATO is still the best institution for ensuring a secure political and military link between the United States and Europe and for deterring large-scale military threats. NATO needs to continue to make its forces more defensive, transparent, and European. The challenge is to develop a credible rationale for maintaining an integrated military command, especially as other institutions such as the EC, WEU, and CSCE assume more responsibilities.

The member countries of the WEU are pivotal to the shape of the European security identity since they are also members of NATO and the EC. Expanding the WEU’s role to act as a bridge between NATO and the EC, as opposed to acting exclusively as the security and defense arm of the EC, would help minimize duplication of effort, foster a more effective European role both within NATO and for non-NATO contingencies, and provide the United States with a mechanism for influencing European security policy.

The integration process in the EC has developed a momentum of its own, irrespective of U.S. preferences. An obstructionist approach would most likely close the door on any U.S. influence over the process. For that reason, the United States should support the process of European economic and political integration.

The CSCE process can provide a pan-European forum for addressing the security concerns of the newly emerging democracies in the East. While operating within the constraints of a consensus-based organization, the CSCE can serve important functions in the areas of norm setting, arms control, and perhaps mediation and conciliation. Institutions that command military or peacekeeping forces (NATO and, possibly in the future, the WEU) can act as the agent of the CSCE in a crisis.

Taken together, these recommendations are elements of a revised U.S. strategy toward Europe. The policy would allow the United States to respond to domestic U.S. pressures to reduce overseas military commitments while ensuring a U.S. role in Europe’s evolution.

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