German and Polish Views of the Partnership for Peace

Thomas S. Szayna, Ronald D. Asmus
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German and Polish Views of the Partnership for Peace

Thomas S. Szayna, Ronald D. Asmus

Prepared for the United States Army

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PREFACE

This documented briefing examines the German and Polish perceptions of the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program as an element of the larger security debates taking place in the two countries. The observations and implications derived from the research should be of interest to Army planners and analysts dealing with European security issues. The research was sponsored by the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence (ODCSINT) and was conducted in the Arroyo Center’s Strategy and Doctrine Program. The Arroyo Center is a federally funded research and development center sponsored by the United States Army.
SUMMARY

The German and Polish leaderships have largely similar views of the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program. Their views stem from fundamental security concerns, and both see PfP as a preparatory step on a path to NATO enlargement for at least some of the partner countries, most of all Poland. The German pressure for NATO enlargement is based on fears of vulnerabilities arising from instability to Germany’s east. Thus, Germany seeks to enlarge NATO and EU to dislodge itself from its current “frontline” position. The Polish pressure for NATO enlargement is based on a recognition of common interests with Germany and the perception of Russia as the only potential threat to Polish sovereignty for the foreseeable future. Polish integration into EU and NATO would ensure the country’s prosperity and long-term security.

It is clear that the German-Polish relationship will be a special factor in the evolution of cooperation under PfP. The most important NATO ally, Germany, and a key PfP partner, Poland, are well on the way to taking the proposals announced in the PfP invitation document and pushing them to the maximum in the interest of furthering military cooperation between the two countries. Stemming from their strategic goals, the Polish-German PfP activities are likely to involve ground forces and center on contingency planning for crises involving Poland. Consequently, a qualitatively new level of security links between Poland and Germany is already crystallizing. Indeed, if the Polish-German security and military links continue to expand at their present fast pace, then in a few years it will be necessary to think of Germany and Poland as one “security space.”

Both the German and the Polish leaderships are strongly Atlanticist in their outlooks, and they hope the United States takes a similar approach to PfP implementation, especially regarding Poland. They want a major U.S. role in the “enhanced” PfP process they envision. However, they fear that the United States might choose not to play such a role and are concerned about potential differences arising over the interpretation of PfP (as a fast track to membership).

The main difference between Germany and Poland regarding PfP relates to dealing with Russia. The German leadership is more likely than the Polish to bend its policy to achieve agreement on security issues with Russia. The Poles fear that some of their hoped-for plans for extensive PfP cooperation with Germany may fall victim to possible German concessions to Russian sensitivities.
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE ARMY

There are a number of implications for the Army. Because both the German and Polish leaderships see PfP as a path to NATO expansion for some countries, the issue at stake here is the nature of future U.S. security commitments in Europe. If PfP emerges as a path to NATO expansion, then it brings out fundamental Army planning issues regarding stationing of troops and contingency plans in Europe. If PfP does not emerge as a path to expansion, then the extensive German-Polish military cooperation that is bound to take place anyway has the potential to draw the Army beyond current U.S. political commitments. This could happen, for example, in a crisis involving Poland and Russia that led to German involvement on the Polish side (as a result of the extensive Polish-German defense cooperation), leading in turn to the drawing in of NATO in general, including the United States.

It is important to note that both the German and the Polish armed forces are continental in orientation, meaning that in both countries the ground forces are perceived as the dominant and most important service and the main instrument in support of security and military objectives. Consequently, there is a strong desire on the part of the Germans and the Poles to involve the U.S. Army in PfP activities. The Air Force and the Navy are not irrelevant but they are clearly secondary in the Polish and German PfP cooperation plans.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The authors would like to thank Marten van Heuven for a constructive review of an earlier draft of this document. Mary Morris, Jeff Isaacson, Tom McNaugher, and Jim Quinlivan also made useful comments on earlier versions of the briefing. In addition, the authors are indebted to Judy Larson for stylistic improvements to earlier versions of this briefing. Nikki Shacklett and Pamela Thompson deserve thanks for their assistance in editing and processing the briefing, respectively. Timothy Sanz, at the Army's Foreign Military Studies Office at Fort Leavenworth, deserves special thanks for assistance in making available to the authors Polish military publications.
German and Polish Views of the Partnership for Peace

This briefing summarizes the results of a short-term, direct assistance effort for the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence (ODCSINT).
Study Questions

- How have the post–Cold War security debates in Germany and Poland evolved?
- How have Germany and Poland adapted PfP to their own policy needs?
- What are the implications of German and Polish interpretations of PfP for the United States and the Army?
- What specific issues should concern the Army as PfP evolves?

Based on discussions with the DCSINT staff, the research aimed to assess the Partnership for Peace (PfP) as an element of the larger security policy debates in Poland and Germany. In this sense, the main intent of the study was to trace the evolution of the post–Cold War security debates in the two countries, paying attention to the basic motivations and driving forces. A more specific study goal was to examine how Poland and Germany have adapted PfP to suit their security policy needs. In other words, where does PfP fit in the Polish and German calculations? The research then aimed to draw implications for the United States and, more specifically, for the Army. Do the Polish and German interpretations of PfP differ from the U.S. interpretation, and if so, what potential problems does this present? Finally, the research also aimed to suggest some specific issues for the Army to attend to as cooperation under the PfP program is implemented.

The cutoff date for information contained in this briefing is April 1995. The research comes at a time of increased debate over the enlargement of NATO to include some of the former Warsaw Pact states. Almost a year and a half has elapsed since the proclamation of PfP in January 1994. Much of 1994 was spent in preparing for cooperation under PfP. Actual activities began to take off only in late 1994. Thus, this is an appropriate time to investigate where PfP has evolved and how it is perceived in other countries. The research drew on published data (primary and secondary sources) and on interviews with officials from Poland and Germany. The research was conducted at an unclassified level.
### Overview of Findings

- German and Polish views of PfP are similar
  - PfP is a path to NATO expansion for some countries, especially Poland

- German-Polish relationship has a special role in PfP process
  - Will "push the envelope" of military cooperation

- Germans and Poles are concerned about possible divergence with the United States on views of PfP

- Main German-Polish difference centers on dealing with Russia
  - Germans more amenable to security concessions (including PfP) for Russia than Poles are

The main point emerging from the research is that the German and Polish leaderships have largely similar views of PfP. Their views stem from fundamental security concerns, and both see PfP as a preparatory step on a path to NATO enlargement for at least some of the partner countries, most of all Poland.

It is also clear that the German-Polish relationship will be a special factor in the evolution of cooperation under PfP. The most important NATO ally, Germany, and a key PfP partner, Poland, are well on the way to taking the proposals announced in the PfP invitation document and pushing them to the maximum in the interest of furthering military cooperation between the two countries. Consequently, a qualitatively new level of security links between Poland and Germany is already crystallizing. Indeed, if the Polish-German security and military links continue to expand at their present fast pace, then in a few years it will be necessary to think of Germany and Poland as one "security space."

Both the German and the Polish leaderships have a strong Atlanticist outlook, and they hope the United States takes a similar approach to PfP implementation, especially regarding Poland. They want a major U.S. role in the process. But they fear that the United States might choose not to play such a role, and they are concerned that differences might arise over the interpretation of PfP (particularly, whether it is a fast track to membership).
The main difference between Germany and Poland regarding PfP relates to dealing with Russia. The German leadership is more likely to bend its policy to achieve agreement on security issues with Russia. The Poles fear that some of their hoped-for plans for extensive PfP cooperation with Germany might fall victim to German concessions to Russian sensitivities.
Implications for the Army

- German and Polish interpretation of PfP implies future enlargement of U.S. security commitments in Europe
  - Raises basic Army planning issues in Europe
  - Could draw Army beyond current political commitments

- Germans and Poles see ground forces as key to pursuing security and military objectives
  - Strongly desire U.S. Army involvement in PfP activities

- Germany and Poland are likely to use PfP activities to prepare for potential contingencies involving Poland
  - Army crisis reaction forces valued

There are a number of implications for the Army. Because both the German and Polish leaderships see PfP as a path to NATO expansion for some countries, the issue at stake here is the nature of future U.S. security commitments in Europe. If PfP emerges as a path to NATO expansion, then it brings out fundamental Army planning issues regarding stationing of troops and contingency plans in Europe. If PfP does not emerge as a path to expansion, then the extensive German-Polish military cooperation that is bound to take place anyway has the potential to draw the Army beyond current U.S. political commitments. This could happen in the case of a crisis involving Poland and Russia that leads to German involvement on the Polish side (as a result of the extensive Polish-German defense cooperation) and in turn draws in NATO in general, including the United States.

It is important to note that both the German and the Polish armed forces are continental in orientation, meaning that in both countries the ground forces are perceived as the dominant and most important service and the main instrument in support of security and military objectives. Consequently, there is a strong desire among the Germans and the Poles to involve the U.S. Army in PfP activities. The Air Force and the Navy are not irrelevant, but they are clearly secondary in the Polish and German PfP cooperation plans.
In addition, Germany and Poland seem poised to use PfP as a means of preparing for possible contingencies that involve Poland. More specifically, they see greater usefulness in contingency plans for NATO forces to deploy rapidly to Poland in times of threat rather than for cooperation in search and rescue or traditional peacekeeping. Thus, the U.S. Army units that the Poles and Germans would most like to see participate in PfP activities in Poland are elements of the Fifth Corps and U.S. rapid reaction forces.
This briefing is divided into two main parts. The first part, which follows, examines the German perceptions of PfP. The second part analyzes the Polish approach to PfP. A few general conclusions and implications close out the presentation.
Germany and PfP: Key Questions

- How can Germany provide for its security? What role does PfP play?

- What are Bonn's political and military priorities vis-à-vis PfP partners?

- How does PfP fit into Bundeswehr restructuring and defense planning for scenarios in and out of Europe?

- What specific issues should concern the Army?

This briefing examines four key questions that guide German attitudes toward PfP. First, how can Germany provide for its security after the Cold War, and where does PfP fit in German security policy? Second, what are the German political and military priorities vis-à-vis a long list of PfP partners? Third, how does PfP fit into the overall process of the restructuring of the German armed forces and new German defense planning for future scenarios in and beyond Europe? Fourth, what specific issues in the German debate over how to use PfP to achieve German policy objectives should the Army pay special attention to in the future?
What Is Germany’s Post–Cold War Strategic Challenge?

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<td>• Germany is the greatest beneficiary of the Cold War’s end but fears a return of old geopolitical dilemmas</td>
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<td>• Germany’s vital interests are contiguous with NATO and EU borders in the south but not in the east</td>
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<td>Moral: reunify Europe</td>
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<td>• Germany has the greatest stake in NATO and EU enlargement but needs to build consensus</td>
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<td>Prevent U.S. decoupling</td>
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Germany was the greatest beneficiary of the end of the Cold War. Not only was the country reunified, but the collapse of communism and the unraveling of the Soviet Union led to a withdrawal of Russian power some 1,000 kilometers eastward. At the same time, Germany finds itself confronted with new vulnerabilities. It is located at the border of a major faultline in Europe, with the western part united and integrated but the central and eastern parts unstable and fragile. It is the NATO and EU country most vulnerable to potential instability in the former communist states of Europe. Germany’s security challenge was aptly summed up by the General Inspector of the German armed forces, General Klaus Naumann, who has remarked that Germany’s dilemma is that although its vital interests in the south are contiguous with the borders of the EU and NATO, this is not so in the east. There, Germany’s policy must seek to expand those borders so that they cover vital German interests.

Four different factors have reinforced the German commitment to NATO and EU enlargement. The first is the moral imperative to reunify a Europe that was artificially divided by World War II and the subsequent imposition of communist regimes in central Europe during the Cold War. The second is the political imperative to anchor the new and still fragile democracies of central Europe.
Given the crucial role that Germans believe NATO played in stabilizing German democracy, the creation of a stable security framework for formerly communist central Europe is needed to stabilize this region too. Third, to insure its own economic prosperity, Germany needs stable and prosperous eastern neighbors. Fourth and finally, Germany wishes to consolidate the strategic gains from the end of the Cold War.

German officials realize that Germany has the greatest stake in both NATO and EU enlargement. While pursuing this agenda, they have also been sensitive to the need to build consensus in Europe and across the Atlantic and to avoid the impression that this is largely a German-driven agenda. Therefore, they have tried to respond to the interest of key allies, such as France, that NATO and the EU look south as well as east. Above all, they have been concerned about the need to keep the United States involved in European security and to avoid the danger of strategic decoupling between the United States and Europe.
German Attitudes Toward PfP

- PfP is viewed through a prism of overall political and strategic objectives
- Germans pushed a definition of PfP as “not an alternative to enlargement”
- PfP is used to pursue multiple objectives toward candidate and noncandidate countries
  - Path to expansion for candidate members
  - Antechamber for possible candidates
  - Alternative to expansion for noncandidates
- PfP is a venue for squaring the circle of enlarging NATO to some countries while reassuring others

Germany has viewed PfP through this much broader prism of its political and strategic objectives in post–Cold War Europe. PfP was an American idea. However, at the NATO Defense Ministers’ meeting in Travemünde in 1994, German Defense Minister Volker Rühe pushed to insure that PfP was not publicly portrayed as an alternative to eventual NATO enlargement. The same point was also underscored publicly by the late NATO Secretary General, Manfred Wörner. In short, the Germans accepted the U.S. proposal and sought to use it to pursue German objectives.

German policymakers have come to view PfP as an all-purpose instrument for pursuing multiple objectives vis-à-vis different countries. For those countries that the Germans consider firm candidates for Alliance membership, PfP is the path to enlargement. For those countries that the Germans view as possible candidates but where they are less sure, PfP is an antechamber where Germany can pursue cooperation and provide political reassurance and still keep its options open. For those countries that the Germans consider noncandidates, PfP is the alternative to expansion. PfP has become, in German eyes, the all-purpose vehicle for squaring the circle between very different political objectives.
### German Attitudes Toward PfP Depend on NATO Enlargement Debate

<table>
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<th>Resolved issues</th>
<th>Unresolved issues</th>
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<td>• NATO and EU/WEU “congruent”</td>
<td>• What does it mean in practice?</td>
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<td>• Differentiated approach</td>
<td>• Which countries in which category?</td>
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<td>- Integration for candidates</td>
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<td>- Cooperation for non-candidates</td>
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<td>- Visegrad top priority</td>
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<td>• Full Article 5 guarantee</td>
<td>• What kind of defense arrangements?</td>
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<td>• Strategic partnership with Russia</td>
<td>• Content? NATO-Russia relationship?</td>
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<td>• Need to maintain Ukrainian independence</td>
<td>• How? Does expansion hurt or help?</td>
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Perhaps the key factor in shaping future German attitudes toward PfP is how the debate over NATO enlargement unfolds. While there is a strong consensus in favor of both NATO and EU enlargement, there have nevertheless been differences within the German government over several key issues.

This chart lays out the issues and areas in which the German government has reached closure and resolved key issues, as well as those in which important questions remain. The resolution of the latter will affect in an important way how Germany structures its PfP activities with future partners. The German government, for example, has adopted a position that NATO and EU/WEU membership should in the long run be “congruent” in order to avoid so-called “back door commitments” arising from countries that might join the WEU but not NATO. Yet it is not clear what this means in practice. Similarly, although the Germans have embraced the differentiated approach discussed earlier, there are different views within the German government on exactly which countries belong in each category. The Germans have insisted that NATO enlargement eastward include a full Article 5 guarantee, but they have yet to define what kind of specific defense arrangements this should entail—and what role the Bundeswehr should play.
Finally, although almost all German policymakers agree on the need to develop a cooperative relationship with Russia while NATO enlarges, the content of a new so-called "strategic partnership" remains elusive. And although the German leadership recognizes the need to be sensitive to Ukrainian concerns and to sustain Ukraine’s independence while NATO enlarges, the dilemma of how to do this in practice has not been resolved.
### NATO and EU Enlargement Debates: Congruence?

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<th><strong>NATO</strong></th>
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<th><strong>Possible candidates</strong></th>
<th><strong>Non-candidates</strong></th>
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The official German government position on "congruence" between NATO and EU/WEU membership illustrates just how difficult it can be to resolve these issues in practice. This chart shows the current membership of both NATO and the EU as well as German views on likely candidates, possible candidates, and noncandidates. Even today, membership between NATO and the EU is not congruent. Turkey is a member of NATO but is excluded from the EU. Austria, Finland, and Sweden recently joined the EU, but they are presently not inclined to join NATO. Nor is it clear whether the Alliance would want them to join. The divergence in the priorities of the two institutions becomes greater when one considers likely candidates and possible candidates down the road.

Such differences underscore the difficulties Germany, too, has in setting its strategic priorities and in deciding just what countries it does or does not want to see join the Alliance and how it will structure its future security and military relationship with them under PfP. How Germans make these decisions is crucial for the United States. This issue underscores the need to ascertain whether U.S. and German priorities are similar and whether the U.S. and German armed forces are likely to pursue similar objectives under PfP.
Germany and PfP: the Polish Example

- Geography and history make Poland the most important yet most difficult partner
- Rapid NATO and EU enlargement maximizes Western and German influence
- Ad hoc efforts push the envelope through triangular diplomacy—e.g., joint exercises
  - France-Germany-Poland
  - Denmark-Germany-Poland
- Bundeswehr in Poland? Yes, if Poles want it and context is right
  - Franco-German brigade?
  - Polish-German brigade?
  - Danish-German-Polish corps?
- Is future military cooperation hindered by 2+4 Treaty?

A quick look at how Germany has pursued its PfP relationship with Poland underscores the German leadership’s objectives. For reasons of geography and history, Poland is the most important yet the most difficult PfP partner for Germany. In German eyes, a rapid integration of Poland into both NATO and the EU helps resolve this dilemma, for it maximizes both Western and German influence over Poland in a multilateral context.

Germany has sought to pursue its objectives through a variety of bi-, tri-, and multilateral means. It has initiated a variety of ad hoc cooperative relationships in an effort to push the envelope within the PfP process and to underscore its interest in Poland’s rapid integration into NATO. These have included planned PfP exercises in the so-called “Weimar triangle” involving France, Germany, and Poland, as well as military cooperation and exercises between Denmark, Germany, and Poland.

Expanded PfP cooperation and the prospect of Polish membership in NATO have also raised the issue of a possible deployment of Bundeswehr troops in Poland in the future. The official German answer to the question whether Bonn would be prepared for such a step is “Yes, if the Poles want it and the context is right.” The latter refers to the perceived German need for such deployments to take place
multilaterally, preferably involving the United States, and under the aegis of NATO.

A number of different ideas have surfaced already about possible military cooperation in the future. These have included the possibility of a Franco-German brigade being deployed to Poland or, alternatively, a Polish-German brigade. Some consideration is also being given to the possibility of extending the German-Danish multinational corps to include Polish forces should Poland become a member of NATO. This, however, has raised the question of whether a clause in the 2+4 Treaty on German unification might hinder future military cooperation between Germany and Poland due to the special status of the territory of the former German Democratic Republic.
Article 5 of the 2+4 Treaty on German unification states that foreign troops will neither be stationed nor deployed in this part of Germany. The issue of how to interpret the word “deploy” was resolved only at the last minute during the negotiations on the treaty and after high-level intervention. It was resolved through an addendum to the treaty which states that the definition of the word “deployed” will be left to the German government to decide while taking the interests of all the affected parties into account.

It is unclear today what impact this clause in the treaty might have on PfP exercises and whether and under what conditions, for example, U.S. Army forces would be able to engage in PfP exercises in eastern Germany. If NATO enlarges eastward, the questions become more difficult. In an enlarged NATO, Germany potentially becomes a key site for logistics and infrastructure, as well as a launching pad for power projection by NATO forces. Can Germany play that strategic role if NATO’s activities in the five länder that formerly constituted the GDR are subject to these constraints? Would U.S. forces based in western Germany essentially be forced to leapfrog what is a demulti-nationalized island in the heart of the Alliance in order to carry out security commitments to new members? How much of a problem does this present for NATO military strategy, especially the ability of the U.S. Army to perform new missions?
Where Does PfP Fit in
German Defense Planning?

- Germany’s new strategic situation
  - No longer a front-line state
  - Most-dangerous vs. most-likely threats
  - Producer, not consumer, of security

- Stepping stones in Bundeswehr restructuring
  - Bundeswehr law supports in-region missions (2/92)
  - German DPG defines “vital interests” and new missions (11/93)
  - White Paper provides new political and strategic rationale (4/94)
  - Constitutional Court allows out-of-area involvement (7/94)
  - Conceptual Guidelines create Crisis Reaction Forces (7/94)
  - Cabinet finalizes restructuring, including earmarked units (3/95)

- Where will Germany choose to become militarily involved?

How does PfP fit into trends in current German defense planning? Since the end of the Cold War, the German military has engaged in a process of reorientation and restructuring to meet Germany’s new strategic needs. No longer a front-line state, Germany has moved from being a consumer of security during the Cold War to a potential producer of security in the post–Cold war era. German defense planners now distinguish between the most dangerous threat to Germany—i.e., a resurgent aggressive Russia—as opposed to what they see as the most likely threats—i.e., the need to contain regional or ethnic conflict on Europe’s periphery or to participate in crisis-management missions beyond Germany’s borders.

The Bundeswehr has taken several key steps in reshaping its official rationale and mission as well as in creating forces to meet these new requirements. In February 1992, the German parliament passed new legislation clarifying that the role of the Bundeswehr went beyond territorial defense and included the defense of the NATO region; in late 1993 the German Ministry of Defense issued a new Defense Policy Guidance (DPG) that defined German “vital interest” in the post–Cold war era and broadened the Bundeswehr’s missions to include both crisis management and peacekeeping. In the spring of 1994 the German government issued a new White Paper providing new political and strategic rationale for the German armed forces. In July the German
Constitutional Court ruled that German forces could participate in out-of-area missions. Shortly thereafter, the defense minister announced a blueprint for the creation of some 50,000 Crisis Reaction Forces. These plans were, in turn, finalized by the German cabinet in March, and the units earmarked for these new missions were officially announced as well.
Bundeswehr Restructuring Has
Implications for PfP

- CRF purposes and missions overlap with PfP objectives
- CRF possible avant garde for PfP
  - 6 light, mechanized, air-mobile and air-mechanized brigades
  - 6 air force squadrons for attack, air defense, and reconnaissance
  - 2 naval task forces of 2–3 frigates
- Ground forces have a special role in furthering political and military objectives
- Key is how NATO implements security guarantees to new members
  - Defend Germany in Poland or Poland in Poland?
  - Further Bundeswehr restructuring if NATO expands?
- German priorities may limit CRF role to “in and around Europe”

What implications do such changes have for German attitudes toward PfP? While the Crisis Reaction Forces (CRF) are not singled out as having a specific role under PfP, their purpose and rationale correspond to many of the same objectives. The purpose of German reaction forces has been described by General Klaus Naumann as designed to “keep conflict away from German soil.” In a sense this is also one of the German objectives in wanting to enlarge NATO. If the purpose of PfP is to prepare the path to expansion for candidate countries, as well as to improve cooperation with other countries to facilitate their possible participation in peacekeeping or crisis-management missions, then these forces are a prime candidate to perform such missions. The forces will consist of six light, mechanized, air-mobile and air-mechanized brigades; six air force squadrons for attack, air defense, and reconnaissance; and two naval task forces of 2–3 frigates each.

German ground forces are the dominant service in the Bundeswehr. Senior German military officials emphasize that the army is the key for achieving both political and military objectives. In the words of one German official, it is German armed forces that provide the political glue that keeps NATO’s multinational forces together. Looking down the road, a key question for PfP is how NATO decides to implement Article 5 guarantees if it enlarges. As one German general has put it,
the issue is whether the Alliance is really defending Germany in Poland or defending Poland in Poland. Depending on what defense strategy the Alliance opts for, and what mix of reaction and main defense forces it decides is optimal, a further restructuring of the Bundeswehr might be needed.

Finally, the German CRF is currently designed as an all-purpose force, in principle the force that could undertake a range of missions: peacekeeping in the Balkans, crisis management in formerly communist central Europe, or fighting in the Persian Gulf. Whether and where it is deployed, and what role it plays in PfP, will depend on how Germans ultimately decide their strategic priorities.
PfP Breaks Down Taboo of German Military Involvement in the East

- 60% majority considers formerly communist central Europe a “vital interest”
- Public support favors NATO and EU enlargement
  - 58% favor NATO membership for Poland, Czech Republic, and Hungary
  - 58% support EU broadening to EE; support for individual countries varies
- Support for U.S. military presence in Germany tied to developments in east
  - 55% see U.S. military presence as “insurance against instability in east”
  - 36% consider instability in EE today a “critical threat”
- Support drops when asked about specific scenarios
  - 25% would deploy Bundeswehr to defend Poland against Russian attack
- PfP is a venue to build support for expanded military involvement in central and eastern Europe

Finally, PfP also offers Bonn a useful venue for breaking down the taboo of German military involvement in the former communist countries of Europe, above all central Europe. A series of public opinion polls on German attitudes about key national security issues since the end of the Cold War have shown a growing sense that Germany does have a vital interest in formerly communist central Europe. The polls also indicate growing public support for both NATO and EU enlargement. Moreover, in the public’s mind the rationale for the continued presence of the U.S. armed forces in Germany is tied to developments further east. A majority of 55% sees the U.S. armed forces in Germany as insurance against instability in the east and some 36% consider instability in “Eastern” Europe today to be a “critical threat.” However, when asked whether they would defend a country such as Poland from a Russian attack, only 25% of the German public supported the deployment of the Bundeswehr. Against this background, PfP serves an important political function of accustoming the German public to the prospect of Germany providing security to formerly communist central Europe.
Conclusions: Germany and PfP

- PfP is viewed in the context of a longer-term goal to enlarge NATO and EU
- PfP is an all-purpose vehicle for candidates and noncandidates
- Resolution of key NATO enlargement issues will shape future German attitudes
- Germans will make special effort through robust PfP to create "strategic partnership" with Russia
- Germans strongly desire involvement of U.S. forces, especially the Army

In conclusion, it is clear that Germany sees PfP through a broad and largely political prism of achieving its longer-term goal of enlarging both NATO and the EU to the former communist countries of central Europe. In German eyes, PfP offers a useful all-purpose instrument that allows Germany to differentiate between different categories of countries with which it seeks very different objectives and relationships. These range from new defense commitments in some cases, looser cooperative relationships designed to provide some level of political reassurance in others, to an element of "strategic partnership" in the case of Russia.

Perhaps the most crucial issue in shaping future German attitudes will be the manner in which the core issues in the NATO enlargement debate are resolved. Germany will structure its PfP activities differently depending on which countries are candidates, what the future defense arrangements for extending new guarantees look like, and how the Alliance responds to Russian sensitivities on both the political and military components of NATO enlargement. Germany clearly will attempt to use PfP to give meaning to the notion of a "strategic partnership" with Moscow. At the same time, there will be a strong German interest in involving U.S. armed forces, especially the Army, in future PfP activities.
The next section examines the Polish security debates and the resulting Polish views of PfP.
Poland and PfP: Key Questions

- How can Poland’s security challenge be solved? What role does PfP play?
- What are Polish priorities in putting PfP into practice?
- How does PfP fit into Poland’s defense planning and military modernization plans?
- What specific issues should concern the Army?

The central question in Polish security deliberations is how to address the basic security challenge of being located between Germany and Russia. The challenge has reappeared following the end of the Cold War. The specific issues that follow are: (1) How does PfP fit into Polish security calculations? (2) What are the Polish priorities in terms of implementation of PfP? (3) How do the Poles see PfP implementation in their overall defense planning, and how does PfP address the Polish military modernization problems? (4) In terms of the Army’s specific interests, which issues regarding Polish PfP interpretation and implementation warrant special Army attention?
Poland's Security Challenge Centers on How to Deal with Russia and Germany

- Poland regained sovereignty in 1989–1991 but is now in a security vacuum
- Russia and Germany pose the only potential fundamental threats to Polish sovereignty
  - Uncertain evolution in both states, especially in Russia
- Poles see the current period as a "window of opportunity" before major threats resurface
  - Element of urgency to Polish deliberations
- Polish security policy must guarantee that the newly won sovereignty is not short-lived

The core point in Polish security deliberations is the reemergence of an old Polish security challenge: the problem of being located on the North European Plain between Russia and Germany, two more powerful and periodically aggressive neighbors. The problem has been a recurring one in modern Polish history, often with tragic results for the Poles. Thus, while the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Warsaw Pact meant that Poland has regained sovereignty after 50 years, the Polish leadership is deeply insecure about the longevity of that sovereignty, seeing the country's position as essentially being in a security vacuum. The Polish leadership perceives only two countries that can threaten Polish sovereignty in a fundamental manner: Russia and Germany. The Poles have fears about the evolution in both countries, though most of their concern is focused on Russia. While the Poles perceive potential security threats from other neighbors, such as Ukraine, they do not see such threats as fundamental. At best, they see them as leading to border conflicts and believe they can handle such threats with their own resources.

There is an element of urgency in Polish security debates, in that the Polish leadership believes that the current period, relatively free of fundamental security threats, is only a temporary lull and that major threats are bound to resurface. They believe they have a 10–15 year "window of opportunity" in which they must create a permanent solution to the Polish security challenge so as to preclude the reappearance of a fundamental threat. Otherwise, they fear the country's newly regained sovereignty will be short-lived.
Poles See an Integrated Germany Not As a Threat But As a Partner

- Poland wants Germany to remain integrated in European institutions
  - Constrains German use of power for national ends
  - Produces economic benefits without fears of domination

- Poles realize that Germany’s interests coincide with Poland’s
  - Polish security and prosperity benefits both states
  - Germany is Poland’s strongest advocate in European institutions

- Poles consider German “problem” solved, but residual fears remain
  - Will pro-U.S. and NATO views persist in Germany?
  - Concern about resurgence of German nationalism and weak government response to it

The Polish leadership differentiates between Germany and Russia in its estimates of likelihood for reappearance of threats to Polish sovereignty. The Poles realize that an integrated Germany is not a threat, since the Germans will not use their considerable power for national ends. In fact, they see an integrated Germany as the foremost Polish partner, leading to substantial economic benefits for Poland and fading danger of “domination.” Fears of German economic domination have a long history (in the period between the two world wars, successive German governments tried to use economic tools to exact political concessions from Poland) and they are mixed with some residual apprehension (especially at the popular level) over German attachment to what is now western Poland.

After some initial caution in dealing with Germany, the Polish leadership has come to the realization that German and Polish interests coincide; Polish economic prosperity and security from outside threats is in the German interest. An already extensive and fruitful record of bilateral cooperation has dissipated most of the Polish fears. The Polish-German Treaty of 1990 obligated Germany to act as a proponent of Polish integration into the EU, and the Germans have fulfilled such a role. They have been the strongest advocate for Polish integration into European institutions, strengthening the Poles’ confidence that they are indeed dealing with a reliable partner.
Although the perception that the German "problem" has finally been solved has taken deep root among the Polish leadership, a few residual fears and worries remain. The fears are evident to an extent in the Polish military. The question marks center on potential developments, usually revolving around the issue of steadfastness in German pro-integration views and, more specifically, pro-U.S. and pro-NATO outlooks. Finally, the resurfacing of some nationalist and xenophobic violence in Germany, and what the Poles saw as an initial weak government response to it, has brought out some Polish concerns.
Poles Consider a Democratic Russia Unlikely To Threaten Poland

- Polish goal is to help bring about a democratic, prosperous, non-imperialist Russia
  - However, outcome seen as increasingly unlikely
  - Non-imperialist issue especially problematic
- Poles assume that the "Russia question" will be central to European security for the foreseeable future
- Poles especially worried about evolution in Russian policies
  - Attempts to keep Poland in Russian "sphere of influence"
  - Attempts to thwart Polish NATO entry

The main security fears within Poland center on the point of future Russian political evolution. The Polish leadership would like to see the solution of the Russian "problem" through the development of a democratic, prosperous, and non-imperialist Russia. However, over the past three years, the Poles increasingly have come to see such an outcome as less and less likely. The issue of the Soviet (and earlier Russian) imperial legacy and the persistence of what the Poles see as imperialist outlooks is a special problem since, to the Poles, even some democratic Russians have imperialist leanings.

Polish security specialists assume that the "Russia question" will be a central issue in European security affairs for the foreseeable future in the same way that the "Ottoman question" was central in the 19th century and the "German question" was central for most of the 20th century. As such, the Poles posit that potential Russian expansion is going to be an ever-present danger for a long time.

The uncertainty about political evolution in Russia and the potential for assertive, imperialist-minded Russian nationalists to come to power only increases the sense of insecurity among the Poles. The Polish leadership has interpreted a variety of Russian statements and policies since 1991 with a suspicion that the policies aim to keep Poland in the Russian "sphere of influence." Russian attempts to negotiate a highly
constraining bilateral treaty with Poland in the immediate post-Warsaw Pact era and some aspects of the Russian military doctrine are just two examples of Russian behavior worrying to the Poles. The Russian reneger on Yeltsin’s “consent” in 1993 for Poland to join NATO and Russian behavior in international forums to try to counter NATO enlargement are seen in this light.
Poles Believe Integration into Western Structures Will Solve Their Security Dilemma

- Integration solves both German and Russian problems
  - Germany unable to threaten Poland
  - Russia unlikely to threaten Poland if it means threatening Germany and the United States

- Integration into Western structures has overwhelming domestic support

- Security is also a great boost to economic prosperity

- Without integration, Poland will have to deal with Germany on a bilateral basis
  - Fears that such relations will be inequitable

The Polish leadership perceives integration into Western security and economic structures as offering the only solution to the Polish security problem. Such integration has the potential to solve both the German and Russian problems for the Poles and bring about a condition of long-term security. An integrated Germany would not pose a threat to Poland, while even a nondemocratic Russia would be unlikely to pose a threat, since such a threat would also mean conflict with Germany and the United States. There are also domestic motivations, in that integration into Western structures has overwhelming support. In addition, the Poles assume that attainment of lasting security would be a tremendous boost for economic prosperity, expecting that it would lead to increased investment flow.

There is also a negative motivation in favor of integration. The Polish leadership realizes that unless the country is integrated into Western structures, it will have to deal with Germany on a bilateral basis. Due to the imbalance of power between the two countries, the Poles fear that such relations would be inequitable and problematic in the long term even if Germany remained integrated and democratic.
### Poles Consider NATO the Ideal Security Institution

- Main security institution in Europe for the foreseeable future
  - Other security institutions in Europe lack credibility
  - EU membership not expected before 2000; NATO membership perceived as easier and quicker
- Crucial transatlantic (U.S.) connection
  - Prevents image of German-dominated institution (issue with WEU in the future)
  - Poland among strongest advocates of U.S. presence in Europe
- Overwhelming domestic support
  - Prestige issue: rightful acceptance of Poles as “full Europeans”
  - Opposition only from fringe nationalist parties

The Polish leadership sees integration into NATO as the ideal way to ensure long-term Polish security. As a powerful and the only currently existing collective defense organization in Europe, NATO holds tremendous attraction for insecure countries. Other European security institutions, such as WEU or OSCE, have a long way to go to develop into credible guarantors of security. WEU is attractive, but the Poles do not expect to become members of the EU before 2000 and perhaps even later; thus, WEU does not meet the more immediate Polish security concerns. There is also a strong perception that NATO membership is achievable more quickly and easily than EU membership.

The crucial factor in NATO’s attractiveness is the U.S. role in the alliance. Besides the fact that the identification of the United States with NATO prevents the image of the institution as German-dominated (a concern with WEU), NATO is associated with the only superpower and the most powerful military in the world, giving the organization an unparalleled image of strength and providing a credible deterrent to any potential Russian threat. Thus, for both Russian and German “reasons,” the Polish leadership is among the most Atlanticist in Europe and in favor of a strong U.S. role and presence in Europe. Integration into NATO has overwhelming support domestically, since it touches on the issue of prestige. Since all the large countries of
western Europe are NATO members, the Poles detect their lack of membership to mean treatment as "second-class" Europeans. Only a few fringe ultra-nationalist political movements of little or no importance are against Polish entry into NATO.
Poland Was Initially Disappointed by PfP but Has Tried to Adapt It to Polish Needs

- Has sought NATO membership since 1991
- Disappointed by PfP’s failure to provide a formal security guarantee
- Dismayed by extension of PfP to Russia and Central Asian states
- Could not reject PfP
  - Only thing NATO offered
  - Fell short of expectations but did not contradict them
- Is attempting to ensure that PfP leads to full integration and not a permanent half-way house

Since the collapse of the Warsaw Pact, the various Polish governments have pursued consistently the goal of NATO membership. With a dose of wishful thinking and exaggeration of some Western sympathy toward such aspirations, as well as with Yeltsin’s statement in Warsaw in mid-1993 “allowing” Polish NATO entry, some Polish security experts believed that rapid NATO membership was indeed in their grasp in mid and late 1993. Thus, the announcement of PfP was especially disappointing. PfP failed to provide a formal security guarantee. Moreover, invitation to join PfP was extended to all of the post-Soviet states. In the Polish view, the failure to differentiate between states such as the Czech Republic and Poland on the one hand and Russia on the other implied that NATO treated the “exploited” and the “exploiters” in the same manner. Also, in the Polish view, the extension of PfP invitation to the post-Soviet Central Asian states diluted the program to almost meaningless levels. Polish dismay was evident in January 1994 and almost led to the public embarrassment of President Clinton by the Polish president, Lech Walesa.

However, the Poles could not reject PfP outright. For one, it was the only thing that NATO offered. More important, while PfP clearly fell short of Polish expectations, it did not contradict Polish aspirations. Thus, the Polish leadership accepted PfP and attempted to shape it so that it matched more closely the Polish long-term aspirations to NATO membership.
### Poland Seeks to Transform PfP into a Quick Path to NATO Membership

- Will consider PfP a failure if it does not lead to membership
  - Wording in the Presentation Document
- Far-reaching proposals in the individual agreement (close to functional membership)
  - Close ties to NATO military commands
  - Air defense
  - Command and control, joint exercises
  - Interoperability, research and development
- Use noncontroversial provisions to suit their needs (peacekeeping, crisis management plans)
- Seek full multinational defense model as part of NATO (not a French or Spanish model)

The desire to transform PfP into a path to NATO membership has been evident in Polish PfP activities. The preamble to the Polish PfP Presentation Document specifically refers to the fact that Poland enters into the partnership as a means to NATO membership. The Poles have interpreted NATO's acceptance of the document as signifying NATO's agreement on this point. Indeed, the Polish leadership will see PfP as a failure if it does not lead to membership.

The Poles also have included numerous and far-reaching proposals in the Presentation Document that, if implemented, will in fact give Poland the functional equivalent of membership. The proposals range from close ties with several NATO headquarters, to modernizing Polish air defense so as to be able to link it instantaneously to NATO's integrated air defense in times of crisis, to adopting NATO C3 standards and equipment, to joint exercises of a wide range of units, to achieving a wide degree of overall interoperability, to putting in the infrastructure for rapid reinforcement by NATO units in Poland, and to participating in NATO's research and development programs with an eye to the Polish military's modernization. In addition, the Poles have taken some some noncontroversial provisions in the PfP invitation document (peacekeeping and crisis management cooperation, to mention just two) and defined them in a wide manner so as to suit Poland's specific needs. What all of the proposals indicate is that, eventually, the Poles want a full NATO multinational defense model to apply to Poland (when it becomes a member). They do not wish any differentiation for Poland within NATO in the manner of Spain or France.
What Means Will Poland Use to Accomplish Its NATO Membership Goal?

- Push NATO proposals to maximum
- Seek bilateral or trilateral cooperation with current NATO members
  - German-Polish
  - Danish-Polish
  - German-Danish-Polish
  - German-French-Polish
- Draw current NATO members into Polish defense affairs to make Poland a de facto member
  - Create advocates within NATO for larger PfP role for Poland and/or membership

The general policy that the Poles have adopted is one of taking the NATO proposals contained in the PfP invitation document and taking them to the maximum in terms of the intensity and scope of cooperation. Even if the United States or some other NATO countries balk at the implementation of such proposals, the Poles have some leverage and means of pressing the issue forward. Probably the most important of such means is the expanding bilateral and trilateral cooperation between Poland and several key NATO countries, most of all Germany. Since 1993, Polish-German cooperation in the defense realm has progressed by leaps and bounds, governed by annual agreements on defense cooperation. In 1994, nearly half of the activities conducted by the Polish military with other countries’ armed forces were conducted with the German military. While many of the activities were of little significance, many were substantive. Successive annual agreements for cooperation are likely to be more and more ambitious.

The Danish military also has been extremely active in cooperating with the Polish armed forces. The Danish role has been crucial because it has allowed the initiation of Polish-German military cooperation (as part of Danish-German-Polish cooperation) with a convenient multilateral cover. French-German-Polish cooperation also has progressed. Proposals for future evolution of the cooperation include joint Danish-
German-Polish and French-German-Polish units. The Poles have been motivated by the desire to draw in current NATO members to cooperate with the Polish military at such a level that Poland would become a NATO member in all but name. In addition, such cooperation creates strong advocates among current NATO members for full Polish NATO membership. Germany and Denmark especially have their own reasons to develop close links with the Polish military (proximity and keeping any potential security threats further off) and they are likely to continue with their expanding links. Others, such as the Dutch, also seem to be following this path.
PfP Affects Polish Military Modernization

- Spurs military restructuring and presents tough choices
  - Encourages smaller force size, better equipment and training

- Brings intra-military issues into the open
  - Strengthens the hand of civilians at Ministry of Defense
  - Downplays military’s argument for self-sufficiency
    - Military reluctant to abandon all planning against attack from the West

- Cost issues will not sour the Polish drive for NATO membership
  - Poles recognize that membership involves substantial costs and painful choices
  - Expect some cost sharing with NATO

Acceptance of PfP has raised difficult internal questions for the Polish military. Most of all, PfP encourages far-reaching military restructuring by favoring a drift toward a “NATO-like look” for the Polish military. The need for substantial equipment modernization and more training goes against the vested interests of the General Staff (who favor a larger number of troops). As such, PfP has brought out into the open some problems in civil-military relations. It has strengthened the hand of the civilians at the Ministry of Defense and it has questioned some of the assumptions governing Polish military planning. The attachment of the Polish General Staff to the idea of defense self-sufficiency (historically conditioned by distrust in others’ security guarantees) and its reluctance to abandon all contingency planning for potential future threats from the West has come under intense questioning.

The Polish leadership realizes that participation in PfP, at the level proposed in the Presentation Document, involves substantial costs. However, the fundamental importance of the Polish quest for NATO membership means that costs alone will not sour the Polish drive. Indeed, at both the political and military levels in Poland, there is acceptance of the fact that NATO membership will involve substantial costs and painful choices. While the Poles expect limited Western assistance in their efforts, in the form of some cost sharing with NATO, they seem to accept the necessity of the costs.
Conclusions: Poland and PfP

- PfP is seen as an instrument for achieving NATO membership
- Poles wish to transform PfP
  - Will be helped by some NATO members
- If PfP doesn’t lead to membership, Polish enthusiasm for NATO will wane, though not the overall pro-Western orientation
  - Bilateral links with NATO countries will be emphasized
  - WEU and/or other structures (Weimar) will gain importance
  - Drive for defense self-sufficiency will become stronger
  - Dismay or resentment against U.S. will emerge
  - Cooperation with U.S. in many areas (e.g., peacekeeping) will decrease
- Poles are primarily interested in being the foremost “partner”
  - Main desire is to accentuate differentiation
  - But place some value on PfP’s linking Ukraine and Russia to West

Based on the preceding findings, there are a number of conclusions about Poland and PfP. Most of all, the Polish leadership sees PfP as an instrument to a larger goal, namely, NATO membership. Since the PfP program did not meet their goals, the Poles have adapted it to suit their ends. Because several NATO countries (especially Germany), for their own reasons, are sympathetic to Polish aspirations, they have begun to develop a far-ranging program of defense and military cooperation with Poland. They are unlikely to stop such cooperation. In this sense, whether or not PfP formally develops into a path to membership, the cooperation between Poland and some NATO members (carried out under the PfP auspices) is likely to develop in a few years to such a level that it will amount to the functional equivalent of a Polish NATO membership.

If PfP fails to evolve into a path to full membership for Poland, there are a number of consequences for the Polish defense posture and international behavior. Most of all, Polish enthusiasm for NATO will wane, though the overall pro-Western orientation will remain. Instead of NATO, the Poles will place even more emphasis on bilateral military links with NATO countries, especially Germany. Alternatives to NATO, such as WEU or the Weimar triangle (Polish-German-French ties), will become more important to the Poles. In terms of Polish
military planning, the tenet of self-sufficiency will become stronger, leading perhaps to larger force levels (and slightly different force structure) than might be envisioned for a Poland on a “NATO track.” Regarding Polish-U.S. defense ties, open dismay and even resentment of the United States (because of its dominant role in NATO) is bound to come out. Cooperation in such areas as peacekeeping will not stop but it certainly will suffer. Polish provision of troops to operations such as Haiti will disappear. Occasional glimpses of dismay with the United States are already noticeable in Poland, among the military and some political figures (centering on specific issues, such as U.S. pressure on Poland to stop certain arms sales or, in a more general manner, stemming from disappointment with the supposed U.S. reluctance to engage in far-reaching cooperation with Poland in the military and security realm).

Regarding Polish views of PfP cooperation by NATO with other countries, the Polish leadership is not particularly interested in the topic. The only concern is that Poland be the foremost partner with NATO and first in line to join. A favorable outlook on PfP cooperation with Ukraine and Russia (so as to link them to the West) is the only exception to this rule.
A few general conclusions and implications regarding Poland, Germany, and PfP follow.
Conclusions: German and Polish Views of PfP

- Agreement on underlying goal: PfP leads to membership for some states, especially for Poland
  - Germany and Poland are the two strongest advocates of PfP as a stepping stone to NATO enlargement eastward
  - Both see U.S. involvement as vital
  - Both have doubts about the depth of the U.S. commitment

- Differences on tactical issues
  - Germans more amenable to concessions to Russia on a range of security issues, including PfP
  - Final look of NATO defense posture in Poland (when Poland is a member) may lead to different PfP activities

A general conclusion that emerges is that Polish and German leaderships share the view of the basic goal for PfP. They want PfP to lead to membership for some of the partner states, most of all, Poland. In a related point, the two countries are also the two strongest advocates favoring PfP as a step toward NATO enlargement. Consequently, Germany and Poland have engaged in far-reaching cooperation to push the process forward. Both countries see U.S. involvement in extensive and far-ranging PfP cooperation as vital, but there are doubts in both countries about the depth of U.S. commitment to such a process. The specific doubts about the U.S. commitment to PfP overlap with the larger doubts about its commitment to retain a presence in Europe.

The differences between the Polish and German leaderships on PfP revolve around tactical issues. The German leadership is more amenable to concessions to Russia in the security realm, including PfP. This reinforces residual Polish doubts about Germany and brings up historicist specters of Rapallo and the Stalin-Hitler Pact. In addition, the Germans and the Poles have not reached full agreement on the final look of the NATO defense posture in Poland, if the latter becomes a member. Agreement on such an issue seems premature at this time, but it has the immediate consequence of leading to different viewpoints regarding PfP activities. The Polish preference for a full multinational defense model and planning for contingencies in eastern Poland lead the Poles to seek different PfP exercises/activities than the Germans may be willing to accept. Such issues may lead to irritants in an otherwise fast-developing program of military cooperation.
Regarding specific issues that DCSINT should track regarding Polish participation in PfP, a few specific points stand out. Most of all, the rapidly developing bilateral and trilateral Polish military cooperation with several NATO countries needs close monitoring. This is in line with the overall implication for the Army of a “back-door” security commitment for NATO. Polish-German cooperation deserves special attention. On a related point, the level of Polish dependency in the defense realm on Germany alone, as opposed to NATO, warrants consideration. In terms of Polish intra-military issues, the level of Polish dismay over NATO’s (and specifically, U.S.) lack of desire to meet the full extent of the Polish proposals for security and defense cooperation should be watched carefully. The specific symptom of the disappointment, and the possible Polish search for alternative security solutions, is the level of prominence of the assumption of self-sufficiency in Polish military planning. Finally, in an analogous situation to a “back-door” NATO commitment evolving through extensive bilateral cooperation between Poland and Germany, Polish military cooperation with some of the Baltic states and Ukraine should be monitored closely. Should extensive Polish-Ukrainian military cooperation develop just as Polish-German cooperation develops, then a potential Russian-Ukrainian conflict could cause Germany to be drawn more rapidly into a crisis, with consequences for the alliance as a whole.
Issues for Army to Track: Germany

- New USAEUR and Bundeswehr missions—on the same track?
- Pattern and substance of evolving German military cooperation in the east
- Future planning and training for German Crisis Reaction Forces
- German approach to implementing new guarantees if NATO enlarge
- "Compensation" package for Russia could have an impact on the U.S. Army’s ability to perform new missions

What issues in German thinking about PfP are especially important for the Army to track in the future? Perhaps the most important issue is whether new USAEUR and Bundeswehr missions are evolving on the same track. Should they diverge, it could raise important political questions about the rationale for and the sustainability of the U.S. Army presence in Germany as well as military issues concerning cooperation with the Bundeswehr.

It will also be important to watch the future pattern and substance of evolving German military cooperation with the countries east of Germany as a barometer of German priorities and interests. An especially important issue will be the future role Germans design for the newly created Crisis Reaction Forces. What kinds of scenarios will these forces plan and train for? How heavily involved will they be in PfP activities?

German views on how to implement security guarantees for potential new NATO members will also be crucial. Will Germany prefer to defend Germany in Poland or Poland in Poland? This will have important implications in terms of the kind of PfP activities Germany will pursue in the future. Finally, the precedent of the special status of eastern Germany under the 2+4 Treaty raises the issue of whether Russia will push for, and how NATO would respond to, any additional arrangements restricting military activities in central and eastern
Europe if NATO enlarges—and whether and how this might affect the U.S. Army’s ability to perform new missions to which NATO enlargement would lead.