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FRANCE, ITALY AND
THE 2002/2003 IRAQ CRISIS

by

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France opposed the US-led intervention in Iraq in March 2003 while Italy supported it. Domestic dynamics, including popular opinion and growing concern for Muslim sentiment, exerted a secondary influence on those decisions. Other factors that influenced the leaders of France and Italy to take opposing stances on the prospective intervention included security and threat assessments. Discord in US-French relations was exacerbated by disagreements over other international issues, especially the role of the UN Security Council. This thesis assesses the relative weight of these various factors in the French and Italian decisions, and examines the interplay of the key national decisions made by American, French and Italian leaders. The thesis concludes that French and Italian decisions were influenced by factors in addition to the issues in question—that is, whether the Iraqi regime had complied with the UN Security Council resolutions calling for the elimination of weapons of mass destruction and certain delivery means and, if not, whether the use of force was an appropriate and justified course of action. It also concludes that the severe damage to US-French relations may be overcome as Paris and Washington cooperate in meeting international security responsibilities. The European Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy may face greater challenges, owing to the significant intra-EU differences revealed during the Iraq crisis.
FRANCE, ITALY AND THE 2002/2003 IRAQ CRISIS

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ABSTRACT

France opposed the US-led intervention in Iraq in March 2003 while Italy supported it. Domestic dynamics, including popular opinion and growing concern for Muslim sentiment, exerted a secondary influence on those decisions. Other factors that influenced the leaders of France and Italy to take opposing stances on the prospective intervention included security and threat assessments. Discord in US-French relations was exacerbated by disagreements over other international issues, especially the role of the UN Security Council. This thesis assesses the relative weight of these various factors in the French and Italian decisions, and examines the interplay of the key national decisions made by American, French and Italian leaders. The thesis concludes that French and Italian decisions were influenced by factors in addition to the issues in question—that is, whether the Iraqi regime had complied with the UN Security Council resolutions calling for the elimination of weapons of mass destruction and certain delivery means and, if not, whether the use of force was an appropriate and justified course of action. It also concludes that the severe damage to US-French relations may be overcome as Paris and Washington cooperate in meeting international security responsibilities. The European Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy may face greater challenges, owing to the significant intra-EU differences revealed during the Iraq crisis.
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I. INTRODUCTION

A. OVERVIEW

This thesis analyzes the divisions among European governments regarding the March 2003 decision by a U.S.-led coalition to intervene in Iraq. It offers case studies of the Italian decision to support this intervention and the French decision to oppose it. Each case study considers the genesis of the national decision and the key determinants, particularly economic interests, threat assessments, and European, international and domestic political concerns.

The thesis investigates the hypothesis that each national decision was influenced by factors in addition to the issues immediately in question—that is, whether the Iraqi regime headed by Saddam Hussein had complied with the UN Security Council resolutions calling for the destruction of WMD and certain delivery means and, if not, whether the use of force was an appropriate and justified course of action.

Much of the literature on this rift focuses on the European-American dimension of the crisis. More particularly, the literature discusses possible outcomes for individual countries with respect to their continued relations with the United States. This exclusive focus on bilateral relations between individual European nations and the United States diverts attention away from the dynamics of another set of key relationships—those among European countries. The distance between the French and Italian governments’ positions on Iraq was wide, and exchanges between President Chirac and Prime Minister Berlusconi were acrimonious.

This research is important for three reasons. First, European NATO nations have historically been among America’s closest allies. If these relationships are to continue in a strong and positive manner, American policy makers must consider the factors that drove specific decisions by European governments. Second, if the European Union’s two permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (France and the United Kingdom) opposed US policy, this could significantly hamper the United States in pursuit of its foreign policy goals. Third, this analysis may assist policy makers and others (1) to better understand the internal political dynamics of France and Italy; and (2)
to structure US positions on issues in light of these dynamics, either the substance of the policy itself and/or its presentation.

Appropriate analysis of this issue requires investigation of the relevant questions. What decision did leaders in France and Italy make? As suggested above, France’s leaders ultimately opposed military intervention in Iraq without an additional UN Security Council mandate explicitly authorizing the use of force. Moreover, they indicated a willingness to use France’s veto in the Security Council to deny a mandate for the use of force in the absence of additional evidence from the then-ongoing weapons inspections. Italy’s leaders supported the American-led coalition’s intervention in Iraq, thereby asserting Italian membership in the coalition against terrorism.

What factors influenced leaders in France and Italy to take opposing stances on the prospective intervention in Iraq? In articulating his position, French President Jacques Chirac enjoyed wide popular support. Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi’s position was not popularly supported. Indeed, Italian polls showed that over 75 percent of the population opposed intervention. What domestic dynamics supported the decisions made by President Chirac, and what considerations encouraged Prime Minister Berlusconi to support the United States without wide domestic support? What international factors influenced these leaders? This thesis seeks to clarify the relative weight of these various factors in the French and Italian decisions.

Responses to these questions may illuminate the prospects for future relations within the European Union and between EU members and the United States. Does the division on the intervention in Iraq reflect an enduring change of political alignments inside the European Union or inside NATO? What may be the short- and long-term effects of these decisions on French and Italian relations with the United States? Was France’s decision against supporting American policy an isolated occurrence based on domestic factors, or does it signal a trend towards increased opposition to American foreign policy objectives? Was the Italian decision an anomaly, in view of the Italian public’s negative attitude towards unsanctioned intervention? The analysis is based on primary and secondary sources on the decisions and the policy-making processes of the governments of France and Italy. Primary sources for this research include reputable international news agency reports of government action, political opposition or support,
and popular reaction and opinion. In addition, French and Italian government
communiqués and other publicly accessible statements are cited. Secondary sources
include interpretations and analyses by scholars and public policy research institutions.
This analysis supports conclusions on the probable impact of each government’s
decisions on relations with the United States and the country’s position in the EU and
NATO.

This thesis is organized as follows. Chapter II examines the decisions of the
French and Italian governments and the rationales for these decisions articulated at the
time preceding the US-led coalition’s intervention in Iraq. Chapter III explores the
origins and determinants of those decisions in France, while Chapter IV performs this
task for Italy. Chapter V draws comparisons and analyzes the results of French and
Italian decisions, and discusses implications of these decisions. Chapter VI offers
conclusions.
II. DECISION AND RATIONALES

The terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 created a near-universal rallying around the United States. The French newspaper Le Monde declared “We are all Americans,” and NATO invoked Article 5, the mutual defense clause in the North Atlantic Treaty.1 China, France and Russia supported the Bush Administration’s decision to attack Al Qaeda and the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. There was little international dissent regarding the United States declaration of war on terror. If one compares this to the climate of opinion on the first anniversary of the attack, the international picture could not be more different. Sympathy for the victims of 11 September 2001 and support for the US government’s war on terror were replaced by hostility directed at the US approach to bringing about regime change in Iraq and antipathy towards perceived American arrogance.

This chapter explores the national decisions of France and Italy regarding the impending US-led coalition intervention in Iraq in the months prior to the initiation of Operation Iraqi Freedom in March 2003. This chapter reviews the public statements by leaders in the United States, particularly President George Bush, Vice President Richard Cheney, and Secretary of State Colin Powell, and reactions to US policy statements by French President Jacques Chirac, French Foreign Minister Dominique de Villepin, and Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi.

US policy appeared more directed towards a conclusive solution to the problem of Iraq following the 11 September 2001 attacks. At what point the Bush administration decided to pursue forcible regime change in Iraq, or if it ever had faith in the UN Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) are issues that will not be explored here. It is assumed here that prior to late 2002 the US government had greater confidence in the efficacy of the measures pursued under the authority of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), including weapons inspections.

This chapter is organized as follows. Events are reviewed chronologically beginning with President George W. Bush’s 29 January 2002 State of the Union Address and ending on 19 March 2003 with the commencement of hostilities in Iraq. Then this chapter explores the international debate, with attention to the following questions. What was the goal of each government’s proposed actions, disarmament and/or regime change, and how did each government view these goals? How did each government evaluate the role and value of UNMOVIC and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) weapons inspections? How relevant was UN Security Council action and what was the value of UN Security Council approval as perceived by the US, French and Italian governments?

A. KEY DATES AND POSITIONS


In his 2002 State of the Union Address, President Bush introduced the “axis of evil” concept into public consciousness. Three countries were included in the “axis of evil”: Iran, Iraq and North Korea. Iraq was spotlighted for continued flouting of UNSC mandates and employment of chemical weapons. President Bush summarized his action plan toward rogue states: “If we stop now—leaving terror camps intact and terror states unchecked—our sense of security would be false and temporary. History has called America and our allies to action, and it is both our responsibility and our privilege to fight freedom’s fight.”2 The nature of the action envisaged—diplomatic, military, or economic—was not specified in this address, but was clarified subsequently.

The French response was calm. A French Foreign Ministry spokesperson noted that France was disinclined to define states as terrorist and that resolutions against terrorism were being considered in the United Nations. Questions about possible French action to counter American unilateralism were dismissed. A subsequent statement referred to a discussion with Secretary Powell, who denied any current US war plans.3

During the first half of 2002, France was preoccupied with national elections. The focus of the French electorate and political leaders was directed to domestic issues,

particularly when Front National candidate Jean-Marie Le Pen defeated more the centrist socialist candidate, Lionel Jospin, and became the alternative to the incumbent President, Jacques Chirac. France overwhelmingly reelected President Chirac. His party also won by a large majority in parliamentary elections. The reelection gave President Chirac and his party an electoral mandate, but winning the election required an internal focus in the first half of 2002.4

There was no official Italian reaction to President Bush’s State of the Union address. The reasons for this may include domestic developments in the Italian government. In early January 2002, Prime Minister Berlusconi’s Foreign Minister Renato Ruggiero resigned; rather than appointing another, Berlusconi combined the duties of Foreign and Prime Minister. He was occupied with assuaging concern in the European Union about losing a popular foreign minister who was seen as pro-European Union, and spent considerable time countering charges of “Euroscepticism,” and articulating a nuanced policy towards the European Union in both the British and French media.5 Further, Berlusconi was under scrutiny domestically over conflict of interest charges regarding his business concerns.

Commentary about a possible US-led intervention in Iraq moved off center stage, particularly in Europe, as various governments, including that of the United States, attempted from January 2002 to June 2002 to resolve the escalating crisis between Israel and the Palestinian Authority.

2. June – August 2002

President Bush’s June 2002 commencement address at West Point signaled a change in his administration’s attitude towards Iraq. Central themes included a heightened perception of Iraq as a direct threat to American security, and a loss of trust in security through isolation or “containment” measures, such as weapons inspections by international agencies. While President Bush did not refer explicitly to Iraq, he said,

Containment is not possible when unbalanced dictators with weapons of mass destruction can deliver those weapons on missiles or secretly provide

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them to terrorist allies. Our security will require all Americans to be forward-looking and resolute, to be ready for preemptive action when necessary to defend our liberty and to defend our lives.  

In an August 2002 address to the National Convention of the Veterans of Foreign Wars, Vice President Cheney reiterated President Bush’s assertion that containment was ineffective. He identified a need for strong action against Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq, and expressed a lack of confidence in UN weapons inspections. “A return of inspectors would provide no assurance whatsoever of his compliance with UN resolutions. On the contrary, there is a great danger that it would provide false comfort that Saddam was somehow ‘back in his box.’” Other statements in this speech appeared to signal a more martial tone in US policy. The Vice President described Saddam Hussein as a direct threat to the United States and its allies, and attributed to him an intent to use WMD.

Simply stated, there is no doubt that Saddam Hussein now has weapons of mass destruction. There is no doubt he is amassing them to use against our friends, against our allies, and against us. And there is no doubt that his aggressive regional ambitions will lead him into future confrontations with his neighbors—confrontations that will involve both the weapons he has today, and the ones he will continue to develop with his oil wealth.

Vice President Cheney’s remarks made military intervention appear inevitable.

The elected leaders of this country have a responsibility to consider all of the available options. And we are doing so. What we must not do in the face of a mortal threat is give in to wishful thinking or willful blindness. We will not simply look away, hope for the best, and leave the matter for some future administration to resolve. As President Bush has said, time is not on our side. Deliverable weapons of mass destruction in the hands of a terror network, or a murderous dictator, or the two working together, constitutes as grave a threat as can be imagined. The risks of inaction are far greater than the risk of action. I am familiar with the arguments against taking action in the case of Saddam Hussein. Some concede that Saddam is evil, power-hungry, and a menace—but [argue] that, until he crosses the threshold of actually possessing nuclear weapons, we should rule out any preemptive action. That logic seems to me to be deeply

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7US Vice President Dick Cheney Speaks at VFW 103rd National Convention, 26 August 2002; http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/08/print/20020826.html
flawed. Regime change in Iraq would bring about a number of benefits to the region. With our help, a liberated Iraq can be a great nation once again.

In tandem, these speeches previewed an assertive, military approach to resolving the problem of WMD in Iraq, an expansive departure from earlier statements.

There was no reaction to these speeches from the Italian government, and the reaction from the French government continued to be tranquil. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) was directly asked, “Do you have any comment on Dick Cheney’s statements indicating a shift in the justification for preventive strikes?” An MFA spokesperson responded, “There is a healthy debate going on in the United States…. We consider the top priority is for the inspectors to return without delay, unconditionally and without hindrance.” President Chirac acknowledged the growing danger of WMD proliferation, but maintained that there existed a wide array of tools to address the problem. “The danger arising from weapons of mass destruction also comes from certain countries and is growing. I’ve already had the opportunity to say it: there is no single way to address the issue.” He advocated the development of legal constraints as well as strengthening the United Nations Security Council as more effective means to stop WMD proliferation.

Prevention is first of all the development of restrictive legal instruments that prevent proliferation…These instruments are still incomplete, both in their scope and in their verification mechanisms. … The Security Council must take up this problem because these new dangers constitute a real menace to international peace and security. I therefore propose that the Security Council meet at this level [heads of states] in tandem with the General Assembly, with a double mandate: to assess the policy of nonproliferation and give it a new, decisive impetus.

8 Ibid.
9 French Foreign Ministry of Affairs Statement, 27 August 2002
10 “Le danger provenant des armes de destruction massive vient aussi de certains pays et il s’accroît. J’ai déjà eu l’occasion de le dire: il n’y a pas qu’un seul moyen d’y faire face.”
11 President Chirac speaks at a reception for ambassadors, 29 August 2002: “La prevention, c’est d’abord le développement des instruments juridiques contraignants qui empêchent la proliferation. … Ces instruments sont encore incomplets, soit dans leur portée, soit dans leurs mechanisms de verification. Il faut donc persuader les pays récalcitrants ou sceptiques que cette voie est la bonne. Le Conseil de Sécurité doit se saisir de ce problème, car ces nouveaux dangers constituent un menace réelle à la paix et à la sécurité internationale. Et je propose donc que le Conseil se réunisse à ce niveau en 2003, en marge de
There are few explanations for the absence of any official reaction from Italy, although Berlusconi’s domestic legal troubles combined with the absence of a separate Foreign Minister may have contributed to keeping the burgeoning US inclination to use force in Iraq off the Italian domestic agenda.

3. **September 2002**

A September 2002 press conference by British Prime Minister Tony Blair and President Bush added to the public debate the statement that intelligence suggested that Iraq was within six months of developing a nuclear weapon.\(^\text{12}\) The US administration also released two important documents: *A Decade of Deception and Defiance* reviewing the offenses of the Iraqi regime, and the *United States National Security Strategy*.\(^\text{13}\) The possibility of an Iraqi nuclear weapon highlighted the US administration’s perceptions of a threat while the *National Security Strategy* unveiled its approach to international relations.

On 12 September 2002, President Bush addressed the UN General Assembly (UNGA). His remarks concerned the imminence of the threat posed by Iraq’s WMD proliferation. He outlined six conditions Iraq’s leaders had to meet in order to avoid the threat of military intervention:

- “immediately and unconditionally forswear, disclose, and remove or destroy all weapons of mass destruction, long-range missiles, and all related material”
- “immediately end all support for terrorism and act to suppress it”
- “cease persecution of its civilian population”
- “release or account for all Gulf War personnel whose fate is still unknown,” and “accept liability for losses resulting from the invasion of Kuwait”

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• “immediately end all illicit trade outside the oil-for-food program.”\textsuperscript{14}

The President highlighted his certainty that Iraq possessed WMD, the great potential for Iraq to collaborate with Al Qaeda, and the immediacy of the threat.

And our greatest fear is that terrorists will find a shortcut to their mad ambitions when an outlaw regime supplies them with the technologies to kill on a massive scale. In one place—in one regime—we find all these dangers, in their most lethal and aggressive forms, exactly the kind of aggressive threat the United Nations was born to confront. … With every step the Iraqi regime takes toward gaining and deploying the most terrible weapons, our own options to confront that regime will narrow. And if an emboldened regime were to supply these weapons to terrorist allies, then the attacks of September the 11\textsuperscript{th} would be a prelude to far greater horrors.\textsuperscript{15}

President Chirac urged a change in the proposed American course of action, noting that French goals were to find and destroy WMD, and to maintain UNSC unity. France did not support unilateral preventive action or regime change, concerned that it would set an untenable precedent and would undermine the coalition in the war on terror.

As soon as one nation claims the right to take preventive action, other countries will naturally do the same. … I think this is an extraordinarily dangerous doctrine that could have tragic consequences. Preventive action can be undertaken if it appears necessary, but it must be taken by the international community, which today is represented by the United Nations Security Council…. I’m utterly opposed to unilateralism in the modern world…. Now, the Security Council has decided that Iraq must not have weapons of mass destruction; it did not say that a regime change was necessary there…. This coalition remains necessary to fight against terrorism…. This coalition must be managed cautiously. That’s why I think everything should be done to ensure that the coalition isn’t jeopardized by an act that doesn’t have the approval of the international community and which would run the risk of undermining the coalition’s solidarity, notably in the Arab and Muslim countries.


\textsuperscript{15} Ibid.
The only reason Chirac admitted for military action was the absence of unfettered access for the weapons inspectors, as noted by the inspectors themselves. He reiterated support for military action should the UNSC approve it.\textsuperscript{16}

Prime Minister Berlusconi strongly supported the American position during remarks to the UN General Assembly following President Bush’s speech, expressing Italy’s moral and political backing for disarmament in Iraq.

At this time the main challenge to the UN and to our system of values and principles comes from the regime governing Iraq that systematically violates all the resolutions of the United Nations. A response to safeguard the international community from the danger of the accumulation of unconventional weapons of mass destruction is necessary and vital.\textsuperscript{17}

He followed up the UNGA remarks with a speech in Parliament in which he emphasized the threat of Iraqi WMD, but articulated a multilateral perspective. “On the other hand, everyone agrees that the political regime of Iraq constitutes a regional and global danger, whatever the opinions are on the way to begin to remove this danger.”\textsuperscript{18}

Perhaps more cognizant of its direct impact on the domestic audience, Berlusconi neither advocated nor disavowed preemption as a course of action. Instead, he focused on the failure of containment and the possibility that the use of force could become necessary, pointedly referring to the effects of appeasement before the Second World War.

[T]he Americans taught us something that we Europeans had forgotten in the tragic months of appeasement, when at Munich with Italian mediation, Adolf Hitler succeeded in imposing the law of strength and fait accompli on European democracies intimidated and reluctant to act. … Let us continue with courage in this political, diplomatic and military effort that


\textsuperscript{17} Prime Minister Berlusconi speaks to the 57\textsuperscript{th} UNGA, 13 September 2002. “In questo momento la principale sfida all’Onu e al nostro sistema di valori e di principi è portata dal regime che governa l’Iraq e che viola sistematicamente tutte le risoluzioni delle Nazioni Unite. È necessaria e indispensabile una risposta per salvaguardare la comunità internazionale dal pericolo costituito da un accumulo di armi non convenzionali di sterminio di massa.” http://www.governo.it/Governinforma.index.html

\textsuperscript{18} Prime Minister Berlusconi speaks to the House of Deputies, 25 September 2002. “D’altra parte, sul fatto che il regime politico iracheno costituisca un pericolo regionale e globale concordano tutti, quale che sia l’opinione sulle vie da intraprendere per rimuovere questo pericolo.” http://www.governo.it/Governinforma.index.html
the hard facts, considered without fanaticism but dispassionately, impose on us as a duty, a national duty.19

4. October 2002-December 2002

President Bush’s speeches during the October-December 2002 period aimed three key messages relating to Iraq at domestic and international audiences. The first was the urgency of the threat.

On its present course, the Iraqi regime is a threat of unique urgency. … In defiance of pledges to the UN, it has stockpiled biological and chemical weapons. It is rebuilding the facilities used to make those weapons.20

Second, he positively linked Iraq to Al Qaeda and asserted that the links were 10 years old. Third, he emphasized the danger of collusion between Iraq and Al Qaeda.

We’re concerned that Iraq is exploring ways of using these UAVS [unmanned aerial vehicles] for missions targeting the United States. And, of course, sophisticated delivery systems aren’t required for a chemical or biological attack; all that might be required are a small container and one terrorist or Iraqi intelligence operative to deliver it. And that is the source of our urgent concern about Saddam Hussein’s links to international terrorist groups. … We know that Iraq and al Qaeda have had high-level contacts that go back a decade.21

President Bush summarized by emphasizing the lack of UN progress over the past twelve years.

Some believe we can address this danger by simply resuming the old approach to inspections, and applying diplomatic and economic pressure. Yet this is precisely what the world has tried to do since 1991. Clearly, to actually work, any new inspections, sanctions or enforcement mechanisms will have to be very different. America wants the UN to be an effective

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19 Prime Minister Berlusconi speaks to the House of Deputies, 25 September 2002. “[G]li americani ci hanno insegnato qualcosa che, noi europei avevamo dimenticato nei mesi tragici dell’appeasement, quando a Monaco, con la mediazione italiana, Adolf Hitler reuscì a imporre la legge della forze e del fatto compiuto su democrazie europee intimidate e riluttanti ad agire. … proseguiamo con coraggio in quello sforzo politico, diplomatico e militare che i nudi fatti, guardati senza fanatismo ma anzi con freddezza, ci impongono come un “dovere, come un dovere nazionale.””
http://www.governo.it/GovernoInforma.index.html


organization that helps keep the peace. And that is why we are urging the Security Council to adopt a new resolution setting out tough, immediate requirements.  

On 16 October 2002, a joint resolution of the US House of Representatives and the US Senate authorized President Bush to use force against Iraq.

The President is authorized to use the Armed Forces of the United States as he determines to be necessary and appropriate in order to (1) defend the national security of the United States against the continuing threat posed by Iraq; and (2) enforce all relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq.

In contrast, President Chirac emphasized the central role of the UNSC in disarming Iraq—whether disarmament came through an inspections regime or through military force. He proposed an iterative process wherein the UNSC would establish standards to be met, and would address instances of Iraqi noncompliance. This proposal removed the need for an automatic use of force clause in the resolution. At the same time, France never explicitly ruled out UNSC-approved military action. Queried about France’s projected actions at the UNSC—abstain, support or veto measures being proposed—Chirac responded with three observations. First, that President Bush’s administration wanted a resolution authorizing military interventions, a clause he believed unnecessary. Second, UN weapons inspectors would assess Iraqi obstruction and material breach, not France or the United States. Third, if Iraqi obstructions occurred, the UNMOVIC needed to inform the UNSC, which would then determine an appropriate response.

President Chirac and Prime Minister Berlusconi jointly addressed the press one day before UNSC Resolution 1441 was up for a vote. When asked about pressure to support a US-backed resolution, President Chirac deferred questions regarding the use of force. He highlighted underlying issues, citing concerns that preventive wars set a

22 Ibid


dangerous precedent, and declared that such military decisions belonged in the UNSC to preserve legitimacy. Responding to the same questions, Berlusconi’s stance was ambiguous. He supported Chirac’s position, but added his wish that the situation be resolved to everyone’s satisfaction.25

UN Security Council Resolution 1441 was a compromise between the Americans, who wanted a strong penalty-oriented resolution, and the French, who advocated a phased process without an automatic triggering mechanism. UNSCR 1441 obligated Iraq to disarm, to submit to an inspections regime, and to provide detailed data about its weapons programs.26 This resolution did not specify the mechanism to identify material breach or failure to comply, and in that respect, was open to interpretation by either side of the debate.

American rhetoric about the imminence of the Iraqi threat moderated significantly following the unanimous adoption of UNSCR 1441. There may be several explanations. One consideration is that the negotiations leading up to the UN Security Council vote coincided with US national midterm elections. The administration may have been willing to let UN inspectors return to Iraq to palliate international opposition. With support from the US House of Representatives and Senate for President Bush to take action without additional UN Security Council approval, the administration may have felt less pressure to act immediately. IAEA and UNMOVIC inspectors were in a difficult situation; whatever they discovered could be interpreted to suit the argument either for or against rapid military intervention.

There were few statements of policy regarding Iraq from the French or the Italians following the 7 November 2002 joint press conference. In his end-of-year report, Prime Minister Berlusconi alluded to “winds of war” in conjunction with possible war in Iraq and the danger of international terrorism, but the majority of his remarks focused on domestic issues.27 President Chirac also made one public statement during this respite.

26 UN Security Council Resolution 1441, 8 November 2002
27 Prime Minister Berlusconi’s remarks to reporters, 30 December 2002
between 8 November 2002 and January 2003, restating his confidence in weapons inspections and the need for Iraq to disarm.28


In January 2003, President Chirac reaffirmed his confidence in the capabilities of the weapons inspectors and the value of inspections. He observed that UNSCOM weapons inspections had located and destroyed more WMD than had the first Gulf War, and reasserted the opinion that military intervention required explicit additional UN Security Council approval.

Until 1998, when unfortunately interrupted, the inspections permitted the discovery and destruction of a considerable number of weapons of mass destruction. In total, more were destroyed by inspections in that era than by the war in the Gulf.29

In comments directed perhaps at the Bush administration, Chirac said, “I conclude by saying that, for France, war is always evidence of failure, is always the worst of solutions.”30

In a 23 January 2003 New York Times article, “Why We Know He’s Lying,” US National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice expounded on the administration’s lack of confidence in weapons inspections. The gist of her argument was a comparison between the disarmament efforts of former Soviet republics and those of Iraq. The governments of Kazakhstan and Ukraine took weapons inspectors to various sites, presented dismantled weapons, destroyed missiles and silos, and turned over a ton of enriched uranium. This was contrasted with the Iraqi failure to provide verifiable information or to reveal its proscribed missiles and WMD stockpiles.

Iraq’s behavior could not offer a starker contrast [to the former Soviet republics]. Instead of a commitment to disarm, Iraq has a high-level political commitment to maintain and conceal its weapons, led by Saddam


30 Ibid., “Je conclus en disant que, pour la France, la guerre est toujours le constat d’un échec, est toujours la pire des solutions…”
Hussein and his son Qusay, who controls the Special Security Organization, which runs Iraq’s concealment activities. Instead of implementing national initiatives to disarm, Iraq maintains institutions whose sole purpose is to thwart the work of the inspectors. And instead of full cooperation and transparency, Iraq has filed a false declaration to the United Nations that amounts to a 12,200-page lie.31

President Bush’s January 2003 State of the Union Address heralded another pivotal policy change towards intervention in Iraq. Exhortations for the UN’s members to unite and act against Saddam Hussein were combined with a litany of his offenses. The President indicated that America and its allies would no longer tolerate the continuation of weapons inspections that had no prospect for success.

We have called upon the United Nations to fulfill its charter and stand by its demand that Iraq disarm. … Almost three months ago, the United Nations Security Council gave Saddam Hussein his final chance to disarm. He has shown instead utter contempt for the United Nations, and for the opinion of the world. The 108 UN inspectors … were not sent to conduct a scavenger hunt for hidden materials across a country the size of California.

Included in the speech for the first time were promises of salvation and deliverance aimed directly at the Iraqi people. “And tonight I have a message for the brave and oppressed people of Iraq: Your enemy is not surrounding your country—your enemy is ruling your country. And the day he and his regime are removed from power will be the day of your liberation.” These three elements created an impression of the inevitability of a US-led military intervention.

The world has waited 12 years for Iraq to disarm. America will not accept a serious and mounting threat to our country, and our friends and our allies. The United States will ask the UN Security Council to convene on February the 5th to consider the facts of Iraq’s ongoing defiance of the world. Secretary of State Powell will present information and intelligence about … Iraq’s illegal weapons programs, its attempt to hide those weapons from inspectors, and its links to terrorist groups. We will consult. But let there be no misunderstanding: If Saddam Hussein does

not fully disarm, for the safety of our people and for the peace of the world, we will lead a coalition to disarm him.\textsuperscript{32}

Three days later, on 31 January 2003 in a joint press conference with British Prime Minister Tony Blair, President Bush set a deadline for Iraqi compliance with an implied end to UN wrangling.

This is a matter of weeks, not months. Any attempt to drag the process on for months will be resisted by the United States. … It’s not just a test for the United States or for Britain. It’s a test for the international community, too. And the judgment has to be, at the present time, that Saddam Hussein is not cooperating with the inspectors, and therefore is in breach of the UN resolution. And that’s why time is running out.\textsuperscript{33}

5 February 2003 saw one of the last efforts to secure explicit additional UNSC approval for military action in Iraq, as Secretary Powell briefed the UNSC on the American position regarding prospective intervention. There were two salient messages in his presentation. The first was American impatience with the weapons inspections regime. UNMOVIC inspectors found a few empty chemical weapons artillery shells, plus missiles whose range exceeded the permitted range of 150 kilometers. Inspectors were not finding, and Iraqi officials were not revealing, caches of chemical or biological weapons, mobile labs, or the capacity to construct nuclear weapons. Powell contended that such items would never be found in the course of weapons inspections. As proof he played recordings of intercepted phone calls between Iraqi officials that were presented to the Security Council as evidence of deceptions of weapons inspectors. The second relevant message in Powell’s remarks was the incipient irrelevance of the UNSC should it fail to act.

Iraq has now placed itself in danger of the serious consequences called for in UN Resolution 1441. And this body places itself in danger of irrelevance if it allows Iraq to continue to defy its will without responding effectively and immediately. The issue before us is not how much time we are willing to give the inspectors to be frustrated by Iraqi obstruction. But how much longer are we willing to put up with Iraq’s noncompliance


before we, as a council, we, as the United Nations, say: ‘Enough, Enough.’  

The Bush administration appeared impatient with further UNSC negotiations. On 6 February 2003, following Secretary Powell’s address, President Bush accented the imminent danger Iraq posed.

The Iraqi regime’s violations of Security Council resolutions are evident, and they continue to this hour. … The Iraqi regime has actively and secretly attempted to obtain equipment needed to produce chemical, biological and nuclear weapons. Senior members of Iraqi intelligence and al Qaeda have met at least eight times since the early 1990s. Iraq has sent bomb-making and document forgery experts to work with Al Qaeda. Iraq has also provided Al Qaeda with chemical and biological weapons training. … The danger Saddam Hussein poses reaches across the world.

The President charged the UNSC to make a stand.

The dictator of Iraq is making his choice. Now the nations of the Security Council must make their own. … Now the Security Council will show whether its words have any meaning. Having made its demands, the Security Council must not back down, when those demands are defied and mocked by a dictator.

The President concluded, “The game is over.” Given the deadline established jointly with Prime Minister Blair, intervention appeared certain.

French rhetoric became more pointed and confrontational after Secretary Powell’s presentation to the UNSC. President Chirac disputed the American image of the French as pacifists in his February 2003 interview in Time. He pinpointed possible adverse outcomes of military intervention in Iraq—e.g., “creating a large number of little bin Ladens”—while highlighting his view of the proper solution—international isolation and control of Iraq through weapons inspections. He again expressed his support for military intervention if weapons inspectors reported to the UNSC that Iraq was uncooperative.

It’s up to them [the inspectors] to come before the Security Council and say, ‘We won. It’s over. There are no more weapons of mass


destruction,’ or ‘It’s impossible for us to fulfill our mission. We’re coming up against Iraqi ill will and impediments.’ At that point, the Security Council would have to discuss this report and decide what to do. In that case, France would naturally exclude no option.

One interesting aspect of this interview is how he addressed the issue of America’s role as the world’s only superpower. While he denied any desire to balance American power, he stated that he thought the world was a more dangerous place with only one dominant power, and that he favored a multipolar world with Europe having its rightful place.

Any community with only one dominant power is always a dangerous one and provokes reactions. That’s why I favor a multipolar world, in which Europe obviously has its place.  

French skepticism about the accuracy of Powell’s assessment and the wisdom of the policy prescription advanced by the Bush administration grew more pronounced as war seemed to become more inevitable. In a barbed speech to the UNSC on 14 February 2003, French Foreign Minister Dominique de Villepin dismissed the image of UNSC member countries pursuing conflicting agendas. In a point-by-point rebuttal of the American position articulated by Secretary Powell, he expounded French counterarguments. He first disputed American assertions that inspections were failing, citing Iraqi permission for aerial reconnaissance, permission to question scientists without government minders, and the provision of a detailed list of experts who had witnessed previous destructions of military capabilities as proofs of success. Villepin then refocused the debate away from the immediate decision—intervention or inspections—towards a post-war scenario, implying that it was irresponsible to undertake a near-term war when reconstruction and peace would be difficult to establish. Further, he questioned reported links between Iraq and Al Qaeda, expressing doubt about their existence based on French intelligence reports. He concluded, “Given this context, the use of force is not justified at this time.”

The Italian position regarding the debate was more diffuse. In a press conference at the White House with President Bush, Prime Minister Berlusconi affirmed Italy’s

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faithful allegiance to the United States. However, rather than expressing emphatic support for or opposition to intervention, Berlusconi viewed his role as convincing others that the threat of terrorism was real; his target audience included the European Union, the United States and the Russian Federation. His message was that a united front would better convince Saddam Hussein to reveal his WMD for destruction. When asked directly whether his support for the United States included participation in a military intervention, Berlusconi replied, “we will never forget that we owe our freedom to the United States of America.”

Prime Minister Berlusconi’s remarks to the Italian parliament following Secretary Powell’s UNSC address are striking in three aspects. He started by reiterating Powell’s central themes concerning the imminent danger of terrorism and WMD proliferation, the futility of weapons inspections, and the possible need for military intervention. However, he shifted his focus to managing domestic public and political perceptions of his government’s role in the evolving crisis. His speech was aimed more at ensuring strong support for his international positions than at convincing the Italian parliament of the merits of supporting either the American or French position.

6. **February-March 2003**

During late February and early March 2003, President Bush’s speeches could be interpreted as preparing the American people and foreign nations for the imminent armed intervention in Iraq. In the course of a 26 February speech to the American Enterprise Institute, the President articulated a vision for a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq and highlighted the humanitarian reasons for American intervention.

A liberated Iraq can show the power of freedom to transform that vital region [that is, the Middle East], by bringing hope and progress into the lives of millions. America’s interests in security and America’s belief in liberty both lead in the same direction: to a free and peaceful Iraq. … Bringing stability and unity to a free Iraq will not be easy. Yet that is no excuse to leave the Iraqi regime’s torture chambers and poison labs in operation. Any future the Iraqi people choose for themselves will be better than the nightmare world that Saddam Hussein has chosen for them.

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... The United States has no intention of determining the precise form of Iraq’s new government. That choice belongs to the Iraqi people. Yet, we will ensure that one brutal dictator is not replaced by another. All Iraqis must have a voice in the new government, and all citizens must have their rights protected.40

On 8 March 2003, President Bush denounced Iraq as uncooperative during his radio address to the nation. He began with an allusion to a report by Dr. Hans Blix, Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC, who had provided a progress report to the UNSC on Iraqi disarmament the previous day.41 President Bush presented Dr. Blix’s report as evidence of Iraq’s continued obstruction of disarmament.

Unfortunately, it is clear that Saddam Hussein is still violating the demands of the United Nations by refusing to disarm. ... Iraqi operatives continue to play a shell game with inspectors, moving suspected prohibited materials to different locations every 12 to 24 hours. ... These are not the actions of a regime that is disarming. These are the actions of a regime engaged in a willful charade.

He concluded that Americans must be prepared to use military force should Saddam Hussein resist peaceful disarmament. 42

During his 15 March 2003 radio address, the President indicated there was “little reason to hope” for peaceful disarmament in Iraq. He drew attention to the anniversary of Iraqi chemical weapons attacks on Iraqi Kurds in Halabja, highlighting this incident as an example of the capabilities of Saddam Hussein. Furthermore, he cited USNC failures to act decisively as precursors to “tragedy” in Bosnia, Rwanda and Kosovo. The president concluded by expressing his doubts about Iraq’s voluntary disarmament and envisioned a case for the use of force in Iraq. “There is little reason to hope that Saddam Hussein will disarm. If force is required to disarm him, the American people can know


It should be noted that other readers of Blix’s report drew conclusions at variance with those of President Bush.

that our armed forces have been given every tool and every resource to achieve victory.”

On 16 March 2003, President Bush held a joint press conference in the Azores with key allies—British Prime Minister Tony Blair, Spanish President José Maria Aznar, and Portuguese Prime Minister José Durão Barroso. The purpose of their meeting was to reaffirm transatlantic linkages and to demonstrate allied solidarity. President Bush established a short deadline, for the UNSC and for Iraq.

And we concluded that tomorrow is a moment of truth for the world. Many nations have voiced a commitment to peace and security. And now they must demonstrate that commitment to peace and security in the only effective way, by supporting the immediate and unconditional disarmament of Saddam Hussein.

On 16 March 2003, Christiane Amanpour interviewed President Chirac for a television broadcast. Chirac repeated his opposition to military intervention in Iraq. Responding to questions central to the WMD debate, President Chirac indicated that he was unsure about whether Saddam Hussein possessed huge stockpiles of WMD, but that the way to discover the truth and remove the problem was weapons inspections. Even at this late date, though, President Chirac did not rule out the potential for military intervention in the event that the UN weapons inspectors were at an impasse.

On 17 March 2003 President Bush indicated that the opportunity for a non-military solution in Iraq was ending. He referred to the failure of over a decade of international effort in peacefully disarming Iraq. The president contrasted the “honorable efforts” of the international community with the deceptions of the Iraqi regime. Finally, he reiterated the combined danger that Saddam Hussein, Iraqi WMD, and Al Qaeda terrorists posed. “The danger is clear: using chemical, biological or, one day, nuclear weapons, obtained with the help of Iraq, the terrorists could fulfill their stated ambitions and kill thousands or hundreds of thousands of innocent people in our country, or any

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other.” In recommending that all media personnel and inspectors leave Iraq, President Bush presaged the beginning of the military conflict.

Saddam Hussein and his sons must leave Iraq within 48 hours. Their refusal to do so will result in military conflict, commenced at a time of our choosing. For their own safety, all foreign nationals—including journalists and inspectors—should leave Iraq immediately.46

On 19 March 2003, President Bush announced that coalition forces had begun a military campaign to “disarm Iraq, to free its people and to defend the world from grave danger.”47

On the same day, Prime Minister Berlusconi spoke to the Italian Parliament regarding the direction of the crisis. He noted that the UNSC was unable to find a compromise solution, and he blamed France for the breakdown in unity. The purpose of his discourse to the Parliament was to report his decision to allow the United States basing and over flight access, as well as to assure parliamentarians both allied with him and in opposition that there would be no active Italian involvement in the intervention.48

By March 2003, a US-led military intervention appeared inevitable. Compromise between the American and French positions was impossible, given American timetables and French insistence on giving weapons inspectors more time. Italian support for the American policy was steady, but consisted only of political support. Both France and Italy passively supported the American effort once a course of action was decided. France allowed over flights of its sovereign airspace, while Italy permitted both over flights and basing of deploying US troops and equipment.

**B. GOAL: DISARMAMENT OR REGIME CHANGE?**

The Italian government never issued a comprehensive policy statement about the uniquely Italian position. France and the United States differed widely on their objectives regarding the future of Iraq. Although both governments deplored the regime of Saddam Hussein, the prospect of a preventive war, the goal of which was, from the


outset, to oust a sovereign government, disturbed French officials. One continued focus of President Chirac’s discourse was that the combination of preventive action and regime change was contrary to the tenets of international law as well as those espoused by the French constitution and political culture. Moreover, Chirac argued that preventive war and regime change could set a dangerous precedent for other conflicted regions. More generally, he noted that conflicts between India and Pakistan, China and Taiwan, and North and South Korea could escalate if the governments of those countries pursued similar foreign policies.49

From the beginning of the public debate, the Bush administration focused on regime change and disarmament as parallel objectives. In defining regime change, President Bush appeared cryptic between January and June 2002. Many of his early speeches equated disarmament with regime change, stating his belief that if the Iraqi government completely disarmed, then it would be a fundamentally changed regime. However, Vice President Cheney’s address to the VFW in August 2002 painted a vision of Iraq following regime change as a liberated Iraq with a pluralistic and democratic government. It is difficult to conceive of a situation in which a liberated, pluralistic, disarmed Iraq could exist with Saddam Hussein as its leader. Subsequent public dialogue reinforced this linkage of a new regime with a liberated Iraq; this lent credibility to the perception that regime change equated to an end to Saddam Hussein’s rule in Iraq.

France focused on disarmament through weapons inspections as a means to contain Saddam Hussein. Thus, the removal of Iraqi WMD would render Saddam Hussein a paper tiger; he would still be a heavy burden to the citizens of Iraq, but no longer a threat to the world. Thus, a regime change would be welcome, but not required to neutralize the threat.

Americans were still preoccupied with the threat of more terrorist attacks on the United States following the attacks of 11 September 2001. The Bush administration clearly and consistently linked the Iraqi regime’s WMD with the possibility of future Al Qaeda attacks. In this way, the Bush administration cast doubt on the effectiveness of UNSC-sponsored disarmament inspections as a containment device. Instead, forcible

disarmament was linked with regime change as the only real way to ensure American and global security. France perceived disarmament inspections as having intrinsic value as a method to prevent WMD proliferation. The Bush administration deemed disarmament inspections absent regime change a threat to security.

C. VALUE OF UNMOVIC INSPECTIONS

As suggested above, the divergence in perceptions on regime change and disarmament carried directly into the evaluation of weapons inspections. The French position can be summarized in three concepts. First, more weapons had been destroyed during the post-conflict UNSCOM period than had been during the Gulf War. Second, inspections were a painstaking, iterative process that required patience, but which would ultimately succeed in securing and destroying Iraq’s WMD stockpile. Last, a protracted military intervention in Iraq could result in either the employment of WMD to counter the invasion, or during hostilities, the WMD could be shipped to neighboring states or potential allies, causing uncontrolled and hostile WMD proliferation.50

Weapons inspections were viewed by the Bush administration as a futile distraction. The Vice President suggested that, because Iraqi personnel were so devious, the weapons inspections could foster a false hope among Americans that WMD had been found and destroyed when, in fact, they had merely been hidden.

[A] person would be right to question any suggestion that we should just get inspectors back into Iraq, and then our worries will be over. Saddam has perfected the game of cheat and retreat, and is very skilled in the art of denial and deception. A return of inspectors would provide no assurance whatsoever of his compliance with UN resolutions.51

In February 2003 Secretary Powell presented to the UN Security Council recordings of intercepted conversations between Iraqi personnel apparently planning to hide material from UNMOVIC inspectors. Weapons inspections, as far as the Bush administration was concerned, were just another opportunity for Iraq to play a cat-and-mouse game with external powers while preserving or expanding its WMD cache and increasing the threat of WMD proliferation.


In support of both positions, the UNMOVIC reports of 27 November 2002 and 28 February 2003 left the assessment of Iraqi cooperation as well as progress on weapons inspections open to interpretation. A government could choose to interpret the weapons inspections as a successful work in progress or an abysmal failure. Weapons inspectors were caught between powerful political and national security interests, and produced a report that was, as analyzed by Berlusconi, “a professional work, technical, that could not possibly not be open to political interpretations and conclusive decisions in light of resolution 1441.”

Presidents Chirac and Bush viewed the efficacy of weapons inspections as a means to constrain Saddam Hussein and remove and destroy WMD differently. Although the American administration agreed to allow some time for weapons inspectors to perform, there was little faith in the process. Generally, statements by the Bush administration dismissed Iraqi gestures towards disarmament whereas statements by the French government tended to view those gestures as steps in the desired direction.

D. RELEVANCE OF UN ACTION

The United Nations was established to avert future wars using mechanisms of international dispute resolution such as international law and collective policing. Enshrined in the UN Charter are the concepts of international peace and security and of the sovereign equality of nations. The preamble to the Charter refers to the “equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small.” From the perspective of American policy makers, this makes the UN a powerful tool of policy legitimization when the United States desires to take action approved by the UN. However, when the UN through the Security Council or through nonbinding resolutions in the UN General Assembly checks the power or direction of an American administration, the UN may appear to be an impediment rather than a supporting structure.

The people and government of the United States have a complex and ambivalent relationship with the UN which has at times been articulated by noteworthy congressional leaders. Support for the UN has waxed and waned with its perceived value on a number


of issues. In the situation regarding Iraq, the Bush administration sought support in the UN. However, UN constraints during the buildup to Operation Iraqi Freedom frustrated members of the Bush administration who were reluctantly persuaded to present a case for action at the UN in September 2002 and in February 2003 once it became apparent that getting UNSC approval would be difficult. The administration tried repeatedly to encourage UN action on Iraq by declaring that the UNSC would become irrelevant if it could not enforce its own mandates. The Bush administration portrayed its decisions and actions as defending the UN from irrelevance. President Bush’s justification for legitimate military intervention hinged on UNSC approval designated in UNSCRs 678 and 687 which had never been rescinded. For the French, supplementary explicit UNSC approval was the only source of legitimacy for military action.

E. SUMMARY

The American, French and Italian positions regarding the threat of Iraq’s WMD were similar. The solution to the problem of how to deal with the threat is where the positions diverge. The American inclination towards a military action was apparent as early as June 2002. France was generally opposed to military action, and advocated this position increasingly firmly as the American position tended more towards military intervention. Throughout the crisis, the Italian focus remained on balancing relations with France and the United States. Berlusconi concurred with the US threat assessment, and supported both weapons inspections and military intervention.
III. KEY DETERMINANTS-FRANCE

Relations between France and the United States during the past 50 years have been tempestuous--from President de Gaulle’s withdrawal of French military assets from NATO’s integrated military structure, to Foreign Minister Hubert Védrine’s refusal to join the Community of Democracies, a US initiative under President Clinton that Védrine called a “pressure group for the promotion of democracies around the world.”54 Védrine’s analogy is that of a love-hate relationship; the French are fascinated by America’s market economy, high-quality entertainment productions, and sense of individuality. At the same time, the French are loath to cede their own identity, culture, political objectives or economic structures.55 As a result, French political leaders are often at odds with American political leaders on issues of foreign policy, economic development, and general influence in world politics.

Against this backdrop, French objections to American proposals on military intervention in Iraq should be unsurprising. Despite this trend, Aspen Institute analyst Marta Dassù predicted in September 2002, “it is equally likely that France will refrain from taking any high profile stance [on Iraq], given the serious risk of losing all of its stakes. Having already burned its fingers at Rambouillet, France is probably unwilling to take any chances of overexposure this time around, especially by embarking on a path that might well turn out to lead nowhere in terms of visible political results.”56 Prior to September 2002, France’s posture was relatively mute; in reaction to increasingly explicit American indications of a willingness to use force, the French opposition to the American posture became more pronounced and contentious. The result was the opposite of what Dassù envisioned: the French did pursue a path with results that were, at best, ambiguous, and at worst, a political debacle.

54 Hubert Védrine with Dominique Moïsi, France in an Age of Globalization (Brookings Institution, 2001), p vii.


President Chirac’s decision on the prospective US intervention in Iraq had its origins in several concerns. His position was articulated in opposition to the American position as well as in opposition to certain EU member and prospective EU member governments. Apart from the articulated issues, what factors may have shaped the French decision to oppose the US-led intervention in Iraq? The roots of conflict over Iraq are entrenched in French political history, more shallowly in differing assessments of the threat of Iraq’s WMD and in dissimilar domestic political situations. This chapter examines the political and strategic foci of the French government and how they affected the question of intervention. In addition, it examines the domestic, European Union, and international dynamics that appear to have shaped the French decisions. It also examines the differences between French and American threat assessments that influenced each nation’s action orientation. From these analyses, it is possible to draw some preliminary conclusions regarding the interplay between American, French and EU actions and reactions.

A. FRENCH POLITICAL CULTURE

The French believe in their long history of greatness and importance in Europe and in the world. The genesis of French influence and leadership in Europe may be found in Charlemagne’s reign from 771 to 814 and continued with subsequent rulers, including François I, Louis XIV and Napoleon Bonaparte. This legacy contributed to a French sense of national exceptionalism, and perhaps even a belief in a divine calling to influence politics in the world. Comparable beliefs in manifest destiny, exceptionalism, and a higher calling can also be found in American political traditions.

Following stunning battlefield defeats in the First and Second World Wars, French leaders were insistent on reestablishing the respect, power, and grandeur due France as befitted the national legacy. No single leader typified this drive more than Charles de Gaulle. With Winston Churchill’s assistance, he ensured that France became a permanent member of the UN Security Council despite its reduced military capabilities and arguably diminished international stature. Under his leadership, France withdrew from NATO’s integrated military structure to pursue a more autonomous foreign and defense policy. Especially noteworthy were the establishment of a French nuclear doctrine distinct from American and NATO nuclear doctrine and a doctrine of political
and military control that mirrored American doctrine—French armed forces under French command. Often the pursuit of French independence has been perceived to be at the expense of American influence and in conflict with greater European integration. Subsequent French presidents, notably François Mitterrand, a vehement critic of de Gaulle, continued to implement Gaullist defense policies.57

B. FRENCH ROLE IN INTERNATIONAL ORDER AFTER 9/11

In a December 2001 article President Chirac outlined the impact of his actions following the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks and the value of France’s contributions to the campaign against international terrorism. He emphasized his leadership in rallying the UN and forming a broad international coalition to combat the threat of terrorism. Chirac also underscored his role in rallying the Europeans, noting that France, along with its European partners, provided major contributions to the struggle against terrorism, specifically in revising legal codes, strengthening law enforcement, and making arrests in Europe. He also noted French diplomatic contributions from Pakistan to Northern Africa. Chirac’s conclusions focused on his commitment to French national unity and the necessity for international solidarity and intense cultural dialogue to avoid a clash of civilizations.58

In his capacity as the leader of a nuclear power, a permanent member of the UNSC, a leader of the drive towards European integration, a key ally in the fight against terror, and one of the United States’ oldest allies, President Chirac assumed a public role of mentor to an American administration burdened with a poorly-conceived policy towards Iraq. France’s position leading up to the US-led Iraq intervention was consistent with its historical behavior. On one hand, the French government consistently attempted to portray itself as one of America’s oldest and most reliable allies. At the same time, Chirac emphasized French autonomy. France alone would decide whether to act in concert with the US-led coalition or to offer it only passive support in conjunction with political objections in the UNSC. Concurrently, the French government professed a

devotion to multilateral action, particularly if it enlarged the role of France and Europe in the global arena.

Public policy statements made by President Chirac leading up to the US-led intervention in Iraq clarified the current vision of France’s role in the world and its perceived relationship with the United States. In a speech to French ambassadors, Chirac outlined his foreign policy objectives in a question and answer format: Can France remain master of its destiny? Can it make its voice heard in answering the great questions facing men today? He answers, “I am convinced that it can and it must.”59 On this basis, he outlined the policy for his ambassadors to pursue.

It is with this belief and this determination that I assign to our diplomacy four principal directions for the coming years: to achieve decisive progress in European construction; to reinforce French security; to work to the benefit of peace and democracy and to promote the emergence of a humane world more unified and more ecologically responsible.60

These goals are lofty but consistent with French political culture and France’s world view, incorporating a bent to either sustain or improve the nation’s position.

Before the March 2002 World Trade Summit in Monterrey, Mexico, Chirac espoused a nuanced relationship with the United States. His explanation that France was not an ally who was aligned with the United States, but a faithful ally nonetheless embodied the evolving discourse on the impending US-led intervention in Iraq.61 This position enabled one of America’s staunchest allies, France, to act as a mentor and ally in the role of loyal opposition while maintaining autonomy of national action.

1. Domestic Political Concerns

Following his May 2002 reelection, President Chirac had few domestic problems in reconciling his stance on intervention in Iraq with his foreign policy objectives.


60 Ibid., “C’est avec cette conviction et cette volonté que j’assigne à notre diplomatie quatre orientations principales pour les années à venir: réaliser des progress décisifs dans la construction européenne; renforcer la sécurité des Français; travailler bien sûr en faveur de la paix et la démocratie et favoriser l’émergence d’un monde humainement plus solidaire et écologiquement plus responsable.”

Reelected by a considerable margin after a contentious race against radical Front National candidate Jean-Marie Le Pen, he was freed from domestic political vulnerability. The focus of his reelection campaign was on internal domestic issues—crime, unemployment, and immigration. This was in particular contrast to German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder’s reelection campaign, one central theme of which was opposition to military intervention in Iraq. In addition, the French electoral system freed Chirac from vulnerability to a parliamentary vote of no confidence that could remove him from office, unlike British Prime Minister Tony Blair and Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi. Thus in a secure position domestically, Chirac had relative latitude to act in a manner consistent with his vision of France’s role on the world stage. In this case, the political direction Chirac took—opposing intervention in Iraq unless it was sanctioned by the UNSC—was overwhelmingly supported by the French public.

Of all the European Union countries surveyed by the German Marshall Fund, the French public perception of the threat of Iraqi WMD was the lowest in Europe. 43 percent surveyed perceived Iraqi WMD as a threat, compared with 75 percent in Great Britain and 60 percent in Germany. Attitudes on the use of force in Iraq reflected a similar trend. 27 percent of the French population opposed intervention in Iraq while another 63 percent supported intervention only after approval from the United Nations Security Council. Only 6 percent of the French supported US unilateral action; the average opposition in other EU countries surveyed was about 10 percent in support of unilateralism.62 On the question of intervention in Iraq, Chirac’s position concurred with popular French inclination, and more generally, reflected public opinion in most European countries.

2. France and the European Union

The history of France’s relations with its partners in the European Union has been contentious. Initially supportive of greater integration in the European Community, President de Gaulle shifted French policy from support to obstruction of certain proposed forms of European integration. Whether this shift was attributable, as Luigi Barzini suggests, to “irrational longings” in reaction to “contemporary humiliations and

impotence” or to de Gaulle’s desire for independence from British and American influence can be argued indefinitely. De Gaulle’s actions perpetuated the conflict in any alliance to which France was a party but not the leader—French independence versus unified action. The result guaranteed that France, despite its perception of itself as the light of the civilized world, would not soon be the acknowledged leader of an integrated and unified Europe.63

More contemporaneously, French goals for the EU are directed towards making it a world power. Included in this project is the May 2004 expansion of the EU to twenty-five members as well as the development of a European Security and Defense Policy distinct from (but pursued in cooperation with) NATO. One stated objective in establishing common policies is to provide the EU with the ability to have a dialogue with the United States with a single voice. The ultimate ambition of this policy would be to make the EU an equal partner of the United States in areas beyond economic policy. In this vision espoused by Védrine, France and Germany would serve as the engine of the EU locomotive.64 However, French and German attempts to speak for all of the European Union on Iraq were widely opposed.

Acrimony concerning the proposed US-led intervention was not limited to exchanges between the French and American governments. German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder trenchantly opposed the intervention, to the point of including this opposition in his platform in the German national elections in September 2002. Leaders of the Czech Republic, Denmark, Hungary, Italy, Poland, Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom signed an open letter in January 2003 supporting the prospective US-led intervention in Iraq, delineating the parties in this intra-EU rift.65 French reaction to this departure from the established pattern of French-German leadership was hostile, and exchanges between the camps shattered any possibility of EU unity on this subject. President Chirac went so far as to rebuke certain governments for acting “irresponsibly.”

[C]oncerning the candidate countries … I think they have behaved with a certain levity. Because entering the European Union, that presumes

64 Védrine & Moïsi, pp 55-75
altogether a minimum of consideration for the others, a minimum of concentration. If, at the first difficulty, one starts giving one’s own point of view independently of coordination with the assembly in which, however, one wants to enter, that is not a totally responsible behavior. In any case, it is not a well-mannered behavior. Therefore I think they have missed a good chance to keep silent. … Therefore I would say that these countries have been both ill mannered and a bit unconscious of the dangers brought about by a too quick alignment with the American position.  

In this instance, the European Union was not a vehicle by which French power could be maximized. Although the French position regarding Iraq was consistent with public opinion across Europe, Chirac was unable to persuade most of his counterparts in EU countries to align themselves with France and Germany in opposition to the American policy.

C. AMERICAN THREAT PERCEPTION

The US National Security Strategy and the White House’s assessment of Iraq’s past behavior in the Decade of Defiance and Deception document provided both a summary of the Iraq threat in the eyes of the Bush administration and insight concerning the extent of the damage wrought by the 11 September 2001 attacks on Americans’ sense of security. Both documents illuminated an activist and interventionist American policy regarding Iraq that divided NATO, the EU, and the United Nations.

The US National Security Strategy redirected America’s post-cold war stance. The document acknowledged the value of containment during the Soviet period, but decried containment in the case of Iraq. The Soviet era was contrasted with a more

66Jacques Chirac, “Conference de Presse de Monsieur Jacques Chirac, President de la Republique A L’Issue de la Reunion Informelle Extraordinaire du Conseil European” 17 February 2003. “Concernant en tous les cas les pays candidats, … je trouve qu'ils se sont comportés avec une certaine légèreté. Car entrer dans l'Union européenne, cela suppose tout de même un minimum de considération pour les autres, un minimum de concertation. Si, sur le premier sujet difficile, on se met à donner son point de vue indépendamment de toute concertation avec l'ensemble dans lequel, par ailleurs, on veut entrer, alors, ce n'est pas un comportement bien responsable. En tous les cas, ce n'est pas très bien élevé. Donc, je crois qu'ils ont manqué une bonne occasion de se taire. … Il ne faut pas oublier que plusieurs pays vont avoir, parmi les Quinze, la nécessité de ratifier l’élargissement par la voie du référendum. Or on sait très bien que, déjà, les opinions publiques, comme toujours quand il s’agit de quelque chose de nouveau, ont accueilli l’élargissement avec quelques réserves, sans toujours comprendre exactement l'intérêt qu’il y avait à l'approver. … Donc, ces pays ont été, je dirais, à la fois, disons le mot, pas très bien élevés et un peu inconscients des dangers que comportait un trop rapide alignement sur la position américaine.”
complex and dangerous security environment peopled by “rogue state dictators” and terrorists whose objectives include obtaining WMD.

The nature of the Cold War threat required the United States—with our allies and friends—to emphasize deterrence of the enemy’s use of force, producing a grim strategy of mutual assured destruction. … But new deadly challenges have emerged from rogue states and terrorists. None of these contemporary threats rival the sheer destructive power that was arrayed against us by the Soviet Union. However, the nature and motivations of these new adversaries, their determination to obtain destructive powers hitherto available only to the world’s strongest states, and the greater likelihood that they will use weapons of mass destruction against us, make today’s security environment more complex and dangerous.67

In addition to devaluing containment, the new threat brought with it a sense of immediacy. Thus preemption was necessary due to the nature of the adversaries at hand.

It has taken almost a decade for us to comprehend the true nature of this new threat. Given the goals of rogue states and terrorists, the United States can no longer solely rely on a reactive posture as we have in the past. The inability to deter a potential attacker, the immediacy of today’s threats, and the magnitude of potential harm that could be caused by our adversaries’ choice of weapons, do not permit that option. We cannot let our enemies strike first.68

The administration advocated preemptive actions, should they be necessary, to avert a future attack against the United States.

We must adapt the concept of imminent threat to the capabilities and objectives of today’s adversaries. Rogue states and terrorists do not seek to attack us using conventional means. … To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries the United States will, if necessary, act preemptively.69

The US National Security Strategy shifted the American focus from containment to preemption while accentuating the imminence of the global terrorism threat. A Decade of Deception and Defiance focused attention on Iraq’s role in the imminent threat. This analysis enumerated UN resolutions that Iraq had ignored or violated; the possession of

68 Ibid, p. 15.
69 Ibid.
chemical and biological agents and a demonstrated willingness to employ them; the continued pursuit of fissile material; the retention of prohibited missiles; the repression of Iraqi citizens; the refusal to account for Gulf War prisoners; and efforts to circumvent the oil-for-food program and economic sanctions. Based on this analysis, President Bush urged the UN to take action to prevent further WMD proliferation in Iraq.70

Secretary of State Colin Powell’s remarks to the UNSC incorporated all elements of the Bush administration’s argument for intervention in Iraq. He constructed a case for immediate intervention in Iraq based on US threat assessments and the alleged inefficacy of the weapons inspection regime. Addressing the role of the weapons inspectors, he placed the blame at the Iraqi regime’s doorstep: “Inspectors are inspectors; they are not detectives.” Powell quoted Hans Blix, the Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC: “Iraq appears not to have come to a genuine acceptance, not even today, of the disarmament which was demanded of it.” Powell summarized the Bush administration’s position with the following conclusions: that three months previously, the UNSC had recognized the threat that Iraq posed to international peace and security; that Iraq then had been in material breach of UNSC resolutions and had remained so subsequently; that this continued intransigence hastened the advent of serious consequences; that UNSCR 1441 had been composed as a last-ditch effort to avoid armed intervention in Iraq; and that actions by the Iraqi regime flouting the provisions of UNSCR 1441 were undermining those chances.71

From the inclusion of Iraq in the “axis of evil” in President Bush’s January 2002 State of the Union Address through Secretary Powell’s February 2003 UNSC speech, American analyses presented the Iraqi threat as “grave and growing,” especially in view of the possibility that Saddam Hussein might transfer WMD to interested terrorist organizations—specifically Al Qaeda.72 From the Bush administration’s perspective, Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq constituted an imminent threat which required

70 White House Publication, “A Decade of Deception and Defiance,” and President George W. Bush’s Remarks to the UN General Assembly, both 12 September 2002.


immediate “preemptive” military action to safeguard the security of the United States and the rest of the world.

In other words, the Bush administration’s threat analysis tended to consolidate various aspects of terrorism in the concept of the global war on terror—including Iraq, Al Qaeda, Hamas and other regimes and organizations. Defining the intervention to bring about regime change in Iraq as a component of the Global War on Terrorism was the Bush administration’s ultimate justification for the proposed intervention.73

D. FRENCH THREAT PERCEPTION

In comparison with the Bush administration’s approach, the French analysis focused on discrete threats which had to be addressed by specific methods. Thus, the issue of Iraq was not depicted as an element in the global war on terrorism, but as a specific threat. Other threats included globalization and poverty, regional crises, WMD proliferation, and international terrorism. Each of these threats had distinct origins and required particular solutions that needed to be crafted and pursued. The French approach to Iraq supported maintaining a containment arrangement that was deemed satisfactory, while the Americans favored an interventionist approach.

Iraq as a threat to the United States or the global order entered the French national dialogue only after much coverage by the US press and President Bush’s administration. In August 2002 Chirac alluded to the threat of terrorism and WMD, noting that terrorism was not the only global menace, and that the world needed to focus on other threats such as poverty, WMD proliferation, and regional crises such as the Israel-Palestine conflict. While acknowledging the danger of terrorism and WMD proliferation, he noted that there is more than one course of appropriate action for addressing these threats—including a possible military response—but focused on actions and policies that could prevent the advent of terrorists.

But terrorism is not the only threat and the world should not organize itself solely around a response [to that threat]. … The danger arising from weapons of mass destruction comes also from certain countries and it [the danger] is growing. I have already had occasion to say it, [but] there is more than one way to address it. It is therefore essential to act through

73 This can be seen in many of President Bush’s speeches: 28 January 2003 State of the Union Address; 26 February 2003 to the American Enterprise Institute; 17 March 2003 Presidential Address to the Nation.
prevention and, in the last resort, to bring into play the assurance that
deterrence offers us.\textsuperscript{74}

To reduce the likelihood of WMD proliferation, Chirac proposed an international
system of prevention through monitoring which he defended as not the product of naïveté
but an effective system. He also admonished the United States to consider the value of
multilateralism in pursuing global objectives such as preventing WMD proliferation.

In an 8 September 2002 interview, Chirac, in contrast to the US administration,
seemed uncertain as to the existence of Iraqi WMD: “I’m not saying it doesn’t exist, I’m
simply saying that I haven’t seen any [evidence].” When queried about Saddam Hussein,
Chirac averred that Hussein was clearly a dangerous man to his own people, and as such
merited international monitoring. However, he disavowed any perception of a threat by
Saddam Hussein to France, or to anyone at all outside Iraq. He denied any knowledge of
links between Al Qaeda and Iraq specifically or between Iraq and international terrorism
generally. The most revealing portion of this interview illustrated the difference between
French and American threat assessments. It was this observation by Chirac:

When Saddam Hussein and his regime are a danger to the outside, that’s
when we have to act. But first, we must be sure there’s a danger. If he’s
not a danger, however, and he’s only Iraq’s problem, then it’s not our
problem.\textsuperscript{75}

The French Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dominique de Villepin, addressed the
UNSC nine days after Secretary Powell. His comments were a point-by-point response
to the arguments presented by Powell. Where Powell disparaged the efficacy of weapons
inspections, Villepin affirmed their impact, maintaining that they had established positive
control of Iraqi WMD. Where Powell reviewed evidence of Iraqi obstruction, Villepin
cited incremental improvements in Iraqi cooperation. Powell submitted evidence of links
between Iraq and international terrorism:

\textsuperscript{74} Jacques Chirac, “Discours prononcé à l’occasion de la réception des ambassadeurs,” 29 August
2002. “Mais le terrorisme n’est pas la seule menace et le monde ne doit pas uniquement s’organiser autour
de la réponse …Le danger provenant des armes de destruction massive vient aussi de certains pays et il
s’accroît. J’ai déjà eu l’occasion de le dire: il n’y a pas qu’un seul moyen d’y faire face. Il est donc
essential d’agir par la prevention et, en dernier resort, de faire jouer la garantie que nous offer la
dissuasion.”

\textsuperscript{75} New York Times, Interview with President Jacques Chirac, 8 September 2002,
http://www.elysee.fr/actus/arch020909/english.htm
But what I want to bring to your attention today is the potentially much more sinister nexus between Iraq and the Al Qaeda terrorist network, a nexus that combines classic terrorist organizations and modern methods of murder. Iraq today harbors a deadly terrorist network headed by Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi, an associate and collaborator of Osama bin Laden and his Al Qaeda lieutenants. … When our coalition ousted the Taliban, the Zarqawi network helped establish another poison and explosive training center camp. And this is located in northeastern Iraq. 76

Villepin replied,

Ten days ago, the US Secretary of State, Mr. Powell, reported the alleged links between Al Qaeda and the regime in Baghdad. Given the present state of our research and intelligence, in liaison with our allies, nothing allows us to establish such links. 77

While the Bush administration’s public statements became more insistent in linking Iraq with an imminent threat of attack and the possible transfer to terrorists of WMD, the French statements continually disputed this connection. Chirac asserted that it was “probable” that Saddam Hussein had WMD, 78 but that he might not have them, in contrast with the American administration’s certainty that he did. Chirac’s assessment was that Saddam was no threat to anyone beyond Iraqi borders, while the Bush administration held that the danger of attack, perhaps by terrorists armed with Iraqi WMD, was imminent.

While the Bush administration reiterated the danger of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, Chirac repeatedly pointed to the danger posed by American unilateralism and the potential for wider negative consequences, including instability in the Middle East.

I’m utterly opposed to unilateralism in the modern world. … Now we must be very careful. This coalition remains necessary to fight against terrorism. Necessary. Especially given the currents of opposition to Western countries which are becoming more and more prevalent in poor and emerging countries. This coalition must be managed cautiously.


That’s why I think everything should be done to ensure that the coalition isn’t jeopardized by an act that doesn’t have the approval of the international community and Muslim countries.79

E. THREAT OF IRAQI WMD VERSUS THREAT TO INTERNATIONAL ORDER

Throughout the French public policy discussion the overwhelming concern regarding intervention in Iraq was not directed towards the threat from Iraq, WMD, or the decision-making of Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein. Instead, the primary focus of the French discourse concerned the potential demise of a multilateral order in favor of what was portrayed as US unilateralism. France remained concerned about the rights of the sovereign nation and the preservation of the supremacy of international law, and held that these principles required an additional UNSC Resolution explicitly authorizing the use of force.

The Bush Administration’s public policy focused consistently on the Iraqi component of the threat to international security. To forestall an attack on American soil, the Bush administration held, it was imperative to take the fight to the enemy, wherever he could be found. Iraq was a stationary target compared to the elusive Osama bin Laden. The American public’s support for military action in Iraq was nonetheless not as strong as might have been expected based on the Bush administration’s approach. Approximately 13 percent of the US public opposed military intervention under any circumstances, and another 65 percent supported intervention only under the auspices of the UNSC.80 Nonetheless, many Americans believed that Iraq was connected to the 11 September 2001 attacks, and that it merited immediate attention. According to a Pew Research Center poll, 66 percent of Americans surveyed in October 2002 believed Saddam Hussein had a direct role in the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks, and in a 20 February 2003 poll, 57 percent of respondents believed it as well.81

79 President Jacques Chirac, Interview in New York Times, 8 September 2002. [link]


The divergences in assessments of Iraq derived from two distinct approaches to the problem. The American analysis interpreted Iraqi WMD as a threat to the world, and Saddam Hussein’s defiance of UNSC resolutions as a threat to international order. In contraposition, the French concern was that the threat of Iraqi WMD paled in comparison to the damage that might be done to the current international order by a US-led coalition in taking action against the Iraqi regime without an additional UNSC resolution explicitly authorizing the use of force.

F. SUMMARY

A vital lesson President Chirac drew from the attacks of 11 September 2001 was the value of solidarity and interdependence in the international order. American “unilateralism,” the French argued, might fundamentally undermine the current international order. French consciousness of France’s position in that order, as one of the five permanent members of the UNSC, was probably one of the foundations of France’s objections to the American-led military intervention in Iraq. From a French perspective, American influence with individual EU countries further disrupted evolving EU solidarity, threatening French efforts to lead the EU in a direction more independent of US influence.

France’s view of its role during the Iraq crisis was consistent with its long-held self-image—that of a global nuclear power that serves as one of five permanent members of the UN Security Council. When other global powers, the United States and the United Kingdom, took action without sufficient UNSC authority in French eyes, the French reflex was to consider how that action affected the French position and international image. Whenever UK and US action skirted UNSC authority, the French held, the role of the UNSC, its value and authority, were diminished. If the UNSC role was diminished, French international influence was reduced.

The debate over “preemptive” or “unilateral” action and over the requirement for additional explicit UNSC approval for multilateral action in Iraq involved deeper issues. Those issues included the future of the EU and its role in world politics. The pivotal questions included political leadership in the EU and its future military security.

An additional threat to French influence surfaced inside the EU. The British-Spanish-led group of EU countries supporting the American position isolated the
traditional Franco-German leadership, frustrated President Chirac, and illuminated internal EU divisions.\textsuperscript{82}

Chirac has espoused multipolarity as in France’s long-term strategic interest. One of the central components of his vision of multipolarity was an emerging global role for a strong, independent European Union--ideally led by a Franco-German coalition. Although he recognized that American dominance was currently unassailable, Chirac’s evident intent was that an independent EU would act as a balancing force to American power. He justified this position by noting that the existence of a single “hyperpower” could be dangerous.

This review of the factors influencing French decisions is not comprehensive. Additional factors that deserve consideration include French economic interests and possible sales of French armaments. However, France’s national security interests were well articulated; it is unlikely that Chirac would allow private sector economic concerns to influence the definition of the nation’s policy when he believed French security to be threatened.

IV. KEY DETERMINANTS-ITALY

Relations between Italy and the United States cannot easily be characterized. An apt description might include periods of “intense interest” followed by “benign neglect.” From the 1930s to the 1980s Italy’s domestic political scene hosted the largest and most vibrant non-governing communist party in the world. During the Cold War, Italy maintained cordial relations with East Bloc neighbors, while concurrently remaining a steadfast US and NATO ally. Once Italy’s entrance into NATO was approved by the Italian parliament American political interest in Italy waned. It waxed whenever Rome could substantially contribute to the solution of US and Alliance strategic challenges, for instance, in the late 1950s and in the early 1980s. During the years of post-Sputnik anxiety, Italy hosted US Jupiter Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles (IRBM). During the intermediate-range nuclear missile crisis in the early 1980s, Italy agreed to host the deployment of US cruise missiles.

Viewed against the backdrop of these historic relations, wherein Italy was sometimes considered a marginal player, owing in part to its low level of spending on military equipment, it was at first glance surprising that one of President Bush’s most vocal allies in the months preceding the American-led intervention in Iraq was the Italian Prime Minister, Silvio Berlusconi. In adopting this position, Berlusconi assumed political risks by opposing domestic popular opinion as well as flouting the position adopted by two prominent European leaders, France’s President Chirac and Germany’s Chancellor Schroeder.

Prime Minister Berlusconi’s decision to support the prospective US-led intervention in Iraq appears to have been influenced by various domestic and foreign policy factors. His position was articulated in concert with the leaders of Britain, Poland, and Spain and in opposition to the Franco-German position. However, Italian participation in the offensive aspects of Operation Iraqi Freedom was restricted to logistical support such as basing US forces on Italian territory and allowing over-flights of Italian airspace. Thus, Berlusconi’s support of the American position, while staunch

83 John W. Holmes, “Can Italy Change Yet Remain Stable?” Mediterranean Quarterly, Spring 1993, pp. 57-68.
and vocal, did not demand the same political capital as that of Britain’s Prime Minister, who sent forces into combat.

This chapter reviews the recent history of Italian political evolution, examines the political and strategic vision of the Berlusconi government, and considers how these factors may have influenced Berlusconi’s decision to support the American-led intervention. Berlusconi’s personal identification with American President George Bush has elicited much discussion. This chapter also examines the variations between the Italian and American threat assessments that reinforced Italy’s action orientation. Although Berlusconi cited Iraqi WMD as a threat to Italian and global security, other Italian threat assessments, such as the Italian defense ministry’s white book, focused on issues of regional instability and international terrorism. It appears that Berlusconi’s inclusion of the Iraq WMD threat reflected new assessments. Finally, the chapter offers conclusions about the future of relations between Italy and the United States, as well as the Italian role in international politics.

A. ITALIAN POLITICAL CULTURE

The Italian peninsula was united by the armies of the king of Piedmont-Sardinia, aided by the political machinations of Count Cavour and the revolutionary armies of Giuseppe Garibaldi and Giuseppe Mazzini. The principal obstacles to the unification of Italy were the Vatican, Austria and Spain. The post-medieval political history of the Italian peninsula is that of independent city-states with competing commercial interests and political allegiances, and unique systems of self-governance. In varying eras, city-states had been dominated by Austria (in the north), the Papal States (in the center) and scions of either the Spanish or French monarchies (in the south). Traditions of art, architecture, and political thought evolved in city-states connected—very loosely—by cultural and linguistic ties and geographic proximity.

The wars of Italian unification occurred over the course of the nineteenth century. Early uprisings between 1820 and 1830 were quashed by the Austrian army. As movements for political unification gained adherents and popular appeal, the successive wars in 1848, 1861 and 1870 led to the establishment of the Kingdom of Italy. The diverse forces and political theorists contributing to both political and military success are often represented by three key figures.
Giuseppe Mazzini was an ardent republican who fought to unify Italy as a republic rather than a kingdom. Giuseppe Garibaldi was a revolutionary and a socialist whose military expedition of 1860 toppled the rule of Francis II, the last monarch of the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies (Sicily and Naples). Count Camillo di Cavour masterminded the political alliance between Piedmont and France against the Austrians that led to the successful rebellion and proclamation of the Kingdom of Italy.\textsuperscript{84} The interaction between these differing perspectives on the optimal nature of governance in a unified Italy—socialist, republican or monarchist—have subsequently exerted varying degrees of influence over Italian domestic political activity and identity.

1. Impact of Papacy

That the Papal See was located in Rome added a dimension of complexity to the politics of the Italian peninsula, both before and after unification. Popes had been the temporal sovereigns over a large swath of the central Italian peninsula for over a millennium—from 754 to 1870. Anti-clerical sentiments popularized during and after the French Revolution made this situation increasingly problematic during the nineteenth century as the popes had to contend with and ultimately suppress revolutionist movements with Austrian and French assistance. In 1870, King Victor Emmanuel II seized the opportunity presented by the defeat of Napoleon III in the Franco-Prussian war and invaded the Papal States and annexed them to the rest of Italy. Thus, Italy was unified at the expense of the Papal States.

Pope Pius IX declared himself a “prisoner” of the Italian monarch and excommunicated those who had participated in the Italian annexation of the Papal States. In another attempt to exert spiritual power in politics, the Pope enjoined Catholics to oppose the king’s efforts at unification and encouraged electoral boycotts. This pastoral guidance had multiple effects. Sermons by the Italian clergy against the government reduced popular participation. The new government retaliated by circumscribing church gatherings if they involved political activity.

Throughout this period, Pope Pius IX encouraged other European powers to intervene in order to restore the Papal Territories. That the Italian government allowed

him (and the curia) wide latitude in articulating such appeals lessened the concerns of other European leaders and eliminated any chance of outside intervention. This state of siege between the Vatican and the Italian government went unresolved until the Lateran Treaty of 1929.\textsuperscript{85}

Despite a reduction in the temporal power of the papacy, individual pontiffs have used their position as the moral and spiritual leader of the Roman Catholic Church to influence Italian politicians. Since he took office in 1978, Pope John Paul II has consistently encouraged national leaders to find methods other than war to resolve disputes. In the instance of the first Gulf War, the Pope’s exhortation for a peaceful solution to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait resonated across Italian political parties, finding support equally among both the Catholic and the Communist parties.\textsuperscript{86}

Pope John Paul II addressed the Italian Parliament in November 2002. Many of his words reinforced domestic concerns highlighted already by Prime Minister Berlusconi, including the declining birthrate and the erosion of family values. Addressing the ongoing international wrangling over courses of action in Iraq, the Pontiff urged an increased attention to “concord, solidarity and peace between the nations.” He deplored the ongoing violence in Israel and the Occupied Territories as well as the ill effects of international terrorism on the world’s major religions.\textsuperscript{87}

The Pope opposed the push to use force to disarm Iraq. His articulated concerns paralleled many of those expressed by President Chirac. That is, evidence of the existence of WMD was dubious, and war in Iraq could provoke wider regional instability.\textsuperscript{88}

Following US Secretary of State Colin Powell’s February 2003 presentation to the UN Security Council about Iraq’s noncompliance with the UNSC’s disarmament objectives, the Vatican response was scathing in its assessment of the Bush

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\begin{footnote}{\textsuperscript{86} Laura Guazzzone, “Italy in the Gulf Crisis” in Nicole Gnesotto and John Roper, eds., \textit{Western Europe and the Gulf} (Paris: Institute for Security Studies, Western European Union, 1992), pp. 82-85.}
\end{footnote}

\begin{footnote}{\textsuperscript{87} Vatican, “Address of His Holiness John Paul II.” Papal address to the Italian Parliament, 14 November 2002. \texttt{http://www.vatican.va}}
\end{footnote}

\begin{footnote}{\textsuperscript{88} Pope John Paul II, “Le parole del Papa alla recita dell’Angelus (The words of the Pope at the recitation of the Angelus).” 16 March 2003}
\end{footnote}
administration’s policy, the paucity of credible proof, and Prime Minister Berlusconi’s uncritical support for the Bush Administration’s proposed actions. Monsignor Renato Martino, President of the Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace, dismissed as unimpressive the evidence of Iraq’s ties to international terrorism or its possession of WMD in quantities that would constitute a threat to humanity. Furthermore, he indicated that the gravest danger in this particular crisis was posed by the Bush administration. He asserted that “if Washington goes to war in spite of a veto in the Security Council, this will bring about the destruction of the United Nations.” He further highlighted Prime Minister Berlusconi’s deficiencies in insistently supporting the American position.89

The pope had two primary goals. The first was to avert war by influencing national leaders on the American-led side of the debate to reconsider military intervention as a viable solution. The second was to ensure that intervention in Iraq did not lead to a war between Islam and Christianity. That attacks against Iraqi Christians were minimal until mid-2004 is seen as a success in this regard.90

In March 2003, Prime Minister Berlusconi attended a last-minute meeting with the Pope about the prospective events in Iraq. It is impossible to concretely assess the effects of the Pope’s objections to a military intervention in Iraq on the Italian Prime Minister’s decision. However, the Pope’s position bolstered the arguments of many of Berlusconi’s opponents, whether under the guise of pacifism or opposition to the American position. This may have combined with other factors such as public opposition, causing Berlusconi to adopt a moderate stance between the British and French positions.

2. Fascism and Mussolini

The ascendancy of fascism as a political movement in Italy following the First World War helped to shape the course of domestic politics in Italy following the Second World War. Some of the unique features of Italian democracy are attributable to the backlash from Mussolini’s dictatorship.


90 This is based on the author’s personal interviews in the Vatican in September 2004.
Mussolini got Italy into the war on the losing side. Following Mussolini’s ouster in July 1943, King Victor Emmanuel III and Prime Minister Pietro Badoglio surrendered to the Allies, declared war on Germany, and gained recognition by the Allies as a cobelligerent against Germany. Divided by German occupation in the North and the Allied military presence in the South, Italy’s regions cobbled together functioning local governments. The coalition that governed Italy between 1944 and 1948 was one of strange bedfellows, whose primary links consisted of shared antipathy for Mussolini rather than a coherent policy for post-war Italy. The parties to this coalition included the PCI—the Italian Communist Party, the politics and pro-Soviet orientation of which caused anxiety to American leaders.

Having experienced the effects of a strong central government with power concentrated in the hands of a single individual, the post-war government of Italy was designed to diffuse power—that is, to be weak—and to prevent a repetition. Rather than a strong national leader, the President of the Republic and the Presidente del Consiglio dei Ministri (customarily known in English as the Prime Minister) had little real authority and power. Power was instead diffused through the Parliament by means of coalitions of political party leaders.91 The shifting coalitions made the takeover by a single strong leader difficult, and instead promoted inefficiency, and ultimately, corruption. Because national governments needed to cater to diverse constituencies to retain power, they rarely articulated or implemented strong domestic or international policies.

World War II ended Italy’s Fascist experiment and ushered in a new political era following a plebiscite in 1946 redesignating Italy a republic instead of a monarchy. Two key factors influenced Italian political developments during the post-war era: Allied occupation and anti-Fascist alliances formed during the resistance. The resistance created links between communists, socialists, Catholics and democrats, all of whom aspired to shape the nation and therefore formed a series of coalition governments between June 1945 and May 1947. American political preoccupations with the strength of the Italian Communist Party (PCI), particularly with its links to the Soviet Communist Party, caused the US government to act to counter its influence. American actions included

decelerating the withdrawal of US troops and contributing large donations to the Christian Democrats, coupled with threats of terminating Marshall Plan funding should the PCI win the election.\textsuperscript{92}

The result was that the Christian Democratic Party won over 48 percent of the electoral vote while the Socialists and the Italian Communist Party together won 31 percent, pushing the PCI into the opposition.\textsuperscript{93} The Christian Democrats, with the support of the Vatican and the Allies, assumed leadership of the Italian government. The Christian Democrats participated in every coalition government from June 1945 to June 1992, and usually held the post of Prime Minister (notable exceptions included Giovanni Spadolini, a Republican, from July 1981 to December 1982, and Bettino Craxi, a Socialist, from August 1983 to April 1987). The Communist Party was excluded from governing coalitions after May 1947 despite earning a consistently large percentage of the popular vote.\textsuperscript{94}

3. Current Domestic Political Issues

Events in 1989 ushered in the first in a series of changes that altered the Italian domestic political landscape. The fall of the Berlin Wall and subsequent collapse of the Soviet Union precipitated rifts in the internal structure of the Italian Communist Party, which then split into two factions, one with a moderate political agenda and the other with a more hard-line approach. The collapse of Soviet communism eliminated pressure to formally exclude Italian Communists from the central government. These events fostered the growth of several new political parties.\textsuperscript{95}

The second change occurred between 1992 and 1994 as the political structure that had existed since 1948 imploded. Italian politicians and businessmen, primarily associated with the Christian Democrats, were indicted for corruption in large numbers. The scandal and electoral backlash resulted in the dissolution of the existing political order and the disappearance of most major politicians from Italian politics through

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{92} E. Timothy Smith, \textit{The United States, Italy and NATO, 1947-1952} (London: Macmillan, 1991), pp. 33-36.
  \item \textsuperscript{93} Young, pp. 134-136.
  \item \textsuperscript{94} Di Scala, pp. 277-287.
  \item \textsuperscript{95} Dario Biocca, “The Debate over Italy’s Identity (and Future),” \textit{Daedalus}, Volume 126, Number 3 (Summer 1997), pp. 236-237.
\end{itemize}
criminal convictions, disgrace or exile. For the first time since 1947, Italian voters had the opportunity to elect alternates to Christian Democrat-based coalitions, but the only parties to escape the corruption charges with their political bases and elites intact were of the left.

With the political elite in shambles and the reformed Communist Party (now called PDS—Partito Democratici di Sinistra, Democratic Party of the Left) poised to enter a coalition government, new politicians and political parties emerged. One of these parties, the Lega Nord (Northern League), espoused the re-division of Italy into northern and southern countries and made strong showings in regional elections in 1992 and 1994. The former Fascist Party, first named the Italian Social Movement and subsequently the National Alliance, emerged in Sicily as a regional power in 1992.97

A series of short-lived governments rose and fell based on unstable alliances. One such government was the seven-month reign of Silvio Berlusconi in 1994 as the leader of a new party, Forza Italia. Berlusconi forged a tenuous alliance with the leaders of the Lega Nord and the National Alliance on a platform of anti-communism, political and economic reform, and streamlined government. “Berlusconi, a virulent anti-Communist, says he entered politics to short-circuit a likely election victory of a left-wing alliance led by the former Italian Communist Party.”98 Berlusconi’s alliance ultimately appealed to moderates concerned about a win by the left as well as voters repudiating the scandals of the previously ruling parties.

Berlusconi’s election shattered the political establishment. The alliance won pluralities for both chambers of the Italian parliament followed closely by the success of the PDS. Centrist parties, including former Christian Democrats, earned only about 16 percent of the popular vote. According to a contemporary report,

Berlusconi promises the first unabashedly free-market government in Italy since World War II. Outlining his policies to reporters on Thursday, the

96 Ibid., p. 237
97 Di Scala, pp. 326-334.
Milan entrepreneur promised economic renewal through new investment, more jobs, reduced government spending and debt and tax reform.\(^99\)

Although his government survived only seven months due to the defection of Lega Nord leader Umberto Bossi, during the years from 1994 to 2001 Berlusconi proved himself to be a credible politician rather than a wealthy dilettante. In contrast, the opposition center-left politicians have struggled to build and maintain effective coalition governments. During the period from 1994 to 2001 the center-left fielded three prime ministers (Romano Prodi, Massimo d’Alema, and Giuliano Amato), and in the elections against Berlusconi in 2001 had nominated a fourth candidate to lead the coalition.

Italian general elections on 13 May 2001 pitted Berlusconi’s center-right coalition of Forza Italia, Lega Nord, and the National Alliance against the center-left coalition headed by the former mayor of Rome, Francesco Rutelli. Berlusconi campaigned on a platform similar to that of his 1994 campaign. He also argued for closer relations with the United States, and championed economic liberalization, tax reductions, and market reforms.\(^100\)

Berlusconi’s alliance with the Lega Nord and the National Alliance revived questions over Italy’s place in the European Union. Concern over the possible renewal of fascism in Italy as well as rumors about Berlusconi’s business dealings provided a platform for critics in other European countries to attack him and to try to influence the outcome of the election.\(^101\) Despite negative publicity, Berlusconi’s Forza Italia won a clear plurality of the election (30 percent of the vote) while his allies in the Lega Nord and the National Alliance lost votes, rendering his leading position in the coalition more secure against the vacillations or machinations of his allies.\(^102\) Although Berlusconi’s election represented the culmination of a series of electoral upheavals, this popular mandate still did not equate to a strong central government. Thus, the nature of the

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\(^101\) Christopher Dickey and Barbie Nadeau, “The Knight Errant; Get used to him. Win or lose, Silvio Berlusconi—and the forces he represents in Italy—will not go away. Why Europe is so worried,” *Newsweek*, 14 May 2001.

Italian central government would hamper his ability to implement policies unimpeded by divergent interests.

B. BERLUSCONI’S DOMESTIC POLICY

The diffusion of power in the Italian central government resulted in the domination of political parties that were constrained to form unstable coalitions. This led to the frequent collapse of ruling coalitions as individual members exited the government based on local or personal interests. For the Italian political establishment, this central instability led to the collapse and restructuring of approximately 50 government coalitions after 1948. It should be noted that, although the composition of the governments changed frequently, individuals often held the same portfolio through successive governments, or alternatively were moved to various ministries depending on the makeup of the particular government.

One of Berlusconi’s goals was to maintain his coalition and remain as Prime Minister for his full 5-year term of office. If he were to succeed in doing this, it would be an unprecedented achievement in Italy’s post-war history. In early 2001, candidate Berlusconi outlined in an open letter to the Italian people both his critique of the then-governing coalition and his vision for the future of Italy. His electoral proposals focused on three principal issues that hindered domestic progress and international recognition: stagnation of the Italian economy, inefficiency in the Italian public sector, and the lack of personal security due to an increasing crime rate. His electoral platform was based on five precepts--family, development, federalism, security, and Italy’s European and Western destinies.

A brief overview of each of these planks in Berlusconi’s platform reveals a set of values similar to those espoused by George W. Bush during his electoral campaign in 2000. Berlusconi called the family “the natural arena through which fundamental moral

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and civic values are passed, a large component of social cohesion and solidarity, and the guarantor of our country’s future.”

He criticized Prime Minister Giuliano Amato’s administration for failing to advance a coherent domestic or foreign policy agenda, which (he alleged) condemned Italy to being the economic laggard in Europe. His critiques included the increasing public debt, youth unemployment, inefficient public administration, lack of foreign investment and declining economic liberty.

Regarding federalism and government reform, Berlusconi highlighted his concept of the role of the state and its relationship to society. Specifically, he viewed the state as the guarantor rather than the originator of rights, differentiating between the citizens as the source of state sovereignty or as subjects of the state. His reform proposals included increasing the efficiency of the central government through a program of modernization combined with decentralization and devolution of jurisdiction of the central government either up to the European Union or down to regional governments.

According to Berlusconi, the Italian state was losing legitimacy in the critical area of national security. “Ensuring the security of people and property constituted the fundamental contract between citizens and government, without which the state would lose its historic and moral legitimacy.” He opined that the nation was becoming less secure as the direct result of government failures to protect citizens from crime. One of his critical election themes was reasserting the state’s ability to deter crime as well as to apprehend and prosecute criminals. Two issues he indicated as sources of particular concern were illegal immigration, which he proposed to alleviate by establishing improved immigration controls; and drug trafficking, particularly with its links to

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organized crime. These challenges he proposed to combat through rigorous deterrence, prevention, and repression.\(^{107}\)

Berlusconi’s vision for Italy’s role in Europe and the West was elaborated as follows. After saluting the key components of post-World War II Italian international policy—participation in European integration, loyalty to NATO, and close relations with the United States—he asserted that this policy must continue. Further, he contrasted his vision of Italy’s and Europe’s future—primacy of individual rights, and the role of government as a tool of the citizen—with those of his center-left socialist and statist opponents, who, he contended, envisioned the state as predominant, with the citizen under its dominion. The crux of this differentiation focused on his proposed solutions to Italian and European Union problems. He asserted that the results of leftist-socialist leadership included decreasing prosperity, increasing unemployment, capital flight, and the euro’s loss of value in relation to the dollar. Berlusconi offered four recommendations: (1) to promote a liberal European constitution while respecting the principle of subsidiarity; (2) to create conditions for economic, job, and social growth; (3) to find new ways to collaborate with the US, particularly in the defense sector; and (4) to develop new methods of socio-economic cooperation with states neighboring the EU as disincentives to illegal immigration.\(^{108}\)

On 7 May 2001 Berlusconi signed a “Contract with the Italians” reminiscent of the Republican Party’s “Contract with America” program in the 1994 election. In this contract, Berlusconi articulated five goals he intended to achieve, should he be elected, during his five-year term.

- Demolishing fiscal pressure through target reductions in income tax brackets and abolition of inheritance and gift taxes
- Implementing measures to reduce crime and increase individual security
- Increasing minimum pensions
- Halving the unemployment rate by creating 1.5 million new jobs
- Opening up 40 percent of public works contracts


An interesting aspect of Berlusconi’s contract was his promise not to present himself for reelection at the end of his five year term should four out of his five goals not be achieved.\textsuperscript{109}

In his end-of-year review of his government’s progress on 30 December 2002, Prime Minister Berlusconi made only passing mention of issues of foreign policy, including the prospective US-led intervention in Iraq, despite the heated rhetoric between the Bush administration and the governments of Germany and France. Instead, he provided a comprehensive progress report on his government’s achievements with regard to his “Contract with the Italians.” He recounted successes—the abolition of inheritance and gift taxes; reductions in tax rates in target income brackets; a 15 percent reduction in the homicide rate; an increase in pensions; and the creation of 234,000 new jobs. He also introduced areas for further improvement: increased infrastructure, and additional fiscal, labor and bureaucratic reforms.\textsuperscript{110}

Prime Minister Berlusconi won the 2001 elections based a combination of two factors: his domestic policy agenda and a backlash against the parties of the left. While President Bush and President Chirac were concerned with decision-making on Iraq, Berlusconi was much more focused on corraling the divergent interests of his coalition to execute his economic and domestic security policies.

C. BERLUSCONI’S FOREIGN POLICY

After World War II, Italian foreign policy was generally directed towards three specific areas: Europe, the Mediterranean, and the United States. The effects of Italy’s experience with Mussolini included eager participation in the European integration movement. In the security domain, Italy became a steady and reliable US ally, sometimes regarded as a consumer rather than producer of security. Berlusconi’s vision for Italian foreign policy envisaged continuity with these post-war traditions and yet with a more prominent role for Italy: this complemented his ambitious domestic agenda.


\textsuperscript{110} Silvio Berlusconi, “Testo integrale dell’Intervento del Presidente del Consiglio, Silvio Berlusconi, il 30 dicembre 2002 a Villa Madama.” 30 December 2002. \url{http://www.governo.it/presidente/conferenza30122002/testo1.html}
Italy was one of the original signatories of the Treaty of Rome and a key component of the evolving European Community. Successive Italian politicians have supported the construction of an integrated Europe and have sought recognition as being among the elite of European leaders from Britain, France, and Germany. Economic growth in the 1980s did not continue through the 1990s. As Italy’s economy decelerated, it lost its position of first-tier leadership, and questions were raised about whether Italy would be able to join the European Monetary Union. Berlusconi’s foreign policy involved reasserting Italian leadership in Europe while reaffirming his support for a strong European Union with a capability to act in a united manner on issues such as globalization, capital and trade flows, and security and defense.

Italy’s ability to reenter the ranks of European leadership and influence the direction of the European Union depended on certain economic and political factors. First, Berlusconi needed to convince his peers that he was not a eurosceptic. Second, he needed to rein in Italian economic imbalances. Berlusconi expended considerable effort to reassure both domestic and European audiences of his intention to maintain Italy’s role as an active participant in the European Union. He articulated his views and action plans in his campaign literature, and agreed to interviews in British and French newspapers to communicate his key messages.

An integrated economic policy required disrupting long-standing patronage relationships between particular sectors of the economy and the ministries set up to regulate them. Berlusconi’s reform of the Italian public sector through government restructuring and privatization would be facilitated by cooperation—and pressure—from other EU members.

Berlusconi also reaffirmed his intention to strengthen the ties between Italy and the United States as a part of Italian security strategy. Since the beginning of the Cold War, American military capability has comprised an important portion of Italian security policy. After the threat of a Soviet invasion disappeared, NATO Europe’s need for


112 Elezioni Politiche 2001, Vocazione Europea e Occidentale
American security guarantees diminished, despite the greater prominence of terrorism and WMD proliferation in the post-Cold War security environment. European-American security links were undermined by various factors in addition to decreased Allied dependence on US protection. First, the anticipated results of the peace dividend led to cutbacks in Allied defense spending. Second, American interests shifted to other regions, particularly after the 1990-1991 Persian Gulf War. Third, the growing gap between American and European military capabilities signified mounting obstacles to successful combined operations. To prevent a further erosion of trans-Atlantic security links, Berlusconi articulated a plan to reenergize and reinforce Italian-American relations, particularly with regard to economic and military security affairs.

Berlusconi’s interest in North Africa continued a traditional Italian focus on the Mediterranean region. His policy integrated a plan for developed nations, such as members of the EU, to assist under-developed nations in North Africa to pursue democracy and to fight poverty, disease, illiteracy and hunger. The genesis of Berlusconi’s plan can be traced to economic and security factors. African countries have long been Italian trading partners. More importantly, illegal immigration by Africans migrating to Italy to escape civil unrest or to find employment constituted sources of instability and increased crime in Italy. Berlusconi’s proposed solutions to this problem involved a combination of domestic initiatives aimed at more effectively controlling immigration and a multilateral approach to improving conditions in Africa.

Before the terrorist attacks against the United States on 11 September 2001, decreasing illegal immigration and promoting international economic development were the foci of Prime Minister Berlusconi’s foreign policy. Following the attacks, Berlusconi continued to emphasize an Italian leadership role in the fight against poverty. However, he adapted his approach to the eradication of poverty and the introduction of democracy and liberal market economies. In addition to stabilizing underdeveloped countries domestically, these contributions would (it was hoped) reduce the impetus for terrorism. His 25 September 2002 speech in the Chamber of Deputies clarified his

113 Dassù and de Andreis
114 Elezioni Politiche 2001, Sicurezza and Berlusconi to 57th Session of UNGA
115 Prime Minister Berlusconi speaks to the 57th UNGA, 13 September 2002
reasons for joining the American-led coalition against terrorism as a natural extension of Italian national interests and values. Berlusconi highlighted the results of the coalition’s actions against the Taliban regime in Afghanistan – the elimination of that regime and the eradication of Osama bin Laden’s terrorist bases in that country – in addition to the increased cooperation in Europe in intelligence gathering and law enforcement. Italian contributions to Operation Enduring Freedom elevated Italy to the third place in the world in the number of troops involved in UN-authorized peacekeeping operations. Berlusconi described involvement in Afghanistan as an important component of the Italian contribution to global security, stability and peace, and also as necessary to ensure continued Italian security.116

One of Prime Minister Berlusconi’s foreign policy goals was to raise Italy’s international profile. This included three specific areas of Italian interest: the European Union, the Mediterranean region (particularly southern Europe and North Africa), and the world at large. In a January 2002 interview with The Times of London, primarily defending himself against charges of Euroscepticism, Berlusconi clarified his foreign policy objective. “But it is time for Italy to ‘make itself felt in the world.’”117 By adopting a position supportive of the Bush administration, Berlusconi was able to raise his profile in Europe, and to define himself in contrast to French and German leaders.

D. ITALIAN THREAT PERCEPTION

Prime Minister Berlusconi’s assessment of threats to Italian security prior to September 2001 could be summarized with three words: “illegal immigration” and “crime.”118 After the terrorist attacks against the United States in September 2001, additional concerns involving the defense sector more explicitly, such as the increasing gap between American and European military capabilities and an Italian military establishment ill-suited to act effectively in the post-11 September environment, became more pressing. To answer these concerns and present a concrete roadmap towards


solutions the Berlusconi government issued, for the first time in sixteen years, a new *Libro Bianco*, or “white book,” on defense. This document may be regarded as the Italian equivalent of the US Quadrennial Defense Review, both in scope and vision.

In his preface to the white book, Italian Defense Minister Alberto Martini outlined the government’s purposes in publishing the document. He acknowledged the new geopolitical order following the attacks against the United States on 11 September 2001 and the consequent need for a reorganization of the Italian armed forces to confront these new threats. Martini particularly emphasized the differences between the current threats to peace and security as compared to those posed by the Soviet Union. He specifically identified international terrorism as a threat to Italian security; and he called for a reorganization of the Italian armed forces to better confront those threats.119

The first chapter of the white book summarized the Italian threat assessment from the perspective of the defense establishment. The situational assessment noted two watershed events: the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989 and the 11 September 2001 attacks on New York and Washington. The first released all parties from the East-West alliance model. This led to new security constructs, such as “unipolarity” and “hyperpower,” and allowed old grievances, such as those long repressed in the Balkans, to erupt. The second shock shattered geostrategic assumptions and brought into consideration threats to security in Europe beyond spillovers from ethnic violence in the Balkans. These new threats included international terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction as well as money laundering, drug trafficking, and organized crime.120

In a 13 September 2002 speech to the UN General Assembly, Berlusconi was more pointed about the threat posed by international terrorism, endorsing the policy articulated by President Bush. Berlusconi referred to the struggle against terrorism as necessary for the defense of human rights and the ideals of liberty, peace, and justice. This speech was the first instance in which he incorporated the threat posed by the government of Iraq as a component of the Italian threat assessment.


At this moment the main threat to the UN and to our system of values and principles comes from the regime governing Iraq that systematically violates all the resolutions of the United Nations. A response is necessary and indispensable to safeguard the international community from the danger constituted by the accumulation of weapons of mass destruction.\(^{121}\)

The Bush administration was convinced of the imminent danger of the WMD it believed that Iraq had acquired, while President Chirac was unconvinced. Berlusconi’s approach incorporated considerations that diverged from the positions of both France and the United States to develop an Italian approach to the Iraqi threat. First, Italy had a long history of domestic terrorist threats. Most of the original Red Brigade leaders had long been imprisoned but “next generation” new cells were emerging. Moreover, Red Brigade connections remained available to terrorists who cared to use them. Al Qaeda was discovered to have active cells in Italy, and a possible marriage between anarchist and Islamic terrorist organizations constituted a critical domestic security consideration. Second, with over 7,000 kilometers of Italian coastline, even the most stringent immigration controls could only reduce the human influx; they could not be expected to prevent it entirely. Lastly, southern Italy is within the range of missiles that could be available in North Africa and the Middle East in the foreseeable future. The proliferation of missile technology and WMD constituted a possible threat of attack against Italy.\(^{122}\)

To what extent Berlusconi incorporated these factors into his decision-making calculus is unknown. However, he was clearly aware of them. These considerations may have influenced Berlusconi to support the American-led intervention in Iraq as a measure against the spread of weapons technology and the diffusion of Islamic terrorist activity.

E. SUMMARY

The 2001 election in Italy ushered in a center-right leader whose political and economic policies were closer to those of US President Bush than to those of French President Chirac. The crisis between France and the United States over possible courses

\(^{121}\) Prime Minister Berlusconi speaks to the 57th UNGA, 13 September 2002;

“In questo momento la principale sfida all’Onu e al nostro sistema di valori e di principi è portata dal regime che governa l’Iraq e che viola sistematicamente tutte le risoluzioni delle Nazioni Unite. È necessaria e indispensabile una risposta per salvaguardare la comunità internazionale dal pericolo costituito da un accumulo di armi non convenzionali di sterminio di massa.”

of action in Iraq offered an opportunity for Prime Minister Berlusconi to strengthen US-Italian ties by demonstrating that under his leadership Italy was a more loyal ally than France.

Berlusconi’s ability to finesse a policy between the French and American positions may have enabled him to manage his relations with his domestic constituencies and EU critics more successfully than if he had adopted a position unambiguously aligned with that of the United States on the model of British Prime Minister Tony Blair.

An understanding of Italy’s political history is central to appreciating the dynamics that bounded Berlusconi’s ability to act authoritatively in both foreign and domestic policy. His latitude was restricted by the Italian constitutional structure that forced him to organize a governing coalition rather than a strong central government. Even though his party, Forza Italia, won a credible majority, this did not allow him to dominate the government. Rather, he had to balance the competing interests of his coalition partners with his own policy objectives; this resulted in a policy on Iraq that appeared strong, but that required minimal political or military action.

Berlusconi’s ambitious domestic agenda included unpopular reforms. This was especially true of his goals to streamline government-owned industries and to reform state services. To achieve these goals required that Berlusconi expend political capital. This constrained his ability to pursue a foreign policy that might require a similar expenditure of political capital. However, the possibility of contracts for reconstruction in Iraq following the intervention may have offered enticing opportunities for Italian firms, which could further Berlusconi’s domestic economic policy by promoting greater industrial activity, increased employment, and additional US-Italian business interactions, notably in post-Saddam Iraq.

Pope John Paul II’s unequivocal opposition to military intervention in Iraq further complicated Prime Minister Berlusconi’s ability to articulate a decisive policy. The Pope’s critical stance united diverse opposition groups. On top of needing to balance his own government coalition, Berlusconi was compelled to take the Pope’s concerns into account, together with the opposition movement inspired by the Pope.

The Italian threat analysis appeared to be more flexible than that of either the Americans or the French. Although defense documents clearly included crime, illegal
immigration, and international terrorism in their threat calculus, Berlusconi was able to develop the concept of Iraqi WMD as a proximate threat as a result of the prospect that regional instability would lead to increasing waves of illegal immigration. His assertion that regime change in Iraq would result in greater stability and might therefore reduce illegal immigration was an effective argument in Italy. Berlusconi’s approach fused aspects of the American threat assessment with important components of the Italian assessment, creating a specific interpretation to justify support for the American-led intervention in Iraq.
V. ANALYSIS

The election of center-right governments in France, Italy, and the United States between 2000 and 2002 could have introduced an era marked by commonalities in domestic and foreign policy objectives. Analysis of the circumstances under which each candidate won his office might have predicted moderate, centrist domestic and foreign policies. However, various events, including the US-led invasion of Iraq, the US treatment of enemy detainees at Guantanamo Bay, and impasses regarding World Trade Organization negotiations, polarized relations between the United States and some NATO allies. Commentators on both sides of the divide predicted the dissolution of the Atlantic Alliance. Some officials in the Bush administration may have reinforced these divisions through the pursuit of a new doctrine of creating ad hoc coalitions rather than continuing reliance on established alliances. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld offered an explanation for favoring specific coalitions of the willing for some purposes: “[W]ars can benefit from coalitions of the willing, to be sure. But they should not be fought by committee. The mission must determine the coalition, and the coalition must not determine the mission. If it does, the mission will be dumbed down to the lowest common denominator, and we can’t afford that.”\(^\text{123}\)

Rifts among European leaders reinforced the perception of polarization and facilitated the American ambition to establish a mission-driven coalition.

George W. Bush became president through the intervention of the United States Supreme Court during the much-contested 2000 election. Political elites in NATO Europe were reassured by the appointment of many veterans from his father’s administration, which offset the new president’s image as a foreign policy neophyte. It was assumed that he would pursue policies similar to those of his father, under the tutelage of experienced foreign policy hands. The Bush administration’s measured military response in Afghanistan to the terrorist attacks of September 2001 followed many of those hallmarks—a multilateral coalition operation with relatively defined

objectives. Other aspects of the administration’s strategic direction and response in confronting international terrorism were more confusing.124

Jacques Chirac was elected in May 2002 by a nominally overwhelming popular mandate. However, the choices available to the French electorate created a misleading impression. Expectations concerning French domestic politics were upset when Chirac’s presumed opponent, the Socialist leader Lionel Jospin, was defeated during the first round of the elections. This loss catapulted the ultra-right National Front candidate Jean-Marie Le Pen into primary contention for the presidency of France. Le Pen’s anti-Semitic, anti-immigration, anti-European positions attracted only a limited constituency, and thus only about 18 percent of the vote. Chirac became the preferred option for most French voters and thus was elected with a deceptively wide margin of victory.125

Italian domestic politics were also in upheaval following the collapse of the dominant Christian Democrats amid corruption charges in the early 1990s. The demolition of the political establishment opened the field of contention to the surviving leftist parties—including the communists—and the emerging political aspirants united under the banner of Berlusconi’s Forza Italia. Berlusconi’s election with a large majority was due in part to the attractiveness of his message, but also in part to the nature of his opposition. The Italian electorate was reluctant to trust a left-leaning government.

This chapter provides an analysis of the diverse factors that affected French and Italian decisions regarding the March 2003 US-led intervention in Iraq. Next, this chapter examines the international dynamics that resulted in disruptions within NATO and the European Union. This chapter seeks to answer the following questions. Does the division over Iraq represent a key change of political alignments? What are the possible short- and long-term effects on US-French and US-Italian relations?

A. FRANCE

French politicians since Charles de Gaulle have challenged American leadership in Europe and have often attempted to counterbalance American influence. Even prior to the overwhelming cultural flood emanating from America after the Second World War,


the French were concerned with the threat of Americanization to French customs. The tradition of resisting American influence may have contributed to French opposition to American policy on Iraq. France’s opposition to the possible intervention in Iraq was attributed by US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld to obstructionism:

They are frequently recalcitrant about a lot of things. Any given day or week their role in NATO—they seem to be the country that disagrees with a lot of other countries.  

He dismissed the impact of the French decision on other American allies.

Now, you’re thinking of Europe as Germany and France. I don’t. I think that’s old Europe. If you look at the entire NATO Europe today, the center of gravity is shifting to the east. … Germany has been a problem, and France has been a problem. 

The extreme acrimony that accompanied the discourse between the American and French governments exceeded the bounds of pointed diplomacy. Divisions of allies into “Old Europe” and “New Europe,” and other diplomatic jibes by President Bush, Secretary Rumsfeld, and Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz served to exacerbate tensions and divisions rather than providing an opening for an amelioration of relations. US commentators suggested that the reasons might include typical anti-Americanism, excessive concern about investments in Iraq, and occasionally French-Iraqi circumvention of the oil-for-food program. The contrast between the base motives attributed to the French and the lofty, moral security goals of the United States aroused domestic ire in particular sectors of the United States, ultimately precipitating silly reactions like renaming French fries “freedom fries.” This public lashing of the French government and its position helped to widen rifts within the European Union. Paris demanded loyalty from current and prospective EU members to either the United States

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or to France, with consequences to follow for the “wrong” decision. The pointed exchanges were not one-sided; French and German representatives also had harsh reactions to American criticisms.

It would be inaccurate to suppose that French policy was driven solely by stubbornness, or by a determination to protect French business interests or to challenge American hegemony. It appears that French policies were animated by an interest in maintaining the global status quo, by skepticism regarding the American justification for the use of force (particularly as applied to links between Al Qaeda and Iraq), and by concern for post-war political turmoil in Iraq and beyond.130

President Chirac dismissed concerns about French investment losses in Iraq and denied that France was involved in violations of the oil-for-food program. He asserted that economic interests in Iraq constituted 0.2 percent of French foreign trade and that Iraqi oil constituted less than 8 percent of total French imports. Chirac categorically rebuffed allegations of French involvement in prohibited arms sales to Iraq.131

It is plausible that the history of French policy in this region circumscribed the range of actions available to Chirac, and that certain domestic political factors reinforced those choices. Initial obstruction that yielded to support of American objectives, once certain French pre-conditions had been achieved, was an alternative widely anticipated outcome. Chirac’s rigid opposition to the American-led effort was not anticipated by European analysts.132

Many American observers dismissed the French opposition to military intervention in Iraq as another instance of French obstructionism. However, an alternative explanation deserves consideration: that French foreign policy has been reasonably consistent in certain respects since the end of World War II. Indeed, certain policy principles have been followed by all of France’s national leaders irrespective of their domestic political orientation. In this case, policies of respect for international law

and maintenance of French autonomy influenced decisions on the immediate issues in question. This convergence of past practice and present assessment resulted in a policy of opposition to the US-proposed military intervention in Iraq.133

Similarly, the impression expressed by some Americans that the French were incapable of an effective use of force is misinformed, as the history of French operations in the Kosovo conflict in 1999 and in Afghanistan since 2001 shows. It was a French judgment that the use of force in Iraq in early 2003 would be inopportune and destabilizing in the region.

Certain domestic factors may have played a subordinate role in shaping President Chirac’s decision to pursue his selected course of action. These factors include the large Muslim population in France, public opinion, a countervailing threat assessment, and a negative evaluation of US diplomatic efforts. Key secondary considerations may have been German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder’s antipathy to the American-led intervention and a French goal of exerting the power of a unified European Union as a credible force in a multipolar world. Each factor had the potential to discourage active support for a US-led intervention in Iraq or to further polarize the French and American points of view.

It is not French practice to maintain statistics on religious preference, so demographic information on French Muslims as a segment of the French population is estimated or extrapolated from other information. Estimates of the Muslim population place it between 4.5 and 5 million people, or approximately 7 to 8 percent of the population.134 The difficulties of integrating immigrants whose social, religious and cultural affiliations differ significantly from the perceived mainstream French “civilization” were highlighted as themes by Le Pen during the 2002 election, and continued to resonate across Europe. Increasing incidents of anti-Semitism in France attracted the opprobrium of the American and Israeli governments, although evidence indicated that some of these occurrences were related to political frustrations with events in the Middle East rather than neo-Nazi tendencies.135

133 This is based on the author’s personal interviews in France in September 2004.
concern that a protracted and destructive intervention in Iraq could produce significant civil disorder and increased incidents of domestic terrorism in France.\textsuperscript{136} Other observers judged that the impact of domestic Muslim concerns was negligible in the formation of French policy about the central question of Iraq. French Muslims are more concerned about the increasing strife in Israel and the Occupied Territories. Therefore, resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict would offer a greater opportunity to lessen tension in the region, with a concomitant reduction in potential civil unrest or domestic terrorism in France.\textsuperscript{137}

It is difficult to ascertain the magnitude of the effect of French public opinion in shaping President Chirac’s decision to oppose the American-led intervention in Iraq. There are two areas in which public opinion and domestic policy may have had mutual influence: perceptions of the threats and perceptions of possible solutions.

The Chicago Council on Foreign Relations/German Marshall Fund’s analysis, entitled \textit{Worldviews 2002}, illuminated several variations in perceptions in French and American public opinion regarding US foreign policy. Polling data on America’s role as the sole superpower showed French respondents overwhelmingly supported the advent of a unified European entity to counterbalance the United States (91 percent) as compared to 76 percent in Italy and 48 percent in Germany.\textsuperscript{138} This correlates to President Chirac’s position that American unipolarity was dangerous, and to France’s stated foreign policy objective to establish a common European Union position on international relations.\textsuperscript{139}

Regarding the use of force in Iraq, only 6 percent of French respondents supported American unilateral action and 27 percent opposed any intervention in Iraq. The majority of those polled—63 percent--supported American intervention only under the auspices of UN approval. In the 2002 \textit{Worldviews} study, American public support for intervention in Iraq was similar to that in France: 65 percent supported intervention if the UN approved, and 13 percent opposed intervention under any circumstances; 20 percent

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{136} Gordon, p. 5.
\item \textsuperscript{137} This is based on the author’s personal interviews in France in September 2004.
\end{itemize}
of the Americans polled supported unilateral American intervention. This data suggests that during the period covered by the surveys, May and June 2002, American and French reactions to possible intervention in Iraq were similar. These surveys predate the intense public campaigns by the Bush administration to solidify support for a coalition against Iraq.

A notable difference in these surveys is the variation in the perception of the threats to national safety and their origins. 65 percent of French respondents viewed international terrorism as a threat, much lower than the 91 percent of American respondents. On Iraq’s possible WMD, 58 percent of French versus 86 percent of American respondents saw these as a source of threats. As tensions escalated and as French and American government officials attempted to convince domestic and international audiences of the validity of their respective opinions, the French public may have been more inclined to support a cautious approach to the threat, while the American public may have been more susceptible to the barrage of statements definitively linking the Global War on Terrorism, Iraq, WMD, and Al Qaeda together into a unitary threat.

A January 2003 IPSOS/Le Monde opinion poll found 77 percent of French respondents opposed to intervention in Iraq. A January 2003 poll conducted by the Pew Research Center found increasing support for military intervention in Iraq among American respondents: 46 percent supported military action regardless of the findings of UN-sponsored weapons inspectors, and this increased to 76 percent if WMD caches could actually be located. By March 2003, these positions were solidified: 59 percent of American respondents favored war against Iraq, and 75 percent of French respondents opposed war against Iraq.

The combination of increasing public opposition and French Muslim hostility to US policy in particular may have dissuaded the French government from offering overt support for US policy in Iraq. Yet, had President Chirac been convinced by the American threat assessment, he could have pursued other avenues despite public opinion. The leaders of Britain, Italy, Poland and Spain each faced substantial public opposition to intervention in Iraq—51 percent of the British, 81 percent of the Italians and the Spanish, and 73 percent of the Poles opposed the American-led intervention. However, each national leader shaped a national policy that supported to varying degrees the American position. Instead, Chirac steadily opposed the US-led intervention, his decision resonating with French public opinion.

President Chirac’s assessment of the threat posed by Saddam Hussein in Iraq differed substantially from the American threat assessment. His perceptions were consistent with those found in public opinion polls, and he dismissed the American assertions regarding Iraqi WMD and Iraqi connections to Al Qaeda. French threat assessments and reactions to American proposals can be divided into two categories: the threat of international terrorism and the threat of Saddam Hussein and WMD in Iraq. The Bush administration tended to lump these concerns together into a single, hydra-like problem. The French assessment saw international terrorism as a threat distinct from Saddam Hussein’s WMD. Moreover, French officials argued, an intervention in Iraq might either side-track or undermine the campaign against international terrorism.

In an October 2002 speech at the Institute of Higher National Defence Studies, French Prime Minister Jean-Pierre Raffarin highlighted his perception of threats to France and international security. He emphasized in particular concerns about terrorism—both international and domestic—and WMD proliferation. However, Raffarin also discussed other destabilizing elements which threatened peace and international order. His regions of concern included Israel and Palestine, Africa, and Pakistan-Kashmir-India.

145 Ibid.
Raffarin’s speech followed the release of the American *National Security Strategy* and President Bush’s speech to the UN General Assembly in September 2002. In what may be seen as a partial rejection of the American threat assessment, Raffarin cautioned against categorizing disparate elements of regional instability as terrorism. While he agreed that Iraq remained dangerous and that Iraqi WMD acquisition could constitute a threat, he strongly supported an enhanced weapons inspection regime as the appropriate first course of action to counter this threat.

As if to account for American belligerence, Raffarin asserted that the United States was still in shock following the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks. He offered French empathy for the American desire to pursue security through the use of unilateral military intervention; but he indicated that France did not condone that course of action, and suggested that the United States return to a more multilateral approach.

While France shares the United States’ natural determination to respond to the attack to which she was a victim, France wishes her to remain true to a vision of collective security resting on the law, cooperation between states and the authority of the Security Council.147

American and French threat assessments concurred that Saddam Hussein’s control of Iraq was a threat to stability in the Middle East and to international security more generally. The method to either mitigate or eliminate that threat was the issue of contention. The American conclusion was that regime change in Iraq would have a beneficial effect on political stability and security in the region; it would eliminate bases of support for international terrorism, and would ensure positive control over WMD stockpiles in Iraq, thus eliminating a source of proliferation. Objections to intervention included the concern that the threat to regime survival might provoke Saddam Hussein to use WMD in desperation or to collaborate with Al-Qaeda, thus accelerating WMD proliferation; or that war in Iraq would precipitate more instability and violence in the region.148

A final factor which may have influenced Chirac’s ultimate decision to oppose the possible American-led intervention in Iraq was a series of diplomatic impasses that

\[147\text{Ibid.}

No leader has taken greater risks in the struggle against terrorism than President Musharraf of Pakistan and no country has more at stake in this fight. And right here in NATO we have an ally, Turkey, that is a model for the Muslim world’s aspirations… Those who would criticize Turkey for its problems confuse what is problematic with what is fundamental, focus too much and ignore where it is going.149

Ongoing disputes about US decisions not to ratify the Kyoto Accords or the Rome Statute establishing the International Criminal Court, economic discord over steel tariffs and farm subsidies, and frustration over the US treatment of Al-Qaeda and Taliban detainees in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, added to the tension in US-French relations.150 As France and Germany expressed doubts about the sagacity of the proposed intervention, their loyalty and value as allies were questioned. This marginalized leaders who failed to support the American intervention. The stark positions in the Bush administration of either “with us” or “against us” provoked resentment in Europe.151

The reasons for French resistance to American policies were multiple and varied. French antipathy to American proposals may have stemmed in part from the archetypal French resistance to American leadership that has characterized Franco-American relations since the troubled relationship between de Gaulle and Roosevelt during World War II. However, to dismiss Chirac’s opposition to intervention in Iraq as simple anti-Americanism would be incorrect. It is more likely that his decision to oppose the American action was influenced by several factors—an interest in maintaining

150 Pond, p. x.
151 Pond, p. 47.
international balance, respect for international law, and countervailing threat and cost-benefit assessments. It is also probable that his negative reactions to American diplomacy solidified Chirac’s domestic political position rather than defined it.

B. ITALY

The Italian government headed by Silvio Berlusconi was regarded by the Bush administration as a loyal ally in the war on terror in spite of its comparatively minor military contributions. Although Berlusconi’s personal desire to reinforce ties with the American president and the United States cannot be discounted, his decision to support the American position was probably influenced by factors beyond a desire to please American allies or to express differences with other EU leaders. Considerations that may have also affected Berlusconi’s decision calculus included the Italian Muslim population, the balance of domestic politics and public opinion, Italy’s economic situation, a variation of the American threat assessment, and possible interdiction of WMD or terrorist threats emerging from Northern Africa. A secondary impetus may have included a desire to counterbalance Franco-German domination of the leadership of the European Union.

Italy’s Muslim population is small compared to that of France—about 1 percent of the population. Restive Italian Muslims opposed to Berlusconi’s support for US positions may not have represented a level of concern similar to that in France. However, in contrast to France’s overwhelmingly enfranchised Muslim population, the Muslims in Italy are comparatively disenfranchised and less of a factor in national politics. Muslims in Italy are seen as transient and therefore as less of a public opinion factor than in France. A1 Qaeda cells in Italy in proximity to radicalized, unassimilated Muslim immigrants nevertheless increased the danger of domestic terror attacks and the danger that Italy would be used as a staging ground for attacks against other objectives. The possibility of either civil disturbances or attacks by Al Qaeda operatives may have had a moderating effect on Berlusconi’s support for the American position.

http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2002/13941.htm

153 This is based on the author’s personal interviews in France and Italy in September 2004.

154 Savage, pp. 31-38.
Prime Minister Berlusconi faced other contentious factors which he needed to balance in order to support intervention in Iraq. The coalition structure of Italy’s national government presented a threat to Berlusconi’s hold on power. In this respect, he faced challenges in conducting an unpopular foreign policy that neither President Bush nor President Chirac confronted. Intervention in Iraq was unpopular with the Italian public, the Pope, the political opposition, and components of Berlusconi’s coalition. Shifting alliances within his governing coalition had ended Berlusconi’s first term as prime minister (27 April – 22 December 1994); his current government could have as quickly descended into internecine squabbles if either of his coalition partners, the Lega Nord’s leader Umberto Bossi or the National Alliance’s leader Gianfranco Fini, had decided to join the opposition.

Pope John Paul II’s ability to influence the Italian political agenda is difficult to ascertain. However, prior to the start of hostilities in Iraq, he exerted himself through diplomatic missions to Iraq and the United States, and through encyclicals advocating the value of peaceful conflict resolution instead of military action in an effort to promote negotiations. His office rejected American evidence of Iraqi failures to cooperate with International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and UN Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) inspectors. The pope excoriated the rationales for military intervention in Iraq. His opposition divided Italian public opinion, and united diverse Italian opponents to Berlusconi.

Italian public opinion mirrored French public opinion. Indeed, Italians expressed stronger opposition to war under any circumstances and less support for war, even with UN approval, than did the French. During the May 2002 *Worldviews* interview period, 33 percent of the Italian public opposed intervention in Iraq; only 54 percent supported intervention with UN support, and 10 percent supported American unilateral action. By March 2003 opposition to war in Iraq had increased, with 82 percent of Italian


respondents opposed and only 17 percent in support of intervention.\textsuperscript{158} Public manifestations against military intervention in Iraq included significant demonstrations in major metropolitan areas. Another concrete sign of anti-intervention sentiment included an organization called \textit{Disobbidienti} (disobedients) whose concerted efforts were directed towards disrupting US military movements in Italy and hampering Italian military assistance efforts. The Italian government went to great lengths (and at significant political risk) to guarantee unfettered movement of the US military in Italy.\textsuperscript{159}

The Italian public’s opposition to military intervention in Iraq did not correlate directly with the public’s perception of threat; indicators were generally higher than in the French case but lower than in the American threat assessments. 67 percent of Italian (compared to 60 percent of French and 91 percent of American) respondents saw international terrorism as a critical threat. Iraq’s WMD merited concern from 57 percent of Italian (compared to 43 percent of French and 86 percent of American) respondents. The Italian public also expressed a high perception of threat from immigrants and refugees: 52 percent of respondents saw this as a threat to Italian security; in France, 34 percent of respondents viewed immigration as a threat. American perceptions of immigrants as a threat exceeded the threshold in of all the European countries surveyed, with 60 percent of respondents noting immigration as a threat to American security.\textsuperscript{160} Although the Italian public saw Iraq as a threat, military intervention was not the optimal solution to counter the threat, especially as that might increase the flow of refugees.

In the cases of France and the United States it is possible to speculate on the impact of public opinion on foreign policy or the impact of government actions to gather support for a particular foreign policy. However, in the case of Italy, Prime Minister Berlusconi executed a foreign policy for which there was little public—or political—support. Berlusconi’s pursuit of an unpopular foreign policy incurred significant political risks and invited the dissolution of his government. To accept such risks, Berlusconi


\textsuperscript{159} This is based on the author’s personal interviews in Italy in September 2004.

must have calculated the possible political benefits. What follows is a review of the factors that may have encouraged him to pursue an unpopular foreign policy.

With Italy burdened by recession following the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks, lethargic economic initiatives, and EU-driven fiscal constraints, Berlusconi may have seen intervention in Iraq as a partial solution to an economic problem. US officials asserted that the ouster of Saddam Hussein would be militarily simple, and that democracy would be quickly established. In February 2002 Ken Adelman asserted that “demolishing [Saddam] Hussein’s military power and liberating Iraq would be a cakewalk.”\footnote{Ken Adelman, “Cakewalk in Iraq.” \textit{The Washington Post} (13 February 2002). \url{http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/a1996-2002feb12?language=printer}} Umberto Bossi, a key member of the Berlusconi government and the leader of the Lega Nord party, proffered a similar analysis. “The war will be finished in the time in which one can smoke a Tuscan cigar.”\footnote{Unattributed article, “Bossi: ‘Refugees stay home.’” \textit{La Repubblica} (Rome), 19 March 2003. \url{http://www.repubblica.it/online/politica/italiairaqundici/bossi/bossi.html}, “Nel tempo in cui si fuma un toscano, la guerra è finita.”}

Perhaps convinced that military intervention in Iraq was inevitable and success guaranteed, Berlusconi may have seen the reconstruction effort as an opportunity to revitalize Italy’s economic sector. To ensure access to post-war reconstruction contracts, Berlusconi cultivated a position supporting the American-led operation as a loyal ally. He lessened ill effects with his domestic constituency and partially disarmed his political opposition by limiting visible support during combat operations to passive cooperation.

Concrete security interests may also have contributed to Berlusconi’s support for intervention in Iraq. Although the Prime Minister’s support for the intervention as a partial solution to the problems of international terrorism and Iraqi WMD was at variance with that of the Italian public, the government and the people shared a common perception regarding the source of the threat. Before 11 September 2001, crime and illegal immigration dominated Italian security concerns; international terrorism and Iraqi WMD subsequently superseded these concerns. Berlusconi’s public discourse effectively linked the source of illegal immigration (primarily from North Africa) with sources of international terrorism—characterized as primarily poverty and political repression. He further presented Iraq’s WMD possession as a threat to Italian national security.
His success was evident in the political support he garnered to grant the US military overflight and basing permissions before the start of hostilities. Political support to send in 3,000 Italian carabinieri following the fall of Baghdad is additional evidence.

When Prime Minister Berlusconi outlined his threat assessment to the UN General Assembly in September 2002, it appeared that he accepted all of the American premises: that containment was not a successful implement to disarm the Iraqi government; that freedom and democracy are the antidotes for terrorism; and that gaining positive control of Iraqi WMD now would be preferable to a less controlled confrontation at a future date. He appears to have disregarded concerns over the possible proliferation of WMD beyond the state control of Saddam Hussein into the hands of Al Qaeda in the event of a military intervention. He may have also viewed intervention as a measure of prevention against future inundations of illegal immigrants.

One component of Berlusconi’s election campaign promises—that of strengthening US-Italian ties—was realized through his vocal support for President Bush. Prior to the events of 11 September 2001, Berlusconi’s reemphasis on improving relations with the American government appeared to be a continuation of the policy of maintaining strategic alliances followed by Italy since World War II.163

After the clash of political wills between the United States and France over Iraq, Berlusconi’s efforts to support the American position while preventing a rift with France or Germany may have reflected a desire to preserve the cohesion of the Atlantic Alliance and the European Union.164 As the vitriol level escalated between France and the United States, NATO’s future was questioned.165 Italian support for the intervention in Iraq expanded President Bush’s “coalition of the willing,” and kept the Americans and the Italians engaged in dialogue.

A final influence on Berlusconi’s decision to support the American position may have been the public reprisals taken by the Bush administration against Germany’s Chancellor, Gerhard Schroeder, following his strong opposition to American action.

163 Darnis, p. 109.
164 Ortega, pp 20-21.
during his 2002 electoral campaign. Italy’s delayed entrance into the fray gave Berlusconi time to analyze possible repercussions of any anti-American decision. The Bush administration’s denigration of France and Germany may have proven cautionary, dissuading wavering allies from aligning themselves against the US position.

Despite its opposition to US policy and subsequent “punishment,” Germany’s extensive economic relations with the United States, among other factors, prevented a complete rupture. France may have been better positioned globally through its Francophonie links, World Trade Organization protections, and alternate spheres of influence to resist any American retaliation. Italy’s smaller economy and more unstable political order would have made political and economic recovery more challenging. The vigor with which Franco-German opposition to US policy efforts was scorned by Washington may have reinforced an opportune decision for Berlusconi to cement a “special relationship” with President Bush while firmly establishing Italy’s place in the European Union.

The decision by Prime Minister Berlusconi to support the American-led intervention in Iraq in spite of considerable domestic opposition and Franco-German pressure appears to have been based on a combination of factors. The need to harmonize domestic opposition to intervention with maintaining a strategic alliance with the United States required that Berlusconi execute intricate maneuvers. Moreover, his range of action was circumscribed by the nature of his ruling coalition and the constitutional constraints on the Italian government. It is possible that a desire to avoid US rancor also influenced Berlusconi to adopt a pro-US stance rather than a pro-French stance.

The first part of this chapter reviewed the factors that may have influenced the governments of France and Italy in their decisions to oppose or support the US-led intervention in Iraq. Hence, it encompassed such domestic concerns as public opinion and threat perceptions. An assessment of the relationship between those factors follows.

Comparing public opinion and official policy statements in France and the United States, one difference emerges: that is, the definite link between Al Qaeda and Saddam Hussein that was emphasized in the US government’s justification of intervention stands at odds with the French judgment that no such link was evident or likely. That these

166 Pond, pp 59-68.
convictions about the Al Qaeda/Saddam Hussein link had a positive impact on American support for intervention can be inferred from the comparatively high level of public support in the months prior to the intervention in Iraq.\textsuperscript{167} Had this link not been so firmly asserted and so widely accepted, it is possible the American public might have expressed less support for the administration’s policy. By contrast, President Chirac actively questioned the presumption of extensive links between Al Qaeda and Saddam Hussein’s regime.

No evidence has been found so far—or at least has been made official—of ties between Iraq and international terrorism, and particularly al Qaeda. … We have no proof that Iraq is involved in international terrorism or al Qaeda in particular.\textsuperscript{168}

The public in France appeared to have adopted a similar assessment of the threats—Osama bin Laden’s Al Qaeda versus Saddam Hussein’s regime—and to have come to the conclusion that the threats were distinct and unrelated.

President Chirac may have calculated that his opposition to the American led-intervention would garner increased political and diplomatic support for his position; he may have judged that the American backlash would be negligible. Prime Minister Berlusconi apparently calculated that the Americans were right, especially in their expectation of a rapid win in Iraq; he probably judged that he would not sacrifice an excessive amount of domestic political capital in supporting President Bush. The current state of trans-Atlantic relations indicates that some errors in political judgment were made.

The political fractures leading up to the American-led intervention in Iraq resulted in significant disruptions to the trans-Atlantic relationship. Some observers judge that it was the worst crisis since the 1956 Suez intervention by Britain, France and Israel.\textsuperscript{169} America’s relations with France and Germany reached a low point in 2002-2003.

\textsuperscript{167} The Pew Research Center, “Post-Blix: Public Favors Force in Iraq, But…US needs more international Backing.” 20 February 2003, p. 3.  \url{http://www.people-press.org}

\textsuperscript{168} \textit{New York Times}, Interview with President Jacques Chirac, 8 September 2002. \url{http://www.elysee.fr/actus/arch020909/english.htm}

To what extent does the US-French division over Iraq represent an enduring change in political alignments? Since Charles de Gaulle’s return to the leadership of France in 1958, Franco-American relations have vacillated between high levels of mutual respect and support and episodes of estrangement. De Gaulle provided complete support to the United States support during the Cuban missile crisis, yet withdrew France from the integrated military command structure of NATO to pursue an independent nuclear deterrence policy. He sought to establish a distinct path for his nation between the dominion of the Soviet Union and the United States, and his concerns over the superabundance of American influence were reflected in his political, economic, and social decisions.

The events of 2002/2003 reflect a certain continuation of this trend. President Chirac’s confrontations with the Bush administration exceeded simple objections to US policies in the UN Security Council. The French were perturbed because the American-led action would violate their interpretation of international legal principles. While the American position was that action was necessary to save the United Nations Security Council from irrelevance (and that the United States and its coalition partners had sufficient authority to act under existing UN Security Council resolutions), the French interpretation was that the proposed American-led action would undermine the authority of the UN Security Council.

The Italian government has been a US consistent ally since the foundation of the Atlantic Alliance. That Berlusconi sought closer ties with the United States during the Iraq crisis may have appeared extreme to some observers given the popular opposition to the proposed US-led intervention; but it was not exceptional in the history of American Italian relations. Indeed, a deviation from the chosen course of action towards an alignment with France would have signaled an even more dramatic shift in Italian foreign policy.
VI. CONCLUSIONS

The March 2003 military intervention in Iraq by a US-led coalition resulted in a deep rift between the United States and certain allies. This is particularly true of relations between America and France. In contrast, the debate over intervention enabled the Italian government to express support for the American position, strengthening relations between the two governments. The preceding analysis found that factors in addition to the issue of the Iraqi regime’s lack of compliance with UN Security Council resolutions concerning WMD possession and proscribed delivery means probably influenced the French and Italian decisions.

What follows is an assessment of the effects of the 2002/2003 Iraq crisis on US relations with France and Italy. This conclusion examines some possible outcomes of the rift in Franco-American relations, and their implications for the future of these relations and intra-EU relations.

In Italy’s case, the Berlusconi government’s support for President Bush’s policies ensured continuing good relations. However, critical assessments of Prime Minister Berlusconi’s performance in domestic and foreign policy could result in a change of government.

For Franco-American relations, 2002 and 2003 were exceptionally bad years. According to a highly respected Italian expert, this was the worst episode in US-French relations since the 1956 Suez crisis. The pervasive antipathy expressed by both sides eroded confidence on many levels. Confidence in the United States as a reliable ally and guardian of international order was replaced by wariness about US unpredictability and mistrust of US intentions. Popular and media attacks in the United States on the motives of the French and the Germans only exacerbated an already tense situation and deepened resentment. Ameliorating relations will require considerable effort in Paris and Washington.


Already some steps to overcome the recent acrimony have been taken. Cooperation between the United States and France in alleviating chaos in Haiti in early 2004 following the collapse of President Jean-Bertrand Aristide’s government is one instance. Following a unanimous vote in the UN Security Council, a Multinational Interim Force designed to restore civil order, to which France contributed approximately 300 soldiers, was dispatched.

In August and September 2004, France assumed command of two key NATO operations. In August 2004 France took command of the NATO-led multinational International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Kabul, Afghanistan, to which France contributes approximately 1,000 troops. France is therefore one of the largest contributors to security in Afghanistan. The French command of the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR) for a year beginning in September 2004 is expected to further the normalization of relations between the United States and France. In another important effort to rebuild trans-Atlantic relations, President Chirac supported the decision by NATO in June 2004 to participate in training Iraqi security forces despite strongly held reservations about the implications of further NATO involvement in Iraq.

However, interactions between some American and French government officials were particularly acrimonious, and in some cases, individuals have yet to be reconciled with their counterparts, and remain irritated by the emotions expressed in 2002-2003. For example, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld reportedly refused permission for the French military to participate in US-sponsored international military conferences and exercises, and restricted US Department of Defense participation in the Paris Air Show. Mutual professional respect and practical considerations in addressing security and defense challenges are nonetheless regaining lost ground. Exercises and exchanges are important factors in ensuring smooth interactions in future combined military operations.172

The Iraq crisis precipitated a large shock for the European Union’s aspiration to formulate and pursue a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Much of the dispute between France and Italy (and the other EU members) was not concerned with

issues of economic policy or threat assessments; instead, it centered on control over the CFSP agenda. That is, who determines the EU’s foreign and security policy? This experience may have created conditions under which the major EU powers will attempt to establish greater unity to deal with the next crisis. A common foreign and security policy is intended to enhance EU cohesion, and to ensure that the EU will have more influence over US policies than individual EU countries had during the Iraq crisis.

However, it may be difficult for the EU to achieve that level of success in the near future. The May 2004 enlargement of the EU from 15 to 25 members increases the complexity of an already cumbersome decision-making process. Moreover, the new member nations may consider that they have an interest in maintaining strong bilateral relations with the United States. In the case of some new EU members (for instance, Poland and the Baltic states), this may be attributable to a judgment that Russia remains a threat to their national sovereignty, and that an American security guarantee is more credible than a French or an EU guarantee. This may also be attributable to the same problem that burdened relations between France and supporters of US policy such as Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom: control over the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy agenda.

As suggested above, another factor may be the strength of bilateral relations between the United States and individual EU nations. As was revealed during the 2002-2003 Iraq crisis, some nations may judge that their national interest requires combining security derived from an alliance with the United States with economic benefits derived from membership in the EU. In this instance, loyalty to a security interest may outweigh attachment to the European Union.
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