When the Deputy Secretary of Defense approved the peacetime use of Reserve component intelligence elements in January 1995, few appreciated the positive impact this action would have on revolutionizing Reserve intelligence support for active commands in a crisis. Four years later, highly qualified members of a Reserve battle damage assessment team arrived in Britain to support Operation Allied Force. Within 72 hours of leaving their Reserve unit at Fort Sheridan, they were working at computer terminals at the Joint Analysis Center (JAC), RAF Molesworth. Employing Reservists was hardly a surprise. The use of Reserve intelligence forces has become necessary for the active commands to meet daily mission requirements. The joint Reserve intelligence program (JRIP) directly supports combatant commands from both joint Reserve intelligence centers (JRICs) in the United States and locations in U.S. European Command (EUCOM).

The Taproot of Change

An experienced, skilled JRIP did not materialize overnight. It had its origins in initiatives that go back to June 1982, when Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger stated “Units that fight first shall be equipped first regardless of component.” This concept was a catalyst for JRIP since intelligence Reservists can only be adequately trained when given access to the same infrastructure, software, and training as active duty forces. Another factor that helped create JRIP was the 1986 passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act with its focus on jointness. The third factor is the continuing reorganization within DOD. Downsizing has made a
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greater operational use of Reservists imperative for support of gaining commands. To address these issues, the Secretary of Defense directed measures to improve the use of Reserve capabilities.

After two years of coordination, DOD approved Peacetime Use of Reserve Component Intelligence Elements: Implementation Plan for Improving the Utilization of the Reserve Military Intelligence Force, which changes the way the Reserve and active forces are integrated. And in 1995, the Chairman notified the unified commands that the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence would issue instructions on implementing the plan and incorporating its substance into DOD directives.

The plan details overall responsibilities; increases efficiencies through joint organizations, functional management structures, and flexible drills; improves relations among drilling Reservists, their units, and defense intelligence elements; and calls for the creation of a common database for Reserve intelligence specialties. It also addresses appropriations for pay and allowances provided to Reserve intelligence personnel by unified commands and selected defense agencies.

To compensate for a projected drawdown in active military and civilian intelligence staffs, the plan underscores the need for the full engagement of Reservists from peacetime to mobilization. It directs the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) to integrate the efforts of organizations responsible under this plan for intelligence mission development, tasking, and management to apply a cohesive and comprehensive approach to using the Reserve components. It further assigns DIA to create the Reserve Intelligence Integration Division (RJID), and direct the Joint Reserve Intelligence Connectivity Program (JRICP).

In addition to serving as a clearing house for operations, the staff element of DIA provides a data processing/communications infrastructure with general defense intelligence program funding (through which Reservists who are geographically separated from gaining commands or customers can be tasked to support requirements during inactive duty and active training periods). Under this program JRICs have evolved at military sites across the United States and are accessible to drilling Reservists. Each is a secure facility with state-of-the-art systems that reserve units and individual mobilization augmentees from all services use to provide peacetime-through-wartime intelligence support. Of 29 sites, the Army operates 11, the Army National Guard 3, the Navy 9, the Marine Corps 2, the Air Force 2, and the Air National Guard 2, with Joint Forces Intelligence Command and the Navy and Marine Corps Intelligence Training Center each operating a site.

The advanced technology at these sites includes communications bandwidth and software necessary to pull information from remote databases, build products, and deliver those products in a timely manner. It is capable of supporting most phases of intelligence production. Through the sites, directly connected to the active forces, Reservists can improve their skills while operating on the same systems used in a mobilization. At the same time, this arrangement allows warfight- ers to employ the Reserves as a force multiplier through reach-back.

**From Reserve to Allied Force**

When the United States became involved with NATO in Kosovo, it was necessary for JAC at RAF Molesworth to request joint Reserve intelligence support elements. The center could not have supported forces in the Balkans and meet its other requirements without increasing manpower through active and Reserve augmentation. EUCOM and JAC took the initiative and called upon the Reserves to support projected manpower shortfalls. Because of limited space at Molesworth and to conserve funds, several Reservists reported to remote elements in JRICs at Fort Sheridan and Fort Gillem. If the crisis continued, a significant number of Reservists and augmentees would have been mobilized to JRICs.

The 117th Intelligence Squadron of the Alabama Air National Guard was integrated into the JAC division of imagery U-2 exploitation cell at RAF Molesworth. This unit, along with a Naval Reserve imagery cell from KRISE at Fort Gillem, drills at JRIC in Birmingham, Alabama. The units provide imagery exploitation and analysis and intelligence reporting to EUOM, JAC, and DIA Missile and Space Intelligence Center. Of the 76 officer and enlisted personnel in this squadron, half are qualified imagery analysts and the balance are imagery mechanics, technicians, and administrators.

The success of the unit is a result of consistent interaction with JAC. Up to three times a year the squadron sends a detachment of imagery analysts to RAF Molesworth to perform annual training and support intelligence imagery requirements. Their skills have been enhanced by access to computer systems at the drill site in Alabama. Also contributing to success is their knowledge of fundamental light table analysis of U-2 and other products. JAC is the only joint intelligence center outside the United States that works extensively
DeVries

with U-2 image exploitation. Moreover, members of the 117th Intelligence Squadron have trained active duty analysts in imagery exploitation.

Because the squadron has a continuing relationship with JAC, uses the same exploitation software, and understands the theater, it can easily support the center in crises. The unit was ready when Operation Allied Force began. One of its senior enlisted imagery analysts was deployed to JAC and assigned to a new unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) exploitation cell. The squadron master sergeant was quickly integrated into the cell and, after working two consecutive shifts for a period of time, became night shift supervisor. It was as a result of this type of Reserve commitment that the UAV exploitation program succeeded during Operation Allied Force.

Use by JAC of the Linked Operations-Intelligence Center Europe, which furnishes NATO, American, and other Allied militaries with near-real time collection, exploitation, and dissemination at the secret releasable to NATO classification level, became a conduit for UAV exploitation. Through that channel, with a Naval Reserve intelligence officer as deputy chief, the exploitation cell gained access to NATO and other allied UAV imagery for both battle damage assessment and targeting. This set the stage for future shared systems. Because of his expertise, the Naval Reservist was deployed forward to Macedonia as officer in charge of the center's forward detachment.

The cell also worked with the exploitation cell of the 13th Intelligence Squadron located at Beale Air Force Base which provided much of the remote exploitation from the Air Force Predator
RESERVE INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT

UAV program. Additionally, Reservists were mobilized at the base from the 152nd Reconnaissance Squadron drilling at JRIC in Reno. JAC sent an active duty servicemember familiar with the center and the European theater to help coordinate the program. As demands increased on the center to keep its staff in theater or deploy forward, it was found that this stateside liaison role could be performed by Reservists from the 117th Intelligence Squadron who were both familiar with EUCOM and had a good working relationship with JAC counterparts.

One of the greatest successes was the activation of the Reserve Battle Damage Assessment EUCOM Support Team formed during JRISE drilling at JRIC in the North Central Army Reserve Intelligence Support Center at Fort Sheridan. This team was undergoing training when it was first recalled for contingency support in Autumn 1998. It immediately began honing targeting skills in the initial Kosovo work-up phase. After tours lasting from 30 to 90 days at JAC, team members returned home. Recalled again in May 1999 as a fully trained team, they arrived at the center within 72 hours and immediately went to work doing battle damage assessment and supporting targeting. By contrast, most active duty augmentees EUCOM recalled for the same crisis required 40 days to arrive in theater. In addition, active duty augmentees could not remain beyond 179 days without making a permanent change of station. These issues make active duty augmentees less desirable than Reservists. The targeting section alone increased manning by half to accomplish its 24-hour mission, and 15 percent of the augmentees were Reservists. It was the Reserves who were timely, had the required expertise, and understood JAC systems and software and the European theater.

In response to increased operational tasking, JAC took the initiative and became the first joint center to use JRIC as a remote site in a crisis, in the process creating a Reserve intelligence production center. As events intensified and production requirements could not be met, the center transferred all-source analytic mission support for the Middle East and Africa to JRISE at Fort Gillem. JAC deployed one analyst to Fort Gillem and JRIC sent another to the center. This exchange allowed the five Reserve analysts to be skillfully employed. Reservists were mobilized to the site and tasking orders were instituted. During the mobilization, JRISE produced 130 theater intelligence digest updates and products with graphics which were posted on Intelink. Moreover, Reservists at Fort Gillem responded to a request for information from a ship at sea, highlighting the reach possible from real-time connectivity.

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During the Kosovo crisis, the center also began to transfer part of its order of battle (OOB) mission to Fort Sheridan. Personnel in the OOB branch were transferred to the Balkans Intelligence Support Element (BISE) and could not continue with the full OOB mission. By shifting this task to the Reserves, JAC could continue to meet these requirements. In fact, the branch at Fort Sheridan is responsible for researching and maintaining part of the center's modernized integrated database, resulting in ground, naval, and air order of battle updates being generated for twenty countries at present. The unit from Fort Sheridan is tasked to provide full-time support to the database mission with a team of Reserve analysts who were activated to directly assist with the Balkans crisis. They continue in that role today.

Increased Operational Tempo

The Joint Analysis Center uses Reservists throughout the command and deploys a number to forward locations. In the past, joint Reserve intelligence support has been provided primarily at JAC in Britain, but increasing support comes directly from JRCs at Fort Gillem, Fort Sheridan, and Birmingham.

Reserve and National Guard members available for tasking in FY99 included 200 officers and
350 enlisted servicemembers drilling as unit members or individual mobilization augmentees. Through extensive use of systems and connectivity, FY99 JRIC production increased 100 percent over FY98. During Operation Allied Force, JAC required the augmentation of 152 Reservists, of which a third were Army and many had JRISE training that enabled them to provide immediate support on arrival. The Naval Reserve intelligence program provided 65 percent of augmentees to the center. Furthermore, the Naval Reserve Intelligence Command sent 40 members who provided reach-back support at DIA, the Office of Naval Intelligence, Naval Space Command, and U.S. Transportation Command in direct support of Operation Allied Force as well as manpower for the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, EUCOM, and Sixth Fleet. Naval Reserve personnel at JAC and elsewhere also filled valid Joint Task Force Noble Anvil billets normally filled by active duty personnel. The assistant chief of staff for intelligence (N–2), Sixth Fleet, was strongly supportive of both his war-traced and other Reservists. Their intelligence capabilities were enhanced by access to JRICs and to the secret Internet protocol network at some of their drilling sites.

With advanced collection comes almost limitless data to analyze. When a downsized force is factored in, combatant commands and services must rely more upon joint Reserve intelligence support in peacetime and mobilization. JAC alone is responsible for 66 percent of the countries in DIA Watchcon status and in 1998 supported 18 real world operations. To meet the increased collection and dissemination during Operation Allied Force, the center relied on an average of 130 Reserve augmentees at RAF Molesworth. These joint Reservists not only supported JAC there but were mobilized to JRICs and forward deployed in Skopje and Sarajevo and with Commander, Sixth Fleet, and the Combined Air Operations Center. As the director of
the division of targeting stated, they were "so
good that they were totally integrated with and
indistinguishable from permanent party person-
nel." Moreover, as the head of BISE noted,
"Without the Reserves, we would not have been
able to do ground mobile target assessment and
target value analysis."

**Recommendations**

In the next crisis, establishing an advanced
UAV exploitation cell will require twenty more
personnel to operate on a 24-hour basis. In addi-
tion, funds will be needed for a video exploita-
tion suite with sophisticated storage and retrieval
systems and to provide training. Since JAC does
not have the manpower to support an exploita-
tion cell, the most likely source is the 117th Intel-
lignce Squadron. Only if that unit was directly
war-traced to the center and given the funding,
systems, communications bandwidth, and train-
ing could it provide the requisite video exploita-
tion. Further, the center could reach back to JRIC
in Birmingham and activate a remote exploita-
tion cell. For that to happen, use of JRICs as mo-
bilization sites must be addressed, especially by
the Army Reserve, combatant commanders, and
Defense Intelligence Agency. Resulting policies
and procedures will have to be agreed upon.

As more and more potential exists for em-
ploying JRICs as remote production sites during
contingencies, more funding and equipment will
be required to maintain them as viable intelli-
gence centers. They will need the same software
and equipment upgrades as the combatant com-
mands as well as adequate bandwidth. As stated
previously, if JRICs are to become remote sites,
the service chiefs, especially in case of the Army
Reserve, must review their mission and support
this concept. The Reserves can no longer afford to
keep training for the big mobilization day or fol-
low a strict Title 10 interpretation.

Every service component must examine how
to better support its customers from peacetime
through mobilization. The Air Force intelligence
program, as a force engaged, provided 57 percent
of Reserve augmentees involuntarily recalled in
connection with Kosovo operations. That number
equalled 4,000 man-days for EUCOM, either from
in-theater or through reach-back operations,
which marked the first time the Air Force re-
sponded to the command by waiving its 179-day
rule. Reserve intelligence systems, connectivity,
training, and missions must continue to be re-
viewed and actively supported if the joint Reserve
intelligence forces are to complete their mission.
Those activated for Kosovo were the first in, last
out. The active duty augmentation process,
which relies on personnel force lists submitted by
requesting commands, is part of the answer but is
not timely enough.

The role of the Office of the Secretary of De-
fense for Command, Control, Communications,
and Intelligence in writing the implementation
directive and instructions must continue, with
DIA following up on implementation. During
this intense process, services and combatant com-
mands can agree on the ultimate use of JRICs.
With the reality of virtual collaboration and
reach-back and the seamless integration of soft-
ware applications through joint intelligence vir-
tual architecture, and with proliferation of Web-
based applications just around the corner, the
joint intelligence Reservist must continue to be
provided the most realigned infrastructure and
connectivity. In concert, both baseline intelli-
gence and theater-specific training to improve Re-
serv ability to support warfighters must be pro-
vided to joint intelligence Reservists no matter
where they are located.

The revolution in military technology has ar-
rived and the United States must reevaluate its
defense programs and fund them as appropriate.
Only then will the joint Reserve intelligence pro-
gram continue to be a force multiplier.

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