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**OPERATIONAL DESIGN FOR PEACE ENFORCEMENT: LESSONS FOR
THE OPERATIONAL STAFF**

By

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A paper submitted to the faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

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Abstract

U.S. involvement in Somalia serves as a useful case study of the unique challenges an operational staff may face when applying operational design to the planning and execution of a peace enforcement operation. U.S. and UN strategic aims were not achieved in Somalia. The root problem was a lack of emphasis on what is known today in joint doctrine as operational design. When planning and executing a peace enforcement operation, the Commander, Joint Task Force and his staff must use operational design in order to create a campaign plan that achieves strategic objectives. Peace enforcement operations may require combat. Planning such missions must include the key elements of operational design: understanding strategic guidance, identification of critical factors, and development of the operational concept. The absence of the key elements of operational design in the planning and execution of operations in Somalia had a direct bearing on the outcome achieved.

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OPERATIONAL DESIGN FOR PEACE ENFORCEMENT: LESSONS FOR THE OPERATIONAL STAFF

“Sergeant?”

Eversmann turned wearily. Diemer wore a panicked expression.

“I think I just saw a helicopter get hit.”

Black Hawk Down

The story of Task Force Ranger on October 3-4, 1993 is well known. With the downing of the first of two UH-60 Blackhawk helicopters in downtown Mogadishu, a tactical mission that depended on speed and mobility began to unravel and along with it, the entire U.S. operation in Somalia. What began as a noble humanitarian assistance operation in the post-cold war “New World Order” would expose serious deficiencies in the ability of the U.S. military to successfully plan and conduct peace enforcement operations. Perceived U.S. failure in Somalia would not just affect the credibility of American foreign policy, but would have serious implications for future national security as well. Trans-national terrorist organizations such as Al Qaeda have cited Somalia as an example of how to defeat the American will to fight.ⁱ There can also be no doubt that the people in Fallujah, Iraq, who publicly desecrated the bodies of murdered Americans on March 31, 2004, drew their lessons from Mogadishu and were hoping for a similar affect on American policy.

How did an operation that saved the lives of thousands of starving Somali citizens and seemingly fulfilled its initial objectives have such an ignominious ending?ⁱⁱ The question is complex, for contrary to popular perception some aspects of the Somali operation can be considered a success. Yet today, Somalia still lacks a political settlement, remains one of the most dangerous places on earth, and has potential for another humanitarian disaster.ⁱⁱⁱ In the end, U.S. and UN strategic objectives were not achieved. Why not?

The root problem in Somalia was a lack of emphasis on what is known today in joint doctrine as operational design. Operational design is the process used to create a cohesive plan by providing “the conceptual linkage of ends, ways and means for the campaign.”^{iv} More commonly associated with planning for major wars, operational design is also applicable to military operations other than war (MOOTW*^v). When planning and conducting a peace enforcement operation, the Commander, Joint Task Force (CJTF) and his staff must use operational design in order to create a campaign plan that achieves strategic objectives.

U.S. involvement in Somalia serves as a useful case study of the unique challenges an operational staff may face when applying operational design to the planning and execution of a peace enforcement operation. Operational design consists of three key elements: strategic guidance, critical factors and operational concept development.^{vi} In the case of Somalia, these elements were either absent or not fully considered by operational planners. This situation led directly to the outcome achieved and yields important lessons learned for the CJTF and his staff about to embark on their own peace enforcement operation.

Somalia: The Context

American involvement in Somalia originally began as a humanitarian assistance mission and developed into a peace enforcement operation (PEO). There were three distinct phases: Operation PROVIDE RELIEF/UNOSOM I, Operation PROVIDE HOPE/UNITAF, and Operation CONTINUE HOPE/UNOSOM II. Each phase had separate objectives that reflected an ever-expanding mandate based on U.S. and UN political decisions.

* Although the acronym MOOTW currently exists in joint doctrine, some services consider peace operations, including peace enforcement operations, as a subset of Stability and Support Operations (SASO).

U.S. operations in Somalia began in August 1992 with airlifts of food from neighboring Kenya. Known as Operation PROVIDE RELIEF, this first phase of American involvement was conducted in support of UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 751 of April 24, 1992, which authorized humanitarian relief operations under the direction of the United Nations Operations in Somalia (UNOSOM). Limited in scope, this operation was unable to provide effective humanitarian assistance to the Somali population as the UN lacked logistical, command and control and intelligence capabilities to undertake such a mission.^{vii} UNSCR 794, passed on December 3, 1992, endorsed a new U.S.-led operation to establish a “secure environment for humanitarian relief operations.”^{viii} The second phase of American involvement began on December 8, 1992 as Operation RESTORE HOPE under direction of the Unified Task Force (UNITAF) and commanded by USMC Lieutenant General Robert Johnston, the commander of the First Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF).

UNITAF was a large multinational effort in which U.S. military and diplomatic power predominated. The operation succeeded in ending mass-starvation in Somalia, but policy differences arose between the U.S. and UN over the meaning of “secure environment.”^{ix} UN diplomats pressed for a more active military role in confiscating weapons from the warring parties in Somalia and forcing a political settlement. Reluctant to engage in long-term nation building, the U.S. pressed for a complete hand over of the relief effort to UN control. This was accomplished on May 4, 1993 with the establishment of UNOSOM II, under the command of Turkish Lieutenant General Cevik Bir. This would be the third and defining phase of U.S. involvement, with the American contribution known as Operation CONTINUE HOPE. While UNOSOM II was not a U.S.-led operation, the mission was heavily influenced by U.S. staff officers. Intelligence, Operations, Planning and

Logistics functions on the UNOSOM II staff were all under the direction of U.S. officers.^x The Deputy UN Force Commander was U.S. Army Major General Thomas Montgomery, who also functioned as the senior commander of U.S. forces in Somalia (COMUSFORSOM).

UNSCR 814, which established UNOSOM II and was passed with the full support of the United States government, greatly broadened the mandate to intervene militarily in Somali internal affairs. This resolution changed the scope of the humanitarian assistance mission to a peace enforcement operation under the Chapter VII enforcement provisions of the UN Charter.^{xi} The transition from UNITAF to UNOSOM II and the operational-level planning and execution of missions in support of the increased military mandate of UNOSOM II provide the most useful lessons learned for the CJTF and his staff embarking on a peace enforcement operation.

The Environment of Peace Enforcement Operations

Peace Enforcement Operations are defined in Joint Publication 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations*, as the “application of military force, or threat of its use, normally pursuant to international authorization, to compel compliance with resolutions or sanctions designed to maintain or restore peace and order.”^{xii} Unlike peacekeeping operations (PKO), which are undertaken with the consent of disputing parties, military forces participating in PEO may face minimal or no host nation support. As part of their mandate to “compel compliance” they may be required to take sides in a dispute.^{xiii} Given these circumstances, PEO may require offensive operations.^{xiv}

Joint Publication 3-07.3, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedure for Peace Operations*, lists thirteen characteristics of peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations.

Four of these characteristics have particular relevance to operational design in the case of Somalia. First is the Primacy of Political Objectives.^{xv} In a peace enforcement operation, as in war, political objectives should drive military decisions. A CJTF and his staff must clearly understand the political objectives of the operation and the combatant commander's intent. Only then can military tasks be derived which will achieve those overall objectives.

Second is Complexity, Ambiguity and Uncertainty.^{xvi} PEOs take place in highly dynamic political, military and cultural environments and the CJTF and his staff will be faced with a multitude of complex and uncertain situations. This situation is obvious to operational planners for a major war, but it may be less obvious to planners thinking in terms of MOOTW. In Somalia there was, and still is, an absence of basic law and order throughout the country. There was widespread destruction of national infrastructure and political institutions, which compounded the problem of providing humanitarian assistance.

Third is Interagency Coordination and fourth is Multinational Cooperation.^{xvii} In the context of operational design, these characteristics are related. A PEO will likely occur in an interagency or multinational framework. Other U.S. government agencies, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and the United Nations may be present in the area of operations. The CJTF and his staff must coordinate their efforts with those of the other organizations involved. Unity of effort among all organizations is critical to achieving the overall objectives of the operation. In Somalia, a Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC) was established to facilitate this unity of effort.

A PEO will likely take place under a mandate from the United Nations. A CJTF and his staff in command of a multinational PEO will have to deal with a host of issues that greatly complicate planning and execution of the operation. However, international support

and involvement will give a PEO legitimacy. Unity of effort, multinational command and control, rules of engagement (ROE) and non-standard logistics are some of the problems that exist to a much greater degree than if the operation is U.S. only. Unity of effort and command and control of multinational forces were two of the biggest challenges faced by the UN Force Commander in UNOSOM II.^{xviii}

The Three Elements of Operational Design

Successful accomplishment of national or multinational objectives is a result of the integration of military power, interagency and multinational operations, along with diplomatic, economic and informational efforts.^{xix} This should be the goal of any operational campaign plan. Careful consideration of the three elements of operational design--strategic guidance, critical factors and operational concept development--will enable the CJTF and his staff to “ensure a clear focus on the ultimate strategic objective and corresponding strategic center of gravity (COG), and provide for sound sequencing, synchronization, and integration of all available military and nonmilitary sources of power to that end.”^{xx} U.S. and UN policy failed in UNOSOM II, the final and defining phase of the operation, because of a lack of focus on strategic objectives and a corresponding failure to synchronize and integrate military and non-military power.

Element #1: Understanding Strategic Guidance

The first element of operational design, strategic guidance, is typically promulgated via a Warning Order or Operations Order to the CJTF and his staff.^{xxi} Understanding strategic guidance is the first step in ensuring the primacy of political objectives. Strategic guidance includes the desired end state, which is a definition of what constitutes success in a particular military operation. The CJTF will use the desired end state to derive his own

operational-level objectives that serve as a prerequisite for his staff to begin campaign planning.^{xxii}

Was proper strategic guidance provided to U.S. commanders in Somalia? More specifically, in the third and defining phase of U.S. involvement, Operation CONTINUE HOPE/UNOSOM II, was strategic guidance and desired end state properly communicated to COMUSFORSOM? A review of Commander, U.S. Central Command's (CINCCENT)* Operations Order (OPORD) for Operation CONTINUE HOPE, dated April 21, 1993, reveals ambiguous strategic guidance. CINCCENT's Concept of Operations refers to establishing a secure environment for humanitarian assistance, but does not provide a definition of what that means.^{xxiii} Without a clear understanding of "secure environment," the operational commander, COMUSFORSOM, would have difficulty distilling military tasks required to achieve the desired end state.

Interestingly, many organizations involved in the operation felt that a secure environment had already been established in Somalia, among them the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff.^{xxiv} The UN Force Commander for UNOSOM II's own operations plan (OPLAN) dated May 2, 1993, lists as one of its assumptions that "a relatively secure environment for the delivery of humanitarian relief supplies will continue to exist in the UNITAF AOR."^{xxv}

There were two main obstacles to the promulgation of clear strategic guidance to COMUSFORSOM. The first was the United Nations itself. The UN Force Commander (UNFC) took his guidance from the UN Secretary General and UNSCR 814. Dated March 26, 1993, UNSCR 814 authorized the mandate for UNOSOM II. The direction to the UNFC was to "assume responsibility for the consolidation, expansion and maintenance of a secure

* In 1993 Commander, U.S. Central Command was referred to as "CINCCENT" and is now referred to as CDRCENT.

environment throughout Somalia...^{xxvi} As in CINCCENT's OPOD, there is no clear definition of secure environment in UNSCR 814. The UNFC's own OPLAN also does not provide a definition of secure environment, but instead refers to humanitarian and political objectives contained in UNSCR 814.^{xxvii} These objectives did not easily translate into military tasks, and indeed, given the political situation in Somalia, may have been impossible to achieve.

The second obstacle was a lack of clear, long-term U.S. national interest in the region. U.S. decision-makers were divided over American objectives in Somalia during Operation CONTINUE HOPE/UNOSOM II. The primary difference centered on whether there should be an increased diplomatic effort or more aggressive military action. Unable to reach a consensus, a decision was made at the national level of command to implement a "two-track" approach employing both diplomatic activity and military operations.^{xxviii} This effort was inconsistent, not well-coordinated and complicated by policy differences with UN leadership.^{xxix} An example of this inconsistency is the further decision by U.S. leadership in September 1993 to focus on the diplomatic approach and deemphasize military operations.^{xxx} However, just one month prior additional combat forces, including Task Force Ranger, were deployed to Somalia. These forces were sent in response to pressure from the United Nations to aid in capturing the warlord Mohamed Farrah Aideed of the Habr Gidr clan in Mogadishu. U.S. national leadership apparently did not consider that the UN decision to coercively disarm warring factions and attempt to capture Aideed would lead to a de facto state of war between the UN and Aideed's militia.

Lack of strategic guidance had serious consequences on the U.S. mission during Operation CONTINUE HOPE/UNOSOM II. Without an end state clearly articulated by the

UN or U.S. national leadership, commanders in Somalia had no guidance with which to create a campaign plan that would accomplish strategic objectives. With no clear way ahead, U.S. forces inevitably became vulnerable to “mission creep.”^{xxxii} Over time, the UN began to increasingly rely on U.S. combat forces to enforce UNOSOM II’s mandate of coercive disarmament. Concurrent with U.S. government attempts to lower the military profile in Somalia, the potential to engage in combat dramatically increased. U.S. national leadership had decided on a diplomatic approach, but orders or guidance to commanders in Somalia were not changed.^{xxxiii} The chain of events was set in place which led to the ill-fated TF Ranger raid of October 3-4, 1993. The United States and other western nations supporting UNOSOM II would decide to pull-out in the aftermath of the raid.

What can the CJTF and his staff do to mitigate the circumstance of unclear or ambiguous strategic guidance? The key is recognition and a proactive challenge to the CJTF’s chain of command. If the operation is to take place in a region in which the United States does not have a clear, long-term national interest, ambiguous or incomplete strategic guidance may be expected. As experience in Somalia further shows, decision makers at the national level may or may not understand the potential for combat in a PEO (or other MOOTW situations), and therefore may not grasp the necessity of providing clear strategic guidance. Or, policy makers may be divided on what that guidance should be. According to Joint Publication 5-00.1, *Joint Doctrine for Campaign Planning*, “when objectives are unclear or ambiguous, the combatant commander or subordinate JFC must seek clarification and convey the impact, positive or negative, of continued ambiguity to the NCA.”^{xxxiii} If clear strategic objectives still are not forthcoming, the CJTF should request the combatant

commander to define the desired end state, and then get it formally approved by the national leadership.^{xxxiv}

American experience in Somalia provides another lesson in strategic guidance for the CJTF and his staff conducting a PEO: strategic guidance (if it exists) must be reexamined when the tactical situation changes. Given the fluid and dynamic nature of a PEO, a change in the tactical situation is probably inevitable, as it was in Mogadishu during Operation CONTINUE HOPE/UNOSOM II. UNSCR 837, passed with the full support of the United States government on June 6, 1993 after the massacre of twenty-four Pakistani soldiers, opened the way for direct combat operations against Aideed's militia forces. The initial broad guidance to COMUSFORSOM, do what is necessary to ensure the UN is successful, yet limit the visibility and role of U.S. forces, was no longer viable. Unfortunately, no change in guidance to COMUSFORSOM was forthcoming. The CJTF and his staff must recognize when a change in the tactical situation has rendered past strategic guidance irrelevant. If the mission can no longer be accomplished, the CJTF must seek a clarification from higher authority.

Element #2: Identifying Critical Factors

Identification of critical factors will help remove some of the complexity, ambiguity and uncertainty inherent in peace enforcement operations. After careful consideration of strategic guidance and desired end state in order to determine operational objectives, the CJTF and his staff can then turn to the question of how those objectives will be achieved. Identification of enemy critical factors will enable operational planners to best understand an enemy's strengths, weaknesses and vulnerabilities. Then, the enemy's strategic and operational centers of gravity (COGs) can be identified. As the source of the enemy's power,

COGs must be neutralized or destroyed in order to achieve friendly objectives. At the operational level, detailed planning to achieve campaign objectives cannot begin without first identifying enemy COGs.^{xxxv}

Because of the aggressive nature of peace enforcement operations, in which a political settlement can be imposed upon warring parties against their will, the potential for friendly forces to engage in combat exists.^{xxxvi} Therefore, identification of the critical factors and centers of gravity of the main belligerents must be accomplished by operational planners. The combat capability of belligerent groups standing in the way of a political settlement can be neutralized, if required. Conversely, the CJTF and his staff must also identify friendly strategic and operational COGs, in order to strengthen and protect them against attacks. Failure to do so will jeopardize the success of the PEO and put friendly forces at risk.^{xxxvii}

On arrival in theater, the UNOSOM II military staff did not conduct an analysis of critical factors in order to identify the COGs of the various militia groups operating in Mogadishu.^{xxxviii} Given the high probability of combat, a COG analysis should have been done. Probably more important, an analysis of friendly strategic and operational COGs should also have been accomplished. An analysis of friendly COGs would have shown that the strategic COG of UNOSOM II was likely the coalition of force contributing nations.^{xxxix} The coalition began to fall apart with the announcement of the withdrawal of U.S. forces by President Clinton in the aftermath of the raid by TF Ranger.

Although there are several reasons a COG analysis was not conducted by the military staff of UNOSOM II, it cannot be considered an omission only on the part of the United Nations. The UNOSOM II staff was heavily populated with American personnel and the greater part of the combat-capable force in Somalia was under American operational and

tactical control.^{xi} Additionally, COG analysis was accepted U.S. military doctrine. The reason why critical factors and centers of gravity were not identified is that operational-level planners in Mogadishu simply did not foresee the nature of the threat posed by Aideed's militia. The possibility of heavy combat was not seriously considered. Assumptions in the UNOSOM II Oplan state that "the primary threat to security will be isolated lawlessness, armed looters, and small scale interfactional fighting. Areas that were declared 'secure' under UNITAF will remain so."^{xii} Therefore, the focus was on continuing to provide security for humanitarian efforts threatened by local bandits. In a short time however, the operation would transition from one of humanitarian assistance to a peace enforcement operation in a clearly deteriorating situation.^{xiii} With the increasing likelihood of combat operations, a COG analysis should have been done.

Another possible friendly strategic COG in a PEO is legitimacy.^{xliii} If a peace enforcement operation loses legitimacy, the operation will collapse due to the loss of international and domestic support. In Somalia, UNOSOM II assumed a much broader mandate than either UNOSOM I or UNITAF when the original humanitarian assistance operation expanded into peace enforcement and nation building. By supporting UNSCR 814 which established UNOSOM II, the U.S. government gave its approval to this expanding mission. However, when the force sustained unanticipated casualties and the bodies of American soldiers were dragged through the streets of Mogadishu, the operation lost legitimacy in the eyes of the American public.^{xliv}

The lesson for the CJTF and his staff embarking on their own PEO is to identify critical factors and COGs of all warring parties prior to arriving in theater, even if the chance of combat is considered remote. Then, if combat operations are required to enforce the PEO

mandate, the CJTF will be ready for that contingency. Friendly strategic and operational COGs must be considered, along with those of the enemy. The failure of the UNOSOM II staff to do so left friendly COGs “vulnerable to attack and exploitation by hostile militia forces.”^{xlv} The difficulty in a peace enforcement operation is that friendly strategic COGs are likely to be intangibles that may not be readily apparent to military members of an operational staff more familiar with planning for major wars. The national will, legitimacy, or, as in the case of Somalia, the coalition itself must be high on the list of potential friendly COGs.

Element #3: Operational Concept Development

The third element of operational design is operational concept development. There is no set format for the operational concept, it depends entirely on the nature of the campaign being planned.^{xlvi} The overall goal of operational concept development is to expand the first two elements of operational design, strategic guidance and critical factors, into a successful campaign plan. *Joint Doctrine for Campaign Planning* lists the minimum items that an operational concept should address: defeat mechanism, application of forces and capabilities, sequencing and synchronization.^{xlvii} The American experience in Somalia indicates that the interagency and multinational environment of peace enforcement operations require the CJTF and his planners to place special emphasis on synchronization.

Synchronization is defined in joint doctrine as “the arrangement of military actions in time, space and purpose to produce maximum relative combat power at a decisive place and time.”^{xlviii} U.S. forces failed to achieve synchronization during the raid of TF Ranger on Oct 3-4, 1993. This raid became the decisive point of the entire UNOSOM II operation. There are several prerequisites for successful synchronization. Among the most important are:

clear and attainable military objectives, sound command and control structure, proper command relationships, comprehensive intelligence and overwhelming combat power.^{xlix} These prerequisites were all lacking in some degree from the planning and execution of the TF Ranger raid, but probably the most important was the lack of a sound command and control structure.

U.S. forces operating in support of UNOSOM II labored under a convoluted and confusing command and control structure. This was due to the reluctance of U.S. political leadership to place American forces under the operational control (OPCON) of a foreign commander. COMUSFORSOM was actually subordinate to the UN Force Commander as his deputy. Consequently, he was given limited OPCON of U.S. combat forces, and could employ the 10th Mountain Division Quick Reaction Force (QRF) only under very specific circumstances.¹ The majority of the time the QRF remained under the operational control of Commander, U.S. Central Command, General Hoar. CINCCENT was located in Tampa, FL throughout the operation.

Task Force (TF) Ranger, brought into theater four months after UNOSOM II commenced operations, was not in COMUSFORSOM's chain of command. The unit was commanded by U.S. Army Major General William Garrison, under the operational control of CINCCENT. Because of the need for operational secrecy, TF Ranger missions were planned without integrating the QRF.ⁱⁱ COMUSFORSOM, who had the responsibility of ensuring U.S. national objectives were met in Somalia, had no veto power over TF Ranger missions and had limited time to plan support missions once TF Ranger was committed to an operation. This lack of unity of command limited synchronization between U.S. forces. During the raid of October 3-4, 1993, when TF Ranger required the assistance of the QRF

and other coalition armor units for extraction from a deteriorating situation, precious time was spent readying those forces and planning the extraction operation.^{lii} In the meantime, TF Ranger continued to be engaged by militia forces and suffered additional casualties.

Poor command and control is not a new lesson learned. But, it is a key factor in developing an operational concept that maximizes synchronization. If a peace enforcement operation is conducted under the auspices of the UN or some other multinational framework, the CJTF and his staff will face command and control difficulties. Unless the U.S. is the lead nation, multinational command and control will likely be a “parallel” command arrangement in which a staff is “comprised of members from all contributing nations and assembled on an ad hoc basis.”^{liii} This generally yields a lesser unity of command, with national contingents exhibiting varying degrees of willingness and cooperation.

How can the CJTF and his staff mitigate this situation? Aside from pressing hard for the operation to be U.S.-led, in a multinational framework, the CJTF may have to accept a lack of unity of command. This will be particularly true if U.S. forces are brought into his area of responsibility (AOR) but not placed under his operational control. The next step for the CJTF is to at least ensure unity of effort exists between forces in his AOR. Joint Publication 0-2, *Unified Action Armed Forces*, lists three principles of multinational unity of effort: common understanding, coordinated policy and trust and confidence.^{liv} Members of the multinational force must share a common understanding of the overall aim of the operation and the concept for its attainment. It is important to keep the planning and organization simple. Exchanging qualified liaison officers will improve interoperability and ensure a coordinated policy. Trust and confidence must be established early and maintained with regular communication. Acknowledging political and cultural sensitivities in a

multinational environment, an emphasis on respect, professionalism and courtesy is also required. The CJTF must also insist on full transparency of combat plans among the different commands and institute procedures to protect the security of those plans.

Conclusion

This paper is not meant to be a criticism of U.S. operational-level planning in Somalia. Instead, the intent is to use the American experience in Somalia as a case study to demonstrate the importance of operational design. When planning and conducting a peace enforcement operation, the Commander, Joint Task Force (CJTF) and his staff must use operational design in order to create a campaign plan that achieves strategic objectives.

First, remembering the primacy of political objectives, the CJTF and his staff must clearly understand the strategic guidance and desired end state of the operation. Only then can military tasks be distilled that will achieve strategic objectives. In Somalia, clear strategic guidance was not forthcoming. This made it difficult for COMUSFORSOM to create a cohesive campaign plan and made U.S. forces vulnerable to “mission creep” with disastrous consequences. The CJTF must recognize this fact and proactively challenge his chain of command to provide strategic guidance. He should also be alert to changes in the tactical situation and reevaluate his strategic guidance as required.

Second, the CJTF and his staff must be aware of the importance of identifying critical factors, even when the potential for combat is thought to be minimal. This will remove some of the complexity, ambiguity and uncertainty inherent in a peace enforcement operation. In Somalia an identification of critical factors to include an analysis of friendly and enemy centers of gravity was not accomplished, mainly because the possibility of heavy combat was not considered likely. The lesson for the CJTF and his staff is that a friendly and enemy

COG analysis should always be undertaken, prior to arriving in theater if possible. This is just as important to a peace enforcement operation/MOOTW situation as it is to the planning for a major war.

Finally, peace enforcement operations are likely to occur in the context of an interagency or multinational framework. The CJTF and his staff must develop an operational concept that places special emphasis on synchronization of the various military commands, interagencies and NGOs present in the AOR. Synchronization can be achieved with sound command and control. However, recognizing that unity of command in a multinational framework such as Somalia may be impossible, the CJTF should focus special attention on achieving unity of effort.

U.S. involvement in Somalia serves as a useful example of the unique challenges an operational staff may face when applying operational design to the planning and execution of a peace enforcement operation. The case of Somalia shows that the absence of the three key elements of operational design--strategic guidance, critical factors and operational concept development--prevented planners from creating a cohesive campaign plan in the third and defining phase of the operation. The Somali experience began with hope but ended in frustration and defeat. Although adherence to the key elements of operational design may not have achieved the ambitious goal of nation building, the outcome most certainly would have been less damaging to American prestige and less destructive to the Somali people.

Notes

ⁱ Jeremy Zakis, "Usamah Bin Mohammad Bin Laden," *ERRI Terrorist Group Profile Special Report*. 30 June 1998. <<http://www.emergency.com/bldn0798.htm>> [9 May 2004].

The exact quote from Osama Bin Laden is: "The youth [Muslim mujahedin in Somalia] were surprised at the low morale of the American soldier and realized more than before that the American soldiers are paper tigers. After a few blows, they ran in defeat."

ⁱⁱ John T. Fishel, ed., *"The Savage Wars of Peace" Toward a New Paradigm of Peace Operations* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1998), 155-156.

ⁱⁱⁱ Department of State, Bureau of Consular Affairs, "Travel Warning for Somalia" (Washington, DC: 31 October, 2003).

^{iv} Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Doctrine for Campaign Planning*, Joint Pub 5-00.1 (Washington, DC: 25 January 2002), II-1.

^v *Ibid.*, I-6.

^{vi} *Ibid.*, II-1.

^{vii} United States Army Center of Military History, *United States Forces Somalia After Action Report and Historical Overview: The United States Army in Somalia, 1992-1994* (Washington, DC: 2003), 5.

^{viii} United Nations, Security Council, *Resolution 794*, 3 December 1992.

^{ix} Lester Brune, *The United States and Post-Cold War Interventions* (Claremont, CA: Regina, 1998), 22.

^x *United States Forces Somalia After Action Report and Historical Overview: The United States Army in Somalia, 1992-1994*, 72.

^{xi} Kenneth Allard, *Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned* (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1995), 18.

^{xii} Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Doctrine for Joint Operations*, Joint Pub 3-0 (Washington, DC: 10 September 2001), V-12.

^{xiii} Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Peace Operations*, Joint Pub 3-07.3 (Washington, DC: 12 February 1999), III-2.

^{xiv} *Ibid.*, III-3.

^{xv} *Ibid.*, I-12.

^{xvi} *Ibid.*

^{xvii} *Ibid.*

^{xviii} Fishel, 156-157.

^{xix} *Doctrine for Joint Operations*, III-4.

^{xx} *Joint Doctrine for Campaign Planning*, II-1.

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- xxii Ibid., II-3.
- xxiii USCINCCENT message 211701Z Apr 93, OPOD Serial 001, Operation RESTORE HOPE II, Concept of Operations.
- xxiv CJCS message 151315Z Apr 93, PLANORD for UNOSOM II, paragraph 1.
- xxv UNOSOM II OPLAN I 021200C May 93, 3.
- xxvi United Nations, Security Council, *Resolution 814*, 26 March 1993.
- xxvii UNOSOM II OPLAN I, 6.
- xxviii U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, *Review of the Circumstances Surrounding the Ranger Raid October 3-4, 1993 in Mogadishu, Somalia* (Washington, DC: 1995), 43.
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- xxx Ibid., 34.
- xxxi USCINCCENT message 061735 Sep 93, "Mission Creep in Somalia, Assessment of U.S. Force Commitments."
- xxxii Roger N. Sangvic, "Battle of Mogadishu: Anatomy of a Failure," (Unpublished Research Paper, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS: 1998), 24.
- xxxiii *Joint Doctrine for Campaign Planning*, II-3
- xxxiv Ibid.
- xxxv Ibid., II-8
- xxxvi *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Peace Operations*, III-3.
- xxxvii Thomas J. Daze, "Centers of Gravity of United Nations Operation, Somalia II," (Unpublished Research Paper, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS: 1995), iii.
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- xxxix Ibid., 162
- xl Ibid., 72.
- xli UNOSOM II OPLAN I, 3.
- xlii Brune, 31-32 and USCINCCENT P4 message, Sep 93 to CJCS and Ambassador Wisner, USDP.
- xliii Rick Brennan and R. Evan Ellis, "Information Warfare in Multilateral Peace Operations, A Case Study of Somalia," (Washington, DC: SAIC, 1996), ii.
- xliv Fishel, 161.

^{xlv} Daze, iii.

^{xlvi} *Joint Doctrine for Campaign Planning*, II-12.

^{xlvii} *Ibid.*

^{xlviii} *Ibid.*, II-20

^{lix} Milan N. Vego, *Operational Warfare*, (Newport, RI: Naval War College, 2000), 552.

¹ *United States Forces Somalia After Action Report and Historical Overview: The United States Army in Somalia, 1992-1994*, 121.

ⁱⁱ Richard M. Cabrey, “Operational Art in Operations Other Than War,” (Unpublished Research Paper, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS: 1998), 27.

^{lii} *Review of the Circumstances Surrounding the Ranger Raid October 3-4, 1993 in Mogadishu, Somalia*, 39.

^{liii} *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Peace Operations*, III-7.

^{liv} Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)*, Joint Pub 0-2 (Washington, DC: 10 July, 2001), IV-1.

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