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JPME for Reserve Component Officers

By

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The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

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Abstract

The current Reserve Component officer management and education programs have failed to provide the Combatant Commanders with the RC officers they need. These programs will continue to fail unless the Department of Defense (DOD) addresses specific issues. This paper provides a broad overview of the existing Joint Professional Military Education (JPME), outlines the Combatant Commanders requirement for RC joint officers and reviews the efforts that have been made to establish a RC joint developmental program. Additionally, this paper considers how these efforts have come up short to date and related issues that could compound the problem. Finally, it presents recommendations, along with associated counter arguments, necessary to provide the Combatant Commanders with the trained RC officers they need.
Introduction

Skilled officers, like all other professional men, are products of continuous and laborious study, training, and experience. There is no shortcut to the peculiar type of knowledge and ability they must possess. Trained officers constitute the most vitally essential element in modern war, and the only one that under no circumstances can be improvised or extemporized.

- Douglas MacArthur, May 1932

The requirement for educated officers is as valid today as it was in 1932. Certainly there can be no more important place for joint educated officers than in the Combatant Commands that are responsible for the application of military power in their assigned regions. More specifically, the Combatant Commanders' need for trained joint officers was so great that in 1986 Congress passed a law requiring, among other things, that a program of training, tracking and promotion of joint officers be established for Active Component (AC) officers. This joint program, as defined by Congress for AC officers, does exist today. However, this law does not apply to Reserve Component (RC) officers even though all Combatant Commanders have RC officers on their staffs. A study done by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs notes, "While RC personnel in joint billets do receive some on-the-job training in joint assignments once they arrive, these experiences rarely provide a solid or standardized foundation in the fundamentals of joint operations." Efforts to develop a joint program for RC officers have been made, but as yet no program has been established.

The current RC officer management and education programs have failed to provide the Combatant Commanders with the RC officers they need. These programs will continue to fail unless the Department of Defense (DOD) addresses specific issues that will be pointed out in this paper. This paper will provide a broad overview of the existing Joint Professional Military Education (JPME), outline the Combatant Commanders requirement for RC joint officers and review the efforts that have been made to establish a RC joint developmental program. Additionally, this paper will consider how these efforts to date have come up short as well as related issues that could compound the problem. Finally, it will present recommendations, along with associated counter arguments, necessary to provide the Combatant Commanders with the trained RC officers they need.

**Existing JPME**

The Goldwater-Nichols Act (1986) mandated the joint officer system consisting of JPME for AC officers serving in specific joint billets and the joint specialty officer (JSO) program. To understand the educational needs and requirements for a RC program, one must have some knowledge of the existing AC joint system. This knowledge necessary because all RC studies and discussions are based on the AC skill sets for a JSO and the learning objectives established in the AC JPME program.

In order to become a JSO, an AC officer must complete JPME Phase I, JPME Phase II and serve in a joint duty assignment (JDA) for a specific cumulative period (for most officers this is 36 months, but there are exceptions that will not be discussed here). JPME Phase I is taught as part of the intermediate and senior service staff colleges such as the Army and Naval War Colleges. Phase I covers the basic fundamentals needed in
joint operations. JPME Phase II is taught at the Joint Forces Staff College, National War College and the Industrial College of the Armed Forces. Phase II covers advanced concepts in joint planning, operations, procedures, and perspectives. Length of time served in a JDA is tracked in a DOD automated system. Officers completing all three requirements receive a JSO identifier and are tracked as such by the Services. The Goldwater-Nichols Act also requires JSOs to be promoted at the same rate or greater than other officers in the Services and that all officers promoted to O7 have joint experience (there is a waiver procedure and exception process that will not be discussed here). In the future, promotions to O7 will require the officer to be JSO qualified. Officers are therefore, not "punished" for serving in JDAs away from their specific service and are motivated to become JSO qualified in order to be considered for O7. DOD must report to Congress annually on JSO promotions and fill rates. These requirements do not apply to RC officers.5

Goldwater-Nichols6 does direct a parallel effort for RC officers: "The Secretary of Defense shall establish personnel policies emphasizing education and experience in joint matters for reserve officers not on the active-duty list. Such policies shall, to the extent practicable for the reserve component, be similar to the policies for the active component." As efforts were initially focused on the active duty officer, little was done to meet this directive until 1998 when three studies, discussed below, were released that emphasized the need for joint educated RC officers.

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4 O7 refers to either a General Officer or a Flag Officer.
Combatant Commanders Requirement for RC Joint Officers

Two of these three studies clearly articulate the Combatant Commanders' need for joint educated RC officers. Conducted separately, the two studies were directed by the Assistant Secretary of Defense - Reserve Affairs and the Reserve Forces Policy Board. The Assistant Secretary of Defense - Reserve Affairs recognizing a greater demand for RC participation in the joint arena\(^7\) contracted the Logistics Management Institute (LMI) to specifically study the need for a JPME for RC officers. As part of this study released in 1998, LMI identified 4,385 RC positions authorized in all joint organizations within DOD.\(^8\) When the total DOD requirement is broken down, it shows that Combatant Commanders need over half (2,466) of the positions studied. After identifying the positions, LMI surveyed the supervisors of each position to determine the required skill sets of the RC officers. Using the learning objectives established at the respective schools teaching AC JPME Phase I and II, LMI established that approximately fifty percent of the total positions require the skills identified as JPME Phase II learning objectives.\(^9\) These findings mean that Combatant Commanders not only have RC positions within their staffs, the RC officers filling fifty percent of these positions require the skill sets taught at the AC JPME Phase II. The remaining fifty percent of the positions require at least some of the skill sets associated with AC JPME Phase I.

At about the same time that LMI released their report, the Reserve Forces Policy Board conducted a survey of the nine regional Combatant Commands to determine issues associated with AC/RC integration. The second most important issue identified among all

\(^{6}\) Ibid., section 666.
\(^{8}\) Ibid., 2-2, table 2-1.
\(^{9}\) Ibid., A-14, table A-5.
nine Combatant Commanders in the area of AC/RC integration dealt with the need for JPME for RC officers assigned or pending assignment. 10 Eight of the nine Combatant Commanders emphasized this need in writing. The three following excerpts capture the tone of the comments expressed by all eight of the Combatant Commanders that provided written comments on this issue:

JPME among issues that concern the ability of RC special operations forces to support our evolving missions is of paramount importance to this command.

- SOCOM

RC personnel should be afforded the same JPME training as the AC. Develop distant learning version. . .

- PACOM

Increase RC attendance at all phases of JPME, with particular emphasis on JPME Phase II.

- EUCOM 11

**Efforts to Establish a RC Joint Developmental Program**

The third of the three studies was by the Director of the Joint Chief of Staff (DJCS). The J-7 was tasked to review JPME and develop a course of action that might improve the JPME process. 12 The JPME 2010 Study was released that same year and included nine findings to be reviewed during the subsequent course of action development phase. One of these nine findings stated, "The inclusion of the Reserve Component personnel in the JPME process needs to be addressed." 13 A year later, the J-7 released the JPME 2010 Study Course of Action Development Report. This report lead to the DJCS tasking the National Defense University in May of 2000 to, "develop and implement an aggressive schedule and resource plan that, when adequately resourced

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11 Ibid., G-19, fig G-1.


13 Ibid., 3.
would satisfy the spirit and intent of this congressional mandate [referring here to section 666 explained earlier].”

Subsequently, the Joint Forces Staff College (JFSC) developed and beta tested an Advanced JPME (AJPME) based on the recommendations of the LMI study of 1998. AJPME is a thirty-two week blended distance learning and resident course modeled on JPME Phase II. It is designed for RC joint officers and does not provide qualification for JSO. The first delivery of the course began in September 2003 with the first class expected to graduate forty officers.

DOD guidance in 2002 was issued with the purpose to implement policy, assign responsibilities, and prescribe procedures for administering joint officer management for RC officers. These instructions require that joint duty assignments reserve (JDA-R) positions be validated by all DOD agencies using specific criteria. Combatant Command positions are addressed such that any one of these positions involved in the national military strategy, joint training and exercises, strategic planning, contingency planning, managing resources, and command and control of combat operations will be considered JDA-R. That covers practically any RC position in a Combatant Command with the exception of administrative ones. Agencies are further required to include identification of positions that require no JPME, those that require JPME Phase I and those critical billets that require AJPME. Officers assigned to these positions must serve a minimum of two years if in full time support status or three years if not in full time status (with

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16 Ken Pisel, interview with author, telephonic with the Armed Forces Staff College, 29 April 2004.
some exceptions that will not be discussed here). Additionally, the Secretary of the Military Departments are required to fill the JDA-R positions and to document, track and monitor them in a common personnel information data system.

The Instructions further state that RC officers that have completed JPME Phase I, AJPME and served at least the minimum time are considered fully joint qualified. This should not be confused with being designated a JSO under the AC program as defined by the Goldwater-Nichols Act. JSO requirements for active duty officers differ from fully joint qualified.

At this point, some sixteen years after the Goldwater-Nichols directed the Secretary of Defense to establish personnel policies that emphasise education and experience in joint matters for reserve officers, the AJPME has been established and DOD Instruction issued implementing policy for the RC.

**How These Efforts Have Come Up Short to Date**

Though DOD guidance did successfully establish procedures for identification of JDA-R positions and integrate the AJPME as developed by the National Defense University (NDU) into a RC joint qualification program, it came up short in several areas. Additionally, even though the AJPME appears to be an excellent solution to provide RC with joint training as required by the Combatant Commanders, there are shortcomings associated with this program as well.

The Goldwater-Nichols Act was very careful to lay out a program for those serving in a joint duty assignment so that they get equal treatment within the Services for promotion. This is not so for the RC officers. Nothing in the DOD Instructions requires

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the Services either to assure promotion rates are equitable for RC officers that have served in a joint assignment or even require the Services to provide an annual report on their promotion rates. This shortcoming could prevent some officers from pursuing joint qualification under the fear of not staying competitive with their fellow officers.

As mentioned earlier, the Goldwater-Nichols Act does not allow an AC officer to be selected for promotion to the grade of brigadier general or rear admiral (lower half) unless the officer has served in a joint duty assignment (there are exceptions that will not be discussed), and in later years JSO qualification. This not only assures that the Services' senior officers will have a joint perspective, but also motivates high quality officers to seek joint duty. There is no such requirement for the selection of RC officers to general or flag officer. RC senior officers will continue to lack a joint perspective. Just as in the AC, the requirement to think "joint" exists in the RC. As an example, the Army's effort to transform current brigades to Units of Action (UA) includes the Army National Guard. In a briefing on Building Army Capabilities to the House Armed Services Committee, the Army Operations Officer (G3), stated the Army's intent is to, "Create modular brigade based Army that is more responsive to Regional Combatant Commanders' needs, better employs joint capabilities. . . . " As the RC general officers in peacetime will be expected to train, man, and equip the transformed Army National Guard UAs to meet the needs of the Combatant Commanders, it is imperative they understand the joint environment.

Top quality AC officers pursuing general or flag officer have an incentive to actively pursue a joint duty assignment. This is especially critical in the RC where most

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assignments are sought out and volunteered for by the individual officer normally within an acceptable commuting distance from their home or place of civilian employment rather than being assigned to a position as is done on active duty. There is no incentive for a RC officer to seek out joint duty assignments. Neither is there incentive for RC officers to complete the thirty-two week AJPME, the majority of which must be completed on their own time via distance learning.

An automated system to track the joint qualification and tours of AC officers is used to monitor the JSOs. The DOD Instruction requires something similar for RC officers by tasking the Secretary of the Military Departments to, "ensure that information sufficient to document, monitor, and track those officers shall reside in common personnel information data systems." The Instruction fails to give a suspense date to the Military Departments for this critical event. If the sixteen year period it took DOD to issue Instruction 1215.20, from the time the Goldwater-Nichols Act mandated policies to the "extent practicable for the reserve component be similar to the policies for the active component," is used as a yard stick, it may be some time before the Departments establish their personnel-tracking systems. Without a personnel-tracking system for RC joint qualifications, there is no way to manage RC officers' schools and tours without going into the record of each individual officer. This means, unlike the AC joint program, there is no way to assess the progress of the RC Joint Officer Management Program as a whole.

20 Headquarters, Department of the Army, Building Army Capabilities Briefing (DCS-G3: 25 February 2004), slide 7.
One final shortcoming associated with the DOD Instruction concerns the area of JDA-R validation. The Instruction requires, again with no suspense date, the Military Departments to validate their JDA-R requirements into three categories: those that require no JPME; those that require JPME Phase I; and those critical billets that require Advanced JPME. No method or standard for this validation was provided, leaving the service departments to develop their own. This could lead to different standards for officers serving side by side in similar billets in the same command assuming the departments move to validate without a DOD suspense date.

As stated earlier, the DOD Instruction did incorporate the AJPME as developed by the NDU. Though an excellent solution to provide RC with advanced joint training, there are shortcomings associated with AJPME that need to be addressed. These shortcomings fall into three areas: throughput; selection; and incentives.

Once fully implemented, the intent of the JFSC is to graduate five hundred students per year to sustain the approximately 1223 RC joint officers requiring AJPME identified by the LMI study of 1998. Coupled with the DOD Instruction requiring RC officers to stay in a joint assignment for three years, the initial shortfall, and attrition, a throughput of five hundred appears logical. To accomplish this level of AJPME throughput, JFSC has determined a need for fifteen RC personnel for instructors and program administrators. LMI, in their study, estimated it would take twenty part time personnel for an AJPME throughput of only 300 officers per year. Even assuming JFSC has determined their needs correctly at sixteen, at this time the Services have provided

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23 Mike Puckett, interview with author, telephonic with the National Guard Bureau J7-E&PD, 7 April 2004.
24 Ken Pisel, interview with the author, telephonic with the Joint Forces Staff College, 29 April 2004.
only six RC officers to JFSC for AJPME.\textsuperscript{26} There is no way for JFSC to meet the required throughput of five hundred per year while staffed at less than forty percent.

Other than established prerequisites maintained by JFSC there is no formalized selection process for attendance at AJPME. Neither Combatant Commanders nor any other activity have a way to insert their critical training needs into the system.\textsuperscript{27} In a system that currently depends on volunteers for schools and assignments, an incentive program is important. Unlike attendance at many military schools, there is no college credit or award of a skill identifier associated with attending AJPME. Additionally, Phase I completion is a prerequisite to AJPME. Historically, Navy and Coast Guard Reserve personnel have limited opportunity to attend AJPME. As pointed out in the LMI study, these services’ culture do not encourage or consider school attendance for their RC a necessity.\textsuperscript{28}

\textbf{Related Issues That Could Compound the Problem}

The LMI study released in 1998 was based on Joint organizations' manpower authorization documents as of mid 1996.\textsuperscript{29} The estimated 1,223 RC officer positions requiring AJPME used as a basis by JFSC in developing AJPME is nine years old and has become suspect with the increased dependency of the military on the RC in recent years. A more recent unofficial study by the office of the Assistant to the CJCS for Guard and Reserve Matters estimated the requirement to be over 1600.\textsuperscript{30} The Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) Joint Reserve Unit estimates that approximately 100 RC officer

\textsuperscript{26} Mike Puckett, \textit{RC JPME Information Paper} (National Defense University: 8 January 2004).
\textsuperscript{27} Bob Olson, interview by author, telephonic with the Joint Forces Command Joint Reserve Unit, 22 April 2002.
\textsuperscript{28} Dayton S. Pickett, David A. Smith and Elizabeth B. Dial, \textit{Joint Professional Military Education for Reserve Component Officers}, 1-2.
\textsuperscript{29} Ibid., 3-4.
\textsuperscript{30} Mike Puckett, \textit{RC JPME Information Paper} (National Defense University: 8 January 2004), 1.
Positions have been added to JFCOM alone since the LMI studies.\textsuperscript{31} Even more potential JDA-R positions may arise as the Reserve Component Employment Study 2005 calls for an increase in RC participation in a Joint Task Force Headquarters for Homeland Defense.\textsuperscript{32}

Additionally, the National Guard Bureau (NGB) is in the process of transforming its 54 state and territorial headquarters into joint force headquarters. As part of this transformation process, the NGB J1 is identifying positions within the NGB and the 54 state and territorial headquarters that need to be JDA-R. The NGB J-1 expects between ten and twelve positions to be coded JDA-R at each of the state and territorial joint force headquarters.\textsuperscript{33} No estimate is yet available on JDA-R positions at the NGB Headquarters itself. Assuming each joint force headquarters and the NGB Headquarters require even the estimated minimum number (ten) of JDA-R positions, a total increase of 550 positions can be forecasted. If one third (staying with the LMI study findings) of the total positions will require advanced joint skills, a minimum total increase of AJPME requirements of 183 can be estimated.

Taking the Guard and Reserve Matters current estimate of 1600 and the low side NGB transformation requirement together, the JFSC is facing somewhere between a 15\% to 46\% increase in RC officers requiring AJPME. This fact, coupled with the lack of AJPME personnel means there is no way that the JFSC can sustain the annual workload to provide AJPME graduates. It even seems doubtful given JFSC's current AJPME staffing of 40\% that they will be able to even clear the existing back load of requirements so that the sustainment process can begin.

\textsuperscript{31} Myron Mason, interview by author, telephonic with the National Guard Bureau J1-MM, 22 April 2004.
Recommendations

To resolve the shortcomings that have been presented, nine basic recommendations along with an associated counterargument to each follow:

In order to assure RC officers that they will remain competitive as was done for the AC officers, DOD needs to direct that selections to promotion for those that have served in joint assignments are at least equal to officers that have not served in joint assignments. In tune with the belief that nothing gets done except that which is checked, the services should also be required to provide an annual report to DOD on the selection process. Either amending DOD Instruction 1215.2 or issuing a new instruction could do both of these initiatives. In order to accomplish this, a tracking system for joint RC officers will be required (further addressed later). It must be pointed out that current promotion rates for AC joint officers are already equal to those that do not serve in joint assignments and there is no reason to believe it will not be the same for RC officers.\textsuperscript{34} However, as the promotion systems for AC and RC officers are separate, it is possible that a comparison between the two is not valid.

To assure that top quality officers actively seek joint assignment and provide joint knowledgeable senior leadership in the RC, it is recommended that the qualification requirement for selection to general or flag officer in the RC to be similar to that in the AC. This initiative would not only have to be phased in over a course of years but also be implemented in somewhat of a different manner given the nature of the RC. Perhaps an incentive joint assignment system later augmented by mandatory joint duty after selection to 07 but prior to selection of 08 or 09 for those that did not have the

\textsuperscript{33} Myron Mason, interview by author, telephonic with the National Guard Bureau J1-MM, 22 April 2004.
opportunity for joint assignment prior to 07 selection. If such a policy has been considered and rejected by DOD prior to the Services' increased dependency on RC personnel then it may be time for a reexamination.

To get AC officers into joint assignments, a system of mandatory placements and incentives needs to be implemented. Mandatorily assign RC officers to joint positions within sixty miles of the RC officer's home of record. The 60-mile radius is not an arbitrary number - the RC currently uses it as the accepted commuting distance before Temporary Duty (TDY) funds are provided while an RC member is on active duty. It would also be possible to extend the sixty-mile radius of mandatory assignments by actually paying the RC officer's travel and expenses while in a drill status. There is no added expense to the first initiative and, to date, though they may, most of the Services have chosen not to provide travel and lodging expenses to RC members in a drilling status because of the associated costs.

In order to manage joint assignments, schools and qualifications, a RC automated tracking system needs to be established quickly as the first officers will graduate from JPME in May of 2004.35 DOD Instructions need to be amended giving the Military Departments a firm suspense date. A working model in the form of the AC JSO program already exists. Modify that system into a web based program that will allow direct RC unit input. This is not setting a new precedent as most RC unit administrators already provide direct input into centralized human resource systems. It is possible that DOD intentionally left this action item open ended because of the complexity or cost associated with establishing such a tracking system. If that is the case, then DOD needs to provide

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34 Donald H. Rumsfeld, *Annual Report to the President and the Congress* (Washington, DC: 2003), tables B-13A-D.
a suspense that is several years out to allow funds programming. Leaving this action with no suspense date is a good way to assure it will not happen.

DOD needs to suspense and standardize across the Military Departments the validation method to determine which JDA-R positions require no JPME; those that require JPME Phase I; and those critical billets that require Advanced JPME. This assures that RC officers’ joint qualifications are standard within and across the Military departments. The simplest way to do this would be to copy the methodology used by LMI in their 1998 study, which used the learning objectives already established and approved at the service schools. A counter to this recommendation is that DOD wanted to allow the various agencies the flexibility to establish their own standards and did not wish to suspense the Departments in light of resource constraints. Allowing the Departments to establish their own standards could; however, lead to expectations of RC officers that will not be met.

To solve the existing JFSC AJPME personnel shortages, the Services must be required to provide the necessary schoolhouse personnel. Assignments to these positions need to be made a must fill by DOD. Without these personnel, there is no way possible for JFSC to provide the AJPME throughput necessary to provide RC joint trained personnel. The only counterargument to this is that the Services have decided that the throughput of five hundred is not required. If a Service does not provide their personnel, don’t educate their people.

There is a huge potential backlog of RC officers currently assigned to JDA-R positions. The selection process must be formalized and the joint agencies, such as the Combatant Commands, be given prioritization input into the nomination and selection

35 Ken Pisel, interview with author, telephonic with the Joint Forces Staff College, 29 April 2004.
process. If the JFSC personnel shortages are not resolved, this becomes even more critical as the AJPME throughput is going to be limited for several years. Collecting and attempting to prioritize the requirements of all the joint agencies is a tough, complex job but one that must be done in order to mitigate the backlog.

The throughput requirements for AJPME must be reexamined so that JFSC can adjust accordingly. However, without the Departments validating their requirements, this is almost an impossible task. Referring back to what was stated earlier, no suspense date has been issued for this validation. A suspense date needs to be established and another study contracted, smaller in scope to the LMI study, to identify and validate JDA-R positions could be executed. If funding negates this recommendation this year, then DOD must budget for the process in the out years.

Finally, the Department of the Navy must reexamine how it will produce RC officers, JPME Phase I qualified. Without Phase I qualification, Navy RC officers will not meet the requirements to attend AJPME and the Navy will not be able to fill its JDA-R positions needed by the Combatant Commanders.

**Conclusion**

The current RC officer management and training programs have failed to provide the Combatant Commanders with the RC joint educated officers they need. These programs will continue to fail and the problems potentially get even worse with the heightened dependency on the Reserves. DOD must take specific actions to resolve the situation. Nine recommendations for DOD have been provided. These recommendations include assuring competitiveness for RC joint officers; providing incentives to become joint qualified, mandatory joint assignments; establishing a RC personnel system to track
joint qualifications; and standardizing JDA-R validations. Last, DOD must provide JFSC the teaching staff they need; establish a prioritization for training; reexamine the AJPME throughput requirements and direct the Navy to examine its Phase I qualification for its RC officers. If these recommendations are implemented, the Combatant Commanders have a good chance to get the RC joint qualified officers they need.
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