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WAR TERMINATION, JOINT PLANNING AND THE INTERAGENCY PROCESS

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The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

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Abstract

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Introduction

A central tenet of war is that, as an extension of politics, the absolute goal should be a lasting peace based on a pre-determined political (not just military) end state. The events of the last 15 years have placed into question the ability of the U.S. government to achieve this objective. Operation JUST CAUSE in 1989 demonstrated that while the United States had managed to overcome many post-Vietnam military deficiencies, it remained incapable of effecting a smooth political transition once the military objective had been met. The inability to translate military success into a desired political end state would further be highlighted by Operations DESERT STORM and IRAQI FREEDOM.

A key element in each of these war termination failures has been the inability of cabinet level agencies to coordinate on war termination issues. Despite the efforts initiated by Presidential Decision Directive 56 and guidance provided in various joint publications, little has actually been accomplished in establishing an effective interagency mechanism to assess, draft, and coordinate a coherent war termination strategy. The establishment of a permanent, joint, interagency planning group is required lest we continue to fail at achieving political goals despite achieving military successes. The combatant commander must play a major role in establishing the military conditions under which a successful transition strategy may be implemented, but he cannot own the process. Unity of effort will only be achieved through unity of command; as such the process must be controlled directly by elements at the highest levels of government.
Terminology

The term “war termination” is quite often used to indicate nothing more than that period in time during which hostilities cease. Much of the war termination literature focuses on the military aspects of culminating points of victory and defeat of the enemy, the assumption being that once military success has been achieved, political success will inevitably follow. Still others limit the discussion to the specifics of armistice or truce negotiations. Neither approach adequately addresses the fact that war termination as a process involves not only the issue of when to terminate hostilities, or what to negotiate at the bargaining table, but also the “how” of implementing a post-hostilities transition plan that will leverage military successes and achieve desired political goals.

Thus for the purpose of this discussion war termination is defined as the process by which military efforts are leveraged towards a desired political end state, usually a stable and lasting peace. It involves all elements of national power: military, economic, political and informational. Any failure to incorporate all four of these aspects in a planned, coordinated manner will most likely result in a less than optimal war termination process as demonstrated by some failures of the past.

Failings of the Past

The need for a more effective war termination strategy was initially highlighted in the aftermath of Operation JUST CAUSE. Prior to JUST CAUSE, military operations had focused, rightfully so, on the execution of the war proper, as the outcome was of no certainty. Any lessons learned on the issues of war termination were overshadowed by a focus on more effective war fighting. Even Operation URGENT FURY in Grenada, by all accounts a
military success, served more to highlight the need for increased jointness over any flaw in war termination.

The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 was an attempt by Congress at mandating reforms within the Department of Defense (DOD) in order to achieve greater unity of effort amongst the services. Functional authority was centralized through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) who was also designated as the principal military advisor to the President, National Security Council (NSC) and the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF). The act established the position of vice-chairman and streamlined the operational chain of command from the President, through the SECDEF to the unified commanders.

The effectiveness of Goldwater-Nichols was demonstrated in the 1989 invasion of Panama. The operation was a resounding military success, and yet the strategic objective was not readily obtained. As the Panamanian defense forces ceased to become combat effective, rioting and looting filled the streets while the civilian population required an ever-increasing need for housing, supplies and humanitarian assistance. An interim government was established, yet members of the now defeated Panama Defense Force, all supporters of the deposed dictator, continued to dominate it at all levels.

In a post-war analysis of JUST CAUSE, the operation’s commanding general stated, “During nearly two years of deliberate planning and three months of ‘fine tuning,’ the Joint Staff, USCINCSO, and tactical commanders had carefully crafted and coordinated their efforts. Simplicity characterized both the operation order for JUST CAUSE and its chain of command. If there was a planning weakness, it was the lack of detailed attention to post-combat operations and the civil affairs personnel needed to carry them out.” There was no
plan to assist in the transition to a new, permanent government once the Noriega regime fell, and in the end, “…neither SOUTHCOM nor the XVIII Corps was prepared for the transition, the breakdown of social order, and the temporary escape of [Manuel] Noriega.”

Operation JUST CAUSE was significant in that it signaled a new era in US military might. “Jointness” as a force multiplier had proven its effectiveness. While the military outcome of any military operation should never be assumed, one could safely argue that, with the downfall of the Soviet Union, U.S. conventional military power would remain unmatched in the near future. War termination would now stand out as the major obstacle in achieving that political utopia of both an assured military and political outcome. The lessons of JUST CAUSE, however, would not be learned in time for the next major military operation, DESERT STORM.

Once again, U.S military might had brought the enemy to the table, yet it remains questionable as to whether there had been any true deliberation on war termination prior to the cessation of hostilities. No heads of state or political representatives were present at the cease-fire talks. Two conquering generals met with their vanquished counterparts and discussed a purely military conclusion to what primarily should have been a political process. It is at the armistice talks where either a lasting peace is established or the foundation is laid for the next round of hostilities and it would seem that the latter case rather than the former had prevailed.

“Powell told me that the President would ask for a meeting of generals from both sides within 48 hours to work out the military particulars of the cessation of hostilities… It had never crossed my mind that I would have to sit down opposite Iraqi generals.” Thus was the state of mind of the Central Command (CENTCOM) commander six and a half
hours prior to the actual cease fire negotiations. After receiving no guidance from
Washington, he added, “If need be, I would go to Safwan and wing it… the talks would be
limited to military matters… our side had *won*, so we were in a position to dictate terms.”
A truer statement was never spoken, and yet the larger issues of exactly what terms were to
be dictated had yet to be decided. What’s even more striking in this last statement is the
assumption that a limited military victory would *guarantee* that Iraq would automatically
comply with any terms presented. We knew Iraq had been defeated, but did Iraq itself know
this?

The failure to achieve all the objectives of the Gulf War was, in the end, a political
failure, not a military failure and it is in the political realm that we must seek out a solution.

**Current Doctrine**

With the need for an adequate approach to war termination demonstrated, the
question remains as to what processes currently exist for developing war termination
strategies. In analyzing current planning doctrine, two major shortfalls emerge: the lack of a
war termination doctrine as a separate but essential aspect of military doctrine and the
exclusion of an effective process in the overall development of the military campaign.

On the latter point, the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) is
the process currently employed by combatant commanders in order to successfully fight and
win wars. As a system designed to “cover all aspects of conventional joint military
operations planning and execution”\(^{v}\), one would expect to find in JOPES an extensive and in
deepth discussion of war termination and transition to post hostilities civilian control, yet the
reality could not be further from the truth.
The JOPES manual restricts its discussion to format and the various roles of the NSC, JCS and the combatant commander in the development of operational plans (OPLANs) and contingency plans (CONPLANs). Concept development is limited to personnel estimates, intelligence estimates, logistic estimates, command and control and planning directives; in effect, those items essential only for combat. Appendix V of JOPES, Volume II does provide planning guidance for an OPLAN “Interagency Coordination Annex” (a requirement for all deliberate plans), and it is in this “ANNEX V” that the combatant commander has an opportunity to implement a war termination strategy under the guise of an interagency coordination plan. ANNEX V, however, does not provide an explicit discussion on war termination as an integral part of the OPLAN. One could argue that the intent of JOPES is not to delineate doctrine, but to provide a framework for the promulgation of doctrine. The point here, though, is that the framework, while providing explicit direction for implementing the various components of operational art, leaves only an implicit requirement for the promulgation of war termination as a part of campaign planning.

An analysis of joint doctrine itself provides little more in the way of war termination other than to continuously highlight the requirement for an effective war termination strategy with little guidance on how to actually achieve that end. A survey of the various joint doctrine publications yields statements not unlike the following:

Properly conceived termination criteria are key to ensuring that victories achieved with military forces endure. To facilitate development of effective termination criteria, US forces must be dominant in the final stages of an armed conflict by achieving the leverage sufficient to impose a lasting solution. Transition planning must be initiated during the initial phases of operation planning to ensure adequate attention is placed in this critical area — plan for transition when planning for intervention.
Many questions are left unanswered with this handling of such a critical component of operational art. For example, what are “properly conceived termination criteria”? While the need for a war termination strategy is expressed repeatedly, does the current process actually allow for end-state planning as part of the military campaign? Who is responsible for the transition phase of a military campaign, and are those responsible an integral part of the planning process? Aside from stating the requirement for war termination planning, current joint doctrine is remiss in the details and considerations of effective war termination planning and execution.

The relevance of these doctrinal and planning shortfalls to the combatant commander is obvious in that at some point, military operations will have to give way to some sort of transition phase and the combatant commander will now find himself in the supporting vice supported role. It is at this transitional stage that the effects of inadequate war termination planning will be most apparent, as the combatant commander may find himself unable to transfer control of the situation to diplomatic and political entities, and may find himself bound indefinitely to supporting a military operation other than war (MOOTW) of our own making.

Ownership

The assumption to this point has been that the combatant commander must take total ownership of the problem. As has been demonstrated, neither doctrine nor processes currently in place support this ownership. Most attempts at “fixing” the problem, therefore, have focused on shortcomings at the combatant commander’s level. For example, in a Joint Force Quarterly article entitled “Operational Planning and Conflict Termination”, the author
advocates the creation of an interagency organization to conduct war termination planning in concurrence with a combatant commander’s campaign planning. Such a team would work directly for the COCOM, possibly under the J-5, and would be responsible for providing recommendations on achieving favorable end-state conditions in the diplomatic, informational and economic power dimensions. In October of 2001, a similar concept was implemented by the SECDEF with the establishment of the Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG) at the COCOM level. For Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF), the JIACG was used extensively to leverage the capabilities of various governmental agencies.

The problem with this approach in general and the JIACG in particular is that it is a fix that resides solely at the COCOM level where there is no real authority to implement a transition plan beyond that which involves the use of combat forces. At some point, the line of authority must switch from the COCOM or his Joint Task Force (JTF) commander to some other entity. The JTF commander will at that point no longer be leading the effort. An assertion can be made that any planning process or doctrine will eventually be rendered ineffective if it resides solely at the COCOM level.

If the COCOM (and by extension, DOD) is incapable of taking total ownership of the war termination process, the question remains as to which level of government should be accountable for implementing and executing a viable war termination plan? The answer may not lie in a single executive department or agency but in the interagency process (IAP) itself.

The Interagency Process

The National Security Act of 1947 provides the framework for coordinating the various executive departments and agencies and must be used as the basis for establishing an
interagency process for war termination issues. The National Security Council as established by the National Security Act is chaired by the President and is currently attended by the Vice President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Defense, and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. Optional attendees include the heads of other executive departments and agencies as well as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Director of Central intelligence.

The National Security Council is the President's principal forum for considering national security and foreign policy matters and serves as the President's principal arm for coordinating policy among various government agencies. It is from this body that the decision to go to war is made and therefore, it is from this body that the end state should be defined. The NSC represents all aspects of government power and is in a unique position to advise the president on all issues affecting war termination. The specific aspects of war termination should be high on the priority list of the NSC and should be driven by the NSC itself. With such a large organization, however, comes the problem of coordinating the myriad government agencies towards implementing an effective war termination strategy.

Currently, interagency coordination in the war termination process is largely ad hoc and lacking in any type of formal doctrine or structure. Lessons learned from previous endeavors are easily forgotten as new groups of individuals come together in reaction to the latest crisis. Expertise is varied, as the ad hoc structure does not lend itself to organizations necessarily sending their “best and brightest”. It is for these and many other reasons that the interagency process has been lamented as the weakest link in the chain; as such, the IAP should be the focus of any attempt at constructing a viable mechanism for the deliberation of war termination issues.
While the shortcomings of the IAP have been highlighted for years it was not until Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 56, “Managing Complex Contingency Operations” that an attempt was made to mandate and codify reforms in the interagency coordination process. The impetus for the document itself actually came from DOD. In the words of Richard Clarke, then an NSC Senior Director and chairman of both the Haiti and Somalia executive committees, “They [DOD] thought the failure of the civilian side of the U.S. government to contribute effectively in [the Bosnia Crisis] hurt the military side of the U.S. government because it meant the military had to do more; it had to do things that it would rather not have done – that civilians should have done. It also meant they could not leave.”

This is, in effect, the problem that is conflict termination.

The PDD itself called on the Deputies Committee of the National Security Council to establish interagency working groups (IWGs) for complex contingency operations, which are, by definition, non-combat operations. Despite this fact, the concept could very easily be extended to combat operations and integrated into the joint planning process as a mechanism for an effective war termination strategy.

All of the elements for successful integration are addressed: ownership of the IWG by an element of the NSC (the Deputies Committee), the requirement for a political-military (“pol-mil”) implementation plan, demonstrable milestones and measures of success as well as centralized planning with decentralized execution. Additionally, the PDD directs training be conducted in order to create “a cadre of professionals familiar with [the] integrated planning process”, as well as planned rehearsals and after-action assessments.

As a fix for what ails the interagency process, PDD-56 is not without its shortcomings. It does not include non-government organizations (NGOs) or multinational
organizations as part of its attempt at unifying the interagency effort. Additionally, the pol-
mil portion fails to adequately outline explicit procedures for handling transitions. For
example, the requirement for a “Transit/Exit Strategy” is described as “a strategy that is
linked to the realization of the end state… requiring the integrated efforts of diplomats,
military leaders and relief officials of the USG and the international community.”xii The
document in effect merely restates the problem without providing specific guidance on how
to accomplish any specific task.

As a final point, the initiative itself was not followed up by the administration and
was, in the end, effectively ignored. A pentagon-financed study conducted in 1999
concluded that, “the spirit and the intent of PDD-56 directed training is not being followed.
No one has stepped forward in the leadership role.”xiii Most agencies involved in PDD-56
told the study’s consultants they had no role in actually carrying out the directive. “The
report presents the ironic situation of the NSC, which had the lead in carrying out PDD-56,
not following a directive sent out by the president it advises.”xiv

With the limitations of PDD-56 pointed out, the question remains as to whether any
structure currently exists which is capable of effectively producing and implementing a war
termination strategy. The Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG) previously
mentioned provides a possible alternative. It was organized to “provide interagency advice
and expertise to combatant commanders and their staffs, coordinate interagency counter-
terrorism plans and objectives, and integrate military, interagency, and host nation efforts.”xv
The concept was utilized extensively during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF), which
provides a final case study for lessons learned in war termination planning and the
interagency process.
War Termination and Operation IRAQI FREEDOM

The aftermath of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM demonstrates the issues that still exist despite repeated efforts towards greater unity of effort amongst the agencies representing the various elements of national power. Two previously discussed “tools” were implemented during the planning process, and the results provide us with some valuable insight as to what needs to be done to further increase our effectiveness at war termination.

The primary objective of OIF was not unlike that of operation JUST CAUSE: regime change. A secondary objective was to “help the Iraqi people create conditions for a transition to a representative self-government.” In order to accomplish these and other objectives, Central Command put together a multi-phase operational plan which included a post-hostilities / stability operations phase. An ANNEX V was included in the OPLAN, as per current doctrine, and a JIACG was developed in order to coordinate the interagency effort. The combatant commander had utilized all the tools currently available to him and had complied with joint doctrine on the need for war termination planning and interagency coordination. Despite these efforts, we seem to have yet to win the peace. The question remains as to whether the current situation in Iraq is the result of poor planning, as many have suggested, or merely circumstances beyond our control.

An analysis of the OIF OPLAN does indeed demonstrate that, contrary to popular criticism, the combatant commander had planned extensively for the post-hostilities phase and had indeed integrated other government agencies into the operational plan. The OPLAN ANNEX V established a JIACG and mandated that “All agencies… provide representatives to the USCENTCOM Joint Interagency Coordination Group (CCJIA CG) to facilitate
interagency coordination for the duration of the operation.”xvii There is, however, no indication that the JIACG was established early enough to affect actual planning. USCENTCOM OIF lessons indicate that civil-military operations (CMO) did provide input for stabilization phase operations, yet the document also indicates that the input was solicited by Information Operations (IO), and was not automatically included. Additionally, civil-military operations personnel were not read into the plan until late in the process to the extent that “themes and messages being suggested by CMO… were OBE.”xviii

The actual affects of the OPLAN ANNEX V on coordinating the various government agencies for war termination and post-hostilities transition is questionable. Its main purpose seems to have been to coordinate U.S. government agency support for offensive operations, and not post-hostilities or transition operations. Additionally, while directive in nature, it is doubtful whether any non-DOD agency would perceive ANNEX V as authoritative, as none of the organizations listed work for either the JTF commander or DOD. The inclusion of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), for example, in a classified document (i.e. one that the organization itself would have no access to) highlights the fact that the ANNEX V served more to outline the role that each agency included should have, and not necessarily the role it would actually play.

Problems with the JIACG itself also became evident during OIF. The JIACG was not integrated into all phases of the planning, possibly due to a lack of flexibility from the interagency elements.xix Reach back also became an issue as not all elements of the JIACG were physically located in the area of responsibility (AOR), and many of those located in the AOR did not have decision-making authority or direct access to those who did.xx
The critical war termination failures were not a result, however, of events at the COCOM level. Although difficult to document via primary sources, much criticism has been directed at the NSC for its inability to coordinate the interagency effort. According to a report by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), “The National Security Council failed to perform its mission. It acted largely in an advisory role and did not force inter-agency coordination.”xxi The report goes on to highlight conflicts between DOD and DOS, stating “much of the State Department’s planning efforts for nation-building [in Iraq] were lost or made ineffective… because of the deep divisions between the State Department and Department of Defense.”xxii

There is other anecdotal evidence to support this conclusion. In Plan of Attack, author Bob Woodward provides a narrative for the events that would eventually place the responsibility for the post-hostilities phase of OIF squarely on the shoulders of DOD. According to Woodward, Douglas Feith, an undersecretary for policy in the Pentagon, had developed a plan for administering a post-Saddam Iraq:

He proposed setting up a planning cell in Defense that would implement policy on the ground in Iraq after the war. It would be best, he said, to lodge this cell in Defense since [General] Franks and the Central Command would have a major role in the post-conflict, but the cell should be inter-agency from the very beginning. He would have people who could work 24 hours a day, seven days a week. They would take policy level guidance from the deputys and principals and then implement the plan in Iraq. But the cell would not just plan. Feith said it would become expeditionary. In the name of efficiency, the people would actually go to Iraq after the military situation permitted and carry out the plans.xxiii

According to Woodward, DOS had been working for almost a year on a post-Saddam plan for Iraq; yet felt the Feith mechanism was “logical” as DOD would have the people, money and resources to execute the plan. Based on this information, President Bush signed into effect National Security Directive 24 which set up the Office of Reconstruction and
Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) under the Department of Defense, and not the Department of State.

The post-Saddam plan developed by DOS, known as the Freedom of Iraq Project, was an attempt at a practical planning mechanism for figuring out what could be done both prior to regime change and in the aftermath of transition.\textsuperscript{xxiv} It was, in effect, a war termination plan proper developed by tapping into a talent pool of ex-patriot Iraqi professionals who knew both the nation and its problems. Seventeen working groups were developed covering issues from transitional justice to defense policy to anti-corruption.\textsuperscript{xxv} The end result was thirteen volumes of reports and supporting documents.

With DOD providing a mechanism and DOS providing a plan, it would seem at this point that the transition from hostilities to post-hostilities and beyond (i.e. war termination) would be a relatively smooth process. There are indications, however, that the plan developed by DOS was never implemented, which if true would indicate a failure of the IAP at the highest levels.

According to one senior defense official, “It was mostly ignored. State has good ideas and a feel for the political landscape, but they’re bad at implementing anything.”\textsuperscript{xxvi} The aforementioned CSIS study also concluded, “…the Office of the Secretary of Defense ignored most of the previous inter-agency process or left it hanging in limbo.” Woodward claims, “Powell had sent over the ‘Future of Iraq’ study and the names of about 75 State Department Arab experts who had done the study… Heading that team was Thomas Warrick, who had supervised the study and Meghan O’Sullivan… Later Powell got word that Rumsfeld had kicked Warren and O’Sullivan out of the pentagon, ordering them to leave by sun down.”\textsuperscript{xxvii}
Real world events would also lead one to the conclusion that the State Department study had been ignored. A State Department briefing on the Iraqi Freedom Project dated 21 March, 2003 highlighted, amongst other things, the need to keep the post-Saddam Iraqi army employed and engaged in the reconstruction effort and the need for that same army to prevent anarchy and looting once the regime had fallen.\textsuperscript{xxviii} These and other recommendations had come from Iraqis who knew both the country and its people. Many of the recommendations proved to be quite prophetic.

Conclusions and Recommendations

Conflict termination is, in and of itself, an art and if we as a nation are to continue exercising the military force option, we must develop a team of dedicated experts who are familiar with the intricacies of war termination and post-hostilities transition. Not unlike the Feith proposal, the organization will require its own subject matter experts, doctrine development, training and an ability to incorporate lessons learned. This team of experts must be able to actually lead the transition once an acceptable military end state has been achieved.

The COCOM or JTF commander does not and should not own the entire process. He has neither the power nor the authority to coordinate the efforts of such a broad array of government agencies and is ill equipped for nation building. One conclusion of the previously cited CSIS study was that “… the US military needs to fully accept that conflict termination, peacemaking, and nation-building are as much a part of their mission as war fighting.” The study goes on to state, “… the need to see conflict termination and transition to nation building as a critical military mission [of the military] is one of the most important
single lessons of modern warfare.” In this author’s opinion, the CSIS conclusions are only partly valid. Military forces are designed and trained to kill people and break things. While the U.S. military does have a logistics capacity second to none and units that are trained to assist in post-hostilities (Military Police and Civil Affairs, for example), the vast majority of US armed forces are trained as war fighters, and not “nation builders”. Our military forces cannot be all things to all people.

The process itself must be controlled at the highest levels of government. In the end, the decision on when and how to terminate wars and the aftereffects of said wars are complex political issues, not military ones. The military can only set the stage for an effective war termination process. Once that stage has been set, it should be up to the body politic to implement an effective war termination strategy that incorporates all elements of national power.

Unity of effort can only be achieved through unity of command. Author Fred Ikle sums up the problem best when he states, “…various agencies and individuals in each nation compete in shaping policy, while pursuing their own interests and relying on their divergent estimates of friendly and enemy strengths… those involved focus on the means, rather than on how the over-all effort will accomplish some national ends.” It is for this reason that primary ownership of the process cannot reside within a single agency. The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs is the ideal candidate to organize and be responsible for coordinating a planning and execution team in the Feith model for war termination and post-hostilities transition. No single agency should be allowed to hijack the process.

The process may have to be legislated. It was not until Goldwater –Nichols that DOD and the JCS were able to more affectively organize their war-fighting efforts and it is more
than likely that any process implemented at the NSC level for war termination planning and execution will also have to be forced. If nothing else, PDD-56 demonstrated how difficult organizational change is to implement. Left to its own, it is unlikely that the current system will rise up to meet future challenges in war termination planning and execution.

Finally, the conflict termination team must be incorporated into the joint planning process from the onset. Joint doctrine must be changed to incorporate war termination as a function of the NSC and not the component commander. While it will remain true that, per joint planning doctrine, combatant commanders are responsible for incorporating conflict termination into joint planning, it must be highlighted that the development of a war termination strategy will occur as part of a larger process whereby the combatant commander is but a single component.

In the end, executing a war plan without a proper war termination strategy is like “designing an elaborate and expensive bridge that [reaches] only halfway across the river.” The complex nature of the problem demands no less than a total, coordinated effort involving all aspects of national power. Planning cells and processes developed solely at the combatant commander level will only produce marginal gains towards more effective war termination. The interagency process continues to be the weakest element of an effective war termination plan and as such, it is at this level that the problem needs to be resolved.
Notes


iii Murray, ed., 220.


vi Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Doctrine for Civil Affairs, Joint Pub 3-57.1 (Washington, DC: 14 April, 2003), VII-12.


xi Ibid., 5-6.

xii Ibid., 6.


xiv Ibid.


xix Ibid.

xx Ibid.


xxii Ibid.


xxv Ibid., slide 4


xxvii Woodward, 283.


xxix Cordesman, 17.


xxxi Ibid., 5.
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