Title: Joint Professional Military Education: Timing is Everything

Subtitle: Getting the Commander What He Needs

Advisor: No advisor, but Professors Jim Butler and Milan Vego provided insights and assistance.

This paper focuses on identifying what joint commanders’ need and why they are not getting it. It begins with the premise that although the Joint Professional Military Education system has significantly improved since the inception of the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 and the creation and refinement of a joint education program, current timing of this education does not fully meet the need of the war-fighting commander. The paper first explores what commanders need and why they need it, concluding that the current educational process is largely sufficient, but ill timed in an officer’s career for junior officers and complicated by service issues that preclude many field grade officers from attending prior to their joint assignment. It illustrates the need for junior officer education based on evolving trends toward increasing involvement by junior officers in joint operations and the need to educate junior officers for this likelihood. The paper will specifically focus on commanders’ needs to have junior officers exposed to basic joint fundamentals and for officers being assigned to joint warfighting commands to be able to take advantage of existing educational structures prior to their assignment. Additionally some areas within the current curriculum will be highlighted that need to be emphasized to better support the commanders’ needs, including the Crisis Action Planning, Deliberate Planning, and Time Phased Force Deployment Data processes. The methodology of the paper is to first determine commander’s needs, though a review of the results of various recent studies and commander interviews. Next the paper will quickly assess the current educational structures and will address the two unsatisfied commander needs in greater detail. The paper will offer a counterargument, then recommendations and will conclude.

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*Joint Professional Military Education: Timing is Everything*
*Getting the Commander What He Needs*

by

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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the Joint Military Operations Department.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

Signature:______________________

9 June 2004

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Abstract

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Joint Professional Military Education: Timing is Everything
Getting the Commander What He Needs

Introduction

Recent operations continue to demonstrate the need for high-quality, experienced, and proficient operational planners and general-utility officers that are joint educated, interagency-minded and service-grounded to support joint, combined and service-specific planning and operational requirements, at all levels, in support of the war-fighting commanders. Accordingly, proper education,¹ training, and utilization of officers remain relevant and important topics to assure development to meet this need. Most efforts to date have focused on satisfying broad joint requirements and have not necessarily supported the needs of the combatant commander, although much effort has been made to involve him and to gain his input. Thesis: Although the Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) system has significantly improved since the inception of the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 and the creation and refinement of a joint education program, current timing of this education does not fully meet the need of the war-fighting commander. Specifically, junior officers need to be exposed to basic joint fundamentals sooner and field grade officers need to be able to take advantage of existing educational structures prior to their assignment, without the various “administrative and management” distractions which currently prevent or delay their education prior to joint assignment. Additionally some areas within the current curriculum need to be emphasized to better support the commanders’ needs.

Methodology: The focus of this paper is on getting combatant commanders what they need, when they need it. The organizational methodology used in this paper is simple, the author will initially focus on ascertaining what the commanders’ needs are
and why they are important. Second, the author will assess the current joint educational process at meeting the identified needs. The author will highlight that the timing for joint education does not fully support the commanders’ needs in two areas: the timing of education for junior officers (01-03 level) and the timing for education for field-grade officers (04-06 level) due to several “administrative” issues. The author will focus separately on the two identified needs, by elaborating on the timing of education and other complicating factors that affect timing and attendance. It should be noted that although the timing for field grade education is generally considered appropriate, other “administrative” issues complicate this timing resulting in fewer attending than could be achieved and those that attend not necessarily being those that will be assigned to joint duty. The author will additionally indicate that the focus of education does not fully support the commander in selected areas as well. Third, the author will offer a counterargument. Forth, the author will propose recommendations to “fix” the timing of the education process. Finally, the author will conclude the paper.

The paper will deal exclusively with the joint, resident education of active component, commissioned officers as general-utility, joint-duty officers that work or are about to work for the combatant commander, either on his staff, or a supporting staff, including those on temporary or ad hoc Joint Task Forces (JTFs) under his responsibility. It will not address reserve-component, non-commissioned officer, enlisted, or officer candidate education. The paper will not address the educational needs of officers bound for duty with the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Joint Staff or other joint activities other than those aforementioned. It will not address the specialized joint educational needs to support planners, intelligence officers or other specialist, nor will it focus on
non-educational needs of the combatant commander including training, preparation, experience or other developmental programs, although important. It will not address joint organizational structure or law. Although not the focus of the paper, it will, however, elude to, and in some instances indicate, the need for reform regarding joint educational execution, shifts in curriculum focus, timing for the education, and personnel policies.

What the Commander Needs and Why

Several studies and feedback mechanisms, including the J7 and independent contractor studies addressed later in this paper, have been developed and used to ascertain what the commander needs regarding educational requirements for officers potentially assigned to his command, including asking the commander personally. Although space in this paper precludes a full review of these efforts, a brief review of the results of the most current efforts, including commanders’ comments, yield two major areas of dissatisfaction and illuminate why these needs are important. These two areas are the timing of junior officer education and the complications that affect the timing of field grade officer education.

Commanders’ Need: Joint Fundamentals for Junior Officers

Commanders’ need junior officers to be exposed to the fundamentals of JPME. Commanders’ comments, study findings and operational lessons learned substantiate this point. Due to space limitations, the author will focus predominately on commanders’ comments and relevant findings from two studies to illustrate this need. “[T]he common school of thought among the combatant command senior leaders was that officers
assigned to JTFs (Joint Task Force) were unprepared to do the job and carry out their responsibilities. ‘There is too much learning on the ‘fly’, and this is an inefficient way to do business. We can do better,’”

“... cited one senior leader. Indeed, “senior leaders communicated that JPME does not begin early enough in an officer’s professional military education.”

“In February 1998, the Director of the Joint Staff, Vice Admiral Blair, directed the J-7 to review JPME and develop a course of action that might improve the JPME process.”

As part of this study, he directed a commission to study future educational requirements. Through a series of questionnaires and senior officer interviews, the Requirements Team associated with this commission sought to determine the relevance and importance of each requirement and to identify trends common in the joint educational process. “A total of 1182 individuals filled out the main JPME 2010 questionnaire. In addition, 63 senior leaders were interviewed from (Office of the Secretary of Defense)(OSD), Joint Staff, standing joint task forces (JTF), and the combatant commands.”

“Among the findings of the commission was one that ‘if we continue with ad hoc JTFs in the future, junior officers need a fundamental knowledge of JTF Operations before they are assigned to a JTF.’”

In a similar part of the study, the “(t)eam suggests there is an operational necessity to accomplish such education thereby ensuring the graduates of the system meet the warfighting demands of the 21st Century.”

“JPME (simply) needs to be driven more by operational necessity.”

Another study, the Congressionally-mandated, independent study by Booz-Allen-Hamilton, also acknowledged the trend for increased “demand for joint competence at earlier stages in officer’s careers” and that “(j)oint competence is now required of junior grade officers.”
Commanders’ Need: Field Grade Officer Education Prior to Assignment

The second major area where the commanders’ needs are not being satisfied is the timing for JPME for Field Grade Officers. *Commanders need their field grade personnel to attend JPME prior to arriving at their joint assignment.*11 Commanders felt that “all officers assigned to joint positions should have JPME. With the exception of (on-the-job training (OJT)), the only place officers acquire this education, to any degree, is from the JPME system. It is the belief of the Requirements Team that an operational necessity exists that officers serving in joint positions be educated in joint matters.”12 Again, this point is substantiated by commanders’ comments and study data.

Joint Task Force operations, planning and execution requires that officers come to the fight with not only a knowledge of service core competencies, but a well-founded understanding of the (Crisis Action Planning (CAP)) and Time Phased Force Deployment Data (TPFDD) processes. Comments from the senior leaders…indicated officers assigned to JTF headquarters come with little or no JPME and/or joint experience. How to stand up a JTF, and organize it early, were repeated concerns among the senior leaders interviewed. We still do not integrate well within JTFs, whether the JTF is formed from a lead service component or an existing functional headquarters. This is due to a general lack of ‘know how’ and understanding of topics such as joint doctrine.13

In the case of Phase II education, the data from the study yields that “(o)ver 50 percent of the senior leaders clearly believe that something needs to be done”14 to improve the timing of the education. “The results of this data, coupled with perceptions from senior leaders in the field, indicate a strong need exists for increased emphasis on preparing officers to serve at a JTF headquarters. In some cases, the combatant commands felt such education would relieve them of the burden of teaching the skills in-theater.”15 These same commanders indicated that it was not so much that they were dissatisfied with the quality of the product they were receiving through the joint education process, but that it
was a function of getting officers that had attended existing education or that had operational, joint experience. In fact they were generally pleased with the product they were receiving.  

Although this team determined that the joint curriculum was generally sound and “teaching what is required,” it indicates that there was a desire among commanders and senior staff members to better emphasize “topics which roughly parallel their level of emphasis by the service and joint schools. These included JTF, Crisis Action Planning (CAP) and other service capabilities. The view that ‘the current JPME system is working and is not broken’ was used to characterize the tenor of comments by Senior Leaders in OSD and the Joint Staff. Their counterparts in the Combatant Commands and the Standing JTFs identified areas to be emphasized, but as a group expressed no fundamental discontent with the topics.” Three areas, in particular, were identified as requiring additional emphasis, the Deliberate Planning Process, the Crisis Action Planning Process, and the Time Phased Force Deployment Data process. This data indicates that more commanders and senior officers on combatant commanders’ staffs believe these processes are of more importance than their counterparts in other joint assignments who believed other areas were more important. This need for emphasis may require greater curricula emphasis or tailoring to targeted populations at the PME institutions on the topics identified, but it does not identify an overall flaw in the educational system of the general-utility, joint officer. Exposure to the students that are in the education system on all aspects of the curricula is being achieved.
Current System Assessment: Good and Bad

Now that the most pertinent commanders’ issues have been identified, the author will shift to assess how well the current education and assignment systems satisfy them. First the good news: The studies’ findings indicated that, generally speaking, the service and joint education systems are in good shape and are generally producing the desired education that is needed. Due to space limitations, the author will highlight only one study, the JPME 2010 Study, to illustrate this point. It “set out to identify specific knowledge, skills, and capacities necessary for officers to perform effectively in their current job while adapting the change coming about as we implement Joint Vision 2010.” This team concluded that “(v)irtually all topics in the JPME 2010 Questionnaire’s General Requirements section are covered at the ILC (Intermediate Level College) level. A substantial number of these are also covered at the SLC (Senior Level College) level. This indicated that our JPME institutions are providing the opportunity to educate officers in topics identified as both relevant and important in crucial topic areas.” The general conclusion of these studies can be summarized in one of its findings which indicate that “JMPE Phase I and Phase II institutions are currently teaching what is required.” and that “One could safely conclude that officers serving in joint commands find the majority of the topics currently covered in Phase I and Phase II as relevant to their current assignments.” The results went on to indicate that “There were no trends noted on the need for any major revisions of Phase I or Phase II curricula.”

Now the bad news. Despite the success of the education system, in general producing a good product, the commanders’ concerns are still not satisfied. Their
fundamental concerns, as expressed in their consistent, repetitive comments from the study’s are not satisfied. In particular, these areas include the timing of education, the need for earlier exposure to joint fundamentals for junior officers, and for officers being assigned to their command to receive JPME I and II education prior to assignment. Several factors cause this situation including service and joint personnel management processes and policies, high operational tempo affecting availability of officers, timing of schooling, service culture and their relative value of education, and other factors. The author will look separately at some of these factors as they relate to the timing of junior officer education and the timing of joint education of those inbound for joint duty.

**Timing of Junior Officer Joint Education**

There are several reasons why this need is not currently being satisfied. To date the focus of junior officer education and training has generally and appropriately been on the development of service core skills. Joint education generally begins later in an officer’s career although officers from all services do not universally receive either JPME I or JPME II education. Although the intermediate school level has, in the past, generally been regarded as the right time to educate officers in joint operations, this educational timing is becoming increasingly insufficient and does not meet commanders’ needs by providing this educational base to junior officers prior to actual deployment. Simply stated, it occurs too late for them to take advantage of it. In a temporary or ad hoc JTF, where the immediate or time-sensitive nature of the deployment is more likely, such education is not likely to be achieved following notification and prior to the actual deployment. Any available time the JTF had would likely be consumed with its associated preparation to deploy and/or a quick train up, so such education needs to be
conducted prior to notification or assignment. Unfortunately, the lack of appropriate education may be further exasperated by the “come as you are” nature of JTFs, the lack of opportunity for joint, predeployment training, and the tendency for hastily-organized JTFs to be service-centric in configuration, at least initially.

Another reason commanders’ needs are not being met is that the degree of junior officer involvement was not anticipated. “Since the end of the Cold War, as joint integration has taken place at lower levels of command, more junior officers now require knowledge of joint matters and competence in a joint environment.”30 The report highlights that “(w)here joint duty used to be the preserve of senior active duty officers in the Unified Component Commands (UCC) and national headquarters, it increasingly includes offices at the 0-4 and 0-3 level. For example, research showed that a current UCC has 11 subordinate joint headquarters involving roughly 1,000 staff officers in grades 0-1 to 0-6, 33 percent of whom are in grade 0-3.”31 Table 1 below illustrates this point.

Table 1: Percentage of Officers by Grade/Service
(Percentage of an estimated 1,000 officers, by Grade and Service, of All Officers (except General/Flag Officers) Currently Serving in Joint Organizations Below the Unified Command Level in a Selected UCC.) 32

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service</th>
<th>0-1</th>
<th>0-2</th>
<th>0-3</th>
<th>0-4</th>
<th>0-5</th>
<th>0-6</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>&lt;1</td>
<td>&lt;2</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>&lt;1</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>&lt;1</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>&lt;1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>&lt;1</td>
<td>&lt;1</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>&lt;1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>&lt;1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Another reason for this poor timing is that policy has focused predominately on the intermediate and senior levels of education under recognizing the evolving importance of junior officer education. Only minimal joint education is currently provided to or required of junior officers. It has long been recognized that “(a)lthough students should be introduced to joint matters at pre-commissioning and primary-level schools, it is at the intermediate schools that substantial joint education should begin.”

The current Officer Professional Military Education Policy, from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, for pre-commissioning and primary-level joint professional military education echoes this same level of emphasis. This policy directs significantly more “emphasis on the intermediate and senior levels of PME” and joint education. For primary-level (junior officer), joint education, it limits the learning areas to just two areas, Joint Warfare Fundamentals and Joint Campaigning, with only minimal specific sub-areas to be covered in each. Joint accreditation efforts put relatively weak emphasis on ensuring standardization and consistency among primary-level institutions and courses, compared to the extensive accreditation effort used to ensure compliance with Phase I and II requirements. Joint policy does not even address it. Perhaps this is understandable given the history of joint education. At the time, the Goldwater’-Nichols Act focused on the intermediate and senior level approach which it deemed as more appropriate. But with the changing times come changing requirements. Today, joint operations are involving increasingly more junior officers and are accelerating the need for them to be familiar with joint fundamentals. Today “‘joint proficiency’ must characterize the entire officer corps. (T)hese competencies, in various forms, will be needed at all levels of leadership. While not all officers will need to develop these
competencies to the same degree, all officers, regardless of rank, component or specialty, must have access to the training and education they need to properly discharge their responsibilities. With this evolving need, educational gaps need to be addressed.

The team further noted that the same “senior leaders (went on to state) their intent (was) not to make (Joint Service Officers (JSO)) out of junior officers, but to provide a more basic and fundamental level of knowledge that will assist them if they are assigned to a JTF headquarters.” Additionally, they recognized the importance for these officers to be well versed in service-specific competency. “Service core competency is the cornerstone to educating these officers.”

**Timing of Field-Grade Officer Joint Education and Complicating Factors**

Several factors contribute to limiting the opportunity to attend Phase I and II joint professional education for field grade officers. These factors affect the “window of opportunity” for officers to attend joint education and consequently the timing for school attendance. These factors include differences in cultures and support for joint education among the different services, personnel assignment policies, local unit considerations and priorities, and educational program intent. A brief discussion of some of the major contributors to this challenge will be made to highlight the scale of the problem and underscore the impact on the commander.

First, the approach of different PME cultures among the military services has had an impact on who attends PME and joint education. The negative side of this impact is the inconsistency between services concerning the opportunity and emphasis to attend such education. Differences in service selection criteria also contribute.
The Army culture emphasizes PME, and promotion is tied to PME completion.... The Navy culture does not emphasize PME. The residual Navy philosophy is that time in the fleet is more important than attendance at PME. While (the Goldwater’s-Nichols Act) has begun to change this philosophy slowly, formal Navy policy calls for attendance at intermediate or senior-level PME, but not both. This policy is unlike that of all the other Services.... Only about 8 percent of Navy officers attend both an intermediate and a senior-level school. Consequently, the curricula at the two Navy colleges are basically the same, except for the operations course, which has a different focus at each level. The Air Force emphasizes PME. Service policy is to send Active Component officers to intermediate-level (Air Command and Staff College (ACSC)) PME as early as possible after selection for promotion to the rank of major. The ACSC selection board meets immediately after the promotion board and considers the same pool of officers. (Regarding the Marine Corps,) while it has historically resembled the Navy’s PME culture for some time, Marine Corps culture now diverges from the Navy’s to be more selective in its attendees for education.42

Another contributor is difference in personnel assignment policies. These have a substantial impact on PME attendance and can limit the window of opportunity of who attends educational institutions. They influence when officers attend. High operational tempo, competing service qualifying requirements that frequently require performance of certain jobs for certain lengths of time to meet qualification, and additional operational and support commitments due to the current global war on terror and other operations also contribute to this challenge.

Another factor is “local politics” and priorities. Often key individuals and positions are deemed too important to be “gapped” so sending an individual to obtain education is often viewed as counterproductive to the needs of the command. This situation is frequently the case regarding Phase II education and is a major complaint by commanders who generally dislike having to lose officers for schooling that they feel should be accomplished prior to the officer arriving to the command.43 In addition to losing the officer for the 90 days required for him to attend Phase II schooling,
commanders have to fund the education as well.

Although it has been the desire that all field-grade officers attend Phase I education, such attendance is not universal. Again different services approach this differently. For example, the Army and Air Force view selection for attendance as a competitive selection for those on the career path upward. Those not selected, do not attend resident education. The Navy, after years of not being required for Navy field-grade officers, only recently required Phase I education of its officers by the time they are an O6. Although a step in the right direction, the Navy’s approach of sending “who is available” still causes many at the 04 and 05 level to miss the opportunity to attend prior to their serving in a joint headquarters, although efforts are made to provide everyone the education at some point prior to promotion to 06. Table 2, below, highlights the impact of these factors on actual institutional output, with the Army and Marines leading by considerable degree, producing more JPME I graduates, while the Navy and Air Force follow. Greater attention to complicating factors could result in more similar results among the different services.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service</th>
<th>Number/Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>9,662 (74.6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>542 (5.0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>71 (2.1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marines</td>
<td>7,232 (45.8%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Phase II education, although generally well received by both commanders and students alike, does not support the timing desires of the field commanders to have officers educated prior to arriving at their command. Indeed, many students attend Phase II education after being assigned to their joint headquarters and then departing the unit to attend. “One of the most difficult issues of Joint Officer Management (JOM)/JPME is the requirement for most JSOs to attend JPME II at the Joint Forces Staff College (JFSC). As officers attending the school often leave a JDA vacant for 90 or more days, an inconvenience that seriously devalues the school in the eyes of many.” This frequently requires their absence from the command where they were assigned to serve, if the command can and is able to let them attend at all. Indeed, “9 of 9 UCCs agreed that JPME II should occur en route to a joint assignment.” “The physical capacity of the (Joint Forces Staff College) prevents students from attending the Phase II course before they arrive at their joint duty assignment…. (although seats are generally available.)”

During the interviews, the most common theme was the need to attend JPME Phase II en route to a joint assignment (31 of 35 senior leaders mentioned it.) The practice of TDY and return was described in further detail by 12 (of the 13) as being ‘disruptive, counterproductive, wasteful, bad, and a burden to family and command.’ Some of these comments include: “gapping hurts worse than the lack of training’ and ‘the longer an officer spends at the command before he goes TDY, the less he needs to go to Phase II PME.”

Additionally the purpose of this education is generally misunderstood which causes additional confusion. “Although the purpose of JPME II is to educate officers in joint matters for service as JSOs (Joint Service Officers) throughout their careers, JPME II is almost universally perceived as preparatory training for one’s first (Joint Duty Assignment (JDA)). The law requires that JPME I precede JPME II and that officers nominated for the joint specialty complete their qualifying JDA service ‘after’ JPME II.
For most officers, then, JPME II must precede their first JDA. Table 3, below, illustrates how most JSOs (graduates of Phase II) received their education with the majority not getting it prior to being assigned to perform joint duty first. This is fundamentally broken and does not support the commander’s needs.

Table 3: Population of Joint Speciality Officers (JSO) by Joint Duty Assignment (JDA)/Joint Professional Military Education (JMPE) Sequence. (Represents 3,399 JSOs attending JPME II en route to their JDA, 2,633 JSOs attending JPME II after arriving at their duty stations, and 94 JSOs qualified as JSOs by completing two JDAs without Professional Military Education (PME).)

Counterargument

Having identified commanders’ needs and assessed the current system, the author will consider the counterargument. Since aforementioned views are based on the fundamental assumption that the commander’s needs are important, it is here that the best counterargument can be focused. An argument can be made if one takes the view that the purpose of joint education is not to satisfy the needs of the operational commander, but to provide a more general purpose, joint education to most or all officers involved in the broad spectrum of joint duty. This argument would cite the need for joint education to satisfy a wide range of requirements of which the commanders’ needs were but one.
There is some evidence to support this argument. Indeed the current educational approach, largely mandated by Congress, is set up for this purpose. But the argument breaks down in that it does not distract from the fundamental premise of this paper. This paper is limited to focus on the operational commander, not on more broad considerations. Indeed both broader considerations and commanders’ needs should be considered in developing a more balanced educational approach and in determining the timing for education in a more comprehensive manner to satisfy all requirements. Operational commanders, focused on fighting the Nation’s wars and conducting its operations, should simply be paramount to the consideration of other joint needs that focus on the “business practice” side of joint duty at the expense of satisfying the operational effort – although these distinctions are often blurred in some joint organizations and agencies. Although beyond the scope of this paper, several options exist to educate officers to satisfy all requirements, including targeted career tracks, separate training focuses, and other options.

**Recommendations**

A much more comprehensive plan is needed to satisfy identified commanders’ needs. The following recommendations are made. Regarding junior officer education, more effort must be applied to determine the best means to integrate and enforce education of joint fundamentals into the primary (junior officer) education program. Current Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) policy regarding primary education needs to be expanded to meet current and evolving requirements for earlier junior officer education and to focus the accreditation effort to affect and ensure compliance.
Regarding education of field grade officers, the current focus should be retained, but service complicating factors need to be comprehensively studied to determine optimal measures to take to achieve a greater likelihood that those officers being assigned to a joint headquarters are given the opportunity to complete JPME I and, where appropriate, JPME II education prior to their assignment to a joint headquarters. This approach will likely require the CJCS to direct the services to make some changes to enable this possibility in order to balance accommodating service career needs with the need for joint education in a more holistic approach. Regarding the commanders’ identified areas for emphasis, current educational institutions need to better emphasize or tailor education of those with duty at joint, warfighting headquarters to enhance in the areas of Crisis Action Planning, Deliberate Planning, and the Time Phased Force Deployment Data process.

**Conclusion**

Commanders’ needs matter. Although generally being met by the educational system, some needs are not being met. The timing of joint education does not, in all instances, support these needs. Timing and attendance are affected by a variety of factors. Although well placed in the scheme of education and career timing, the timing is not well executed or supervised for junior officers. In the case of field grade officers, although the education is well emphasized, supported, and executed, it is not universally achieved. Significant “distractions” due to various administrative and management issues affect timing and availability of officers during their limited “windows of opportunity” to attend schooling. This, in turn, typically results in officers not attending prior to being assigned to joint duty. At a time when the need for such education is being accelerated by operational demand, many of these officers are getting this education
through on-the job training instead of as a result of a well developed and executed educational design concept that the services fully support. The consequence is that “the system” does not produce educated officers at the time they are needed by the joint commander as well as they could. Additionally, the current curriculum design requires greater emphasis on the areas of the Crisis Action, Deliberate Planning, and Time Phased Force Deployment Data processes to meet commanders’ needs. Many factors complicate the timing of education including operational requirements, service culture and education emphasis, and joint and service assignment policies. Greater study is required to determine the most comprehensive approach to satisfy educational requirements prior to assignment to support the commander. There are better alternatives than educating through on-the-job training on the battlefield.
Endnotes:


3 Ibid., 2.

4 Ibid., 42.

5 Ibid., 1.

6 Ibid., 1.

7 Ibid., 3.

8 Ibid., 12 and 53.

9 Ibid., 43.

10 Booz, Allen, Hamilton, Independent Study of Joint Officer Management and Joint Professional Military Education, Draft Report. (McLean, Virginia: Publisher Undetermined, 2003), ES-6. This independent study was intended “to determine the effectiveness of joint officer management (JOM) and joint professional military education (JPME) based on the implication of the proposed joint organizational and operational concepts…and emerging officer management and personnel reforms under consideration by the Secretary of Defense.” 53


12 Ibid., 53.

13 Ibid., 2.

14 Ibid., 2 and 8.

15 Ibid., 11 and 52.
“Topic D2, Deliberate Planning Process, was rated with a higher importance among 04s (3.69) (4 is high importance) although 06s (78.92%) thought this topic was more relevant. ACOM rated it highest (83.83%); (while, not surprisingly) OSD rated it lowest (45.16%). (Similarly,) “Topic D3, Crisis Action Planning Process, was rated with a higher importance among 05s (3.99) although 06s (82.16%) thought this topic was more relevant. ACOM rated this topic of highest importance (4.27); (while) OSD rated it lowest (3.48). PACOM rated its relevance level highest (85.91%); OSD rated it lowest (46.77%).”

“The Board endorses the criteria and processes currently used by Services to select officers for intermediate and senior level schooling. By choosing officers who have strong professional records and potential for increased responsibilities, the Services use professional military education most profitably.”


31Ibid., 17.

32Ibid., 17-18.


41 Ibid., 8.


Booz, Allen, Hamilton, Independent Study of Joint Officer Management and Joint Professional Military Education, Draft Report, (McLean, Virginia: Publisher Unknown, 2003), 50. "Of the roughly 700 JFSC graduates who responded to the poll supporting this study, strong majorities responded favorably to questions regarding their experience at the school."56

Ibid., Appendix I.2, I.2-3.


Booz, Allen, Hamilton, Independent Study of Joint Officer Management and Joint Professional Military Education, Draft Report, (McLean, Virginia: Publisher Unknown, 2003), ES-10. "This misperception of JMPE II as preparatory training was expressed frequent and at unified command visits. Many senior leaders and other officers expressed the in interviews that they did not see the purpose of the JFSC. Some were emphatic in their remarks. No officer, senior or otherwise, expressed a similar view toward other PME or JPME schools."57


Booz, Allen, Hamilton, Independent Study of Joint Officer Management and Joint Professional Military Education, Draft Report, (McLean, Virginia: Publisher Unknown, 2003), ES-10. “Ten senior leaders stated that graduates met their expectations although 4 of these states that Phase II should be tailored somewhat to the functional area/job the office is going to be assigned to.”


Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations. Joint Publication 3-08. 1996.


The Joint Staff. The Joint Staff Officer’s Guide. JFSC Publication 1, 2000.

