Lessons From a Small Country: Managing Interagency Cooperation in Suriname

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14. ABSTRACT

Interagency coordination is a complicated business, and many observers of the process perceive particular structural difficulties in coordination between Combatant Commanders and Embassies. A case study of interagency cooperation in Suriname, however, suggests that existing institutional arrangements between diplomatic and military institutions provide appropriate mechanisms for implementing the inherently interagency, and even multinational, non-crisis interventions in areas such as law enforcement, counter-narcotics, and issues in civil-military relations supportive of such operations. The Suriname case, in pointing to areas of advantage for coordination, generates suggestions for features Combatant Commanders should recall and replicate in devising and implementing similar elements of theater strategy elsewhere.
Lessons from a Small Country:
Managing Interagency Cooperation in Suriname

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A paper submitted to the faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

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18 May 2004
Abstract

Interagency coordination is a complicated business, and many observers of the process perceive particular structural difficulties in coordination between Combatant Commanders and Embassies. A case study of interagency cooperation in Suriname, however, suggests that existing institutional arrangements between diplomatic and military institutions provide appropriate mechanisms for implementing inherently interagency, and even multinational, non-crisis interventions in areas such as law enforcement, counter-narcotics, and issues in civil-military relations supportive of such operations. The Suriname case, in pointing to areas of advantage for coordination, generates suggestions for features Combatant Commanders should recall and replicate in devising and implementing similar elements of theater strategy elsewhere.
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Introduction

The frictional seams in military-civilian cooperation are the frequent subject of discussion, typically highlighting issues such as disconnects between the regional authority of combatant commanders and the bilateral approach of individual country ambassadors, or between diplomatic and military regional theater boundaries. Proposed solutions to redress these perceived shortcomings often recommend new bureaucratic entities to better bind these seams, but such fixes may tempt the further complication rather than resolution of already complex interagency relationships as policy makers attempt to balance diplomatic, economic, military, and informational elements of national power to reach U.S. national goals.

Is there an inherent structural problem with existing U.S. policy-making and implementing mechanisms? Not necessarily, but combatant commanders must remain actively aware of the advantages to be derived from natural coordinating mechanisms within current structures to achieve optimal results.

This paper seeks to demonstrate, by means of a case study of U.S. security cooperation with Suriname, that existing policy coordination mechanisms are fully adequate to meet policy challenges in the inherently multiagency activities of non-crisis interventions in the areas of law enforcement including anti-narcotics and arms trafficking efforts and related issues of civil-military relations in the context of regional stabilization. It is beyond the scope of this paper to evaluate effectiveness with regard to crisis and wartime interventions, but one may hope that even if current successes are indeed limited to the narrow focus area addressed here, those habits might eventually transfer to other cooperation spheres as well.
An appropriate and effective integration of interagency assets is especially important in relation to national security goals in a Latin American context. The nexus among narcotics finance, arms smuggling, and the funding of international terrorism is a frightening reality that finds ready possible expression in this region. With U.S. ability to combat drug and arms trafficking therefore an important element in preserving U.S. national security, understanding institutional arrangements with an eye to ensuring their most effective use is a worthy topic for reflection and application to similar challenges in other theaters.

**The Perceived Operational Challenge**

What is the fundamental problem as Combatant Commands interact with the civilian agency world? Jennifer Taw, in a study on interagency issues for the Army in Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) crisis response outlines the commonly perceived dilemma in familiar form when she argues that the Combatant Commands hold a unique position in the interagency process, insofar as they do not have direct agency counterparts who hold comparable rank in the civilian world. She continues that:

“there are, of course, regionally oriented assistant secretaries, but they are neither deployed nor responsible as the CINC’s (sic) are for operations on the ground. Conversely, there are ambassadors, who are both deployed and responsible for field-level operations, but they are responsible for individual countries rather than regions. The unified commanders are thus the only U.S. regional actors.”

For Taw, this results in a complicated backdrop for developing comprehensive regional efforts, since the State Department runs country teams while the Defense Department operates regional commands, even before introducing the further complication of other agencies.
Others cite similar discomfort not only with in-country interagency cooperation, but in particular between the Ambassador and Combatant Commanders, viewing “interagency coordination at the operational and tactical levels as one of the most neglected” yet important aspects of the national security process. In that vein, a State Department colleague and predecessor at the Naval War College proposed the creation of a “Country Team Advisory Committee” (CTAC) to interact with the Combatant Command on a regular and institutionalized basis to help achieve unity of military and civilian effort and ensure adequate input into combatant commanders’ regional planning.

While the temptation to overcome difficulties with new bureaucratic entities is a strong one, and can certainly be cogently argued by advancing the need to make contrasting structures more superficially similar as they are tasked to coordinate activities, an examination of interagency law enforcement/regional stabilization activities in Suriname provides fodder to challenge assertions that new structures are in fact necessary. Moreover, existing structures may be especially appropriate for the types of non-crisis activities being examined, resting as they inevitably must not only on interagency resources, but on multilateral partners.

To capture that conclusion, this paper proceeds along the following method. First, a background section outlines the characteristics and essential challenges for U.S.

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1 Jennifer Morrison Taw, Interagency Coordination in Military Operations Other Than War: Implications for the U.S. Army, (Santa Monica, California: Rand, 1997), pp. 15-16
4 This same coordinating issue was a topic of heated discussion in this author’s own National Security Decision Making seminar (Fall, 2003). In the end-of-course National Security Strategy exercise, the seminar’s solution was to address the problem with a new structural entity, a “Regional Coordinating Authority,” who was in effect a field-based civilian acting in a traditional National Security Council policy mediating/prioritizing role.
policy in Suriname in light of U.S. policy objectives derived from the National Security Strategy. Second, policy planning documents for the U.S. Southern Command and the Suriname Milgroup, on the one hand, and the State Department and its Embassy in Paramaribo, on the other, are outlined and compared. A consideration of the practical implementation of these plans follows, highlighting interactive mechanisms between the military and civilian agencies. Finally, a “lessons learned” section recommends how Combatant Commanders can take best advantage of existing structures to optimize regional policy planning and implementation.

**Background: Suriname**

Suriname, a Dutch colony until 1975, is a developing nation on the northern Caribbean coast of Latin America. The Dutch imprint is evident in the astounding ethnic diversity of the country, the vestige of labor imported in varying degrees of coercion from indentured servitude to cruelest slavery from China, the East Indies/Java, and West Africa. The official language is Dutch, but residents also speak a variety of other languages including English, Hindi, Javanese, Chinese and Creole dialects. There is a small and marginalized indigenous Amerindian population. Most of the population lives in the narrow, northern coastal plain, and transportation infrastructure to the interior is underdeveloped to non-existent.

The country’s political history has been tumultuous, dotted by military coups, popular uprisings, and fractious parliamentary coalition politics featuring a large number of political parties, many ethnically based. Government struggles to maintain control over its territory. The 2003 State Department International Narcotics Control Strategy

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5 Where not otherwise noted, content in this background section is derived from Department of State, Background Note, Suriname, December, 2003, [http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/1893.htm](http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/1893.htm), [5/8/2004].
Report (INCSR) 6 notes that “the Government of Suriname’s (GOS) inability to control its borders and the lack of a law enforcement presence in the largely unmonitored interior allow traffickers to move drug shipments via sea, river, and air with little, if any, resistance.”

Past governments have been accused of active complicity with criminal elements. A former military dictator, currently a prominent opposition figure serving in parliament, Desi Bouterse, was convicted in the Netherlands in absentia on drug charges. Subsequent administrations removed key military officials linked to these governments, but this history complicates the state of civil-military relations in the country. Suriname has been described as “the most extreme example of a small nation whose institutions have been corrupted by the drug trade.”7 Wawro and Cirino group it with “accomplice states,” their term pertaining to governments that are “tolerant of illegal activities, having lax judicial systems, and key political and military figures involved in criminal activities.”8

Suriname is a transshipment point for cocaine from South America to Europe and (some) to the United States, and for ecstasy from Europe to the United States. While the INCSR credits the government with a number of important seizures in 2003 and with legislative progress on criminal codes and against economic crimes, the report also concedes that “…reports of money laundering, drug trafficking and associated criminal activity involving current and former government and military officials continue to

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circulate.” That report also cites a GOS official’s allegations that members of the Colombian terrorist group, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), are present in Suriname to coordinate arms-for-drugs and money-laundering activities.

Numerous financial regulatory mechanisms including the establishment of a Financial Intelligence Unit have been implemented in the last two years, but “Suriname’s overall anti-money laundering regime remains weak.” Laundering is believed to occur through several means including the manipulation of commercial and state controlled bank accounts.

Trafficking in persons both to and through Suriname remains a concern, although the government has established an anti-trafficking commission and its Public Prosecutor’s Office has worked with police to assist possible trafficking victims.

The current government under President Ronald Venetiaan took office in August, 2000, having campaigned on a platform of reform for the troubled economy. Elections are next scheduled for 2005.

Significance for U.S. Interests

Despite significant challenges, the GOS continues the difficult process of “consolidating democratic, constitutional rule” in the country. As the previous background discussion makes clear, the GOS begins from a fragile basis. The rationale for assisting Suriname to successfully transform to an effective partner is evident.

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9 INSCR, pp. 40-41.
12 Ibid.
“International security relies on states to protect against chaos at home and limit the cancerous spread of anarchy beyond their borders and throughout the world.”

The United States National Security Strategy ties narcotics trafficking and its linkages to its headline goal of “Work with Others to Defuse Regional Conflicts.” With regard to Latin America, the strategy commits to help nations “adjust their economies, enforce their laws, defeat terrorist organizations, and cut off the supply of drugs…” while recognizing “the link between terrorist and extremist groups that challenge state security and the drug trafficking activities that finance those groups.” The concern is even more explicitly addressed in the later “National Strategy for Combating Terrorism,” which recognizes the nexus of the narcotics trade, illicit finance, and international terrorists. The strategy pledges to enable weak states who wish to fulfill their “sovereign responsibilities” but lack legal frameworks and/or law enforcement capacities, and makes partnership with the international community an explicit objective in strengthening weak states that might otherwise support the “(re)emergence of terrorism.”

With this thumbnail sketch of Suriname’s link to U.S. national strategic objectives in hand, an outline of military and diplomatic planning to meet these challenges follows.

**Theater Strategy and Suriname Country Security Cooperation Plan**

USSOUTHCOM’s Theater Strategy is “based on promoting regional security and stability among… democracies” by building regional cooperative security to reduce regional tensions; developing military roles and missions for the 21st century that are

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16 Ibid, p 21, 23.
supportive of civilian authority and respectful of human rights and the rule of law; and supporting the national counterdrug strategy “at the request of participating nations through their respective U.S. Ambassadors” through training and operational support and provision of equipment. In this last realm, USSOUTHCOM does not aspire to lead agency status, but to supporting its interagency partners. In its Operational Overview, SOUTHCOM stresses that “the command depends on strong relationships with all the country teams in the region to integrate interagency objectives into its operations.”

This overt concern is also reflected in the Country Security Cooperation Plan (CSCP) for Suriname, in which the milgroup posits participation in development and coordination of the U.S. Ambassador’s Mission Performance Plan (MPP) as well as coordination with the Country Team to eliminate potential conflicts and to obtain assistance as required for various activities. The Defense Attache (USDAO) takes part in daily political/economic meetings and weekly country team meetings, as well as in the Law Enforcement Working Group (LEWG). (Both the country team and LEWG composition and functions are discussed in further detail in the following section.)

Suriname’s USDAO/Milgroup is currently staffed by three permanently assigned members: a Defense Attache, a Security Assistance NGCO, and one DIA OPsCO. A permanently assigned Security Assistance Officer is planned, pending the conclusion of the NSDD-38 process, that work is currently covered by extended

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20 Weekly SITREP-USDAO/MILGRP Paramaribo, Suriname, various.
21 NSDD-38 is the mechanism by which country ambassadors evaluate and approve/deny the addition of permanent personnel to Embassy staff.
temporary duty (TDY) visits. Temporary staffing also comes to Suriname for exercise-specific support and other short-term required tasks.

Substantively, the CSCP addresses five capabilities which loosely fall into categories of stable and productive civil-military relations and anti-terrorism, counter-narcotics, and the identification and deterrence of illicit activities and operations. Examples of current activities include International Military Education and Training (IMET), under which Surinamese officers are currently attending military police and judge advocate courses. One Surinamese military Corporal is serving a one-year tour aboard the U.S. Coast Guard’s Gentian, which provides maritime interdiction training by hosting multinational military participation among the vessel’s crew during a series of exercises and visits in Latin America. In the area of Foreign Military Funding/Sales, the Surinamese Ministry of Defense is currently considering the purchase of riverine boats and/or military vehicles, as well as equipment including radios. Suriname is an active participant in regional exercises, and this year is hosting a New Horizons engineering/humanitarian/civic action exercise beginning in June, 2004.

Narcotics interdiction activities in the region fall to SOUTHCOM’s Joint Interagency Task Force South, which is responsible not only for tactical interdiction actions, but for the integration of interagency and international counterdrug partners. Participating agencies include DOD, the Coast Guard, Customs, the Drug Enforcement Agency, FBI, DIA, Naval Criminal Investigative Service, and the National Security

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22 Suriname CSCP.
23 The synopsis of current military activities pertaining to the topical areas of interest to this paper are derived from various “Weekly SITREP-USDAO/MILGRP Paramaribo, Suriname.”
24 Photos and comments on the USCGC Gentian’s visit to Suriname can be found on the Gentian’s unofficial website: <http://members.ispwest.com/vojo/>
Great Britain, France, and the Netherlands provide ships, aircraft, and liaison officers to the task force.25

**WHA Bureau and Embassy Paramaribo’s Mission Performance Plan**

As the Suriname CSCP follows SOUTHCOM’s TSCP, so does Embassy Paramaribo’s Mission Performance Plan (MPP), the primary planning vehicle for performance goals and indicators, dovetail with the State Department’s Bureau for Western Hemisphere Affairs (WHA) Bureau Program Plan (BPP). The BPP falls under the responsibility of the WHA Assistant Secretary. Overarching goals for the Western Hemisphere emphasize improvement in homeland security; advancing the rule of law and development of transparent, accountable government institutions; and fighting instability arising from narcotics-related violence. Anti-crime and counter-narcotics programs in particular are singled out for their ability to complement the war on terrorism, by promoting the modernization of criminal justice and law enforcement systems and disrupting the profits used to finance terrorism.26

The MPP’s “Democratic System and Practices” goal27 integrates all mission elements including activities by the Milgroup to strengthen governmental institutions and increase professionalization of the armed forces in pursuit of objectives such as better cooperation against terrorism and transnational crime. To foster more professional security forces and to promote respect for the rule of law, the Embassy has sponsored training by U.S. government experts in Suriname as well as visits by Surinamese law enforcement officials and judges to the United States. The U.S. also assisted Suriname in

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26 U.S. Department of State, Strategic Plan, Fiscal Years 2004-2009, pp. 8 and 15. General regional goals are cited from the public Department plan instead of from the BPP to avoid complications of classification.
establishing a Financial Intelligence Unit against money-laundering, and has an active public diplomacy program to support efforts towards greater transparency in public institutions.

These linkages between these various instruments are an acknowledged asset in performance goals, resting on the assertions that a strengthened democratic civil society with a professional military subordinate to civilian control will contribute to internal, regional, and hemispheric stability, and that a buttressed rule of law will contribute to better law enforcement and thus the fight against illegal drugs, migrant trafficking, and domestic and transnational organized crime. 28

Embassy Paramaribo employs 21 U.S. citizens and 62 Surinamers among three government agencies (State, DOD, and Peace Corps.) The Drug Enforcement Agency covers Suriname from Cucacao and San Juan, Puerto Rico, but has requested approval to establish a permanent position in Suriname through the NSDD-38 process.29

Functionally, programming is managed through the ambassador’s traditional “country team” concept, in which heads of all sections and agencies participate in regular meetings to optimize coordination of assets to overall mission goals. A more specialized “Law Enforcement Working Group (LEWG)” is chaired by the Deputy Chief of Mission, filling the traditional DCM role30 as the working-level manager/coordinator for day-to-day embassy operations. LEWG participants include the DATT and those State

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28 Ibid.
29 Ibid, p. 4; author’s consultations in Washington, D.C. with the State Department’s Bureau of International Law Enforcement and Narcotics Matters. (INL), April 2004
30 Simmons, p. 128
Department officers with law enforcement dimensions to their work requirements, with additional input from regional representatives of other relevant agencies.  

**Linkages: Equivalent Regional Planners Linked by the Country Team**

My interest in delineating at length the passage from the strategic intentions of the National Security Strategy, through to State Department and SOUTHCOM regional planning priorities, and down to country-level implementation has not been to belabor the reassuring and not terribly surprising fact that both military and diplomatic planners are successfully constrained by national strategic priorities. The exercise does, perhaps, provide the most basic broad-brush evidence that military and diplomatic instruments act in concert.

However, my intent is rather to underscore the practical regional planning equivalency between the Assistant Secretary and Combatant Commander. As the COCOM’s TCSP guides Milgroup Suriname’s country planning, so does the Western Hemisphere Affairs Assistant Secretary’s Bureau Program Plan guide the Ambassador’s Mission Program Plan.

Assertions that State Assistant Secretaries are “neither deployed nor responsible for operations on the ground” are, therefore, missing the point. Embassies on the ground are the functional equivalent of the WHA Assistant Secretary’s “deployment” through the Embassies’ implementation of a piece of the Bureau programming whole.

The reachback to Bureau Program Planning from the Ambassador and country team’s

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31 Author’s State Department consultations, April 2004. (At Embassy Paramaribo, a small mission, aspects of the law enforcement portfolio are shared among several officers. The LEWG may include staff from the political/economic section and consular affairs. In larger missions, the LEWG might be functionally chaired by an officer representing State’s Office of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Matters, but typically with the DCM still retaining oversight and formal responsibility for its workings. Note that USAID Jamaica has regional responsibility for Suriname, but currently runs no bilateral programs in country.)
carrying out of their individual MPPs is the mechanism that links the A/S to operations in
the field.\textsuperscript{33} (For that matter, the claim that the SOUTHCOM Combatant Commander,
headquartered in Florida, is somehow more “deployed” in the Latin American region is
problematic in the first instance.) This is not merely an argument of technical hierarchy,
but perhaps also of physical capacity, considering the small size of the State Department
particularly in relation to DOD.

Recognizing the COCOM-Assistant Secretary equivalency does not detract from
the position of the Ambassador as the President’s personal representative and competent
authority over all USG assets save military personnel falling under a Combatant
Command. This recognition does, however, reflect the hierarchy within State of program
planning between the Ambassador and the regional Assistant Secretary (who, in addition
to possessing regional programming authority, also authors the annual performance
appraisals for ambassadors in the regional bureau’s jurisdiction.). The particular
attraction and benefit of the Ambassador’s special, dual-hatted position is his or her role
as an individual “super-empowered” within the system by virtue of that Presidential
proxy, in terms of influence with both host government entities, and our own U.S.
Government entities.\textsuperscript{34}

\textsuperscript{32} See, for example, Taw, pp. 15--16
\textsuperscript{33} This linking bilateral and regional programming is further reinforced by the COCOM’s Political Advisor
(POLAD), another coordinating link between these planning levels, and in touch not only with State’s
Bureau of Political-Military Affairs which sponsors the POLAD positions, but typically also with
ambassadors and regional bureau personnel. Country team reach back to regional State planning is not
intended to minimize the important coordinating role played by POLADs, but rather to demonstrate that in-
country entities who bring unique and valuable perspectives have a similar conceptual role.
\textsuperscript{34} It would indeed be naïve to argue that the ambassador’s role as the President’s personal representative
bestows absolute power to control other agencies’ activities, but the strong moral suasion associated with
that status is undeniably a valuable tool in orchestrating interagency cooperation in-country.
Managing a Strategy of Partnerships

Beyond these technical and practical bases for arguing the country team “personification” of A/S-COCOM planning equivalency, there is another compelling benefit to exploiting the coordinating functionality of the country team when implementing intervention areas discussed in this paper. By their nature, law enforcement, counter-narcotics, and anti-terrorism issues inherently lend themselves to technical, multidisciplinary, and international approaches; that is, they often require integration of third-country participation.

As Secretary of State Colin Powell has stressed, world opinion’s attention to perceived U.S. bilateralism in the Middle East obscures the prominent intention of the current National Security Strategy to work through international partnerships in meeting common security challenges. In Suriname, this means cooperation with the Dutch, but also British, governments in the areas of law enforcement and civil-military relations. Note that in the Suriname case, as will be true in many others, the geographic pattern or intra-donor participation will not necessarily fall within a single geographic region, as delineated either by State or the Combatant Commands.

How does the United States coordinate with those partners? Some recent examples from Suriname demonstrate the utility of tapping the routine in-country donor coordination that naturally occurs among embassies for the decision-making process. When it was proposed three years ago that the Milgroup in Suriname be considered for closure, a major factor in the decision to retain the office was apparently input from

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coordination with Dutch diplomatic and military colleagues in Paramaribo. Dutch assistance aimed at professionalizing the military was being phased out, rooted in the difficult psychology of relations with its ex-colony. Parallel U.S. assistance was therefore viewed as increasingly important in combined efforts to transform civil-military relations. It was the special field-based input of in-country diplomatic and military coordination with donor counterparts made that observation and policy consequence possible.

Similarly, regarding assistance to Suriname’s new Financial Intelligence Unit (which admittedly does not directly bear on military coordination, but supports a closely related field in the narcotics/law enforcement/corruption nexus), consultation on relative American and Dutch roles occurs via those countries’ embassies in Paramaribo, not in the Hague or Washington. The JIATF South counterdrug effort does include representatives from third-country militaries including the Netherlands, but that coordination appears to be more of a tactical nature in support of interdiction operations than on a policy coordination level.37

JIATF South provides a pertinent example of how the coordinating mechanisms outlined in this paper find expression in practice. In late April, JIATF held its Spring 2004 Counterdrug planning conference in Florida and Alabama. Embassy Paramaribo’s Deputy Chief of Mission,38 also the chair of the Embassy’s LEWG, attended with the goal of more closely linking the Task Force’s assets and programming to U.S. goals in Suriname. He outlined problems and prospects, and explored additional customs,

38 Conversation with DCM Paramaribo, 5/14/2004
military, and other interdiction support that that JIATF might provide to help the task force guide its forward planning.

Interestingly, he was the only DCM to take up the JIATF’s invitation, although several narcotics affairs officers from Embassies in the region attended in addition to milgroup representatives. Given SOUTHCOM’s emphasis on integrating its planning with country teams, that is perhaps surprising, since the attendance of individual embassy coordinating entities provides the possibility for valuable input into theater operations, reflecting received goals from the State Department’s equivalent regional planning process, expertise from in-country interagency management, and unique knowledge of complementary third-party activities.

**Conclusions and Recommendations**

Sometimes, structures aren’t broken. As military and civilian planners contemplate how best to mesh their tools in the deliberate non-crisis planning environment that supports law enforcement/counter-narcotics issues, the Combatant Commanders starts from a solid basis in paying explicit concern to linkages with country teams and ambassadors. Keeping in mind the reasons underpinning that wisdom, as reflected in the following axiom and three corollaries, will ensure that these advantages are exploited to maximum advantage.

- **Equivalent Regional Planning Entities**

  *COCOMs and Assistant Secretaries are operational planning equivalents, and the institutionally smaller State Department ties its regional goals to the implementation process through the multi-agency country team’s reach-back to bureau regional planning*

- **Ambassadors’ Special Role**: A Bonus, not a Constraint
Discomfort over the lack of COCOM-Ambassador equivalency is misplaced. The Ambassador is simultaneously subordinate to State regional bureau structures and uniquely empowered by Presidential proxy to interact with host governments and mediate in-country interagency coordination.

• The Deputy Chief of Mission: Functional Coordinators

The Ambassador’s deputy, as the working-level coordinator for embassy program management, is well attuned to the interplay between the inter-agency piece on the ground and the considered regional planning at the central Washington level. As such, DCMs are valuable points of contact for theater coordination.

• Weaving Multilateralism into U.S. Planning

Embassies typically coordinate with other donors in-country on a regular basis, and are useful conduits for appropriately considering/aligning the activities of extra-USG entities in U.S. planning.
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