AIR COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE

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THE INTERAGENCY PROCESS AND AMERICA’S SECOND FRONT IN THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM

by

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## Contents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DISCLAIMER</td>
<td>ii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ILLUSTRATIONS</td>
<td>v</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PREFACE</td>
<td>vi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABSTRACT</td>
<td>viii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Terrorism—Our greatest national security threat</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- The Nature of the Threat</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THE INTERAGENCY PROCESS</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- National Pol-Mil Interaction</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Operational Pol-Mil Interaction</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Tactical Pol-Mil Interaction</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THEATER ENGAGEMENT PLANNING—A SPRINGBOARD FOR SUCCESS</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- PACOM—Admiral Blair approach</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OEF—PHILIPPINES—A CASE STUDY</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Contextual Factors during OEF-Philippines</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Economic contextual factors</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Diplomatic and International factors</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Environmental factors</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Socio-cultural</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Operational Interagency Process during OEF-PI</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Tactical Interagency Process during OEF-PI</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Challenges during operational planning and employment</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Host-Nation Sensitivities—MOU/ROE Guidance</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Key Turning Points during OEF-PI</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Post-9-11</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- MH-47 Crash</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Hostage Rescue</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- End of Balikatan</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONCLUSIONS/RECOMMENDATIONS</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Continue TEP consistent with other DIME initiatives</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Illustrations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Illustration</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Figure 1. Interagency Process</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 2. Planning: Military/Civilian Coordination</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Preface

Terrorism is the most persistent, complex, and most lethal threat to our nation and presents challenges to our law enforcement and intelligence communities, personal freedoms, and ability to maintain our legitimacy during our fight against terrorism. Using our diplomatic, informational, military, and economic (DIME) instruments of power against terrorism in concert with each other yields the most potential for success against this dangerous asymmetrical threat. As we continue the Global War On Terrorism (GWOT), it is important to remember that the war goes beyond Afghanistan and the hunt for Usama Bin Laden. America’s second front in the Philippines is another, quite different problem set, requiring a different approach to address terrorism at the root level and promote economic prosperity in the Asian Pacific region. As one of the Intelligence, Reconnaissance, and Surveillance (ISR) planners for the operations while serving on the United States Commander in Chief, Pacific (USCINCPAC) staff, I observed first-hand how OEF—Philippines presented military leaders in Pacific Command (PACOM) with the many challenges—some similar and some different than those experienced in OEF—Afghanistan. The smaller military foreign internal defense (FID) efforts in the Philippines, in concert with other elements of DIME employment, are demonstrating United States resolve to eject terrorism in close partnership with this key Asian Pacific nation.
Many thanks to Col Ron Ladnier who took time from his busy schedule as ACSC Commandant to provide clear guidance and advice on avenues of research. His timely feedback and editing on interim measures in the project’s process kept me on track. Many thanks also to Dr. Vicki Rast and Major Marci Watkins who were good enough to read over the project and provide additional scope, editing, and focus.
Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to present solutions on how to address terrorism—the most challenging threat to our national security—and recommend what can be done at the operational level to enhance interagency and coalition partner collaboration required to achieve success against this threat. First, I briefly discuss the nature of the terrorism threat. Second, I review the interagency process at the national level and describe the interagency coordination mechanisms that exist at the operational and tactical levels. Third, I demonstrate how theater engagement was and will continue to be critical to winning the GWOT. This paper also includes a case study reviewing the contextual factors and key turning points during Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF)—Philippines—America’s second front in the GWOT. OEF—Philippines presented military leaders in Pacific Command (PACOM) with the many challenges—some similar and some different than those experienced in OEF—Afghanistan. Finally, I provide recommendations on how to develop an integrated strategy to combat terrorism. Recommendations include: continuing to conduct theater engagement in concert with the other instruments of power (IOPs), enhancing interagency collaboration at the operational and tactical levels, and continuing to support coalition partnering and information sharing.
Chapter 1

Introduction

Defending our Nation against its enemies is the first and fundamental commitment of the Federal Government. Today, that task has changed dramatically. Enemies in the past needed great armies and great industrial capabilities to endanger America. Now, shadowy networks of individuals can bring great chaos and suffering to our shores for less than it costs to purchase a single tank. Terrorists are organized to penetrate open societies and to turn the power of modern technologies against us.

—President George W. Bush

Terrorism is a very challenging threat to our national security. This paper examines what can be done at the operational level to enhance interagency and coalition partner collaboration required for success against this threat. This chapter discusses the nature of the terrorist threat. The next chapter reviews the interagency process at the national level and describes the interagency coordination mechanisms at the operational and tactical levels. Subsequent chapters demonstrate how theater engagement was and will continue to be critical to winning the GWOT. This paper also includes a case study reviewing the contextual factors and key turning points during Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF)—Philippines—America’s second front in the GWOT. OEF—Philippines presented military leaders in Pacific Command (PACOM) with the many challenges—some similar and some different than those experienced in OEF—
Afghanistan. The final chapter recommends specific actions to develop an integrated strategy against terrorism based on the lessons learned from operations in the Philippines.

**Terrorism—Our greatest national security threat**

Terrorism is the most challenging issue of our time because elusive terrorist groups attack civilians, creates a lasting fear among the populace, and impacts the overall economies of the countries they strike. Terrorists do not comply with the Geneva Convention’s tenets—US non-combatants are now targets. Our fundamental security at home is at risk along with the US and world economies. Fighting this threat to our homeland will take decades. As we continue the GWOT, it is more apparent than ever that “the United States government has no more important mission than protecting the homeland from future terrorist attacks.”

**The Nature of the Threat**

Terrorism by its very nature is difficult and complex. According to the Honorable Joan A. Dempsey, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) for Community Management, “the social, economic and political tensions across the world that they (terrorists) exploit in mobilizing their followers, has created an extremely complex and challenging intelligence environment.” The inherent transnational nature of the threat creates additional challenges. Terrorists are individuals, not recognized states in the realpolitik sense. Terrorist motives are often difficult for Americans to understand and their actions are difficult to predict. Their ability to adapt to the American security posture makes them true revolutionaries in the application of asymmetrical threats.

In addition, the indications of a potential terrorist attack are often ambiguous. According to Paul R. Pillar, “Terrorist groups—or more specifically the parts of them
that do the planning and preparations for terrorist attacks—are small, highly secretive, suspicious of outsiders, highly conscious of operational security, and for these reasons extremely difficult to penetrate. Their mobility, coupled with their highly technical command and control (C2) structure, makes terrorist targets difficult to find, track, and destroy.

In addition to their complex nature, their support base is also multifaceted. Terrorism enjoys fewer state sponsors than in the past. According to John Helgerson, “many terrorist groups now rely chiefly on private sources of financial help. These include their own criminal and legitimate business activities, individual donors, and nongovernmental organizations.” Terrorists training camps and sanctuaries often times are based in failed states. The poverty levels in these failed states incite strong resentment, perpetuating the terrorist effort. Addressing the root causes of terrorism by creating a safe environment for citizens to go about their daily business without fear is critical to economic prosperity and supporting our national objectives for a strong global economy.

While our government is organizing to fight more proactively against terrorism, many challenges remain. The new Office of Homeland Defense (OHD) is rife with controversy to include: bi-partisan fighting, organizational structures, resources, and authorities concerns. Within the intelligence community alone persists enduring challenges: lack of analytical resources for this complex target set, shortages of area specialists dedicated to the failed states where terrorists thrive, absence of linguists who possess both the required dialects and appropriate security clearances, and chronic shortages of human intelligence (HUMINT) capabilities. None of these shortfalls can be
remedied overnight: It will take time and a fundamental reprioritization of resources to develop analytical depth, linguistic skills, and HUMINT capabilities to infiltrate such terrorist organizations.

In order to overcome this threat of terrorism, collaboration is critical to success. Why is there a new requirement for collaboration? The ability of terrorists to penetrate our open society calls for a greater requirement for interagency collaboration between intelligence agencies and law enforcement to identify and find terrorist cells at home and abroad.\(^\text{10}\) While the Church and Pike Congressional committees in the 1970s specifically limited the interaction between the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) on activities within our country, the post-911 environment created the impetus for the Patriot’s Act of 2001.\(^\text{11}\) Many of these restrictions were lifted so law enforcement agencies could share information with the CIA. There are implications to our personal freedoms when these players in the interagency process are given additional legal authorities. Terrorism is therefore also challenging for our nation because it impels us to create the appropriate balance between doing everything to get information about terrorists and protecting our individual rights.\(^\text{12}\)

Finally, the most convincing reason why terrorism is our greatest challenge is because of the potential increase in the lethality of terrorist attacks, to include the use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Terrorists could use WMD in future attacks.\(^\text{13}\) The concern is that terrorist groups will seek and obtain WMD, including biological weapons such as anthrax. Terrorist groups worldwide have ready access to information on biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons via the Internet.\(^\text{14}\) Multiple press reports indicate Al-Qaeda is attempting to acquire these types of weapons from Iraq if they have
not done so already.\textsuperscript{15} The difficulty in tracking WMD transfers to terrorists—coupled with the immaturity of WMD detection devices—makes combating terrorism a huge challenge for our nation. Being proactive and engaging our allies to assist in this fight will be critical to winning the GWOT. According to VADM Thomas R. Wilson, former director of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), “we will never win the war truly until we work with coalitions and friends and allies around the world to deal with the root causes of terrorism.”\textsuperscript{16}

The nature of the terrorist threat described in this chapter requires a new approach to interagency collaboration. Chapter two will provide the background on the interagency process and describe the political-military (pol-mil) interaction at the various levels of war. Examining the process sets the stage for discussions in chapter four on how the decisions made during the interagency process at the national level significantly impacted planning at the operational and tactical levels during OEF—Philippines.

Notes

\textsuperscript{4} Pillar, Paul R., Statement to the Joint Inquiry of the SSCI and HPSCI, 8 October 2002.
\textsuperscript{7} Fiedler, Lt Col Michael, USAF, NS-535 Panel, 23 Sept 02.
\textsuperscript{9} Laipson, Ellen. Statement To Senate Government Affairs Committee On Foreign Language Requirements In The Intelligence Community, 14 Sept 2000.
Notes

13 Powell, Secretary of State Colin, Statements to Press, 25 Sept 02
15 CNN, 29 Sept 02
Chapter 2

The Interagency Process

In today’s security environment, with special regard to the global campaign against terrorism, an atmosphere of teamwork, cooperation, and sharing is critical to executing U.S. national policy.

—Admiral Thomas B. Fargo, USN

The nature of the terrorist threat described in the first chapter demands we use an integrated approach using all of the instruments of power against terrorism. The interagency process (Figure 1) at the national level and interagency collaboration at the

![Interagency Process Diagram]

Figure 1. Interagency Process

7
operational and tactical level is designed to assist in this integrated approach. The
interagency players meet at the national level to develop an integrated policy within the
national level interagency process. The outcome of this process significantly impacts the
subsequent military planning at the operational and tactical levels. The regional
combatant commanders and joint task force (JTF) commanders are responsible for
ensuring that their plans support the overall national strategy.

National Pol-Mil Interaction

One key part of the interagency process is National Security Council (NSC)
meetings on strategic policy development. According to Dr. Rast, “Domestic and
international political contextual parameters determine the nature of the interagency
process “playing field” while simultaneously selecting the “players.”3 From the
overarching National Security Strategy (NSS) and other guidance from the NSC, the
“players” such as State Department and Department of Defense (DOD) develop plans on
how to deal with other nations. More specifically as depicted in Figure 2, the State
Department develops a Mission Program Plan (MPP) and Regional Program Plan (RPP).4
The MPP and RPP “contain policy objectives, measures of effectiveness, objectives,
priorities in support of NSS….Military operations must support US foreign policy
objectives.”5 Ideally this overarching country-specific document from State should drive
the military engagement strategy as outlined in the combatant commander’s Theater
Engagement Plan (TEP) as outlined in Figure 2.6
Figure 2. Planning: Military/Civilian Coordination

In concert with State, TEPs should provide a synchronized, mutually reinforcing, and sustainable plan demonstrating US unity of effort for relations with a given country. If integrated into a deftly crafted regional strategy, the planning would do more to shape the entire region in direct support of US national objectives. Barry Blechman contends the theater engagement plan has great potential in “rationalizing and disciplining efforts to conduct meaningful, focused, and productive peacetime engagement.” However, different planning processes and stovepipes, failures in interagency coordination, and organizational variances occasionally cause discrepancies in our diplomatic and military approaches.

The State Department planning process is very country specific and somewhat different than that of the regional approach taken by combatant commander’s planning staffs. In addition, the State Department is broken down into functional and geographic...
bureaus that do not align with combatant commander areas of responsibility (AOR) as outlined in DOD’s Unified Command Plan (UCP). Dr. Rast posits “the State Department’s capacity to fulfill its functional equities often exposes the nexus where the political and military equities come together. This nexus illuminates the resource-related equities that appear as the Defense Department’s visible assets.” With a lack of proper resources, the regional combatant commanders often fill a vacuum left by State in their AORs.

According to Dana Priest, who interviewed the former “CINCs,” all of them wanted Washington to take “a more regional approach to solving problems and for Washington to offer greater support to regional coalitions….the CINCs wanted to talk about fixing the interagency process so that they would be smarter about what they were doing and more effective.” The lack of clear guidance from Washington left them to interpret the NSS and National Military Strategy (NMS) at the operational level.

**Operational Pol-Mil Interaction**

The regional combatant commanders approve the TEP and support their plans everyday by their travel and actions. Even the order in which he travels to countries is interpreted by regional actors as a symbol of the relationship the United States has with countries in the region. Dana Priest posits the CINCs in the late 1990s were more than just combatant commanders but often envoys for our government in diplomatic matters of State. Their influence in shaping the AOR for which they are responsible is based on the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) reviewed TEP. The plans are linked to national strategic goals, but much of it is “a smorgasbord of training, exercises, exchanges, port visits, and conferences.”
The TEP Planning Process is used to present a theater shaping strategy and identify theater-shaping requirements.\textsuperscript{15} The TEP strives to provide theater input for national-level synchronization and approval. A better OSD review process of the theater TEPs in coordination with State would greatly improve the ability of our nation to present a common approach and unified front in international affairs. Figure 2 shows the direct linkage between the \textit{NSS} and \textit{NMS} and between the combatant commander’s TEP. The TEP is developed by the J-5 directorate on the combatant commander’s staff and is review by the command’s political advisor (POLAD) before being approved by the combatant commander and then sent back to OSD for review.

The POLAD is a member of the combatant commander’s personal staff and advises him on political issues. The POLAD works for the State Department officially but serves the regional combatant commander by offering the State Department perspective. His main role is to inform the regional combatant commander of State Department initiatives and ensure synergy of efforts between the regional combatant commander and the State Department. For example, in PACOM, Ambassador Charles H. Twining, Foreign Policy Advisor to USCINCPAC, not only reviewed the TEPs for Admiral Blair, but also ensured operations in the Philippines would be in accordance with the Mutual Defense Treaty and MOU signed by President George W. Bush and President Gloria Arroyo in November 2001.\textsuperscript{16} Admiral Blair relied daily on Ambassador Twining’s perspective and used him to make huge inroads into the State Department on behalf of the Regional Combatant Commander based on the issue and personalities involved in the various offices at he State Department.\textsuperscript{17}
The Ambassador is responsible for the overall bilateral relationship with the country. The Regional Combatant Commander, while not a tasking authority over the ambassadors, usually coordinates closely on every military operation conducted in the host nation. In countries where a US diplomatic presence is reduced or are non-existent, Regional Combatant Commanders may be the only in road into those countries. Especially during the Clinton administration, “the military came to outrank its civilian chain of command in influence, authority, and resources in many parts of the world.”

In PACOM during the GWOT, coordination was critical for seamless military operations in the respective host countries. The embassy staffs from countries within the AOR and members of the Regional Combatant Commander’s staff were in daily contact mainly through the J5 channels on policy and planning issues. In addition, some elements of the staff from the J2, J3, and J4 directorates coordinated with the Defense Attachés (DATTs) and Chief of Station (COS) on intelligence sharing, overflight and basing rights, and forward basing and beddown concerns.

**Tactical Pol-Mil Interaction**

At the tactical level, JTF Commanders must organize themselves in a manner, which promotes collaboration with liaisons from national agencies and the Ambassador’s Country Teams. During OEF—Philippines, the JTF Commander and interagency players in the field had very good relations because they were closest to the problem set and had embedded special operators in the embassy for support. The interagency players understood the requirements for intelligence and for force protection information to support military operations. The military forces deployed however were very far removed from the political drivers in the beltway that impact their operations. To
alleviate frustrations with the process, ensuring clear guidance to the JTF on the mission and overall national objectives is imperative. It is also critical that the interagency representatives actions are synchronized with the JTF Commanders plan.

This chapter discussed the interagency process, the political-military interaction at the various levels of wars, and introduced interagency collaboration with regard the combatant commander’s TEP. The examination of the process sets the stage for discussions in Chapter Four on how the decisions made during the interagency process at the national level significantly impacted planning at the operational and tactical levels during OEF—Philippines. To bridge these two chapters, chapter three posits how the peacetime engagement outlined in the TEP was the baseline for success in the GWOT in many AORs, and will describe in detail how it played a major role in the USCINCPAC counterterrorism strategy.

Notes

3 Rast, Dr. Vicki, Maj, USAF, “Contextual Parameters: Environmental Factors Channel Interagency Dynamics”, NS Coursebook, AY 2003, Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell AFB, AL, p. 117.
6 Per J5 Staff, the Theater Engagement Plans (TEP) will become more specific Security Cooperation Plans (SCP) in the future.
Notes

11 The term “CINC” is no longer used per SECDEF guidance. It has been replaced with Combatant Commander or “COCOM.”
17 Knight, CAPT Jim, USN, USCINCPAC, Acting Deputy J3 during OEF, interview with the author 12 March 2003.
Chapter 3

Theater Engagement Planning—A Springboard for Success

Militaries have always had political and policy applications. Shaping merely recognizes that reality and seeks to exploit it.

—Barry M. Blechman, et al

The TEPs developed and implemented during peacetime was the underpinning of the strategy used in the war against terrorism in many AORs. The programs outlined in the TEP funded many good will initiatives. These efforts along with the development of relationships between the regional combatant commander’s, his national agency liaisons, and his coalition partners in the region paid off in the post-9-11 environment. Because many foreign nations had also been affected by the tragedy, they became committed to join the United States in its GWOT. Regional combatant commanders tracked and nurtured this support throughout the campaign.

As described in the chapter two, the regional combatant commanders blurred the lines between military and diplomatic arenas. Often these regional combatant commanders often represented only inroads into some states and were received in many countries with the honors afforded to Heads of State. The relationship these officials created with foreign dignitaries and ministers of Defense proved critical to the foundation of our GWOT strategy. In Central Command (CENTCOM), the legacy left by General Zinni and continued by General Franks demonstrated a commitment to engagement.
Likewise, General Martin in European Command (EUCOM) credited his success in the GWOT on four main thrust tied to his TEP: establishing access, having influence in the AOR, cooperation with coalition partners and striving for interoperability with regional partners. Admiral Blair in PACOM approach was very similar for a very different region.

**PACOM—Admiral Blair approach**

From the early stages of post-9-11 planning to the present, military leaders in PACOM overcame many daunting challenges to address terrorism in the AOR. In developing PACOM’s counterterrorism (CT) strategy, military leaders successfully adapted the existing theater engagement strategy to the war on terrorism in the Pacific. One key leveraging point from the TEP was the on-going Joint/Combined Exchange Training (JCET). The JCET program fulfills our own training requirements and shares these skills with the host-nation. In addition to training, simultaneous humanitarian assistance and civic action projects provide tangible benefits to the civilian population of the host nations. Prior involvement of SOF forces in JCET and combined exercises paid huge dividends after 9-11.

Key to this success was strong leadership from USCINCPAC Admiral Dennis Blair and his superb efforts to establish smart organizational structures to address this new problem set over the long term. Why was he so successful? Just like General Zinni, Admiral Blair was well aware of the political context in which he operated. Admiral Blair had been the Chief of Staff of the JCS and knew the politics of the beltway as well as how to reorganize a staff to deal with the terrorism issue in accordance with joint doctrine and guidelines for interagency coordination. His three years as the Assistant
DCI for Military Support also prepared him for the challenge. He had a strategic appreciation for what the intelligence community could bring to the fight and understood the constraints of the DCI restrictions for sharing information with coalition partners. During OEF, many of these intelligence-sharing restrictions were lifted. Foreign services dedicated their time to cooperating with the United States and in understanding that there is at various levels, a symbiosis here, especially in the intelligence world. Many of these intelligence sharing operations and risk management decisions were appropriately delegated to the theater J2s, all in an effort to enhance the utility of actionable intelligence.

Admiral Blair selected special operators as the critical tool to fight terrorism. Coordination with his special operations component, United States Special Operational Command Pacific (USSOC PAC) was enhanced because of the daily direct interface with them. Unlike Operation ALLIED FORCE (OAF), where Gen Wesley Clarke used the video teleconferencing (VTC) as a conduit for guidance, Admiral Blair was fortunate to have this lead component sharing the same headquarters building during the early planning stages. When the JTF stood up, he trusted his JTF Commander to provide him with situational reports and to identify issues he could advocate on the JTF’s behalf back to the joint staff (JCS). In addition, Admiral Blair had at least weekly scheduled personal phone conversations with the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) Donald Rumsfeld during OEF—Philippines to ensure the military actions were in line with the actions of other agencies operating in the region.

Two very important special missions USSOC PAC’s operators brought to the fight related to combating terrorism were FID missions—strengthening a nation’s own ability
to deal with threats to their country and critical augmentation to the Embassy country teams in PACOM via Pacific Situation Assessment Teams (PSATs). But long before 9-11, special operators had deployed throughout the theater, conducted training in support of the PACOM theater engagement strategy, and sewn the seeds that would bear the fruits of victory in the AOR.

While this chapter three overviews the peacetime engagement outlined in the TEP and describes how it was the baseline for success in the USCINCPAC counterterrorism strategy, subsequent chapters will discuss OEF—Philippines more specifically. The ensuing chapter discusses how the interagency process at the national level significantly impacted planning at the operational and tactical levels during OEF—Philippines. It is a case study reviewing the contextual factors and key turning points during Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF)—Philippines—America’s second front in the GWOT.

Notes

Chapter 4

OEF—Philippines—A Case Study

Today, the theater commanders rely upon their theater special operations commands for rapid response to emergencies and to provide warrior-diplomats who pave the way for better U.S. relations with our foreign partners. USOCCM’s unique capabilities provide CINCs and the Secretary of Defense with powerful tools that are found nowhere else.¹

—General Charles R. Holland, USAF
    Commander in Chief
    United States Special Operations Command

OEF—Philippines provides an excellent case study in interagency collaboration. The following case study is an in-depth analysis on the many challenges leaders faced in the Pacific—some similar and some different than those experienced in OEF—Afghanistan. The contextual factors on America’s second front presented leaders with issues that if not properly addressed would impact the long-term ability of the United States to engage and project power in the Pacific.

Contextual Factors during OEF-Philippines

There were many contextual factors—economic, diplomatic, international, social-cultural, political, and environmental—that impacted the campaign against the Philippine-based Muslim terrorist group Abu Sayyaf (ASG) and forced US planners to focus on a coalition strategy with longer impacting strategic effects.
An examination of each of the contextual challenges listed above is critical to assessing United States effectiveness during OEF-Philippines. Contextual factors are often beyond the control of the military planners and commanders.\(^2\) In this case, leaders had to adapt to the situation and work interagency relations hard in order to succeed. Admiral Dennis Blair appointed Brig General Donald C. Wurster, USAF, Commander USSOC PAC, as the JTF-510 Commander and tasked him with the FID mission in the Philippines. SOCPAC forces provided critical assistance to the Republic of the Philippines to rid themselves of terrorists’ threats to their nations. “US Army Special Forces, supported by special operation forces (SOF) aircraft, took the lead in these FID operations.”\(^3\) The PACOM TEP, which emphasized continued training with the Republic of the Philippines was the springboard from which these operations were launched in the new context of the GWOT.

**Economic contextual factors**

Economic factors impacted operational planning. A major bank failure in 2000, President’s Estrada’s departure in early 2001, challenges to Arroyo’s new administration, and the slowing global economy had depressed prospects for the Philippine economy to recover.\(^4\) Terrorism thrives in states with weak economies. The US – Philippines trade and foreign aid relationship therefore, dominated discussions at the national level. America wanted to strike a fine balance between supporting this partnership and carrying the full load of helping the Philippine economy out of its slump.

**Diplomatic and International factors**

Several diplomatic factors affected operations in the Philippines. First, the US was hesitant to set up a huge presence in the Philippines that would create the perception that
the Americans were returning in full force to its former colony. As the situation developed a force cap was put in place which significantly affected planning.

Second, prior to 9-11, the American military in PACOM was on the more conventional threats like North Korea and China and regional engagement. Admiral Blair fostered engagement with PACOM countries within the AOR to increase regional stability.\(^5\) It was this engagement that provided the conduits of information and intelligence sharing when the GWOT commenced. According to Admiral Blair, it was a an international and an inter-agency effort using “a lot of the skills we had before, fighting things like drugs and piracy and terrorism, but we really intensified it, widened it and put a lot more emphasis on it.”\(^6\)

The third unique diplomatic contextual factor affecting planning was the predominately bilateral American military strategy in the Pacific, in contrast to EUCOM, where the multilateral North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Alliance, European Union (EU), Partnership for Peace (PFP) make planning complex. In one way, this gave military planners a little more flexibility and ability to focus on the Philippine and supporting Japanese partners for operations in the Philippines and in forward staging bases in Japan.

Fourth, the “Afghanistan First” policy in the GWOT significantly reduced the resources available to conduct CT operations in the Pacific. No one would disagree that addressing the Al Qaeda link first and foremost was the right priority.\(^7\) At the national level, the attention given to conducting OEF—Philippines and ASG problem set was a secondary task at best. It would be one of many challenges the PACOM leaders would face in the war against terrorism in the Pacific.
Fifth, US leaders in the Pacific were also concerned about diverting valuable resources away from other OPLANS. Planners had to continually balance the resources diverted to support OEF-Afghanistan with PACOM own OPLAN commitments and efforts to address terrorism within the AOR. Regardless, each regional combatant commander was responsible for planning his or her region’s part of the GWOT strategy. A huge springboard for this planning was the existing theater engagement plans.

**Environmental factors**

Environmental factors, such as distance, weather and terrain, were also significant challenges military leaders faced. “The tyranny of distance” — a term still used today in the Pacific theater to describe the vast expanse of the AOR — created a greater reliance on empowering the forward commander. Communication architectures across the Pacific Ocean to the Philippines’ southern Mindino area were a far cry from the more robust in other AORs. For example, in CENTCOM and EUCOM, the communication architecture for relaying unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) feeds had been in place for some time.

For OEF—Philippines, a cost benefit analysis dictated the relay of that type of full motion video would reside with the JTF commander forward and not be sent back to higher headquarters or the Pentagon except in rare circumstances. Admiral Blair trusted that his JTF Commander Brig Gen Donald Wurster. They decided the Joint Operations Center (JOC) forward was the most important place for the live video information to be utilized. The JTF commander at the tactical level was the one who needed the information to command and control his forces, not anyone at operational level or strategic level for this FID mission. Again the distance created a challenge but leadership and empowerment helped them overcome this challenge.
The other environmental factor was weather and terrain. The jungle canopy and clouds obscured many of these unconventional terrorist targets, making it difficult for target identification and tracking. Innovation and technology helped military planners address these constraints, in addition to finally getting boots on the ground. The tactical situation awareness was greatly enhanced when the FID operations commenced. United States military partnering with Philippine military force greatly increased the situational awareness at all levels of war. Daily situation reports conveyed the appropriate level of detail for the combatant commander. Information was then blessed and relayed back to the national level to keep all parties informed on the progress of operations and emerging requirements from the JTF in Zamboanga.

**Socio-cultural**

Operations in the Philippines had its own unique socio-cultural contextual factors for military and diplomatic planners to contend with. Our U.S. efforts were designed to create a safe security environment to foster economic development, root out terrorists, and train the military forces in counterterrorism (CT) skill sets. According to Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, the Filipinos were appreciative because we helped “them look good, instead of humiliating them or embarrassing them, which I think may have been the fear initially”⁸ Key to this success was the understanding of the culture that SOF forces brought to Balikatin 02 which ran from 17 Feb 2001 to 31 July 2001. Wolfowitz’s recommendation was for the United States to continue to provide them with support because the Philippines must deal with the Muslim terrorist groups in own country and continue to successfully integrate Muslims into predominately Christian society⁹
The rife between Christian and Muslim concentrations was prevalent in the more southern region. The ASG operated in this southern area of the Philippines and was founded by those trained in Afghanistan. According to Admiral Blair, “they are a group that is mostly criminal but certainly has the potential to be used by al-Qaida as a base of operations.” Security in this area is a challenge because of the growing Muslim influence in the region, and the more open societies in which terrorist can move around in to avoid the scrutiny found in the Middle East. Teaching them to secure their borders through interagency coordination with CIA and FBI will reduce the chance of this free flow movement of key terrorist in Southeast Asia.

**Operational Interagency Process during OEF-PI**

At the operational level the combatant commander, Admiral Blair, utilized his POLAD, senior staff, DCI representative, National Security Agency (NSA) liaison, National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA) representatives, and counterintelligence (CI) staff as conduits for information with the national level to ensure other agencies were aware of the FID mission and its unique requirements. In addition to leveraging this his staff and lead component JTF, USCINCPAC quickly established a CT cell within the J3 Directorate, J30CT, to focus on the operational level operations monitoring and CT planning for the entire AOR. This cell grew into a Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF) as national interagency players such as CIA, FBI, NSA, and NIMA augmented this cell to enhance interagency collaboration at the operational level. According to USCINCPAC, “the sharing between the Department of Defense, Federal Bureau of Investigation, the intelligence agencies like the CIA, has taken place on an unprecedented level because of this common campaign within our government against terrorism.”
The JIATF spent a lot of time not only working interagency coordination but also determining the ability and will of regional players to assist in the GWOT and become coalition partners. This baseline assessment allowed for the National agencies to focus on each nation with that in mind. They also conducted a risk management assessment to determine trade-off of intelligence/information sharing with coalition partners for the JTF. The USCINCPAC 24 hour Crisis Action Team (CAT) also ensured direct support to the JTF, taking direct staff action on request for forces and information contained the JTF Commander’s Situational Reports (SITREPs).

**Tactical Interagency Process during OEF-PI**

There were no non-government organizations (NGOs) to coordinate with at the tactical level as describe by doctrine in this scenario. The southern Mindinao region was too “hot” for them.\textsuperscript{14} Because of this the Civil Military Operations Center (CMOC) was not established to conduct the tactical interagency coordination as described in joint doctrine. According to Timothy Sample, “you have to have peace in order to have prosperity, regardless of what country you are in.”\textsuperscript{15} The lack of safe and secure environment in the Philippines was impacting not only their economy and their tourist industry, but also NGOs assistance. Ideally a CMOC would have been established per joint doctrine to assist as the interface between all humanitarian organizations and military forces.\textsuperscript{16} However, the U.S. military forces were left to do the humanitarian relief operations because the NGOs could not send folks down. Navy Seabees and Marine engineers built roads and bridges and dug well to get the area back on their feet.\textsuperscript{17} The assistance provided was an act of good will that would pay huge dividends towards repairing the Filipino economy in the southern region.
Other government agencies, such as the FBI, augmented the JTF forward to assist in force protection and situational awareness for the Operational Detachment Alpha (ODA) Teams. Because of the constraints on personnel allowed in the Joint Operations Area (JOA) per the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), every additional person added to support the JTF in Zamboanga for intelligence and force protection measures would be that many less SOF personnel and engineers authorized. Finding the right balance between the tooth-to-tail ratios in a FID environment was a new and unique challenge. For this reason, no National Intelligence Support Team (NIST) per se was deployed to support the JOC in the doctrinal sense. Reachback to the Joint Intelligence Center Pacific (JICPAC) and USCINCPAC J2 staffs, leveraging the operational level interagency representatives, and utilizing rear staging bases for ISR platforms, when appropriate, alleviated the requirement for a huge interagency presence at Zamboanga. The JTF commander had a tailored interagency support team based on his requirements and political constraints. The State Department interagency representation to the JTF was via the DATT in Manila and strengthened by the PSAT Team collocated at the Embassy to ensure the integration of special operations information with the Ambassador. The PSAT also assists in the management of the United States government response to the crisis and provides continuous support to the USCINCPAC decision-making process.18

**Challenges during operational planning and employment**

In summary the challenges during OEF—Philippines were very different from those in OEF—Afghanistan. The scope and scale were much different. The jungle terrain in the Philippines was completely different than that of Afghanistan and presented different challenges to ISR planners. In addition, the forces allocated were significantly
restricted due to political constraints. Despite this, OEF—Philippines represented the largest commitment of overseas forces for a counterterrorism mission outside of Afghanistan but without dropping any bombs.\textsuperscript{19} The U.S. military focus was on assisting the Philippines to do the job of thwarting terrorism themselves while steering clear of engaging in combat. It was a delicate balancing act to advise and assist and avoid the perception that the U.S. military was running things. Understanding the culture and this sensitivity was key to success in dealing with this former colony.

**Host-Nation Sensitivities—MOU/ROE Guidance**

The post-U.S. bases era has seen some improvement in the United States relationship with the Philippines. The Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) of 1999 and Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT) of 1951 are increasing the military cooperation but there were still host-nation sensitivities to our deploying forces.\textsuperscript{20} This sensitivity was captured in a MOU signed by both President Bush and President Gloria Arroyo from the Philippines.\textsuperscript{21} The restraints and constraints contained in that document had a huge implication on the planning for that operation. Namely, there was a force cap on the number of forces authorized to conduct the FID mission—representing America’s second front on terrorism.\textsuperscript{22} In addition, specific Rules of Engagement (ROEs) were established in the document, which would put the special operators in an advisory role only.

Force protection was an immediate concern. The JTF Commander forward deployed to Zamboanga and set up a JOC at huge distances from USCINCPAC and USSOCPAC Headquarters. Once the Command and control elements were established in Zamboanga, US Army Special Operations Forces forward deployed to the island of Basilan to work with the Philippine army and marines on the tactics, techniques, and procedures.
associated with FID. Basilan was home to their most elusive terrorist, the ASG. This
group was holding American and Philippine hostages for ransom to pay for their terrorist
activities. Finding them on this island was a little easier said than done.

Key Turning Points during OEF-PI

Post-9-11

Before 9-11, the ASG was identified as a threat to the Philippines—they held U.S
and Filipino hostages for ransom and were linked to Al Qaeda. The U.S. plan on dealing
with this situation was an integrated plan that incorporated the FBI, CIA, State
Department players. The military planning was focused on what the military could do to
support those efforts. After 9-11, the ASG was quickly added to the list of threat groups
in the GWOT. Admiral Blair established JTF-510 in the Philippines to train the Filipino
military to address this threat over the long term. While the JTF focused on training,
other interagency players like State and FBI continued to work on getting the hostages
released by other means. By February 2002, “the SOF mission was to train and upgrade
the skills of the Filipino troops in antiterrorist operations so that they could take the fight
to the ASG guerillas.” The restrictions to the FID mission were very tight based on the
historical and legal contextual issues surrounding the situation. The decision to restrict
our US involvement in the Philippines was approved at the highest level of both of our
governments. The Regional Combatant Commander, understanding these political
realities, gave the JTF a clear FID mission and focused on the longer-term engagement
with the Philippines. Over the long term, the Filipino military would have the skill sets to
address this internal threat and the US would not be mired down over the long term with huge cost of a forward presence in a country we left ten years prior.

The engagement theory became the underlying theoretical basis for force structure and special ops employment in the Philippines. How well did the theory and doctrine play out in actual ops against the ASG? Assessing effectiveness in FID against such threats, like the ASG could never be separated from the hostage issue as the mission statement implied. The ASG had kidnapped Martin and Gracia Burnham on 27 May 2001 and Filipino nurse Deborah Yap on 1 June 2001 for ransom. The dangers of going after the terrorists holding hostages close at bay were readily apparent. The FID training would entail training both the Army and Marine forces of the Philippines to rescue hostages, although U.S. direct participation in these operations was prohibited. Because the JTF-510 mission was training, the resources allocated to this effort were primarily in-theater assets. With real strike operations going on in OEF—Afghanistan, it was very difficult for PACOM to justify deploying additional assets, such as additional ISR platforms, to the AOR. While in a much smaller scale than OEF—Afghanistan, these special operations missions proved just as risky to U.S. forces.

**MH-47 Crash**

A major turning point in the operations was the 21 February crash of a US MH-47 Chinook helicopter from the 160th Army Special Operations Aviation Regiment. All ten SOF personnel perished in the Bohol Strait shortly after the crew dropped off several SOF Teams in Basilan due to poor weather conditions. The tragedy pointed to the inherent danger associated with the CT mission. It was a major turning point in the
operations because news of this tragedy impacted the political oversight, interest in, and dedication of resources given to this second front in the GWOT from the JCS staff.

**Hostage Rescue**

The final hostage stand off during a Philippine military sweep, Operation Daybreak, on 7 June 2002 was another turning point during OEF-Philippines. Martin Burnham and Deborah Yap were killed and Marcia Burnham was rescued. The hostage situation was finally resolved after a year and 11 days for the Burnhams—tragically for two of the three hostages. This was a major turning point because the gloves were now off in the pursuit of the ASG leadership. Any engagement by the Filipino military forces with the ASG after that point could be pursued without fear of inadvertently killing a hostage. The hot pursuit led to the death of the several key ASG leaders over the next several weeks.

**End of Balikitan**

By the end of Balikitan-02, the JTF had overcome many hurdles in establishing a non-threatening presence in a former colony. The initial results of OEF-PI, under Brig Gen Wurster’s leadership, destroyed key members of the ASG leadership, provided much needed aid to the Philippines, enabled continued access for training and operations, and exploited intelligence sharing opportunities where appropriate. The United States also provided “some $148 million in excess defense articles, including C-130 and UH-1 aircraft, three patrol ships, 400 trucks, and 15,000 M-16 rifles.” In addition Foreign Military Financing increased ten-fold and International Military Education and Training (IMET) increased to $2 million—the second largest IMET in the world. In addition to military assistance, USAID invested almost $74 million in grants to support the
Philippines and joint law enforcement and intelligence agency collaboration improved significantly.  

As a result of OEF—Philippines, PACAF is further assisting in C2 architecture and integrating air and space forces into the SOF mission planning by establishing a new unit at Hickam AFB, HI, Kadena AB, Japan, and Osan AB, Korea. The Joint Special Operations Air Component will provide joint air planning and coordination at the tactical and operational levels. The unit is designed to get in earlier on the initial stages of SOF planning and focus on bridging any gaps between JSOTF/JOC and JFACC/JAOC staffs, especially in situations like these where the smaller scope of operations did not require a full-up JFACC, only a JSOACC with occasional augmentation/assistance by the DIRMObFOR and Joint Reconnaissance Center.  

United States military leaders devised effective strategies to overcome many contextual challenges. The JTF proved able to adapt their planning to the contextual challenges while focusing on the causes of terrorism not just the terrorist themselves. We met our strategic goals by working with the Filipino military to address the threat group. Admiral Blair and Brig Gen Wurster, in particular, empowered their people, trusted their planners, and fulfilled their respective responsibilities. They fought for the resources they needed but kept the request at an appropriate level given the relative status and scope of this mission in relation to other missions within and outside the AOR.  

The lessons from the OEF—Philippines experience, especially the limits of the mission based on political constraints, remain useful. The experience needs to shape the way we incorporate the interagency players at the operational and tactical level. This experience also solidifies how the theater engagement plan that incorporated SOF
exercise with coalition partners was a critical first step in the war on terrorism. The next
and final chapter recommends specific actions to develop an integrated strategy against
terrorism based on the lessons learned from operations in the Philippines.

Notes

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6 Blair, Admiral Dennis, USCINC PAC, transcript of oral interview by Margaret
7 Steven Vogel, “Americans Arrive in Philippines U.S. Special Forces To Aid
8 Wolfowitz, Paul, Deputy Secretary of Defense, address at Hoover Institution Event
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10 Blair, Admiral Dennis, USCINC PAC, transcript of oral interview by Margaret
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12 Wolfowitz, Paul, Deputy Secretary of Defense, address at Hoover Institution Event
13 Blair, Admiral Dennis, USCINC PAC, transcript of oral interview by Margaret
14 Wolfowitz, Paul, Deputy Secretary of Defense, address at Hoover Institution Event
Notes

Chapter 5

Conclusions/Recommendations

The military dimension of our cooperation is only one element in a broader cooperation against terrorism, but certainly draws the most attention from the news media.

—Ambassador Francis J. Ricciardone

According to Thomas W. O’Connell, who served as the Deputy of Office of Military Affairs at CIA and the former JSOC/J2, “in the post-9-11 world, we will rely heavily on the good will and efficiency of many coalition forces to track down and interdict terrorists.” Based on the lessons from the OEF—Philippines experience described in chapter four, several recommendations emerged on how to develop an integrated strategy against terrorism, which incorporates coalition partnering. The first recommendation is to continue to conduct theater engagement in concert with the other instruments of power (IOPs). The second recommendation is to enhance interagency collaboration at the operational and tactical levels. The third and final recommendation is to support coalition partnering and information sharing.

Continue TEP consistent with other DIME initiatives

As stated in the newly released NSS, “To defeat this (terrorist) threat we must make use of every tool in our arsenal—military power, better homeland defenses, law
enforcement, intelligence, and vigorous efforts to cut off terrorist financing.”

Through the time-phased and complementary application of the elements of national power, we can increase our effectiveness against terrorism. In addition, new and creative ways must be examined to deal with this asymmetrical threat capable of shifting rapidly toward our vulnerabilities. The IOPs must be used in concert with each other to be effective. Brutal military force alone is not effective over the long-term against such an elusive target. Knowing the constraints of applying each IOP is also critical.

**Diplomatic**

Our diplomatic approach must continue to expand the coalition against terrorism, negotiate basing rights for military options, and develop intelligence sharing relationships with other countries. Our ability to work with coalition partners against terrorism will only get more difficult as 9-11 momentum fades. The US must continue building the coalition for the GWOT that is willing to support us with actions not just words. Conveying our message abroad is often difficult, especially in the Arab region. With no end in sight to our support to Israel and our continued presence in the Gulf region, the hostility against the US will continue in the future. The protracted conflict in the Levant and potential U.S. action against regional powers that support terrorism, such as Iraq and Iran, will only serve to fan the flames inciting terrorist actions against the US.

We should continue to identify state sponsors of terrorism but be cautious in expanding the “axis of evil” with our rhetoric. Diplomats and military envoys must convey the same message to dissuade states from supporting terrorism. Dealing with states already suspected of supporting terrorism is hampered by a reduced diplomatic presence in many of these countries. Our lack of access in those countries harboring
terrorist forces us to rely on coalition partners to meet our objectives: penetrate terrorist cells, understand and disrupt their plans, and kill them.

**Informational**

The informational IOP can further American ideals abroad and reduce terrorism, especially in areas where our popularity is most threatened. This IOP can also dampen the psychological aftershocks of the terrorist attacks. Moreover, these reassurances can reduce economic impacts both domestically and in the global market. We must pursue informational options include using Voice of America, providing realistic counters to anti-American rhetoric in the media, dropping leaflets and radios, monopolizing on the effect of globalization expanding American values abroad, and increasing sensitivity training to forces to be more in tune with cultural issues while being hosted overseas. This most critical area of the IOPs is often our biggest shortfall. Using it properly can alleviate fear, instill trust in the government’s action plan to fight terrorism, build an international coalition against terrorism, and deter adversaries from supporting terrorism in the future.

**Military**

We must continue military operations and planning for the GWOT. While the military has been very successful in the initial stages in the war on terrorism, we must continue efforts to review our force protection plans and rehearse WMD scenarios that can impact military operations. We must continue our planning efforts, to include unilateral action and coalition teaming where appropriate, to strengthen our global response posture. We should expand the Guard and Reserve activation to ensure
adequate forces are available for deployments, build up forces in strategic areas to strike terrorist camps, training facilities, and states sponsoring terrorism, and enforce sanctions of states sponsoring terrorism. Other military options include conducting operations in failed states to deny terrorist sanctuary and using deliberate force for regime change in countries that sponsor terrorism. We must protect our infrastructure, both physical and information networks, from attack from terrorist groups that have already demonstrated their technical savvy. Taking the long view, we should focus on training our coalition partners, through FID and JMET efforts, to deal with their own internal terrorism problems before they spread. Funding these initiatives that are validated by the interagency process is key to success. Most importantly, we have to ensure that our military efforts do not undermine our longer-term strategy for regional cooperation as demonstrated successfully in OEF-PI.

**Economic**

Finally, using economic tools at our disposal is important but often less effective than the other instruments. We should continue sanctions and freezing of the assets of state sponsors of terrorism and suspected terrorist groups, increase aid to Allies, place embargo on countries supporting terrorism, and provide debt relief to GWOT coalition partners as part of our strategy. According to President Bush, “America will help nations that need our assistance in combating terror. And America will hold to account nations that are compromised by terror, including those who harbor terrorists—because the allies of terror are the enemies of civilization.” By assisting our allies economically, the United States can address the root causes of terrorism itself. These economic efforts must be clearly linked to our other IOP efforts.
Support Interagency Collaboration at the Operational and Tactical Level

The entire plan for an integrated strategy as outline above, cannot be done without effective interagency collaboration. Key to this collaboration is the use of liaisons from different organizations embedded at the right locations in key agencies. According to Watkins, “A boundaryless war requires a boundaryless response and a flexible, responsive, interagency organization that can knock down the barriers between the different agencies is what we need now to ensure we can overcome whatever threats America may face—now and in the future.” As the resources get tight and consideration is given to downsize liaisons at various agencies, a thorough review of the benefits to these types of inroads is critical. Any reduction in quality liaisons would deleterious consequences for the interagency collaboration effort at operational level. Continuing to organize in a manner, which promotes interagency cooperation, is crucial to continued success. The establishment of JIATFs during OEF at Headquarters USCINCPAC is testament to the synergy that can be gained by addressing this unique problem set in an integrated fashion.

Continue to foster information/intelligence sharing

As demonstrated in OEF-Philippines, we must support coalition partnering and information sharing. The use of SOF as demonstrated in the Philippines to assist with certain sensitive aspects of coalition operations is one way to improve our overall relationship. It is imperative that we maximize the ability of our collective forces to protect themselves and win.
Continuing to foster information and intelligence sharing after a risk management assessment is completed will greatly enhance our knowledge base for the GWOT. The risk assessment is required because we have to be selective in our intelligence sharing with regional partners due to the lack of reciprocity from some nations. While some have the will and skill to help us fight the war on terrorism and provide us access to critical information, other regional partners lack the will or skill to help or both.

Sharing information not only with our coalition partners but also between agencies will be critical for future success. Understanding the intelligence requirements of the SOF forces—a special tool in the GWOT—is just as important. As operations in the Philippines demonstrated, it is imperative that the SOF forces clearly articulate their special requirements so that the interagency players can work to meet those requirements.

The State Department, FBI, CIA, and DOD need to foster sharing and support to SOF by providing effective full-time liaisons, participating in exercises, collaborative collection planning, and technical compatibility. According to Thomas W. O’Connell “there is no substitute for the daily interaction between military forces and national agency elements capable of focusing an entire range of collection, analysis, production, and dissemination skills across their diverse directorates.” The daily interaction of DOD, State, FBI, and CIA during OEF-Philippines was critical to supporting our national objectives for the region and the unique information requirement of a JTF composed primarily of SOF personnel. In the future, SOF requirement will only get more complex as the GWOT continues.

In conclusion, this study has weaved the nature of the terrorist threat, interagency collaboration, and theater engagement planning together in an examination of the
contextual planning factors surrounding OEF—Philippines. The outcome is several recommendations on how to develop an integrated strategy against terrorism, which incorporates coalition partnering. By continuing to conduct theater engagement in concert with the other instruments of power (IOPs), enhancing interagency collaboration and supporting coalition partnering and information sharing will increase our effectiveness in combating terrorism.

Notes

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4 Campbell and Flournoy, To Prevail, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2001, p. 4.
5 Dr. Ware, NS-537 lecture, 25 Sep 02.
10 O’Connell, Thomas W., Defense Intelligence Journal, p. 68.
### Glossary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Definition</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>9-11</td>
<td>11 September 2001 and the airline high jacking attacks on the World Trade Center towers and the Pentagon</td>
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<td>AOR</td>
<td>Area of Responsibility</td>
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<td>ASG</td>
<td>Abu Sayyaf</td>
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<td>C2</td>
<td>Command and Control</td>
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<td>CAT</td>
<td>Crisis Action Team</td>
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<td>CENTCOM</td>
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<td>CIA</td>
<td>Central Intelligence Agency</td>
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<td>CINC</td>
<td>Combatant Commander</td>
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<td>CJCS</td>
<td>Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff</td>
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<td>Civil-Military Operations Center</td>
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<td>Counter-terrorism</td>
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<td>DIME</td>
<td>Diplomatic, Informational, Military, and Economic</td>
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<td>Foreign Internal Defense</td>
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<td>GWOT</td>
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<td>HUMINT</td>
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<td>IMET</td>
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<td>IOP</td>
<td>Instrument of Power</td>
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<tr>
<td>JIATF</td>
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<td>NCA</td>
<td>National Command Authorities (term has been replaced by use of President or SECDEF)</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
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<td>NIC</td>
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<td>NIMA</td>
<td>National Imagery and Mapping Agency</td>
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<td>NMS</td>
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<tr>
<td>OAF</td>
<td>Operation ALLIED FORCE</td>
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<td>ODA</td>
<td>Operations Detachment Alpha</td>
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<tr>
<td>OEF</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Pacific Command</td>
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<td>RPP</td>
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<tr>
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<td>WMD</td>
<td>Weapons of Mass Destruction</td>
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Biography

Major Michelle M. Clays is a student at Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. Major Clays received her Bachelor of Science degree in 1988 and entered intelligence officer training at Goodfellow Air Force Base, Texas in February 1989. In August 1989 she graduated as a Signals Intelligence Officer. Major Clays served as a flight commander and chief of mission management at the 6924th Electronic Security Group, Wheeler Army Airfield, Hawaii supervising over 90 enlisted personnel in round the clock intelligence collection and analytical operations. Following this assignment, she attended Squadron Officer School in October 1992. From December 1992 to June 1995, Major Clays was the Chief of Collection Systems and Exercises at Headquarters 2nd Air Force, the Air Force’s battle management NAF focused on ISR. During her tour, she deployed to Guantanamo Bay NAS, Cuba as the U-2 LNO with the JSOTF for Operations RESTORE/UPHOLD DEMOCRACY.

Major Clays was selected to attend the Post-Graduate Intelligence Program at the Joint Military Intelligence College at the Defense Intelligence Agency. She received a Master of Science degree in Strategic Intelligence. In June 1996, Major Clays served on the National Warning Staff, National Intelligence Council where she produced warning intelligence products. She was the executive officer for the Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for Analysis and Production. Major Clays was assigned in December 1998 to Headquarters U.S. Air Force, Washington, D.C., in the Office of the Deputy Chief of
Staff, Air and Space Operations, where she served in the Space and National Systems Division, ISR Directorate. In July 2000, she returned to Hawaii and was assigned to Headquarters USCINCPAC at Camp Smith and became the Chief of ISR Requirements, Directorate of Intelligence. After graduation from ACSC, Major Clays will be the Assistant Operations Officer at the 70 Intelligence Wing, Fort Meade, Maryland.

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