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AIR COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE

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TIME TO TAKE ACTION: A PLAN TO IMPROVE AMC'S  
WARFIGHTING SUPPORT FOR THE COMBATANT  
COMMANDER BY RE-ALLOCATING C-17 ASSETS IN SUPPORT  
OF THE WHITE HOUSE AIRLIFT MISSION

by

Bryan E. Miller, Major, USAF

A Research Report Submitted to the Faculty

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Advisor: Lt Col James Harvard

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## *Preface*

The primary reasons for my research into this topic come from both passive and active interactions with the various portions of the AMC Banner System performing world-wide operations over a period spanning nearly five years. This purpose of this paper is to recommend a plan to improve Air Mobility Command's warfighting support for the Combatant Commander by re-allocating C-17 assets. I utilize data from historical records to demonstrate a negative and ever-growing impact of increasing banner mission requirements, the reality of the decreasing number of heavy airlift frames available to fly those missions, and show the diminishing ability of AMC to provide Combatant Commanders with adequate and timely warfighting airlift assets.

I would like to acknowledge the contributions of several people who assisted me in various ways in my research. First and foremost, I want to thank Susan for taking on additional burdens during the times I spent collecting data at the base library and the Air Force Historical Research Agency as well as the late hours I spent writing over several months. Next, thanks to Lt Col Harvard for his guidance as my research advisor, especially in the development of the structural format of this paper. Finally, a special thanks to a number of people and organizations that provided the mass of raw data that this report is based upon: Mr. Kent Beck (USTRANSCOM Historian), Dr. John Leland (AMC Historian), Lt Col (Ret) Brian Lilly (TACC/XOBA), Maj. Geoffrey Norton (TACC/XOOOD), Maj Chris Bautz and Mr. Denny Stump (White House Airlift Operations), and all the individuals at the Air Force Historical Research Agency located at Maxwell AFB, AL who pulled the volumes of information from their files.

### *Abstract*

There are many issues addressed in this paper concerning AMC airlift provided in support of White House. Current and future airlift capacity does not allow Air Mobility Command (AMC) to provide the President of the United States (POTUS) a level of airlift support commensurate with his national and international commitments without significantly impacting warfighting capability. The primary purpose of this paper is to recommend a plan to improve Air Mobility Command's warfighting support for the Combatant Commander's by re-allocating C-17 assets.

This research specifically addresses Special Assignment Airlift Missions (SAAMs) that fall under the labels of Phoenix Banner (Presidential), Phoenix Silver (Vice-Presidential), Phoenix Copper (First Lady and other VIP's as directed), and missions that are flown to directly support these missions typically labeled as AMC "Support Missions."

The research method employed in this study included a review of Air Force historical documents and an analysis of Air Mobility Command provided data. A number of charts regarding White House support missions are derived from this raw data. These charts reveal trends over specific periods of time allowing three distinct growth periods to be identified. A parallel decrease in AMC heavy airlift assets is compared to these growth periods presenting the reader with an impetus for change. The major conclusion drawn from this research is that one particular change can greatly improve the current banner system. It is a change in the heavy airlift aircraft beddown structure. The results support a change in AMC's infrastructure by re-allocating C-17 aircraft to a Super C-17 Squadron at Andrews AFB, MD.

## **Part 1**

### **Introduction**

#### **Statement of the Problem**

Current and future airlift capacity does not allow Air Mobility Command (AMC) to provide the President of the United States (POTUS) a level of airlift support commensurate with his national and international commitments without significantly impacting warfighting capability.

#### **Revealing the Cause of the Problem**

This paper centers on one primary cause for the airlift capacity problem presented. It brings to light the fact that the banner system is unnecessarily expensive and inherently inefficient due to the current structure of the heavy airlift aircraft beddown arrangement. The results of this research demonstrate that AMC can improve its ability to support the Combatant Commander's by removing institutional barriers to efficiency and by taking action to re-allocate C-17 assets.

The previous statement is not meant to reflect negatively on HQ AMC, the Tanker Airlift Control Center (TACC), or its Banner Cell in any way. To the contrary, interim solutions like "Banner Express 2000" demonstrate that AMC recognizes the airlift capacity problem and is attempting to lessen future effects on America's warfighting capability. But, without changing existing institutional paradigms, the Banner Express concept of operations simply remains a temporary and reactionary solution to shortage of heavy airlift assets issue.<sup>1</sup>


## **The AMC White House Support Mission**

Air Mobility Command (AMC) provides a many types of direct airlift support for the President of the United States (POTUS) utilizing Special Assignment Airlift Missions (SAAM). SAAMs are a type of mission that satisfy special, unusual, and sensitive requirements of the United States government and other approved users.<sup>2</sup> This research specifically addresses those airlift missions that fall under the labels of Phoenix Banner (Presidential), Phoenix Silver (Vice-Presidential), Phoenix Copper (First Lady and Other's as directed), and missions flown directly in support of those missions typically labeled as AMC "Support Missions." In order to minimize confusion in terminology, for the purposes of this paper, unless a specific Phoenix "type" mission is singled out, the AMC structure (basing, validating, tasking, scheduling, etc.) which supports the combination of these missions will simply be referred to as the "banner system," and references to the combination of missions will be called "banner(s)."

## **The Banner System Process**

Here is how the current Banner System works. A White House support agency submits a request for the movement of personnel or material to the White House Airlift Operations (WHAO) office. WHAO validates this request on behalf of the White House Military Office (WHMO) staff. Airlift Operations forwards this request to the United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) for support. USTRANSCOM processes the request for the type of transportation support which best fits the situation: ground delivery, sealift, or airlift, based upon the priority, size and time constraints required of the user. If USTRANSCOM determines that airlift is the appropriate method of movement, USTRANSCOM forwards the request to the HQ AMC Tanker Airlift Control Center. The appropriate TACC cell or when stood up, the Banner Cell, then tasks individual airlift units to perform the mission based upon a litany of other

factors. The individual unit executes the mission under the direction of the TACC. Finally, the TACC continues to closely monitor the mission from beginning to end to ensure it receives the appropriate priority. This process is graphically represented by the following flowchart.



**Figure 1. Banner User Request to Execution Flow.**

### Notes

<sup>1</sup> Refer to Appendix C for more information on Banner Express.

<sup>2</sup> History, Air Mobility Command, Department of the Air Force, 1 January –31 December 1998, Volume 1, 80.

## **Part 2**

### **Background Information**

#### **History of the White House Airlift Support Mission**

Presidential airlift, as a primary military mission, traces its origins back to the 503<sup>rd</sup> Army Air Base Unit, a component of Air Transportation Command, to June 1944.<sup>1</sup> The mission grew so much over the years that it required the relatively small 503<sup>rd</sup> Army Air Base Unit based out of National Airport in Washington, DC to grow into the current Presidential Airlift Group (PAG) located at Andrews AFB, MD.<sup>2</sup> The PAG, even now, is only one of several groups that make up the 89<sup>th</sup> Air Mobility Wing. Various groups and squadrons in this wing support a multitude of Very Important Person (VIP) missions. These Very Important Person (VIP) airlift missions are only a part of the total White House airlift mission however. Along with the VIP's come the administrative and personal staffs as well as the US Secret Service assigned security details. Each staff member as well as the USSS staff has a need for administrative and communication support in order to carry out their mission. The airlift of this administrative and command, control, and communication support equipment along with mission enabling personnel is the greater portion of the White House airlift mission supported by AMC's heavy airlifters.

Air Mobility Command's TACC fully supports these staffs and security details by providing the requested airlift support. The requirements for airlift support vary greatly depending upon the traveler's position in the government and the size and length of their mission. In the case of

this paper, the VIPs of interest are the President, the Vice-President, the First and Second Families, and occasionally VIPs directly representing the President. These requirements are prescribed by law and are based upon USSS as well as military necessities. Multiple organizations provide people and equipment to perform these tasks and each utilize heavy airlift assets. Examples of these organizations and the typical support they provide include:

- Command and Control Communications support provided by WHCA
- Medical equipment and facilities provided by the White House Medical Unit (WHMU)
- Helicopter support provided by the elite Marine One Squadron (HMX-1)
- Ground Support Equipment (GSE) provided for Air Force One (AF-1), Back-up aircraft, Banner aircraft, Senex aircraft, and often Press support aircraft – various DoD units
- Ground transportation support provided by the USSS (including protective limousines and tactical team vehicles)

White House airlift missions are not the only missions that AMC supports on a daily basis with almost all airlift requests being tasked directly through the TACC on a user/mission priority basis. For the occupants of the White House, the user/mission priority system is not a concern. These banner missions fall under a 1A1 or 1B1 priority designator (1A1 is the highest of 24 numerical-alpha designators the Joint Chiefs of Staff uses to prioritize military airlift requirements) and are therefore always supported. Evidence of AMC's dedication to supporting White House missions can be seen in a statement from a recent AMC Historical document:

*Whenever necessary, the Tanker Airlift Control Center realigned, postponed, or cancelled other customers' missions to meet the requirements and timetables prescribed by the White House Military Office (WHMO). During major presidential trips overseas, representatives of the two organizations talked on an hourly basis or even more frequently. Given the high-priority of PHOENIX BANNER, PHOENIX SILVER, and PHOENIX COPPER, the Tanker Airlift Control Center reported the status of planned and ongoing White House support missions at the operations review presented daily to the TACC Commander. Slides summarizing airlift activity on behalf of the White House were also shown at the Friday operations review, chaired by the AMC Commander or vice commander and attended by Headquarters AMC's 'A' Staff and the TACC's senior action officers. At both meetings, the chief of the PHOENIX BANNER*

*planning cell explained the status of mission in progress and answered questions posed by the general officers and other attendees.*<sup>3</sup>

For several years now, SAAMs have annually made up an average of 20 percent of all AMC airlift missions.<sup>4</sup> Since 1992, when AMC stood up as a command, annual histories have pronounced that the missions supporting the President are the “number one priority” and a just recently the President became the “number one customer” of Air Mobility Command.<sup>5</sup>

Ten years ago the amount of travel done by the President seemed to have a minimal effect on overall airlift operations, mostly due to the large size of the heavy airlift fleet. But the mission has had a consistently growing effect since at least 1995, and has had a drastic effect since 2000. Further evidence of these effects include the fact that since the start of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF), the President’s travel schedule has been drastically curtailed due to a lack of airlift asset availability. One specific comment taken from a recent AMC History expresses this point well. “The reason for the decline in the total number of SAAMs flown was basically the increased demand for airlift created by in support of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, the war against terrorism outside the continental United States following the 11 September 2001 terrorist attack on America.”<sup>6</sup>

Recognizing this fact is important to be able to appreciate that current and future national airlift requirements affect Air Mobility Command’s ability to support the White House airlift mission. A summary of national airlift requirements is presented in the following paragraphs.

### **National Airlift Requirements**

Current data reveals that USTRANSCOM and AMC support an average of 450 air missions daily.<sup>7</sup> Both organizations are responsible for ensuring efficient operations. The breakdown of this responsibility in the next paragraphs allows one an appreciation of the scope of the task.

## **Army Requirements**

AMC provides daily support for the Army during peacetime by ferrying troops, providing airborne troops jump practice platforms etc. But, during wartime conditions the intensity of airlift support for the Army grows exponentially. The latest evolution of AMC airlift support for the Army focuses on deploying Stryker Combat Brigade Teams (SCBT).<sup>8</sup> Recent studies show that both the USAF and Army leaders recognize that even with the lighter SCBT as the standard there is a vast shortage of airlift assets. This passage from the 2001 AMC History reveals:

*“If all conditions were ideal (namely shortest routes available, minimal aircraft downtimes, GRL packages deployed on time, good weather, quiet hours lifted, timely cargo arrival at McChord, and timely fleet generation), then 48 C-5s and 75 C-17s could deploy the IBCT in 96 hours, departing at a rate of one aircraft every 20 minutes. However, if the IBCT was deployed in this fashion, no other major deployment could occur simultaneously. This mix was more than a Presidential reserve call-up, but less than a partial mobilization. Thus, for AMC, the IBCT movement was a major-theater war movement operation and, as such, could not be executed during peacetime. Moreover, 48 C-5s and 75 C-17s represented the minimum number of aircraft required with conditions ideal and execution nearly flawless.... Studies and Analysis concluded that in ‘theory’ AMC could move the IBCT in 96 hours, but expressed ‘low confidence’ in doing so. The bottom-line of this analysis is that deploying the IBCT with AMC’s programmed FY05 capability is a high-risk operation that must overcome significant events, many of which are uncontrollable, to be successful.”<sup>9</sup>*

AMC’s experiences since September 11, 2001 prove this point well. This is the current plan, but in most scenarios the process took 6-15 days longer than the 96-hour requirement. In order to close that gap to 3-8 days it took 60 C-5’s and 84 C-17’s.<sup>10</sup> This of course does not bode well for USAF capability to meet Army requirements even with these smaller SCBT packages.

## **Navy and Marine Requirements**

References from recent Air Command and Staff College Service Mission Briefings indicate that the Navy and Marines are transforming as directed by the Secretary of Defense and that in doing so, each of these services airlift needs are increasing.<sup>11</sup> A major goal of transformation is

the evolution into more deployable force as the overseas basing structure has decreased in size. The Marines for example require airlift support to move troops during MAGTF deployments that are larger than a Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU). This includes requirements of moving no less than 15,000 troops into an area of responsibility (AOR). The key to their rapid deployment is marrying up these personnel with pre-positioned supplies. Airlift requirements for the Marines also increase when operations such as Task Force 58 (OEF in Afghanistan) exceed the commonly accepted and doctrine defined standards concerning their time-on-station and engagement range as expected from Marines operating from aboard their ships.

The Navy in general has a reasonably robust airlift system that has, up to now been able to take care of much of their day-to-day cargo needs. This will not be the wave of the future however, as September 11, 2001 has brought about a significant change in the Navy's method of deployment. In the near future many of the Navy's high-demand/low-density assets (carriers, etc.) which can take months to rotate between their AOR and U.S. ports, instead will remain on station while the crews will swap out. This will provide the Navy longer on-station capability and effectively increase the number of ships available at any one time. Again, in order to successfully implement this paradigm change naval air mobility requirements must increase.

### **Air Force Requirements**

Over the years, AMC and its predecessors have developed a variety of ongoing missions. These include Channel and aero-medical missions as well as Aerospace Expeditionary Force (AEF) rotations that by historic standards are the most airframe intensive of these continuously supported missions. Less frequently AMC supports crisis contingency operations including humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, non-combatant emergency evacuation operations (HA/DR/NEO), JCS exercise support, and SAAMs. While each of these missions have grown at

a significant rate since the fall of the former Soviet Union, the number of airframes available to AMC has steadily decreased. One can only speculate how large the next war will be and how much airlift will be needed on a day-to-day basis. However, the recent implementation of Phase I of the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (utilizing 78 civil aircraft and crews) by the DoD during this relative state of peace only reinforces the fact that contingency sized operations such as the long-term “War on Terror” cannot be sustained with the current size of the military airlift fleet<sup>12</sup>

Keep in mind that during Desert Storm, Military Airlift Command (the predecessor to AMC) had 43% more airlift assets available when Phase II of the CRAF was instituted to deploy our forces (IBID).<sup>13</sup> If during OEF a Major Regional Conflict (MRC) arises, where will AMC find the additional aircraft necessary to move military forces into theater. Will we have to pull out all of the pre-planned stops and institute Phase III of the CRAF to include all [920] aircraft in the plan?<sup>14</sup> Or, is the nationalization of a major airline or two the logical next step?

## Notes

<sup>1</sup> Ceremony Pamphlet, *Presidential Airlift Group Activation*, 10 April 2001. n.p. in History, Air Mobility Command, Department of the Air Force, 1 January –31 December 2001, Volume 2, Chron 40.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid.

<sup>3</sup> History, Air Mobility Command, Department of the Air Force, 1 January –31 December 2000, Volume 1, 69.

<sup>4</sup> History, Air Mobility Command, Department of the Air Force, 1 January –31 December 2000, Volume 1, 39.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid. 69.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid. 39.

<sup>7</sup> Maj Gen Bill Welser, “United States Transportation Command Mission Brief”, lecture, Air Command And Staff College, Maxwell AFB, AL., 14 March 2003. n.p.

<sup>8</sup> Previously called the Interim Combat Brigade Team (ICBT). Reference Vago Muradian, Special Writer to the Times and Sean D. Naylor Times Staff Writer, “DoD Increases Pressure on Stryker, Citing Airlift Difficulties,” *Air Force Times*, 9 September, 2002, n.p.

<sup>9</sup> History, Air Mobility Command, Department of the Air Force, 1 January –31 December 2001, Volume 1, 229.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid. 230.

<sup>11</sup> LCDR Gregg Martin, LCDR Joe Evans, and LCDR James Skinner, “U.S. Navy Capabilities Brief”, lecture, Air Command And Staff College, Maxwell AFB, AL., 19 February 2003. and LCDR Carlos Lofstrom, Major Erin Zellers, and Major Ed Montgomery, “U.S. Marine Corps Capabilities Brief”, lecture, Air Command And Staff College, Maxwell AFB, AL., 24 February 2003. n.p.

<sup>12</sup> Gerry J. Gilmore, American Forces Press Service, “DoD Activates Commercial Airlift Reserves for Troops,” American Forces Information Service, 10 February, 2003. n.p. (on-line) at <http://www.defenselink.mil/news/feb2003>.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid.

<sup>14</sup> Ibid.

## **Part 3**

### **Analysis of Challenges Concerning the Current Banner System**

#### **Discussing the Challenge of the Growing Utilization of Banners**

There are dozens of explanations for the rapid growth in the size of the Banner mission. Some of these explanations include: expanded access and availability of information in the public arena, improved ability to instantly communicate anywhere on the planet, and the opportunity to promote freedom and democracy around the world. These explanations are outlined below under the headings domestic and world situations.

#### **Domestic Situation**

For the last decade the American desire to be well informed has grown as technology has improved the public's ability to obtain information. This general increase in public awareness has led to a better understanding of the freedoms we have in America as well as the need to participate in the democratic process. This fact has forced a change in the way representatives of the people in the government, especially the President, present information. Where newspapers and television used to be effective in getting a message out, it is now the personal approach that satisfies the public's desire to participate fully. Therefore, U.S. politicians must now travel to visit personally with their constituents in order to gain support for the advancement of any agenda.

The President is the political leader of the nation as well as the primary driving force of American policy and therefore must also travel or else become irrelevant in the eyes of the public. The United States is a large nation with great distances between major cities making travel by ground conveyance very time consuming and an inefficient use of the President's time. His time is his most valuable asset and as in the business world managing his time is as critical to his mission. This combined with the broad scope of responsibilities of the President make him the busiest leader in the world with a need to be everywhere at once. The expediency of travel by air allows the President to do more of the nations business in less time. AMC therefore takes on a crucial role in supporting the Office of the President by providing safe and timely transport of the personnel and equipment necessary for the success of the Presidential mission.

### **World Situation**

Take a moment to consider the world situation. Since the fall of the former Soviet Union the desire for previously oppressed people to gain the types of freedom represented by America has increased. In the short term, world violence has also increased mostly due to the lack of guidance from the United Nations (UN) or the United States for that matter. Once the wall came down and communism proved to be fatal to the Soviet Economy, most people expected that democracy and capitalism would rise from the ashes like a phoenix being reborn. How soon they forget the growing pains experienced by America's founding fathers. Instead of taking an active role in developing these fledgling democracies, America's role remained ambiguous.

Throughout the 1990's US leaders purchased world respect by providing the gesture of a helping hand to various nations through grants of financial aid and sometimes, if the destination were suitable, Presidential visits. Most of these visits however, were simply thinly disguised vacations with no set political agenda and drew "extensive intense scrutiny of journalists,

congressional critics, and self-styled civilian watchdogs, who like harping on their perceptions of government waste, fraud, and abuse in letters to the editor and similar forums.”<sup>1</sup> These trips grew in number and size as the decade went on and along with each trip came an increase in the number of aircraft tasked to provide the airlift.

This fact however, does not mean that international travel for the President and his representatives is unnecessary. AMC historians recognized this fact in their 2000 history with this comment, “On the other hand, it was important for the President and his most high-ranking officials to meet with world leaders and articulate American policy objectives. The United States, in 2000, was still involved in assisting the former communist states and the Third World nations in their struggles for democracy and market economies.”<sup>2</sup>

Additionally, the need to foster good international relations has dramatically increased since September 11, 2001 as the War on Terror cannot be won by America alone. The United States requires the cooperation of our allies to continue to prosecute this war that may take many years to win. The United States can assure its allies that we stand behind them in this war by showing the flag in all nations around the world. One of the best ways to do this is of course through diplomatic means including striking bargains with the leaders of other nations. The highest diplomatic office at the US government’s disposal is the President and no one can dispute the powerful image presented as he arrives at a foreign air terminal aboard Air Force One.

*“All too often the give and take of the bargaining system is obscured by the symbols of power and authority which surround the presidency. The President commands attention in the media by virtue of his office. He enjoys the prestige of being the chief of state, as well as the head of the government. He has at his disposal a wide spectrum of rewards and a significant number of penalties. These potential points of advantage in the bargaining process should not, however, be confused with the presidential power, which at the bottom, involves the president’s ability to wield these instruments so as to persuade other people that cooperation with him advances their own interests.”<sup>3</sup>*

The following quotes also reflect the level of importance placed on the President's foreign policy mission. From the NSS, "Our Nation's cause has always been larger than our Nation's defense. We fight, as we always fight, for a just peace—a peace that favors liberty. We will defend the peace against the threats from terrorists and tyrants. We will preserve the peace by building good relations among the great powers. And we will extend the peace by encouraging free and open societies on every continent."<sup>4</sup> And from Joint Vision 2020, "Three aspects of the world of 2020 have significant implications for the US Armed Forces. First, the United States will continue to have global interests and be engaged with a variety of regional actors."<sup>5</sup>


After reviewing the domestic and world situations discussed above one easily sees that the number of banner missions AMC supports will not decrease anytime soon. There will be a growing need for Presidential travel and along with that, a corresponding need to support the movement of personnel and equipment required to ensure mission success. Sadly, the current shortage of heavy airlift capability is affecting the President's overseas mission.

### **Analysis of the Historic Growth of AMC Banner Missions**

In order to fully appreciate the immense growth of support for AMC's banner mission we must arrange the available data into a graphic format. This graph represents the number of banner missions flown annually since 1984. An analysis of the data in this graph allows one to recognize trends in growth. Figure 2 charts Air Mobility Command's TACC/XOOD official accounting of those missions stratified by specific mission type.<sup>6</sup> Keep in mind that each mission typically includes at least four flight segments therefore sortie numbers are much higher.

An analysis of each type of mission over time reveals some trends. For this portion of the discussion we will first examine the breakdown of the two least known missions, the Copper mission and the Support mission. Though both of these missions are flown less frequently than

## White House Mission Totals



**Figure 2. Banner Mission Totals by Calendar Year<sup>7</sup>**

Silvers and Banners (Presidential support mission specific in this context), both have become a standard since 1996 and both are increasing in number each year. Next, a look at the Silver mission reveals a consistent increase in the number of missions supported with only the 1998 – 2000 period showing significant increases. The final and most obvious single mission trend is a

vast increase in Banner (again Presidential support mission specific in this context) mission support provided ranging from a low of 271 missions in 1993 to a high of 879 in 2000.


While examining this chart for annual trends provides valuable information, a more useful type of information is gleaned when this chart is broken down into longer periods of time. By examining periods of time we can determine if trends exist and if they do, to what extent these trends affect AMC. For this examination we combine all four missions (Support, Copper, Silver and Banner) into a single number that represents a total average number of missions flown during a specified time frame. Two distinct and sustained growth periods are identified once this chart is broken down into multiple four-year periods each including a Presidential election year.

For this analysis we must derive a “baseline.” This baseline is the average number of missions flown per four-year period. This baseline can then be compared to every other four-year period in order to identify trends in banner mission utilization. Those trends can then be identified and expressed as percentages of growth. For this study we set our baseline using the period from 1984 to 1987 as that is as far back as we have accurate information. To determine this baseline we add the number of total missions flown in each year together and then divide by four. The 1984 to 1987 baseline for comparison then becomes 374 banners supported annually.

The first distinct growth period occurs during the 1988 through 1991 period where the annual average increases to 550 missions flown. See Figure 3 for a graphic representation of this data. This growth period is then followed by the 1992 through 1995 period where the annual average is 535 missions flown. This makes a sustained annual average of 543 missions between 1988 and 1995 and reveals an impressive 45 percent increase in the average number of missions supported. The second distinct growth period begins with the 1996 through 1999 timeframe which combine for an annual average of 957 missions followed closely by the three year period


of 2000 through 2002 where the average, even with the tragedy of Sept 11, 2001 slackened travel appreciably for an extended period, was 949 per year.<sup>8</sup> The combination of these two periods shows a sustained increase of 954 Banner missions per year supported.

### Average Number of Total Banner Missions Supported



**Figure 3 Chart of Distinct Banner Mission Growth Periods.<sup>9</sup>**

The results of comparing the third growth period to the second gives us a 76 percent increase in missions supported while comparing it to our baseline and you get a whopping 155 percent increase in missions supported annually. See Figure 4 for the graphic representing the growth rate as a percentage over the 1984 – 1987 baseline. These increases are significant when one considers that the total number of airlift airframes available to AMC have vastly decreased during the last ten years.




**Figure 4. Chart of Distinct Banner Mission Growth Periods as Percentage Rate.<sup>10</sup>**

### **Decreasing Heavy Airlift Airframe Numbers and the Banner Mission**

The banner system utilizes four primary aircraft the C-5, C-17, C-130, and C-141. In the overall scheme of operations the C-130’s have typically played a limited role and were only significantly utilized in a few instances. It would be pretentious not to mention their value, but this research is focused upon the heavier platforms as they provide the bulk of the airlift capability used for White House support. Over the last 10 years, the numbers of heavy airlift aircraft in the USAF inventory have fluctuated tremendously. That fluctuation has directly impacted AMC’s overall ability to support banner missions and has resulted in such a shortage of airlift assets that the current administration has “heavily pruned” the President’s travel


schedule.<sup>11</sup> This is a necessary step taken in order to allow the combatant commanders the airlift assets they require to effectively continue the OEF mission. A simple breakdown allows an analysis of the airframe availability that this author refers to as the primary indicator of airlift capability. This reference is in direct contrast to the Congress' commonly accepted cargo capacity determination method of measuring only total capacity. Figure 5 shows the USAF Total of Primary Aircraft Authorized (PAA) numbers for the USAF Total Force (Active Duty, AFRES, and ANG). Note the large decrease between the 1992 and the 2002 numbers.



**Figure 5. Total Aircraft in the USAF Inventory (Only Primary Aircraft Authorized).<sup>12</sup>**

The significance of the growth of banner support missions is further complicated by a parallel decrease in airframe availability. This decrease stems from the combined effects of the

retirement of the C-141 airframe, the slow production of the C-17 replacement airframe, and the domestic/world situation highlighted since Sept 11, 2001. Even if one discounts the War on Terror, specifically OEF as a relatively short-term aberration, a disturbing picture concerning America's warfighting capability still emerges. Figure 6 demonstrates this concern where-by the red arrows represent the divergent trend data.



**Figure 6. PAA Available vs. Number of Total Support Missions Flown 1992-2002.**<sup>13</sup>

AMC cannot continue to effectively support OEF and OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF), much less another major contingency, while at the same time providing White House airlift support at the pace as it has for the last seven years. While no one could predict the events

of Sept 11, 2001, government reports such as the Mobility Requirements Study 2005 (MRS-05) combined with recent lessons of OEF confirm that a shortage of airlift capability exists and point out that steps must be taken to eliminate this shortage to include changes in C-17 procurement.<sup>14</sup>


Let us look at where AMC was in 1992 when it first stood up as a command and contrast that to where AMC is today. Between 1992 and 2002 the number of AMC heavy airlift airframes (less C-130's) decreased by a total of 43.4 percent. Although the carrying capacity has not dropped as significantly due to the C-17's payload being greater than the C-141's it is replacing, the number of airframes available for all operations has dropped by nearly half. Again, Figure 6 shows the growing divergence in airframe availability versus banner mission requirement. This is significant as those involved in the procurement process only consider the amount of material that can be moved, not the number of destinations and missions that may need service simultaneously. In order to fulfill Secretary Rumsfeld's vision concerning the transformation of the military services this shortsighted view must become a view of the past. As the world environment has changed so must the view within procurement community.

Evidence of this growing shortage dates back as far as Desert Storm when the USAF had nearly twice the number of heavy airlift in the inventory and Military Airlift Command (MAC) realized then that it needed between 200 and 300 percent more airlift capacity to fulfill CENTCOM's deployment schedule.<sup>15</sup> Recently, the USAF received the authorization to procure a total of 180 C-17's, up from the 120 planned to be in service by 2006. This will help but at a rate of 10 to 15 additional aircraft produced and accepted per year, this number may not be reached until 2012.<sup>16</sup> Also, with the OPSTEMPO showing no signs of slowing for the next decade, AMC's C-5 aircraft will likely need to be replaced earlier than later. Even the current AMC goal of 222 C-17's will not be enough to effectively provide the Combatant Commander's

with the airlift they require to efficiently perform the mission the President assigns them while continuing to provide the President with an appropriate level of airlift support for his mission.

### **Inherent Costs of the Current Heavy Airlift Beddown Structure**

Along with the shortage of airframes comes the matter of the location of heavy airlift bases. Currently all of AMC's C-5, C-17, and C-141 aircraft are located in the Continental United States and are primarily located on either the East or West Coast as noted in Figure 7.



**Figure 7. AMC C-5, C-7, and C-141 Aircraft Basing Structure.**<sup>17</sup>

Although many of the costs of performing banner missions are included in the AMC basing structure, the current aircraft beddown arrangement greatly increases the overall program cost and builds inefficiency into the banner system.

Almost all Banner missions begin and end at Andrews AFB, MD due to its proximity to Washington DC. Andrews is the only AMC facility with a runway large enough to support heavy airlift operations, and not coincidentally it is the home station of the 89<sup>th</sup> Airlift Wing and

Air Force One. The Presidential Airlift mission is not the only mission the 89 AW supports. They also support multiple squadrons that provide various forms of VIP airlift. Flying Banners out of Andrews therefore makes sense since every user (USSS, WHCA, HMX-1, etc.) is familiar with the location and are all based in the vicinity with the preponderance of their assets.

There are no active duty heavy airlift aircraft permanently stationed out of Andrews AFB to handle the banner mission and soon there won't even be a reserve unit on station. This lack of active duty heavy airlift assets is the primary reason for the inherent inefficiency currently built into the current banner system structure. It drives the cost of banner operations to unnecessary extremes. In the next few paragraphs we'll concentrate on a number of items that effectively drive up costs and prevent a more efficient use of airlift resources.

#### **Needless Maintenance Costs Associated with the Current Beddown Structure**

Consider for instance, the costs added to every mission flown in support of the White House that depart and return to Andrews AFB from bases across the nation. These costs stem from the additional wear and tear applied to each airframe simply because they are not based locally. Regardless of which base an aircraft is deployed from to perform a banner, at least one additional cycle (gear up on take off and gear down for landing) is unnecessarily added to its maintenance record. For most missions at least two cycles are added since most deployments and redeployments of assets occur a week apart. The reason for the split mission date is that AMC cannot afford to leave an aircraft sitting on a ramp when there are so many other mission requirements to support. This seems like a small issue overall with a net benefit being that the aircrew got to practice a landing or two, however, one must consider the fact that major aircraft inspections are driven by items such as the number of times the gear cycles since every cycle places extra wear and tear on moving parts.

Every additional takeoff and landing also adds stress to the entire airframe as the high takeoff power settings and even the normal braking actions result in extra torque being applied, effectively reducing the lifespan of the airframe. Also, costs are added in flying hours and depending on which coast the assigned aircraft comes from, adds between four and ten total airframe and engine hours per mission. This added time also increases the frequency of major inspections and the replacement of parts before they would otherwise normally need to be replaced. A quick look at Table 1 reveals how the cost of these additional flight hours can add up quickly making the seemingly small cost per mission in reality become a significant sum.

<b>Aircraft Type</b>	<b>Flying Hour Rate</b>
C-5	\$ 14,598
C-17	\$ 6,664
C-141	\$ 5,074

**Table 1. GAO Reported Flight Hour Costs by Airframe Type for the Year 2000.**<sup>18</sup>

In order to ensure unhindered travel for the President, a large amount of equipment is required to be in position every time Air Force One deploys. Current policy requires that the Advance teams attempt to procure equipment locally through contracting if necessary to avoid the need to fly in this equipment. This seems like a reasonable policy, but in reality adds another level of difficulty in to the Banner support mission. For the vast majority of missions, the local airports cannot provide all or even most of the equipment required. Because of this reality, AMC has a first and second backup plan. The first includes tasking other DoD entities to provide this equipment (normally GSE like power and light carts, towbars, etc.) and helps spread the burden of cost across the entire DoD infrastructure since the closest unit whether Air Force, Army, Navy, etc. is usually tasked to transport the required equipment to the site. This places the cost burden on the providing entity and allows AMC to pass the support buck and forces units that are

already short on personnel and equipment to set aside personnel and equipment for this non-warfighting mission. This is bad policy and one that consistently undermines sister service relationships for the Air Force.

Two final issues related to maintenance costs include the highly variable mission reliability rates of certain airframes (often associated with specific units) as well as the expenditure of personnel and equipment that each squadron expends maintaining a number of banner aircraft configuration kits. Maintaining these kits requires units to dedicate a lot of time and money that could be used more effectively elsewhere.

### **Aircrew and Airframe Utilization Limitations Associated the Beddown Structure**

When utilizing aircraft and crews from the West Coast the human cost increases proportionally. For example, by the time a crew mission plans and pre-flights their aircraft (3-3.5 hours) departs home station for Andrews AFB (5 hour flight), refuels and takes on passengers and cargo (4 hours) they have already reached 12 hours in their Flight Duty Period (FDP) and by Air Force Instruction (AFI) have only 4 hours to complete the next leg of the mission without augmentation to extend the FDP to 24 hours.<sup>19</sup> The result of this limitation is that most of these missions involve either pre-positioning the aircraft and crew to Andrews a day prior, or as a minimum, stage the crew over night (RON) at an intermediate location. Either way, the crew and aircraft are out of the AMC flow and the Temporary Duty (TDY) costs continue to grow. As you can see, either avenue forces AMC to increase the number of crewmembers involved by either augmenting the crew or accepting that the aircraft and crew are out of pocket for an additional 17 hours.

## Related Administration and Aircrew Training Limitations

The current system places restrictions on aircrew selection and requires each crewmember to complete a special aircrew certification.<sup>20</sup> These requirements are presented in the next few paragraphs and are taken directly from AFI 11-289, 1 June 2000.

2.1.1. Aircrew Selection. Squadron commanders and operations officers will ensure that crew members chosen for these missions are certified IAW paragraph 2.1.2 and highly capable. Selection should be based on qualification, proficiency, experience, maturity, and mission complexity.

2.1.1.1. Aircraft Commanders. In addition, before commanding PHOENIX BANNER, SILVER, or COPPER missions, aircraft commanders require a minimum of 200 hours after aircraft commander upgrade.

2.1.2. Aircrew Certification. All aircrew members will complete the following training program and be certified prior to flying unsupervised on a PHOENIX BANNER, SILVER, or COPPER mission. Training will focus on the unique circumstances that differentiate this mission from other missions. Crew members may enter PHOENIX BANNER, SILVER, or COPPER mission training once they are fully mission qualified (airland only). Wings will establish and maintain PHOENIX BANNER training programs. As a minimum, the training program will consist of:

2.1.2.1. An instructor-led, in-depth review of AFI 11-289, including a discussion of tasking and execution agencies for PHOENIX BANNER missions and how the aircrew will interface with these agencies. It must also include a discussion of POCs that the aircrew will have to coordinate with in case of diversion or delay, including the Air Force Advance Agent and the troop commander from the USSS, WHCA, HMX-1, and SENEX. The goal is to educate crew members on the interface required between crew members and the users.

2.1.2.2. An open book examination of material covered in AFI 11-289, minimum 80 percent, corrected to 100 percent.

2.1.2.3. A memorandum of certification signed by squadron commander or operations officer. For AMC, annotate certification on AF Form 1381, **Certification Of Aircrew Training** and file under Tab 1, section 1 of the individual's Flight Evaluation Folder. For other MAJCOMs, annotate on training letter of transmittal, AFORMS, or AF Form 1381 and file IAW MAJCOM directives.

2.1.3. Briefings. The operating wing will brief the aircraft commander on all aspects of the mission. The aircraft commander will then brief the remainder of the aircrew. The aircraft commander or a designated crew member will then discuss these aspects with the designated troop commander. The troop commander is the single POC representing the user. The aircraft commander will ascertain the identity of the troop commander prior to departure....

The man-hours consumed throughout the heavy airlift force on these seemingly simple procedures add up quickly and could all but be eliminated by changing the current system. For example, paragraph 2.1.3. "Briefings" drives a requirement for each wing to continuously task staff assets that could be better used elsewhere in support of the warfighting mission. After all, "AMC's primary mission is rapid, global mobility and sustainment for America's armed forces."<sup>21</sup> Although this training and the mission briefing are not time intensive endeavors, the

aircrew selection requirement forces units to over-manage their aircrew force in order to ensure enough highly experienced crewmembers are constantly available for banner mission tasking. Eliminating these requirements would seem to be the simple answer, but this is not possible as directives received after SAAM and banner incidents (including aircraft crashes) involving “less experienced” aircrews now force AMC to actively address the inexperience issue.<sup>22</sup> This requirement currently affects every airlift wing directly by reducing crew force management flexibility and indirectly affecting the overall airlift mission tempo.

### **Spare and Alert Aircraft Requirements Associated with the Current Beddown Structure**

A major cost to AMC’s airframe availability is also inherent in the requirement to have a complement of spare and alert aircraft and crews available both for immediate travel needs and in order to ensure pre-planned mission success. Currently AFI 11-289 Chapter Three requires:

#### **3.1. Area Standby Force.**

##### **3.1.1. General:**

3.1.1.1. To support short-notice PHOENIX BANNER and PHOENIX SILVER missions, AMC maintains aircraft and augmented aircrews on standby at various locations. Specific missions may require standby C-5, C-17, C-141, or C-130 aircraft. Crew requirements are a basic aircrew on C-141, C-5, C-130, and C-17 aircraft.

3.1.1.1.1. AMC maintains two aircraft and crews on area standby, one on BRAVO alert and one on CHARLIE alert. Changes to this posture will be coordinated among WHMO, HQ AMC TACC/XOOO, and HQ AMC TACC/XOB.

3.1.1.1.2. HQ AMC TACC/XOB, or the theater AMOCC, as appropriate, will task any specific area standby requirements. Authority to release the area standby is HQ AMC TACC/XOB and HQ AMC TACC/XOZ, or the theater AMOCC, as appropriate.

3.1.1.2. To ensure responsiveness to temporary changes in PHOENIX BANNER or SILVER requirements, WHMO will ensure standby requirements are published and current. Any changes that affect requirements will immediately be identified to WHMO. WHMO requirements, including area standby force, are in addition to other AMC requirements. Non-AMC controlled standby aircraft will be tasked by the appropriate AMOCC (USAFE/PACAF).<sup>23</sup>

Since this mission rates the 1A1 or 1B1 priority, AMC must ensure that the mission is accomplished successfully. Even though the current AFI recently reduced the official number of alert and spare aircraft required for day-to-day operations, it is still common practice for each

airlift wing to have numerous backups for these alerts and spares. This additional blocking of spare and alert aircraft is a result of commander's belief that failure on the part of AMC in these missions is considered unacceptable. The need to pre-position aircraft for mission timing as well as other factors such as weather conditions at both the departure and arrival locations can also increase spare and alert requirements. Many times the number of alert and spare aircraft blocked off at so many locations effectively remove a squadron's worth of aircraft from the inventory for days at a time.<sup>24</sup>

## Notes

<sup>1</sup> History, Air Mobility Command, Department of the Air Force, 1 January –31 December 2000, Volume 1, 78.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid. 79.

<sup>3</sup> Amos A Jordan, William J. Taylor Jr., and Michael J Mazarr, *American National Security, Fifth Edition*, (The John Hopkins University Press Baltimore and London, 1999), 115.

<sup>4</sup> The National Security Strategy of the United States of America. September 2002, 1.

<sup>5</sup> Joint Vision 2020, America's Military: Preparing for Tomorrow. June 2000, 4.

<sup>6</sup> While cross referencing these numbers with the AMC Histories studied, this research revealed discrepancies in various years including official numbers that short the annual number of banner missions. Of note was a discrepancy in CY 2000 where the TACC count is 113 missions short.

<sup>7</sup> Banner mission numbers historically peak during Presidential election years. See Appendix A for data table provided by HQ AMC TACC/XOOOD.

<sup>8</sup> History, Air Mobility Command, Department of the Air Force, 1 January –31 December 2001, Volume 1, 48.

<sup>9</sup> See Appendix 1 for data table provided by HQ AMC TACC/XOOOD. n.p.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid. n.p.

<sup>11</sup> Elizabeth Bumiller, "In Revising Plans, Bush Purposely Flies Hither And Thither, But Not Yon," *New York Times*, 3 October 2001. n.p.

<sup>12</sup> Information from AMC Histories and AMC website. Refer to Appendix B for details.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid.

<sup>14</sup> History, Air Mobility Command, Department of the Air Force, 1 January –31 December 2001, Volume 1, 254.

<sup>15</sup> Thomas A. Keaney and Eliot A. Cohen, *Gulf War Air Power Survey Summary Report*, (Washington DC, 1993), 208.

<sup>16</sup> Gerry J. Gilmore, American Forces Press Service, "DoD Activates Commercial Airlift Reserves for Troops," American Forces Information Service, 10 February, 2003. n.p. (on-line) at <http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Feb2003>.

<sup>17</sup> Air Mobility Command Website, "AMC Overview," Bases and Units, n.p. (on-line) Internet, 12 March 2003, available from <https://www.amc.af.mil/overview.cfm>.

<sup>18</sup> United States General Accounting Office, *Report to Congressional Requesters: Presidential Travel DOD Airlift Cost for White House Foreign Travel*. (Washington, D.C.: August 4, 2000), 39.

<sup>19</sup> Air Force Instruction (AFI) 11-2C-17V3, *C-17 Operations Procedures*, 1 December 1999. Paragraph 3.6.

<sup>20</sup> Air Force Instruction (AFI) 11-289, *Phoenix Banner, Silver, and Copper Operations*, 1 June 2000. Paragraph 2.1.

<sup>21</sup> Air Mobility Command Website, "Air Mobility Command...Providing America's Global Reach," Air Mobility Command Mission...Heart of a credible deterrent posture. n.p. (on-line), Internet, 12 March 2003, available from <http://www.transcom.mil/missions/amc.html>.

<sup>22</sup> Extract (U), SAF/CC, "C-130 Accident Investigation Report," 21 Oct 96, Dup Doc 1-95, Article (U), "Review Says White House Aircraft Safe and Reliable," *Defense Daily*, 5 Dec 96, from History, Air Mobility Command, Department of the Air Force, 1 January –31 December 1996, Volume 1, 154-155.

<sup>23</sup> Air Force Instruction (AFI) 11-289, *Phoenix Banner, Silver, and Copper Operations*, 1 June 2000. Paragraph 3.1.

<sup>24</sup> History, Air Mobility Command, Department of the Air Force, 1 January –31 December 2000, Volume 1, 85-86.

## **Part 4**

### **Proposed Banner System Changes for Air Mobility Command**

#### **Infrastructure Change is the Answer**

The primary infrastructure change that must occur in order for AMC to improve its ability to support the warfighting mission while providing the White House with an appropriate level of banner mission support is changing the beddown structure of heavy airlift assets.

#### **Concept of Operations for Beddown of a Super C-17 Squadron at Andrews**

The establishment of a “Super C-17” (Banner) squadron at Andrews AFB, MD under the 89<sup>th</sup> Airlift Wing is the single most effective answer to banner system cost and efficiency challenges. This research reveals that a squadron of 18 aircraft could fulfill the vast majority of White House banner airlift needs, even during the heaviest use periods. This proposal is based upon a 82.5% average possessed aircraft rate (aircraft at not at depot undergoing maintenance) with an 83.8% average mission capable (not grounded for maintenance) rate which keeps 12.5 aircraft available for missions on a day-to-day basis.<sup>1</sup> The most efficient setup would include a combined Active and Associate Reserve unit as has been so successful at other AMC bases. This would allow increased manpower capabilities without siphoning two full squadrons of active duty personnel from overall AMC manning. It also allows the Reserves to maintain a significant role in the Presidential airlift mission. The Air National Guard would still continue to

participate by providing the bulk of C-130 missions that would still be needed during election year surge operations.

This plan is plausible when one looks at the facilities presently available at Andrews AFB. A Reserve C-141 squadron, the 756<sup>th</sup> Airlift Squadron, with eight aircraft is currently located on and has operated out of Andrews AFB but is soon to transition to KC-135 tanker aircraft.<sup>2</sup> This transition should (could) be stopped and the 756<sup>th</sup> should become the C-17 Associate Reserve portion of this plan. There are no physical limitations to this plan.<sup>3</sup> Ramp space is not an issue, nor is the availability of an interim Air Mobility Unit (AMU) facility or maintenance facility.

This Super C-17 (Banner) squadron would fall under the 89 AW administratively and operationally, but would mirror the Presidential Airlift Squadron tasking model. The White House Airlift Operations office would directly task the 89 AW after validating the banner requirements as is currently done. Both USTRANSCOM and AMC/TACC would have visibility via the GDSS tracking system or the GATES (Global Air Transportation Execution System), thus allowing those commanders to remain in the loop but not be bogged down by the everyday turbulence created by changes that are inherent to White House travel.<sup>4</sup> This plan decreases the amount of time and effort expended at the MAJCOM and higher levels allowing those organizations to concentrate on the warfighting mission effectively increasing the wartime surge capability within these staffs. Also, a mini version of this concept has already been tested a number of times in an operation named Banner Express (BE). Banner Express has been implemented at least four times in the past 12 years with impressive results. See Appendix B for details on Banner Express Concept of Operations.<sup>5</sup>

## **Benefits of the Beddown a Super C-17 Squadron at Andrews**

AMC would reap huge benefits from a beddown change to the force structure. In the next few paragraphs we'll discuss a variety of these benefits paralleling the categories defined earlier.

### **Reducing Maintenance Costs**

First, the reduction of one cycle per mission eliminates at least 954 take offs and landings per year based on the average number of banner missions flown annually for the last three years. That many fewer take offs and landings will also increase the runway and taxiway service life indirectly saving or delaying AMC future airfield infrastructure construction costs.

Next, the number of aircraft configuration kits (required additional items like extra supplies of tie-down straps, hooks, personal oxygen kits, etc. needed to traverse non-AMC supported airfields) required for banner missions decreases when only the 89 Aerial Port Squadron needs to keep a large number of these configuration kits on hand. Any aircraft sent to augment the Andrews squadron would simply be outfitted as the crew receives its local banner mission brief.

Along with this savings comes a savings from the consolidation of routinely deployed maintenance equipment. AMC can put together standard packages, kept at Andrews, in the 89APS that are shipped to any location required to support banner missions. This concept has been turned down in the past because it always added another mission to the mix, however, since September 11, 2001 the Secret Service has increased their overall equipment requirements. The additional requirements now drive a two and sometimes three mission support package and in both packages, one mission includes only a partial C-17 load. This thus provides the opportunity to take the required GSE and makes what was once unfeasible a new and improved standard that more efficiently supports the overall Banner mission. This will not typically add support mission to overseas visits either since support missions are almost always needed at overseas locations.

The fact that a common supply of GSE is utilized will save money and man-hours while avoiding equipment interoperability issues and minimizing the chances of a mission failure. What this eliminates is the risk that the USAF and the USSS have always been forced to accept by unconditionally trusting outside sources, some not so reliable, for equipment that is critical to mission accomplishment. In the period before September 11, 2001 the risk of failure, although high, was not as threatening to the President's mission as it was to the prestige of the AMC if we had been responsible for a travel delay. As it stands today, the risk of AMC's failure to provide unhindered Presidential travel is larger than a black mark on our record. An AMC failure can have national/international implications and could cast doubt on AMC's future reliability.

The history of the 89<sup>th</sup> Air Wing also reflects AMC's dedication to reliability. Aircraft in the 89AW consistently have higher reliability rates than aircraft in the general inventory and the reliability record of Air Force One is unrivalled. Dedicating a single squadron to support banner missions eliminates the current practice of individual units setting aside their most reliable aircraft in order to satisfy banner requirements.<sup>6</sup>

Finally, Air Force One, maintainer's are typically hand chosen for proven ability. This hiring practice allows Presidential Airlift Squadron to keep their aircraft at the highest readiness status at all times without adding a formal training program burden to the unit's mission. Some argue that recruiting the best maintainers for the VIP squadrons at Andrews results in a decrease in maintenance reliability in other weapons systems but this criticism unfounded. The Air Force already requires that, "The most highly qualified technicians available should do all inspections, repairs, and verifications."<sup>7</sup> Maintainers at other units continue to provide the same level of service and at the same time providing the same training required for young maintenance personnel. In fact, this practice may improve overall aircraft reliability as maintainers will be

able to allot more time for each individual aircraft on their ramp rather than spend an inordinate amount of time ensuring a few are Fully Mission Capable (FMC) and ready to perform banner missions.<sup>8</sup> It creates competition amongst other units maintainers challenging them to attain the same levels of performance and it provides a measure of career mobility.

### **Improving Aircrew and Airframe Utilization**

Along with the increases in aircraft reliability previously mentioned, AMC will realize an increase in the number of days aircraft and aircrew are available annually. Recall the discussion in the current banner system section concerning the additional TDY and RON days required to pre-position aircraft. As a minimum, all of those days would become available for other use in supporting other missions. One could also take the 2000 to 2002 average of 954 missions x 1 added day/aircraft = 954 aircraft and aircrew days saved per year which roughly equals one additional squadron benefit. This is based upon 10 missions per aircraft per month with nine aircraft in a squadron available on a daily basis.<sup>9</sup> Take this one squadron equivalent gain and add it to the two squadrons of effective banner support gain and for the price of 1.5 squadrons, AMC gets a full three squadron's worth of performance by implementing this plan.

AMC can add to this gain an increased benefit realized by using a direct delivery method to reduce the number of trans-load actions currently required when performing overseas banner missions.<sup>10</sup> Under the TACC Banner Cell's current "high velocity hub and spoke" system as many as three different airframes are utilized to perform missions into airfields depending on the airfields size. Using this hub and spoke system only adds complexity to the mission and violates the principal of war concept of "Simplicity".<sup>11</sup> An example of the possible efficiency gained by eliminating this hub and spoke system follows. Currently the system would use one C-5 to cross the Atlantic to move equipment to Germany, then trans-load that equipment to two C-141's both

going to different locations in Africa (still major improved airfields), and finally trans-load to four to six C-130's for the delivery into two smaller less improved airfield's of a nation with less capable infrastructure. Using only two C-17's on a direct delivery mission saves multiple airframes, and increases the overall speed of the deployment.

This increase in speed of the deployment of equipment to a location is enhanced by directly delivering the cargo to these smaller airfields. The trans-loading time alone often adds days to these movements. It delays the positioning Tanker Airlift Control Elements (TALCE) with all of their aerial port equipment and increases the number of additional Maintenance Repair Teams required to build up a hub location. It simply adds AMC support missions to the mix. Using a single airframe type for direct delivery now makes sense because the C-17 goes anywhere the other three types are capable of going. In the example above, seven aircraft can be saved allowing AMC to keep those aircraft in the normal airlift channels performing other missions.

Numerous benefits would be gained concerning aircrew issues once the Andrews C-17 plan is implemented. TDY costs for example, though not disappearing completely, will drop significantly since aircrews will be able to return to home station most days as the average length of the crew duty day will decrease. Along with the decreased duty day length comes the end to the constant pre-positioning of aircraft at Andrews. This not only saves money but also decreases aircrew time away from their families. This could have significant effects on aircrew retention as OPSTEMPO is consistently rated as the number one reason for aircrew leaving the USAF. Direct savings will also be realized in mission reliability as the aircraft will be at home station more often and for more time in general thus allowing each aircraft to be better serviced.

The last major cost savings related to aircrew and aircraft utilization will be the dissolution of the "biennial" Banner Express deployment. AMC realized the benefits of having a deployed

squadrons worth of aircraft located at Andrews as early as 1992, but typically considered it more cost effective to stand up the non-permanent Banner Express operation for 10 months out of every 24 month period. Until 1995 a large number of airframes were always available as 250+ C-141's were in the fleet. The drastic increase in banner support requirements combined with the decrease in airframes in the fleet now makes it more feasible and even desirable for a change in thought. It is time to transition the Banner Express operation into a permanent mission.

### **Administrative and Aircrew Training**

Transfer of day-to-day operations responsibility to 89AW or possibly the Presidential Airlift Group is required to ensure the continued success of AMC's banner support. The AMC Staff was drastically cut during the 1990's to allow personnel to be sent back into the warfighting units due to extensive troop strength reduction requirements instituted as the Cold War ended. As it turns out, this cutback was premature since the burden placed upon AMC and especially the TACC have greatly increased in the same timeframe. A transfer of banner responsibility to the 89AW will remove this time and personnel intensive burden and place it organizationally (as well as physically) closer to the White House, the organization that drives the constant and most often short-notice changes. Delegating tasking authority allows the TACC to use personnel from the disbanded Banner Cell to fill other Cell positions directly supporting the warfighting mission.

The Banner Cell at TACC typically consists of 10 personnel on a full time basis and is often times augmented by additional officers and airmen as required.<sup>12</sup> During surge operations this number increases to ensure service for AMC's number one customer – The President of the United States.<sup>13</sup> One recognizes that keeping up on this mission is of the highest importance to the AMC Commander, but the same results can be achieved by either moving a few of those persons to the 89AW where they would be able to be more responsive to requests from the White

House Military Office or just delegating that authority to the 89AW. This would not jeopardize the AMC Commander's ability to be in the know since current technology allows instant communications.<sup>14</sup> Delegating the day-to-day responsibility for the mission to the 89AW allows the AMC Commander and TACC more time to concentrate on warfighting mission support.<sup>15</sup>

Even if banner requirements did occasionally end up overloading the capability of this Super C-17 (Banner) squadron, the local structure at Andrews would easily be able to incorporate chopped aircraft and crews while maintaining the high aircraft reliability and aircrew experience levels expected of banner aircrews.<sup>16</sup>

A move to the local DC area will also solve several of AMC's responsiveness issues. For example, AMC Histories mentioned the problem that dispersed units constantly face in ensuring their crewmembers deploy with current passports and visas as well as in acquiring timely diplomatic clearances, both of which are "critical component[s] of mission planning".<sup>17,18</sup> Since the squadron would be in the local area its personnel would be able to utilize State Department assets first hand, to ensure timely processing of visas, country clearances, and diplomatic clearances.<sup>19</sup> Implementing the Andrews C-17 squadron plan also improves the responsiveness and increases service provided to the USSS, the WHMO agencies, HQ USAF/CVAM (Special Air Missions), and the PAG, while reducing the turbulence inherent in the current system.

Another obvious benefit is the increase in familiarity with the mission gained by the air and ground crew force as they perform the mission on a regular basis.<sup>20</sup> By implementing this plan, this squadron in particular could cut the number of special qualifications (such as airdrop and PNAF) each pilot is must to maintain thus reducing the cost of the training as well as the number of training hours required to maintain each special proficiency. Also, most other airlift units in could drop the special Banner Aircrew Certification requirements thereby relieving some aircrew

management issues thus allowing them to concentrate on the warfighting mission. The resulting increase in banner aircrew experience levels also fulfills the letter and spirit of Congressionally mandated requirements, put into place after the Ron Brown mission and the Jackson Hole, WY mission incidents, that the AF provide VIPs with only the best aircrews the AF has to offer.<sup>21</sup>

### **Reducing Spare and Alert Aircraft Requirements**

Recent efforts by AMC to streamline the banner system have helped in reducing the number of alert and spare aircraft required to ensure mission success but, even with the recent rewrite of AFI 11-289, Phoenix Banner, Silver, and Copper Operations, the system still requires more alert and spare aircraft than a change in the beddown plan would require.

Responsiveness to banner mission requirements can be improved by having assets locally available. Missions could be tasked against the local Andrews assets eliminating the need for pre-positioning of aircraft or waiting for Bravo Alert lines to generate from off station. Having local Andrews aircraft as alert and spare aircraft allows AMC to more efficiently serve the White House without the added cost of temporarily deploying aircraft to Andrews.<sup>22</sup>

This temporary deployment of airlift assets to Andrews cost hundreds of thousands of dollars in TDY costs as well as in the fact that those assets were taken out of the AMC fleet for an extended period of time earning zero dollars for the Transportation Working Capital Fund (TWCF).<sup>23</sup> Additionally, each temporarily deployed aircraft was either hard scheduled or projected for use on other missions already in the system before they were tasked (usually on short-notice) to become banners. This type of tasking disrupts the TACC schedule consistently and results in extra work for TACC personnel. Instances such as this illustrate how the current system forces inefficiencies as the additional man-hours required to track and make these

changes would be better utilized across a wider range of missions. Removing this significant distraction to day-to-day operations will increase the overall efficiency of TACC.

## Notes

<sup>1</sup> History, Air Mobility Command, Department of the Air Force, 1 January –31 December 2001, Volume 1, 403-406.

<sup>2</sup> History, Air Mobility Command, Department of the Air Force, 1 January –31 December 2001, Volume 1, 347.

<sup>3</sup> Some opponents may however argue that the C-141s are leaving because they do not comply with (Stage III) jet noise requirements implemented by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) as well as they are being phased out by 2005 from the inventory. This is a mute argument however since the C-17 does not have these limitations.

<sup>4</sup> History, Air Mobility Command, Department of the Air Force, 1 January –31 December 2000, Volume 1, 246.

<sup>5</sup> See Appendix C for Banner Express 2000 Concept of Operations.

<sup>6</sup> Partially Mission Capable are permitted only in special circumstances. Refer to AFI 11-289, 1 June 2000, paragraph 5.2.

<sup>7</sup> Air Force Instruction (AFI) 11-289, *Phoenix Banner, Silver, and Copper Operations*, 1 June 2000. Paragraph 5.1.

<sup>8</sup> Partially Mission Capable are permitted only in special circumstances. Refer to AFI 11-289, 1 June 2000, paragraph 5.2.

<sup>9</sup> The 10 missions per aircraft per month statistic is supported by verbiage from Maj Gen Bill Welsler's, "United States Transportation Command Mission Brief", lecture, Air Command And Staff College, Maxwell AFB, AL., 14 March 2003. n.p.

<sup>10</sup> Real world example driven by the large carrying capacity of the C-5 combined with greater mission reliability of the C-17 to get in and out of airfields without breaking down -- "C-17s and C-5s supported the BANNER cell's hub and spoke system at a ratio of 2 to 1. On any given day at the height of the deployment, 9 C-5s and 18 C-17s were committed to airlifting presidential equipment and personnel from Anderson to seven South Asia locations visited by the President." From History, Air Mobility Command, Department of the Air Force, 1 January –31 December 2000, Volume 1, 85.

<sup>11</sup> Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 1, *Air Force Basic Doctrine*, September 1997, 21.

<sup>12</sup> History, Air Mobility Command, Department of the Air Force, 1 January –31 December 2000, Volume 1, 69.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid.

<sup>14</sup> Such as e-mail, the GATES program, and Video Teleconferencing if necessary.

<sup>15</sup> Some may argue that delegating this authority will dilute the importance of the mission. However, considering that it is basically a 1A1 level priority mission, "CLOSE WATCH" monitoring is always warranted. The missions of the 89AW as well as the Presidential Airlift Group mission are examples that directly counter this argument. These missions are of the highest priority and both are successfully monitored by AMC from afar. Reference to the CLOSE WATCH program can be found in Air Force Instruction (AFI) 11-289, *Phoenix Banner, Silver, and Copper Operations*, 1 June 2000. Paragraph 4.2.1.

<sup>16</sup> This is done by embedding a local crewmember on the chopped crews and providing a standard deployment brief as is done for new crews in theater operations like the long running OPERATIONS NORTHERN and SOUTHERN WATCH.

<sup>17</sup> "Diplomatic Clearance ('dip clearances' in TACC parlance) are required whenever AMC aircraft operate in the airspace of other nations. Timely diplomatic clearances are a critical component of mission planning and they are granted for specified windows of time. If a mission is delayed for circumstances such as maintenance, weather, or a missed aerial refueling rendezvous, the dip clearance process must begin anew." Referenced in History, Air Mobility Command, Department of the Air Force, 1 January –31 December 2000, Volume 1, 106

<sup>18</sup> History, Air Mobility Command, Department of the Air Force, 1 January –31 December 1996, Volume 1, 93.

<sup>19</sup> Currently this process is performed in a Triage-like manner using overnight delivery services and drastically increases the amount of human effort needed to correctly perform the mission. This is a critical issue US Embassy personnel, especially the Air Attaché's since they spend inordinate amounts of time working visa and passport issues on the ground after the aircraft has arrived. As an Advance Agent I personally witnessed aircraft and aircrew processing delays that hindered mission performance. In most cases the aircrew had been tasked to perform the mission on short-notice (less than 72 hours) and the claim was that it had been impossible for AMC to get the appropriate visa paperwork accomplished in time. This is a poor excuse and consistently undermines our diplomatic instrument of power as each instance requires the Air Attaché to seek favors in order to avoid visibility that would reflect negatively on the USAF. You might just say that this is the Attaché's J-O-B, but those favors are always required to be paid back in some form or another. In simple terms, each of these little favors costs the USAF credibility and as they amass over time, cost the diplomatic mission even more. If the in country diplomatic mission is of no concern to you as the reader of this article, think about this: Every troop and every mission tasked supports the mission of the Commander-in-Chief who is representing the nation. The credibility of the nation is at stake every time a Banner mission departs home station and any less than a stellar performance by any of the players involved is unacceptable!

<sup>20</sup> One of the items I have noticed in the my time as an aircrew member is that as real world contingencies drive operations, it is more difficult for units to maintain proficiency in every mission they are technically required to maintain. More and more often waivers of these requirements are becoming a quarterly standard.

<sup>21</sup> Extract (U), SAF/CC, "C-130 Accident Investigation Report," 21 Oct 96, Dup Doc 1-95, Article (U), "Review Says White House Aircraft Safe and Reliable," Defense Daily, 5 Dec 96, from History, Air Mobility Command, Department of the Air Force, 1 January –31 December 1996, Volume 1, 154-155.

<sup>22</sup> This ability was aptly demonstrated when President Clinton became deeply involved in the Middle-East Peace process near the end of his administration. During this crisis, AMC was tasked to provide airlift assets for immediate support to as many as five Middle-East locations. Multiple aircraft and crews were deployed to and placed on Alpha Alert at Andrews remaining there for many days before a deployment site was chosen. Information from the History, Air Mobility Command, Department of the Air Force, 1 January –31 December 2000, Volume 1, 103-104.

<sup>23</sup> Transportation Working Capital Fund Guidance from SAF/FM Website, Charters – Special Assignment Airlift Mission (SAAM'S), Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCSE), and Contingencies for the Transportation Working Capital Fund (TWCF), and Non-TWCF Aircraft. Effective: 01 Oct 02 through 30 Sep 03. Available at <http://www.saffm.hq.af.mil/FMB/pb/2003/wcf>, n.p.

## **Part 5**

### **Precedents for Action**

There are many precedents that may be used in support of the establishment of a Super C-17 (Banner) squadron at Andrews AFB. The establishment of new organizations by the creation or consolidation of new specialized programs provide evidence that paradigm changes work. Some familiar examples are given in the following paragraphs. Each of these actions improved the efficiency of DoD operations and saves countless millions in operating and infrastructure costs.

The enactment of the Presidential Protection Act of 1976 provided a legislative precedent requiring the DoD to provide logistical and transportation support to the U.S. Secret Service.<sup>1</sup> It was enacted as recognition that the DoD could supply support at a reasonable cost from an established infrastructure. The effect on individual DoD units was hardly taken into account as Congress assumed that the costs would be minimal since the support would be of short duration and temporary in nature.<sup>2</sup> Instead of creating a centralized method of providing this support, an adhoc method of assigning support requests to the nearest capable unit became the norm. This placed an incredible burden on many units that provide support routinely. As evidenced in Part Four, implementation of the proposed plan supports this Act at a much more reasonable cost.

The second precedent is the ongoing consolidation of the Combatant Commanders airlift support mission (previous called CINC Support). This precedent is mostly an administrative role however, pooling the airframes under one administrative agent makes the best use of otherwise

idle assets since user's other than the Combatant Commanders have the opportunity, based upon user and mission priority, to book those aircraft when the owning Combatant Commander is not traveling.<sup>3</sup> USTRANSCOM took over the responsibilities of administering the Operational Support Airlift (OSA) fleet in a similar consolidation. Even with initial Joint integration issues, this consolidation earned a reputation of greatly improving and efficiency of the VIP airfleet.

The third precedent came about in April of 2001 when the USAF recognized that the responsibilities of the Presidential Pilot's Office (PPO) had grown so large that it desirable to form the Presidential Airlift Group under the command structure of the 89AW.<sup>4</sup>

Each of these precedents changed paradigms and vastly changed the way the USAF does business concerning VIP transport. Furthermore, an even larger change has come about that should prompt USAF leadership to consider the plan presented in this paper. The events of September 11, 2001 drove the creation of the Department of Homeland Defense and Northern Command that stood up in October 2002. This historic paradigm change brought about the reapportionment of Space Command and Strategic Command assets to improve efficiency. The federal government and DoD realized change was necessary in order to protect this nation.

These precedents should be recognized as the precursor to other necessary changes in infrastructure. Adopting the proposed plan is one step that Air Force Leaders can take right now to improve AMC's ability to support the President and protect this nation.<sup>5</sup>

## Notes

<sup>1</sup> DOD Directive (DODD) 3025.13, *Employment of Department of Defense Resources in Support of the United States Secret Service*, 13 September 1985, References (c).

<sup>2</sup> Ibid. Paragraph 3.2.

<sup>3</sup> Message. 261910Z APR 01. US Air Force. To HQ USAF CVAM, 26 April 2001.

<sup>4</sup> Ceremony Pamphlet, *Presidential Airlift Group Activation*, 10 April 2001. n.p. in History, Air Mobility Command, Department of the Air Force, 1 January –31 December 2001, Volume 2, Chron 40.

<sup>5</sup> Note: Congressional Leaders are typically very sensitive to making drastic changes in any form, however, the events of September 11, 2001 highlighted a major error in assumptions concerning the peace dividend brought about by the end of the Cold War. As has become painfully obvious today, one of the major errors was the assumption that the world would be a safe place and the U.S. would not need a large military force. This train of thought brought about the draw down in military personnel and as it turns out drastically reduced the procurement of new airlift aircraft. What lawmakers did not seem to understand at that time is this, the preeminence of U.S. Military power depends on it's ability to be maneuver (globally) and our airlift capability is the proverbial "Golden BB" that remains unmatched by any adversary at present.

## Part 6

### Conclusion

*“We have learned and must not forget that from now on air transport is an essential element of airpower, in fact of all national power.” -- General Henry, H. “Hap” Arnold, 1945*

Secretary Roche recently provided guidance to general promotion boards that gives hope to those who believe that our leaders are impervious to change. He stated, “The board should find those officers who provided the direction and force that shaped outcomes rather than reacted successfully to a series of events.”<sup>1</sup> This statement is key for the future leaders of the Air Force.

Employing a Super C-17 squadron at Andrews AFB will not support every SAAM mission, however it effectively increases the number of airlift airframes and aircrews available for AMC’s use in day-to-day operations. Standing up this Super C-17 (Banner) squadron is the most responsible and immediate action that AMC can take to improve its overall airlift capability. It allows AMC to be more responsive to White House airlift requests. It reduces the growing drain on AMC platforms dedicated to other missions by effectively increasing airlift capacities, and it allows the AMC Commander, his staff, and the Air Mobility Command’s TACC to concentrate on supporting the warfighting mission without reducing the level of support for AMC’s number one customer, the President of the United States.

### Notes

<sup>1</sup> *Memo Serves as Officer Career Guide*, Maxwell/Gunter Dispatch, 14 March, 2003, by SSgt C. Todd Lopez, Air Force Print News, 9.

## Appendix A

# AMC RECORD OF WHITE HOUSE SUPPORT MISSIONS<sup>1</sup>

WHITE HOUSE SUPPORT MISSIONS													
2002	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	YEARLY
BANNER	48	58	53	34	49	37	27	52	45	70	52	13	538
SILVER	9	14	23	23	15	22	24	22	20	18	8	4	202
COPPER	0	0	4	0	5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	9
SUPPORT	3	7	0	0	16	0	0	0	1	4	12	1	44
TOTAL	60	79	80	57	85	59	51	74	66	92	72	18	793

2001	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	YEARLY
BANNER	15	30	39	29	28	63	43	31	37	32	26	12	385
SILVER	6	5	0	1	3	15	11	11	7	5	7	10	81
COPPER	5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	5
SUPPORT	1	7	0	4	7	13	15	0	0	5	0	0	52
TOTAL	27	42	39	34	38	91	69	42	44	42	33	22	523

2000	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	YEARLY
BANNER	40	41	149	89	78	69	64	112	11	82	79	32	846
SILVER	36	56	59	43	49	50	55	50	18	50	17	4	487
COPPER	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2
SUPPORT	6	7	23	0	9	6	11	40	10	10	23	6	151
TOTAL	82	104	231	132	136	125	130	202	39	142	119	44	1486

1999	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	YEARLY
BANNER	31	68	71	40	96	60	84	51	52	51	16	44	664
SILVER	25	20	36	45	46	60	40	20	55	47	9	32	435
COPPER	1	2	16	0	9	3	0	0	2	9	0	0	42
SUPPORT	1	4	5	0	0	5	3	4	8	0	0	0	30
TOTAL	58	94	128	85	151	128	127	75	117	107	25	76	1171

<sup>1</sup> Memo w/attchs (U) AMC/TACC/XOOO to AMC TACC/XOO et al, "Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) Request 2000-276," 29 Oct 00, Sup Doc 2-9. For an analysis of presidential support airlift from 1 January 89 through 31 December 2000, se Rpt (U), Kent beck, USTRANSCOM/TCJ3-OD, "Phoenix Banner/Silver Summary, CY 89-00," 21 Jan 01, Sup Doc 2-6. Updated by Geoffrey Norton, Major, USAF, HQ AMC TACC/XOOO, Chief, Executive Travel Branch, 3 March 2003.

1998	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	YEARLY
BANNER	31	22	106	74	53	66	66	45	68	47	32	27	637
SILVER	12	3	30	19	17	30	46	22	42	56	27	21	325
COPPER	1	1	0	0	5	0	0	0	2	5	17	0	31
SUPPORT	0	0	0	0	0	6	2	2	1	0	11	2	24
TOTAL	44	26	136	93	75	102	114	69	113	108	87	50	1017

1997	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	YEARLY
BANNER	22	11	35	10	41	51	46	18	28	52	50	41	405
SILVER	4	18	13	9	14	17	7	7	23	24	16	12	164
COPPER	0	0	9	0	1	0	4	0	3	4	6	0	27
SUPPORT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL	26	29	57	19	56	68	57	25	54	80	72	53	596

1996	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	YEARLY
BANNER	48	57	50	42	30	74	55	78	123	128	106	15	806
SILVER	22	11	16	12	11	11	14	18	33	48	28	7	231
COPPER	0	0	0	0	0	2	6	0	0	0	0	0	8
SUPPORT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL	70	68	66	54	41	87	75	96	156	176	134	22	1045

1995	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	YEARLY
BANNER	36	21	31	44	21	44	12	23	57	52	38	36	415
SILVER	6	7	25	10	9	13	12	5	20	23	5	9	144
COPPER	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
SUPPORT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL	42	28	56	54	30	57	24	28	77	75	43	45	559

1994	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	YEARLY
BANNER	41	27	36	43	31	50	58	14	25	68	46	15	454
SILVER	1	2	18	15	23	2	16	11	12	26	14	9	149
COPPER	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
SUPPORT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL	42	29	54	58	54	52	74	25	37	94	60	24	603

1993	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	YEARLY
BANNER	8	27	14	20	27	8	38	31	31	18	31	18	271
SILVER	0	6	3	7	4	4	6	10	6	4	6	21	77
COPPER	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
SUPPORT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL	8	33	17	27	31	12	44	41	37	22	37	39	348

Data Base  
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1992	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	YEARLY
BANNER	31	59	35	20	42	37	106	93	128	135	38	18	742
SILVER	17	35	15	8	10	8	8	17	31	30	3	4	186
COPPER	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
SUPPORT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL	48	94	50	28	52	45	114	110	159	165	41	22	928

1991	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	YEARLY
BANNER	10	22	31	31	27	27	73	9	50	21	40	43	384
SILVER	19	15	8	14	22	19	15	14	18	16	13	7	180
COPPER	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
SUPPORT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL	29	37	39	45	49	46	88	23	68	37	53	50	564

1990	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	YEARLY
BANNER	32	41	10	36	32	31	43	15	31	72	93	44	480
SILVER	15	5	16	20	18	14	26	24	30	56	8	10	242
COPPER	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
SUPPORT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL	47	46	26	56	50	45	69	39	61	128	101	54	722

1989	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	YEARLY
BANNER	9	34	9	33	44	31	20	9	29	18	27	37	300
SILVER	4	6	6	8	8	8	6	7	15	6	7	5	86
COPPER	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
SUPPORT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL	13	40	15	41	52	39	26	16	44	24	34	42	386

1988	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	YEARLY
BANNER	11	24	19	11	20	19	15	28	32	31	32	8	250
SILVER	28	27	25	18	15	21	14	24	24	18	9	4	227
COPPER	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
SUPPORT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL	39	51	44	29	35	40	29	52	56	49	41	12	477

1987	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	YEARLY
BANNER	4	0	6	16	18	18	11	12	9	5	14	9	122
SILVER	8	16	14	16	21	22	20	7	27	27	33	12	223
COPPER	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
SUPPORT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL	12	16	20	32	39	40	31	19	36	32	47	21	345

Data Base  
Continued  
Next Page

1986	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	YEARLY
BANNER	9	26	5	23	12	15	37	13	26	50	12	6	234
SILVER	24	23	16	16	18	26	19	4	17	21	7	12	203
COPPER	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
SUPPORT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL	33	49	21	39	30	41	56	17	43	71	19	18	437

1985	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	YEARLY
BANNER	3	2	6	14	36	21	2	8	27	11	19	13	162
SILVER	0	2	15	3	19	10	4	2	14	16	18	15	118
COPPER	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
SUPPORT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL	3	4	21	17	55	31	6	10	41	27	37	28	280

1984	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	YEARLY
BANNER	11	20	4	56	25	32	29	28	38	77	22	4	346
SILVER	9	15	4	8	6	3	5	12	10	11	1	3	87
COPPER	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
SUPPORT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL	20	35	8	64	31	35	34	40	48	88	23	7	433

1983	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	YEARLY
BANNER	NO DATA AVAILABLE									16	20	8	44
SILVER	NO DATA AVAILABLE									13	6	13	32
COPPER	NO DATA AVAILABLE									0	0	0	0
SUPPORT	NO DATA AVAILABLE									0	0	0	0
TOTAL	NO DATA AVAILABLE									29	26	21	76

## 1984 -2002

TOTAL NUMBER OF BANNER MISSIONS	7,562
TOTAL NUMBER OF SILVER MISSIONS	3,596
TOTAL NUMBER OF COPPER MISSIONS	110
TOTAL NUMBER OF SUPPORT MISSIONS	205
TOTAL NUMBER OF MISSIONS	11,473

## Appendix B

### List of Sources for Figure 4

- Air Mobility Command Website, "AMC Overview," n.p. (on-line) Internet, 12 March 2003, available from <https://www.amc.af.mil/overview.cfm>.
- History. Air Mobility Command, Department of the Air Force, 15 June 1992– 31 Dec 1994. Document excerpts unclassified #61, 28 Jan 2003. Vol 1. 372
- History. Air Mobility Command, Department of the Air Force, 1 June 1992 – 31 Dec 1994. Document excerpts unclassified #61, 23 Jan 2003. Vol 2. 431-432, 717-723
- History. Air Mobility Command, Department of the Air Force, 1 January – 31 Dec 1995. Document excerpts unclassified #61, 17 Jan 2003. Vol 2.
- History. Air Mobility Command, Department of the Air Force, 1 January – 31 Dec 1996. Document excerpts unclassified #61, 17 Jan 2003. Vol 1. 273-281
- History. Air Mobility Command, Department of the Air Force, 1 January – 31 Dec 1997. Document excerpts unclassified #61, 21 Jan 2003. Vol 1. 305-311
- History. Air Mobility Command, Department of the Air Force, 1 January – 31 Dec 1998. Document excerpts unclassified #61, 21 Jan 2003. Vol 1. 319-325
- History. Air Mobility Command, Department of the Air Force, 1 January – 31 Dec 1999. Document excerpts unclassified #61, 23 Jan 2003. Vol 1. 409-413
- History. Air Mobility Command, Department of the Air Force, 1 January – 31 Dec 2000. Document excerpts unclassified #61, 28 Jan 2003. Vol 1. 403-411
- History. Air Mobility Command, Department of the Air Force, 1 January – 31 Dec 2001. Document excerpts unclassified #61, 28 Jan 2003. Vol 1. 341-349

## APPENDIX C

### **Banner Express 2000 Concept of Operations<sup>2</sup>**



## **BANNER EXPRESS 2000 CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS**

<sup>2</sup> CONOPS (U), HQ AMC TACC/XOBA, BANNER EXPRESS 2000," 1 August 2000, Sup Doc 2-59, from the History, Air Mobility Command, Department of the Air Force, 1 January –31 December 2000, Volume 2: Supporting Documents. E-copy provided by Brian T. Lilly, LtCol (Ret) GS-12, HQ AMC TACC/XOBA, 2 Feb 03.

OPR: TACC/XOBA

## BANNER EXPRESS 2000

The Banner Express 2000 is an ambitious plan to optimize our limited airlift assets and provide reliable service to our most important customers. It is not intended to cover each and every situation. It is expected that we will encounter issues we did not anticipate. It will be updated as necessary throughout the Banner Express. It is important for everyone to understand that we are fully committed to the Banner Express. I am counting on your support.

**//SIGNED//**

---

MICHAEL W. WOOLEY, Brigadier General, USAF

Commander, Tanker Airlift Control Center

23 Feb 00

## SUMMARY OF CONOPS CHANGES

### **CHANGE 1, 17 Feb 00**

1. Signature Block changed to reflect new TACC/CC
2. Amended paragraph 2. (amendment underlined)
3. Changed paragraph 2.1. (changes underlined)
4. Amended paragraph 2.1.2. (amendments underlined)
5. Changed paragraph 2.2. (changes underlined)
6. Changed paragraph 2.3. (change lined out)
7. Completely changed paragraph 2.8.1. (entire paragraph)
8. Added paragraph 3.1.5. (paragraph underlined)
9. Added paragraph 3.1.6. (paragraph underlined)
10. Amended paragraph 3.2. (amendment underlined)
11. Changed paragraph 3.4. (changes underlined)
12. Changed paragraph 3.6. (changes underlined)
13. Amended paragraph 3.7.2. (amendment underlined)
14. Changed paragraph 3.8.1. (change underlined)
15. Amended paragraph 3.9.1. (amendment underlined)
16. Annex A Phone Roster updated
17. Annex B Personnel Requirements updated (changes underlined)
18. Annex C Banner Express Timeline, subsequent Annexes re-lettered
19. Banner Barrel Schedule Annex changed (changes underlined)
20. Aircrew Brochure Annex deleted

## CONOPS DISTRIBUTION LIST

HQ AMC/LGR/LGA/LGS/LGJ/DOO/DOR/DOT/DOV

HQ AMC TACC/RFR/RFG/XOB/XOC/XOO/XOZ

HQ AFRC/DO/LG

NGB/XOD/LG

15AF/DO/LG

21AF/DO/LG

22AF/DO

4AF/DO

43OG/LG

62OG/LG

89OG/LG

305OG/LG

317AG/CC

437OG/LG

463AG/CC

# BANNER EXPRESS 2000 CONOPS

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## BANNER EXPRESS 2000

### CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

#### **Period of Operation: 1 Feb – 10 Nov 00**

1. **Situation:** The period prior to a presidential election is accompanied by an increase in Phoenix Banner/Silver missions. During the 2000 campaign this increased activity may last as long as 10 months. The purpose of the Banner Express (B.E.) is to position sufficient C-130 and C-141 aircraft and crews to Andrews AFB to expedite the movement of personnel and equipment in support of White House travel. The prepositioning of these aircraft and crews increases mission velocity and responsiveness, reduces home-station launch requirements, and reduces overall flying hour costs associated with the positioning/depositioning of aircraft to/from Andrews AFB.

2. **Forces:** To support these additional Phoenix Banner taskings, TACC will direct the deployment of sufficient personnel and equipment to maintain 24-hour mission support in all areas. The total number of personnel and equipment dedicated to the B.E. will be adjusted as necessary to support this 1A1 requirement. Mandays and per diem are available for all AFRC and ANG personnel supporting the B.E. For AFRC crews, MPA mandays and per diem will be issued to cover the eight-day rotation period. AMC will fund TRs for crewmember swapouts necessitated by illness, personal emergency, or similar events.

2.1. **Aircrew:** Initial deployment will be two C-130 crews and four C-141 crews.

2.1.1. The 62AW Phoenix Banner Charlie requirement will be considered part of the B.E., and therefore part of the six C-141 crew package, effective 1 Feb 00. Effective 2 Feb 00 at 1200L, the 437AW is relieved of the Banner Bravo alert responsibility. This requirement will be supported by the Banner Express. Bravo alert requirements will be IAW existing AMCI's.

2.1.2. All aircrews will be Phoenix Banner qualified. Crew complement is IAW AFI 11-289, paragraph 2.1. Exception: C-130 crews will be Basic with two Loadmasters. Paragraph 2.1.1. provision for crews to be "fully mission qualified" equates to "airland" qualified. Each aircraft will have at least one fully qualified flying crew chief. AFRC C-130 crew complement will be two pilots, one navigator, one flight engineer, two loadmasters, and one flying crew chief. Due to billeting availability, all active duty and AFRC/NGB aircrews are limited to a maximum of seven crewmembers. Adherence to FSRTs for AFRC and NGB aircrews is critical. HQ AFRC/DO is the approval authority for FSRT extension requests.

2.1.3. Aircrew Scheduled Return Times (SRTs) should be staggered to prevent multiple simultaneous crew swapouts. Replacement aircrews should have SRTs to maintain staggered swapouts. Aircrew swapouts will be coordinated between the TACC Banner Barrel and the on-scene Mission Commander (MC) at Andrews AFB.

2.2. **Aircraft:** Initial deployment will be two C-130 aircraft and four C-141 aircraft. Aircraft configuration will be as follows:

2.2.1. C2 Mod, sidewall seats, no comfort pallet (all aircraft).

2.2.2. Operable winch and vehicle ramps (all aircraft).

2.2.3. Standard ramp fuel loads at Andrews will be used.

2.2.3.1. C-141 is 80.0

2.2.3.2. C-130 is 36.0

2.2.4. Additional tie down straps are required for each aircraft.

2.2.4.1. C-141: 150 (total of 200)

2.2.4.2. C-130: 60 (total of 100)

2.2.5. Life Support requirements will be provided by the 89AW for emergencies only. –21 Equipment inspections on all aircraft will be valid for the entire duration of the deployment.

2.3. **Mission Commanders:** 62AW is the lead unit for the B.E. TACC will task one overall Mission Commander (MC) from the 62AW (rank of O-5) and four Deputy MCs, two C-141 and two C-130, (rank of O-4/O-5). Each MC/Deputy MC should have previous MC experience. Graduates of the AMC Stage Manager Course are desired but not mandatory. The Deputy MCs will work rotating ~~eight-hour~~ shifts. Each MC has authority to make decisions regarding operations for either MDS. The overall MC is the AMC on-scene commander for all Banner Express operations. He/she may be required to attend 89AW staff meetings or other functions. Close liaison with TACC is necessary at all times.

2.3.1. The initial overall MC and Deputy MCs will be required to spend one duty day at the TACC for orientation, training, and planning prior to stand-up of the B.E.

2.3.2. Replacement MCs and deputy MCs will need at least a two-day overlap to prepare to assume MC duties and responsibilities.

2.3.3. MC/Deputy MCs **will** deploy to Andrews with all flight gear and pubs. (See para 3.6.)

2.4. **Crew Managers:** We will task four C-130/C-141 Crew Managers (“Operations Officers”) to assist the MC/Deputy MCs in crew/mission management. The Crew Managers can be officer or NCO; graduates of the AMC Stage Manager Course are

highly desired but not mandatory. Crew Managers will work rotating eight-hour shifts identical to the Deputy MCs. Crew Managers work directly for the Mission Commander.

2.4.1. Replacement Crew Managers will need at least a one-day overlap to ensure seamless crew management and learn all duties and responsibilities.

2.5. **Acting First Sergeant/Senior Enlisted Advisor: One** NCO (MSgt or above) will act as the 1<sup>st</sup> Sgt/SEA during the deployment and reports directly to the overall MC.

2.6. **Mission Commander administrative support:** B.E. admin support will consist of two fully qualified 1CO personnel and one fully qualified 3AO. 62AW will provide one 1CO and the 3AO. The deployed C-130 unit will provide the other 1CO. These personnel will perform all B.E. admin tasks as directed by the MCs. Admin personnel swapout must allow sufficient overlap to train replacement personnel. Admin personnel report directly to the Mission Commander.

2.7. **Maintenance Support personnel:** Sufficient maintenance personnel, including maintenance officers and Pro-Supers, will be required to maintain 24 X 7 support for both C-141 and C-130 aircraft at Andrews AFB. Initial maintenance personnel requirements are shown by specialty and MDS in **ANNEX B**. **Annex F** and **Annex G** contain specific guidance on C-130 and C-141 maintenance requirements, respectively.

2.8. **ARC Participation:** HQ AFRC and NGB have each committed one C-130 aircraft and crew starting the first weekend in March.

2.8.1. HQ AFRC C-130 aircraft and crew will depart home station NET 1700L, and will arrive at Andrews AFB NLT 2300L on Friday, 3 Mar 00. Crew and aircraft must be back at home station NLT 1700L on the following Friday (7 days later). Replacement aircraft and crew will arrive at Andrews every Friday utilizing the same schedule. The MC and/or TACC Banner Barrel will coordinate with HQ AFRC/DOOM for details concerning unit information and any other special requirements. AFRC aircraft will position/deposition on TWCF or AMC mission support Mission Identifiers. The same applies for maintenance swapout missions. Actual mission numbers are determined by the TACC Banner Barrel. HQ AFRC/DO will continue to monitor AFRC participation in Banner Express 2000.

2.8.2. NGB C-130 aircraft and crew will be available at home station and LFA at 1800Z on Saturday, 4 Mar 00. Crew and aircraft must be back at home station NLT the following Sunday (8 days later). Replacement aircraft and crew will be available for alert at 1800Z every Saturday utilizing the same schedule. The MC and/or TACC Banner Barrel will coordinate with NGB for details concerning unit information and any other special requirements.

3. **Mission Planning, Execution, and Support:** MCs will coordinate all alerts, recycles, and aircraft/crew swapouts, and any other items affecting mission

accomplishment with the TACC/XOBA Banner Barrel. MCs are responsible for assigning the right crew to the right mission.

3.1. All crew management will be IAW existing AMC Regulations and Instructions.

3.1.1. Passports **are** required for all crewmembers and crew chiefs in case of short-notice OCONUS Banners/Silvers to locations in close proximity (ie. Canada, Mexico, Central America, etc.).

3.1.2. Mobility bags are **not** required for any personnel.

3.1.3. Aircrew arming will be standard CONUS arming requirements.

3.1.4. Life Support requirements will be provided by 89AW for emergencies only. Personnel will depart home station with their personal Life Support equipment (helmets, masks, etc.) inspection valid for the entire duration of their deployment.

3.1.5. COMSEC materials are not required for CONUS Banner Express Missions.

3.1.6. Aircrews will include the “Andrews Banner Express Mission” in the remarks section of all DD Form 175s for missions to/from Andrews. This will assist the 89AW personnel in differentiating the Banner Express missions from other Andrews AFB transient aircraft and expedite service by Ground Control, Tower, Command Post and Transient Alert, including parking location.

3.2. Requests for waivers will be coordinated through normal channels. Keep the TACC Banner Barrel and the appropriate TACC C2 cell informed of any situation that might affect Banner Express operations. For AFRC assets, AFRC/DO will exercise concurrent waiver authority for flights involving degraded equipment, non-compliance with MEL/MESL, or non-standard fuel loads.

3.3. MCs are responsible for providing TACC/XOB with weekly Phoenix Banner mission summaries. Sample summary is shown in **Figures 1a and 1b**.

3.4. The MCs will work out of the 89AW Command Post. They can be reached through the 89AW Command Post, Banner Express Ops, or via cellular phone during duty and non-duty hours. Refer to Annex A for specific phone numbers.

3.5. MC/Deputy MCs should not normally plan to fly Banner Express missions. However, if circumstances dictate, they may be needed on short-notice to fill in for crewmembers unavailable due to illness, family emergencies, miscellaneous mission requirements, etc. MC/Deputy MCs **will** deploy to Andrews with all flight gear and pubs.

3.6. All personnel, including B.E. staff, will be billeted off base. Billeting is not available on base. Billeting at Andrews AFB will be paid by AMC through the 89AW Contracting Office and Services Squadron. Billeting for aircrews/crew chiefs TDY away from

Andrews on missions will use their government credit card. **Individuals are responsible for all miscellaneous room charges at Andrews (phone calls, meals, movies, etc.).** If official calls are made from the room phone, individuals are responsible for paying the hotel directly, and claiming the phone calls on their travel voucher.

3.7. Banner Express 2000 alert posture: The Banner Express will always have at least one C-141 aircraft/crew in a minimum of Charlie alert status and one C-141 in Bravo alert status. Changes to the alert status and requirements for additional alert forces will be handled on a case-by-case basis based on the number of Banner Express missions operating on a given day.

3.7.1. All alerts will be accomplished in off-base billeting.

3.7.2. Response time for Banner Express Alpha alerts will be 1+30 from notification. Alpha alert LFA times will be the same as the LFA time for the first mission being backed-up. This allows maximum flexibility and minimum delay for missions encountering problems any time during the pre-launch sequence.

3.7.3. Response time for Banner Express Bravo alerts will be 3+30 from notification. However, every effort will be made to meet the standard 3+00 Bravo alert response time.

3.7.4. Banner Charlie alert requires that the crew be capable of departure within 17+15 hours of mission notification.

3.7.5. Common sense dictates that crews remain within the Washington, D.C./Andrews AFB area and carry cellular phones. Travel outside this area for any crewmember, regardless of alert status, is prohibited unless approved by the MC cadre with the concurrence of the TACC/XOBA Banner Barrel. The MC is the final authority on what constitutes the Washington, D.C./Andrews AFB area.

3.8. Crews will contact the appropriate TACC Command and Control cell before entering crew rest at locations other than Andrews AFB for updates to follow-on taskings or changes to current mission. All re-routes or diversions from planned itineraries must be coordinated with the TACC Senior Controller and, time and circumstances permitting, the TACC Banner Barrel.

3.8.1. Crews will contact the MC through the Andrews AFB Command Post 30 minutes prior to arrival to confirm follow-on requirements or changes to current mission.

3.9. Crews and aircraft not required for Banner Express operations, including the Charlie alert aircrew, may be used for local proficiency sorties using unit training time and mission numbers. Coordination with the TACC Banner Barrel is necessary. If the aircraft experiences a malfunction that would affect a Banner Express mission, the crew must land immediately for repairs. Aircraft on local training missions must monitor

Andrews Command Post in case they must be recalled for any short-notice requirements.

3.9.1. All crews flying local proficiency sorties must be familiar with all 89AW local area operating procedures. The preferred airfields for local proficiency training include Navy Norfolk, Langley AFB, McGuire AFB, and Dover AFB. Do not plan missions to use Dulles or Newport News. All crews will comply with local operating procedures. Local proficiency missions flown by AFRC crews will use O&M flying hours and will operate using training Mission Identifiers issued by HQ AFRC/DOOM.

3.10. All mission cuts for Banner Express crews, regardless of mission type, will include the following remark: "BANNER EXPRESS CREW/AIRCRAFT. DO NOT DIVERT/REROUTE WITHOUT APPROVAL OF TACC (XOB>24 HOURS; XOC/XOZ<24 HOURS) AND BANNER EXPRESS MISSION COMMANDER". Mission cuts for missions entering the Banner Express will include the remark: "BANNER EXPRESS INPUT". Mission cuts for missions on their last Banner Express will include the remark: "BANNER EXPRESS OUTPUT".

4.1. **Communications:** A phone list of the most commonly used numbers is located in ANNEX A. Cellular phones will be issued to ensure timely communications between Banner Express units and aircrews.

4.1.1. Cellular phones will be provided by Andrews AFB Land-based Mobile Radio. The 89CS will be reimbursed for all costs associated with cellular phones, to include the initial purchase of phones. Cellular phones are for official use only. MCs are overall POC for cellular phone management.

4.1.2. MC/Deputy MCs will have four cellular phones; three primary and one spare.

4.1.3. Each crew will have two cellular phones. They are issued to the crew by the MC/Deputy MC and returned prior to departure from Andrews on every mission.

4.1.4. Other personnel will be issued cellular phones on an as-required basis determined by the MC.

4.1.5. All personnel must use GIMail for personal e-mail. HOTMail or other similar services will not be available at Andrews AFB.

5.1. **Transportation:** Transportation for MCs, aircrews, MC admin support and maintenance personnel will be supplied by the GSA motorpool and/or a fleet lease agreement through the 89AW Transportation Squadron. Vehicles are for official use only. MCs are overall POC for vehicle management.

5.1.1. MCs will have seven vehicles; four for the MC staff, two for the admin support staff, and one for the Senior Enlisted Advisor (acting 1<sup>st</sup> Sgt).

5.1.2. Each crew will have two vehicles. They are issued to the crew by the MC and returned to the MC prior to departure from Andrews on every mission.

5.1.3. Other personnel will be issued vehicles on an as-required basis determined by the MC.

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## ANNEX A

### BANNER EXPRESS PHONE NUMBERS

(all numbers are DSN unless otherwise indicated)

**Andrews AFB** (Andrews area code is 301; commercial prefix is 981)

<b>Banner Express Ops</b>		<b>voice</b>	<b>858-0203/04</b>
		<b>fax</b>	<b>858-0205</b>
	<b>Overall MC</b>	<b>cell (301)</b>	
<b>89AW Command Post</b>	<b>Lt Col Brydon Chief Gabrini</b>	<b>voice</b>	<b>858-5058/9</b>
		<b>fax</b>	<b>858-7671</b>
<b>89APS/TRO</b>	<b>Chief Coker</b>	<b>voice</b>	<b>858-6198</b>
<b>89OSS/DO</b>	<b>Lt Col Ryan</b>	<b>voice</b>	<b>858-6458</b>
<b>89OSS/OSA (Airfield Manager)</b>	<b>Mr Malone</b>	<b>voice</b>	<b>858-3416</b>
<b>89 OSS (Base Operations)</b>	<b>MSgt Mayfield</b>	<b>voice</b>	<b>858-3419</b>
<b>89 AGS (Transient Alert)</b>	<b>SMSgt Rosier</b>	<b>voice</b>	<b>858-9553/4091</b>
<b>89SVS/CC</b>	<b>Lt Col Birmingham</b>	<b>voice</b>	<b>858-9333</b>
<b>89SVS (Chief of Billeting)</b>	<b>Mr. Norman Miley</b>	<b>voice</b>	<b>858-5480</b>
<b>89SVS (Inflight Kitchen)</b>		<b>voice</b>	<b>858-3543</b>
<b>89CS/SCM (Cell Phone POC)</b>	<b>Cpt Dunbar</b>	<b>voice</b>	<b>858-4314</b>
<b>89CS/SCY (Phone Funding)</b>	<b>Cpt Thuermer</b>	<b>voice</b>	<b>858-4515</b>
<b>89CS/SCBN (Base LAN)</b>	<b>Lt Schreiber</b>	<b>voice</b>	<b>858-6200</b>
<b>89TRNS/CC</b>	<b>Lt Col Holland</b>	<b>voice</b>	<b>858-2611</b>
<b>89TRNS/LGTO (Vehicle POC)</b>	<b>Lt Riley</b>	<b>voice</b>	<b>858-2874</b>
<b>89AW Contracting Sqn</b>	<b>Mr. Wheat</b>	<b>voice</b>	<b>858-2304</b>
	<b>1Lt Ingram</b>	<b>voice</b>	<b>858-2301</b>
	<b>Mrs. Mackay</b>	<b>voice</b>	<b>858-2304</b>
	<b>Amn Johnson</b>	<b>voice</b>	<b>858-2304</b>
<b>459AW MX Ops</b>	<b>Lt Col Linster</b>	<b>voice</b>	<b>857-2851</b>

<b>459AW Current Operations</b>	<b>Maj MacGregor</b>	<b>voice</b>	<b>857-2600/2800</b>
		<b>fax</b>	<b>857-5496</b>
<b>Navy Ops (Ramp Space Coord)</b>		<b>voice</b>	<b>857-2740/2744</b>
<b>Naval Air Facility Commander</b>	<b>Cmdr Stokes</b>	<b>voice</b>	<b>857-2786/9280</b>
<b>Colony South (Aircrew and B.E. Staff)</b>		<b>comm (301)</b>	<b>856-4500</b>
			<b>(800) 537-1147</b>
		<b>fax</b>	<b>(301) 868-1439</b>
	<b>Ms. Chrissy Welch</b>	<b>e-mail</b>	<b>sales@colonyouth.com</b>
<b>DoubleTree Club (Mx Cadre)</b>		<b>voice</b>	<b>(301) 773-0700</b>
		<b>Fax</b>	<b>(301) 772-2016</b>
	<b>Ms. Teri Agosta</b>	<b>e-mail</b>	<b>teriagosta@aol.com</b>
<b>WHMO</b>	<b>White House Switch 284-2000, press 1, then extension 71263</b>		
	<b>commercial direct to airlift ops (202) 757-1263</b>		
<b>paging on call personnel:</b>	<b>comm to White House Switch (202) 757-5000</b>		
	<b>fax (202) 638-1578</b>		

**SCOTT AFB** (Scott area code is 618; commercial prefix is 256)

<b>TACC</b>	<b>Banner Barrel</b>	<b>voice</b>	<b>576-4525</b>
		<b>cell (618)</b>	<b>604-5846</b>
	<b>Americas East Barrel</b>	<b>voice</b>	<b>576-1789</b>
	<b>Americas West Barrel</b>	<b>voice</b>	<b>576-1504</b>
	<b>Barrel Reserve Liaison</b>	<b>voice</b>	<b>576-3841</b>
	<b>Barrel facsimile</b>	<b>fax</b>	<b>576-1781</b>
	<b>C2; East Cell</b>	<b>voice</b>	<b>576-1748/03</b>
	<b>C2; West Cell</b>	<b>voice</b>	<b>576-1749/04</b>
	<b>C2; Senior</b>	<b>voice</b>	<b>576-1705</b>
	<b>Flight Plans</b>	<b>voice</b>	<b>576-3415/3490</b>
	<b>SAAM Requirements</b>	<b>voice</b>	<b>576-1790/3584</b>
		<b>fax</b>	<b>576-5194</b>
	<b>SAAM Planning</b>	<b>voice</b>	<b>576-4196</b>
		<b>fax</b>	<b>576-5194</b>
	<b>Comm Cave (patch capability)</b>	<b>voice</b>	<b>576-2227</b>
	<b>TACC/XOPM (AMTs, TSgt Cox)</b>	<b>voice</b>	<b>576-2087</b>
<b>AMC/DO</b>	<b>Director of Operations</b>	<b>voice</b>	<b>576-3315</b>
<b>AMC/DOOO</b>	<b>Operations Support</b>	<b>voice</b>	<b>576-2089</b>
<b>AMC/DOT</b>	<b>Training</b>	<b>voice</b>	<b>576-3610</b>

<b>AMC/DOVP</b>	<b>Flight Policies</b>	<b>voice</b>	<b>576-5305</b>
<b>AMC/LGRM</b>	<b>Logistics Management</b>	<b>voice</b>	<b>576-2412</b>
<b>AMC/LGRC</b>	<b>Logistics Control</b>	<b>voice</b>	<b>576-1763</b>
<b>AMC/LGTR</b>	<b>MX Vehicle (TSgt Stebbins)</b>	<b>voice</b>	<b>576-2508</b>
<b>AMC/PA</b>	<b>Public Affairs/Media Relations</b>	<b>voice</b>	<b>576-5003</b>

**McChord AFB** (McChord area code is 253; commercial prefix is 984)

<b>Current Ops</b>	<b>voice</b>	<b>984-2631</b>
	<b>fax</b>	<b>984-3322</b>
<b>Command Post</b>	<b>voice</b>	<b>984-2635</b>
	<b>fax</b>	<b>984-2163</b>
<b>62AW Contracting Office</b>		
<b>MSgt Ron Rangel</b>	<b>voice</b>	<b>984-5131</b>

**McGuire AFB** (McGuire area code is 609; commercial prefix is 724)

<b>Current Ops</b>	<b>voice</b>	<b>440-3077</b>
	<b>fax</b>	<b>440-6846/2232</b>
<b>Command Post</b>	<b>voice</b>	<b>440-3935</b>
	<b>Fax</b>	<b>440-2810</b>

**Charleston AFB** (Charleston area code is 843; commercial prefix is 963)

<b>Current Ops</b>	<b>voice</b>	<b>673-5556/8</b>
	<b>fax</b>	<b>673-4148</b>
<b>Command Post</b>	<b>voice</b>	<b>673-2533/3354</b>
	<b>fax</b>	<b>673-4151</b>

**Dyess AFB (317AG)** (Dyess area code is 915; commercial prefix is 696)

<b>Current Ops</b>	<b>voice</b>	<b>461-2821/1046</b>
	<b>fax</b>	<b>461-2822</b>
<b>Command Post</b>	<b>voice</b>	<b>461-1996</b>
	<b>fax</b>	<b>461-1268</b>

**Pope AFB (43AW)** (Pope area code is 910; commercial prefix is 394)

<b>Current Ops</b>	<b>A-3</b>	<b>voice</b>	<b>424-7386/7383</b>
		<b>fax</b>	<b>1-(910)-394-7379</b>

<b>Command Post</b>	<b>voice</b>	<b>424-9000</b>
	<b>fax</b>	<b>424-9096</b>

**Little Rock AFB** (Little Rock area code is 501; commercial prefix is 987)

<b>Current Ops</b>	<b>voice</b>	<b>731-3358/6850</b>
	<b>fax</b>	<b>1-(501) 987-7799</b>
<b>Command Post</b>	<b>voice</b>	<b>731-3200</b>
	<b>fax</b>	<b>731-6524</b>

## ANNEX B

### BANNER EXPRESS PERSONNEL REQUIREMENTS

#### Aircrew/Staff Personnel Requirements

AFSC	Job Description	C-130	C-141	Total
C-141	Overall Mission Commander	0	1	1
Rated	Mission Commander	2	2	4
Any	Crew Manager (Officer or NCO)	2	2	4
1CO	Admin (A Forms)	1	1	2
3AO	Admin (General)	0	1	1
NCO	Senior Enlisted Advisor/1st Sgt	0	1	1
<u>6C051</u>	<u>Contracting NCO</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>1</u>
<u>2T271</u>	<u>ATOC NCO</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>1</u>
<u>1A171</u>	<u>Ramp Coordinator (Flt Eng)</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>1</u>
<u>1A271</u>	<u>Ramp Coordinator (Loadmaster)</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>1</u>
Rated	Aircrew	<u>32</u>	<u>46</u>	<u>78</u>
	Aircrew/Staff Personnel Totals	<u>39</u>	<u>56</u>	<u>95</u>

#### Maintenance Personnel Requirements

AFSCs					
C-141	C-130	Specialty	C-130	C-141	Total
2A5X1	2A5X1	Crew Chief	8	19	27
2A6X1	2A6X1B	Jet Mechanic	4	3	7
2A4X1	2A4X1	Comm/Nav	2	3	5
2A4X2	2A4X1	Guidance/Control	2	3	5
2A6X5	2A6X5	Hydraulics Mechanic	2	3	5
2A6X6	2A6X6	Electro/Env	2	3	5
2A6X4	2A6X4	Fuel Cell Mechanic	1	1	2
2S0X1	2S0X1	Supply	2	2	4
2A5X1	2A5X1	Aero Repair	1	1	2
	2A5X1	Dual Rails	1	0	1
	Any	Dash 21/CTK	1	0	1
	Any	Debrief	1	0	1
2A590	2A590	Pro-Super	2	2	4
021A3	021A3	MX Officer	1	1	2
2A300	2A300	MX Super	<u>2</u>	1	3

B-1

## ANNEX C

### BANNER EXPRESS AIRCRAFT/AIRCREW SWAPOUT SCHEDULE

	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>DATES</u>
<b><u>C-130</u></b>	317AG (Dyess)	1 Feb – 30 Apr
	463AG (Little Rock)	1 May – 31 Jul
	43AW (Pope)	1 Aug – 10 Nov
	HQ AFRC C-130 acft/crew (1)	Every Friday as of 3 Mar
	NGB C-130 acft/crew (1)	LFA @ 1800Z every Sat as of 4 Mar
<b><u>C-141</u></b>	62AW/4AS	1 – 21 Feb
	62AW/8AS	20 Feb – 12 Mar
	62AW/4AS	11 Mar – 1 Apr
	62AW/8AS	31 Mar – 21 Apr
	62AW/4AS	20 Apr – 11 May
	62AW/8AS	10 – 31 May
	62AW/4AS	30 May – 20 Jun
	62AW/8AS	19 Jun – 10 Jul
	62AW/4AS	9 – 30 Jul
	62AW/8AS	29 Jul – 19 Aug
	62AW/4AS	18 Aug – 8 Sep
	62AW/8AS	7 – 28 Sep
	62AW/4AS	27 Sep – 18 Oct
62AW/8AS	17 Oct – 10 Nov	

ANNEX D

**BANNER EXPRESS BARREL SCHEDULE**

<u>Dates</u>	<u>Banner Barrel</u>
1 – 13 Feb 00	Maj Don Anderson
14 – 27 Feb 00	<u>Maj Joe Indelicato</u>
28 Feb – <u>15</u> Mar 00	Maj Brian Erts
<u>16</u> – 26 Mar 00	<u>Lt Col Brian Lilly</u>
27 Mar – 9 Apr 00	Mr. Don Brock
10 – 23 Apr 00	Lt Col Brian Lilly
24 Apr – 7 May 00	Ms. Dana Hasemann
8 – 14 May 00	Maj Tom James
15 – 28 May 00	Maj Joe Indelicato
29 May – 11 Jun 00	Lt Col Rick Morris
12 – 25 Jun 00	Lt Col Brian Lilly
26 Jun – 9 Jul 00	Lt Col Jim Eastwood
10 – 23 Jul 00	Maj Joe Indelicato
24 Jul – 6 Aug 00	Mr. Don Brock
7 – 20 Aug 00	Lt Col Brian Lilly
21 Aug – 10 Sep 00	Ms. Hasemann
11 – 24 Sep 00	Maj Joe Indelicato
25 Sep – 9 Oct 00	Maj Chris Roycraft
10 – 15 Oct 00	Lt Col Rick Morris
15 – 29 Oct 00	Maj Joe Indelicato
30 Oct – 10 Nov 00	Lt Col Brian Lilly

## ANNEX E

### C-130 MAINTENANCE ANNEX

E-1. **Situation:** During the period from 1 Feb 00 to 10 Nov 00, four Dyess C-130s will be deployed to Andrews AFB, MD to support an increase in Phoenix Banner/ Silver/ Copper missions. There will be one 45 day rotation and two 30 day rotations. To support daily aircraft sorties, a full array of logistics support will be required to generate and sustain operations.

E-2. **Assumptions:** The pace of operations is estimated to be 3 missions per day for the duration of the operation. Remaining aircraft will sit on alert with no other taskings. Logistics support from the Andrews AFB logistics complex will be minimal.

E-3. **Forces:** The number of logistics personnel required to initially sustain this operation are as shown in Annex B. These are minimum requirements to sustain a 2-shift operation. For APG assume one FCC per tail. For Pro-Supers assume all system red-x certified.

E-4. **Schedule:** Initial operations will begin with two 12-hour shifts. Based on the anticipated operations schedule, daily maintenance operations are not expected to exceed 20 hours per day. However, schedules will probably need to be adjusted once the deployment is under way and a more accurate tempo is established.

E-5. **Maintenance support:** will come from several different sources including the 89AW (AMC), 459AW (AFRES), and organic. MICAP and MRT support will be coordinated with, and tasked through HQ AMC/LGRC. Additional MX personnel, equipment, and RSP will be coordinated with, and tasked through, HQ AMC/LGRM.

E-5.1. The majority of backshop support will come from the 89AW. They have a full array of capabilities including fuel cell repair, hydraulic tube/hose fabrication, wheel/tire build-up, structural maintenance, engine oil analysis, and battery build-up and repair.

E-5.2. On-equipment support will come from the 89AW Aircraft Generation Squadron's Transient Alert element. The 459AW will support requests for assistance on an as-needed basis as long as they have the resources to do so.

E-5.3. **Transportation:** All required AGE and special purpose vehicles are available at Andrews. General-purpose vehicles are being sourced by TACC in coordination with 89AW Transportation Squadron.

E-5.3.1. Minimum vehicle requirements for maintenance/logistics are:

4 - 15 pax vans (Flight Line/Hotel/Dining Facility transport; 2 per shift)

2 - Compact Cars (Pro-Supers)

1 - Vehicle (car or pick-up) for Maintenance Officer

1 – P/U truck for Supply (transport parts/supplies)

E-5.4. **Communications:** The 89CS will provide six land mobile radios (LMR) for use on the flight line (5 for maintenance and one for ops). The Mission Commander will issue cellular phones as required. POC for maintenance support there is SMSgt Rosier, Superintendent of Transient Alert, at 858-5619.

E-5.5. **Supply:** Due to the length of the deployment consideration should be given to establishing local supply and bench stock accounts. The 89 SUPS does stock consumables. Units will deploy with the following to support the supply requirement:

- XD2 ESTA Segment
- XF3 and XB3 ESTA Segment
- Wheel/Tire Pallet (with brakes)
- Spare Engine (on high-boy trailer)
- Spare Prop
- 1 Set of Jacks

E-5.6 **Mobility Equipment:** Each aircraft will require two extra cases of oil and hydraulic fluid (8 of each total), and 100 total tie-down straps and devices per aircraft. Units will deploy with the following mobility equipment:

- Mob Cart
- Maxi Bin
- 69 Pallet
- 87 Pallet
- 52 Ops Support Pallet
- Full set of prop heater cones
- Tool boxes and Pro Gear

E-6. **Billeting:** All maintenance personnel (C-130 and C-141) will be billeted off-base at the same hotel.

E-7. **Operating Location:** C-130 and C-141 maintenance will operate from Hangar 2. The MSK will be positioned in maintenance hangar.

E-8. **Aircraft Parking:** All aircraft will be parked on the 89AW ramp to facilitate ease of maintenance. Aircraft may be relocated to the 459AW or Naval Flight Facility ramps at the discretion of the Chief, Transient Alert if necessary.

## ANNEX F

### C-141 MAINTENANCE ANNEX

F-1. **Situation:** During the period from 1 Feb 00 to 10 Nov 00, six C-141s will be deployed to Andrews AFB, MD to support and increase in Phoenix Banner/Silver/Copper missions. To support daily aircraft sorties, a full array of logistics support will be required to generate and sustain operations.

F-2. **Assumptions:** The pace of operations is estimated to be 4 missions per day for the duration of the operation. Remaining aircraft will on alert or available for add-on White House support missions. Logistics support from the Andrews AFB logistics complex will be minimal. Logistics support from the 459AW will be on an as-needed basis.

F-3. **Forces:** The number of logistics personnel required to sustain this operation are as shown in Annex B. These are minimum requirements to sustain a 2-shift operation. For APG assume one FCC per tail. For Pro-Supers assume all system red-x certified.

F-4. **Schedule:** Initial operations will begin with two 10-hour shifts. Based on the anticipated operations schedule, daily maintenance operations are not expected to exceed 20 hours per day. However, schedules will probably need to be adjusted once the deployment is under way and a more accurate tempo is established.

F-4.1. Anticipate rotating personnel at either 30 or 45 days. In any case, the newest maintainer must be in place before the returnee may depart. Pro-super and officer rotations will be similar but must allow for a minimum of two days for turnover.

F-5. **Maintenance Support:** Maintenance support will come from several different sources including the 89AW (AMC), 459AW (AFRES), and organic. MICAP and MRT support will be coordinated with, and tasked through HQ AMC/LGRC. Additional MX personnel, equipment, and RSP will be coordinated with, and tasked through, HQ AMC/LGRM.

F-5.1. The majority of backshop support will come from the 89AW. They have a full array of capabilities including fuel cell repair, hydraulic tube/hose fabrication, wheel/tire build-up, structural maintenance, engine oil analysis, and battery build-up and repair.

F-5.2. On-equipment support will come from the 89AW Aircraft Generation Squadron's Transient Alert element. The 459AW will support requests for assistance on an as-needed basis as long as they have the resources to do so. The 459AW will be allocated additional funding to support overtime if required to compensate time off for the two-deep maintenance specialists that are on 12-hour shifts.

F-5.3. **Transportation:** The 89AW will provide one bobtail and one pick-up truck. General-purpose vehicles are being sourced by TACC in coordination with 89AW Transportation Squadron.

F-5.4. **Communications:** The 89CS will provide seven land mobile radios (LMR) for use on the flight line. In addition, Transient Alert has 3 LMRs available for issue. The Mission Commander will issue cellular phones as required.

F-5.5. **Supply:** An MRSP kit will be deployed to support supply requirements, however due to the length of the deployment consideration should be given to establishing local supply and bench stock accounts.

F-6. **Mobility Equipment:** Each aircraft will require 200 total tie-down straps and devices. 62LG personnel will deploy with the following equipment:

AC Segment RSP  
Tool boxes and Pro Gear

F-7. **Billeting:** All maintenance personnel (C-130 and C-141) will be billeted off-base at the same hotel.

F-8. **Operating Location:** C-130 and C-141 maintenance will operate from Hangar 2. The MRSP kit will be positioned in Hangar 2 maintenance bay.

F-9. **Aircraft Parking:** All aircraft will be parked on the 89AW ramp to facilitate ease of maintenance. Aircraft may be relocated to the 459AW or Naval Flight Facility ramps at the discretion of the Chief, Transient Alert.

**F-2**

## *Glossary*

<b>Acronym</b>	<b>Definition</b>
AEF	Aerospace Expeditionary Force
AFI	Air Force Instruction
AFRES	Air Force Reserves
ANG	Air National Guard
CONOPS	Concept of Operations
CONUS	Continental United States
CRAF	Civil Reserve Air Fleet
DIP	Diplomatic Clearance
DoD	Department of Defense
FAA	Federal Aviation Administration
FMC	Fully Mission Capable
GATES	Global Air Transportation Execution System
GDSS	Global Decision Support System
GSE	Ground Support Equipment
HA/DR/NEO	Humanitarian Assistance, Disaster Relief, Non Combatant Evacuation Operation
HQ	Headquarters
MRS BURU	Mobility Requirements Study Bottom Up Review Update
MRS-05	Mobility Requirements Study-2005
MTM/D	Million Ton Miles per Day
OCONUS	Outside of Continental United States
OPTEMPO	Operating/Operations Tempo
OSA	Operational Support Airlift
RON	Remain Over Night
SAM	Special Air Mission
SAAM	Special Assignment Air Mission
TACC	Tanker Airlift Control Center
TALCE	Tanker Airlift Control Element
TRS-05	Tanker Requirements Study-2005
TWCF	Transportation Working Capital Fund
U.S.	United States
USAF	U.S. Air Force
USTRANSCOM	U.S. Transportation Command

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