THESIS

“MAINTAIN COURSE AND SPEED…”
COMMAND AND CONTROL FOR MARITIME HOMELAND
SECURITY AND HOMELAND DEFENSE

by

Scott F. Breor

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Thesis Advisor: Christopher Bellavita
Second Reader: Robert Simeral

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Since 11 September 2001 a number of authorities have provided definitions for both Homeland Security (HS) and Homeland Defense (HD), however, as the definitions develop, they provide less functional detail. The most often asked question posed to professionals in the field is “what is the distinction between the Homeland Security mission and the Homeland Defense mission.” What they are really asking is, in a particular scenario, “who’s in charge of the operation?” “When is it law enforcement, or non-military, and when is it a military operation”? Many have argued that the command structure between the two Services needs to be changed to ensure the seam between HS and HD is minimized. This is a natural approach because command and control is possibly the most important of all operational functions. The objective of this thesis is to argue that the Navy and Coast Guard should not establish a joint interagency command structure for the missions of Homeland Security and Homeland Defense. They should continue to coordinate and support one another, when required, but they should not combine the two Services together into a permanent single organization.
ABSTRACT

Since 11 September 2001, a number of authorities have provided definitions for both Homeland Security (HS) and Homeland Defense (HD), however, as the definitions develop, they provide less functional detail. The most often asked question posed to professionals in the field is “what is the distinction between the Homeland Security mission and the Homeland Defense mission.” What they are really asking is, in a particular scenario, “who’s in charge of the operation?” “When is it law enforcement, or non-military, and when is it a military operation”? Many have argued that the command structure between the two Services needs to be changed to ensure the seam between HS and HD is minimized. This is a natural approach because command and control is possibly the most important of all operational functions. The objective of this thesis is to argue that the Navy and Coast Guard should not establish a joint interagency command structure for the missions of Homeland Security and Homeland Defense. They should continue to coordinate and support one another, when required, but they should not combine the two Services together into a permanent single organization.
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I. INTRODUCTION

Since 11 September 2001 a number of authorities have provided definitions for both Homeland Security (HS) and Homeland Defense (HD), however, as the definitions develop, they provide less functional detail. The most often asked question posed to professionals in the field is “what is the distinction between the Homeland Security mission and the Homeland Defense mission.” What they are really asking is, in a particular scenario, “who’s in charge of the operation?” “When is it law enforcement, or non-military, and when is it a military operation”?

Many have argued that the command structure between the two Services needs to be changed to ensure the seam between HS and HD is minimized. This is a natural approach because command and control is possibly the most important of all operational functions. The idea is that by establishing who is in charge of the operation, the relationship between organizations in support of the operation can be defined and the span of control of the commander can be determined.\(^1\) But this avenue should not be taken until: (1) clear HS/HD objectives can be set for each Service, and (2) the HS/HD objectives are not assessed in a bubble, all the objectives and missions that support the national strategies are considered.

The lack of clear distinction between the HS and HD mission areas stems from the inadequate guidance provided to adequately address the operations of maritime Homeland Security (law enforcement) and maritime Homeland Defense

\(^1\) Chet Helms, Operational Functions, Naval War College reading 4103A, Newport RI, undated, page 4
(military operation). Without this strategic guidance it is difficult for the Coast Guard and Navy to establish clear objectives within the two mission areas. This lack of clarity is then magnified in the transitional seam between HS and HD and the support/supported relationship becomes unclear. This eventually leads the experts to challenge the maritime domain command and control structure.

A. OBJECTIVE

The objective of this thesis is to argue that the Navy and Coast Guard should not establish a joint interagency command structure for the missions of Homeland Security and Homeland Defense. They should continue to coordinate and support one another when required, but they should not combine the two Services together into a permanent single organization.

Presently the guidance provided does not adequately define the operational objectives for the missions of Homeland Security and Homeland Defense. In February of 2001, the Hart-Rudman Commission revealed the lack of coherent strategic guidance for homeland security and recommended an urgent effort to focus strategy and resources on the homeland. Without clear objectives the capabilities and requirements cannot be properly determined. Attempting to build a command structure without fully understanding these areas is not recommended. In addition, with what little guidance there is, it appears that the overlap between Homeland Security and Homeland Defense can be best addressed with the present command

structure and relationship that has been established between the Coast Guard and Navy.

Today, action at the tactical level can have strategic implications. In the maritime domain there are numerous stakeholders: international, federal, state, local and private industry. A miscue between on-scene commanders from differing agencies could have detrimental affects on the operation, with international relations, and eventually - with the economic sector.

The Brookings Institute concluded that a catastrophic attack on the maritime industry using a nuclear device concealed in a shipping container could cause damage and disruption costing the U.S. economy as much as $1 trillion. The importance of establishing an effective command and control structure for ensuring security in the maritime domain cannot be overstated.

B. METHODOLOGY

This paper will attempt to extrapolate what the objectives are for HS and HD from the current strategic guidances and policies. These objectives will then be compared to the Services missions to identify not just where the overlap might exist, but also the extent of what these missions will be versus the other Service requirements. This evaluation will then be used to compare the current command structure to an interagency model.

A fundamental concept that will be applied is that organizations are formed to influence the environment and

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achieve specific outcomes. How well the organization’s outputs achieve the desired outcomes will indicate its effectiveness. Imperative to an organization’s ability to efficiently produce outputs is its command and control structure.

The formation of a command structure should be built around the organization’s desired outcomes. If the outcomes are not clearly defined then the organization will not know how it should influence the environment and what objectives it should establish. Once you have an idea of the objectives and the missions then the command and control structure can be formulated. This is basically what the Navy and Coast Guard have been trying to muddle through, but unfortunately they have wanted to address the command structure in parallel with the development of the objectives. In addition, there have been some unofficial proposals that address the command development process in a vacuum, only focusing on the Homeland Security/Homeland Defense missions and not all Service missions.

Unfortunately, in the review of the guidances and policies it became very clear that there is not a doctrinal standardization for how goals, capabilities, missions, and objectives are defined. For this reason, a model was developed to help interpret between the various documents to determine what the requirements and objectives would be for the Homeland Security and Homeland Defense missions (Figure 1). In addition, it should also be noted that the current guidances and policies do not provide very clear

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direction and further doctrine is required to better define the two missions.

C. TERMS OF REFERENCE

The Coast Guard is the lead federal agent for Homeland Security in the maritime domain. Homeland Security as defined in the National Strategy for Homeland Security is a concerted national effort to prevent terrorist attacks within the United States, reduce America’s vulnerability to terrorism, and minimize the damage and recover from attacks that do occur.⁵

![Diagram of Goal to Capability Flow](image)

Figure 1. Goal to capability - flow diagram

The Department of Defense (DoD) is the lead federal agent for Homeland Defense. Homeland Defense is defined in the Defense Planning Guidance 2004-2009 as the protection

of U.S. sovereignty, territory, domestic population and critical defense infrastructure against external threats and aggression.

This thesis is a snap shot in time and the assessments and conclusions are based on current guidances and policies. As further clarification is provided with respect to the missions of HS and HD the roles and command structure may have to be reevaluated.

D. EXPECTED BENEFITS OF THIS THESIS

This thesis is intended to show that the apparent seam between the Homeland Security and Homeland Defense missions cannot be simply narrowed with a change in the command structure. The breadth of this seam, rather, is a function of information sharing and can only be narrowed by timely actionable intelligence.

In addition, the thesis will also show that more guidance is required for the Homeland Security and Homeland Defense missions.
II. CURRENT STRATEGIC GUIDANCE

In the strategic planning process the first step an organization has to undertake in order to fulfill its mission is to decide what outcomes it would like to achieve. The Navy and the Coast Guard have fundamental missions that each executes to reach outcomes that have been drawn from national strategies. These missions go beyond what is required for HS and HD. How much beyond is an important aspect to consider if one wanted to combine the organizations to execute a specific mission. What would then happen to the management of the other missions?

The major overarching strategies and policies that guide the Services include, but are not limited to: The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, the National Military Strategy, and the Defense Planning Guidance (the Strategic Planning Guidance was not approved at the time of this research). These strategies were chosen because they have the largest effect on DoD. But for HS and HD a couple of other strategies must also be considered. These strategies are: The National Strategy for Homeland Security, the National Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructures and Key Assets, the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, and the National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction. From these strategies we can identify objectives for HS and HD, which can then be compared to the Services current missions.

A. NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

The National Security Strategy (NSS) reflects the nation’s values and interests. In accordance with this strategy, defending our homeland against its adversaries is the first and fundamental commitment of the Federal Government. The strategic goals of the NSS are: political and economic freedom, peaceful relations with other states, and respect for human dignity. In addition, the NSS specifically states eight objectives to achieve the strategic goals: (1) Champion aspirations for human dignity, (2) Strengthen alliances to defeat global terrorism and work to prevent attacks against allies, friends and the United States, (3) Work with others to defuse regional conflicts, (4) Prevent enemies from threatening allies, friends and the United States with weapons of mass destruction, (5) Ignite a new era of global economic growth through free markets and trade, (6) Expand the circle of development by opening societies and building the infrastructure of democracy, (7) Develop agendas for cooperative action with other main centers of global power, and (8) Transform America’s national security institutions to meet the emerging challenges and opportunities.

In addition, the NSS captures the terrorist threat by stating that the nation will be menaced less by fleets and armies than by catastrophic technologies in the hands of the embittered few. In essence, to support these goals and objectives the Navy strategy must not only be able achieve its traditional missions but it must be able handle the new emerging threat of the embittered few – the terrorists.

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8 Ibid.
Even though the definitions for HS and HD make it difficult to distinguish between the two, the NSS objectives help to frame the capabilities required for the missions. Additionally, it is clear that not all of the NSS objectives are specific to the HS or HD missions. The NSS reaches much beyond the HS and HD framework, which means that the Coast Guard and Navy have other roles and missions to consider in support of the nations strategic goals. All of these roles must be considered when assessing an effective command and control structure.

B. NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY/QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW

This nation must have ready forces that can bring victory to our country, and safety to our people.... innovative doctrine, strategy and weaponry.... to revolutionize the battlefield of the future and to keep the peace by defining war on our terms.... We will build the security of America by fighting our enemies abroad, and protecting our folks here at home.

President George W. Bush

The NSS, the National Military Strategy, the Report on the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), and the Defense Planning Guidance provide the overall strategic framework for the DoD. From these guidances it is clear that globalization has fostered a flowering of both wealth and technological innovation that has enabled a new dynamic in society, the super-empowered non-state actor. No longer is the world divided up in perfect state nations. The non-state adversaries transcend the geographical boundaries onto a new virtual battlefield.

The Navy must be flexible enough to surge at a moment’s notice to deter, prevent, or interdict these
adversaries in this new environment.... the foe may be a state nation or it could be an Exxon tanker. In this planning process, the Navy considers its missions, looks out at its environment and determines its desired outcomes (goals) as well as the broad policies and objectives that it is hoped will lead to their achievement.\textsuperscript{9} From these reports the following goals and objectives have been identified:

- Assuring allies and friends (goal)
  Objectives -
  - Demonstrate U.S. steadiness of purpose, national resolve and military capability to defend and advance common interests
  - Strengthen and expand alliances and security relationships

- Dissuading adversaries from developing threatening forces or ambitions (goal)
  Objectives -
  - Shape the future military competition in ways that are advantageous to the United States
  - Complicate the planning and operations of adversaries

- Deterring aggression and countering coercion against the United States, its forces, allies and friends (goal)
  Objectives -
  - Develop and maintain the capability to swiftly defeat attacks with only modest reinforcement

\textsuperscript{9} Ibid.
• At the direction of the President, decisively defeating an adversary at the time, place and in the manner of U.S. choosing\textsuperscript{10} (goal)

In addition to the objectives, the overriding themes of prevention and flexibility can be noted. By using the projection of military power we can prevent certain situations from occurring. With the ability of providing a greater choice of military options to deal with the situation the leadership is given greater flexibility. These themes must be remembered when formalizing the HD objectives and the command structure.

C. JOINT OPERATIONAL CONCEPT

The Department of Defense (DoD) recently published the Homeland Security Joint Operating Concept. A Joint Operating Concept (JOC) is a description of how a future Joint Force Commander will plan, prepare, deploy, employ, and sustain a joint force against potential adversaries' capabilities or crisis situations specified within the range of military operations\textsuperscript{11} Even though we will see that the JOC's objectives duplicate those of the National Strategy for Homeland Security, the JOC still gives keen insight into the mission requirements.

The Homeland Security JOC's central idea is that the first line of defense is performed overseas through traditional military operations to stop potential threats before they can directly threaten the Homeland, but that not all potential threats can be prevented - a layered


\textsuperscript{11} The Secretary of Defense, Joint Operations Concepts, November 2003, page 17
defense is required. With a layered defense there will be a series of opportunities for countering the threat. This layered defense is divided into three regions: the Forward Regions, the Approaches, and the Homeland (Figure 2).

The Forward Regions are foreign land areas, sovereign airspace, and sovereign waters outside the Homeland. The Forward Regions can be thought of as the first line of defense. The next line, or second line of defense, is the Approaches. The Approaches is a conceptual region extending from the limits of the Homeland to the boundaries of the Forward Regions that is based on intelligence – once intelligence has indicated a threat is en route to the Homeland, it is considered to be in the Approaches. The last line is the Homeland. The Homeland is a physical region that includes the 50 states, U.S. territories and

![Layered and Comprehensive Defense](image)

Figure 2. Comprehensive layered defense
(From: Homeland Security JOC 2004)

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13 Ibid.
14 Ibid.
possessions in the Caribbean Sea and Pacific Ocean, and the immediate surrounding sovereign waters and airspace.\textsuperscript{15} It is with this layered defense that the JOC’s goal can be achieved; to detect, deter, prevent, and defeat threats and aggression against the United States as early and as far from its borders as possible so as to minimize their effects on United States society and interests.\textsuperscript{16} The JOC identifies the following as required capabilities:

- Detect and prevent potential threats to the Homeland as they arise in the Forward Regions
- Detect and defeat ballistic missile attacks on the Homeland
- Detect and defeat airborne threats to the Homeland
- Deter and defend against hostile space systems threatening the Homeland
- Detect and defeat maritime threats to the Homeland
- Deter and defend against physical and cyber threats to DoD critical infrastructure in the Homeland
- Project power to defend the Homeland
- Prepare for and mitigate the effects of multiple simultaneous CBRNE events
- Conduct Homeland Defense and Civil Support (CS) operations and Emergency Planning (EP) activities while: operating as Lead Federal Agent (LFA),

\textsuperscript{15} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{16} Ibid. Page 15
providing support to a LFA, and during transitions of responsibility

- Conduct Homeland Defense and CS operations and EP planning activities when responsibilities overlap and in the absence of a formal designation of LFA.\(^{17}\)

But these identified capabilities are very general and loosely defined. Since they describe something to strive for and do not necessarily outline a specific ability they will be referred to as objectives throughout the remainder of this thesis. This is in accordance with the model discussed in the introduction.

Even though the JOC formulates how the joint force will operate in the next 15 years, arguably, the identified objectives can be used to describe the present day requirement. This is because the objectives listed in the JOC mirror those of the National Strategy for Homeland Security. The Navy presently has various capabilities to apply to operations in support of the HS objectives. But the Navy must also utilize these same capabilities to achieve objectives that are not specific to the HS and HD missions. This must be taken into account during the command structure assessment process.

D. THE NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR HOMELAND SECURITY

Most post September 11, 2001 threat estimates and policy guidance indicate that the world in the near future holds uncertain elements and continued anti-U.S. underpinnings and that the “antipathy of our (U.S.) enemies may well be increasing, and new enemies may emerge.\(^{18}\) The

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\(^{17}\) Ibid. Page 20

National Strategy for Homeland Security (NSHLS) calls on the nation to cooperate together to protect our Nation from these enemies.

The strategy further identifies three strategic objectives, which mirror the definition for Homeland Security:

- Prevent terrorist attacks with the United States
- Reduce America’s vulnerability to terrorism
- Minimize the damage and recover from attacks that do occur\(^{19}\)

But these objectives are very broad and resemble what most would consider goals – desired outcomes. The NSHLS does provide further clarity for each objective and these are listed as follows:

- Prevent terrorist attacks
  Specific Objectives –
  o Deter all potential terrorist
  o Defeat terrorism wherever it appears
  o Detect terrorists before they strike
  o Prevent their instruments of terror from entering the country
  o Eliminate the threat terrorist pose\(^{20}\)
- Reduce vulnerabilities
  Specific Objectives –
  o Prevent an ever-evolving target
  o Government to work with private sector to identify and protect critical infrastructure and key assets


\(^{20}\) Ibid. Page 2
Government to work with private sector to detect terrorist threats
Government to work with private sector to augment our defense
Mitigate risk against economic costs and infringements on individual liberty\textsuperscript{21}
Minimize the damage and recover

Specific Objectives –
Prepare to manage the consequence of future attacks
Improve systems and prepare the individuals that will respond to the terrorist attack
Build and maintain various financial, legal, and social systems to recover from all forms of terrorism
Protect and restore institutions needed to sustain economic growth and confidence
Rebuild destroyed property
Assist victims and their families
Heal psychological wounds\textsuperscript{22}

From these objectives, and the ones mentioned previously, the HS and HD missions can now be better defined. As the scope for each mission area takes shape there becomes a better understanding of the requirements. Once the requirements are established it becomes clear to see what level of resources must be committed so that each Service can complete not only the HS/D objectives, but also the other national objectives.

\textsuperscript{21} Ibid. Page 3
\textsuperscript{22} Ibid. Page 3
As the lead federal agent for Homeland Security in the maritime domain, the Coast Guard’s strategy for Homeland Security identifies the following objectives:

- Prevent terrorist attacks within, and terrorist exploitation of, the U.S. Maritime Domain
- Reduce America’s vulnerability to terrorism within the U.S. Maritime Domain
- Protect U.S. population centers, critical infrastructure, maritime borders, ports, coastal approaches, and the boundaries and seams among them
- Protect the U.S. Marine Transportation System while preserving the freedom of the U.S. Maritime Domain for legitimate pursuits
- Minimize the damage and recover from attacks that may occur within the U.S. Maritime Domain as either the LFA or a supporting agency

Like the NSHLS, the objectives listed by the Coast Guard describe a desired outcome and not necessarily a specific item to strive for to achieve desired outputs (Figure 1).
However, the strategy further states maritime strategic elements. These elements are more inline with how the objectives in the previously discussed documents are scoped. To complete the HS and HD mission defining process the elements will be used as objectives. These objectives are as follows:

- Increase Maritime Domain Awareness
- Conduct Enhanced Maritime Security Operations
- Close Port Security Gaps
- Build Critical Security Capabilities
- Leverage Partnerships to Mitigate Security Risks
- Ensure Readiness for Homeland Defense Operations

F. HOMELAND SECURITY AND HOMELAND DEFENSE OBJECTIVES

We must take the battle to the enemy, disrupt his plans and confront the worst threats before they emerge. In the world we have entered, the only path to safety is the path of action. And this nation will act.

President George W. Bush
United States Military Academy at West Point
1 June 2002

From the guidances and policy statements mentioned above we can now identify objectives for the missions of HS and HD (Table 1). These objectives are an interpretation due to the disparity that existed between the way goals and objectives were used in each document. But before the objectives are categorized there are two fundamental operational themes that must be looked at and considered.

First, the Coast Guard imply in their mission statement for HS that the operational focus is on the
homeland. They do this by framing their mission statement within the context of protecting only the U.S. maritime domain, population, territory, and critical infrastructure. This will mean that even though the identified objectives for HS may have similarities to those of HD, they are distinctly different due to the Coast Guards focus on the homeland. This difference translates into vastly different capability requirements and missions.

Second, while the National Strategy for Homeland Security focuses on preventing terrorist attacks within the United States, the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism focuses on identifying and defusing threats before they reach our borders. President George W. Bush further stated at the Capital on 29 January 2002, “America is no longer protected by vast oceans. We are protected from attack only by vigorous action abroad, and increased vigilance at home.”

This “preemptive away game” philosophy was also captured by Admiral Vern Clark in a Proceedings article – Homeland defense will be accomplished by a national effort that integrates forward deployed naval forces with the other military services, civil authorities, and intelligence and law-enforcement agencies. Working with the newly established Northern Command (USNORTHCOM), we will identify, track, and intercept dangers long before they threaten our homeland. This preemptive strategy mandates a forward deployed force requirement. In summary,

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25 The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, page 2
the current doctrine has Coast Guard focusing on the homeland and the Navy in the forward regions.

This does not mean that the Coast Guard should not have an expeditionary role, or that the Navy should not support the homeland operations. But these underlying themes need to be considered when reviewing the objectives and assessing the organizational structures.
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Table 1. Maritime - Homeland Security and Homeland Defense objectives
III. NAVY MISSIONS

With a general framework developed for the HS and HD objectives, an assessment against the Services capabilities and missions can now be made. This evaluation will give an indication of how the Homeland Security/Defense (HS/D) capability requirements compare to the spectrum of Service missions.

Traditionally the Navy has maintained a forward presence in their support of the National Security Strategy. In 1989, Theodore Roosevelt, Assistant Secretary of the Navy at the time, had shifted the homeland defense strategy from coastal patrol to power projection based on the philosophy that the best defense is a good offense. Operating from this forward presence posture, naval forces execute their missions to achieve the objectives that are established from the goals established in national strategies.

VADM Turner, in the 1998 Naval Warfare College Review, summarized the traditional Navy missions as follows: (1) Strategic Deterrence - to deter all-out attack on the United States or its allies, to discourage any potential aggressor contemplating less than all-out attack with unacceptable risks, to maintain a stable political environment within which the threat of aggression or coercion against the U.S. or its allies is minimized; (2) Sea Control - to ensure industrial supplies, to reinforce/resupply military forces engaged overseas, to provide wartime economic/military supplies to allies, to provide safety for naval forces in the projection of power ashore role; (3) Projection of Power Ashore - to secure
territory from which a land campaign can be launched, to secure a land area from which an air operation can be launched, to secure selected territory or facility to deny the adversary its use, to destroy adversary facilities (Communication, logistics, etc.); and (4) Naval Presence Mission – to deter actions inimical to the interests of the United States or its allies, to encourage actions that are in the interests of the United States or its allies.27 These traditional missions are now embedded in the Navy’s future operating concept – Sea Power 21.

A. SEA POWER 21

Essentially the Navy’s traditional missions have not changed within the Sea Power 21 concept (Figure 3). However, with Sea Power 21 the Navy force planning has been shifted to create capabilities that will be able to handle today’s wide spectrum of military conflicts. In addition the force-planning shift will provide greater operational flexibility to the warfighter and the National Command Authority.

Sea Power 21 is comprised of three fundamental concepts; Sea Strike, Sea Shield, and Sea Basing. Sea Strike is the ability to project precise and persistent offensive power from the sea; Sea Shield extends defensive assurance throughout the world; and Sea Basing enhances operational independence and support for the joint force.28 ForceNet will enable Sea Strike, Sea Shield, and Sea Basing. ForceNet is the operational construct and


28 Admiral Vern Clark, Projecting Decisive Joint Capabilities, Naval Institute Proceedings, October 2002
architectural framework for naval warfare in the information age that integrates warriors, sensors,

Sea Power 21

Sea Shield
- Force Protection
- Surface Warfare
- Under Sea Warfare
  - Theater Air and Missile Defense

Sea Strike
- Strike
- Fire Support
- Maneuver
- Strategic Deterrence

Sea Basing
- Deploy and Employ
- Provide Integrated Joint Logistics
- Pre-Position Joint Assets Afloat

FORCENet
- Intel, Surveillance, Reconnaissance
- Common Operational and Tactical Pictures
- Networks

Figure 3. Sea Power 21

networks, command and control, platforms, and weapons into a networked, distributed combat force that is scalable across all levels of conflict from seabed to space and sea to land.29

Sea Strike, Sea Shield, Sea Basing, and ForceNet each have specific capabilities that enable the Navy to achieve its objectives and produce the outcomes that support the national strategies. But not all of the capabilities are required to carry out the HS and HD missions, or are they?

B. NAVY CAPABILITIES

The requirements for the HS and HD missions are still maturing. But from a snap shot of the current guidance’s a general set of objectives have been identified and listed in Table 1. An evaluation of Sea Power 21 focused capabilities with the objectives identified in Table 1 will

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give an indication of how the Navy’s capabilities, which were programmed to meet all the requirements outlined in the national strategies, are aligned to support the HS/D missions (Figure 4).

Navy Capability Pillars

**Sea Shield**
- Force Protection
- Surface Warfare /MIO
- Under Sea Warfare
- Theater Air and Missile Defense

**Sea Strike**
- Strike (IO, SOF, Fixed and moving targets)
- Fire Support (Extended range fires)
- Maneuver (Project forces)
- Strategic Deterrence

**Sea Basing**
- Deploy and Employ (Mobility)
- Provide Integrated Joint Logistics (Sustainment)
- Pre-position Joint Assets Afloat (Integrate)

**FORCEnet**
- ISR (Cueing and targeting)
- Common Operational and Tactical Pictures (Track targets)
- Networks

Figure 4. Navy Capability Pillars

From this comparison there is an indication that each one of the Navy’s focused capabilities can be used to fulfill the requirements to meet the objectives for the HD mission. Additionally, the comparison also shows that a few of the capabilities could be used to support the Coast
Guard’s HS mission. However, as a reminder, the requirements for the HS and HD missions are still maturing and that this assessment is a rough “snap shot” in time. As the objectives for the two mission areas become better defined the Navy may have to adapt its capabilities to support HD.

In summary, the Navy’s capabilities are best suited for the HD mission, as might be expected. A few of their capabilities could be used to support the Coast Guard in the HS mission but these capabilities were not specifically programmed and resourced for that mission. This is an important point that must be considered in the development of the command and control structure. Even though the Navy can support the HS mission, its capabilities and organizational focus are directed and best suited for HD. How are there gains in the efficiency and effectiveness of operations if the command structure is mixed with other agencies that do not have the same focus?
IV. COAST GUARD MISSIONS

The Coast Guard is the lead federal agent for Homeland Security missions in the maritime domain. In this capacity, the Coast Guard is in charge of reducing, preempting, deterring and defending against security threats targeting ports, waterways and the coastal areas of the United States and its territories. The Espionage Act of 1917 and the Magnuson Act of 1950 provide the Coast Guard with the authority to safeguard all vessels, ports and facilities from acts of sabotage or other subversive acts.30 As a unique instrument of national security, the Coast Guard is the only military service with civil law enforcement authority, regulatory and safety responsibilities, and Captain of the Port Authorities.31

As Title 14 U.S.C. 89, the Coast Guard personnel have law enforcement authority on, and over the high seas and waters subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.32 Title 14 U.S.C. 1 and 2 state that the Coast Guard is a military service and a branch of the armed forces at all times and that it must maintain a state of readiness to function as a specialized Service in the Navy in time of war.33 It is also specifically authorized to work closely, and cooperatively with the Navy during peacetime (14 USC

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30 Testimony by RADM Paul Pluta to the House of Representatives, Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs and International Relations, Committee on Government Reform; Homeland Security: Securing Strategic Ports, 23 July 2002
31 Ibid.
32 Title 14 U.S.C., http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=browse_usc&docid=
33 Ibid
145), and assist the DoD in performance of any activity for which the Coast Guard is especially qualified (14 USC 141).

The Coast Guard is in a unique position. It operates under the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) but it is also a military Service. DHS was established through the Homeland Security Act of 2002 to better coordinate the capabilities of numerous federal agencies to protect the U.S. from terrorist attacks, and provide for a better-coordinated defense of the homeland. For Homeland Security missions the Coast Guard has over 95,000 miles of coastline and 361 ports to protect.34

Should the maritime or surface elements of America’s global transportation system be used as a weapon delivery device, the response right now would almost certainly be to shut the system down at an enormous cost to the economies of the United States and its trade partners.35 As we learned from the September 2002 Los Angeles/Long Beach labor dispute, economic losses from a major port shut down can be staggering, estimated a $20 billion for that 11 day period. In a recent study published after the events of September 11, the Brookings Institution concluded that a catastrophic attack on the maritime industry using a nuclear device concealed in a shipping container could cause damage and disruption costing the U.S. economy as much as $1 trillion.36

34 Department of Transportation, Statement of Admiral James M. Loy on Strengthening U.S. Security Against Maritime Threats Before the Subcommittee on Oceans and Fisheries, U.S. Senate, 11 October 2001


Like the Navy, the Coast Guard has organizational objectives that are not related to HS or the DoD mission of HD. The traditional Coast Guard missions include:

- Ports, waterways and coastal security
- Drug interdiction
- Migrant interdiction
- Other law enforcement
- Defense Readiness
- Search and rescue
- Aids to navigation
- Living marine resources
- Marine environmental protection
- Ice operations
- Marine safety\(^{37}\)

It can be seen above that not all of the areas support the HS mission (figure 5). These missions that do not contribute to the HS objectives are not less important. These missions have a long-standing requirement that still holds true and therefore must be accomplished. The Coast Guard has missions that might indirectly support HS but for the most part they are stand-alone missions.

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\(^{37}\) Senior Leadership Working Group, Navy-Coast Guard Senior Leadership Talks, January 2004
A. U.S. COAST GUARD’S MARITIME STRATEGY FOR HOMELAND SECURITY

As the lead federal agent for Homeland Security in the maritime domain, the Coast Guard developed a strategy for HS and identified the following objectives:

- Prevent terrorist attacks within, and terrorist exploitation of, the U.S. Maritime Domain
- Reduce America’s vulnerability to terrorism within the U.S. Maritime Domain
• Protect U.S. population centers, critical infrastructure, maritime borders, ports, coastal approaches, and the boundaries and seams among them

• Protect the U.S. Marine Transportation System while preserving the freedom of the U.S. Maritime Domain for legitimate pursuits

• Minimize the damage and recover from attacks that may occur within the U.S. Maritime Domain as either the LFA or a supporting agency\(^{38}\)

The Coast Guard objectives for HS appear to have similarities to the objectives required of the Navy for HD. But from what was discussed earlier, the Coast Guard objectives are focused on the U.S. maritime domain and population centers while the Navy objectives are focused on the forward regions. This distinction is very important because it sets, for the most part, different objectives and, in turn, different capability requirements. So even when there is mission overlap each Service brings a unique capability and ability (organizing, training, equipping, and legal) to the situation. This is actually a benefit because the different capabilities and abilities provide a greater flexibility to the leadership in how they handle the situation.

In summary, even with mission overlap each of the Service’s possess unique capabilities. The Navy’s current capabilities are better aligned with the HD mission and the Coast Guard has to balance their capabilities’ with the HS and non-HS missions. These qualities appear to be three competing interest and may not integrate well when combined

\(^{38}\) U.S. Coast Guard Headquarters, Maritime Strategy for Homeland Security, Coast Guard Publication 3-01, December 2002
into a single organization's operation planning process. Centralized direction is a fundamental tenet of command and control.39

39 Milan N. Vego, Operational Warfare, Publication NWC, Newport: Naval War College, Page 187
V. COMMAND STRUCTURE

The DoD has divided the globe into five geographical areas, which are the responsibility of combatant commands. A combatant command is a unified or specified command with a broad continuing mission under a single commander established and so designated by the President, through the Secretary of Defense (SecDef), and with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Services organize, train, and equip for combatant commander employment in the execution of that mission.

The regional combatant commander for the homeland is Commander, US Northern Command (CDRUSNORTHCOM). CDRUSNORTHCOM’s mission is to conduct operations to deter, prevent, and defeat threats and aggression aimed at the United States, its territories, and interests within the assigned area of responsibility and as directed by the President or Secretary of Defense, provide military assistance to civil authorities including consequence management operations. CDRUSNORTHCOM is responsible for the Homeland Defense mission in the air, land, and maritime domains for the 48 contiguous states, District of Columbia, Alaska, Canada, and all approaches to North America.

The Navy has been tasked to support USNORTHCOM’s mission to deter and defend against hostile action from maritime threats by providing defense in depth that is seamless, unpredictable to our enemies, and able to defeat

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40 Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 3-0/Doctrine for Joint Operations, 10 September 2001, page II-12
threats at a maximum distance from U.S. territory. The USNORTHCOM mission statement is broad but it does mirror language contained in the national strategies. Unfortunately, except for the HS JOC and the current execution orders, there is no other doctrine to guide the Navy within the HS and HD missions. Without a doubt, the lack of guidance compounds the confusion during the phase of the mission when HS and HD overlap. A response to resolve this concern has been to address the current command structure.

As a combatant commander, USNORTHCOM has the authority to prescribe the chain of command and organize the commands and forces within the command. The component commands under USNORTHCOM have representation from the Army, Navy, Marines, and Air Force. Although it is a Service, the Coast Guard is part of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and they have a coordinating relationship with USNORTHCOM. Any use of Coast Guard resources would have to be approved by DHS.

The chain of command established by USNORTHCOM is unique in some respects, due to the way forces are assigned, but the vertical line to the Service components is typical for combatant commands (Figure 6). The Navy component to USNORTHCOM is the commander for USNAVNORTH. In addition, a functional commander for the maritime domain has been established with the Joint Force Maritime Component Command (JFMCC). The JFMCC is the joint force commander’s maritime manager.

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But does this command structure effectively use the national maritime resources? If a Maritime Interagency Task Force was established would the HS and HD mission overlap in the maritime domain be better managed?

A. INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE

The main function of an interagency task force (IATF) is to coordinate activities among organizations working activities of common interest. Working as a single entity the organization could establish processes to improve information sharing and coordinate the employment of resources for greater effectiveness.

Successful examples of the IATF concept are the Joint Interagency Task Forces (JIATF). The JIATFs’ were established as a result of Presidential Decision Directive 14 that ordered a review of the nation’s command and control and intelligence centers involved in international counter narcotics operations.\(^{43}\) A few of the organizations

that support the JIATF are DoD, the Department of Homeland Security, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Drug Enforcement Administration, and the Defense Intelligence Agency.

Providing the right mixes of capabilities and effectively controlling the execution of those capabilities is, without question, essential to the success of any operation. But the success of the JIATF concept in counter narcotics is based on coordination of multiple agencies into a single mission. This is not the same for HS and HD.

For HS and HD there are not only multiple agencies executing multiple missions, but in some cases there also exist mission overlap between these same agencies. This critical point makes the application of the JIATF concept to HS/D much different than to the mission of counter narcotics. In addition, HS/D in the maritime domain is a global mission, which makes the assignment of forces a challenging problem. Are the forces in the Persian Gulf assigned to the regional combatant commander, or the IATF? If the IATF then how is the combatant commander’s requirements fulfilled? This does not appear to be an efficient process.

Finally, from early discussion it was shown that even though the Navy can support the HS mission, capabilities are more directed and best utilized in HD – especially the “away” game. Whereas, the Coast Guard is focused on the homeland and they must balance HS and non-HS missions. How could an IATF balance such diverse operational requirements? The scope would be too narrowly focused and the other mission requirements would most likely be affected from a lack of resources. We must develop a
command and control system that can achieve a steady state, not a fragmentation of roles and responsibilities.\textsuperscript{44}

The IATF concept does have merit. Although it may not be efficient for the operational prosecution phase, it could be very effective for building the operational picture in the maritime domain.

As stated earlier, a focus on intelligence and information sharing is more critical to minimizing the seams between HS and HD than shaking up the command structure.

\textsuperscript{44} The Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction (The Gilmore Report), Forging America’s New Normalcy, The 5\textsuperscript{th} annual report to the President and the Congress, 15 December 2003
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VI. INTELLIGENCE

In the war on terror, knowledge is power.

President George W. Bush
East Room, The White House
8 October 2001

Ninety-five percent of all non-North American foreign trade and 100 percent of foreign oil imports pass through American ports. Over 200 million intermodel containers traveled the world’s seas in 2002, carrying about 90 percent of all goods involved in global trade. Approximately 21,000 of these containers arrive in the U.S. daily, with more than six million arriving annually. Some of the largest vessels carry up to six thousand containers. If a terrorist group decided to bring in a weapon of mass destruction via a container it would be like trying to find a needle in a haystack. In addition, the ships themselves have many nooks and crannies that make inspections difficult if not impossible. Even slowing the flow long enough to inspect either all or a statistically significant random selection of imports would be economically intolerable. The requirement to feed America’s economic machine is an area that could be easily exploited by a terrorist organization.


46 U.S. State Department, Maritime Administration wants to expand port security zone, Retrieved October 10, 2003, from http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/pol/terror02022701.htm


48 Ibid.
An explosion of a weapon “of any type” would have implications not only for all U.S. ports, but also the ports worldwide. If we shut down our ports following an attack, like we did the air traffic on 9/11, it would have a devastating effect on the U.S. economy. Ships would be prevented from docking and unloading, trains and trucks would feel the cascading effects as the inventory of goods slowly becomes reduced, and overseas ports would need to close their gates due to limited pier space as goods set for export backed up. So dependent on intermodal containers has industry become, that a three to four week closure of U.S. ports would bring the container industry, and subsequently global trade, “to its knees.”49 “The only thing that can prevent it . . . is intelligence and careful screening of all the unfamiliar vessels coming into your port,” said Fer van de Laar, safety manager for the International Association of Ports and Harbors.

The Defense Intelligence Agency’s (DIA) Joint Intelligence Task Force – Combating Terrorism (JITF-CT) is DoD’s lead national level intelligence organization for indications and warning, the production of timely all source intelligence, integration of national level analytic efforts on all aspects of the terrorist threat, and development and maintenance of an accurate, up to date knowledge base on terrorism related information.50 The Director, JITF-CT also serves as the DoD focal point and senior Defense Intelligence representative within the


Intelligence Community for terrorist threat warning, proposing and coordinating within the intelligence community promulgation of such warnings to appropriate DoD organizations and combatant commands.\textsuperscript{51}

Since 11 September 2001, our federal, state, and local agencies have been working together to improve the information sharing processes. In 2003 the President instructed the Director of the Central Intelligence, the Director of the FBI, and the Secretaries of Homeland Security and Defense to develop the Nation’s first unified Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC).

The TTIC merges and analysis terrorist-related information collected domestically and abroad in order to form the most comprehensive possible threat picture. As a partner in the new TTIC, DoD intelligence and investigative elements collaborate with other participating organizations in developing terrorist threat assessments for our national leadership, for the operating forces, and for the DHS.

These are great steps forward but much more can and should be done, specifically in the maritime domain. Collectively, the agencies involved in the maritime domain need to provide the nation with a robust capability to identify, track, and, where appropriate, intercept suspicious cargo and vessels as far from U.S. shores as possible. The Navy and the Coast Guard should be assigned active roles in the operation of this national maritime-surveillance system-of-systems. This is the key to managing the seams between agencies that have overlapping missions in the maritime domain. With actionable intelligence the seams will be transparent. An IATF to

\textsuperscript{51} Ibid.
build and maintain this maritime domain awareness would probably be the most effective command and control structure.

This Maritime IATF would only be responsible for the collection, analysis, and dissemination of maritime intelligence. The operational components, if required, would be used for surveillance and information gathering - not for operational prosecution.

For example, if a situation is determined by higher authority to be a law enforcement matter, than the Coast Guard would be directed to intercept the vessel and the Navy could be requested to support. If, on the other hand, higher authority pronounces it to be a military mission than the Department of Defense would intercept and the combatant commander, whose area of responsibility is applicable, would be responsible for the event.

Combatant Commanders, law enforcement officials, joint forces, state and local leaders, just to name a few of the possible stakeholders, would all have access to this maritime intelligence. The maritime intelligence conduit would touch all geographical boundaries and all participating organizational structures (figure 7).

Today, there is already an established maritime intelligence center - the National Maritime Intelligence Center (NMIC). The NMIC houses the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI), Coast Guard’s Information Coordination Center (ICC) and the Marine Corps Intelligence Activity (MCIA). ONI, with the MCIA, ICC, Drug Enforcement Agency, and U.S. Customs, has devoted an increased effort to non-traditional maritime intelligence missions. These have included expanded reporting and analysis of merchant ship
activity. In addition, ONI now supports U.S. Northern Command’s Combined Intelligence and Fusion Center, and other federal, state, and local agencies to identify and monitor civil maritime threats to the homeland.

The NMIC is not a “national” maritime intelligence center in the true sense of the word. It is a structure that houses separate intelligence agencies that support their respective Services. If the IATF concept were developed further and eventually implemented for maritime intelligence gathering, it would make perfect sense to modify the NMIC to fill this role. The question that now arises: Which agency will have oversight (authority and budgetary) of the NMIC? The Department of Homeland Security, DoD, and the Central Intelligence Agency are just a few of the possible lead federal agencies.
Figure 7. Intelligence Fusion
VII. SUMMARY

Presently the current guidance for HS and HD do not adequately define the operational objectives for the missions. Without these clear objectives the capabilities and requirements cannot be properly determined. Attempting to build a command structure without fully understanding these areas may not be the best course of action at this point in time.

Providing the right mixes of capabilities and effectively controlling the execution of those capabilities is, without question, essential to the success of any operation. This is the fundamental point that makes the IATF command structure for HS/D operations a poor choice. Both Services conduct operations that are not related to the HS and HD missions. Attempting to balance the various operational priorities would be burdensome and in all likelihood ineffective. In addition, HS/D in the maritime domain is a global mission, which makes the assignment of forces a challenging problem. Are the forces assigned to the regional combatant commanders, or the IATF? If the IATF then how is the combatant commander’s requirements fulfilled? This does not appear to be an efficient process.

Finally, from early discussion it was shown that even though the Navy can support the HS mission, capabilities are more directed and best utilized in HD — especially the “away” game. Whereas, the Coast Guard is focused on the homeland and they must balance HS and non-HS missions. How could an IATF balance such diverse operational requirements? The scope would be too narrowly focused and
the other mission requirements would most likely be affected from a lack of resources.

The national requirements make it impossible to achieve unity of effort between the Navy and Coast Guard due to the diverse mission responsibilities. A more effective approach would be to maintain the current organizational command structures and continue to exercise the support/supporting relationships. In this manner the Services can optimize the use of their capabilities for their other competing requirements. There will never be a 100 percent guarantee of security for our people, the economy, and our society – it is not achievable and draws our attention from those things that can be accomplished.\footnote{The Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction (The Gilmore Report), Forging America’s New Normalcy, The 5th annual report to the President and the Congress, 15 December 2003}

The protection of assets in the maritime domain is a complex national and international problem. The maritime threat demands attention and response.\footnote{Ibid.} The most effective response is to improve the sharing of information. The apparent seam between the HS and HD missions cannot be simply narrowed with a change in the command structure. The breadth of this seam, rather, is a function of information sharing and can only be narrowed by timely actionable intelligence.

Information must be able to move more freely amongst partner nations, law enforcement organizations, private industry, state and local governments, and other federal agencies. The IATF concept may be the best structure for
this requirement. Working as a single entity the organization could establish processes to improve the flow of information. This IATF would collect, analyze, and disseminate intelligence. The IATF would not have the responsibility or capability to intercept a vessel of interest. This intercept would be the responsibility of the organization selected by higher authority as the lead federal agent, which could be anyone of the stakeholders.

With timely and accurate intelligence the Services will be able to transition between HS and HD, integrate with partner nations, state and local authorities, other federal agencies. The seam between the two mission areas will be transparent.
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