THE ROLE OF JOINT TASK FORCE SIX IN HOMELAND SECURITY

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This SRP is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the Master of Strategic Studies Degree. The views expressed in this student academic research paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

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The Role of Task Force Six in Homeland Security

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Following the terrorist attacks on 11 September, 2001, the United States placed renewed emphasis upon defense of the homeland, making it the President’s number one priority. Under the Department of Defense, U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) was created to provide command and control over homeland defense operations. As a subordinate headquarters under USNORTHCOM, Joint Task Force Six (JTF-6) provides Department of Defense counterdrug support to federal, regional, state and local law enforcement agencies throughout the continental United States. When directed, JTF-6 will provide support to domestic agencies to combat terrorism. Since 1989, Joint Task Force Six (JTF-6) has fought the nation’s War on Drugs in support of domestic law enforcement agencies. How can JTF-6 best be used to fight the War on Terror? The mission and functions of Joint Task Force six is the focus of this paper. These areas will be analyzed for application in homeland security operations with a recommendation on its role in fighting terror within the homeland.
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PREFACE

I want to thank my Project Advisor, Colonel Mark Eshelman for his guidance and mentorship in formulating this paper. Next, I would like to thank LTC John Boker and LTC Mike Lipinski from Joint Task Force Six for their research contributions and insights on JIATF-North. Finally, to my wife, Ana, for all her loving support and patience while writing this paper.
THE ROLE OF JOINT TASK FORCE SIX IN HOMELAND SECURITY

DoD must institutionalize definitions of homeland security, homeland defense, and civil support and address command relationships and responsibilities within the Defense Department. This will allow the Defense Department to identify and assign homeland security roles and missions as well as examine resource implications. DoD must bolster its ability to work with the organizations involved in homeland security to prevent, protect against, and respond to threats to the territorial United States.

— Donald H. Rumsfeld (QDR 2001)

The Department of Defense plays a fundamental role in defending and protecting the United States territory as the President’s number one priority. Today, DoD is decisively engaged in prosecuting the global war on terrorism taking the fight to the enemy abroad in Afghanistan and Iraq. However, DoD also plays an important role in fighting the war on terror at home in the United States. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has the lead role to protect the U.S. homeland from terrorist and their use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The establishment of U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) was a major step to interconnect the Defense Department with homeland security operations. When directed by the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF), USNORTHCOM provides military assistance to civilian authorities (MACA) in support of DHS. This important task uses military resources after first responder assets or capabilities are exhausted for domestic crisis events.

A subordinate command to USNORTHCOM with a credible history in fighting the nation’s War on Drugs is Joint Task Force Six (JTF-6). Since 1989, JTF-6 has made significant contributions to homeland security by combating the flow of illegal drugs. JTF-6 is a model for joint-interagency coordination and planning that effectively integrates DoD capabilities with law enforcement agencies (LEA). The JTF-6 counterdrug (CD) mission and functions have a number of parallels and applications to homeland security (HLS) mission areas of border security, intelligence and warning, and emergency preparedness and response. Further, JTF-6 is a command and control headquarters capable of crisis management and response.

In 2001, JTF-6 expanded its mission statement to include combating terrorism (CT). The introduction of combating terrorism has revealed new opportunities and some distinct challenges. Several questions exist given this additional responsibility. How is DoD and USNORTHCOM structured to support with homeland security? As an operational headquarters, what role can JTF-6 have in homeland security? What possible restrictions exist that may inhibit JTF-6 support of homeland security tasks? What opportunities exist for JTF-6 in the future? This paper will explore these questions and examine the mission and functions of JTF-6 with respect
to homeland security. It will propose changes to current organizational functions and make a recommendation on how to best utilize the capabilities of JTF-6 in support of the national effort to secure the homeland.

THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ROLE IN HOMELAND SECURITY

Protecting the United States and its citizens demands teamwork at every level of government. DHS leads the national effort to protect the U.S. against threats to the homeland. The Defense Department maintains military capabilities to support DHS if requested once state and local capabilities or resources are exhausted. The SECDEF is committed to work with DHS in order to define and coordinate respective responsibilities. The SECDEF sits as a member on the Homeland Security Council and created the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense (ASD-HD) to validate and coordinate requests for military assistance and cooperative ventures between the Defense Department and the Department of Homeland Security. The Defense Department has 65 employees working with the DHS “to ensure close and seamless cooperation between the departments.”

In his testimony to Congress in May 2002, Secretary Paul McHale, the ASD-HD, stated three distinct circumstances that involve DoD with security matters inside the United States. First, under extraordinary circumstances, DoD plays a lead role to execute its traditional military missions. The combat air patrols flown over the National Capital Region shortly after the attacks on 11 September 2001 are an example of DoD’s direct military involvement in homeland security. Under these circumstances, DoD is supported by other Federal agencies. Secondly, under emergency circumstances of a catastrophic nature DoD may provide capabilities to first responders to augment or provide unique support. Some examples include responding to forest fires, floods, hurricanes, tornados, earthquakes, or possible CBRNE (chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, high yield explosives) attack. Lastly, temporary circumstances, where security missions are limited in scope or duration with DoD in support of another lead federal agency. An example is the 2002 Olympics when security measures were enhanced using military forces. An important point is that DoD serves in a supporting role except under extraordinary circumstances where DoD becomes the lead federal agency.

USNORTHCOM is the newest Combatant Command responsible for the defense of U.S. territory to include the homeland. In 2002, the unified command plan (UCP) was restructured for USNORTHCOM’s area of responsibility (AOR) to include the United States, Canada, Mexico, the Caribbean basin, and the contiguous waters in the Atlantic and Pacific oceans.
Commander, USNORTHCOM has specific responsibilities for homeland defense and for assisting civil authorities. The USNORTHCOM mission statement reads:

USNORTHCOM conducts operations to deter, prevent, and defeat threats and aggression aimed at the United States, its territories, and interests within the assigned area of responsibility and as directed by the President or Secretary of Defense, provide military assistance to civil authorities including consequence management operations.6

The USNORTHCOM subordinate commands are tailored and established to provide support to civilian authorities for consequence management and counterdrug operations. The Joint Force Headquarters for Homeland Security (JFHQ-HLS) is the command and control headquarters that conducts land and maritime defense planning and coordination for MACA. The JFHQ-HLS exercises operational control over two JTF headquarters each with separate and distinct missions. Joint Task Force-Civil Support (JTF-CS) provides support and expertise over consequence management operations in response to weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in the form of chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high yield explosives events. Joint Task Force Six (JTF-6) provides support to federal, state and local law enforcement agencies in counter-drug operations.7 The experience, relationships, and protocols established between the subordinate commands and domestic first responders have important intangible benefits in civil support operations. According to the NORTHCOM Commander, “These headquarters provide one-stop shopping for federal military assistance.”

JTF-6 is committed to prevention and deterrence of illegal drug trafficking. It provides law enforcement agencies (LEA) with dedicated DoD support to fight the war on drugs. The JTF-6 mission statement reads:

JTF-6 synchronizes and integrates Department of Defense operational, training, and intelligence support to domestic law enforcement agency counterdrug efforts in the continental U.S. to reduce the availability of illegal drugs in the United States and when directed, provides operational, training, and intelligence support to domestic agencies’ efforts in combating terrorism.9

JTF-6 was established by the SECDEF to serve as the planning and coordinating headquarters for CD support to domestic LEAs along the southwestern region of the U.S. In 1994, JTF-6 expanded the area of operations to the entire 48 continental United States. A unique aspect of JTF-6 is its interagency connection with Operations Alliance (OPALL). Operations Alliance is a planning and coordinating headquarters for all DoD counterdrug support requests from domestic LEAs. OPALL is composed of senior representatives from 23 Federal, State, and Local law enforcement organizations whose jurisdictional responsibilities include interdiction, investigation, and intelligence gathering.10 Operation Alliance validates and
prioritizes CD support requests and provides recommendations to the Commander, JTF-6 (CJTF-6). Mission planning and coordination is a routine function for JTF-6 and OPALL. This close civilian-military partnership promotes effective interagency planning at the operational level.

**JTF-6 RELEVANCY TO HOMELAND SECURITY**

To remain relevant in the nation's War on Terror, JTF-6 must be optimized to support USNORTHCOM’s warfighting and civil support missions. An analysis of three HLS mission areas will reveal how JTF-6 mutually supports and provides unique DoD capabilities to homeland security.

**BORDER SECURITY**

The heightened demand for U.S. border security provides an opportunity for JTF-6 to contribute in homeland security. The Defense Department maintains a unique set of surveillance capabilities to support border protection and security. For years, the U.S. Border Patrol (USBP) and U.S. Customs (USCS) have struggled with illegal immigration and drug trafficking at the borders. The problem is further compounded with global terrorist networks and threats of WMD. The USBP is ill equipped in detection and monitoring (D&M) assets to adequately cover the vast land stretches along U.S. borders. The U.S. land border stretches 1,989 miles along the U.S.-Mexico border and 5,525 miles along the U.S.-Canadian border. Thus, border security is a complicated and resource intense task for the Department of Homeland Security.

The National Border Patrol Strategy identifies ways JTF-6 can be leveraged to support the strategy of “prevention through deterrence” at the U.S. borders. Today, DoD counterdrug efforts frequently employ military reconnaissance and surveillance assets along the U.S.-Mexico and U.S.-Canadian borders in support to the U.S. Border Patrol. Because of limited assets, the USBP routinely requests JTF-6 operational support along the U.S. land borders. In 2002, JTF-6 operational support requests totaled 113 of which 50 were associated with border detection and monitoring. JTF-6 military aviation, engineer, and intelligence support provide unique capabilities that augment DHS border protection agencies to detect, track, and interdict illegal trafficking of drugs, weapons, money, contraband, and personnel. The most common military assets requested are rotary wing and fixed wing aircraft equipped with forward-looking infrared radar (FLIR) systems, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV), ground sensor units, tunnel detection elements, and construction engineer units. Aviation units perform day and night aerial reconnaissance and surveillance while ground surveillance radars are positioned along likely
avenues of approach to detect and monitor movement across the border. The Army Corps of Engineers provide seismic equipment and sensors to detect suspected tunnels used by drug trafficking organizations. Engineer construction units build strategic border infrastructure for mobility and countermobility purposes. Border roads, lighting, and vehicle barriers systems are the most common engineer missions. JTF-6 intelligence support provides JTF-6 mission planners with current terrain analysis and threat assessments of drug trafficking activities within the AO. Each operational mission is meticulously planned and synchronized with OPALL using actionable intelligence from interagency sources. As a result, military and law enforcement work in consonance to protect and secure the U.S. borders. JTF-6 counterdrug efforts play an important role to fight the war on drugs and can certainly play a role in homeland security to fight the war on terrorism.

INTELLIGENCE AND WARNING

Tonight, I am instructing the leaders of the FBI, the CIA, the [Department] Homeland Security, and the Department of Defense to develop a Terrorist Threat Integration Center, to merge and analyze all threat information in a single location. Our government must have the very best information possible, and we will use it to make sure the right people are in the right places to protect all our citizens.

—George W. Bush

The establishment of an all-source fusion center for land domain threat intelligence and information dissemination is another role for JTF-6 in homeland security. Essential intelligence tasks for JTF-6 are to collect, analyze, and disseminate drug trafficking intelligence for law enforcement. JTF-6 intelligence analyst (IA) program accomplishes these tasks using military officers trained in threat analysis using indicators and warnings. The IA program supports national intelligence agencies with threat analysis and assessments for drug trafficking activities throughout the AOR. With respect to homeland security, use of indicators and warning are forms of intelligence that can detect terrorist activity before an attack occurs. Accurate intelligence facilitates proper preemptive, prevention, and protective action applied at the right place at the right time. Specific tasks include identify, collect, analyze, and distribute source intelligence information.15

The CJTF6 maintains situational awareness through multiple information sources inside the J2, Intelligence Directorate. The J2 performs operational intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) along U.S. land borders and develops intelligence products for CD operations. Information of interest includes the operating environment, terrain, and threat intelligence that
produce threat assessments to include imagery and topographical products. The J2 maintains a robust collection management and foreign intelligence analysis capability to support LEA’s.\textsuperscript{16} The J2 maintains liaison with federal intelligence organizations such as United States Interdiction Coordinator (USIC), Arrival Zone Interdiction Coordinator (AZIC), El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC), and Air and Maritime Interdiction Coordination Center (AMICC).\textsuperscript{17} JTF-6 positions intelligence analysts (IA) into High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas (HIDTA) located in 26 major cities throughout the U.S.\textsuperscript{18} These IAs conduct intelligence training, analysis, and assessments together with FBI, DEA, USCS, INS, USBP representatives to develop accurate threat assessments on national drug-trafficking activities.\textsuperscript{19} With DoD representation, the HIDTAs forms a joint-interagency construct for information sharing of threat intelligence. This network can rapidly mobilize information across federal organizations in response to drug trafficking or terrorist activity within the USNORTHCOM area of responsibility.

The JTF-6 intelligence community has close affiliation with national drug interdiction agencies that provide a solid framework for sharing threat information and fusing intelligence pertaining to land border interdiction operations. The JTF-6 expanded role would form an intelligence fusion center incorporating intelligence assets from the Border Patrol Field Intelligence Center and El Paso Intelligence Center. Building a shared network of intelligence and data collection on transnational threat activity in the AOR increases situational awareness for USNORTHCOM and connects DoD into the information-sharing network with DHS.

**EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE**

Emergency preparedness and response is an expanded role for JTF-6 in support of civil support operations for USNORTHCOM. The JTF-6 crisis action team (CAT) and crisis action center (CAC) provides USNORTHCOM with operational command and control capability for multiple crisis events emerging within the United States. JTF-6 maintains a 24-hour joint operations center (JOC) for mission control and reporting. For crisis response, the JOC activates a crisis action center under the J3, Operations Director. The J3 alerts the CAT team and command and control cell for crisis management operations. The CAT organizes itself within 2 hours prepared to deploy a forward C2 element as directed by the CJTF-6. The CAT is composed of field grade planners from Personnel, Intelligence, Operations, Environmental, Engineer, Logistics, Communications, Legal, Public Affairs, and Resource Management.\textsuperscript{20} The CAT staff trains and exercises with USNORTHCOM to hone crisis management skills and procedures in response to domestic crisis events inside the U.S.
USNORTHCOM exercises, such as UNIFIED DEFENSE, DETERMINE PROMISE, and TOPOFF2 train and educate the combatant commander, his subordinate commanders, and respective staffs in domestic crisis action planning and response at the strategic and operational levels. Crisis response exercises evaluate operating procedures to rapidly identify, acquire, and employ military resources to preempt, prevent, or mitigate a threat or act of terrorism. For each exercise, the LFA requests DoD support to exercise interagency planning and interoperability. Currently, JTF-6 maintains no interagency representation on the CAT. Operations Alliance representation on the CAT provides a conduit for information sharing and coordination with the interagency. This integration effectively establishes a joint-interagency crisis action-planning group at the operational level for USNORTHCOM.

The FBI’s domestic crisis response exercises evaluate tactical level readiness of regional and field offices. In 1998, the FBI began taking steps to enhance its exercise program with DoD.21 Today, domestic crisis exercises stress USNORTHCOM's ability to effectively assess and coordinate civil support operations with interagency partners. The most comprehensive terrorist response exercise conducted in the United States was Top Officials 2 (TOPOFF2).22 TOPOFF2 was sponsored by the Department of Homeland Security and designed to train federal, state, and local responder plans and capabilities to prevent, preempt, and mitigate the effects of a WMD event. USNORTHCOM used TOPOFF2 to train and exercise crisis response cells at subordinate command level. The exercise scenario created a national response for a suspected terrorist attempt to infiltrate a Russian radioisotope thermal generator (RTG) through the Lake Champlain area destined for New York City within 36 hours. The US Border Patrol requested military aviation FLIR reconnaissance assets for D&M operations within the Swanton sector. The JTF-6 exercise objectives were to assess CAT and CAC alert response, produce an OPORD message to USNORTHCOM for border surveillance support, and deploy a command and control element.23 The C2 element provides current operations and planning, situational awareness, and military liaison with domestic first responders. TOPOFF2 validated exercise objectives and a future role for JTF-6 in crisis management and response for USNORTHCOM.

VIGNETTE: OPERATION BORDER SHEILD

The following vignette demonstrates how JTF-6 could contribute to homeland security using capabilities and functions previously discussed. The fictitious OPERATION BORDER SHEILD replicates operations routinely performed by JTF-6 but applied to a national crisis situation. This vignette is a temporary circumstance limited in scope and duration placing JTF-6 in support of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) for a border security mission.
GENERAL SITUATION

National intelligence sources indicate a transnational threat transporting a WMD device will attempt to cross the US-Mexico border in the next 7-10 days. The Department of Homeland Security through the FBI determines the enemy has a base of operations inside the U.S to support the infiltration. The DHS mobilizes available aerial and ground patrol assets from Bureau of Border Control and Protection. However, insufficient aviation reconnaissance and ground surveillance assets exist to cover the major land approaches. The DHS requests DoD military assistance to identify and track the threat along the southwest border. The Department of Defense approves a request for forces and designates USNORTHCOM as the supported command. The Commander, USNORTHCOM assigns Joint Task Force Six as the command and control headquarters for all military support to the FBI. The JTF-6 crisis action center is activated with the crisis action team alerted to commence planning and coordination for OPERATION BORDER SHEILD.

MILITARY SUPPORT

The US Joint Forces Command and the National Guard Bureau task units as directed by DoD to support OPERATION BORDER SHEILD. These units directly coordinate, plan, and conduct liaison with JTF-6 at Fort Bliss, Texas. The Air National Guard provides AC-130 aircraft equipped with low-light television for detailed, local area surveillance. The Army National Guard provides OH-58-D aircraft with side-looking aerial radar for deep surveillance along the border. A US Army military intelligence battalion provides ground sensor teams to install ground surveillance radar (GSR) along suspected avenues of approach to detect cross border movement. A US Army signal battalion provides communication support across the area of operations. The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) provides imagery support for wide-area surveillance of the southwest border region. JTF-6 headquarters provides a 6-person liaison team to the FBI for intelligence collection and threat analysis. All base camp and logistical support operations are coordinated and provided through JTF-6.

CONCEPT OF THE OPERATION

The FBI’s task and purpose is to conduct detection and monitoring operations along the southwest border to identify and track a WMD device emanating south of the U.S. border. Once identified, FBI agents are directed to a point of intercept on the ground leading to the arrest and apprehension of the threat. The use of military aerial and ground reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S) teams will patrol along likely avenues of approach within the area of operations. The FBI will accompany military R&S teams for purposes of arrests, searches, or
seizures of suspected illegal trafficking. Unique military aviation platforms will patrol the airspace to detect, monitor, and collect information on nuclear weapons at extended distances and forward data links to FBI agents on the ground. JTF-6 maintains tactical control (TACON) of military forces throughout the operation and closely coordinates and synchronizes detection and monitoring tasks and locations within the area of operations. JTF-6 headquarters will establish a command post to perform its C2 functions.

This vignette highlights two important points: 1) JTF-6 appointed as a C2 headquarters for National Guard forces; 2) JTF-6 operating outside its current counterdrug authority. It surfaces important operational considerations associated with use of Title 32 National Guard forces and the geographical area of responsibility which could impact JTF-6 future role in homeland security.

OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

To maximize JTF-6 in homeland security, the use of Title 32 National Guard forces and expanding the area of responsibility are key considerations for USNORTHCOM. In February 2001, JTF-6 discontinued using Title 32 National Guard (NG) units for CD missions by direction from U.S. Forces Command. Prior to this, JTF-6 used NG units to perform 20% of their operational missions over a 7-year period during 2-week annual training periods. The primary issue is command and control and rules for the use of force (RUF) for Title 32 forces serving under a Title10 headquarters. Furthermore, National Guard units serving in a Title 32 status are exempt from the Posse Comitatus Act provisions allowing them to function in a law enforcement capacity.

A similar circumstance evolved for Combined Joint Task Force-Olympics (CJTF-O) during the 2002 Olympic games. The solution was a memorandum of agreement (MOA) between State Adjutant Generals, CJTF-O, Joint Forces Command, and National Guard Bureau that gave the CJTF-O tasking authority over Title 32 forces within the area of operations. This same model is recommended to resolve the Title 32 command and control issue for JTF-6. This means CJTF-6 would not “command” NG forces but would exercise “tactical direction” to achieve unity of effort.

The National Guard can be leveraged for U.S. regional proximity, relationships with domestic first responders, and law enforcement capability. The National Guard provides JTF-6 with increased resources to perform CD mission requirements. JTF-6 missions can be tailored to achieve NG annual training requirements and typically meet 90% of a unit’s mission essential tasks. In the short term, issues surrounding C2, RUF, and PCA can be resolved with proper training and close coordination between the CJTF-6 and the respective State Adjutant General.
Title 32 National Guard units offer law enforcement augmentation to USCS and USBP at border checkpoints and between ports of entry to search, seize, and arrest suspected transnational threats.

The areas of responsibility for USNORTHCOM and JTF-6 do not coincide. The countries of Mexico, Canada, and the Caribbean territories are outside the JTF-6 area of responsibility. The 48 contiguous States define the operational boundary for JTF-6. Cross border operations into Mexico and Canada are not authorized. Detection, monitoring, and communication of surface activity crossing the border into the U.S. is limited to 25 statute miles from the border. Under these conditions, drug intelligence collection is limited to the U.S. border region, early warning for law enforcement is constrained, and illegal drug traffickers normally penetrate the U.S. land borders before interdiction occurs. In the case of WMD, these conditions could potentially lead to a catastrophic event inside the United States.

The JTF-6 area of responsibility should match USNORTHCOM area of responsibility to include Mexico, Canada, and the Caribbean. During a JTF-6 briefing provided to Secretary Paul McHale, clear guidance was received to expand JTF-6 intelligence responsibility for USNORTHCOM. Specifically, JTF-6 must focus on fusing intelligence for USNORTHCOM with regard to National Security Threats and Foreign Aggression looking beyond the U.S. borders to the farthest reaches of the AOR. This would incorporate the Pacific and Atlantic air and maritime approaches out to 500 miles and 1700 miles respectively complimenting detection, monitoring, early warning, and information sharing efforts among national and defense intelligence agencies. JTF-6 must assist USNORTHCOM in their warfighting mission and fuse intelligence within the NORTHCOM area of responsibility. Expanding JTF-6 intelligence collection efforts to the outer edges of the AOR would enhance detection, monitoring, information sharing, and develops a common operating picture (COP) for USNORTHCOM. The end result is an accurate and timely threat assessment of the AOR for the Commander, USNORTHCOM.

MISSION EXPANSION: COMBATING TERRORISM

The nation’s War on Terror prompted DoD to reevaluate and adjust its structure and mission relevant to the National Strategy for Homeland Security. The establishment of USNORTHCOM was a prominent change within the Defense Department. Shortly after, USNORTHCOM approved the JTF-6 amended mission statement to include, “when directed, provides operational, training, and intelligence support to domestic agencies’ efforts in combating terrorism.”
The mission to support domestic agency efforts in combating terrorism raises an important issue concerning U.S. policy for domestic counterterrorism. Current U.S. policy vaguely describes DoD’s role and responsibilities for CT support to domestic agencies. The relevant U.S. policies are Presidential Decision Directive (PDD)-39, U.S. Policy on Counterterrorism, dated 21 June 1995 and PDD-62, Combating Terrorism, dated 22 May 1998. PDD-39 establishes DoD’s responsibility to reduce vulnerabilities affecting the security of U.S. military personnel and facilities and to ensure CT capabilities are well managed, funded, and exercised. PDD-62 establishes the Office of the National Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure Protection and Counter-Terrorism to integrate interagency efforts to fight the threat of terrorism.

Neither document sufficiently describes DoD’s role to support domestic agencies with deterrence and prevention of domestic terrorist threats. However, Department of Defense Directive 3025.15, Military Assistance to Civil Authorities addresses employment of military forces and approval authorities for domestic CT operations excluding counterdrug operational support. DODD 3025.15 is the governing DoD policy with regards to domestic CT support. However, a recommendation would be to amend PDD-39 to explicitly address DoD’s role and responsibilities in domestic CT operations and establish a CJCSI delegating authority to Commander, USNORTHCOM to approve CT missions. Further, recommend JTF-6 retain the following DoD counterdrug policies: DoD Policy on Domestic Counternarcotics and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3710.01, Delegation of Authority For Approving Operational Support To Drug Law Enforcement Agencies and Counterdrug-Related Deployment of DoD Personnel. These policies provide CJTF-6 with CD guidelines and authority to approve and execute CD missions with three exceptions: border detection and monitoring missions, missions exceeding 179 days, and missions with over 400 military personnel. The SECDEF retains approval authority for these exceptions.

In February 2003, the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism was published that describes a four tenet strategy to focus the national effort to combat terrorism. The four tenets are: 1) defeat terrorists and their organizations, 2) deny terrorist sponsorship, support, and sanctuary, 3) diminish the underlying conditions that terrorists seek to exploit, 4) defend U.S. citizens and interests at home and abroad. The fourth tenet supports two reorganization initiatives for JTF-6 in relationship to domain awareness and integrated crisis response and management objectives. Those initiatives are a Standing Joint Force Headquarters (SJFHQ) and a Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF).
STANDING JOINT FORCE HEADQUARTERS (SJFHQ)

The U.S. Joint Forces Command developed the SJFHQ concept creating a "mission-tailorable" headquarters embedded within the COCOM command structure. It focuses on operational trouble spots within the AOR as either a joint task force (JTF) headquarters or a forward headquarters element for the combatant commander. The SJFHQ establishes habitual relationships with the interagency community with shared situational awareness. The SJFHQ provides the combatant commander with an informed and in-place C2 capability, reducing the "ad hoc" nature of today’s joint task force headquarters.

In May 2002, The U.S. Army War College conducted a Strategic Crisis Exercise based on the events of September 11, 2001. The exercise challenged and stressed the newly formed USNORTHCOM against a wide-range of homeland security scenarios. One recommendation provided in the after action review was establishment of North, South, East, and West regional SJFHQ under USNORTHCOM to manage multiple crisis events across the U.S.

Under this construct, JTF-6 becomes one of the four SJFHQs and aligns with federal emergency management agency (FEMA) regions within the assigned geographical region. The SJFHQ operational, training, and intelligence functions are focused on WMD threats and crisis and consequence management operations for chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosives (CBRNE) events. Essentially, the core functions for JTF-6 change from counterdrug to incident response. This would require extensive staff training and expertise in consequence management operations. Military liaison teams (MLT) are collocated with regional FEMA headquarters for continuity of operations. The SJFHQ would require additional joint positions for field grade military planners to resource each respective military liaison team. However, integrating MLTs with FEMA staffs improves connectivity for crisis and consequence management planning and positions C2 cells forward for situational awareness during national crisis or emergency. The SJFHQ staff coordinates security cooperation plans with FEMA first responders and the National Guard to define roles, responsibilities, and procedures. The SJFHQ is linked to the interagency through Operations Alliance. The interagency representation for OPALL requires additional staffing to include FEMA and other key partners. For planning, active and reserve units are apportioned to the SJFHQ and participate in crisis and consequence management exercises. These units participate in regional crisis exercises to assess military civil support operations for regional emergency management plans. The SJFHQ produces enhanced domestic emergency response for USNORTHCOM creating a network of military planning and command and control cells conjoined with FEMA facilitate civil support missions.
JOINT INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE (JIATF)

Another option for JTF-6 serving an expanded role in homeland security is the JIATF, a well-known concept within the realm of counternarcotics. In April 1994, the National Interdiction Command and Control Plan established three national joint interagency task forces: JIATF East in Key West, Florida; JIATF South in Panama; and JIATF West in Alameda, California. The JIATF primary tasks are to plan, conduct, and direct interagency detection, monitoring, and sorting operations of air and maritime drug smuggling activities within the Pacific, Atlantic, and Caribbean. The JIATF joint operations center fuses intelligence and operations functions using command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I) technologies and expertise. Representatives from the Department of Defense, Department of Transportation (U. S. Coast Guard) and the Department of the Treasury (U. S. Customs Service) form the nucleus for the interagency team. Other assigned agencies include the Drug Enforcement Administration, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Defense Intelligence Agency.

The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism focuses on identifying and defusing threats before they reach our borders. The JIATF concept applied to land focused detection, monitoring, and intelligence fusion defines a unique alternative for JTF-6. The organizational structure, skill sets, and relationship with Operations Alliance create desirable conditions for JTF-6 to reorganize and merge with OPALL to create a JIATF-North under USNORTHCOM. JIATF-North would perform three essential functions for USNORTHCOM: domestic support operations, theater security cooperation, and detection and monitoring for the “land domain” surrounding the United States.

Domestic support operations would remain unchanged and consistent with the current DoD counterdrug policy and regulations as outline previously. However, JIATF-N would provide support to federal LEAs with DoD-unique capabilities to enhance the overall effectiveness of the DoD-LEA team in combating terrorism. Some possibilities are anti-terrorism and WMD-CBRN training, tactical intelligence and targeting, intelligence analysis, and reconnaissance and surveillance operations.

Intelligence collection and fusion responsibility within the NORTHCOM joint area of operations will undoubtedly increase the JTF-6 combating terrorism role. More importantly, the JIATF-N would function as a “centralized fusion center” for all reconnaissance efforts throughout the JOA to identify vulnerabilities for USNORTHCOM. JIATF-North would collaborate reconnaissance information collected from the shared information network (JIATF-S, JIATF-W, EPIC, AMICC, AZIC, USIC) and produce a threat assessment and common operational picture for the JIATF commander.
The JIATF-N would become the operational arm for USNORTHCOM to fulfill designated theater security objectives. Encouraging combined and multinational military cooperation to eliminate threats in the JOA is a common interest shared with Canada and Mexico. JIATF-N would develop military to military partnerships with Canada and Mexico to share intelligence to identify, track, and defeat asymmetric threats lurking inside the AOR. Joint and combined military training and exercises with Canada and Mexico would hone cooperative partnerships focused upon a common purpose. The desired endstate is a fully integrated security cooperation plan with Canada and Mexico extending the United States security umbrella over the entire North American continent.

ANALYSIS

Comparing the SJFHQ and JIATF functions highlights some similarities and differences. Both options maintain a 24-hour joint operations center for reporting, command, and control linked to the interagency through OPALL. The relationship with Operations Alliance is essential in both cases to maintain the interagency linkage for coordination and sharing information across the federal, state, and local levels. Both options support a stand-alone JTF headquarters with organic command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence capabilities.

The SJFHQ option is a major restructuring initiative for JTF-6 to align with regional FEMA headquarters. JTF-6 is a “border centric” headquarters with limited experience in consequence management (CM) operations. It has no inherent expertise or staff to manage chemical, biological, nuclear, and high-yield explosive (CBRNE) events. JTF-6 would require extensive training and augmentation to plan and prepare for WMD consequences. Furthermore, JTF-CS is organized and staffed exclusively for CM operations pertaining to CBRNE events within the United States.

The JIATF option has unique applications to homeland security with respect to strategic level intelligence and warning for USNORTHCOM. The JIATF model maximizes existing interagency relationships and operational and intelligence functions already in place at JTF-6. The JIATF requires no additional staffing or expertise to perform its functions. Merging OPALL with JTF-6 would require funding allocations for expanded facilities and enhancement to existing C4I technology. Finally, approximately one year would be required for JIATF-North to reach full operational capability.

RECOMMENDATION

The transformation of JTF-6 is inevitable for the HQ to remain relevant as a “counter-threat” headquarters for USNORTHCOM. It has remarkable capability for border security,
intelligence and warning and emergency response. However, to continue its service to the nation the following recommendations are provided to ensure a successful transition:

1) Amend PDD-39 to clearly define DoD’s role and responsibility in support of domestic counterterrorism operations. The Joint Staff should establish a CJCSI to provide all applicable provisions and authorities to execute CT support for domestic authorities. The CJCSI should include as a minimum

   a. Provide a delegation of authority to USNORTHCOM for CT support within the USNORTHCOM joint area of operation. This authority should be further delegated to the CJTF-6 as the approval authority for all CD and CT missions to include detection and monitoring.

   b. Retain CJCSI 3710.01 for counterdrug operations.

2) Pursue the use of Title 32 National Guard forces to support JTF-6 counterdrug missions during NG annual training periods. The challenges surrounding the C2, RUF, and PCA can be overcome with training and close coordination between JTF-6 and NG units. For domestic support operations, Title 32 National Guard forces have distinct advantages over Title 10 units when requested to perform law enforcement duties for national security events or crisis.

3) Establish a memorandum of agreement (MOA) between JTF-6, USNORTHCOM, and the National Guard Bureau that gives the CJTF-6 tasking authority over Title 32 forces in support of JTF-6 missions.

4) Continue the development of the JIATF-N concept to expand on strategic intelligence fusion of the “land domain”, theater security cooperation with Mexico and Canada, and domestic support operations. Expand the JIATF-N area of responsibility to include Canada and Mexico. The JIATF-N headquarters provides an additional command and control node for crisis management operations. Exercise JIATF-N to include domestic civil support operations to establish relationships and operating procedures with first responders.

CONCLUSION

The Joint Task Force Six command headquarters is an ideal organization for an expanded role in homeland security. The JTF-6 role in DoD counterdrug operations provides an excellent foundation to facilitate such expansion under USNORTHCOM. Border security is a viable mission for JTF-6 supporting deterrence and prevention of drug trafficking while simultaneously countering potential WMD smuggling across U.S. land borders. Emergency preparedness is an
intrinsic quality of JTF-6. It stands prepared 24 hours a day, 7 days a week for crisis management and response to support first responders. With its unique set of intelligence collection and analysis capabilities, JTF-6 can be leveraged to become Northern Command’s premiere land domain intelligence fusion center, with strategic applications for homeland security. Finally, the JTF-6 organization possesses the leadership, staff, and structure to become a Joint Interagency Task Force for USNORTHCOM. This emerging organization will provide the Department of Defense, U.S. Northern Command, and our nation with a set of unique capabilities to enhance DoD’s homeland security capability to detect, deter, and defeat transnational threats and weapons of mass destruction before they reach the United States homeland.

WORD COUNT= 5,951
ENDNOTES


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