ARMY RESERVE TRANSFORMATION: AN ASSESSMENT

by

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The U.S. Army Reserve (USAR) has gone through numerous transformations since its founding in 1908. The U.S. Army Reserve's leadership has proposed six "imperatives" that outline the Federal Reserve Restructuring Initiative (FRRI). Critics say these changes have been attempted before but were unsuccessful. This paper will show the past and current situations in the USAR. It will then review possible transformational lessons learned from another branch of the armed forces, a sister Service, the U.S. Navy Reserve (USNR). Finally, changes for future transformation efforts will be recommended.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE OF CONTENTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ABSTRACT........................................ iii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARMY RESERVE TRANSFORMATION: AN ASSESSMENT......................... 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BACKGROUND........................................ 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOME HISTORY........................................ 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THE CURRENT SITUATION............................... 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THE UNITED STATES NAVY RESERVE....................... 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE................................ 8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAVAL RESERVE RECRUITING.............................. 11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAVAL RESERVE ADVANCEMENT............................ 11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS............................. 12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENDNOTES........................................... 15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIBLIOGRAPHY....................................... 17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ARMY RESERVE TRANSFORMATION: AN ASSESSMENT

Nothing is more difficult than to introduce a new order. Because the innovator has for enemies all those who have done well under the old conditions and lukewarm defenders in those who may do well under the new.

—Nicolò Machiavelli, 1513 A.D. The Prince

The USAR has transformed many times since its founding in 1908. The latest transformation began in 1991. While doing this, the USAR continued to achieve the highest readiness levels in Army Reserve history. The major elements of this transformation were seven in all. During this period, the USAR conducted a 36% strength reduction, established the U.S. Army Reserve Command (USARC), and accomplished the RC (Reserve Component) swap migration. (All the combat units went to the National Guard and all the combat service and combat service support units went to the USAR.) The USAR also redesigned the Army Reserve Commands (ARCOM) into Regional Support Commands, cutting command and control overhead in half. All the training divisions were restructured. The Army Reserve Personnel Center (ARPERCEN) was redesigned into Army Reserve Personnel Command (AR-PERSCOM). Finally, for the first time ever, the USAR organized multi-component units.

The most recent transformation of the USAR, as it moves toward the future force, has six basic elements. These elements are referred to as six “imperatives.” These items are identified as imperatives because it is essential for the USAR to make these changes if the USAR is to continue to be prepared and significant to the Active Component (AC) and to the combatant commander. The six imperatives are: (1) Reengineer the mobilization process to streamline and automate procedures that are currently time intensive, paper based, and multi-layered in order to respond more quickly with individuals and units to meet the combatant commander’s needs, (2) transform command and control to focus regional commands on training, leader development unit readiness, and shorter mobilization timelines to focus against the core mission of providing trained, ready Soldiers when needed by the combatant commander, (3) restructure units into a flexible and adaptable force that meets anticipated mission requirements within the resource cap of 205K Soldiers, (4) divest structure that is irrelevant, habitually unready, or too costly to modernize so that the USAR can deliver maximum value to AC units and combatant commanders and utility for resources expended, (5) improve human resources staff, technologies, and business practices to assist USAR commanders and leaders at all levels to recruit, develop, train, and care for Soldiers, families, civilians and contractors to provide support individuals in the USAR and ensure they are trained and ready when needed by the combatant commander, and (6) build a rotational based force so a soldier
will only deploy 9 to 12 months every 5 to 6 years. Create additional depth in high demand capabilities. This will provide stability and predictability to soldiers, families and employers while simultaneously supporting GWOT, major combat operations and small scale contingencies. Further, it will improve individual support to combatant commanders by increasing the number of trained and ready soldiers in critical MOS’s available for individual augmentation. Finally, this imperative will assist the USAR in overcoming past impediments - systems issues, red tape, and communications problems that will meet the AC & combatant commander’s demand for individual capabilities without threatening unit readiness.

The means by which the USAR will accomplish all of this is the Federal Reserve Restructuring Initiative (FRRI). With the FRRI, the USAR will have to invest in high demand, low density skills, rotational and specific skill depth, Authorized Level of Organization category 1 (ALO1 units are 90% ready or higher) units, and perhaps, the most difficult of all, the USAR will have to create its own Trainees, Transients, Holdees and Students (TTHS) account. TTHS is an account of all those personnel who are not deployable and not assigned to a unit. The bill payer for this is a divestiture of less relevant structure, unready units, and some force over structure [e.g. when units have authorized versus required billets in the Modified Table of Organization (MTOE) and Equipment or Table of Distribution and Allowances (TDA)].

Critics say the USAR has tried to do this before and failed. The USAR has tried, unsuccessfully, to reorganize its regional command and control, Individual Ready Reserve/Individual Mobilization Augmentee (IRR/IMA) programs, and its deployment timelines. This time, the ACs transformation to the future force and the current global situation may be the right impetus and focus for the USAR. There is no bill to the Army. The FRRI should provide ready Soldiers, ready units, and shortened deployment timelines in direct support of combatant commander requirements.

BACKGROUND

Soldiers complain. It is a fact in the military. Many have heard the old saying that a complaining Soldier is a happy Soldier. However, issues in the Reserves today may have long reaching, strategic implications. Now, more than ever, part time Soldiers, national guardsmen and Reservists are complaining loudly. Since September 11, 2001, more than 212,000 “citizen-soldiers” have been mobilized. Currently, there are more than 170,000 Reserve Component members on active duty. Approximately 80,000 of these “citizen soldiers” are in Iraq. Perhaps 20,000 of those in Iraq will have tours extended up to a year.
The over-utilization of the Reserve Component members, with the loss of jobs, income, and time with loved ones, could lead to some serious problems for the future. A recent Washington Post article said that a new survey of troops in Iraq indicates, “…that Army troops tended to sound more dissatisfied than the Air Force personnel and the Marines, and that Reservists were the most troubled.” Moreover, the article closed by saying, “In the past, enlistment rates tended to drop after conflicts, but many defense experts and non-commissioned officers have warned of the potential for a historically high exodus, particularly of Reservists.” The Reserve Component has become an integral part of Army operations around the world. Is the complaining truly an issue?

SOME HISTORY

As far back as the Athenians, militaries have represented societies. Some say that militaries in many ways reflect their societies. After all, wasn’t it a sick and twisted German society that unleashed the Wermacht on the rest of the world? Military organizations recruit from within their national populations. It could also be said that citizen involvement in the common defense has been estimated as a critical part of national security for centuries. However, throughout history, no one ever assumed that the obligation of citizens was boundless. These limits took on many forms. In the past, the most formal or fundamental of these obligations was the difference between defense of the homeland and expeditionary warfare. In a recent Washington Times article, Philip Gold, a former Marine reserve officer and President of Aretea, a public and cultural institute in Seattle, wrote, “…although even as late as the Civil War, short term enlistments were the norm. But foreign adventures were always limited by law, contract or custom, either to the duration of the campaign or some fixed term of service.”

As the Cold War geared up, many democracies drafted. That said, many free societies conscripted men into the military against their will. Many continue to draft. The Vietnam experience destroyed the legitimacy of conscription for the U.S. Most other democracies had tied the draft to homeland defense. The U.S. believed that draftees could be sent anywhere for any reason. This was one of the major factors for the U.S. defeat in Vietnam, not in the jungles of South East Asia by the Viet Cong, but by citizens in the streets of America. In 1968, less than 6,000 Reservists were recalled and less than 3,500 were sent to Vietnam. The reluctance of President Lyndon Johnson to mobilize the Reserves for Vietnam had severe consequences militarily and at home.

In the mid 1970s, the U.S. Army began recruiting an “all volunteer” force. Studies and numerous incidents with the post Vietnam War army had shown that volunteer Soldiers
performed much better. A few years later, the Army required that all volunteers possess a high school diploma. This higher standard meant that Soldiers would be more likely to finish their terms of enlistment. Soldiers would be less likely to end up in the stockade and would be more likely to kill enemy soldiers before they, themselves, got killed. Volunteers with a high school diploma, not a Graduate Equivalency Diploma (GED), a test that can be taken where the equivalent of a high school diploma is awarded, would retain their training. High school diploma graduates are still the focus of Army recruiting today.

After Vietnam, General Creighton Abrams became the Army Chief of Staff. General Abrams said the Army would never go to war again without significant Reserve augmentation. He said, “If we go to war again, we’re taking the reserves with us.” This has been known as the Abrams Doctrine. It has also been referred to as the Laird-Abrams Doctrine. This comment followed very closely behind the “Total Force Policy” released in 1970 by the then Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird. Once again, the U.S. made a very broad assumption, that is, assuming Reserve mobilizations would win popular support for whatever the administration wished to accomplish. Since the first world war, and perhaps before, pundits and politicians alike have seen the part-time Soldiers, be them a militia, a national guard, or a federal reserve force, as a conduit to civil-military relations. If a Soldier leaves a plow or a computer terminal in the civilian community to participate in an armed conflict wearing his or her country’s uniform, the public is bound to support the war, campaign, or operation. Linking the National Guard and the Army Reserve so closely to the Regular Army should ensure the support of the American people and their political leadership.

THE CURRENT SITUATION

There have been almost three decades of “citizen-soldiers” in a far different role than what a militia was to U.S. founding fathers or why a Reserve force was founded prior to World War I.

The Army Reserve is a federal force. The USAR was founded in 1908 as a medical service reserve. The USAR has been mobilized more times in the last decade than in all the previous decades since its founding. The Army Reserve’s Mission, under Title 10 of the U.S. Code, is to “…provide trained units and qualified persons available for active duty in the armed forces in time of war or national emergency, and at such other times as the national security may require.” This mission could be broadly defined and interpreted in many ways. The code does not define war or national emergency.
In July of 2003, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld directed the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to reduce the reliance of the active Services on their Reserve Components. He directed that the Services eliminate involuntary mobilization of Reservists during the first fifteen days of a rapid response operation and to eliminate any alerts to mobilize reservists prior to an operation. Maybe the Defense Secretary is listening to all the complaining.

Every year, the Association of The United States Army (AUSA) produces The Green Book. The Green Book is an annual compilation and update of the major commands in the Army and what has happened in the last year. In the 2003 Green Book, Lieutenant General (LTG) James Helmly, Chief of the Army Reserve (CAR), wrote, “Arguments that reserve forces should not participate in operations such as Iraqi Freedom, Enduring Freedom, and other on-going operations around the world are faulty in logic and fail to recognize the value of the reserve component forces, both politically in terms of strengthening the bond between the American people and the members of their armed forces and the skills the reserve component Soldiers bring to the fight.”

On the other hand, General John Keane, the Army’s Vice Chief of Staff and one of the CAR’s superiors, said in a recent newspaper article, “We know the mix is wrong, and when we go to war, we’re far too dependent on the Reserve Component to provide our logistical support and some of our other combat support. We’ve got to fix that. That’s number one.”

Maybe the CAR is not listening to the complaining. However, it is not unusual for a Service Chief to speak with such bravado. Such speech must be promulgated in order to maintain legitimacy, relevancy, and resources. Maybe the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army is listening. The questions remain: are the Reserves over utilized? What will be the long-term implications?

When the U.S. was young and the Army was small, it was easier for the civilian community to relate to the Army. As the U.S. and the Army have grown, this has become more difficult. As worldwide responsibilities make this relationship more complicated, a more parochial or insular Army will not alleviate the situation. The concept of returning to an Army where Reserve Components played a major role was the right thing to do after Vietnam. The Abrams Doctrine contributed to the revitalization of an inadequate, impotent, decayed, and neglected Army Reserve and Army National Guard. The results of the latest force reductions of the regular forces after Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm also helped the Reserve Components with the addition of Officers and Non-Commissioned Officers (NCOs) with a great deal of active duty experience. The face of the Reserve Components has drastically changed in the last forty
years. Unfortunately, along with these changes have come uncontrollable external changes in the threat and national interests.

It is very easy to see that the long-term impact of longer and more frequent deployments of the Reserve Components will be in recruiting and retention. Although it will be some time before the numbers are in and fully tallied, history shows the possibility of a decline. The troubling aspect is how bad of a decline? How big of a mass exodus? How can the bleeding be stopped?

The solution can be written very easily in one word. The solution is Restructuring. Unfortunately, this solution cannot be accomplished easily. Restructuring is a monstrous task. This will not be “transformation.” It will be something needed to respond to internal needs, not external threats. It must begin with the law, the will of the people, and a great deal of public policy analysis. Readjusting the active/reserve mix will be a gruesome task. In his latest op-ed piece, COL Randy Pullen of the U.S. Army’s Strategic Studies Institute said, “Readjusting the active-reserve balance will require a deft hand. Moving too many of the Army’s essential capabilities from the reserves back into the active Army and relegating, for the most part, only those capabilities that will be seldom, if ever used, could well bring back the worst conditions of the Vietnam era for the Army Reserve and Army National Guard.”

Perhaps the Abrams Doctrine should not yet be rejected. Yet, it is clear that this model may not be fully applicable to today’s Army. Finding the right force structure for the Army and its Reserve Components will do much for how the U.S. military is favorably perceived by its citizens, respected by its allies, and feared by its enemies.

What can the USAR do to end the problems and retain relevancy? Is the USAR headed in the right direction with the six imperatives?

USAR transformation must address the following: (1) re-vitalize public support, (2) be more joint, and (3) meet or exceed recruiting and reenlistment requirements. However, prior to actual restructuring, the Army and USAR must do serious policy analysis. The six broad policies listed earlier in this paper were identified as imperatives for the USAR. Assuming that these policies have been thoroughly examined from a statistical or monetary standpoint, what public policy “lessons learned” can be brought to bear from an organization outside the Army yet similar to the Army? What lessons learned can be gained from the U.S. Navy Reserve (USNR) transformation?
THE UNITED STATES NAVY RESERVE

In the last two decades, the U.S Navy and its Reserve Component, the U. S. Naval Reserve, have had three transformations. The first was “Maritime Strategy” in 1986. The second was “From the Sea” in 1992 and the third was “Forward From the Sea” in 1994. The U.S. Navy’s most recent transformation is titled, “Sea Power 21.” Sea Power 21 has three basic tenets: (1) Sea Strike, (2) Sea Shield and (3) Sea Basing. This transformation has many similarities to Army transformation, especially with regard to Families of Systems (FoS), Systems of Systems (SoS) and sensor to shooter warfare.

Sea Strike is projecting precise and persistent offensive power. This will employ networked sensors, sailors, and platforms to capitalize on the capabilities of sea-based forces. Sea Shield projects global defensive assurance. This defense includes homeland defense, defense of the littorals, and potentially deep overland defense. Sea Basing projects joint operational independence. Sea Basing basically involves joint logistical support for joint forces provided by networked, highly mobile, and secure sea going transportation platforms operating in the maritime domain. This transformation will be enabled by ForceNet. Similar to the Army’s system of systems (SOS) approach, ForceNet is an overarching effort to integrate sailors, ships, sensors, networks, command and control. Admiral Vern Clark, Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), referred to ForceNet as the glue that holds Sea Strike, Sea Shield, and Sea basing together. ForceNet will be the Navy’s version of network centric warfare.

The method by which the Navy will achieve its vision of Sea Power 21 is a triad of organizational processes. This triad consists of Sea Trial, Sea Enterprise, and Sea Warrior. Sea Trial contains fleet forces as having a major role in coordinating concept, doctrine, and technology development. Sea Enterprise involves the overall funding, reduction of overhead, and substituting technology for manpower in the future fleets. Sea Warrior means that the Navy will re-invest in personnel with changes in recruiting, promotions, education, and training. This paper focuses on Sea Warrior, in particular. In his October 2003 article in Proceedings, Admiral Vern Clark specifically referred to the relationship between the full time and Navy and USNR. He said, “Our goal is to create a Navy in which all sailors – active and reserve, afloat and ashore – are optimally assessed, trained, and assigned so that they can contribute their fullest to mission accomplishment.”

The Naval Reserve Force Transformation Initiative (NRFTI) was the USNRs internal organization to address Navy Reserve transformation. Among the many areas that NRFTI addressed, the top three topics were: Organizational Culture, USNR Recruiting, and USNR Advancement.
ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE

In a recent article for *The Officer*, the bimonthly magazine of The Reserve Officers Association, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Richard B. Meyers, USAF, listed transformation that he derived from the Joint Vision as having an intellectual element, a technological element, and a cultural element. He continued, “Transformation is a process and a mindset, not a product...Ensuring that we have the capability to face new and future challenges requires more than an agile mindset. A fresh cultural attitude is necessary.”

The most elusive and perhaps the most difficult to influence is organizational culture. During the Cold War, the USNR always believed that it would have skillful, proficient and committed drilling sailors. The USNR assumed that there would always be plenty of these sailors, with the proper mix of prior service (PS), Service Veterans (SV), and non-prior service (NPS) experience willing to serve in a part-time capacity. The USNR believed that there would be an abundance of PS sailors that would bring with them time tested standards and leadership. Conversely, the USNR held that any other more specialized skills could be filled with NPS sailors who had unique civilian acquired education or training. The USNR also assumed that its more seasoned, mid-level leaders, junior officers and junior petty officers, would by chance, obtain the necessary military and management skills needed for future development and skills. In addition, the USNR members during this period led a rather contented existence of drilling in their local community and sometimes traveling to their gaining commands for their annual training. Also, during this period, the likelihood of a single mobilization, much less multiple or long term mobilizations, was very implausible. With these conditions, it was relatively easy to recruit sailors, especially those separated or separating from active service. Those PS sailors were more likely to finish a twenty year career in the Reserves after a two, four, or six year term in the active Navy.

Now, times have changed. In the last 5 years, the USNR drilling workforce has declined in numbers; the recruitment of PS sailors has taken a nose-dive. In response, the USNR has made a great effort to replace the PS Sailors with NPS sailors. These NPS sailors have only perfunctory training and have nowhere near the background or experience of a PS sailor. This has caused a high rate of personnel turnover and many drilling Reservists are not even completing initial term of obligated service. In the recent past, many drilling USNR members had no mobilization assignment, no unit war trace, no decent training, and no strong command and leadership. The USNR was becoming less ready and less solid.

In response to these problems, the NRFTI determined an extensive list of elements that the USNR culture must contain. This list can be found at Table 1. The new organization has four
broad categories. These categories are: (1) a Customer Service Ethic, (2) Leadership, (3) Full Time Support/Selective Reserve Relationship, and (4) Special Naval Reserve Elements. In general, the USNR has realized the need to make the USNR a more pleasant place to work. It must help sailors deal with the increased pressures and demands notwithstanding. The USNR must appeal to all sailors – PS and NPS alike. NPS sailors must be thoroughly indoctrinated, at least to the levels as the other Service Reserve Components. The USNR must revise its leadership styles at all levels. The military values in the USNR must be re-evaluated to be better aligned with changes in society and a different PS/NPS force mix. The fulltime support staff must have a more “customer service” attitude with regard to drilling Reservists and drilling Reservists must have a more “customer service” attitude toward gaining commands and combatant commanders. Finally, the USNR must forcefully put forward the career progression and achievement of each USNR member. The most interesting part of the new culture is the Special Naval Reserve Elements. These elements involve the needs of USNR sailors to develop aptitudes in order to deal with issues related to their part-time status, which are not at all military skill related. Some of the issues cover fulltime support relations, families, balancing the USNR with employment, and dealing with employers. The NRFTI even established a means and process to identify the cultural elements and a method. If the USNR is successful at this shift in organizational culture, many of the other transformation initiatives should come very easily.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Customer Service Ethic (FTS)</th>
<th>Leadership</th>
<th>FTS/SELRES Relationship</th>
<th>Special Naval Reserve Elements (not required in Navy culture)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- Strong customer-service orientation by all</td>
<td>- CNOS, Covenant Leadership philosophy (FTS and SELRES)</td>
<td>- Common culture and values</td>
<td>- Ability to balance HR obligations with civilian life</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Customer service training pipeline</td>
<td>- Traditional Navy/military leadership elements (that do not conflict with Covenant Leadership)</td>
<td>- FTS = administrative support</td>
<td>- Willingness to mobilize family/father support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Commitment, not compliance</td>
<td>- Training and development</td>
<td>- SELRES = training/mission performance</td>
<td>- Ability to lead/manage decentralized, part-time units</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Sincere desire to help bring positive motivation in</td>
<td>- Provide meaningful work</td>
<td>- Leverage SELRES civilian skills</td>
<td>- Fosters a positive working relationship between SELRES and FTS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Empowerment to resolve problems at all levels</td>
<td>- Provide camaraderie</td>
<td>- Mutual respect between NAVY, FTS and SELRES communities</td>
<td>- Possess a strong commitment to serving the Navy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Change cultural bias to &quot;yes&quot;</td>
<td>- Provide &quot;cradle-to-grave&quot; leadership training</td>
<td></td>
<td>- Strong sense of belonging to Naval Reserve</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- One-stop shop support based upon Reserve location</td>
<td>- Provide resources</td>
<td></td>
<td>- Support for Naval Reservists by employers and family</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Local FTS trust/responsibility/accountability</td>
<td>- Provide recognition and rewards</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Continuous improvement</td>
<td>- Empower subordinates</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Strong professional standards/ethics</td>
<td>- Run professional</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Customer feedback</td>
<td>- Mentor subordinates</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Respect for billeting Reservists</td>
<td>- Be innovative</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Solution oriented</td>
<td>- Integrity/honesty</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Responsiveness/Flexibility/Agility/Competency</td>
<td>- High levels of respect</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Accessibility</td>
<td>- Competence</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>- Mission understandable at the lowest level</td>
<td>- Flexibility</td>
<td></td>
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**TABLE 1: U.S. NAVY RESERVE FUTURE ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE ELEMENTS**
NAVAL RESERVE RECRUITING

With everything relating to organizational culture taken into account, the USNR realizes that there are numerous benefits to recruiting a well balanced mix of PS and NPS sailors. It is clear that the PS sailor, in most cases (if he or she has little or no break in service), is ready to become a world wide asset for the USNR and the USN almost immediately. The NPS sailor requires many more resources such as time and money before he or she can become an asset or even eligible for mobilization. Because of how recent these studies have been, NRFTI was unable at this time to determine if, in fact, NPS sailors have become a higher attrition risk.

The NRFTI assessed the recruiting policies and operations of all the federal Reserve Components and National Guard; Marine Reserve, Air Force Reserve, Air National Guard, Army Reserve, Army National Guard, and Coast Guard Reserve. Current USNR recruiting policies and operations were reviewed as well. The USAR was most identified with some of its programs. In particular, the USARs policy of having One Army/One Recruiter (the force structure of the Army’s recruiting command), the varied locations of recruiting stations, the TRY ONE program (a program where PS soldiers can try one year in the USAR with no further obligation), and a wide range of billet choices with retraining incentives.

Basically, the NRFTI recognized that the Navy has to realign its recruiting command. USNR recruiting activities for active duty and the Reserves must be more closely aligned, principally with regard to personnel and budget as the foundation. Appropriate recruiting operations will follow if this is accomplished. Tying the billet and retraining will be an added incentive for PS sailors. The USNR has determined that in order to remain viable, it must increase the percentage of recruits who have prior service. It appears that the USAR was a primary model.

NAVAL RESERVE ADVANCEMENT

The enlisted sailors in the USNR have habitually experienced numerous problems with their promotions, career progression, and overall advancement. Many of the reasons include closed ratings due to being over manned, age limits, changing requirements, and high year tenure. Many USNR sailors who have met advancement requirements are not able to advance. Many sailors have chosen to leave the USNR, not to return. Those who remain behind possess quite a morale problem. It is clear that this situation flies in the face of adequate and effective rewards for good performance. This situation, along with a poor organizational culture and a limited focus on recruiting, can produce a dysfunctional Navy Reserve.
Once again, the NRFTI studied the policies and procedures of all the Reserve Components mentioned above and reviewed its own internal policies and procedures. The NRFTI discovered that the inability to promote enlisted members in timely manner because of over manned slots could be somewhat mitigated by communication. The USNR should move ahead with the Navy’s program similar to the Army’s Army Knowledge Online (AKO), an army web based system for E-mail and information bulletin boards. Closed positions, potentially closed positions, and other open positions that are lesser manned should be easily accessible if communicated to USNR sailors. The NRFTI study also mentioned that the Army Reserve Personnel Command, merged with the Army Active Duty Personnel Command, has had great success and has closely aligned to almost a single pay and personnel system. This would be huge for the USNR to undertake. Additionally, the USAR allows more than one Military Occupational Skill (MOS) for education, training, and promotion. The NRFTI has proposed that the USNR have the same latitude with its Navy Enlisted Classification Codes (NECCs). Once more, it appears that the USAR has been used as quite the model for USNR transformation.

**SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS**

The USAR has been leading the Department of Defense, and more specifically, all the Reserve Components with its transformation efforts over the last few years. The USAR has perhaps been through more drastic transformations than any other Service or Service component. These changes have come about either due to necessity or required by time in general. As stated earlier, the USAR went through its most recent transformation in 1991, only a dozen years ago. In his article, in *The Officer*, General Meyers said: “The Army Reserve has been a part of this effort for the past decade, if not longer, with the establishment of the Army Reserve Command. It organized multicomponent units, such as theater support commands and logistics headquarters. The Army is now better positioned to deploy and employ all units – without distinguishing between Reserve and active duty status. Nowhere is this seamless integration more obvious than in the forces deployed to central Asia as a part of *Operation Enduring freedom*. Unfortunately, General Meyers was referring to changes from the 1991 transformation. There has been little said or written, especially in a critical sense, about the current proposed USAR transformation and its six imperatives.

The USNR was chosen as a comparative model in this study for many reasons, but mainly because USNR roles and missions are very similar to the USAR. First and foremost, the USAR’s six imperatives could draw several parallels from Sea Power 21 and the NRFTI. The USNR augments its active forces in much the same way as the USAR. The USNR also has
begun its transformation effort just like the USAR and the USNR is at a similar, but equally critical point in the process. In addition, the USNR was chosen because the USNR, in the end, recommended many USAR programs for its use even though the NRFTI studied all Reserve Components.

With regard to enlisted advancement, the NRFTI recognized that enlisted advancement was broken. All of the NRFTI recommendations were those programs that were already in existence in the USAR. Just because the USNR appears to hold the USAR as a model, is it to be assumed that the USARs advancement process is without fault? USAR enlisted advancement is not mentioned in the six imperatives. Should it be? The USAR has proffered a plan to have some of the personnel functions, currently performed at the Human Resources Command (HRC) St. Louis, Missouri, to be completed at the seven Regional Support Commands (RSCs). Will enlisted advancement be handled at these regional locations? To what extent? If enlisted advancement is healthy now in the USAR, what will be the impact of regional personnel activities? Little has been said as to how these regional personnel activities will be staffed and operated. Is the USAR the right model for the USNR? More research and policy analysis must be conducted on the impact of USAR promotions on retention.

Moreover, similar applications could be made for USNR recruitment. It is clear that although the NRFTI considered all Reserve Components, all the recommendations made by the NRFTI were USAR activities and programs. It is all and good that the USAR was the primary, archetypal representation for the USNR to modify and adapt its recruiting but, again, is the USAR the right model? Nowhere in the six imperatives are the potential recruiting problems incurred by the USAR due to recent oversear and extended tours. Has the USAR leadership given thought to the inevitable changes that must take place in recruiting operations to address current changes in the USAR? More research and policy analysis must be given to the potential changes in recruiting due to the current situation in the USAR.

The final analysis is in regard to organizational culture. The impact of recruiting and promotions have on the fabric of an organization is abundantly clear. These are two basic personnel functions. However, the most pervasive, the most elusive, and the most difficult to quantify is organizational culture. Organizational culture is the foundation upon which all other functions stem. This is different from command climate. Organizational culture has roots.

The Army's Field Manual on Leadership (FM 22-100) describes organizational culture in the following manner: "Culture is a longer lasting, more complex set of shared expectations than climate. While climate is how people feel about an organization right now, culture consists
of the shared attitudes, values, goals and practices that characterize the larger institution. It's deeply rooted in long-held beliefs."

Has a look been taken at the “values, goals and practices” of the USAR? It is very apparent that the USNR has highly regarded these issues. In fact, the USNR focused on culture long before other studies involving education, training, promotions, or recruiting. The USNR recognized its past culture, during the Cold War and prior to September 11th, 2001 and mapped out needed changes and directions for future initiatives. In a slight change in perspective from the NRFTI, the USAR may need to take a look at USNR transformation for some guidance. Before the USAR lists what imperatives must take place, or lists the ends and means for USAR transformation, perhaps the USAR should look at the ways in which transformation should be conducted. A change in organizational culture may hold the key and begin to quell some of the complaining.
ENDNOTES


2 Ibid


5 Michael Kilian, “Military Too Dependent on Reserves, General Says”, The Chicago Tribune, 26 October 2003

6 COL Randy Pullen, “Keep the Reserves in the Fight”, Strategic Studies Institute Newsletter, September 2003


8 GEN Richard B. Myers, CJCS, “An Example Worth Noting”, The Officer, January/February 2003

9 Ibid
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