AN EVOLVING JOINT ACQUISITION FORCE

by

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United States Army

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ABSTRACT

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The last two major U.S. conflicts, Operations Desert Storm/Shield and Iraqi Freedom have demonstrated our military’s evolution toward a joint fighting doctrine. Along with recent changes to Department of Defense (DoD) policy emphasizing joint military operations, there is sufficient reason for all DoD organizations to conduct a self examination to insure they are postured to support the joint warfighter. This Strategic Research Paper (SRP) explores the prospects of reorganizing the acquisition community into a truly joint DoD organization that integrates and serves all Component Services. It proposes two options: (1) Integrate Program Executive Offices into the U.S. Joint Forces Command organization modeled on U.S. Special Operations Command’s acquisition and logistics organization; (2) Establish a Joint Acquisition Executive within the office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The first proposal would integrate the joint-materiel developer with the joint-concept developer, insuring synergy between the parties desiring to rapidly conceive, develop, and acquire solutions to joint warfighting needs. The second proposal would provide the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff more authority in materiel acquisition programs and would improve the process of identifying and providing critical materiel solutions to the joint warfighter.
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AN EVOLVING JOINT ACQUISITION FORCE

Professionalism within the military tends to generate an institutional conservatism that works against needed change inside the organization. This occurs because the military culture too often confuses professionalism with loyalty to a particular military service, or even to a professional specialty within a service (such as the Army infantry, naval carrier aviation, or Air Force fighter communities). The problem occurs when this relatively healthy expression of solidarity to a community hardens into an unreasoned, blind commitment to existing doctrine or structure.

—Admiral (Retired) Bill Owens
Former Vice Chairman
U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff

The last two major U.S. conflicts, Operations Desert Storm/Shield and Iraqi Freedom have demonstrated our military’s evolution toward a joint fighting doctrine. Along with recent changes to Department of Defense (DoD) policy emphasizing joint military operations, there is sufficient reason for all DoD organizations to conduct a self-examination to insure they are postured to support the joint warfighter. This Strategic Research Paper (SRP) explores the prospects of reorganizing the acquisition community into a truly joint DoD organization that integrates and serves all Component Services. This new structuring will provide the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with more authority in materiel acquisition programs and will improve the process of identifying and providing critical materiel solutions to the joint warfighter, thereby fulfilling a designated task to improve joint operation concepts.

During the Second World War, the enormous production of military equipment needed for our forces was a key component of effectively and successfully completing the diverse missions of that war. In that war for survival, efficiency was a relatively low priority. But as modern missions have developed into more complex operations using more technologically advanced equipment, the need for a joint-acquisition workforce has been demonstrated over and over. Without an organizational change in the way our armed forces acquire equipment, our military risks outcomes more significant than merely duplicating purchases for each Service, or overspending for the same equipment. Without a joint acquisition force, our military also risks dysfunction or functional degradation resulting from a lack of system compatibility in combat.

Though the proposal for a joint acquisition workforce is not new, the U.S. military is nearing the point where the DoD should take action to fully embrace this organizational change as the acquisition workforce’s contribution to our military transformation.
This SRP proposes the establishment of a joint acquisition workforce. This proposal is advanced in detail, as follows:

- Review of literature pertaining to military acquisition development from the time our country was founded to the present
- Description of the current acquisition workforce
- Discussion of DoD’s Transformation focus on joint operations
- Challenges associated with organizational changes
- Preview of recent changes in the military, including the joint force structure and acquisition community
- Concluding recommendations

BACKGROUND AND HISTORY

LITERATURE SURVEY

Though many articles and monographs have been written about U.S. Defense acquisition, two studies stand out as excellent sources of information about reforming military acquisitions. The first study provides a detailed chronological perspective of acquisition, and the other monograph explores potential reorganization to a joint acquisition workforce. Together, the two sources cover the entire span of U.S. military history from pre-Revolutionary days to the end of the 20th century.

First, Lieutenant Colonel Stephen V. Reeves’ “The Ghosts of Acquisition Reform: Past, Present and Future” provides a comprehensive review of U.S. military acquisition policies for the first 200 years of its existence, starting in 1775. The section entitled “The Ghosts of Acquisition Reform-Past” covers the period from the Revolutionary War to World War II (WW II). In this section, Reeves cites references that indicate many current acquisition policies come from this pre-WW II period. The concept of a government-owned production facility or a depot was put into practice in 1777 by General George Washington, who authorized a cannon production plant. Reeves traces the bidding process for government contracts back to the early 1800s. He also cites the Dockery Commission (the so-called “prototype commission”) created in 1893 by Congress as the point at which the U.S. government began making quantity buys based on standardized government specifications. According to Reeves, the Air Corps Act of 1926 was significant because it permitted production contracts to be awarded based on performance rather than on price alone. Reeves then observes that the large-scale military build-up of WW II placed the defense acquisition process into an impossible situation. At this time, the U.S. government had to develop a system that could rapidly transition the military from
a peace-time situation with relatively few materiel requirements, to one that could quickly acquire huge amounts of munitions and military equipment in a time of national emergency.

Reeves goes on to discuss major congressional acquisition studies, commissions and panels in a section entitled “The Ghosts of Acquisition Reform-Present.” This section begins with the Hoover Commission (1947 – 1949) and continues up to the 1994 Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act. Reeves then asserts that the National Security Acts of 1947 and 1949 form the basis of our current-day defense acquisition structure. These two Acts created the DoD, the position of Secretary of Defense, a War Council, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Munitions Board, and the Research and Development Board. The 1985 Packard Commission was the first to recommend establishing the structure for the current-day acquisition workforce. Based on this recommendation, the government established an Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, service acquisition executives, and program executive officers—and consolidated the acquisition laws and regulations as well.

The second monograph was written by Major Jaimy S. Rand, and is entitled “Transition to Jointness: An Analysis and Appraisal of Consolidating Service Acquisition Personnel into a Joint Acquisition Force.” Rand proposes a consolidated defense acquisition workforce with representatives from all the military services. Rand concludes that a joint acquisition workforce is not immediately necessary, because the current system adequately addresses emerging joint requirements while meeting the needs of all stakeholders (i.e. taxpayers, military and workforce personnel). Included in the study is a discussion of the historical development of key military acquisition reforms through 1999, highlighting the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act of 1991. Rand argues that several significant policies and laws have effectively moved the defense acquisition workforce and related policies to transition toward jointness. Rand also describes the acquisition workforce from each of the military services' perspectives (Army, Air Force, and Navy). However, Rand contends that the policies are vague with respect to joint acquisition or a consolidated workforce structure. So in reality there are many gaps in the road to this lofty goal. Rand reviews several organizational structures for a joint acquisition workforce, to include unified commands and a hypothetical all-civilian workforce. Rand also appraises the prospects of a consolidated joint acquisition workforce.
ACQUISITION WORKFORCE

DoD Transformation Guidance asserts that “To transform the [military] force we must commit resources, yet remain detached enough from these commitments to continue an iterative process of innovation and experimentation that permits new insights to guide future investment decisions.” This means the DoD must be able to review the Service Component’s transformation roadmaps and objectively decide which investments and programs best support the joint warfighter’s concepts and requirements. One way to set the conditions for objectivity is to insure each of the Service Components has equal or shared investments in the jointly developed and acquired materiel solutions by creating an acquisition organization in a Joint Command headquarters. DoD could consider establishing a joint-staffed materiel developer organization within the U.S. Joint Forces Command. Or it could create an Acquisition Executive within the office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Either of these two possible solutions will enhance the process of procuring necessary materiel designed to operate successfully in a joint operation.

In fact, joint program offices do exist today. Policies set by the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology and Logistics) insure that Service Components with an interest in a joint program (to include the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s office) provide oversight with respect to requirements, funding, personnel, and other activities associated with delivering the joint capability to the field. However, the potential for Service parochialism lurks within the current paradigm because a single Service is designated as the lead for the joint program. Given shrinking resources, shifting priorities within the different Service Components, and political influence (even though some safe-guards are found in the acquisition regulations designed to protect joint programs) decisions that do not reflect the desires of all stake-holders can cripple the program.

Title 10, U.S. Code, chapter 38 (sometimes referred to as Title IV) contains language that permits waivers and thus exempts officers with scientific and technical backgrounds from joint duty assignments in order to be qualified for promotion to the rank of 0-7 (General or Flag Officer). Current DoD policy includes such a waiver for Acquisition Program Management, Materiel Procurement, and Research and Development fields. The fact that DoD exempts acquisition officers from joint duty assignments is a strong indication that there are very few Joint Program billets available. It also indicates that there are relatively few programs being developed jointly for the joint warfighter.

Until recently, the system that required Services to define their needs and acquire the materiel to satisfy those needs was convoluted. Now that the validation of all requirements
resides with the Joint Staff, major re-structuring is necessary to streamline the process and insure military acquisition organizations are truly joint.

JOINT FORCES

The DoD Transformation Planning Guidance clearly directs that joint-operating military organizations are essential to the Transformation strategy. The guidance states “the outcome we must achieve [is]: fundamentally joint, network-centric, distributed forces capable of rapid decision superiority and massed effects across the battlespace.” To accomplish this goal, the DoD “will explicitly link acquisition strategy to future joint concepts in order to provide the capabilities necessary to execute future operations.” Materiel developers from within the acquisition community are responsible for crafting the acquisition strategies. Therefore they must clearly understand the future joint concepts being developed by the joint warfighter.

The joint force is defined in Joint Publication 1-02 as “a force composed of significant elements, assigned or attached, of two or more Military Departments operating under a single joint force commander.” Some analysts have proposed taking the current efforts towards operating joint to a higher level in the current defense transformation, because they currently fall short of truly integrating the combat capabilities of the services. Retired Vice Admiral Arthur Cebrowski, currently Director of the Office of Force Transformation, speaks regularly of “interdependence” as a step beyond current planning and efforts. In the materiel acquisition process, the first step is to determine the warfighter’s need. In the current DoD structure, the need is generated by a Combatant Commander and documented in the form of a Capabilities Requirement Document. In the past, the materiel solutions procured to fulfill warfighter needs were often designed primarily for one Service, though some were jointly developed systems. Examples of joint-developed equipment include the Global Positioning System (GPS) and the new joint service chemical/biological (CB) protective clothing ensemble called Joint Service Lightweight Integrated Suit Technology (JSLIST) system. There are still many areas where consolidation should be considered, such as in the procurement of trucks, helicopters, and uniforms—to name a few candidates for joint-procurement. Given the current emphasis on joint organizations and for many of the same reasons that Combatant Commanders use a joint force structure for military operations, it also makes good sense to use a joint force structure to develop and acquire military equipment.
One joint military organization already incorporates total life cycle management of materiel acquisition: the U.S. Special Operations Forces. Within the U.S. Special Operations Command, there is an organization responsible for managing selected Special Operations-specific research, development and acquisition programs (see Figure 1). This organization serves as the command focal point for Special Operations Forces materiel acquisition. However, the Special Operations Command has been designated as a separate component of the DoD, and therefore it also has its own Acquisition Executive. The Component Acquisition Executive has milestone decision authority and is responsible for all Special Operations-specific acquisition related matters. From an acquisition perspective, the Special Operations Command’s Acquisition and Logistics Center has the same Defense Management structure design as the Service Components, only on a more focused, smaller scale. For example, the Army Acquisition Executive currently has twelve Program Executive Officers reporting to him, while the Special Operations Command’s Acquisition Executive has four. The streamlined Special Operations Command’s Acquisition and Logistics Center organization is designed to promote unity of effort within the acquisition workforce. It also enhances the possibility of acquiring materiel systems designed with cross-service and cross-platform connectivity for use in joint operations, both for mission execution as well as during maintenance operations. Interoperability and the elimination of duplicative efforts, as well early insertion of advanced technological solutions, can also be leveraged by the Special Operations Command’s Acquisition Executive. The Directors within the Center who are responsible for Advanced
Technology and Logistics work in the same organization as the four Program Executive Officers who are responsible for managing their family of systems. Since the Special Operations Command Acquisition Executive owns the entire acquisition process—from concept through development and fielding, as well as future improvements and modifications—he has the ability to enforce joint system integration because he is the decision authority for all phases of acquisition, to include funding of Special Operations-specific equipment.

**ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE**

When trying to institute changes in an organization the size of the U.S. DoD, the problems involved in those changes are daunting. Even glancing at a macro-level depiction of the Department’s organization chart is confusing. On the surface (and maybe because it is possible to draw an organizational chart depicting its chain of command), the U.S. DoD does not appear to be a highly complex adaptive organization, or one “where knowledge-sharing, individual and team competence” are highly valued. Nor does it appear to fit the model of a “learning organization” which is capable of transforming. In fact, because the different layers of the hierarchical organization can be clearly defined, one might conclude that the DoD values centralized leadership-driven problem solving methodology over decentralized innovation and thus confines itself to linear communication. However, the Secretary of Defense clearly expects his organization to succeed in Transformation. So the military’s senior leadership believes that the defense workforce possesses the requisite innovative qualities of a learning and highly complex adaptive organization. Others have also made a case that the U.S. military already exhibits the qualities necessary to meet emerging challenges associated with uncertainty surrounding transformational change. These optimists believe the military will allow rapid administrative changes to occur in order to facilitate rapid organizational adaptation, both inside the Pentagon as well as in the Combatant Commands.

As the Secretary of Defense has stated, transformation is more about people and changing our way of thinking. But why is it taking so long for transformation to occur? Is it because the published guidance does not adequately address the human aspect of transformation? Or is it because humans by their very nature resist change? When Admiral Bill Owens became the vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff during 1994 - 1996, many of the changes he initiated were met with stiff resistance. He wrote a book that explained why the U.S. armed forces needed to transform and undergo a “Revolution in Military Affairs.” He also documented his experiences while implementing the changes that he felt were necessary in order to overcome the inertia that existed in the DoD. Throughout his
time as the vice chairman, he emphasized the need to leverage the synergy available when the efforts of the Service Components were combined, both in military operations as a joint force, as well as in technology development and materiel acquisition. However, Service parochialism was an ever-present thorn in his side. Sometimes the transformation changes he sought to make were stifled due to some parties’ inability to dismiss outdated requirements associated with extinct foes or enemy tactics that were no longer extant. This same mind-set prompted some Services to develop equipment that on the surface appeared to be exactly the same as other Services’ equipment. Yet, upon closer scrutiny, the equipment had subtle differences that were cited as necessary to accomplish Service-specific missions.

Technologies were developed within the Services to enable their military organizations to accomplish their missions on their own. For example, U.S. Naval ships were designed to conduct autonomous operations world-wide to defeat deep-water threats and protect U.S. national interests abroad without the aid of U.S. Army ground troops, Marines or Air Force platforms. At the same time, U.S. Army ground units were equipped to communicate with other U.S. Army ground units using complementary modern systems designed for horizontal and vertical communications. Through a liaison officer, the Army could also communicate with U.S. Air Force systems, but could not communicate directly with U.S. Marines on land or in the air. Nor could they communicate directly with U.S. Navy ships or jets using organic equipment because there was no formally stated requirement to do so. In a Joint Operation, however, all military forces assigned to a Combatant Commander need to have the same organic computers and communication technology in order to successfully operate in the same battlespace with other Service Components.

The time, space and distance between our Service Components in battle are becoming as compressed and constrained as the communications spectrum that supports the military operations. There is not enough band-width or funding to support everyone’s requirement; therefore, measures must be taken to conserve and pool the Services’ collective resources in order to deliver equipment designed to operate in a joint combat environment. To do that, many of the current paradigms in the U.S. armed forces may have to be redefined.

Since the prospects for Transformation have a lot to do with people’s attitudes, the next generation of military officers may be just the right group to carry out the task of transforming to a joint-based organization. The so-called new Millennial officers, or the generation following Generation Xers, have many qualities that indicate they may be less inherently parochial, more adaptive and receptive to serious joint thinking and action. While Generation X may tend to be cynical, the Millennial generation tend to more upbeat or positive in their outlook on life. They
are team players, get along with authority, and are undisturbed by the more controlled or restrictive environment of increased security and monitoring since the U.S. was attacked on 11 September 2000. An organization that successfully adapts to change needs people and leaders with these open, adaptive qualities.

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Military transformation will enable the U.S. Armed Forces to achieve broad and sustained competitive advantage in the 21st century. It comprises those activities that anticipate and create the future by coevolving concepts, processes, organizations, and technologies to produce new sources of military power. The transformation of our armed forces will dramatically increase our strategic and operational responsiveness, speed, reach, and effectiveness, making our forces increasingly precise, lethal, tailorable, agile, survivable, and more easily sustainable.

—Military Transformation Vision for the Department of Defense

REQUIREMENTS PROCESS

According to the Transformation Planning Guidance, the Secretary of Defense, with the advice of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, is responsible for determining resource apportionment. The advocates for transformational requirements are the Commander, Joint Forces Command and the Director, Objective Force Task Force. However, the Service Secretaries are in charge of submitting their Transformational Roadmaps which show their plans to build the capabilities necessary for executing the joint operating concepts and fund their particular programs. Therefore, component-specific programs will still exist in this process, but the Services must show how they are supporting joint-based requirements. Combatant Commanders can insure future systems are designed to operate in a joint environment by documenting and either submitting their Capabilities Requirement Document to the Joint Requirements Oversight Council or to a Service Component for inclusion in the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System process. An example and possible model: the U.S. Joint Forces Command J-8’s advocacy of the Combatant Commander’s requirements to the DoD through the Joint Requirements Oversight Council.

In addition to being the principal organization responsible for determining policy for the many defense-related acquisition programs and being the Milestone Decision Authority for the highest acquisition category programs in DoD, the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology and Logistics) is heavily involved in the DoD Transformation effort. The office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology and Logistics) coordinates the following
Transformation Tasks: Developing Multinational Transformation Recommendations, Achieving Interoperability Priorities, Promoting Rapid Acquisition of Transformational Programs, Conducting Joint Test and Evaluation, Appraising Strategic Transformation. These tasks surely indicate that the joint-based process is deeply embedded in the military acquisition procedures at the highest organization level.

MILITARY ACQUISITION

DoD acquisition regulations (DoD 5000 Series) were recently re-written, only to be cancelled and revised. The Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System instructions and manual were written in accord with the DoD 5000 regulations to insure they were consistent regarding acquisition. The changes introduced by the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) documents include:

- Enhanced methodology to identify and to describe capabilities gaps
- Earlier engagement of the acquisition community
- Better definition of non-materiel aspects of materiel solutions
- Prioritized capability gaps and proposals
- Improved coordination with other departments and agencies
- Broader mandated review of capability proposals

Together, the DoD 5000 series and the JCIDS documents have impacted the acquisition process by specifically directing that evolutionary acquisition is the preferred strategy for rapid acquisition of mature technology, and that spiral development is the preferred process. They also replace requirements documents with capability documents.

As mentioned previously, military acquisition policies provide safeguards against Service parochialism and assurances that the Joint Staff is in control of the requirements process. For example, the decision authority for the more expensive joint systems resides with either the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology and Logistics) or the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence. DoD 5000 regulations also prevent Joint Programs from being terminated or having their funding cut more than 50% without approval by Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology and Logistics) or the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence depending on the program designation. The Joint Staff, J-8, Deputy Director for Joint Warfighting Capability Assessments, also referred to as the “Gatekeeper,” has been given the responsibility of assigning a Joint Potential Designator of “JROC Interest,” “Joint Impact,” “Joint Integration,” or “Independent” to certain program documents. This designation specifies JCIDS
validation, approval and interoperability expectations. So, the joint community is now able to review all new requirements and assess their potential for joint application.

JOINT FORCES

Doctrinally, the term “acquisition” is defined on two levels: One level refers to a subset of military logistics support of joint operations and is mostly focused on the near term or day-to-day procurement actions. So this is largely a J-4 area of responsibility. However, the J-8 staff within the U.S. Joint Forces Command is involved in a second more broad acquisition process to insure joint requirements are integrated across the spectrum of forces available to a Combatant Commander. For clarity, this latter form of acquisition is defined as a Joint Acquisition Program when it is a directed joint effort for the development and procurement of systems, subsystems, equipment, software, or munitions as well as supporting equipment or systems. Its goal is to provide a new or improved capability for a validated joint need. Certain modification programs may be included when they are determined to be of significant interest or priority to the participating services.

Though joint force headquarters, other than U.S. Special Operations Command, do not actually develop and acquire systems, they are heavily involved in the requirements process. The U.S. Joint Forces Command has been specifically tasked to participate in and undertake significant missions associated with the current DoD Transformation. U.S. Joint Forces Command is the approval authority on one, the lead on eight, and a coordinating organization on eleven of the 29 Transformation Tasks. The Commander, Joint Forces Command (C-JFC) and other Combatant Commanders are responsible for developing joint warfighting requirements, conducting joint concept development and experimentation and developing specific joint concepts assigned by Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. C-JFC is responsible for coordinating concept development and experimentation efforts of the Combatant Commands. C-JFC is also responsible for concept development and experimentation on Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff-directed joint concepts and other joint concepts. C-JFC integrates the results from these and other Combatant Commanders’ experiments and then recommends to the Joint Chiefs of Staff modifications to existing joint concepts. The C-JFC is also responsible for a joint transformation roadmap to achieve joint capabilities required by joint concepts.

PROPOSAL AND RECOMMENDATION
It is not the strongest of the species that survive, nor the most intelligent, but the one most responsive to change.

—Charles Darwin

At the current evolutionary phase of defense acquisitions, two viable options have emerged for enabling our military forces to effectively support our national security objectives: First, integrate Program Executive Offices into a joint headquarters organization. Or second, establish a Joint Acquisition Executive within the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff organization.

PROPOSAL OF PROGRAM EXECUTIVE OFFICES IN A JOINT HEADQUARTERS

The Secretary of Defense’s guidance on Transformation specifies four pillars whose stability is necessary to insure the goals of the Quadrennial Defense Review are accomplished. The fourth pillar is designated “Developing Transformational Capabilities”; the acquisition community has a huge responsibility for constructing this pillar of the transformation model. One way to insure the materiel developer is delivering the correct solution to the warfighter is to integrate the developer into the same joint warfighting organization that he is supporting. If the need is being developed by a joint warfighter or the goal is to insure all Services can benefit from the materiel solution, then acquisition professionals should be part of the warfighter’s council that determines what capabilities will be developed.

One method to insure synergy between the organizations desiring to rapidly conceive, develop, and acquire solutions to joint warfighting needs is to structure the joint command to include the materiel developer as part of their organization, possibly at the Program Executive Officer level. For example, Program Executive Offices could be incorporated in the same manner as the component commands currently support the U.S. Joint Forces Command. The Army Forces Command, Marine Forces Atlantic, U.S. Atlantic Fleet, and Air Combat Command currently support U.S. Joint Forces Command with troops and equipment. Similarly, Joint Program Executive Officers could be assigned responsibility for procuring joint materiel for U.S. Joint Forces Command similar to the way weapons systems, equipment, and materiel are acquired for U.S. Special Operations Command. These Joint Program Executive Offices could also coordinate directly with the several other commands being integrated by U.S. Joint Forces Command that focus on specific knowledge areas important to the continued transformation of the U.S. military, like the Joint Warfighting Center and the Joint Battle Center.
PROPOSAL OF A JOINT ACQUISITION EXECUTIVE

In order to insure joint requirements are more efficiently and effectively incorporated into the acquisition process, the current Program Executive Office structure within the Component Services should eventually be collapsed and placed under the control of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. A civilian executive from the Senior Executive Service could be appointed as the Joint Acquisition Executive, and his military deputy would be rotated between the Service Chiefs on the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Program Executive Officers would be either two- or three-star flag officers or Senior Executive Service civilians, and the number of Program Managers for each Program Executive Office should be determined based on the need for unique families of equipment. Managers of platform systems should control the system configuration and insure system integration. Service specific programs should begin either consolidating with “like” systems in a joint program office or phase out of the acquisition system as the armed forces become more joint in nature.

ANALYSIS

The first proposal for integrating Program Executive Offices into the U.S. Joint Forces Command, modeled on U.S. Special Operations Command’s acquisition and logistics organization, offers the most logical near-term solution to insure Combatant Commanders’ joint warfighting needs are rapidly converted into materiel systems. The current process allows the Combatant Commander to communicate his requirements only to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Then the process will either designate a service, or a lead service as part of a joint program, to begin developing the materiel solution. While this new process does insure that jointness is at least considered for all new solutions, still a decision layer could be avoided if the Commander, U.S. Joint Forces Command assumed ownership of the entire process. If the U.S. Joint Forces Command were staffed with an acquisition workforce that could provide advice from concept initiation through its development and fielding, there would be no need to look elsewhere for solutions to the joint warfighter’s need. This would especially be true if all Services began using the same equipment. Along with the commodity areas already mentioned as candidates for joint procurement, maritime equipment is also an area that spans more than one Service (Navy and Army).

In addition to managing the larger programs that satisfy the Combatant Commander’s requirement, like fighter jets or aircraft carriers, a Joint Forces Command acquisition and logistics organization could make great strides in developing and acquiring technology designed for horizontal integration into the larger joint-systems as well as within each of the Services.
Communications and computers utilize technologies that all of the Services are developing through Joint Program organizations. There are very real issues to solving integration challenges both within and among the Services. If the U.S. Joint Forces Command were properly staffed and organized to begin developing the new requirements in these two areas into integrated joint concepts and materiel solutions, this joint initiative would insure platforms could communicate and information could be shared in a joint environment. If U.S. Joint Forces Command assumed authority of such issues at their level, they could insure the essential concepts identified by Combatant Commanders would be satisfied and (at least initially) insulated from priorities above U.S. Joint Forces Command level. At the genesis of identifying required capabilities, the desires of the DoD or Service Secretary are simply not relevant to the requirements of the joint-warfighter. Such requirements should be determined at the joint level—not by the participating Services, and not by the hierarchical superiors.

Significant political, procedural, and cultural barriers would be breached with this proposal. An acquisition program brings in money and jobs to whatever organization is managing the system development. The federal government, as well as state and local politicians, will likely balk at any consolidation actions, much like the reaction to base realignment planning and activities: The consolidation of over 25 Program Executive Office organizations across the Services currently commanded at the one- and two-star level is a major undertaking. The planning, programming, and budgeting system would be impacted by an all-joint acquisition process. Also, years of experience with certain technologies reside at specific geographic locations and are embedded in deep-rooted organizational cultures. Some of these factors may require that U.S. Forces Command’s acquisition and logistics organizations would be consolidated at various locations across the United States—and therefore managed in a distributive manner. This could prove challenging for managers, but certainly not insurmountable. Indeed this distributed concept is being practiced today inside the government as well as in commercial industry. The issues of Service parochialism and the reactionary attitude of “we’ve never done it that way before” are also huge barriers to this sort of change. But these too can be overcome as we have learned from Admiral Owens’ proactive experience.

From a perspective of natural progression, the more logical, long-term, proposal is to provide the Joint Chiefs of Staff with a Component Acquisition Executive. Joint warfighting is increasingly the U.S. military’s way of conducting war. However, compatibility issues still exist between systems in the joint battlespace. The military’s highest leaders are mandating that the Services think and act jointly during the current transformation effort, and this emphasis has begun manifesting itself in the acquisition process: In addition to the establishment of some
Joint Program Offices, all warfighting requirements must now percolate through a process that at least considers whether or not the solution will have merit in one or more Services. The joint requirements process, even if the requirement is not joint, will also determine which Service has the lead on developing the materiel solution. That decision alone is significant because of the second- and third-order effects of which Service Component receives funding and personnel, in addition to designating who has lead on developing joint solutions. There is also the legal issue—or how law is interpreted relative to Service Roles, Functions and Missions.

CONCLUSION

The entire acquisition process begins with an approved set of capability requirements. Every aspect of the acquisition program is based on this set of requirements, which seeks agreement among all stakeholders on the needs of the warfighter. Since recent changes in the DoD 5000 series and Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System place the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the driver’s seat with respect to the requirements process, it is now also necessary to create a Joint Acquisition Executive to make acquisition decisions at the joint staff level. If the military does complete its transition into a truly joint force where effects matter more than historical precedent on which system or what Service accomplishes missions in the battlespace, then some organization needs to be in a position of authority to integrate requirements, concepts, and materiel acquisition throughout the lifecycle of a joint system. A Joint Acquisition Executive could perform all these functions. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, a military component of the DoD, has now been given the responsibility for developing the requirements and concepts. Therefore, it is time for that Component to take complete ownership of the joint acquisition process by incorporating a Joint Acquisition Executive into their organization.

WORD COUNT= 5,706
ENDNOTES


7 Eligibility for Consideration for Promotion: Joint Duty Assignment Required Before Promotion to General or Flag Grade; Exceptions, U.S. Code, Title 10, subtitle A, Part II, Chapter 36, Subchapter II, sec. 619a [database on-line]; available from Legal Information Institute; accessed 15 December 2003.


9 Ibid., 7.


13 DoD5000.2 Instruction dated 12 May 2003 on page 1 defines DoD Components as: The Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Military Departments, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Joint Staff), the Combatant Commands, the Office of the Inspector General of the Department of Defense, the Defense Agencies, DoD Field Activities, and all other organizational entities within the Department of Defense. *DoD5000 Terms and Definitions* defines the DoD.
Component Acquisition Executive (CAE) as Secretaries of the Military Departments or Heads of Agencies with the power of redelegation. In the Military Departments, the officials delegated as CAEs (also called Service Acquisition Executives (SAEs)) are respectively, the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology) (ASA(AL&T)), the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research, Development and Acquisition) (ASN(RD&A)), and the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Acquisition) (ASAF(A)). The CAEs are responsible for all acquisition functions within their Component. This includes both the SAEs for the Military Departments and acquisition executives in other DoD Components, such as the U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) and Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), who also have acquisition management responsibilities.

14 Paparone, Anderson, and McDaniel on page 339 of their work define a highly complex adaptive organization as one “where knowledge-sharing, individual and team competence, and ethical reasoning are most valued.” Peter M. Senge on page 3 of his book The Fifth Discipline: The Art and Practice of the Learning Organization defines a learning organization as “where people continually expand their capacity to create the results they truly desire, where new and expansive patterns of thinking are nurtured, where collective aspiration is set free, and where people are continually learning how to learn together.”

15 Paparone, Anderson, and McDaniel on page 339 of their work define a hierarchical organization as one that tends to be more linear in its methodology and communication, less adaptive to a rapidly changing environment, and looks to its leadership before taking action.

16 Rumsfeld, Transformation Planning Guidance.


18 Noonan and Lewis, 33.


21 Owens, 15-17.


23 Rumsfeld, Transformation Planning Guidance, 4.

24 Ibid., 13-14.
Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System*, Joint Instruction 3170.01C (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 24 June 2003), B-5.

William P. Mclaughlin <william.mclaughlin@jfcom.mil>, "Acquisition at JFCOM," electronic mail message to Theodore L. Jennings <theodore.jennings@us.army.mil>, 8 December 2003.


U.S. Department of Defense. *Glossary: Defense Acquisition Acronyms and Terms*. Fort Belvoir, Virginia: Defense Acquisition University, Center for Program Management, 11th Edition, September 2003. *Evolutionary Acquisition (EA)*: The preferred DoD strategy for rapid acquisition of mature technology for the user. An evolutionary approach delivers capability in increments, recognizing up front the need for future capability improvements. *Spiral Development*: In this process, a desired capability is identified, but the end-state requirements are not known at program initiation. Requirements are refined through demonstration, risk management and continuous user feedback. Each increment provides the best possible capability, but the requirements for future increments depend on user feedback and technology maturation. According to DoDD 5000.1, spiral development is the preferred process for executing an EA strategy. In general, the Initial Capabilities Document (ICD) replaces a Mission Needs Statement (MNS) pre-Milestone A; the Operational Requirements Document (ORD) has been replaced by the Capability Development Documents (CDDs) and Capability Production Documents (CPDs).


Ibid., 36.

Joint Chiefs of Staff. *Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System*, A-11.


William P. Mclaughlin <william.mclaughlin@jfcom.mil>, "Acquisition at JFCOM," electronic mail message to Theodore L. Jennings <theodore.jennings@us.army.mil>, 8 December 2003.


38 Ibid., 12-13.


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