THE CHIEF, NATIONAL GUARD BUREAU HAS DIRECTED
NGB AND THE 54 STATES AND TERRITORIES TO
TRANSFORM THEIR CURRENT HEADQUARTERS
STRUCTURES INTO A JOINT FORCES HEADQUARTERS.

by

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The Chief, National Guard Bureau has Directed NGB and the 54 States and Territories to Transform Their Current Headquarters Structures into a Joint Force Headquarters

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Abstract

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ABSTRACT

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On May 18, 2003, Lieutenant General H. Steven Blum, the Chief of the National Guard Bureau directed the 54 state and territorial Adjutants General (TAGs) to transform their current headquarters structure from three separate headquarters of State, Army and Air Guard to one Joint Forces Headquarters (JFHQ). LTG Blum told the TAGs that he would lead by example and directed the National Guard Bureau (NGB) to transform into a Joint Force Headquarters as well.

The purpose of this transformation was two fold, first to make the National Guard headquarters very similar to an active component (AC) joint headquarters, and secondly, to expand the availability of joint positions for Reserve Component (RC) officers. The current headquarters of NGB and those within the 54 states and territories have both Army and Air Guard personnel working within them but they are not considered joint. Recently, the Office of Secretary of Defense has, as part of its mandate from the Goldwater-Nichols Reorganization Act of 1986, updated Department of Defense directives to encourage RC officers to meet similar AC joint requirements for promotion to general or flag ranks.

This paper covers the significant DOTMLPF implications that are brought about by this transformation.
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THE NATIONAL GUARD IS MEETING THE CHALLENGE OF "JOINT" REQUIREMENTS THROUGH THE CONSOLIDATION OF ITS STATE, ARMY AND AIR GUARD HEADQUARTERS INTO ONE JOINT FORCES HEADQUARTERS.

Lieutenant General (LTG) H. Steven Blum, the Chief, National Guard Bureau (CNGB), at a Pentagon press conference on Friday, 16 May 2003, announced that the role of the National Guard would transform to meet the new challenges facing our world today. He stated,

“So we will transform the National Guard, both the Air National Guard and the Army National Guard, to be a joint team, a team with the five other services—the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, the Marine Corps, the Coast Guard—and the seven Reserve components, so that the citizens of our great nation get the best of all of their capabilities and the effects that a joint team can produce.”

This paper will focus on the implications the transformation will have on the National Guard. The transformation from its current headquarters to a joint force headquarters (JFHQ) will have profound affects on the National Guard Bureau (NGB) and the 54 states and territories. LTG Blum wants to ensure that the National Guard of the 54 states and territories, along with NGB, remains a ready and relevant force to defend our nation against emerging threats whether deployed overseas or here at home. LTG Blum sees the National Guard continuing to answer the call for both federal and state missions. The Army National Guard (ARNG) and Air National Guard (ANG) whether assigned under 10 USC or 32 USC, must continue to be that citizen-soldier prepared for any assignment whether they are deployed in support of homeland security or to a geographic or functional combatant command.

LTG Blum outlined two benefits that will come about as a result of this transformation. The first benefit that will come from forming a single joint force headquarters will be to allow our citizen-soldiers to train as they fight, which is now more than ever as a member of a joint team. Training as they fight will provide a greater opportunity for a seamless transition from citizen-soldier to warfighter with little or no notice. This training and experience our citizen-soldiers will receive working in a joint headquarters will provide a foundation for understanding their roles. This understanding is necessary because the Department of Defense (DOD) is increasing National Guard deployments that involve joint assignments.

In this paper, the term "National Guard" will include members of the ARNG and ANG of the United States as defined in 10 USC 10105, 10107, 10110, 10112 and 32 USC 101. The sections of 10 USC define the ARNG and ANG of the United States as members of the Reserve Component of the Army or Air Force, respectively, whether on active federal service or not. Under 32 USC the National Guard means, "the ARNG and the ANG who are a land force and/or
an air force, respectively, who are trained and whose officers are appointed under the sixteenth clause of Section 8, Article I, of the U.S. Constitution.\(^9\)

This paper will look at the purpose for the National Guard transformation into the JFHQ and its impact on the states and NGB. To better understand the impacts, this paper will expound on the implications using doctrine, organization, training, material, leadership, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF) format. DOTMLPF is a joint term used to identify the domains within which capabilities are developed in response to guidance and operational needs. This guidance and operational needs are identified in our national strategies and visions.\(^10\)

**BACKGROUND**

In the previously referenced press conference LTG Blum indicated that the purpose for transforming the National Guard was to increase its "joint" capability. Right now, the National Guard at the state level has a separate headquarters within each of the 54 states and territories. Along with this state headquarters there is also a separate headquarters for the ARNG and ANG. At the federal level, NGB is comprised of some eleven organizational elements that form its headquarters.\(^11\) Two of these elements are the ARNG and the ANG which have their separate, but equal headquarters. These ARNG and ANG elements have very similar structures to an Army or Air Force headquarters. Neither of these operates as a joint headquarters even though there are both Army and Air Guard personnel assigned to various positions within them. LTG Blum's vision is to consolidate these headquarters into one JFHQ so they resemble an active component joint command and control headquarters. His vision is to integrate other Reserve Component (RC) personnel into them as well.\(^12\)

After LTG Blum met with the Adjutants General (TAGs) at their annual conference he indicated that they were very receptive to the JFHQ plan. In fact, Major General Robert Lee of Hawaii indicated that because he had served in the Army Reserve [and now commands the Hawaii National Guard] he could easily transform his headquarters.\(^13\) NGB is not the higher headquarters to the National Guard of any state. Therefore, the CGNB had to sell his vision to TAGs who, if they concurred would have to implement this vision. By virtue of the Militia Act of 1792, TAGs, are by law, the senior National Guard official within the state or territory with command authority over state forces.\(^14\) LTG Blum provided the TAGs great latitude to develop their respective JFHQ based on the uniqueness of their state.\(^15\)

A lesser-known fact regarding the National Guard is that there are two entities. There is the Army and Air National Guard of the United States and the Army and Air National Guard of
The differences between these two National Guards are the administrative, fiscal, and legal authorities of their members. The National Guard of the United States is composed of members who work for the NGB, DOD, Services, or other federal agencies. For administrative, fiscal, and legal authority these officers are governed under 10 USC also referred to as Title 10 status. The National Guard of the Several States is composed of members who belong to the ARNG and ANG within a state or territory. 32 USC governs these members and the states provide administrative, fiscal, and legal authority over them. This is referred to as Title 32 status. Officers who are on Title 32 status can transfer to Title 10 status when mobilized and subsequently federalized by the President.

There are other differences between ARNG and ANG officers of the United States and of the Several States. The differences are based on whether they are on full-time status or traditional status. Full-time status includes Active Guard/Reserve (AGR) and federal technician. An AGR officer is employed on a duty status almost identical to AC officers. These officers are provided the same pay and allowances at the appropriate rank and time in grade as their AC counterparts. A traditional ARNG or ANG officer, however; has all the same rights and privileges of their AGR or AC counterparts, but normally perform their military duty one weekend every month and two weeks every year. In other words a traditional ARNG or ANG officer has outside employment on a full-time basis and performs military duty on a part-time basis. ARNG and ANG officers working within NGB, DOD, or other federal agencies are on AGR status. The ARNG and ANG officers working on Title 32 status can fall into one of three categories. These categories are traditional, AGR, and federal technician. Officers who are on AGR or traditional drill status have the same issues mentioned previously. Those officers who are federal technicians must be a member of the Army or Air National Guard of the several states as traditional status officers, but are employed full-time within the ARNG or ANG of their state. The full-time position to which a federal technician is assigned within the ARNG or ANG must be compatible with the 32 USC 709 and federal technician guidelines.

Prior to explaining the DOTMLPF implications of this transformation another important implication not covered in the DOTMLPF domains must be addressed. That is funding. There are three implications of funding for the JFHQ. The first is, the current Program Objective Memorandum (POM) only identifies within a Service budget, funding for their appropriate Table of Distribution and Allowances (TDA), Modified Table of Organization and Equipment (MTOE), or Unit Manning Document (UMD). The second is, who is the identified executive agent that will provide administrative and resource funding for the JFHQ. The final implication is whom ever is
the executive agent will provide funding for their appropriate Service personnel and equipment, however; the other Services, such as, the Army, Air Force, Marine, or Navy Reserve, will have to provide funding to the executive agent for their appropriate manpower and equipment within the JFHQ.

The National Guard at the state and territory level are funded and equipped through a United States Property and Fiscal Office (USPFO). A Property and Fiscal Officer who is on Title 10 status oversees the USPFO. There are two primary functions of the USPFO. The first is receiving federal dollars for pay and allowances of all AGRs, federal technicians, and traditional officers. The second function is to receive and distribute federal property. Because of the Title 10 status of the Property and Fiscal Officer, the USPFO does not fall directly under the TAG or other element of the JFHQ. Therefore these primary functions of the USPFO will overlap with the J-1 and J-4 staff functions. They cannot be separated from the USPFO unless there are changes to 10 USC and other regulations.

DOCTRINE

The National Guard has changed rapidly in order to implement the JFHQ at the NGB and State level. NGB was given an IOC date of 1 July 2003, while the states were given an IOC date of 1 October 2003. The operation of a joint staff will be something new for most states; however, the issue of planning and executing operations with both Air and Army National Guard personnel is not. State headquarters, and even NGB, have performed staff functions with both Army and Air Guard personnel assigned to them. The term "joint," as defined by Joint Pub 1-02, "Connotes activities, operations, organizations, etc., in which elements of two or more Military Departments participate." 18 Although these organizations appear to meet this definition these staffs do not operate using joint doctrine.

Within NGB there are organizations that are similar to Department of the Army organizations, such as, the Counterdrug Division, Homeland Security Office, and the Division of Military Support that have both Army and Air Guard personnel working side by side. The NGB is currently rewriting its NGB Memorandum 10-5/38-101, Organizations and Functions of the National Guard Bureau. This memorandum will provide NGB with a manual that will cover organizational structure and "how to operate." The states do not have this same type of document. The only guidance given to the states was to use the J-1 through J-8 construct for their joint staff. The states are now left with defining their JFHQ without the assistance from formal doctrine.
Within the states, transformation from three headquarters into a JFHQ provides them with an opportunity to learn what a joint staff is and to study the appropriate doctrine associated with joint operations. The states' JFHQ will have to familiarize themselves with the entire series of Joint Publications. This will improve the citizen-soldiers experience with joint concepts and operations to better prepare them for joint assignments in the future. With this new consolidation, state headquarters will train on joint staff duties and responsibilities and in the future be capable of forming a joint task force when responding to state missions.

**ORGANIZATION**

There are four issues when looking at the transformation of the JFHQ regarding organization. The first issue is guidance by NGB to the states to use the J-1 through J-8 joint staff construct without prior approval. The second issue is how to document the positions within the JFHQ with both Army and Air National Guard personnel. The third issue is the filling of these documented positions with either full-time or drill status personnel. The final issue is whether the organizational construct will meet the definition of "joint matters" per 10 USC.

The first issue is to determine the type of construct to be used for the JFHQ at both the NGB and state level. To transform the National Guard headquarters NGB must receive approval from OSD. Also, the NGB indicated in their Transformation Planning Guidance that they are seeking guidance from the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) for their JFHQ construct because of its joint staff functions. NGB decided that the JFHQ would start with the basic construct of a joint staff with a J-1 through J-8. Although guidance was provided for the joint staff portion of the JFHQ, NGB did not constrain the states to further develop their headquarters. Each state has its own uniqueness and subsequently there could be 54 different JFHQ constructs. The NGB will have to consolidate these into a common JFHQ construct and seek guidance from JCS and then approval from OSD. This will probably take some time, but the issue is whether OSD will concur with NGB's proposed JFHQ construct. The implication here is that it could take several iterations between JCS and OSD for final approval of a JFHQ. Meanwhile, the states are implementing their construct without additional guidance. Hopefully, once the basic construct for the JFHQ is developed and approved it will document the entire organization using a Joint Table of Distribution (JTD).

The second issue, as described in the NGB JFHQ-ST Transformation Guidance, provides the states with a concept on how to develop a JTD that would establish the requirements for an organizational structure. The JTD is the authorization document for the states and NGB will use to identify positions within the JFHQ. The TAG has the latitude to fill
JFHQ staff positions with personnel from the ARNG, ANG, the other Reserve forces, and federal, state, and local government agencies. The J-1 will form the JTD through the consolidation of both the Army’s Table of Distribution and Allowances (TDA) and the Unit Manning Documents (UMD). The TDA is used to document Army specific spaces, while the UMD is used for Air Force spaces. The Navy, Marine, and Coast Guard spaces will be documented through their appropriate manning documents. There is no guidance on how to document spaces on the JFHQ for the federal, state, and local government agencies. Once all the states have completed their JTDs, they will send them to NGB, who will consolidate them into one JTD called a Joint Concept Plan (JCP). This JCP will be forwarded to the JCS J-1 for review and comment.22

The third issue regarding the JFHQ transformation has to do with the selection of positions to be filled with either full-time or traditional drill status personnel. The state personnel office must conduct an assessment of each position to determine if the position should be filled with full-time or drill status personnel. Because there are two types of full-time, as well as, traditional drill status personnel there are considerations that must be addressed. Some of the considerations are; the function of the position, the work load of the position, and the compatibility of grade of the position with the appropriate federal technician rating. The National Guard Regulation 600-5, The Active Guard/Reserve (AGR) Program Title 32, Full-Time National Guard Duty (FTGND) will be used to explain the function of the position consideration. Per NGR 600-5 an AGR officer is not authorized to perform state emergency missions such as Military Support to Civil Authorities (MSCA) unless they are part of a unit that is activated by the Governor or they are assigned to a specific MSCA TDA, MTOE, or UMD position. Currently, only the Plans, Operations and Military Support Office has the TDA, MTOE, or UMD positions where officers may perform Military Support to Civil Authorities (MSCA) type functions. Therefore, the manning documents of the JFHQ must specifically identify those MSCA positions within the TDA, MTOE and UMD. Positions such as a J-1, J-3, or J-5/7 are traditionally the busiest positions within an AC joint staff. Thus these positions must be filled with either an AGR or federal technician so that someone is there full-time. Further, under federal technician guidelines the rank of an officer must be commensurate with the General Schedule (GS) rating. As an example, a position identified as a GS-13 position should be filled with an officer who holds the rank of Lieutenant Colonel or Colonel. Therefore, a position on the joint staff must be filled with an officer whose duties and responsibilities are commensurate with the appropriate GS position. Also, the federal technicians have a union that has additional power to determine their position within the joint staff.
The last issue looks at the positions within the JFHQ to see if they meet the "joint matters" definition. To be a joint position on the JTD, positions will be assigned on either the Joint Duty Assignment List (JDAL) or Joint Duty Assignment Reserve (JDA-R). The JDAL positions are only applicable to officers on Title 10 status assigned to NGB and those coming from the other RCs. The JDA-R is for officers on Title 32 status assigned within the state JFHQ. The assignment of a position to be "joint" or not on the JTD is based on emerging changes to DOD instructions. These changes are outlined in DODI 1215.20 and affect the Joint Duty Assignment-Reserve list. The JDA-R billets will be assigned in one of three categories. The first category is a joint position that does not require JPME Phase 1. The second category is a joint position where JPME Phase 1 is required, and the third is a critical JDA-R position where JPME Phase 2 is required. JPME Phase 1 is completed if you are a captain or major and attended Command and General Staff College. Phase 1 for lieutenant colonels and higher is completed if you attended a senior service college or its equivalent. JPME Phase 2 is the three-month advance JPME level course given at the Joint Armed Forces College. The DOD has developed a Distance Learning Education JPME Phase 2 course for Reserve officers who cannot get away from their civilian employment to attend the three-month AC course.

Under the JDA-R a position is considered joint if, "...the occupant shall be involved in the integrated employment or support of land, sea, or air forces, ..." This indicates that a position within the JFHQ would have to allow the officer to employ or support the employment of forces. NGB is not a command and control headquarters like Forces Command (FORSCOM), and Joint Forces Command (JFCOM). Because NGB only has "channel of communications" responsibilities to the state National Guard forces there are three options that would change this for NGB. The first would be make NGB a link in the chain of command so that it can have command and control of forces much like combatant commands, FORSCOM, or designated Joint Task Forces. The second option could be to move NGB under NORTHCOM and be a Joint Force Headquarters-National Guard. This will allow NGB to perform its "channel of communications" function and take Tactical Command of National Guard forces mobilized for Homeland Security missions. The last option would be to merge NGB with NORTHCOM's Joint Task Force-Civil Support (JTF-CS). These last two options are probably the most realistic in that the National Guard is moving more into the homeland security realm that are overwhelmingly similar to the state missions National Guard forces perform now. These three options would require not only changes to 10 USC, but to regulations and the National Guard culture as well. Although these options are very controversial at best they will in the end meet the goal of the CNGB to have the National Guard remain "ready and relevant" to our military.
TRAINING

New training on joint command and control as well as staff procedures are just the tip of the iceberg for the various elements of the JFHQ. These elements will have to train themselves first and then as an entire staff to be capable of performing the tasks, conditions, and standards required to successfully qualify as a joint staff.

Currently, there is no oversight to ensure NGB and state headquarters operate to an Army or Air Force standard. The state JFHQ will have to develop a working relationship with an AC joint staff, preferably one that the National Guard units may deploy under for Homeland Security missions. The JFHQ at NGB and the states should work in cooperation with the combatant commands they are apportioned to under the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP). The combatant command that NGB, the 48 States, and 3 of the 4 territories may be apportioned to is NORTHCOM. The state of Hawaii and the territory of Guam will develop their relationships with Pacific Command (PACOM). The state of Alaska has a unique issue in that its forces fall under PACOM, but the State itself is part of NORTHCOM’s area of responsibility. Hawaii’s JFHQ has begun to form an affiliation with elements of PACOM’s JTF-CS to develop joint plans for military assistance to civil authorities operations. NGB, along with the other 47 states and 3 territories, should have NORTHCOM to align themselves with an active component joint staff for training.

MATERIEL

Within the materiel portion of the DOTMLPF there are two issues that will have some impact on the consolidation of the three headquarters into a single JFHQ. The first issue is property accountability and resourcing of the joint staff. The second impact is the functionality of the USPFO.

Normally the structure of an Army headquarters element is based on one of two documents. These are the TDA and Modified Table of Organization and Equipment (MTOE). These documents are organized based on standards, rules, and guidance from the Department of the Army, force structure, and management organizations. They, in turn, develop doctrinally correct models of organizations that can be resourced properly. The TDA or MTOE is then resourced with authorized equipment for specific positions or staff elements. The Air Guard uses different titles for their documents, one of which is the UMD that assigns personnel and equipment to a headquarters. These documents are approved at the highest level within their respective Services. The impact that will affect the National Guard is taking these TDAs,
MTOEs, and UMDs and consolidating them into a JTD. The accountability of equipment will be established because it is assigned within the JTD.

LEADERSHIP AND EDUCATION

A part of LTG Blum's vision is the concept of improving the joint capabilities of National Guard officers. Although, 10 USC encourages officers to have joint assignments and education for promotion to general or flag rank, 32 USC does not require an officer to have any joint education or experience for promotion. Recently, DOD has made changes in their instructions regarding the joint education and experience of National Guard officers for promotion. LTG Blum wants to provide a venue for National Guard officers to receive joint experience through the JFHQ.

Since the Goldwater-Nichols Reorganization Act of 1986 (GNA) there have been few changes within DOD regarding joint assignment and education for RC. In the GNA Congress outlined specific requirements that AC officers must meet in order to be promoted to the general or flag rank. The RCs were not mentioned in the GNA until the end where it was identified that they would have to meet similar requirements in the future. The Secretary of Defense was charged in 10 USC 666 with, 'providing policy for the joint education and experience of the RC.' 31 In 2002, the DOD published DOD Instruction (DODI) 1215.20, titled Reserve Officer (RC) Joint Officer Management Program. This instruction required officers in the RC to meet joint education and assignment requirements if they wanted to be selected for Chief's positions of the RCs. Further, this instruction directed the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) to look at Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) Phase 2 requirements for RCs similar to those outlined in CJCS Instruction (CJCSI) 1800.01A Officer Professional Military Education Policy for RC officers. The CNGB, by transforming the National Guard into a JFHQ, will enhance the availability of National Guard officers to meet the joint assignment requirements now being developed by the OSD.

The JFHQ will, if approved, provide the joint positions that allow citizen-soldiers the opportunity to train as a part of a joint team. For a joint position to qualify as a joint duty assignment its duties and responsibilities must have three elements. First, the position must require the officer to work in the, "integrated employment or support" of forces. This would require the officer to work on a portion of the staff controls forces provided for operations. This can be done at the state JFHQ, as National Guard units are often mobilized and deployed for state disasters and when protection of critical infrastructure is required. A second element that qualifies a position as a joint assignment is that this position must afford the officer the
opportunity to integrate strategic and contingency planning. This person would develop strategic plans dealing with future force structure of the National Guard. This person would also develop plans for hurricane disaster response, flood disaster response, support to law enforcement agencies for civil disturbances and the like. The final required element within an officers duties and responsibilities to make this position a joint position is to work within an headquarters that provides strategic level integration of national military strategies and their impacts on National Guard and other RCs.

Most officers are not aware of the requirements to have joint education and experience for promotion above the rank of colonel. The CJCS is actively involved in the development and implementation of joint education and experience requirements for National Guard officers. These new joint requirements are not to burden the already difficult balance Title 32 officers face between their civilian employment and military career but to better prepare them for increasing mobilizations and deployments. Title 32 officers are now more than ever being mobilized and assigned into positions where joint training and education are necessary to assist in the seamless transition from the civilian employee to military staff officer. Thus, the DOD and the CJCS are trying to ensure that National Guard offices are, as much as possible, equal to their AC counterparts in the area of joint warfighting. It is only recently that RC officers have been encouraged to meet similar AC regulations for promotion to general or flag ranks. 10 USC 668, defines a joint duty assignment as an assignment where the officer, "...gains significant experience in joint matters..." The term "joint matters" is defined within the same code as, "...matters relating to the integrated employment of land, sea, and air forces, including matters relating to national military strategy; strategic planning and contingency planning; and command and control of combat operations under unified command."

In the AC, 10 USC establishes the procedures for the promotion of officers. More specifically, Title 10 USC 619a, establishes that all officers on the active-duty list considered for promotion to flag or general rank must have completed a full-tour at a joint assignment and met their JPME requirements. The RC officer promotion system was changed also. Per 10 USC 666, titled, Reserve Officers not on the active-duty list; the SECDEF must establish policies that require RC officers to have similar education and experience in joint matters in so far as is practical.

The DOD has also established further guidance on the promotion of RC officers to flag or general rank within DODI 1215.20. The DOD and the various other components of DOD were directed to identify RC positions within their commands and determine if they meet the "joint matters" definition to be placed on the JDA-R. This will provide RC officers with credit towards joint experience if assigned for the length established by DODI 1215.20. This DODI
1215.20 further requires RC officers to attend JPME Phase 1 or Phase 2 depending on if the listing of the position is a critical position on the JDA-R. DODI 1215.20 will credit RC officers with joint assignment credit if the position they are assigned is to be JDA-R positions. If they are full-time they will receive full credit in two years or if on drill status they will receive full credit if they hold the position for three years.\textsuperscript{43} This same model is being reviewed to provide National Guard officers joint assignment credit when assigned to JFHQ positions at the state level. First the JCS must approve the JDA-R consolidation under the Joint Manning Document (JMD) submitted by NGB.

**PERSONNEL**

There are two issues that the JFHQ will have on the personnel element of DOTMLPF. The first is the effect on the Joint Manpower Program (JMP) and the reassignment of personnel who do not have a position within the JFHQ.

The intent of CNGB’s vision for the JFHQ is to provide joint billets for ARNG, ANG, and the other RCs to gain joint experience. NGB is planning to request through OSD to JCS the approval of joint assignment positions for JFHQs within the NGB and states. This will allow ARNG, ANG, and the other RC officers to receive joint assignment credit. Under the CJCS Manual 1600.01, *Joint Manpower Program Procedures*, dated 30 April 1998, the number of joint manpower positions is a “zero sum” therefore, there are two ways to obtain joint positions.\textsuperscript{44} The first would require NGB to request additional joint billets through the JCS to OSD. If approved, OSD would have to authorize additional joint manpower positions to the already existing Joint Manpower Program allocation. The second would be the redistribution of existing joint positions from a Service or joint headquarters to NGB.\textsuperscript{45} It is going to be very difficult for the Services or the joint commands to give up any number of assigned joint positions to NGB.

Because NGB guidance did not allow additional manpower the NGB and states’ JFHQs will have unique considerations when filling positions with personnel. After the JFHQ manpower is complete excess personnel will be reassigned into the major subordinate commands under the JFHQ. There are two issues that must be addressed when moving personnel from one command to another with or without their consent. The first issue has to do with whether they are full-time. If so, there are union and compatibility issues that must be addressed, as explained earlier under the Organization domain. The second issue is that of compatibility. Each position must be justified by manpower surveys and requirement models to ensure they are selected based on efficiency and effectiveness.\textsuperscript{46} Not only must the positions be compatible to the headquarters staff element but also to the individual who is assigned within it. A staff
position that will be a full-time position can only be filled with a full-time person whose duties and responsibilities match that of the position. If they do not, the employees have certain rights and must be retrained or moved to a similar position that they held prior to the reorganization.

**FACILITIES**

At this point in the IOC of the JFHQ there does not seem to be any significant issues with facilities. There is sufficient space within a state headquarters to provide for the joint staff. Because many of the states will simply appoint an existing Army or Air National Guard officer with the additional duty to be part of the joint staff, there is no requirement to increase either the size or space within current HQ facilities.

**OTHER NON-DOTMLPF IMPLICATIONS**

The National Guard has two other issues that do not fall within the DOTMLPF domains. The first issue involves the executive agent for funding the JFHQ. The second issue pertains to the organization charged with the distribution of federal funding and property within the state or territory.

The funding for the JFHQ flows from Congress, DOD, Department of the Army and Air Force, to NGB, and then into the USPFO of each of the 54 states and territories. NGB’s guidance for transformation listed two constraints the first was no increase in manpower and the second was no increase in funding. The Service POMs have already been submitted for FY04 through FY09. Within each Service POM there are resources applied to headquarters based on each respective TDA, MTOE, or UMD. NGB must consolidate the TDAs, MTOEs, and UMDs into a JTD and then identify either the ARNG or ANG to be the executive agent for the JFHQ. Thus, the issue before the state is who is going to be the executive agent for the JFHQ. The executive agent will provide the preponderance of funding while the remaining Services will have to transfer funding to the executive agent Service. Once NGB gets approval for the JMD, which is the consolidation of the JTD and funding required, and the EDATE is met, NGB will deactivate the current headquarters systems and activate the new JFHQ. The NGB will work with the DOD to have a POM review to get JFHQ funding into the next POM cycle.

The USPFO has several functions within its structure that would come under different elements of the new JFHQ. Two of these functions are pay and allowance and the receiving and distribution of federal property. The USPFO is responsible for providing pay and allowances to the ARNG and ANG. This is also a J-1 manpower and personnel staff function. The second function of receiving and distributing federal property is a function of the USPFO but would be also fall within the J-4 logistics staff functions. The impact of separating the USPFO
and moving those elements under the appropriate joint staff function within the JFHQ would violate federal laws, one of which provides for the Property and Fiscal Officer to oversee the USPFO. Therefore, significant changes are required to 10 USC, 32 USC, DOD, Departments of the Army and Air Force, and NGB regulations to break up the USPFO. Perhaps it is time for the National Guard to identify and submit for approval all the required changes necessary.

CONCLUSION

The CNGB has a vision to change the command and control structure of NGB and State headquarters. LTG Blum indicated that he wants the National Guard to improve its joint warfighting capabilities by operating more like a joint military headquarters. To do this, the CNGB is requiring the 54 states and territories to consolidate their current structure of headquarters elements into one joint forces headquarters. The JFHQ will demonstrate the National Guard's commitment to remain "a ready and relevant force" for our nation when our military is deployed as an element of national power.

Our citizen-soldiers are deployed more frequently than before. These deployments are placing ARNG and ANG officers into joint staff assignments that require joint training and education. Along with these deployments changes made by DOD are also aiding the transformation of the National Guard. This transformation will require joint experience now more than ever before for our citizen-soldiers.

The JFHQ implementation will require extensive effort by all to develop the manpower and resourcing necessary. By doing it now we will avoid making piecemeal changes to the joint staff in the future. NGB has some additional issues that the states do not have. The states have the structure and forces to meet the "joint matters" definition, while NGB does not, so changes to NGB and/or Title 10 U.S. Code must occur. While the transformation goals of the CNGB will require many changes, Title 10 U.S. Code is just one of those. The NGB and the states will consolidate its headquarters and dual-hat staff personnel so that they must perform both their joint and service staff functions. This transformation will in the end meet the benefits outlined by the CNGB. Our citizen-soldiers will greatly increase their joint experience and gain a better understand of how our military conducts joint warfighting, while also creating a similar structure that is understood by all DOD components.

WORD COUNT= 5,975
ENDNOTES


2 Ibid.


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36 Ibid.


39 Ibid.


43 Ibid.

44 Joint Staff, *Joint Manpower Programs Procedures*, CJCSM 1600.01, (Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 30 April 1998), B-2.

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