STRENGTHENING FOREIGN POLICY THROUGH PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

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The views expressed in this academic research paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Government, the Department of Defense, or any of its agencies.

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In the aftermath of the Cold War and the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States of America is engaged in a major effort to inform and influence understanding of its foreign policy around the world. In this Strategy Research Project, we will examine how the United States formulates foreign policy, the strategy of public diplomacy, and how strengthening coordination of these two instruments of national power would enhance understanding of US foreign policy goals, and the enduring American values that inform that policy.
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STRENGTHENING FOREIGN POLICY THROUGH PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

The decision announced by the Bush Administration in March, 2001 declaring that the United States would not become a party to the Kyoto Protocol on climate change, which the previous U.S. Administration had agreed to support, sent shock waves across Europe. European leaders were caught off guard by the absence of basic “talking points,” for what many foreign press columnists labeled as yet another example of the U.S. Administration’s “unilateral” approach to world affairs.

In recent remarks at a public forum sponsored by the U.S. Department of State, a former American Ambassador with extensive Middle East experience presented highlights of the findings of an advisory group of which he was a member and noted,

We looked at a program in Al-Atabia’a. It was a talk show, a two-hour talk show. The title of the talk show was "The Americanization of Islam." Think of that title: "The Americanization of Islam." (The Arabic) word there was “muamara,’’ (meaning) there was a “conspiracy” by America to take over the Islamic religion. Everyone on that talk show had some very strong views about this conspiracy. There was not one person on that two-hour show who really knew about our country, who knew that we are country, that we are a religious country, that we have freedom of religion in this country, that we have millions of Muslims in this country. There was not anyone who could convey the context and the reality of the American experience on religion and our democracy.¹

The ensuing question one might ask is, “What do the two situations cited above have in common?” The response is that these are illustrations of disconnects between the formulation of U.S. foreign policy, and the strategy by which the U.S. Government communicates its policies and portrays the image of the United States overseas. In her recent testimony before the U.S. Congress, newly-appointed U.S. Department of State Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs Margaret Tutwiler conceded that this strategy, known as "public diplomacy," is weak, and she told Committee members,

We must engage, listen, and interact… in advocating our policies and explaining our actions. Audiences may not agree or like what we say and do, but we are communicating our policies to governments and influential elites, including in the foreign media. Our senior officials, Ambassadors and embassy staff are out there explaining U.S. policy, goals, and initiatives. However, we can all do better.²

The U.S. Department of State (DOS) takes the lead in communicating, explaining, and galvanizing support for U.S. foreign policy abroad, as well as for monitoring and reporting back to Washington how that policy is being received. And the success or failure of DOS efforts on shores far from home may very well be determined by how well our strategy to explain our
policy is conceived, and the extent to which foreign audiences are receptive to hearing our explanations.

The ending of the Cold War continues as a powerful catalyst for change in how the United States conducts international affairs and with whom. In subsequent pages of this paper, we will examine how our nation formulates foreign policy, the strategy of public diplomacy, and how strengthening coordination of these two instruments of national power would contribute to more accurate understanding of U.S. foreign policy goals and the enduring American values that inform our policy.

FOREIGN POLICY MAKING IN THE UNITED STATES: THE KEY ACTORS

No group or nation should mistake America's intentions: We will not rest until terrorist groups of global reach have been found, have been stopped, and have been defeated.

—George W. Bush

THE PRESIDENT

Article 1, Section 7, of the United States Constitution stipulates that the President "shall have the power, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to make treaties." Thus, with the signing of that historic document, the President of the United States was designated by America's forefathers as the chief architect and navigator of the nation's foreign policy.

So, just what is foreign policy? Professor David C. Jordan's "World Politics in Our Time" defines foreign policy as "the substantive goals a state wishes to accomplish in its external relations." Although the views of the U.S. lawmakers, special interest groups, and leaders of other nations may be considered in the eventual policy outcome, foreign policy decision making in the United States almost always mirrors closest the ideals, values, and political party agenda of the American President. President George W. Bush's decision, for example, that the United States would not accede to the Kyoto Protocol on climate change fulfilled a campaign promise that reflected strong conviction in the Republic Party that acquiescence to the treaty would "cause serious harm to the U.S. economy."

Historically, American presidents have been guided in their foreign policy formulation by the principles of "modern liberalism," which traces its origins to 18th Century European "liberalism." Liberalism champions "individual rights, free speech, free trade among the colonies, elected representation," and a hands off approach by governments. However, modern liberalism "allows the state to intervene in economic affairs and in the individual's future
An example of modern liberalism intervention in the affairs of another state is conveyed in the powerful image of former U.S. President Ronald Reagan, an extremely vocal anti-Communist, as he stood in the heart of Berlin, Germany exhorting the Russian President, “Mr. Gorbachev, tear down this fence!” referring to the Berlin Wall that divided East from West for sixty years. Modern liberals, like the pioneers of classic liberalism emphasize the spread of “democracy” as the guaranteed antidote to tyranny and human injustice. President Jimmy Carter made “human rights” the cornerstone of his foreign policy, and President William Clinton declared “democratic enlargement” the primary objective of his foreign affairs agenda. Presidents may vary in their respective philosophical stance, choosing a conservative, radical, or moderate approach, that embraces the principles of his political party and reflects, most importantly, the President’s interpretation of events and his view of the world.

Typically, early in a new administration, the President will declare his vision of the world in any number of traditional ways, such as by making speeches at home or abroad. One of the key platforms is the “State of the Union” speech that is presented before the Congress one year after taking office and always includes a significant section devoted to articulation of the administration’s view of the primary domestic and external issues that shape its foreign policy. Another important instrument through which the President reveals his foreign policy and national security strategy is the Congressionally mandated National Security Strategy (NSS), a document that carries essential policy guidance for the entire Washington bureaucracy.

The National Security Strategies of Bush’s predecessors, dating back to 1987, had emphasized the Soviet threat, democratization, human rights, open trade, arms control, the environment, fighting drug trafficking, and counter-terrorism, for example. However, the tragic events of September 11, 2001 brought about a dramatic reprioritization and definition by the Bush Administration of America’s top foreign policy and national security concerns, with the declaration that “combating terrorism and securing the U.S. homeland from future attacks are our top priority.” The pronouncement, contained in the “National Strategy for Combating Terrorism,” published February 2003, had sweeping implications for America’s view of the world, especially the official Washington-based foreign affairs community.

THE INTERAGENCY PROCESS

While the President assumes leadership in crafting and conducting the nation’s foreign policy, there is a widely cast network throughout Washington, DC that assists the President with the formulation and implementation of that policy. This network consists of political appointees, area specialists, Congress, special advisors, the military, and various government agencies,
such as the U.S. Department of State, the U.S. Department of Defense, the U.S. Treasury, the National Security Council, the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, and the Agency for International Development, to name only a few. Together these individuals and institutions become actors in what has come to be known as the “interagency process.” The interagency decision making process “is uniquely American in character, size, and complexity.” The process is not carried out through a pure, upwardly moving vertical chain of command and decisions. Recommendations may be vetted in any number of ways, including “individual, a small group, and organization, or some combination of them.” Within these channels the President’s new foreign policy initiatives are analyzed, levels of agencies’ support are identified, and strategies are devised for their implementation. The system plays a vital role in the execution of foreign policy, but is at times stymied by intervening bureaucratic politics and overlapping responsibilities that may impede or delay effective foreign policy implementation. I will discuss the latter in the final chapter of this paper and propose recommendations that will help to fortify the link between foreign policy formulation and diplomacy.

THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

The National Security Council (NSC) sits atop this vast network of agencies and related subgroups. The NSC was established under the National Security Act of 1947 and “is designed to offer the President coordinated advice on political, economic, and military policies related to national security.” The National Security Act of 1947 stipulates:

The function of the Council shall be to advise the President with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to national security as to enable the military services and the other departments and agencies of the Government to cooperate more effectively in matters involving the national security.

…Other functions the President may direct for the purpose of more effectively coordinating the policies and functions of the departments and agencies of the government relating to the nation’s security…

Assess and appraise the objectives, commitments, and risks of the United States…

…Consider policies on matters of common interest to the departments and agencies of the Government concerned with the national security…

The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs serves as director of the National Security Council Staff, and determines the agenda for NSC meetings in consultation with the Counsel to the President. The 1947 Act established that the “statutory members of the NSC are the President, the Vice President, Secretaries of State and Defense. All others
present are advisors: Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Director of Central Intelligence, and cabinet members. The staff structure, internal and external functioning and degree of centralized control of the NSC have varied since its creation depending on the personal style of the incumbent President. However, with the arrival of President George W. Bush, and following the issuance of National Security Presidential Directive #1 (NSPD1), February 13, 2001, the staff of the NSC was dramatically downsized. Six regional Policy Coordinating Committees (PCCs) and eleven functional PCCs were established to handle functional responsibilities. Strikingly, the once numerous Interagency Working Groups (IWGs), which were at the center of the NSC process, were abolished and their work transferred to the various new PCCs. The NSC Principals Committee (NSC/PC), established in 1989, continues to function under the Bush realignment as the “senior interagency forum for consideration of policy issues affecting national security,” as does the NSC Deputies Committee (NSC/DC) that “serves as the senior sub-Cabinet interagency forum for consideration of policy issues affecting national security.” The NSC/PC is regularly attended by the Secretaries of State, Treasury and Defense, the Chief of Staff to the President, and is chaired by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs; the latter may request the attendance of other senior officials, such as the Director of Intelligence or the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as appropriate. Attendees at NSC/DC meetings include the Deputies of State, Defense, and Treasury, the Deputy Director of Intelligence, and other senior officials. The reconstituted NSC under the Bush administration continues “the daily and long-term coordination and integration of foreign policy and national security matters across the vast government.” Specifically, it:

- Provides information and policy advice to the President
- Manages the policy coordination process
- Monitors implementation of presidential policy decisions
- Manages crises
- Articulates the President’s policies
- Undertakes long-term strategic planning
- Conducts liaison with Congress and foreign governments
- Coordinates summit meetings and national security related trips.
The actual role of the NSC, which has greatly expanded since the 1960s, today resembles as much a policy making body as it does the chief coordinating body for the execution of foreign policy within the extensive network of government agencies. We will take a look at some of the consequences of this expansion in the concluding section of this research paper.

THE US DEPARTMENT OF STATE

As the lead foreign affairs agency, the U.S. Department of State (DOS), headed by the Secretary of State, is specifically charged with the conduct of American foreign relations. The Secretary of State is the ranking member of the Cabinet, fourth in line of presidential succession, and is widely referred to as America’s “chief diplomat.” The Department manages 260 diplomatic missions in 163 countries around the world. In the “Mission Statement” accompanying the Department’s FY 2004-2009 “Strategic Plan” which, for the first time, was issued jointly with the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), the nation’s lead development assistance organization, the Secretary of State declares:

The principal aims of the Department of State and USAID are clear. These aims are anchored in the President’s “National Security Strategy” and its three underlying and interdependent components – diplomacy, development, and defense… First, we will strive to build and maintain strong bilateral and multilateral relationships… Second, we must protect our nation, our allies, and our friends against transnational dangers and enduring threats arising from tyranny, poverty, and disease. Global terrorism, international crime, and the spread of weapons of mass destruction are new challenges born of traditional ambitions… Third, in confronting the intersection of traditional and transnational challenges, we will combine our diplomatic skills and development assistance to act boldly to foster a more democratic and prosperous world integrated into the global economy.18

The Policy Planning Staff (S/P) of the State Department plays an unique role in the development and implementation of U.S. foreign policy. The director of S/P holds rank equivalent to Assistant to Secretary of State, and the office is normally staffed by career government officials as well as outside experts. Conceived in 1947 by George Kennan, the staff of this office provides independent policy analysis and advice for the Secretary of State. Its mission is to study longer term, global trends – particularly with regard to adversaries of the United States – and to develop policies that will make it possible to confront or counter adverse policy of another state. Former Secretary of State Dean Acheson described the Policy Planning role as: “To anticipate the emerging form of things to come, to reappraise policies that have acquired their own momentum and gone on after the reasons for them had ceased, and to stimulate and, when necessary, to devise basic policies crucial to the conduct of our foreign affairs.”9 Policy Planning Staff undertakes policy studies that are more typical of research
conducted by an independent think-tank, “serving as an institutionalized “second opinion” on policy matters.” In addition, S/P engages in special projects assigned by the Secretary of State; policy coordination within DOS and with other government agencies; drafts speeches and Congressional testimony; and maintains liaison with NGOs, the academic community, and think tanks. The S/P Mission Statement notes that the office was instrumental in “assembling the international coalition against terrorism, coordinating the reconstruction of Afghanistan through February 2002, and implementing the Good Friday agreement in Northern Ireland.”

THE US DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

The role of the Department of Defense (DOD) in foreign policy formulation has grown increasingly, albeit unevenly, since the onset of the Cold War. The threat of nuclear war, accompanied by the U.S. policy of deterrence, brought about a decisive shift that expanded the influence of the Secretary of Defense in foreign policy making. Simply stated, the Defense Department’s traditional preoccupation preceding the Cold War era was the strategy of waging war. But, as David C. Jordan noted in his book written in 1970, “strategy in the nuclear age has become concerned with deterring war; it is a means of preventing the use of nuclear weapons and only secondarily a way of securing the objectives of war.” Jordan further states,

No longer do policy and security determine strategy, but now strategy determines what policies can be fruitfully sought and what security really means. In effect the nuclear environment has given strategy an independent life. This is a change which in practical terms can be seen in the United States in the increasing dominance of the Secretaries of Defense over Secretaries of State, not because of personality (although this could account for variations in influence during some periods), but because of the rising primacy of strategic deterrence and the importance of effective strategic forces which are the province of the Defense Department. Following the collapse of the Soviet threat in 1989, which was preceded by the end of the demoralizing Vietnam War, America’s defense establishment took on a less prominent role in foreign policy making, as it focused on professionalization of the armed forces. However, the role of the U.S. military as an instrument of national power gradually increased in the late-1980s and 1990s, and this trajectory has continued in the Twenty-first Century.

The Secretary of Defense serves as the primary advisor to the President on defense policy, and actively participates in the formulation of foreign policy as a sitting Cabinet member. The DOD Secretary is also a statutory member of the President’s National Security Council, making him a key interlocutor of the interagency process. The ongoing war on terrorism, and the integral role played by the nation’s military in that effort, has dramatically increased the participation of the Secretary of Defense in day-to-day policy making, including matters that
impact America’s relations with foreign countries, to levels not seen since the era of former Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, architect of the policy of “deterrence,” which informed fundamental foreign policy decision making throughout much of the Cold War.

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) is another major Defense establishment actor in the foreign policy process, serving as the principal military advisor to the President and the Secretary of Defense, as well to as the NSC.

THE CONGRESS

The U.S. Constitution bestows Congress, particularly the Senate, the “right to ratify treaties” negotiated by the Executive Branch. Congress was also invested with the power to declare war, regulate commerce with foreign nations, and to approve presidential appointments, such as diplomats and senior Cabinet members. But perhaps the most potent prerogative prescribed under the Constitution is the “power of the purse,” controlled by the House of Representatives, which determines levels of funding and may either add or disallow projects contained in the annual budget requests of key Washington foreign affairs agencies. The Congress, through a vast network of committees, also exercises “oversight” of the activities of government, such as the powerful Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the House Appropriations Committee, and the Senate Armed Services Committee. Congressional watchers seem to agree that the level of intervention by Congress in foreign affairs has waxed and waned throughout the history of the United States, although Congress has frequently inserted itself in decisions involving the deployment of U.S. military personnel, and in policies on immigration and trade. One instrument sometimes used by Congress as a non-binding expression of sentiment on a particular foreign policy issue is the “resolution,” which can be passed by one or both chambers of Congress. Several days after the September 11 terrorist attacks on the U.S., “both chambers passed S.J. Res. 23, authorizing the president to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks.”

THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

The U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) was created in 1947 and serves as the primary agency of the U.S. government that engages in the collection and evaluation of information – primarily of foreign origin – that is considered vital to America’s national security interests. The CIA is an independent agency that is headed by the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) who “serves as head of the United States intelligence community,” and “is
principal advisor to the President for intelligence matters.\textsuperscript{24} The FY 2004 “Mission Statement” of the CIA stipulates:

CIA’s mission is to support the President, the National Security Council, and all officials who make and execute the U.S. national security policy by providing accurate, comprehensive, and timely foreign intelligence on national security topics; conducting counterintelligence activities, special activities, and other functions related to foreign intelligence and national security, as directed by the President.\textsuperscript{25}

The role of the CIA during the Cold War was no doubt essential and highly effective. For example, the Agency was able to monitor Soviet compliance with the numerous arms control treaties reached between the United States and Russia, not to mention successful tracking of Chinese intentions and designs on regional hegemony in Southeast Asia in that era. More recently, American presidents have relied extensively on the Agency’s ability to preempt the spread and transfer of weapons of mass destruction to rogue states and terrorist groups. And, under the Clinton Administration, the Agency was called upon to act as a broker on security matters in Israel’s Gaza Strip and West Bank, in furtherance of U.S. interests to advance the Middle East peace process. Sometimes things have gone right and in other instances intelligence has come up short, thus exposing serious gaps in intelligence gathering and CIA analyses, which have provoked strong criticism and closer scrutiny by Congress and the media.

New global challenges are placing greater demands on the CIA’s ability to adapt, and these same challenges are also expanding the Agency’s influence in the formulation of U.S. foreign policy.

THE ROLE OF DIPLOMACY

There is no country on earth that is not touched by America, for we have become the motive force for freedom and democracy in the world. And there is no country in the world that does not touch us.

—Colin Powell

Previous sections of this paper have examined the process and the roles of key individuals and government institutions in the formulation of U.S. foreign policy. We now turn to a discussion of the official process through which foreign policy is implemented.

Webster defines diplomacy as “the conducting of relations between nations, by their heads directly, or through accredited representatives; the art of managing international negotiations.”\textsuperscript{26} Classic realist Hans Morgenthau describes this process as the mechanism for “establishing the preconditions for permanent peace.”\textsuperscript{27} With the foregoing thoughts in mind, for
the purposes of this discussion we will define diplomacy as the process by which a state accomplishes its substantive foreign policy goals.

US diplomacy is sometimes conducted at home, mainly in Washington, but it primarily occurs overseas. In Washington, the Secretary of State will likely begin his day with a review of the important overnight developments, and take action or give guidance on matters requiring immediate attention. He later participates in a telephone conference call that most often includes the principals of other key foreign affairs agencies, such as the NSC, the CIA, DOD, and the like. Throughout the day, the Secretary will make and receive scores of phone calls to and from abroad, through which he will articulate and promote America’s foreign policy agenda, gain useful insights, and provide feedback or guidance to senior Department staff, such as the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, or the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs. He will conduct diplomacy through meetings with visiting foreign dignitaries and Washington-based chiefs of foreign missions, or he may travel overseas to participate in ministerial-level meetings, such as those involving NATO or the European Union, and sign formal agreements on behalf of the United States. Below the level of the Secretary, there are more than 6,500 Civil Service employees of the Department of State who are “involved in virtually every area of the Department – from human rights to narcotics control to trade to environmental issues.” These Civil Service Employees in Washington work in concert with hundreds of Foreign Service Officers, members of the US diplomatic service, who develop and shape US policy and a strategy for its implementation. Foreign Service Officers in Washington are in regular contact with foreign embassies, US diplomatic missions both at home and abroad, and they coordinate policy matters with other US government agencies and the White House NSC.

In the field, US diplomacy is conducted through nearly 260 diplomatic and consular posts around the world, including embassies, consulates, and missions to international organizations. These missions promote the United States’ interests overseas, and they are the frontline contact between the United States Government, the American people, foreign governments and their citizens. Overseas, US foreign policy is first and foremost implemented by ambassadors and their country teams that include, in addition to Foreign Service Officers in charge of key sections of the Department of State, representatives of other US Government agencies also based at US embassies abroad. The ambassador is the personal representative of the United States President and exercises full responsibility for the direction, coordination and supervision of the implementation of US foreign policy, as well as the American staff who conduct the nation’s diplomacy, overseas. American ambassadors are the primary conduit of foreign policy
issues between the United States and the host country government. Traditionally, embassies have served as the eyes and ears of Washington and as protectors of American citizens overseas. They actively promote US trade and businesses, negotiate treaties and conclude agreements, and seek to enhance understanding of US foreign policy and American culture and values. The world of diplomacy has greatly changed since the times of Benjamin Franklin and Thomas Jefferson. Today's American diplomat must now deal with more complex issues. "An ambassador to Paris or Berlin, for instance, now needs to be up-to-date on genetically engineered crops, climate change, monetary union within the European Union." 29

In the closing section of this paper, we will discuss some of the newer tools of diplomacy and the challenges in a global environment.

**THE FACE OF AMERICA**

We are driven by a desire to be able to justify our actions to others on grounds they could not reasonably reject.

—Kenneth Waltz

Traditional diplomacy most often takes place behind the scenes – out of the public's view. For example, overnight, Washington sends a cable to its embassy in Madrid that carries the United States' position on an important matter. The cable instructs Embassy Madrid to make a "demarche" (convey our views) at an appropriate level of the Spanish Government. Upon receiving the cable, an American diplomat picks up the phone or pays a call on an official the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs to transmit Washington's position. However, there is another facet of diplomacy that has taken on much greater importance in the post-Cold War era, and in this age of instantaneous communications via satellite through which America's image and its government's policies are exposed in the farthest corners of today's world. We cannot control the "spin" that a television news anchor in New Delhi, for example, will place on the image or position of the United States as he reports the news, but we do have the means to influence how foreign audiences perceive America. The tool we use to diplomatically shape our country's image is known as "public diplomacy."

In the Cold War era, public diplomacy was conducted through "a robust array of cultural and intellectual instruments to spread American values behind the Iron Curtain and plead the US case to nonaligned nations."30 Examples of these instruments include "Voice of America" and "Radio Free Europe" broadcasts that transmitted accurate news and messages of hope to listeners on the European continent who were captives inside a world that had little access to free and independent news. Where permitted, the United States Government sponsored visits
to foreign countries by American symphony orchestras, basketball teams, or ballets, and funded the travel of exhibits that highlighted American know-how and its social values. The opinions of overseas youth mattered to the US Government during the Cold War, and funding was made available for exchange programs, such as those managed by the organization Youth for Understanding. Around the world today many leaders of foreign countries, such as British Prime Minister Tony Blair, spent an entire year studying in the United States as a Fulbright Scholar, a program that the US Congress still funds, but at much lower levels and with the requirement of cost-sharing even by poor countries. All of this is not to say that America’s image abroad was stellar, but people knew what America stood for -- freedom and democracy – and many of them learned this by reading in libraries housed in American cultural centers, such as the former Washington Irving Center, in Lagos, where several generations of Nigerians once gathered and dreamed of one day visiting the great United States. Most of these tools of public diplomacy are no longer available to American diplomats, and if they are, they survive on very limited resources. That has distanced us from a generation of foreign audiences where people once knew us very well.

So, why should it surprise us that the America we all know – and which still stands for the same values as did the America of the Cold War -- is so misunderstood and so disdained in many places overseas? The answer may very well be that the most people overseas know about America today is the policy of our government that they believe is unfair or undermines their interests, or the interests of their region. Diplomatic relations are no longer confined to state-centric issues. The perceptions of foreign audiences about America today are often based on biased reporting in local media, and there are increasingly fewer and fewer individuals, even in countries that have been traditional allies, who know America well enough to clarify the facts. As national interests have decreased the exposure of America through foreign television and other local media, the image that one is provided of the US is often superficial and intentionally unhelpful. In the post-Cold War era, America’s diplomats have become predominately the bearers of policy, defrocked of a vital instrument of national power -- public diplomacy -- that had served to explain policy, and had put a “face” on the values that informed that policy.

In her February 4, 2004, testimony before the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, State and the Judiciary, the US Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs acknowledged that the undoing of public diplomacy programs had undermined foreign understanding of the shared values and intentions that shape our policy. Whereas in the past American diplomats were told by Washington that the opinions of foreign youth did not matter, there is now a new focus on increasing our ties with successor generations, brought
about largely by the overwhelmingly negative response of Arab and Muslim youth in streets across the Middle East and elsewhere against US policy. These youths are influenced by the rhetoric and bias of regional media that did not previously exist, such as the popular, anti-US, Arabic-language satellite television network, Al-Jazeera. In this regard, Under Secretary Tutwiler notes, “We must do a better job of reaching beyond the traditional elites and government officials. Where we have not placed enough effort and focus is with the non-elites who, today much more than in the past, are a very strong force within their countries. This must be a priority focus now and in the future.”

The October 1, 2003 Report of the Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim World called for “first and foremost, public diplomacy requires a new strategic direction.” Among other recommendations, the Report urges:

a. The commitment must be led by the political will of the President and Congress fueled by adequate financial and human resources.

b. That strategic direction and interagency coordination on public diplomacy come from a new office located in the White House;

c. The most effective programs of public diplomacy – the ones most likely to endure and have long-term impact – are those that are mutually beneficial to the United States and to the Arab and Muslim countries. We urge that care be taken to emphasize programs that build bridges and address the region’s weaknesses, especially in education, while at the same time advancing the American message and building a constituency of friendship and trust.

d. We emphasize that, in all public diplomacy efforts, the US recognizes that the best way to get our message across is often directly to the people – rather than through formal diplomatic channels.

Clearly, the way forward to optimize understanding of both foreign policy and the American values that inform it is through tighter integration of public diplomacy in foreign policy formulation. As the Advisory Report indicates, the role of the White House and the interagency process are vital to the goal of achieving closer integration between process and the tools of public diplomacy. This process should begin inside the State Department itself, where four years after consolidation with the public diplomacy experts of the former US Information Agency, public diplomacy is still seen by many as the act of responding to a reporter’s question.
Public diplomacy provides a strategy in support of both short-term and long-term goals. At present, although each of the geographic and functional bureaus of the State Department have assigned to them a cadre of public diplomacy officers, most do not participate in the process of policy formulation. In this regard, the Advisory Commission states:

Public diplomacy must participate in the process of policy formulation in on the takeoffs as well as the crash landings. Public diplomacy officials must have access to the formulation of foreign policy in order to advise on methods of presentation and likely responses in other countries.\(^{33}\)

Successful public diplomacy involves not only the State Department and its embassies, but also the White House and numerous other agencies. Beginning with the President as chief spokesman – whether addressing domestic or foreign audiences – he is the most important voice influencing attitudes toward the US abroad, and his every word should be crafted with the same care that is currently given to the launching of a new initiative political campaign.

Finally, and perhaps key, is that public diplomacy must be embedded in the interagency process, where coordination is achievable and highly desirable to demonstrate America’s laudable, but often under-publicized, foreign policy initiatives and achievements by other government agencies, such as the US Agency for International Development. In this regard, the Advisory Commission “urgently recommends that the interagency NSC/PCC be reactivated and co-chaired by the Under Secretary of State for Public diplomacy and Public Affairs and by a high-level representative of the NSC.”\(^{34}\)

The Advisory Report concludes: “Public diplomacy helped win the Cold War, and it has the potential to help win the war on terrorism.”\(^{35}\)

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ENDNOTES


4 In preparing for this discussion, I referred extensively to Professor David C. Jordan’s “World Politics in Our Time,” D.C. Heath and Co., 1970.

5 Ibid, p. 91.


8 Jon Anthony Yinger and George K. Zaharopoulos, Ibid, p. 35.

9 Doyle, p. 205.


14 Yinger and Zaharopoulos, p. 250.

15 Marcella, p. 275.

16 Ibid, p. 278.


20 Ibid.

21 Ibid.


27 Jordan, p. 90.


31 Tutwiler, pp 1-2.


33 Ibid, p. 58.

34 Ibid, p.62.


US Department of State Internet site. *Diplomacy: The State Department at Work*.  
