

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

**IMPROVING THE FINANCIAL RESOURCING
PROCESS FOR CIVIL/MILITARY OPERATIONS**

by

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This SRP is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the Master of Strategic Studies Degree. The views expressed in this student academic research paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

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Report Documentation Page

Form Approved
OMB No. 0704-0188

Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.

1. REPORT DATE 03 MAY 2004		2. REPORT TYPE		3. DATES COVERED -	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Improving the Financial Resourcing Process for Civil/Military Operations				5a. CONTRACT NUMBER	
				5b. GRANT NUMBER	
				5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER	
6. AUTHOR(S) Karen Gadbois				5d. PROJECT NUMBER	
				5e. TASK NUMBER	
				5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER	
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Carlisle, PA, 17013-5050				8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)				10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)	
				11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)	
12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution unlimited					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES					
14. ABSTRACT See attached file.					
15. SUBJECT TERMS					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT	18. NUMBER OF PAGES 24	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT unclassified	b. ABSTRACT unclassified	c. THIS PAGE unclassified			

ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: Ms. Karen L. Gadbois

TITLE: IMPROVING THE FINANCIAL RESOURCING PROCESS FOR CIVIL/MILITARY OPERATIONS

FORMAT: Strategy Research Project

DATE: 19 March 2004 PAGES: 24 CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

This SRP will address the fiscal challenges involved in long-term stability operations. Constraints and bureaucracy currently exist in financing a civil military operation and can obstruct the harmonization between interagencies that is critical to efficient execution of the operation. This was evident in the most recent stability operation in Afghanistan.

Although financial resourcing is key to the planning process prior to operational commencement, the intricacies of the rules and financial mechanisms are not sufficiently addressed. This SRP will address the current constraints in the financial process, specifically those experienced in Afghanistan. This paper will examine the UK model for financial resourcing and address specific means to improve US financial resourcing process for stability operations.

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IMPROVING THE FINANCIAL RESOURCING PROCESS FOR CIVIL/MILITARY OPERATIONS

THE ISSUE

Both the number and cost of civil/military operations are growing steadily. The U.S. provides funding for civil/military operations through assessed contributions to the United Nations (U.N.) which is included in the U.S. Department of State (DOS) budget. Incremental costs of contingent and non-traditional operations such as peacekeeping and stability operations, however, are neither funded through the UN assessment nor included in the federal budget. Therefore, the incremental costs incurred during a stability operation are currently funded “out of hide” by such organizations as the Department of Defense (DOD), Department of State (DOS), Department of Justice (DOJ), and the Agency for International Development (AID). This has created significant challenges for those U.S. organizations involved in stability operations and forms the heart of the issue.

To provide a context for the issue, DOD has reported over \$25 billion in incremental costs for overseas stability operations during the 1991-2001 timeframe.¹ Similarly, other federal agencies like DOS, DOJ and AID are forced to fund the unbudgeted costs of stability operations at the expense of other requirements. This creates a “bow wave” of funding requirements in future budgets of these agencies. In the case of DOD, the repercussions of this issue include a reduction in military readiness as funding for training, equipment and force structure is decremented to cover the unbudgeted incremental costs of stability operations.

To address the issue of financing stability operations several areas must be examined. These areas include how to budget and program required funds, how to find the funds, and how to manage the funds. Each of these areas will be examined in the paper however first it is important to define stability operations and the environment in which they occur.

DEFINING STABILITY OPERATIONS

“Stability operations promote and protect U.S. national interests by influencing the threat, political, and information dimensions of the operational environment through a combination of peacetime developmental, cooperative activities and coercive actions in response to crisis. The military activities that support stability operations are diverse, continuous and often long term. Their purpose is to promote and sustain regional and global stability.”²

Stability operations are most often joint in nature and involve interagency operations, which drives a higher level of complexity. Stability operations may complement and reinforce offensive and defensive capability, or the operation may be a decisive one. “Some of the many purposes for stability operations include but is not limited to the following:

- Protect national interests.
- Promote peace and deter aggression.
- Maintain or restore order.
- Prevent, deter and respond to terrorism.
- Reduce the threat of arms and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) to regional security.
- Promote freedom from oppression, subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency.
- Promote sustainable and responsive institutions.”³

As shown in the preceding list, stability operations can involve a wide array of efforts and often times several may occur simultaneously.

The current global environment is very complex and uncertain indicating demands placed on the U.S. to execute stability operations will grow in the 21st century. Stability operations are not new to DOD. From the beginnings of American history our government has called on the military forces to protect our national interests, preserve peace and provide humanitarian assistance. To that end, U.S. government organizations have provided disaster relief, built roads, bridges and canals in times of crisis both at home and abroad. “During the course of American history many of these types of operations occurred during peacetime, stability operations emerged during the 20th century as a major contributor to ensuring long-term success in the aftermath of combat operations. Dating back to World War II American military forces assisted European governments in reconstructing key infrastructure, rebuilding roads and bridges as well as feeding those starving in such countries as Belgium, France and the Netherlands.”⁴

One of the most critical aspects to successfully executing stability operations is ensuring a unity of effort that leverages, to the fullest extent possible, interagency, joint, and multinational cooperation. Effective coordination between the military and civil organizations forms the foundation for a smooth transition from military operations to civil operations.

“If you concentrate exclusively on victory, with no thought for the after effect, you may be too exhausted to profit by the peace, while it is almost certain that the peace will be a bad one, containing the germs of another war.”⁵

There are two key elements to stability operations, interagency coordination and a transition plan. In the next section of this paper I address interagency coordination and how comprehensive political-military planning can ensure some measure of success.

THE INTERAGENCY.

“Interagency Coordination – Within the context of Department of Defense involvement, the coordination that occurs between elements of Department of Defense, and engaged U.S. Government agencies, non governmental organizations, and regional and international organizations for the purpose of accomplishing an objective.”⁶

The role of the U.S. armed forces within the interagency process has evolved over the last several years. For many years the military has principally interacted with major U.S. departments like the Department of State (DOS) and the Department of Justice (DOJ). As stability operations have increased, the military has found itself involved with other types of organizations like Office of Management and Budget (OMB), Department of Commerce (DOC), and Department of Energy (DOE).

This has created a fairly new facet to the complex world of contingency and stability operations. It is important for military forces to understand stability operations is not just a military issue but instead a problem for the interagency to address. Through leveraging all of the resources of the interagency the DOD can reduce its requirements for personnel, equipment and funding.

In most cases, organizations do not have an understanding or appreciation for the military’s capabilities and constraints. Likewise, the military does not have a full understanding of their organizational cultures, or potential limitations and restrictions. Currently, there is no US national government civilian organization structured internally or empowered regionally to coordinate interagency activities within US combatant commands in peacetime or in a crisis situation.⁷

Over the years, most participants in the interagency process admit that coordination is a problem, causing acute difficulties if not addressed in a timely manner. In an effort to improve the interagency coordination and accountability, Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 56 was written and promulgated in May of 1997. PDD 56 (Managing Complex Contingency Operations) provided recommendations to promote cohesive planning and management of complex crisis. The focus of the document is an integrated political-military plan. “The political-military planning effort does not guarantee success but can assist in meeting objectives by ensuring:”⁸

- U.S. agencies plan operations using same purpose, mission, and objectives.
- All aspects of the operation are coordinated at the policy level.
- Key issues and requirements are identified and addressed early on in the planning process.

- Interagency planning process clearly assigns responsibility for distinct elements of an operation.
- Critical decisions about priorities and allocation of resources are made early on.

“The political-military plan has the following purposes:”⁹

- Helps build interagency consensus on the key elements of the overall operation.
- Assists in synchronizing individual agency efforts.
- Enhances the transparency of planning among different agencies.
- Helps ensure that all key issues are raised during planning.

The process of developing this plan provides a greater level of rigor and structure to interagency planning. Prior to the development of PDD 56 differing interpretations of the mission and objectives existed. Therefore, each agency approached the operation differently, which resulted in disjointed coordination in the field, resources not adequately estimated and key elements of the mission not understood until well into execution of the mission. The Interagency coordination effort can be further complicated if an adequate transition plan is not in place.

TRANSITION PLANNING.

Joint Military Doctrine has developed a framework to guide transition planning. The framework for purposes of transitional planning is well documented in military doctrine, but during Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) the transition was made more difficult for the Combined Joint Task Force 180 (CJTF 180) than it needed to be. The original approach to the operation by leadership in Washington was to focus on Humanitarian Assistance once combat operations ended. The original intent, and associated CJTF 180’s plan, was not initially focused on stability operations. The change in focus to the establishment of a stable Afghanistan came much later and changed the course of the operation.

President Bush changed the focus when he embraced a major role in rebuilding Afghanistan. He made public his intention when he stated on April 17th 2002 “Peace will be achieved by helping Afghanistan develop its own stable government. Peace will be achieved by helping Afghanistan train and develop its own national army.”¹⁰ The transition between combat operations and stability operations builds the bridge between war and peace. The success of such a transition is critical to America’s reputation as a Superpower because it reconfirms America’s commitment to long term peace and stability around the world. During OEF as combat troops continued to search for al-Qaeda, other teams of U.S. military personnel were

conducting operations aimed at spearheading the effort to fix schools, bridges, and hospitals in need of repair.

The role the President accepted was a long- term effort that required the military to embark on the very complex task of stabilizing a nation. The effort would involve constructing the appropriate infrastructure to restore the country of Afghanistan. In order to perform this task, substantial funding would be required and various organizations would have to play an integral role in the effort including interagency, joint and multinational organizations.

Successful transition planning requires a solid understanding of the local civil situation, the non-governmental organizations (NGOs), the international governmental organizations (IGOs) as well as the interagency situation. The decisive points that will facilitate the transfer of military to civil responsibilities are critical and must be more adequately addressed in future operations.¹¹

THE REPERCUSSIONS.

“The standard peacetime funding cycle did not facilitate operations. It took three to four months to get the funding into theater. In March the funds flowed. But as the end of the fiscal year neared the funding dried up until just prior to the year ended then the teams got a pot of money and had to commit it all in a short period of time. The type of funding profile places a burden on the teams in the field trying to cope with a volatile situation.”¹²

There are many challenges in successful execution of stability operations however, none has received so much attention, yet so little has been done as financing. There is much written about the negative impact of the financial constraints on stability operations, however, very little effort has been put forth to correct it. My research of after action reports for Somalia, Haiti and the war in the Balkans all cited financing as a major issue to contend with and one that needed to be rectified sooner than later.

An example of an opportunity lost due to funding issues occurred in Afghanistan during Operation Enduring Freedom. “After Special Operations Forces had retaken the Kandahar Hospital from the Al-Qaeda, the intent was to conduct a quick assessment, get materials and supplies, and go into clean up and repair in order to capitalize on humanitarian aid capabilities while the media covered it. It would have also shown the Afghans that while the U.S. can kill Al Qaeda terrorists; it could also provide compassionate, humanitarian assistance. The lack of an established quick disbursement system held up the funding. It took several months to contract for the clean up.”¹³ The Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid (OHDACA) funding, a DOD appropriation, coordinated with DOS, and approved by OSD provided some early

assistance monies but includes a selection criteria with many complex rules, and constrained project selection and execution.

The standard peacetime funding cycle did not facilitate operations it slowed operations down. It took three to four months to get the funding into theater. As September approached funds flow stopped until just prior to the fiscal year end. Teams then received funding and had to commit it all of the funds in a very short period of time. This type of funding profile places an unrealistic burden on the teams in the field trying to cope with a volatile situation. ¹⁴ In an effort to try to ensure fidelity of monies spent on projects, in country guidance was provided by the Coalition Joint Civil Military Operations Task Force (CJCMOTF).

The CJCMOTF was located in Kabul during OEF and was responsible for oversight of the project nomination form, the key product required by the published guidance. The nomination form required a significant amount of detailed information relative to the proposed project. "The type of information includes, but is not limited to the following:" ¹⁵

- Detailed description of project, if contracting required military oversight explanation and plan
- Locale, and population to benefit
- Cost estimate breakdown including explanation of other funding sources
- Narrative justification including the benefit to the DOD and other National Security/Foreign policy objectives
- Any probable negative outcomes that may result from the project and steps taken to mitigate them.
- Priority ranking in country
- Proposed recipients such as the organization

These bureaucratic requirements received much criticism from those in the field as it creates another level of detail, which delayed projects even longer. Further, the type of information required was generally not readily available and administrative support to assist in gathering the data was also not available. Complicating matters in OEF was the fact that no interagency plan existed for the long-term stabilization of Afghanistan, therefore the requisite information did not exist to prioritize the recommended projects.

In complex contingency operations like Afghanistan, the military is operating in a civil, political, and social environment where victory is defined in non-military terms. ¹⁶ In my opinion, during initial phases of such operations, before NGO and IGO and interagency processes can be put into place, military forces on the ground should have access to O&M monies with the requisite flexibility to expend it to "get the job done". This should include dealing with refugees,

reestablishing critical infrastructure and conducting civic action projects to win support of the population thus reducing the threat. The operational commander, to be effective, must be provided the authority to expend these funds immediately without being subjected to an extensive bureaucratic review.

A successful quick response fund was set up during Operation Iraqi Freedom(OIF), the Commander's Emergency Response Program(CERP), provided commanders with the ability to rapidly allocate resources to meet the local needs of the people of Iraq. The program was initiated in May 2003, since that time commanders spent over \$126 million to directly improve education, health care, water and security. Access to this fund enabled the commanders to make decisions on smaller projects and execute them immediately. The next section addresses the process for obtaining funds and the requirement to manage.

OBTAINING AND MANAGING THE FUNDS.

Currently, the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) is based on the assumption of the need to acquire, maintain, and train forces predicated on the current requirements of the US National Security Strategy. Other "non-traditional" missions such as stability operations, although they contribute to national security interests, are contingent, and therefore not budgeted for in the "normal" budgeting process. In execution Research, Development, Training and Equipment (RDT&E) funds are realigned to cover the costs of the contingency operation resulting in less funding for modernization efforts. There is a great need to bridge the gap between executing the National Security Strategy through DOD's involvement in contingency operations and the actual financing of these unbudgeted operations. During a year of execution, DOD must realign budget authority in order to fund immediate incremental costs of contingency operations, while waiting for supplemental appropriations from Congress. However, this process assumes that Congress will support the action, which may not always be the case, resulting in DOD funding contingency operations at the expense of forgoing other missions.

PPBES

The Planning, Programming, and Budgeting Execution System (PPBES) is the process DOD uses to translate our National Security Strategy (NSS) into force requirements and associated budgets which are then forwarded to Congress for authorization and appropriation action. The basic function of the PPBES process is to allocate defense resources appropriately across the DOD Services and Agencies.¹⁷

The planning portion of the process begins with the Administration's development and publication of the NSS. The NSS articulates the U.S. national security objectives, considers the

strategies necessary to appropriately deal with threats to national security and estimates force structures and levels that will support those strategies. Although this document is very high level in nature and lacks specifics, it does form the foundation for prioritizing requirements and making resource allocation decisions. One product produced from this process is the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG).

The programming effort takes the broad planning information provided in the DPG and defines it in terms of personnel, material and actual dollars needed to execute the NSS. This information is constructed at the service level and result in Program Objective Memorandums (POMS) that are then passed to the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) for consideration. SECDEF then publishes Program Decision Memoranda (PDM) that allocates resources based on service POM submissions.

The budgeting and execution phase of this process actually approves the funding for the identified programs that are then justified to the responsible Congressional committees for authorization and appropriation. The appropriation most applied to contingency operations is Operations and Maintenance (O&M). O&M funding is determined using peacetime optempo requirements developed during the cold war era consequently there is no room to fund emergent requirements like contingency operations.¹⁸

Further complicating the matter, the designated operational commander of a contingency operation does not himself receive funding for an operation. The operational commander must rely on the service component commander's budget authority in executing operations, whether routine or contingent in nature. When stability operations are directed they are funded through existing component budget authority.¹⁹ One must remember even those programs approved through the PPBES process is not always fully funded by Congress. Given the significant number of competing interests and strains on available resources, the establishment of a contingency fund "just in case" is precluded.

Despite the seeming lack of flexibility with the U.S. budget process, several options do exist to fund stability operations in the year of execution. These options include: Reprogramming, Realigning, and Supplemental Appropriations.

REPROGRAMMING.

Reprogramming is the process of redirecting funds (within an appropriation) for purposes other than those contemplated by the Congress at the time originally appropriated. These actions do not represent requests for additional funds from the Congress. Rather, they normally involve the reapplication of resources within a particular appropriation. Reprogramming enables

DOD to execute unanticipated, unbudgeted operations. Basically this option involves shifting funds from one programming line within an appropriation to another. Recognizing, “*rigid adherence to amounts justified for programs may unduly jeopardize the effective accomplishment of unforeseen requirements.*”²⁰ The amounts for reprogramming are restricted and established criteria exist to determine when Congressional notification or approval is required. “The criteria is as follows:”²¹

- Use of general transfer authority
- Increases procurement quantity of specific weapons systems
- Affects an item of special interest to one or more Congressional Committees
- Increases military personnel budget authority or a procurement line by \$10 million or more, increases O&M line by \$15 million or more, increases existing program element by \$4 million or more, adds a new program of \$2 million or more, adds a new program estimated to cost \$10 million or more within a three year period.

Pro: provides flexibility within an appropriation.

Con: does not allow for increase to top line budget authority, issue of funding the operation at the expense of another remains.

REALIGNMENT.

Realignment of funds is similar to reprogramming but has legislation governing its use. Unlike reprogramming, realigning involves moving funding between appropriations accounts. Congress provides DOD with general transfer authority under the annual appropriations act. Basically this establishes a Congressional threshold on flexibility of funding movement.

Pro: provides flexibility between appropriations , within Congressional limitations.

Con: does not allow for increase to top line budget authority, issue of funding the operation at the expense of another remains.

SUPPLEMENTAL APPROPRIATIONS.

Supplemental Appropriations unlike the previous mechanisms, provide additional funding from what was appropriated by Congress in the annual appropriations act. This is the traditional means for DOD to recoup costs associated with incremental costs from contingency operations.

Pro: DOD receives overall plus up in its budget line.

Con: Existing federal budget authority is reduced accordingly, unless jointly declared a national emergency by the President and Congress.

The financing options described only address financing mechanisms during the year of execution. The following is an encapsulation of research on alternatives to funding stability operations over the long term.

THE UK APPROACH TO MANAGING THE ISSUES.

In my research I found an interesting approach to stability operations undertaken by the UK government. The following will look at the overall approach to stability operations and then discuss the financing mechanism the UK employs. To set the stage for this discussion a matter of background is in order. In the late 1990's the UK government performed a critical review of its interagency structure and processes. The outcome of the review was the recognition that more could be done to provide greater effectiveness in resolving and managing conflict as well as performing necessary stability operations. The UK undertook a groundbreaking initiative to pull together key organizations within its government, harnessing the necessary talent to meet the challenges of the future. "The UK's Global Conflict Prevention Pool, established in 2001, is aimed at combining the knowledge and resources of key organizations across the government including the Ministry of Defence (MOD), the Department for International Development (DFID), and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO)." ²² Included in the structure of the UK's Global Conflict Prevention Pool is a very unique financing construct that serves as a potential alternative for the U.S. to perform such stability efforts more efficiently.

Prior to 2001, each organization took responsibility for activity in their specific areas of expertise. Since 2001, these organizations have closely worked together under a single umbrella resulting in a reduction of duplication of effort and ensuring each organization's work supports or complements the other organizations in the Global Pool. The Global Pool is successful in integrating policy-making and program execution across organizations similar in function to the U.S. DOD, DOS as well as the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). This has greatly increased the impact of the organizations through better coordination and development of common strategies.

In considering alternative options for financing contingency operations there are two issues to keep in mind, one is the imperative to maintain Congressional oversight and second is the recognition that federal resources are limited. However, it is necessary to ensure DOD can meet its readiness goals and continue the recapitalization effort currently ongoing. In order to do this DOD must not continue to be required to cover incremental costs associated with civil military operations. A financing alternative that minimizes impact to DOD budget but maintains the necessary Congressional oversight should be pursued.

ALTERNATIVES.

The existing US process for engaging in stability operations call for committing resources based on determination of national interest in line with the NSS. The funding of stability operations involves providing budget authority through Reprogramming, Realignment or a Supplemental Appropriation and essentially back filling incremental costs or absorbing costs from services' budgets. This causes concern regarding the potential for generating a "bow wave" into the future when readiness accounts like O&M or recapitalizations accounts such as procurement are used to fund emerging requirements like a stability operation.

The fiscal climate places ever-increasing restrictions on what is budgeted, since Congress is faced with competing programs across the entire federal government. Given the high visibility of stability operations, it is necessary to consider more viable and feasible options for funding them. A more streamlined, less bureaucratic approach to these efforts is needed to lessen the burden on our military force. The principal intent is to not continually require the military to fund unbudgeted operations "out of hide" at the expense of other budgeted programs. The following outlines several alternative funding methods for consideration.

DIRECT APPROPRIATION TO COMMANDER

Stability operations are by nature unpredictable and can vary dramatically in cost by individual service. A funding option to reduce the impact on congressionally approved program elements is to provide a direct appropriation to the specific theater combatant commander. Recognizing the O&M account is the most often utilized in these types of operations, this direct appropriation would require an addition of a program element to specifically cover costs associated with stability operations. Providing a budgeted amount to the commanders would obviate need for the individual service to change approved budgeted programs during execution. Congress would still have the ability to limit the amount budgeted and maintain the control and visibility required by members of legislation.

ESTABLISH A TRANSFER ACCOUNT.

Another alternative to financing stability operations is establishing an account at the Office of Secretary of Defense (OSD) level that would only be used for contingency operations. This type of account was set up to finance some of the burden of Desert Shield in the early 1990's. The account was called the Defense Cooperation account, and it accepted monies from other countries to defray the costs of U.S. operations. Congress could still maintain restrictions on the actual amount of the fund and determine notification periods, however the principal advantage would be ability to respond to such requirements in a timelier manner.

NEW ZEALAND DEFENSE FUND (NZDF)

For activities of a non-UN nature, such as New Zealand's contribution to OEF, the Government provided the incremental funding required to deliver a higher level of capability and preparedness than in current funding baselines through the utilization of the NZDF. Specific operations are funded on an "as required" basis with the marginal funding provided as necessary. The Government of New Zealand has always funded these types of contingency activities in this manner and is able to accommodate short term requirements with immediate turn around. As an example of magnitude, New Zealand Defense forces received additional funding of \$40 million per year for the last two years for increased operational deployment, the overall New Zealand Defense budget is \$1.6 billion.²³

UK APPROACH

"The UK funding of peace support operations is also included in the structure of the Global Pool. Previously the funding for such operations was provided by the Treasury's Departmental Expenditure Limits (DEL) reserve. The move to the Global Pool was intended to streamline management of the peacekeeping related budgets. Originally each of the three departments, MOD, DFID, and FCO put in funds from their specific budgets. Today, however, each department bids for funding in each of their budget rounds. The departments are provided funding based on prioritization of activities that contribute most to long-term stability in the aftermath of conflict. The Ministers of each of the departments are responsible for setting the priority areas. The criteria considered for funding include: ²⁴

- How important the conflict is to UK national interests.
- The impact UK involvement will have in ensuring efforts success.
- Is the effort international?
- Is the Pool the right funding mechanism?

Once this information is determined, funding is allocated and the appropriate experts from the various departments are called to focus on the effort. The staffs work very closely with non-governmental organizations (NGOs), private sector organizations, as well as international organizations like the UN. The Global Pool does not fund humanitarian relief work, including refugee support. Also established is a Quick Response Fund for efforts that do not fall into the Pool's immediate strategies and require all key members of the Pool agree to the emergent requirement.

The Quick Response Fund has proven very effective in complex operations such as the operation in Afghanistan. The UK solved the funding problem by getting a governmental

agreement allowing the operational commanders to define their mission support broadly. This allows UK operational commanders to operate “without asking permission” from higher leadership to spend O&M type monies on drilling a well or building a school. If it is believed to be in support of the overall mission the commander may authorize it. By providing those on the ground with the flexibility to solve complex issues immediately unimpeded by bureaucracy the support of the population is obtained and maintained, a critical key to success in these types of operations.

RECOMMENDATION.

The role of stability operations in post cold-war U.S. national security policy will continue to increase as will the costs associated with such efforts. The existing burden on America and its taxpayers is significant. The State Department costs associated with stability operations are accountable and visible through the Department’s congressional authorizations and appropriations. The burden to DOD is by many accounts much more considerable and far less visible.

To the extent these nontraditional, contingency operations contribute to the security of our nation, they are a very worthwhile undertaking. The training, personnel and material needed to ensure these efforts are successful must not be undermined due to financial constraints or an overly bureaucratic process. As a result, a more responsive and accountable method of financing for stability operations is necessary.

This paper describes several alternatives to do just that. I recommend the UK’s Quick Response Fund for financing stability operations. The cornerstone of its success is the flexibility provided to the British Commanders in defining their mission. Along with that flexibility is the authority to decide in the theatre of operations, the expenses that need to be incurred to accomplish the mission without permission from higher leadership. On the contrary, US commanders are required to ask permission by way of bureaucratic processes whenever they obligate government funds. It seems ironic that the US government entrusts military commanders with the lives of American troops but is not comfortable with entrusting our nations treasure.

In the end, it is important that whatever mechanism is instituted, it must contain a delicate balance between minimal impact to service budgets and allow for continued Congressional oversight.

WORD COUNT= 4919

ENDNOTES

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¹⁵ U.S. Army Peacekeeping Institute. *Civil Military Operations: Afghanistan*. U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA. 22 October 2003, 106..

¹⁶ Department of Army, *Stability Operations and Support Operations*. Army Regulation FM 3-07 (FM 100-20). (Washington D.C.: U.S. Department of Army, February 2003), 20-115.

¹⁷ BENS Tail to Tooth Commission Report: US Department of Defense's Planning, Programming and Budgeting System, Framing the Problem of PPBS, January 2000, 1.

¹⁸ Contingency Operations, DOD Financial Management Regulations, Vol 12 chapter 23, February 2001. 23-1.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 23-3.

²⁰ DOD Directive 7250.5 "Reprogramming of Appropriated Funds", January 9, 1980.

²¹ General Accounting Office, *Budget Reprogramming: DOD Defense Process Reprogramming Funds*. (Washington D.C.: U.S. General Accounting Office, July 1986), 15.

²² Louise Bell, "The Global Conflict Prevention Pool," August 2003; available from <http://www.fco.gov.uk.html>; Internet Accessed 5 December 2003. 3.

²³ Steven Brown, New Zealand Defense Officer, telephone interview by author, 16 February 2004.

²⁴ Louise Bell, "The Global Conflict Prevention Pool," August 2003; available from <http://www.fco.gov.uk.html>; Internet Accessed 5 December 2003. 8.

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