# Transformation: Effectively Marketing Change in the Army

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ABSTRACT

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Transformation, reform, modernization, change - whatever one calls it - is not a new phenomenon in the Army. Change is an ongoing dynamic associated with practically all modern institutions regardless of the label. The recent controversy surrounding the U.S. Army and its ability to get “onboard” with the Secretary of Defense and his vision for Transformation should not be viewed as an indictment of the Army’s ability to change or “Transform.” Rather it reveals a failure of marketing strategy. The Army has an effective strategy for Transformation. It is widely accepted that the Army led the way in “transformation” with its modernization programs well ahead of other organizations within the Department of Defense (DOD). So what happened?

This paper analyzes the difficulties the Army experienced in marketing “transformation” to the broader Defense community and identifies significant factors contributing to this dilemma. The Army’s marketing strategy appears to have been flawed from the start, it continued to erode, eventually culminating in public confrontations between the Department of the Army and the Office of the Secretary of Defense. This Strategy Research Project (SRP) analyzes ways for the Army to recover from this public relations dilemma and regain it’s standing within the Department of Defense (DOD) as a leader of change and successful transformation.
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“Transformation”, “reform”, “modernization” - whatever one calls change - is not a new phenomenon in the Army. Change is an ongoing dynamic regardless of the label. The recent political and intra-bureaucracy controversy surrounding the U.S. Army and its ability to get “onboard” with the Secretary of Defense and his vision for transformation is not an indictment of the Army’s ability to change or “transform.” Rather it reveals a failure in marketing strategy. The Army has an effective strategy for transformation. It is widely accepted that the Army led the way in “transformation” with its modernization programs well ahead of other organizations within the Department of Defense (DOD). So what happened? This paper will address the controversy and the contributing factors surrounding this issue.

TRANSFORMATION

Transformation has become one of the most commonly used terms in today’s military lexicon. But what is it? And why is it important? There is no single common definition for it. Definitions range from: modernization or military reform to “Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA)”, to a cultural or mindset change, and much more. While clearly an unresolved issue of semantics, varied application of this term or concept of “transformation” has exacerbated what is inherently a difficult process under any conditions. Simply stated, transformation is all about organizational change. It is in this context of post-Cold War global re-alignment and military reform that the U.S. Army has experienced one of their biggest challenges in recent history. The term “transformation” has taken on new meaning as it relates to the Department of Defense and its organizations.

All organizations undergo change. Technology, personnel turnover, economics, cultural shifts, and many other factors influence when and how change occurs. One of the most significant components of implementing change and most likely the biggest challenge is the leadership task of how to best manage change. Managers and leaders must consider two fundamental questions regarding change: “Two realities exist when addressing organizational change. First, ‘What do we change?’ and second, ‘How do we get the people in the organization to change?’” An additional significant factor in managing change, especially in this case, is addressing how do we market externally? “During the external Environmental Scan phase, organizations analyze those external factors that will eventually impact their organizations.” These questions reveal the crux of the issue that the Army encountered with the Department of Defense (DoD) regarding transformation. “The dominant view of military organizations is that they resist change. Responding to bureaucratic incentives, the services
will stick to current routines, altering them incrementally at most, even if this comes at the expense of performing their missions. Only civilian intervention can overcome these obstacles to change. This “civilian intervention”, a role historically played by Congress, has recently shifted to the Secretary of Defense and his Office. As the quote clearly indicates, only through such interventions will military organizations genuinely change.

TRANSFORMATION—THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE’S VERSION

The Department of Defense (DoD) or more specifically the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) has employed a wide variety of means and methodologies for promoting military transformation. While transformation or organizational change, is not a new phenomenon in DoD, it became a “buzzword” connotating the associated controversy with the arrival of President George W. Bush’s administration, along with his new Secretary of Defense, Donald H. Rumsfeld. Initially, the term surfaced in speeches and public addresses by both the President and the Secretary of Defense. President Bush consistently articulated his priority on implementing change or transformation in the military in speeches and public forums. Consider this presidential speech delivered in December 2001:

Our military culture must reward new thinking, innovation, and experimentation. Congress must give defense leaders the freedom to innovate, instead of micromanaging the Defense Department. And every service and every constituency of our military must be willing to sacrifice some of their own pet projects. Our war on terror cannot be used to justify obsolete bases, obsolete programs, or obsolete weapon systems. Every dollar of defense spending must meet a single test: It must help build the decisive power we will need to win the wars of the future.

This priority, coming from the President, set the conditions for Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld to establish military reform, or transformation, as one of his top priorities in order to create efficiencies within the DoD as a whole.

In a speech he delivered on September 10, 2001, Secretary Rumsfeld declared:

Just as we must transform America’s military capability to meet changing threats, we must transform the way the Department [of Defense] works and what it works on. Our challenge is to transform not just the way we deter and defend, but the way we conduct our daily business. Let’s make no mistake: The modernization of the Department of Defense is a matter of some urgency.

But DoD transformation objectives and goals were not clearly specified in an “official” document until the publication of the 30 September 2001 “Quadrennial Defense Report”. Published following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, this document oriented transformation efforts on the newly emerging threat of global terrorism: “Transforming America’s
defense for the 21st century will require a long standing commitment from the country and its leaders. Transformation is not a goal for tomorrow, but an endeavor that must be embraced today. The term transformation was used throughout this key document, which strongly advocated modernizing our military. A series of initiatives and goals involving DoD transformation ensued. As one might expect in a document published at the strategic or national level, these objectives were expressed in overarching macro terms, such as “to project and sustain power in distant theaters.” There was initially very little specificity in defining the expectations of DoD in achieving transformational goals. But additional measures were eventually cited to build the framework for implementing DoD transformation efforts. They included in December 2001 the establishment of the Pentagon Office of Force Transformation, headed by retired Navy Vice Admiral Arthur K. Cebrowski, the creation of numerous Transformation planning cells at the Combatant and Unified Commands, and recently the publication of “Transformation Planning Guidance” in April 2003. So beginning at a macro-level, official DoD perspective, transformation has emerged as a clearly defined initiative complete with a vision, objectives, and goals.

TRANSFORMATION-THE DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY’S VERSION

In examining the U.S. Army’s efforts to implement transformation, it is important to note that the term “transformation,” associated with the modernization or organizational change in the military, was applied by General Eric K. Shinseki, Chief of Staff, U.S. Army (CSA), in June 1999 shortly after assuming his position. This was almost a year and half before being applied at OSD in the same context. As reported in an Association of the U.S. Army (AUSA) publication describing General Shinseki’s vision for transformation: “the Army set in motion a comprehensive transformation of all aspects of its culture and capabilities from warfighting to institutional support.” Indeed the Army vigorously attempted to publicize this new transformation initiative through a variety of means, including an Internet homepage, publications, and speeches by Army leaders. A typical example was aimed at tactical level leaders and soldiers in ARMY Magazine’s “The ARMY Magazine Hooah Guide to Army Transformation” published as a removable extract in the February 2001 edition. This was supplemented by a “train the trainer” presentation available on the Internet, designed for employment in Professional Development forums in Army units (for both Officer and Non-Commissioned Officers).

The Army went as far as establishing its own Army Transformation Office, within the Army G3 (Operations Directorate) Army Staff in the Pentagon well before DoD had established its
own Transformation Office or had even started employing the term “transformation” in official lexicon. The Army employed strong initiatives to implement transformation, even assigning general officers and staff elements whose primary duty is to promote transformation to commands such as the Army’s Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) and at Joint Forces Command (JFCOM). Most recently the Army created and widely distributed a Compact Disk (CD) titled “ARMY TRANSFORMATION – Experience the Future Force” as a new effort in marketing to transform Army culture. The Army’s extensive effort and internal success at marketing transformation was compelling. “The Welch panel, named for its chairman Gen. Larry Welch [USAF, retired], has finished its work and written a 71-page report that declares the Army is well on its way to transforming itself into a much more agile and lethal force.”

Even so, the Army’s effort at implementing organizational change or “transformation” is not a new phenomenon. As in any large organization, with significant roles and responsibilities, change is essential. Effecting change is not easy. This has been recognized by senior Army leaders throughout history. One prophetic example came from General Donn Starry in a March, 1983 article in “Military Review”. He wrote:

Reform of an institution as large as our Army is problematic under the best of circumstances... The need to change will ever be with us. We may have analyzed all the process, framed in its essential parameters, and made some considerable progress toward arming ourselves with systemic mechanisms to permit change to take place. But that in no way ensures either that change will occur or that it will be an easy, orderly process.

General Starry then addressed the inherent difficulties associated with change in an organization, especially the military. He cited numerous examples throughout history. Change, whether labeled “transformation” or otherwise, is inherent to the Army organization and a fundamental role of senior leadership. If the Army’s leaders have consistently acknowledged organizational change as an imperative, why is there such controversy surrounding the most recent DoD efforts to change, or “transform,” especially with the Army? Ironically, General Starry addressed this quandary in the same article: “We [the Army] would be much better served, in the long run, if we could learn how to change our institutions from within instead of creating the circumstances in which change is forced on us by civilian secretaries of war, defense or whatever.” Despite the Army’s extensive efforts to implement change through its own aggressive transformation program, from a senior DoD leadership perspective the Army has failed to meet their expectations when it comes to transformation. Why is this?
TRANSFORMATION—THE CONTROVERSY.

The controversy involving transformation that surrounds the DoD and the Army is not so much about what needs to change, but rather about how to go about implementing change and deciding who is leading these efforts. The official position of “Secretary of Defense” was created in the National Security Act of 1947. Through this Act “the position was to be appointed from civilian life by the President, by and with the Senate’s advice and consent. Therein began the Secretary’s gradual – but – unrelenting growth in power. By 1953, there was no question as to the preeminent power of the Secretary of Defense – to include legal subordination of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.\(^\text{13}\)

When Secretary Rumsfeld arrived in the Pentagon for his second tour of duty as the Secretary of Defense, he arrived with some objectives and goals that he aimed to achieve, whatever the cost. His leadership style was markedly different from his predecessors; it quickly created a stir throughout the Pentagon. One of his top priorities was transformation of DoD. “Rumsfeld was brought back into government to transform the armed forces from a Cold War-era military into a 21\(^{\text{st}}\)-century institution. He wants the armed forces to be smaller, lighter, quicker, deadlier and more flexible.”\(^\text{14}\) Secretary Rumsfeld made this priority very clear from the start. He did not leave much, if any, room for debate. He arrived with a reputation as a hard-nosed leader a reputation he quickly reinforced. His leadership style was actually a paradox. Often viewed in public as intelligent, witty, engaging and direct, another not so widely publicized view was that his abrasive leadership style was counter-productive and intolerant of those who disagreed with him and his policies.

Rumsfeld’s record suggests that it might be foolish to doubt him. Admirers and critics alike, many of whom would only speak anonymously about him ..., credit the Defense secretary with unusual prowess as a war leader and bureaucratic gladiator. ‘There’s no question he’s one of the strongest and most powerful secretaries of Defense we’ve had,’ said Robert S. Strauss, the longtime Democratic Party patriarch. Rumsfeld is pugnacious, demanding, brusque and to his rivals, infuriating. That, admirers say, is what makes him effective.\(^\text{15}\)

So while it was clear that Secretary Rumsfeld arrived with a mandate and vision to “transform” the military and to do it quickly, his leadership style in this powerful position would become a source of controversy.

TRANSFORMATIONAL LEADERSHIP

Secretary Rumsfeld’s form of leadership, while uncommon for a Secretary of Defense, is certainly not a form of leadership uncommon to most senior military leaders. Rumsfeld’s mandate for implementing transformation within DoD represented a daunting challenge and
required bold and audacious measures to set things motion. Academic leadership studies widely advocate a style of leadership required to effectively implement transformation in an organization. Russ Marion and Mary Uhl-Bien, Education and Management professors at Clemson University and the University of Central Florida specifically distinguish “Transformational Leadership” from other forms of leadership, such as “Complex Leadership”: “Transformational leadership represents a top-down leadership approach and suggests more direct attempts at leadership influence. It does this through emphasis on vision (e.g., direction) and getting people to ‘buy in’ and follow the vision.” They further observe that: “At the macro-level, Charismatic or transformational leaders articulate a realistic vision of the future that can be shared [and] make sure it is intelligible to followers.”

General Shinseki, as CSA, did a commendable job as a transformational leader internally to the Army as an organization. His efforts throughout his tenure as CSA reflect his vision for Army Transformation. On the other hand, despite his charismatic leadership attributes in public and significant impact on improving the DoD, Secretary Rumsfeld’s leadership style clearly conflicted with Shinseki’s reflecting a perceived bias against the Army that served as a primary source of controversy.

If the Army has indeed led the U.S. military to embrace transformation, then it seems truly ironic that there would be an adversarial relationship and controversy between them and OSD. Nonetheless, this friction escalated to the point where the Association of the United States Army (AUSA) published a “Torchbearer National Security Report” in February 2003 titled “How ‘Transformational’ is Army Transformation?” This document appears to serve as a rebuttal from the Army regarding OSD claims that the Army was resisting transformation. The introduction by AUSA President, General (retired) Gordon R. Sullivan, notes that “some would argue that the U.S. Army’s transformation to an ‘Objective Force’ is not in concert with U.S. national strategies and Department of Defense (DoD) guidance. In addition, they surmise, what is currently being articulated as an Army transformation strategy is short on substance and long on rhetoric. Nothing could be further than the truth.” The fact that General Sullivan had to overtly address this topic in such a public forum exemplifies just how pervasive this rift had become.

One significant point that General Sullivan alluded to and others continue to focus on is “DoD guidance” regarding transformation. Despite the multitude of sources, offices, studies regarding transformation, the goals and objectives of DoD transformation are not clearly and uniformly articulated anywhere. Nor are transformational goals and objectives uniformly agreed upon. This ambiguity surrounding the Secretary of Defense’s top priority, coupled with
leadership clashes, exacerbates the problem -- and no where more so than in the Army. A professor at the Naval War College, Mackubin Owens summarizes a common view:

The dominant buzzword in the Pentagon for the last few years has been ‘transformation,’ which has been defined by military analysts as innovation on a grand scale, undertaken by a military institution that believes the character of conflict has changed in significant ways. …The war in Iraq illustrates the fact that real military transformation is not an ‘all-or-nothing’ proposition – it is not necessary to replace the entire existing force with entirely new systems and force structures. 18

Owens’s article thus reiterates the difficulties the Army has experienced as it attempts to reconcile its extensive transformation program, viewed internally as very successful and at the cutting edge, with OSD’s program, which is commonly viewed as abstract and poorly defined. These divergent views have fueled the flames of controversy and are broadcast in the mainstream media: OSD versus the Army.

PERCEPTION—OSD VERSUS THE ARMY

Whether the rift and controversy between the Secretary of Defense (or OSD) and the Army truly centers on transformation has almost become moot. The controversy has escalated over a series of contentious and highly visible issues that always seem to be framed in terms of “OSD versus the Army” both in the media and in discussions in the halls of the Pentagon. These issues span the full spectrum, from personnel and equipment to operational tactics. While all of the services and agencies within the Pentagon and DoD have experienced a degree of friction and transitional dilemmas with the significant leadership climate change that Secretary Rumsfeld created, the Army has never seemed to be able to get “onboard” with OSD. There were overtly perceived differences between these parties almost from the start. As one news article stated: “From his first day in office Rumsfeld has fixed his sights on the Army – questioning its leadership, strategy and tactics, and its weaponry. He and his principal lieutenants, Deputy Secretary Paul Wolfowitz and Deputy Secretary Douglas Feith, seemingly found nothing right about America’s senior service.” 19

One of the first and most resounding public controversies between OSD and the Army came when the Secretary of Defense reportedly announced that the residing Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA), General Eric K. Shinseki would be replaced in the summer of 2003. This premature announcement was made almost a year and a half prior to the proposed change. This was unprecedented; in the view of many; it reduced General Shinseki to a “lame duck” status. This signaled the beginning of a rift that the media quickly picked up on. Numerous articles and editorials made such observations as: “Rumsfeld undermined Shinseki’s authority
by naming his replacement 15 months before the scheduled end of Shinseki’s tour. While Secretary Rumsfeld denies he made any such announcement, the perception quickly became reality as it was fortified by media reports.

Shortly following this episode came probably the most divisive controversy of all: the cancellation of the Crusader mobile artillery system in the spring of 2002. This incident, more than any other, is what observers cite to justify the “OSD versus Army” conflict. Again, the media’s portrayal of an unfortunate situation was presented in an unflattering light:

The rupture between Rumsfeld and his top Army generals stems from a combustible combination of clashing personalities and policy differences. The early battle lines were drawn over Crusader, an $11 billion mobile artillery system that Rumsfeld and his allies argued [was not suited] for fighting 21st-century terrorists and guerilla forces. In the spring of 2002, the Army rallied its congressional allies in a highly public fight that culminated with Rumsfeld killing the program. Beyond the obvious repercussions, the second and third order effects of this incident were extremely damaging to the senior Army leadership and widespread throughout DoD. One view in the Pentagon was that the Army had intentionally undermined the Secretary of Defense and OSD; some even believed it was a form of retribution for previous conflicts between these organizations. On the other hand, many Army leaders felt that the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense had used the dramatic cancellation of the Army’s Crusader program to demonstrate their no-nonsense commitment to “the way forward” and DoD transformation. The controversy was so severe that Secretary of the Army Thomas White offered to resign, an offer that Secretary Rumsfeld refused to accept immediately, although Secretary White has since departed.

While there were many other underlying clashes between the Army and OSD that did not garner the attention granted to those previously discussed, the next publicized controversy involved the operational planning for combat operations in Iraq. When General Shinseki testified before a Congressional panel in early 2003 “that securing postwar Iraq would require hundreds of thousands of troops, Pentagon leaders [including Deputy Secretary of Defense Wolfowitz] publicly called his estimate ‘wildly off the mark’. To publicly challenge the senior Army leader on such an issue was clearly an affront to his experience and subject matter expertise, which ultimately undermined his authority once again. In this case, when asked to comment on this confrontational issue, the Secretary of the Army Thomas White backed General Shinseki.

Secretary White’s public support for General Shinseki led to the next controversy -- the “removal” of Thomas White as Secretary of the Army. He was either fired or resigned in May
2003. Initially the official word in the Pentagon was that he had resigned, the final word was that he had been fired by the Secretary of Defense. Once again the media quickly picked up on the ongoing conflict between the Army and OSD, reinforcing the nature and severity of this situation. Headlines such as “A Shift Takes Shape In Army” with a sub heading of “Firing by Rumsfeld signals transition” reflected how far the situation had deteriorated. A common theme in the media was to associate the OSD-Army conflict with the issue of transformation and a portrayal of the Army “dragging its heels”. To make this situation more controversial, Secretary Rumsfeld announced that his proposed replacement for White as Secretary of the Army was the sitting Air Force Secretary, James G. Roche. While well qualified for the job, many Army leaders viewed this as the ultimate insult: Roche, a former Navy officer, coming from the Air Force to take over duties as the senior Army civilian!

The next public controversy centered on senior Army personnel. While it became common knowledge in the Pentagon and eventually in the media – and inside sources close to the CSA confirmed it -- all nominations for Army General Officer in the rank of two stars and above were being personally reviewed and approved by Secretary Rumsfeld himself. Reportedly, personal nominations for these promotions by General Shinseki were almost automatically disapproved upon arrival at OSD. This once again undermined the CSA and his authority, and the second and third order effects were telling. One noteworthy fallout from the Secretary of Defense’s handling of senior level personnel was the OSD’s inability to find a replacement for General Shinseki as CSA. Originally, General John M. Keane, Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, was slated to step up for duties as CSA. But he backed out in early 2003, citing personal reasons. By June, with General Shinseki less than a week from retirement, there was still no named replacement. Reportedly the job was offered to no less than three senior officers among the three and four star ranks; no one took the offer. Consider the media’s observations regarding OSD’s inability to identify a new CSA: “The interesting question is why? Part of the answer is Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld. To put it plainly, Rumsfeld treats people like crap.” This too had a resounding effect throughout the Army ranks. “Normally, the position of Chief of Staff of the Army is the ultimate brass ring an Army officer can hope to grab. There is no higher Army job, and merely holding it guarantees a man at least a small place in the history books—though not necessarily a favorable one.” Ultimately, Secretary Rumsfeld reached into the retired ranks and selected General Peter Schoomaker, former Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command.

This controversy over finding a new CSA gained the attention of congressional leaders. Reports indicated that a group of bipartisan senators queried Secretary Rumsfeld in writing
about why this essential position had yet to be filled, especially during ongoing operations in
Iraq and Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{26} Such notoriety in the media perpetuated the ongoing conflict within the
DoD, but in this case OSD and the Secretary of Defense were cast in a negative light. To some
Army leaders it was almost a form of “poetic justice” -- a direct result of the Secretary of
Defense’s leadership style and command culture. It was satisfying for some to see OSD under
scrutiny for problems they had generated themselves.

The fallout continued shortly after the new CSA was selected with the announcement of
an extensive number of senior Army generals suddenly announcing their retirements. Rumors
and insider perceptions were rampant. To many observers, this was unexpected and came as
a top-down mandate from OSD. Naturally, the media did not miss an opportunity: One article
declared: “Most recently, a handful of Army three-star generals retired, prompting speculation
that Rumsfeld was conducting a purge. ‘It’s a major purge. Blood is flowing out of the
Pentagon,’ said David Hackworth, a retired Army colonel who writes a syndicated column [and
frequently comments on controversial military issues].”\textsuperscript{27}

Without doubt, the ongoing controversy between the OSD and the Army was widely
publicized. For every one of these events, there were a number of corollary or less publicized
confrontations. It was an ongoing confrontation that seemed to escalate with each passing
event. The perception and empirical reality of the Army at odds with OSD and the Secretary of
Defense permeated the Army and the military community at large. The continuous media
reports only fueled the controversy. So what was the root source of the controversy? How could
it be resolved?

PERSONALITY CONFLICT

The common element found in many of the aforementioned incidents between the
Secretary of Defense (and OSD) and the Army is the personality conflict between Secretary
Rumsfeld and the CSA, General Shinseki. Although this simplistic explanation should not pass
the common sense test, the evidence is quite compelling. Initially, as this friction with the Army
became publicly visible, the common perception was simply that Rumsfeld did not like the Army.
He had served in the Navy; he was clearly enamored with high technology in his transformation
initiatives. In his article about Army Transformation, William S. Lind wrote about the significance
of the Army and its essential role as a ground force: “Logically, that should make the Army the
Administration’s focus, its Schwerpunkt. Instead, OSD is in love with the Air Force, to the point
where it wants to make the Army into a second Air Force, waging the high-tech, video game
warfare.” Lind then observed that “Secretary Rumsfeld also preaches reform, but what he
means by reform is just more of the high-tech illusion. Again, the Air Force is the model."  This view was countered by those who claimed this was merely Rumsfeld’s leadership style and he had no service favorites. But the premature announcement of General Shinseki’s departure coupled with the Crusader cancellation served as definitive proof of a clear and direct personality clash.

General Shinseki took over as CSA in the summer of 1999 and arrived with tremendous credentials. He was highly regarded among Army leaders, across the military, and throughout the Department of Defense. He quickly established his commitment to organizational reform by coining the term “transformation” for his vision of the Army of the future. He was also highly regarded in Congress: “GEN Shinseki put a lot of thought and effort into the Army vision and readiness. He gained strong support from 3 [congressional] committees to underwrite transformation early on, with solid support from the fourth.”  While General Shinseki was quite articulate and energetic in getting out his transformation vision to the Army, he was less inclined to publicize it to external agencies, including the media. Inside sources in both the CSA Public Affairs office and the CSA Initiatives Group confirmed a well-known fact in Army channels: General Shinseki did not like working with the media, especially conducting one-on-one interviews. Rather he focused on getting the word out to soldiers and their families. This idiosyncrasy appears to have been a contributing factor in the Army’s inability to market their transformation strategy, serving inadvertently to alienate the organization from OSD leaders. His mindset seems to have permeated the Army leadership: “The Army culture is not to draw attention to itself or promote itself (selfless service is one of the Army’s values). As a result, the Army feels that as long as it is doing what it thinks is right, there is no need to publicize its efforts.”

Soon after his arrival in the Pentagon, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld’s leadership style gained attention within the Pentagon and eventually with the public through extensive media coverage. His aggressive and non-conventional means of quickly seeking ways to implement change in DoD alienated so many senior military leaders early on that there were rumors he would be replaced. Then came 11 September 2001 and the terrorist attacks. Suddenly the U.S. was at war. Rumsfeld excelled in this new environment. Until recently in the public view he could do no wrong: “Even as he directs military operations around the world, Rumsfeld has seized a leading role in the national security debate in Washington, giving the Pentagon new clout in administration debates on foreign policy and intelligence.”  His strong footing in the Bush administration, coupled with his popularity in the eyes of the American public, further alienated the Army from OSD and many other agencies within the Pentagon.
As the previously described controversies multiplied, the source of the friction narrowed to Rumsfeld and Shinseki, culminating as the CSA approached retirement in June, 2003. The media recognized this friction; it was noted in numerous reports, such as an article by Robert Caldwell in May 2003, who reported: “Rumsfeld compounds this atmosphere of mistrust by treating Shinseki, a decorated combat veteran who lost part of his foot in Vietnam, with ill-disguised disdain. Rumsfeld undermined Shinseki’s authority by naming his replacement 15 months before the end of Shinseki’s tour.” Another by Joseph Galloway in June 2003 noted: “Shinseki, a quiet warrior who avoided the media at every opportunity, has been treated shamefully by Rumsfeld and his people. He soldiered on faithfully and loyally, driving the engine of change inside an institution he loves.” Such sympathetic reporting further exacerbated the negative perception that the Secretary of Defense was pushing General Shinseki out the door in order to have free reign in promoting his transformational agenda within the Army.

THE NET RESULT OF CONTROVERSY

Consider the net results of these three overarching themes: transformation, leadership, and personality conflict. Note that each was a key component of the DOD -- Army controversy. In these categorical terms the controversy becomes easier to recognize and seemingly inevitable. This recognition is simplified and in this paper comes in the form of hindsight in an environment absent of competing priorities, time constraints and personal emotions. Even so, as these events transpired it was clear that there was a developing rift between the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the Army. Ironically, it was occurring at a time when the United States was going to war against a newly emerged enemy under very complex circumstances. In hindsight it may be possible to identify a specific reason or personality as the primary source of the controversy, it is nonetheless clear that both the OSD and Army leadership contributed to the eventual outcome.

The controversy created a confrontational attitude between OSD and the Army that did nothing to facilitate the prosecution of the Global War on Terrorism or Operations Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan, or Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). This tension was recognized and closely observed by the military leadership, especially those in the Army who where never sure what the next disagreement would center around. This uncertainty contributed to an attitude among Army leaders that could be labeled as “confrontational”. “The Rumsfeld-Army friction shows in mutually destructive ways. Nowhere in the armed forces is that conflict over modernization more bitter and unresolved than in the U.S. Army.” This perception was
reflected in mainstream media reporting and subsequently among some key congressional leaders and the American public.

The Army’s struggle with understanding and engaging with OSD on transformation, the sequence of high profile controversial events publicized in the media, and the personality conflicts between senior OSD leaders and Army leaders -- primarily the Secretary of Defense and CSA -- clearly had a detrimental effect on the Army’s ability to market itself as an effective organization in a time of transformation. So what could the Army have done differently given the circumstances and personalities involved in this scenario?

A PROPOSED SOLUTION—HOW COULD THE ARMY HAVE DONE IT BETTER?

To even the casual observer, it is very clear that the Army developed and endorsed a comprehensive and visionary program of transformation with well defined goals and objectives for implementing organizational change prior to arrival of Secretary Rumsfeld. But recall the quote from General Donn Starry’s article cited previously: “We [the Army] would be much better served, in the long run, if we could learn how to change our institutions from within instead of creating the circumstances in which change is forced on us by civilian secretaries of war, defense or whatever.”

A significant part of implementing change from within is recognizing relevant external factors and employing a strategy to market your change to appropriate parties. In this case, despite the personality conflicts, the Army could have done a better job in engaging OSD and marketing their transformation plan.

RECOGNIZING SIGNIFICANT ASPECTS OF THE ENVIRONMENT

In his report “Managing Strategic Change: An Executive Overview”, Robert Murphy identifies the significance of an organization conducting an “environmental scan” while implementing change. He further breaks the “environmental scan” into external and internal components. “During the external Environmental Scan phase, organizations analyze those external factors that will eventually impact their operations.” It appears that the Army did not do an adequate job of recognizing the external factors that would impact their plan for executing transformation -- in this case the Secretary of Defense and OSD. Recognizing that this would be no simple endeavor under even ideal conditions, the drastic shift in the leadership and management style that Secretary Rumsfeld wrought throughout DoD amplified this challenge for Army leadership. But a key aspect, especially from a transformation perspective, is recognizing the significance of personalities in implementing change. Despite the perception within the Pentagon, and portrayed in much of the media, that Secretary Rumsfeld had an anti-Army agenda, the Army could have taken more proactive steps to eliminate or minimize this view.
The most significant shortfall that the Army experienced in marketing their transformation strategy was ineffective communication: “One senior officer who advises the CSA indicated that the biggest challenge to Army Transformation is getting the message out. That officer felt that the Army was doing a pretty good job of communicating internally, but the communication outside the Army was a problem.” This was exacerbated by General Shinseki’s reluctance to engage with the media. While the Army employed a wide variety of mediums (Internet web sites, CDs, pamphlets, etc.) to export their transformation vision, these tools were not getting the vocal and visual support of Army leaders in the right forums. One underlying view based on empirical information was that internal resistance existed among a few senior Army general officers who felt that General Shinseki’s transformation initiatives threatened the fundamental structure of the Army and how it was supposed to engage in modern warfare. This perception may well have contributed to the negative connotation or reluctance towards transformation within the ranks of the Army leadership.

Another aspect was the general lack of understanding of transformation and how it applied to the Army. This was evident even among Senior Service College students. In a research study published in 2003 in the Naval War College’s Newport Papers by Thomas Mahnken and James FitzSimonds they examined the views of military officers from all services and the full spectrum of rank structure regarding transformation. The results clearly reflected a great deal of skepticism and general lack of knowledge on what transformation was really all about. The authors attribute part of this skepticism to service culture: “The culture of the armed services plays a dominant role in shaping officer attitudes.” These findings reinforce the importance of marketing change both internally and externally. They further emphasized the significance of why an understanding of the attitudes of most officers would seem to be very important to the process of transformation. The extent to which they approach change with a positive attitude may have much to do with the success or failure of new technologies operational concepts, and organizations.

Recognizing the personality differences between the CSA and OSD leaders, the Army could have selected another senior leader to serve as the transformation “spokesperson” or focal point. They should have selected an individual positively viewed by OSD and the other services:

Some observe that GEN Shinseki has not been the visible, vocal 24/7 guy, that Secretary Rumsfeld was during OIF. That is okay as long as someone else is put in the role to be that visible person. It is in the Army culture to defer to the leader. If GEN Shinseki was not going to be the visible champion of Transformation, no one under him would take over that task unless given that authority and responsibility by the CSA himself. In fact, no one has emerged as
the ‘face of Transformation’ in an America that expects the leader to be visible and speak out on issues of importance to the organization. GEN Shinseki could have appointed someone to be the voice of Army Transformation. Transformation would be well served to have the CSA or a senior officer made visible as the face of Transformation.\(^{40}\)

This significant marketing tool of employing the right personality to represent the organization can not be overemphasized. General Tommy Franks, Commander U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), recognized this as his command entered Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). He reached back to the Pentagon and selected Brigadier General Vincent Brooks to come forward as his spokesperson for providing daily updates on the operation. Brooks was extremely effective in engaging the media and “marketing” CENTCOM’s storyline.

Another issue for marketing transformation from the communications perspective concerns ways of engaging the media. The recent use of “embedded media” during OIF is good example of an effective marketing technique for getting the story out. "On the positive side, use of embedded reporters in OIF was a huge strategic communication success for the Army and Marines. What a contrast between the openness of the embedded media in OIF and the constant secrecy (or silence) around Army Transformation!\(^{41}\) While the media clearly tends to exploit the controversial headline stories, which they repeatedly did in covering the Army versus OSD, proactively engaging the media in similar fashion as with the embedded media initiative would better serve the Army and the public in marketing transformation.

Another solution to the problems the Army has encountered with OSD may come from noting how the other services are doing things. On the surface, all services rely on the same type marketing tools such as Internet web sites, pamphlets, publications, Compact Disks and more. Consider “Naval Power 21… A Naval Vision” published in October 2002, which does not differ much from Army publications of the same type. It certainly appears that senior leadership in the other services have a much more amiable relationship with OSD and subsequently what is portrayed in the media regarding their transformation efforts clearly reflects a more positive theme. For example, in recent media reports focused on the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Vern Clark’s announcement of the Navy’s initiatives to reduce personnel end strength and the number of navy vessels. The report portrayed a proactive effort to effect change, or “transformation” in the Navy, but actually it represented the difficulties the Navy was experiencing in meeting operational requirements with resource and budget constraints. The Air Force has successfully fended off OSD efforts to eliminate its programs involving a variety of aircraft systems such as the F-22, and it is viewed by many as the “service of choice” by the Secretary of Defense. The Air Force has been very effective in portraying their service as high
technology and network-centric. It has publicized the contributions and evolving nature of Air Power, based on “Global Strike, Precision Engagement, Stealth, Information Operations and Space capability.” These themes are closely aligned with those espoused by Secretary Rumsfeld and OSD.

Certainly “cultural change” within the Army is also essential to transformation and paramount to its success but it is not the only area that requires attention. Cultural change is inherent to transforming any organization and the internal Army culture is well on its way to making the necessary changes. The near-term fix for the Army is to address and engage the external factors and personalities in marketing Army Transformation.

Undoubtedly personality conflict, leadership style differences, and a pronounced command climate change in DoD were significant factors in the controversy between the Army and OSD. Despite this, General Shinseki should not be personally identified as the primary source of the Army’s problems. His contributions in launching Army Transformation and his ambitious goals and vision established the Army as the leader among DoD agencies in the transformation initiative. But the Army leadership as a whole did fail to recognize the external factors associated with implementing transformation within DoD and failed to take the necessary steps to adapt, thus preventing the Army from getting “onboard” with DoD transformation.

THE WAY AHEAD

The Army is well on its way to solving some of the problems identified throughout this paper. The selection of General Peter Schoomaker as the new CSA appears at this early stage to have been a wise decision by Secretary Rumsfeld: “Schoomaker says he intends to accelerate an effort begun under his predecessor Gen Eric Shinseki to make the army lighter, faster and more flexible for modern warfare. Gen Schoomaker is introducing a new approach that may make this transition more feasible when the service is strained by its global deployments.” Since he assumed his duties as CSA, General Schoomaker has been extremely visible to both soldiers and to the media; he has completed a global tour to visit troops and units professing his vision and the Army’s way ahead. He has also engaged with OSD and the Secretary of Defense, publicly recognizing the friction that has existed between the organizations:

The chief of staff of the Army said that he’s been impressed with the Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld who has ‘made it clear that he’s available’ to meet regularly on service issues. Gen. Peter J. Schoomaker, speaking with reporters Oct. 7 at the AUSA Annual Meeting, said he did not know exactly what went on between Gen. Eric Shinseki, former chief of staff, and Rumsfeld. ‘I don’t think either of them were happy about how they were communicating.’
This article reflects some positive changes in Army leadership. First, it indicates the new CSA’s willingness to speak publicly and articulate the Army position. Second, Schoomaker directly addresses the issue of friction with OSD and the Secretary of Defense and has undertaken some overt efforts to remedy this situation. And finally, he publicly addresses the issue of conflict between Shinseki and Rumsfeld. All of these add up to the proactive, up-front approach the Army needs to remain engaged with OSD. Now General Schoomaker must work at getting other senior Army leaders to think and act along the same lines to enhance the Army’s marketing efforts. Effective communications is a key component of effective marketing.

Schoomaker has also made efforts to simplify the Army Transformation vision by eliminating some of the technical and bureaucratic terminology and adding clarity to the goals of the “Future Force”. The employment of the Army’s newest combat organization, the Stryker Brigade in Iraq is also being closely watched by critics to see if the Army’s initial transformation efforts meet the expectations of a rapidly deployable and survivable force. And while this was an operational decision made under Shinseki’s tenure, the Army management of the marketing of the Stryker’s performance may be one of Schoomaker’s first public tests.

The selection of James G. Roche as the new Secretary of the Army, assuming his nomination is passed in Congress, will also most likely work in favor of the Army. Granted, Roche’s selection was one of Secretary Rumsfeld’s controversial moves, but he comes armed with strong credentials for working the tough issues in DoD. “Those who have worked with Roche in his career... – say he is suited for the Army job. They say his style involves intellectual rigor and intense questioning, but also applying an open mind and a willingness to make a service’s case if it is legitimate.”

That last observation above is the key challenge for Army leadership --- “…making a legitimate case for the Army.” This is what it will take to get the Army back “onboard” with OSD and the Secretary of the Defense. To use an old colloquial phrase: “they must play the cards they have been dealt.” Working with the new CSA and Secretary of the Army to achieve this goal is the way forward for the Army. This is an essential element in recognizing the external factors and taking them into careful consideration in order for the Army to remain relevant in DoD transformation without sacrificing their own Transformation program.

CONCLUSION

The Army’s overall efforts and initiatives in employing an effective strategy for Army Transformation have been successful and remain on course. Their efforts to effectively market this strategy outside Army channels have failed for the most part. This failure comes primarily...
from an inability to recognize the external environmental factors and personalities that most influence the success or failure of transformation -- in this case, getting “onboard” with OSD and the Secretary of Defense.

As one instructor at the Army War College recently stated: “Transformation is a thought process change -- a cultural change—personnel-driven rather than exclusively technology driven. This focus puts a much larger emphasis on key leader personalities rather than on implementation of technology and evolution of systems.” This observation serves as an accurate assessment of where the Army failed in marketing their transformation strategy. Failure to recognize the significant role of DoD leadership and their ability to influence the decisions for the way forward for the Army resulted in a flawed strategy. This flaw was revealed in the strong clash of personalities. The Army’s inability or reluctance to adjust to the new conditions had a detrimental effect on the program.

These personality conflicts led to a lack of effective strategic communications. The Army’s inability to effectively engage with OSD in marketing transformation strategy was a significant source of the problem. It seems the Army forgot to factor in the external audience. While transformation was well-defined and marketed within the Army, it was never synchronized with OSD. Whether this was a shortcoming associated with this specific CSA / SecDef, or a cultural specific issue, it is a problem the Army must solve to remain effective and relevant with DoD transformation. The Army must continuously assess where it stands in the broader DoD community and make adjustments to maintain its relevance to the external environment.

Fortunately, it appears the Army -- and OSD to an extent -- has recognized the unproductive nature of this controversy and how they have “shared in mutually destructive ways.” With recent personnel changes, some concessions and agreements by both organizations, and a better understanding on the part of the Army to recognize significant external factors, there appears to be a more productive “way ahead.”

The Army places strong emphasis on history and lessons learned. To successfully transform in the current civil-military environment, the Army must expand this study of history and lessons learned beyond the operational realm and into the intellectual and political realms, to include the greater issue of organizational change. General Donn Starry addressed this issue in these exact terms as far back as 1983:

We [the Army] would be much better served, in the end, if we could develop and refine, in our institution, the cultural commonality of intellectual endeavor and the ability to think logically about tough problems. These are necessary to develop new ideas, mature them quickly and chart relevant action programs which effect change in an efficient, orderly way.
To accomplish this, the Army as a Service must accept the reality that whatever is going to be done in the way of transformation must be closely linked and integrated into the transformation that must occur throughout the national security community. This requires restoration of a cooperative atmosphere, a step the new CSA appears to have taken, but it requires further, an initiation of a new dialogue over issues of roles and missions within the emerging global security context. It may well be that Operation Iraqi Freedom was a necessary precursor to the initiation of this new dialogue as it has served to highlight the abiding grim realities of ground combat that had faded from view in the lingering euphoria of Operation Desert Storm.
ENDNOTES


2 Murphy, 42.


12 Ibid, 27.


AUSA Torchbearer Issue, 2.


Galloway, pg. 1.


Ibid, 2.


Ibid, 1.


Schlesinger, 2.

Lind, 1.


Ibid, 22.

McManus, 1.

Caldwell, 1-2.
33 Galloway, 2.
34 Caldwell, 1.
35 Starry, 27.
36 Murphy, 42.
37 Shambach, 22.
39 Mahnken and FitzSimonds, 2-3.
40 Shambach, 23.
41 Shambach, 23.
42 Shambach, 12.
45 Schlesinger, 2.
46 Harry Tomlin, U.S. Army War College Faculty Instructor, Seminar lecture, Carlisle Barracks, PA, U.S. Army War College, 19 November 2003, cited with permission of COL Tomlin.
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