SWIFTLY DEFEAT THE EFFORTS: THEN WHAT?
THE “NEW AMERICAN WAY OF WAR” AND
TRANSITIONING DECISIVE COMBAT TO
POST CONFLICT STABILIZATION

by

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Since the end of the first Gulf War the United States has fought in three decisive operations: Operation Allied Force in Kosovo, Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, and Operation Iraqi Freedom in Iraq. The principles of Rapid Decisive Operations influenced the pattern and conduct of operations in all three conflicts. This has been termed the “New American Way of War.”

The last three combat operations since the first gulf war ratifies the ideas postulated in the concept of Rapid Decisive Operations, and appear to justify the force sizing choices made in the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review. However, post conflict operations were never included as part of the force sizing calculus. Paradoxically it now takes more ground force to secure the peace in post conflict than to bring an end to decisive operations.

This paper will examine the paradox created by the “New American Way of War” and the increased need for ground forces to secure the peace compared to conducting decisive operations. To explore this paradox, the analysis will focus on the period of time in a campaign when decisive operations transition from conflict termination to post conflict stability operations.
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SWIFTLY DEFEAT THE EFFORTS: THEN WHAT? THE “NEW AMERICAN WAY OF WAR” AND TRANSITIONING DECISIVE COMBAT TO POST CONFLICT STABILIZATION

Since the end of the first Gulf War in Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm the United States has fought in three decisive operations: Operation Allied Force in Kosovo, Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, and Operation Iraqi Freedom in Iraq. The principles of Rapid Decisive Operations influenced the pattern and conduct of operations in all three conflicts. The success in the major combat operations of Operation Iraqi Freedom, led Max Boot, to call this a “New American Way of War.”

It was the promise of Rapid Decisive Operations that served as the lynchpin for the revision of the 2 Major Theater of War force sizing construct during the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review. This revision resulted in a new force sizing construct that mandated that “…forces be shaped to defend the United States; Deter aggression and coercion forward in four critical regions; swiftly defeat aggression in overlapping major conflicts while preserving for the President the option to call for a decisive victory in one of those conflicts—including the possibility of regime change or occupation; and conduct a limited number of smaller scale contingency operations.”

The new concept of swiftly defeat the efforts of an adversary was embraced, in large part, on the hope that this would yield force savings with no discernable risk.

The last three combat operations undertaken by the United States in the period since the first gulf war ratifies the ideas postulated in the concept of Rapid Decisive Operations, and appears to justify the force sizing choices made in the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review. However, post conflict operations was never included as part of the force sizing calculus. The notion of Rapid Decisive Operations was one of “hit and run” rather than “fight and stay.” Yet fight and stay is precisely what happened in Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq. Paradoxically it now takes more ground force to secure the peace in post conflict than to bring an end to decisive operations.

This would not be much of a problem were it not for the rules associated with the Quadrennial Defense Review force sizing construct which allows forces to be sized only for the conduct of decisive operations. All other force structure is considered “lesser included” and would be considered, for analytical purposes, to be extracted from a stability operation to conduct decisive operations. However, during Operation Iraqi Freedom the United States did not extract forces from ongoing stability operations in the Sinai, Bosnia, Kosovo, or Afghanistan. The post-conflict operations that the United States Army is committed to now exceeds the amount of force sized to meet the decisive operations needs envisioned under the two Major Theater War Concept. A force improperly sized can lead to symptoms of increased force stress.
causing decreased readiness, increased retention problems, and larger institutional problems if not corrected in the mid term.

This paper will examine the paradox created by the “New American Way of War,” as represented by the concept of Rapid Decisive Operations, and the increased need for ground forces to secure the peace compared to conducting decisive operations. To examine this paradox, the primary focus will be the period of time in a campaign when decisive operations transition from conflict termination to post conflict stability operations. The concepts explored in the previous sections will be compared to the cases of Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq to provide conclusions and recommendations than may be used in future force sizing discussions in the 2005 Quadrennial Defense Review.

A NEW AMERICAN WAY OF WAR

The “New American Way of War,” as described by Max Boot in Foreign Affairs, is a method of war characterized by rapid maneuver, and precision firepower to achieve quick victory with minimum casualties. This new style of warfare puts a premium on flexibility and surprise, and relies on special operations forces to a much greater extent than in times past. The “New American Way of War” depends on the heavy use of psychological and information operations to cause opponents to capitulate without fighting. The main pillar of this “New American Way of War” is the use of information technology to integrate air, land, and seapower to accomplish assigned missions.6 Boot points to United States operations in Iraq during Operation Iraqi Freedom and in Afghanistan during Operation Enduring Freedom as evidence that this transformation in the American Way of War is occurring right before our eyes. However, according to Boot, Operation Iraqi Freedom was much more of a Combined Arms Operation, meaning, there were far more conventional land forces than used in Afghanistan.9 His analysis of Operation Enduring Freedom demonstrated the difficulties of not employing enough land forces in an operation, since the Taliban and Al Quaida forces managed to elude destruction. He argues, paradoxically, that more ground forces will be needed to secure the peace than to win the war.10

The current Director of the Office of Force Transformation, Vice Admiral (Ret) Arthur Cebrowski, has similar views about the changing nature of the American Way of War, and Rapid Decisive Operations. Cebrowski, along with a Professor from the Naval War College, Thomas Barnett, argued that Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan showcased the “Emerging American Way of War.”11 For all intents and purposes, “The Emerging American
Way of War” as outlined by Cebrowski and Barnett provide the Department of Defense vision for the future of warfare.\textsuperscript{12}

The “Emerging American Way of War,” showcases Special Operations Forces operating with local knowledge from remote locations, and applying information-age technology to leverage networked precision capabilities to achieve strategic effects. These forces are assisted by units capable of nation building and constabulary operations upon the end of strike operations to free the elite forces for other missions. This vision exhibits speed in execution of operations, and increasing precision of operational effects to limit an adversary’s strategic choices.\textsuperscript{13}

The “Emerging American Way of War,” through the use of Network Centric operations, provides the promise of less land forces in contact with the enemy during decisive operations. This concept goes so far as to say that the United States “endeavors to keep the ground forces’ “footprint” as economical as possible.”\textsuperscript{14} This is possible since the joint force “aims for rapid dominance of any battlefield it may enter so the initial blows come from the air.”\textsuperscript{15} This is the connection the authors of the “Emerging American Way of War” make with the concepts of Rapid Dominance and Rapid Decisive Operations. In these concepts minimal ground forces will be used to “roll up enemy ground forces that have been softened by air attacks and to occupy terrain.”\textsuperscript{16}

Cebrowski and Barnett are largely mute about the issue of ground forces needed to secure the peace. As described earlier they envision a constabulary and nation building force to allow for elite forces to exit upon completion of decisive operations. The notion is that there will be a clear delineation between decisive combat and post conflict operations. The concept of securing and occupying terrain and controlling the adversary populace is really not explored in any meaningful way other than the assumption that limited land force will be required to secure the peace due to the decisive nature of Network Centric Rapid Decisive Operations. They envision a short stabilization period due to passing off the security of the countryside to the local constabulary or to other national peacekeeping forces.\textsuperscript{17} Cebrowski and Barnett further elaborate on this concept as part of their ideas for the employment of ground forces in which the Army maintains the peace as a “premier long-term occupation force.” The Army will maintain the peace only until the United States can transition the post conflict stability duties to international or local civilian rule.\textsuperscript{18}

What emerges from the Office of Force Transformation’s view of the “New American Way of War” is somewhat different from that of Max Boot’s. Their view is that due to the changing nature of war there will be limited need for ground forces during decisive operations. One may
assume their view is that the same amount of ground forces needed for success during decisive operations, can be used for the post conflict.

**OPERATIONALIZING THE “NEW AMERICAN WAY OF WAR”**

The Joint Forces Command took the ideas of Rapid Dominance and developed the concept of Rapid Decisive Operations. The Rapid Decisive Operations concept will serve as the blueprint for future concept development and experimentation. Rapid Decisive Operations, as described in the whitepaper, integrates knowledge, command and control, and operations, while leveraging other elements of national power, to enable the United States and its allies to attack asymmetrically an adversary from different directions and in different dimensions. These operations will so overpower an adversary in a variety of ways that he will lose coherence, will realize he cannot achieve his objectives and thus will capitulate or will ultimately be defeated. Yet the ideas of Rapid Decisive Operations reflect the hallmarks of the “New American Way of War” as outlined by the Office of Defense Transformation with the emphasis on speed, networked command and control, enabling the application of effects based operations at the lowest level to achieve decisive results.

The concept for Rapid Decisive Operations, while described as simultaneous and parallel in its characteristics, envisions a sequential and serial post conflict transition. The forces that will be required for the transition may or may not be available to the Joint Force Commander since the white paper concept does not address the transition to post conflict and conflict termination. The White Paper never really addresses the need for the Joint Force Commander to simultaneously fight decisive operations while securing the peace.

The ideas of Rapid Decisive Operations also permeate the new Joint Operating Concept for Major Combat Operations. The central theme for the Joint Operating Concept for Major Combat Operations is for the Joint Force to bring conflict with a regional nation state to decisive conclusion through the use of swiftly executed, simultaneous and sequentially applied power in a contiguous or non-contiguous manner. The characteristics of how the Joint Forces Command view the future conduct of Major Combat Operations is to employ a knowledge-enhanced, effects-based approach, applying relentless pressure, and engaging the adversary comprehensively. The Joint Force will accomplish this by using collaborative processes, aligning deployment, employment, and sustainment actions, protecting the Joint Force throughout the battlespace. The Joint Force will start a Major Combat Operation with a strategic purpose in mind to achieve decisive conclusions.
The Major Combat Operations concept thus assumes that a coherent enemy force remains at the end of combat operations that will capitulate to U.S. terms of conflict termination. There is no mention of simultaneous conduct of decisive combat along with stability operations or security operations to impose our will upon an adversary that is no longer a coherent fighting formation but has decomposed into guerrilla bands or terrorist cells. The concept makes mention of ideas for post conflict: “Successfully imposing our will on an adversary whose behavior brought us to engage him in combat operations may very well rest upon what we do after we have forcefully and successfully engaged an adversary’s ability to resist.” The unstated assumption is that decisive operations have brought relative stability to the region. There was no mention of the chaos created in the wake of decisive operations due to a power vacuum created by the swift disintegration of an enemy force. In short there is no meaningful treatment of transition of decisive operations to post-conflict stability operations.

TRANSITIONING FROM DECISIVE OPERATIONS TO POST CONFLICT OPERATIONS

The Joint Forces Command, in lieu of integrating a concept for transition to post conflict operations in the Major Combat Operations Joint Operating Concept has chosen to stovepipe the concept in a separate Joint Operating Concept for Stability Operations. The entire focus of the Stability Operations Joint Operating Concept is to describe the stability operations following a Major Combat Operation.

The Joint Operating Concept for stability operations envisions a “Stability Force” separate and distinct from a combat force, to include a separate and distinct commander for this force. The purpose of this force will be two-fold during combat: to ensure continued momentum of the decisive combat operations, and to create conditions that will ensure the long term success of the post-conflict operations. The stability force will then transition to post-conflict actions, following decisive combat operations, that will focus on assisting the inter-agency, international community and local government by conducting security operations and civil-military operations in “restorative” stability operations. Much of this concept calls for an organization and force structure that is separate and distinct from the force structure and organizations that execute the Major Combat Operations. Therefore, the Joint Force Command Concept is looking to a constabulary force concept, a force structure, and organizations separate and distinct from conventional operational forces to conduct the post-conflict operations. This concept compliments a proposal published by the Center for Technology and National Security Policy at the National Defense University.
In *Transforming for Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations*, Hans Binnendijk and Stuart Johnson recognize that the advent of the “New American Way of War,” characterized by rapid decisive operations with the use of network-enabled, precision effects based operations, brings the need to secure the peace in a rapid simultaneous fashion. The authors conclude that the force needed to conduct decisive operations was inadequate to secure the peace in Afghanistan and Iraq. Establishing a safe and secure environment will be the primary mission of military forces in post-conflict operations. The rapid return of governance and civil services, essential to long-term success of the post-conflict operations, may be facilitated by “embedding” civilians with the expertise required for essential post-conflict activities. The authors propose establishing separate and distinct joint organizations to conduct post-conflict operations rather than providing a single warfighting commander the resources needed to execute simultaneously decisive combat operations and post-conflict operations. The idea would be that the Joint Stabilization force would plan the post conflict operations and then roll behind the major combat operations forces to conduct the post conflict operations in a concurrent manner. The bulk of the security forces envisaged in this concept would be provided by military police with a Tactical Combat Force (TCF) provided as back-up, depending on the enemy situation. The command and control relationships are somewhat vague for the Joint Stability Force. It is unclear if the force would report directly to the regional combatant commander like other Joint Task Forces, work for the Coalition Joint Force Land Component Commander, or, because of the large involvement with the Inter-agency report back to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, or some combination of these that evolve over time.

These are all questions dealing with the transition to post conflict operations that a variety of researchers have asked. Consensus amongst these researchers is that the main task that military forces must accomplish rather quickly in transitioning from decisive operations to post-conflict operations is to provide security to enable the inter-agency, the international community, and local authorities to re-establish services and governance.

In *A Wiser Peace*, researchers from the Center for Strategic and International Studies recommend that to ensure a successful transition from decisive combat operations to post conflict, the United States should not underestimate the needs for security in post conflict. Deficiencies in security forces were endemic in post conflict Afghanistan and to a lesser extent post conflict Kosovo. They argue that a post conflict security force should be part of any combined coalition force that leads combat operations. Unity of effort for the security forces as they transition from decisive operations to post conflict should ensure swift deployment of adequate security forces to eliminate the possibility of any power vacuums in the wake of swift
decisive operations. The authors envision that a “constabulary” force would complete these tasks. They assumed that this force would focus on civil security, primarily policing common crime, not conducting operations against guerrillas or terrorists in an asymmetric conflict. They recommend that the adversary’s army be disarmed, purged of undesirables, and retrained by coalition combat forces to meet internal and external instability needs. Until such time as that force was prepared to assume this mission the coalition combat forces would have to be prepared to meet those missions. Thus combat forces would be required if instability exists and local indigenous capability were not available. These combat forces would be an integral part of the coalition forces for unity of effort and assume these missions as soon as decisive operations transition to post-conflict operations or may be simultaneous with decisive operations.

In America’s Role in Nation Building: from Germany to Iraq, researchers from the RAND Corporation examined post-conflict operations that the United States conducted from Germany and Japan to Iraq. The researchers conclude that in the transition from Decisive Operations to Post Conflict one of the most important considerations will be security. Their research concludes that there is an inverse correlation between the size of the stabilization force and risk. The higher proportion of stabilization force appears to reduce the number of casualties taken in the post-conflict. Indeed, the researchers from Rand discovered that: “It seems that the more swift and bloodless the military victory, the more difficult post conflict stabilization can be.” Thus the “New American Way of War” may create the conditions that require more forces to succeed in post conflict than is required for success in decisive operations.

Two differences between the concepts and actual practice, as represented by the RAND and the CSIS study, stand out. First, the use of specialized fixed organization constabulary forces, rather than conventional combat forces, with the proper capabilities in the right numbers to meet the mission sets as determined by the Coalition Commander on the ground. Second, the idea of a separate Joint Command for stabilization in post-conflict, rather than the Joint Force Commander simultaneously transitioning from decisive operations to post-conflict operations. Finally, there is one other difference between the two concepts and the review of the historical record. The historical record suggests that a larger ground force is required to provide security during the transition from decisive combat to post-conflict than required to be successful during decisive combat operations. The two concepts to establish stability forces, on the other hand, envision no need for additional combat forces for success. In fact, the two concepts assume that lighter forces may be successful in modern post-conflict operations.
TRANSITIONING FROM DECISIVE COMBAT TO POST-CONFLICT STABILIZATION: THREE CASE STUDIES

To evaluate the differences between the actual practice in transition from decisive operations to post-conflict stabilization and the proposed concepts to accomplish stabilization under the “New American Way of War” three operations will be examined. The operations are Operation Allied Force in Kosovo, Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, and Operation Iraqi Freedom in Iraq. These operations were chosen because they exhibit the characteristics of the “New American Way of War.” All three operations showcased the use of networked, precision, air and seapower, enabled by special operations forces concluding in rapid decisive victory of adversary military forces. All three also required a transition to post-conflict operations. The focus of the evaluation of the case studies will be the size of the force during the transition to post conflict operations, the command relationships associated with that force and finally the efficacy of the post conflict security arrangements.

OPERATION ALLIED FORCE-KOSOVO

Operation Allied Force was a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) led operation to enforce full compliance with United Nations Security Council Resolution 1199 that called on the government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to cease hostilities and redeploy mobilized forces from the province of Kosovo. Operation Allied Force was primarily an air operation commencing on 23 March 1999 and ending on 10 June 1999 with the Yugoslav security forces complying with a Military Technical Agreement, which called for the full withdrawal of Yugoslavian forces from Kosovo. The operation lasted 78 days and returned Kosovo to Status Quo Ante Bellum. 40

The Commander of the Allied Forces Southern Europe (AFSOUTH) implemented Operation Allied Force by direction of the Supreme Allied Commander Europe. 41 However; in practice, the Supreme Allied Commander Europe retained much of the command of Operation Allied Force. 42 The Commander of AFSOUTH also had NATO Operational Control of the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps, which fulfilled the role of the Land Component Command. The Commander of AFSOUTH, was dual hated as the United States Commander of Joint Task Force Noble Anvil. In this capacity he had Tactical Control (TACON) of the Joint Special Operations Task Force as well as Operational Control (OPCON) of all United States forces within the Operating Area. 43

Operation Allied Force demonstrated the pattern of war that is now described as the “New American Way of War.” The use of air delivered precision weapon systems, by network centric forces achieved a relatively swift victory with minimal casualties. 44 Indeed one of the major
lessons learned during Kosovo was a validation of American investment in precision weapons, command and control information technology, and extensive Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance systems to enable the United States dominated NATO forces to conduct this “New American Way of War.” That is not to say this was exclusively an air operation. Notwithstanding the potential contributions of Task Force Hawk, ground forces played a role in Operation Allied Force. The Kosovo Liberation Army acted as a force on the ground that facilitated the targeting of the Yugoslav forces in order to increase the effectiveness of the air operations thus enabling the “New American Way of War.” At the time of Operation Allied Force the Kosovo Liberation Army was estimated to number from 5000 to 15,000 soldiers.

Ground Forces were absolutely essential in securing the peace achieved during Operation Allied Force. The Allied Rapid Reaction Corps was given the mission to move in to Kosovo immediately upon cessation of hostilities to secure the agreement reached with the Yugoslavian military and NATO forces. This was no small task and included the mission to establish and maintain a secure environment in Kosovo, to include public safety and order. The initial size of the force, under the name Operation Joint Guardian, was 42,500 troops deployed in Kosovo directly. This force was under the command of the Commander of Allied Forces Southern Europe who acted as the Joint Force Commander for the first three months of the operation. The size of this force correlated to one soldier per 100 residents. Later in the year this force transitioned to the Kosovo Force (KFOR) a NATO led force to provide long-term stability in Kosovo.

Thus in one of the first operations that could claim the definition of the “New American Way of War” a land force, that was larger than the land force used during the decisive operations, had the task to conduct post-conflict security operations. This post conflict security force was under the command and control of the Joint Force Commander who had the responsibility for decisive operations, thereby achieving unity of command and synchronizing the near-simultaneous post-conflict security with the end of decisive operations. The overall effect of the post-conflict security was judged to be successful and has returned the province to Status Quo Ante Bellum in the last five years with a relatively modest NATO and international presence remaining.

OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM-AFGHANISTAN

Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan commenced on October 7, 2001 in response to the Al Qaeda terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001. Enduring Freedom was a United States led operation with coalition
forces. The United States contributed the bulk of the air forces and special operations forces while the coalition partners from thirty nations provided some airpower, special operations forces, and niche specialty forces. The bulk of the ground forces during decisive operations, numbering some 15,000, came from the Northern Alliance, a rebel army that had been in conflict with the ruling Taliban forces for several years prior to OEF. Although, the operation is on-going, decisive combat operations subsided on 6 December 2001 after only 59 days, with the capture of Kandahar and the ruling Taliban leadership removed from power.

The Commander of Coalition forces in OEF continues to be the Commander of the United States Central Command (CENTCOM). The Commander of United States Army Central Command (ARCENT) assumed the command of all land forces for OEF on 11 November 2001 as the Coalition Forces Land Component Commander (CFLCC). The Special Operations Command Central Command (SOCCENT) held the command of Special Operations Forces. Their operations however, were synchronized with the operations of the CFLCC; this included the transition to post conflict security that occurred near simultaneously as combat operations progressed with the 10th Mountain Division and a Marine Task Force providing some post-conflict security. Eventually post-conflict security operations transitioned to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in accordance with the Bonn Agreement on 6 December 2001. The ISAF only has post conflict security responsibility for Kabul and its environs. The post conflict security responsibilities for the remainder of Afghanistan are somewhat vague.

Initially decisive combat operations in OEF displayed the use of networked precision firepower directed by teams of Special Forces on the ground in Afghanistan operating with local indigenous Northern Alliance Forces, which closed with and defeated the opposing Taliban and Al Qaeda forces. Eventually, United States conventional forces deployed and joined with the Special Forces-assisted indigenous forces to conduct Operation Anaconda. The forces required to conduct decisive combat were about 15,000 Northern Alliance soldiers assisted by a handful of special operations A teams and then joined later by about a division sized element to conduct follow-on operations to include Operation Anaconda. Therefore the operations in Afghanistan during OEF resembled the pattern of the “New American Way of War” for decisive combat operations.

The transition to post-conflict security from decisive operations was less successful and its second and third order effects continue to plague Afghanistan to this day. There was never a full recognition that post-conflict security was an integral part of the transition from decisive operations and that these actions should occur simultaneously or near-simultaneously. Instead, a separate organization was established in the form of ISAF and employed about a month after
decisive combat in Kabul occurred, allowing a gap in security to form. This gap has never fully been closed, to the point of placing post-conflict reconstruction efforts and political actions, such as elections, in jeopardy. The military forces committed to the post conflict security effort were limited by design. A month after the fall of Kabul the Secretary of Defense was questioned about deploying peacekeeping forces to Afghanistan:

Could peacekeepers be deployed within the next 10 days without interfering with your operations? My feeling is that you don’t get peacekeeping until you get peace. I like to refer to it as a security force. I don’t think that it will have to be a terribly big one. The only place they are talking about having it is in Kabul, the capital. Most of the other places are relatively calm. There is still fighting and lawlessness, but this is true in some American cities as well.

The post-conflict security force represented a ratio of one military member for every 1,730 residents. The deliberate under-resourcing of post-conflict security and placing the effort under a separate command that arrived late may be one of the factors that are keeping the peace from being secured in Afghanistan.

OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM-IRAQ

Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) was a United States led coalition operation conducted to disarm Iraq of weapons of mass destruction, to end Iraqi support for terrorism, and to free the Iraqi people from the tyranny of the Baath party. Operation Iraqi Freedom was a joint and combined operation directed at the removal of the regime of President Saddam Hussein. Decisive combat operations began on 19 March 2003 and the President of the United States declared decisive combat operations, lasting just 44 days, over on 1 May 2003. President Saddam Hussein was removed from power and operations to secure the peace continue to this day.

The Commander of CENTCOM was the Coalition and Joint Force Commander for OIF. CENTCOM organized the Air, Sea, and Land Operations under the command of functional component commanders who may have commanded similar “functions” from two or more services. The commander of CENTCOM delegated command of all land forces during Iraqi Freedom to the Commander of ARCENT. The Commander of SOCCENT led the Coalition Forces Special Operations Forces. The command and control of the post-conflict security force was somewhat ambiguous. The Director of the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) was to lead the effort of post conflict civil assistance actions and report directly to the Office of the Secretary of Defense with a loose coordination relationship with the Commander CFLCC. The CFLCC did not view post-conflict security as their mission but as ORHA’s. Since there was a clear delineation of responsibility between conflict and post-
conflict security operations neither organization planned for the transition. The problem both organizations had in transitioning to post-conflict security was compounded by the need for the transition to occur simultaneously with decisive operations.

Clearly the decisive combat operations in OIF demonstrated the “New American Way of War”: networked precision munitions, synchronized with the maneuver of modest ground forces rapidly achieved decisive victory. Lessons from Iraqi Freedom are already integrated into the Joint Operating Concepts emerging out of the Joint Forces Command for the vision of conduct of Major Combat Operations into the future. Yet despite the stunning decisive victory the United States has not secured the peace in Iraq.

The limited number of ground forces required to achieve decisive victory actually served as an impediment to the rapid implementation of post-conflict security. The force that CENTCOM and CFLCC originally planned to achieve the operational endstate of a safe and secure Iraq was five divisions organized under the V U.S. Corps, and the Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF). The size of the force that actually conducted the operation was a little over three divisions. This translated to about 151,000 coalition soldiers and marines in the land forces during the transition to post-conflict stability, which represented one soldier or marine for every 164 Iraqi residents. Therefore, rapidly transitioning to post conflict security simultaneously, or near simultaneously, was difficult since the forces required to follow and support, or follow and assume, the mission to secure by-passed territory, or bypassed forces, were not available in sufficient quantities to conduct those operations. Indeed when it came time to secure key civilian institutions in Baghdad the CFLCC commander, upon completion of decisive combat operations, would not be able to meet all the post conflict security missions.

Therefore, the pattern of the “New American Way of War” continued in OIF. A new pattern emerged as well in Iraqi Freedom that germinated from OEF, which was to use limited ground forces during decisive combat with the assumption that these same forces would be adequate to conduct post conflict security missions. Indeed, when presented with the testimony of the Chief of Staff of the Army’s estimate of several hundred thousand to secure the peace in a post conflict Iraq, the Deputy Secretary of Defense stated that “It’s hard to conceive that it would take more forces to provide stability in post-Saddam Iraq than it would take to conduct the war itself and to secure the surrender of Saddam’s security forces. Hard to imagine.” Yet later in the year the number of coalition ground forces working to secure post-conflict Iraq numbered 185,000 soldiers just for the United States Army let alone any coalition partners. Thus the latest war in the pattern of the “New American Way of War” demonstrated that the
rapid nature of decisive combat operations requires more ground forces to secure the post conflict peace than it does to achieve decisive victory.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The “New American Way of War” cannot deliver on the promise of reduced ground forces that the authors of the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review hoped for. In the drive to swiftly defeat the efforts of an adversary and return conditions to status quo ante bellum American forces will require more ground forces to secure the peace than to complete decisive combat operations. Indeed, to conduct a win decisive campaign in a major combat operation the United States will require more ground forces to remove a regime. Two lessons regarding the transition to post-conflict security emerge from the recent past.

To effectively secure the post conflict peace, an overwhelming combat force is required. In Kosovo this meant deploying forty thousand NATO soldiers to provide presence and impose the Alliance’s will upon the Serbs and Kosovars. This translated to one combat soldier for every one hundred residents. The overwhelming forces in the initial transition may be reduced later once peace and stability return, as occurred after Operation Allied Force. Forces in Kosovo are now reduced to half of what they were at the start of the operation. The United States chose to employ modest forces to secure the peace in Afghanistan and Iraq. Today the United States is still unable to provide a stable and secure environment in both nations. In Kosovo the United States and NATO provided a safe and secure environment within months of the end of decisive combat.

To effectively secure the post conflict peace as a result of “The New American Way of War” the Joint Force Commander needs to be able to simultaneously or near simultaneously provide post conflict security while engaged in decisive combat operations. In Kosovo this meant deploying land combat forces as soon as the technical agreement with the Yugoslavs was signed. In Afghanistan coalition forces waited for the International Security Assistance Force for a month before post conflict security was provided to Kabul. In Iraq the coalition forces secured terrain as they progressed, but the arrangements for transition to post conflict security with the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance was somewhat ambiguous. This led to a power vacuum resulting in the massive chaos that coalition ground forces are still not able to control completely almost a year into post conflict. Unity of effort is essential for a simultaneous or near simultaneous transition to post conflict security from decisive combat operations. The idea that a separate organization should be responsible for post conflict security flies in the face of this lesson.
In order to provide the Joint Force Commander the right capabilities needed to transition to post conflict security in future decisive operations the following recommendations should be considered:

- Properly resource the land component commander responsible to conduct decisive operations with combat formations that can follow and assume security missions for bypassed enemy and to provide presence on occupied terrain. The amount of force sized to secure the peace in Operation Allied Force could serve as a good rule of thumb, which was one ground combatant for every one hundred residents.

- Place post-conflict security forces under the command of the land component commander for unity of command. Additional specialized forces such as civil affairs, military police, and engineers may be task organized to the combat formations to assume some post-conflict civil reconstruction, police, and infrastructure repair missions until the security situation allows a transition to international, local, or non-governmental solutions. This step will eliminate the need for a separate Joint Stability Force Organization, since the Land Component Commander will have the right capabilities to secure the peace in parallel with decisive combat operations.

- Adjust the rules for force sizing in the next Quadrennial Defense Review to allow for the sizing of a potentially larger post-conflict ground security force in comparison to the ground force required for success in decisive combat operations. This should be additive force structure rather than a lesser included force structure.

Implementing these recommendations may provide the future joint force commander the right capabilities to ensure that winning the decisive victory includes securing the peace. A full understanding of the way “The New American Way of War” has transformed the nature of war may help in visualizing the reality that more ground force is now required to secure the peace than to conduct decisive combat.
ENDNOTES


5 Flournoy, 225.


7 Flournoy, 186-187.

8 Boot, 42.

9 Ibid 45.

10 Ibid 43.


13 Cebrowski and Barnett, 4. The “Emerging American Way of War” is possible through the networking of military capabilities to allow more discreet use of those capabilities in surgical strikes rather than the imprecise battles of the old systemic style of warfare. All this networking of capabilities will mean that: “...as information moves down echelon, so does combat power,
meaning smaller joint force packages wield greater combat power. Network-centric warfare
generates new and extraordinary levels of operational efficiency.”

14 Barnett and Gaffney, Rule 43.


16 Ibid Rule 49.

17 Ibid Rule 65.

18 Ibid Rule 89.

19 Ulman et. al. The seeds for the “New American Way of War” were planted in 1996 by a
group of military theorists from the National Defense University and outlined in, Shock and Awe:
Achieving Rapid Dominance. The concept of Rapid Dominance was developed in response to
the changing strategic environment of the post-cold war period. This environment was one of
increasing technological change and diversification of strategic threats. One of the main drivers
behind the concept of Rapid Dominance was to be able to change the old two Major Regional
Contingency (MRC) force structure and replace it with one that was more fiscally efficient.
Through the use of perfect, or near perfect, situational awareness on the battlefield more
efficient forces may be used to defeat or destroy an adversary on the battlefield. p. 4

Very little description about what to do after decisive operations is outlined in the concept of
Rapid Dominance. The concept envisioned by the authors is such that “Rapid Dominance
seeks to impose (in extreme cases) the non-nuclear equivalent of the impact that the atomic
weapons dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki had on the Japanese.” pg. 12 Therefore, with
the implementation of Rapid Dominance, decisive victory will entail small forces on the ground
with near perfect information and intelligence directing and applying lethal and non-lethal effects
against an adversary that will be so overwhelmed physically and psychologically that they will
capitulate to your will. The transition to post-conflict is therefore just a matter of moving a
relatively benign constabulatory force to occupy an adversary’s territory for a small period of
time until a handover to local or international authority could occur. While the authors of Rapid
dominance never really address the transition to post conflict the metaphor that Hiroshima and
Nagasaki provide suggests there will be a relatively rapid transition to post conflict without a
messy transition that may involve more ground forces to secure the peace that were required to
fight decisive operations.

20 United States Joint Forces Command, A Concept for Rapid Decisive Operations, RDO
Whitepaper Version 2.0 (Norfolk Virginia: United States Joint Forces Command, 25 October
2001), Preface.

21 Ibid, v. Rapid Decisive Operations, as outlined in the White Paper, envisions
decisiveness by imposing our will on an adversary through breaking his coherence and
defeating his will and ability to fight. Friendly forces will use the concepts of Rapid Decisive
Operations through knowledge of the enemy critical vulnerabilities; effects based planning and
execution; use of information superiority; dominant maneuver; and precision engagement to
synchronize precision effects to generate relentless overwhelming shock on the adversary. As
envisioned in the White Paper, Rapid Decisive Operations are focused on rapid resolution and
“not designed for long-term commitment or to resolve long-standing problems. A rapid decisive
operation creates the desired outcome itself or it establishes the conditions to transition to a higher (e.g., major regional contingency) or lower (e.g., security and stability operation) level of commitment."


23 United States Joint Forces Command, Major Combat Operations Joint Operating Concept, Version 0.88 (Norfolk Virginia: United States Joint Forces Command, 21 November 2003), iii. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with the Commander of the Joint Forces Command as the Executive agent is promulgating a series of Joint Operating Concepts to serve as a framework to guide the Combatant Commands and the Services in their development and implementation of the future force. The pillar of these concepts is the Joint Operating Concept for Major Combat Operations. The purpose of the Joint Operating Concept is to address “…the challenges of conducting large-scale military actions in a distributed, collaborative environment against a militarily capable regional nation state into the second decade of the twenty-first century.”

24 Ibid, 8.

25 Ibid, 17. The description of how a Joint Force fights in a Major Combat Operation in the Joint Operating concept is very similar to the characteristics of Rapid Decisive Operations. Rapid Decisive Operations highlight a knowledge-enabled; effects based force that will use precision effects to generate relentless overwhelming shock on the adversary. As with Rapid Decisive Operations the Joint Operating Concept for Major Combat Operations is scant on details on how a Joint Force would transition from decisive operations to post conflict operations. The Joint Operating Concept envisions that the Joint Force, if it implements the concept fully, will “use decisive defeat of enemy combat forces as a means to achieve decisive conclusion to war.”

26 Ibid, 32.


28 Ibid, 5-7.

29 Ibid, 33-35.


31 Ibid 11-19

32 Ibid, 57.

33 Ibid, 67.

CSIS, 12.


Ibid, 16-17.

Dobbins et al, 165.

Ibid, 162.


Clark, 432.


Clark, 329.


Dobbins et al, 117-120.


55 Biddle, vii.

56 Beaumont et. al.

57 Bonin, 17-20.


60 Force Ratios in 7 Recent Stability Operations.


64 Ibid, 493-515.

65 Boot, 44.


68 Cordesman, 494-496.
69 Fallows, 52-74.

70 Cordesman, 211.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


