USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

TALKING TURKEY: OPENING OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM'S SECOND FRONT

by

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During Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), in addition to the main front from Kuwait, CENTCOM attempted to open a second front through the country of Turkey, into Iraq. This paper describes the command and control and unit resourcing issues confronted in attempting to open this front. This paper then recommends changes to the operational level organizations needed to plan and execute successful military deployments in today’s dynamic environment.
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PREFACE

The efforts by all the members of the ARFOR-T team, and the commanders and staff of U.S. European Command and U.S. Army Europe to prepare the Turkish Theater of Operation in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom were Herculean in nature. Even though the ground mission did not get executed, the lessons learned, and concepts pioneered by the ARFOR-T will serve the military well in the near future.
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TALKING TURKEY: OPENING OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM’S SECOND FRONT

“We must be the world’s premier deployer!”

—General John M. Shalikashvili
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

THE OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) SETTING

As early as summer 2002, when the United States Central Command (CENTCOM) was planning Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), they posited opening a second front in the north from the country of Turkey. Because Turkey is in the United States European Command (EUCOM) area of responsibility (AOR), CENTCOM officially notified EUCOM that they were opening the front and required their support for the movement and sustainment of combat forces there. Ground support and Army Title 10 tasks were assigned to EUCOM’s Army Service Component Command (ASCC), the United States Army Europe (USAREUR). Eventually, the 1st Infantry Division (1st ID) was given the mission by USAREUR to Receive, Stage, Onward Move, and Integrate (RSOI) arriving forces in Turkey, provide for their security, and support their attack into Northern Iraq.

Due to the Government of Turkey’s (GOT’s) reluctance to allow coalition ground forces to transit through their country, the majority of the operations in the Northern Front were abandoned. However, had the GOT approved ground movement, it is questionable if EUCOM’s forces were organized suitably to perform the mission. This paper will explore the adequacy of the organization of the Northern Front and provide possible remedies for the future.

COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS

Soon after CENTCOM approved the two front operation into Iraq, cracks in command and control systems developed causing a lack of unity of effort with regard to the Northern Front. This lack of unity of effort was a result of a continually changing command structure, competing missions, and a lack of expertise with the operational and strategic military arts within the assigned headquarters.

SEAMS BETWEEN REGIONAL COMBATANT COMMANDS

“Unity of command is the interlocking web of responsibility which is a foundation for trust, coordination, and teamwork necessary for unified military action. It requires clear delineation of responsibility among commanders up, down, and laterally.”

—JP 0-2 Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)
Joint Publication 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, outlines the command relationships within a joint operation. The Secretary of Defense designates one of his Regional Combatant Commands (RCC) as the ‘supported command’ and other selected commands as the ‘supporting commands’. “Supporting commands have the responsibility to ascertain the needs of the supported commander and take appropriate action to fulfill them.” For OIF, the Secretary of Defense named CENTCOM as the supported command, with US Pacific Command (PACOM), EUCOM, US Special Operations Command (SOCOM), and US Transportation Command (TRANSCOM) as supporting commands. The Northern Front fell on the boundary between CENTCOM and EUCOM regions. At this boundary, Turkey is in EUCOM’s area of responsibility (AOR), and Iraq is in CENTCOM’s. Consequently, the question of whom has operational control (OPCON) for troop units operating in direct support of combat operations in Turkey developed. For this campaign, CENTCOM, and in particular the Commander of Combined Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC), wanted to facilitate achieving unity of command by receiving the EUCOM forces in Turkey under their command and control (C2). This arrangement would have provided the CFLCC commander the greatest flexibility. But to do this would have meant that EUCOM lost control of a rapidly shrinking European based force and thus threaten their support of their other regional missions.

On the other hand, CENTCOM had a problem of its own in the North. They had insufficient forces to protect the lines of communications (LOCs) of 4th Infantry Division (4th ID) as they advanced south into Iraq. This area behind 4th ID was labeled ‘The Void’ and promoted great discussion on how to ensure the viability of the division’s rear area. Given this predicament, EUCOM favored being assigned control of the area behind the 4th ID to follow them in order to protect their rear area. EUCOM preferred this course of action because they retained control of its forces, providing them more flexibility within their entire AOR.

While both arguments were feasible, neither command was willing to give up control of land or forces in their assigned AOR. Consequently, a sub-optimal command structure was adopted between CENTCOM and the theater forces in Turkey with EUCOM, serving as an intermediary. This complicated command and control for the forces on the ground and hindered achieving the maximum unity of effort.

CHANGING LEADERSHIP AT THE MILITARY-TO-MILITARY, GOVERNMENT-TO-GOVERNMENT LEVEL.

From the outset, the entire process of planning and deploying a force into Turkey was hamstrung by a constantly rotating and often-unqualified series of EUCOM staff members sent
into Turkey to support the U.S. State Department personnel with negotiations. Specifically, EUCOM’s joint planning group (JPG) was tasked with planning the operation, yet EUCOM sent logistic operators from the Directorate of Logistics (J4) staff section to conduct the negotiations. Because the J4 section was not intimate with the requirements, limitations, constraints, and reasoning for the activities of the operation, these negotiators were ill-prepared to achieve a satisfactory agreement with the GOT.

This problem was further exacerbated when the J4 included rotating representatives from the service components who were not completely aware of arrangements made during previous negotiations. This led to a very disjointed presentation of requirements and concessions with the GOT and severely slowed the entire process. The tempo of the negotiations was further stifled because the Turkish culture requires a good existing relationship between negotiators before negotiations began in earnest. Therefore, the series of rotating U.S. military staff personnel hampered the development of personal relationships and consequently the entire negotiation process.11

This discord demonstrates that had the U.S. Government brokered a standing military agreement with Turkey prior to OIF, EUCOM would have been able to eliminate much of the last minute negotiations. Secondly, these points of contention between the governments could have been minimized, if not totally avoided, if the U.S. ambassadorial team to Turkey had begun negotiations from the outset of planning with military representatives that included leadership from the ARFOR planning staff as recommended in FM 3-93.12 This situation highlights the significance of having the necessary interagency representation, possessing the appropriate expertise and participating early in negotiations. In final analysis, this mishandled negotiation process may have been the crux for why the Northern Front was not fully executed.

CHANGING COMMAND STRUCTURES.

Figure 1 depicts the command relationships that existed for the Army in Europe (USAREUR) in the summer of 2002 as the CENTCOM staff refined their Operations Plan for Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF).13
In July 2002, when the V Corps headquarters together with the 1st Armor Division (1 AD), the 173rd Airborne Regiment (173rd ABN RGT) and the Corps Support Command were identified to support OIF, USAREUR already had a significant portion of its remaining subordinate commands committed to other operations. Specifically, one third of the 1st Infantry Division (1ID) was supporting the Balkans, the theater signal command, 7th Signal Command (7th SIG), was split between supporting Southern European Task Force (SETAF), and the Balkan missions, and its theater support command (TSC), 21st TSC, providing logistic support to forces in Afghanistan, to units and installations in Germany and Italy (referred to as Central Region) and preparing to support the deployment of SETAF’s rapid reaction forces. Therefore, when USAREUR was officially directed by EUCOM in October 2002 to open the Turkish front, it had very little in terms of headquarters, combat power, and combat support and service support enablers to support the mission at home let alone in Turkey. Confronted with this mission-stretch, USAREUR put together an ad hoc organization made up of fragments from different units. And as with all ad-hoc organizations, it takes time and training before they can operate effectively and efficiently.

FIGURE 2: SECOND COMMAND STRUCTURE NOVEMBER 2002
USAREUR initially identified the 21st Theater Support Command (TSC), under the command of MG William Mortenson, to serve as the major logistic unit for the operation, responsible for opening the theater and the RSOI of coalition forces.\textsuperscript{16} The 1st Infantry Division Command (1st ID), under command of MG John R. S. Batiste, was directed to be the Joint Rear Area Coordinator (JRAC) for the operation.\textsuperscript{17} In this role, 1st ID was required to coordinate the security of all Department of Defense (DoD) assets in the theater of operation, which in this case was all of Turkey.\textsuperscript{18} With this verbal notification, the USAREUR staff, 1st ID and the 21st TSC began planning. With regard to the operational level JRAC role, the planning challenge for the 1st ID was two fold. First, plan the mission, and second, train their headquarters to operate at the Joint and Operational level – a mission with which they were very unfamiliar.

One month later, in mid November, USAREUR notified the 1st ID that their mission had changed from performing as a JRAC to serving as the Army Forces (ARFOR) Headquarters for all operations in Turkey (ARFOR-T).\textsuperscript{19} This was a significant change in focus and mission for 1st ID. The staff now went from being a joint coordinating headquarters for force protection, to an ARFOR headquarters with C2 responsibility for all Army forces in theater. In this mission, 1st ID assumed much of the 21st TSC’s role for planning and controlling the opening of the theater and RSOI process. This responsibility also included Army Title 10 missions in Turkey.\textsuperscript{20} For 1st ID this resulted in a loss of a month of precious planning time and forced a second C2 realignment. To further exacerbate the situation, EUCOM opted not to designate a JRAC, to coordinate security between the services.\textsuperscript{21} This dramatic change in roles and missions frustrated USAREUR’s and 1st ID’s ability to achieve unity of command and subsequently, unity of effort.

Achieving an effective C2 structure for the ARFOR was further stymied by a non-doctrinal command relationship developed by USAREUR. FM 3-93 highlights that the ASCC may create an ARFOR to serve in its stead for a Joint Force Commander (JFC).\textsuperscript{22} USAREUR deviated from doctrine by directing that the ARFOR-T remain under their direct command and control as opposed to designating the ARFOR-T directly OPCON to EUCOM.\textsuperscript{23} Naturally, this caused an additional layer of command for the ARFOR-T to work through in order to complete the Joint Force Command’s (EUCOM’s) intended actions. This command relationship further undermined the purpose for creating a separate ARFOR structure distinct from the ASCC. Had USAREUR released the ARFOR to JFC control, then they would have been free to continue to focus more fully on other Army missions in the Combatant Command AOR.
The third major command structure change for the Northern Front occurred in January 2003. After diplomatic negotiations by the Secretary of State, Colin Powell, it appeared that the GOT was ready to authorize the flow of US forces through Turkey into Iraq. At this time, the new EUCOM commander, General Jones, USMC, contrary to the view of the previous commander, General Ralston, USAF, felt it necessary to place a command element forward in Turkey to provide command and control for the theater. On 22 January 2003, EUCOM created Joint Task Force – North (JTF-N), with authority over the Joint Operating area of Southern Turkey. While the concept was valid, the timing, resourcing, and location of JTF-North were flawed — and continued to circumvent achieving unity of effort in the theater.

With the 4th ID’s equipment loaded on ships and the Air Force and Army force structures already moving into Turkey, it was clear that JTF-North was a good idea that was executed too late to make a difference. It was created after plans were written by other subordinate organizations, and command relationships already cemented. Further hamstringing this organization was an inadequate manning of their headquarters. It consisted of only 68 officers and NCOs taken from across EUCOM’s region. With the exception of the commander, LTG Broadwater, the staff was well below the grade necessary to work at the highest levels of government with the host nation. Furthermore, none of the staff had previously worked together in their current roles. Factor in that they had no assigned equipment and you have a recipe for an ineffective organization, at least for the first few months.

JTF-North’s headquarters was set up in the U.S. Military Mission to Turkey headquarters in Ankara. This positioning proved both good and bad. On the good side, it allowed LTG Broadwater and his staff to work directly with the senior governmental and military leadership of
Turkey. This interaction was critical at the time of their arrival, for two reasons. First the US government was still negotiating with the GOT for entrance into the country and allowed the JTF-N commander and staff to facilitate this process. Second, it finally stabilized the staff that interacted with the GOT. This was important to cement relationships with the Turkish leadership. On the down side, however, the JTF-N commander’s large distance from his subordinate units made C2 extremely difficult, especially given that his headquarters had little in regards to communications equipment.

To further complicate the matter, USAREUR non-doctrinally retained the ARFOR-T in an OPCON status while simultaneously assigning it to JTF-N in a TACON status. In essence, ARFOR-T served two masters.

During the three months that JTF-North existed, they quite literally never attempted to command or control their fielded forces. There were never any regularly scheduled meetings or VTCs, plans, nor reporting requirements. Their failure to step into the command role was further stifled by the reluctance of the EUCOM commander and his Army and Air Force Service component commanders to work with them. Instead, they by-passed JTF-N and worked directly with the Army and Air Force units on the ground. This was exemplified during the daily EUCOM command VTC where the JTF-N commander was joined by USAREUR, U.S. Air Force Europe (USAFE), ARFOR-T, and the Air Force Element in Incirlik at the table, reporting directly to the EUCOM commander. In the final analysis, it was clear that this relationship diluted JTF-N’s ability to provide C2 in the region and muddied the situation in terms of unity of command.

![Fourth Command Relationship Diagram](chart.png)

**FIGURE 4: FOURTH COMMAND RELATIONSHIP: 22 JAN 2003**
ARFOR-T: USING A TACTICAL HEADQUARTERS IN AN OPERATIONAL ROLE

Tactical level organizations are the nation’s sharp instruments that execute combat operations. Consequently, tactical units are organized very hierarchically and their command is directive in nature. Therefore, the focus is generally down. On the other hand, operational level organizations are designed to coordinate for and synchronize resourcing of their tactical outfits. While they too have a hierarchical command structure, their focus is diffused, with a good portion of it going laterally and up. This lateral and upward focus allows organizational level units to negotiate between peer and senior level organizations to achieve consensus on resourcing and support. Therefore, in order to be effective, the leadership in organizational level units must have a sound understanding of how these outside organizations operate as well as be skilled practitioners of the crafts their tactical subordinates perform.

When planning began for opening the Northern Front, the staff and leadership of the 1st ID, a tactical organization, did not possess the necessary skills to function effectively in the operational realm. And with just two months between notification and execution of the ARFOR’s mission they had insufficient time to thoroughly train these skills. While their skills grew rapidly during planning and upon deployment, their inexperience significantly limited their ability to perform well and most certainly hamstrung their best efforts to synchronize activities across the theater.

A second pitfall of requiring a military organization to step up into the role of a higher level headquarters is that of being required to act as a superior to what were previously peer level units. The friction that can develop comes in three forms. First, the peer commanders are often in competition professionally with each other. This competition can lead to an undercurrent of detrimental actions designed to undercut the new leader’s authority. The second is reluctance on the part of the assigned leader to fully exercise his new authorities because he recognizes that at the conclusion of their mission, he will once again be operating on a peer level. Third, the new subordinate commands are familiar and comfortable with their previous command relationships. Therefore, they can find themselves gravitating back to those familiar relationships to conduct their work. In this instance, the newly appointed command authority can find actions pertaining to his new command processed without his knowledge or concurrence.

Such was the predicament the 1st ID found itself in when appointed the ARFOR for Turkey. In this instance, the 21st TSC, which previously had the lead developing the plan to open the Turkish Theater now, found itself subordinate to what they discerned as another peer command. Furthermore, because many of the activities associated with opening the theater
were logistic centric, the 21st TSC could not help but feel denigrated when a peer unit, without the appropriate logistics expertise, was now their senior headquarters. Additionally, the major subordinate commands of the ARFOR-T, to include the 21st TSC, 7th Signal Brigade, and 18th Engineer Brigade, unlike the 1st ID, had a habitual senior-subordinate relationship with the USAREUR headquarters. This made it natural for these commands to bypass the 1st ID staff and commander and work actions directly with the USAREUR staff. Reciprocally, the USAREUR staff, familiar with working with these commands found it easy to work with them too. This often left the commander of the ARFOR-T out of the decision loop.

The last point of friction that challenged the 1st ID’s ability to plan, and deploy the ARFOR-T was that they did not have formal authority over any of the ‘to be assigned’ units until a deployment order was published by the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and subsequently echoed by EUCOM and USAREUR. This formal attachment did not occur until 10 February 2003. Their lack of authority during the planning and training period for the mission made it easy for the designated subordinate commands of the ARFOR-T to ignore many of the requirements placed upon them by 1st ID. This was particularly contentious with regard to participating in the ARFOR-T training events conducted prior to deployment – thus exacerbating the already strained training level of the entire organization.

With regard to the Command and Control structure in Turkey it is clear that the seam between the combatant commands, the inability of the different staffs to work directly with the Turkish military and government, the three changes in C2 structure over a 2 ½ month period, the ad-hoc nature of these organizations, and the inexperience of the ARFOR staff did not contribute to unity of command or facilitate gaining unity of effort. Because of these shortcomings, had the full Northern Front option been executed, its success could have only been guaranteed through the Herculean efforts of the individual soldiers and leadership of the ARFOR on the ground in Turkey.

PLANNING DIFFICULTIES

Together with the changing command structures, disjointed planning across the various headquarters threatened mission success. Joint Publication 5-0, Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations, prescribes two planning processes at the combatant command level. The first is the Deliberate Planning Process, which as its name implies, is very methodical and is designed to take from 18 to 24 months to complete. The other process has the moniker of Crisis Action Planning (CAP) and is structured to take anywhere from 1 day to 18 months. While CENTCOM had conducted deliberate planning to enter Iraq through Turkey, the supporting
combatant command, in this case EUCOM, conducted Crisis Action Planning (CAP) to plan the supporting efforts.

JP 5.0 highlights that CAP is best facilitated by parallel planning between the supported and supporting headquarters.\textsuperscript{34} FM3-93 further highlights that it is beneficial if subordinate and supporting commands send representatives to the higher headquarters’ CAP process in order to facilitate parallel planning.\textsuperscript{35} For OIF the benefits of parallel planning were undermined on two levels. First, the fact that EUCOM had to undertake the CAP process at all was unnecessary. Had CENTCOM included the EUCOM staff in their deliberate planning processes a year or so earlier, many of the resourcing synchronization and C2 issues could have been avoided. On the second level, EUCOM did not attempt to actively co-locate planners with CENTCOM to facilitate planning. Nor did they make much of an attempt to initiate parallel planning with their subordinate service component headquarters upon notification of the plan to prepare the Turkish AOR in June 2002.\textsuperscript{36} In fact, FM3-93, The Army in Theater Operations, specifies that, “[t]he ARFOR commander’s representatives participate in the joint planning process…to help the JFC understand the proper employment of Army forces.”\textsuperscript{37} This loss of valuable time and integrated planning hindered the development of a synchronized plan.

The dynamic environment caused by changing command structures, uncertainty about the GOT support, and a short planning period contributed to the theater opening plan being created from the bottom up rather than from the doctrinal approach of from the top down. Following the issuance of CENTCOM’s campaign plan, the remainder of the operation was led primarily by the 1\textsuperscript{st} ID’s planning staff.

1\textsuperscript{st} ID published the first written Warning Order for the ARFOR mission on 6 November 2002. On the same day EUCOM floated draft planning guidance, to its service component commanders identifying specific activities that each component will be responsible to perform in Turkey if the action is initiated. With no further input, other than email and conversations between planners, 1\textsuperscript{st} ID issued the ARFOR-T OPLAN on 16 December 2002. USAREUR then used the ARFOR-T OPORD as the base to for their campaign plan that they issued on 30 January 2002. And finally, EUCOM issued their OPORD on 10 February 2002.\textsuperscript{38}

While EUCOM and USAREUR continually drafted numerous versions of orders and planning messages, they remained in draft form and were only made available to subordinate commands through personal planner-to-planner relationships. Emails, and phone calls between planners were instrumental in achieving a satisfactory level of synchronization between commands given the bottom up planning approach that was used. For the 1\textsuperscript{st} ID, their OPORD was as close to a guess as they could achieve using doctrinal publications and leveraging newly
forged planner relationships with higher headquarters. Had CENTCOM, EUCOM, and USAREUR incorporated the ARFOR into their planning process from the outset this process could have been streamlined. Furthermore, had a habitual theater level organization assumed the ARFOR role, planning relationships could have been cemented sooner.

Complicating the planning process further was the management of the number of U.S. forces to be allowed into Turkey. This was a problem for military planners as the State Department negotiated force levels with seemingly little regard for military requirements and never finalized. This caused the ARFOR-T to worse case all planning resource estimates to minimize risk of mission failure. Additionally, the doctrinal unit deployment scheduling process (Time Phased Force Deployment Data – TPFDD development process) was circumvented by the Secretary of Defense, as he wanted to personally approve troop movements down to detachment level.

Ultimately, because the timeline to put the ARFOR-T mission together was short and murky due to failures to adequately conduct parallel planning between strategic and operational levels of command, the GOT’s reluctance to approve troop movements, and a circumvented unit deployment process, the planning process was problematic at best.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>EVENT</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>July 2001</td>
<td>CENTCOM begins planning for OIF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 2002</td>
<td>EUCOM is alerted that a branch plan to open a second front through Turkey is being considered and in that plan EUCOM would support the movement of forces and supplies in the country. EUCOM notifies USAREUR and USAFE of CENTCOM OPLAN for operations through Turkey. USAREUR alerts the 21st TSC to begin logistics planning for the opening and RSOI of 4ID and possibly the 1st UK AD through Turkey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Late Oct 2002</td>
<td>EUCOM notifies CENTCOM that the 2 Front Branch plan was adopted as the base campaign plan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Late Oct 2002</td>
<td>USAREUR Cdr notifies 1ID commander to start looking at using his unit to perform a JRAC function in Turkey to support CENTCOM.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Nov 2002</td>
<td>USAREUR Cdr changes 1ID mission from JRAC to serving as ARFOR headquarters in Turkey.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Nov 2002</td>
<td>1ID issues WARN to Subordinate Commands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12-15 Nov</td>
<td>1ID conducts first CPX</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-3 Dec</td>
<td>1ID conducts ARFOR and Joint Operations Seminar with BCTP</td>
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<tr>
<td>4-6 Dec</td>
<td>1ID and other ARFOR components conduct CPX 2 in Kitzingen, Germany</td>
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<tr>
<td>6 Dec</td>
<td>GEN Bell assumes command of USAREUR</td>
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<tr>
<td>10 Dec</td>
<td>USAREUR Commander officially designates 1ID as ARFOR for operation</td>
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<tr>
<td>10 Dec – 10 Jan</td>
<td>EUOM reconnaissance personnel on 24 hour standby to deploy to Turkey to conduct Site Coordination Visit (SCV)</td>
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<tr>
<td>16 Dec</td>
<td>1ID issues WARN 3. (complete OPLAN for the ARFOR mission in Turkey)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Jan 2003</td>
<td>Government of Turkey (GOT) approves SCV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12-22 Jan 2003</td>
<td>SCV team in Turkey</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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### UNIT RESOURCING

“Army headquarters functioning at the operational-level perform five operational tasks found in the Universal Joint Task List (UJTL). These functions include:

- Conduct Operational Movement, Maneuver
- Employ Operational Fire Power
- Provide C4ISR (Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance)
- Provide Operational Logistics and Personnel Support [sustainment]
- Provide Operational Force Protection to include Counter CBRNE [Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, Electromagnetic] Weapons in the JOA

Because the ARFOR-T’s mission was to open the theater, conduct RSOI and sustainment operations for the 4th ID, they limited their focus to the last three operational-level tasks. Additionally, JP 4-01.8 lists the essential elements of the JRSOI process as C4ISR, Force Protection, and Support Organizations and Structures. It is useful to analyze the ultimate design of the ARFOR-T organization using these elements to determine whether the organization would have been capable of performing their mission in Turkey.

### COMMAND, CONTROL, COMMUNICATIONS, COMPUTERS, INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE AND RECONNAISSANCE (C4ISR)

The use of a tactical Division headquarters, as an ARFOR headquarters is not unprecedented as the 10th Mountain Division did it twice recently in Somalia and Afghanistan. But as is discussed in FM 3-91 Division Operations, “When this is done, the Division requires a significant amount of personnel and equipment augmentation to do the job.”
A comparison of a typical operational headquarters staff with that of a tactical division's staff finds many holes. The sheer size of the operational force compared to a tactical force suggests that more personnel were required to manage the administrative and logistic requirements. The differences between operating at the operational vice tactical level are very significant and require an expertise in resourcing, logistics, and peer-negotiation with other services, nations, and commands to work through issues. With regard to the 1st ID's ability to form an ARFOR headquarters, they were hampered because a third of their division staff was serving in Kosovo with Operation Joint Guardian, and another third was preparing to replace them on 26 November 2002.

To achieve the functionality required to operate as an operational level headquarters, 1st ID requested staff augmentation. Unfortunately, by the time the ARFOR-T deployed, the staff augmentation was only partial. It included BG Pillsbury to serve as the G4, American Red Cross, MWR, theater engineers, and personnel support. It deployed having no additional support for the G2, G3, or G5. Ultimately, the 1st ID attempted to fill many empty billets by stripping its brigade and separate battalions to the absolute minimum. Once done, the portion of the division that remained in Central Region was only capable of minimum sustainment operations, thereby rendering it combat ineffective. Even with augmentation, the Division staff still had to overcome a significant training and experience level to move from operating at the tactical level of war to moving to the operational and strategic. Given these staff shortcomings it is difficult to imagine the Division being capable of sustained, high-tempo operations.
COMMUNICATIONS

The ability to communicate over a 900km line of communication (LOC) is a significant challenge for any unit let alone for a tactical unit designed for radio communications between 80-100 km.\textsuperscript{50} 

To support the ARFOR the USAREUR was able to resource them with elements of the 5\textsuperscript{th} Signal Brigade, part of its 7\textsuperscript{th} Signal Command. This outfit, augmented with the 1\textsuperscript{st} ID's own divisional signal battalion, was capable of providing secure and non-secure telephone and World Wide Web access via satellite at key nodes across southern Turkey.\textsuperscript{52} Additionally, it was prepared to support the 4\textsuperscript{th} ID with signal support into Iraq. This architecture was sufficient but fragile. But because there were no extra satellite communications packages, when any system failed the command was forced to dramatically reduce the number of users for days at a time until they could be repaired.\textsuperscript{53}

Further complicating the use of satellite communications was that there was no satisfactory means for supporting communications of moving units. Because short-range tactical radios were near useless, except within convoy serials, the ARFOR-T was forced to depend on secure and non-secure cell phone communications while on the move.\textsuperscript{54} Naturally, the temptation to conduct secure business over the non-secure phones was a significant operational security (OPSEC) risk.
The last communications resourcing challenge dealt with communicating with the host nation government of Turkey. The Turkish Military possessed very little secure communications capability, and most senior leaders did not have access to it. Consequently, the ARFOR-T traded liaisons with them and relied on face-to-face communications and couriers.

While theater-level communications were adequate for the ARFOR-T mission, the lack of portable secure communications equipment promised to degrade operations on the Northern Front as it did on the Southern Front during OIF. The communication’s shortcomings encountered by the ARFOR-T highlighted the need to invest in a more capable long range, mobile, and secure communications systems for theater level use.

INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT

The nature of the critical intelligence mission in Turkey was difficult because the U.S. was working within a sovereign nation that would not tolerate an intrusion into their internal affairs. With this constraint, the U.S. forces were limited to using national intelligence sources almost exclusively to identify terrorist and Iraqi missile threat. Performing the intelligence analysis mission for the ARFOR-T was the 1st ID’s MI battalion, augmented with equipment and personnel USAREUR’s Theater Military Intelligence Command, the 66th MI Battalion.

The important contribution of 66th MI contribution was not resident in their intelligence system equipment to include Trojan Spirit access to the Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System (JWICS). This equipment provided the ARFOR-T commander and staff essential conductivity with the global theater intelligence community and extremely secure communications with the EUCOM commander. What were notably missing from the intelligence resourcing were human intelligence assets. Within the constraints of the ARFOR-T mission, these teams were not authorized to be employed by the GOT. But this did not lessen the requirement for their employment. Had the ground mission in Turkey continued, there is little doubt their need would have become extremely critical in terms of protecting the force from terrorism and other combatants.

FORCE PROTECTION

Within the Turkish Theater force protection was the primary concern of the ARFOR-T commander. Intelligence analysis of southern Turkey ultimately highlighted that the demographics of the region as having a population that was 98% Muslim. This suggested the possibility of a negative reaction from the populace when the invasion into Iraq occurred. The region also included a large Kurdish population that was continually in conflict with the Turkish government and people. Kurdish sponsored terrorism was rife in the region the ARFOR-T was
operating. Radical Hizbollah factions were also resident in this area and a threat to an US presence in the region. Of further threat significance was that the majority of U.S. military activity would occur within ten miles of the Syrian border. The Syrian government was known to support terrorism against U.S. interests, and was opposed to OIF. The last significant threat came from Iraq itself. The western sector of the Turkish Theater was within ballistic missile range of Iraq. Furthermore, Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS) operatives were known to be operating throughout southern Turkey. These threats, coupled with the fact that US equipment and personnel were operating in the congested ports, cities, and along a limited number of LOCs required the ARFOR-T to implement significant force protection measures.

FM 3-93 specifies that Operational Force Protection consists of Air Space and Missile Defense, Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) Defense, Antiterrorism, Defensive Information Operations (IO), Operations/Information Security (INFOSEC/OPSEC), Law Enforcement, Physical Security for Operational Forces and Means, and Deception Operations. Within each of these functional areas, the ARFOR-T was only partially resourced. This resourcing problem stemmed from personnel strength limitations placed on the U.S. by the GOT and manpower shortfalls across the army.

**Physical Security / Antiterrorism.**

The 1st ID was authorized by OSD (and limited by personnel constraints placed on the U.S. Government by the GOT) to bring only two battalions of soldiers in order to support the security of the theater. Military police (MP) are the ideal force of choice for this base security mission, but because MPs are in high demand they were few available in the active force or reserve force. Therefore, two combat battalions from the 1st ID were identified to perform this role. The resources in these two units were only enough to provide primary force protection at command posts, seaports, airports, and the 4th ID’s tactical assembly area. The base security for all of the other nodes and bases was to be provided by the soldiers of the units that were performing logistic functions there. Here is where another crack developed. Because the numbers of soldiers working at these nodes was small, it required virtually every soldier to be performing his or her logistic task with little or no time left to perform security missions – essentially the nodes would have been undermanned. This under-manning of security forces is due in a large part, especially early in the operation, to the programmed late arrival of the Reserve Component (RC) logistic forces.
Law Enforcement.

The 95th Military Police (MP) Battalion was designated to assume the law enforcement role. This battalion is habitually assigned to the 21st TSC. It is a multi-composition unit that had half of its companies in the active component (AC), and half in the RC. The 95th MP Battalion was only able to deploy the two active component companies. Their third company (a reserve component unit) was not scheduled to arrive until late in the force flow. Due to their small force size, the 95th MP Battalion's primary role was limited to working with the Turkish Jandarme in support of traffic control, and performing other law enforcement functions prescribed by the commander of the ARFOR-T.

Engineering.

Engineering functions for opening a theater are a bit different than most in the Army expect to see. Engineers at the theater level focus more on the development of infrastructure than on traditional mobility, counter-mobility, and survivability engineering missions. Specifically, they manage the acquisition and lease of all real estate, coordinate and supervise all construction contracts, and build facilities. For the mission in Turkey, the USAREUR's newly formed theater engineer brigade, the 18th Engineer (EN) Brigade (BDE) was attached to the ARFOR-T. This was a very beneficial assignment, as this headquarters brought with it the expertise to conduct the contracting for all leased properties in Turkey – for which there were many.

To support the improvement of the infrastructure, a naval Civil Engineer Battalion (CB) was attached to the 18th EN BDE for the first 30 days of the mission. This battalion, together with civilian engineering contract support provided just enough capability to prepare only the most essential facilities for the theater. Specifically, they were capable of building the fuel storage area, portions of the ammunition storage area, and improving some entrances and supply routes through the 4th ID’s planned assembly area. Unfortunately, the lack of time, engineer manpower, and equipment prohibited any attempt at completely preparing the tactical assembly area for the 4th ID. This lack of preparation work carried great risk, as there was a significant possibility that the 4th ID could get mired in mud in the unprepared area – a lesson recently learned in Kosovo and Albania.

Air Space and Missile Defense.

Air missile defense was a shortcoming from the beginning of the operation. At the point when the decision was made to open the northern front into Iraq, all of the U.S. Patriot battalions were already assigned to defend units in Iraq, Israel, and Korea. In the EUCOM area
of responsibility there were two batteries of Patriot available, but no battalion command and control structure to plug into to provide conductivity to the combined air operating picture. To further complicate matters, the Turkish GOT had not authorized the conduct of combat operations in Turkey which prohibited the use of Patriot systems.

In terms of air defense, however, the GOT was eager to have theater ballistic missile air defense over critical infrastructure on the chance that the Iraqis would launch a missile in their direction. As a compromise, the U.S. government agreed to position the two remaining Patriot batteries in Turkey under the heading of ‘NATO’ support to an ally. Therefore, these systems were allowed to enter the country under standard military agreements pertaining to NATO members. Once this diplomatic process was approved and the systems moved to Turkey, combat operations in Iraq were nearly complete. For this mission, these units were only under administrative control (ADCON) for sustainment and force protection to the ARFOR-T. Command and control of the air defense would have proved difficult given their TACON status to the JFACC, and their ADCON status to the ARFOR-T coupled with limited communications infrastructure throughout the entire CENTCOM and JTF-N AOR.

**Information Operations (IO) (including Information and Operations Security INFOSEC/OPSEC, and Deception Operations)**

MG Batiste cited that cultivating and retaining host-nation relations was the friendly center of gravity (COG) for the ARFOR-T and that information operations should supported its protection. Unfortunately information operations did not play a useful role in the in Turkey. This occurred for two reasons. First the IO staff section of the G3 was minimally manned with only two very inexperienced staff personnel. The ability of this staff to produce meaningful work was further minimized by a lack of guidance from USAREUR and EUCOM in this area. Consequently, the ARFOR-T staff was rather impotent with regard to any ability to plan and monitor IO operations. Secondly, civil affairs (CA) and physiological operations (PSYOP) units were not made available to support information operations.

Of the shortcomings associated with this mission in Turkey, the failure of conducting an effective IO campaign with regard to the war was particularly stinging. It can only be speculated at this point, had an IO campaign focused on acquiring the support of the Turkish population for the mission in Iraq been developed and implemented, the Northern Front may have been opened for the 4th ID and the length of the war shortened, thus saving lives.
Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) Defense

NBC defense was another area where significant risk was accepted. Again, mission analysis identified and validated the requirement for a Chemical Brigade with at least two duel purpose reconnaissance and decontamination battalions. In this case, only one RC battalion could be identified and it would take over 90 days to deploy into theater. In short, the ARFOR-T deployed with only the 1st ID’s organic chemical company. The ability of this small NBC asset to provide adequate defense across a 900km wide theater where the potential of missile attacks using chemical warheads and biological contamination by terrorists existed was extremely doubtful.

Rear Area Operations Center (RAOC)

Army doctrine further prescribes that at within the ARFOR-T Headquarters that a RC organization, referred to as the Rear Area Operations Center (RAOC) make up the nucleus of the theater level Force Protection planning and current operations cell. The only RAOC in Europe had been assigned to V Corps in support of their operations on the Southern OIF Front. The 1st ID’s habitually assigned ROC (Rear Operations Center: a smaller version of the RAOC assigned to Divisional sized units] was already performing operations in Kosovo as part of Operation Joint Guardian, and further had been tasked to provide augmentees to CENTCOM in the Kuwaiti theater of operation. Therefore, the 313th ROC, which was habitually assigned to the 21st TSC, assumed the RAOC role for the ARFOR-T.

While these RC component soldiers of the 313th ROC were trained in their specialty, they were few in number, were not present during the planning of the operation, and were not familiar with working at the operation level of war. Consequently they were only marginally effective upon their arrival in Turkey. To keep the C2 for force protection from failing, the 1st ID quickly augmented the ROC using the original mission planners. The late arrival of RC personnel to the operation caused AC augmentation to support what was considered a RC mission. This AC augmentation came at a great expense to other on going missions.

Sustainment Forces

Theater Support Commands (TSC) were designed to provide the ASCC, and subsequently, the Combatant Commander, the backbone of their sustainment support. The preponderance of the theater transportation, ammunition, petroleum, and medical units are in these reserve component elements. These logistics based organizations are often the first to deploy in order to support opening the theater.
The 21st TSC is USAREUR’s assigned theater support command. The 21st TSC is organized around two brigade-sized units. The first is the 29th Support Group (SG) which includes one Supply and Services Battalion, an Ordinance or Maintenance Battalion, an MP Battalion, and a Quartermaster Battalion. The second brigade sized command is the 37th Transportation Group. This unit includes a transportation battalion, and a Truck Transfer Terminal. This Group is heavily augmented with civilian employees to support the daily European sustainment missions.

In October 2002, the 21st TSC planners determined the following logistic requirements were needed to open the northern front.

- Perform heavy equipment transport to move armored vehicles (240 HETs for 820 total single lifts)
- Deliver up to 800,000 gallons of fuel each day
- Provide cargo trucks and trailers to move thousands of short tons of supplies each day and over 3,000 equipment containers for the 4th ID.
- Build Ammunition storage areas to receive and store 1,781 containers of ammunition.
- Perform Level III Medical care (Essentially establish a Combat Support Hospital (CSH))
- Conduct movement control and out of the theater.
- Perform theater level maintenance.
- Perform aerial medical evacuation.
- Conduct force protection within their logistic nodes

This logistic mission was to be sustained over a 900 km LOC in Turkey and then an over an additional 400-km LOC in Iraq as the 4th ID’s formations advance. Therefore, the magnitude of the size of the transportation force was doubled, and in some cases tripled to meet to provide the required support. Considering that the 21st TSC was split in four directions providing support in Afghanistan, Bosnia, Kosovo, and orchestrating the move of V Corps units out of Germany to the Iraqi Theater of operations, this logistic support was much larger that the 21st TSC could provide from their European assigned units. As a consequence, both AC and RC logistic units from CONUS were identified to support the mission. The figure below illustrates the final theater logistic organization approved for the Northern Front. As the figure depicts well over 75 percent of the force was deploying from CONUS with half coming from the RC and requiring 30-45 additional days to mobilize.
FIGURE 7: 21st TSC TASK ORGANIZATION – MOSTLY CONUS BASED

Given the short timelines to prepare the theater, most of these CONUS based sustainment units were not scheduled to arrive in sufficient time to support the 4th ID and was certain to have a significant impact on the operation. Lastly, factoring in that the competition for sea-lift among all the coalition forces was high, and it is clear that relying on these CONUS based and reserve component logistic forces to facilitate the rapid opening of a theater was not feasible. This illustrates a need for a significant reorganization and repositioning of theater opening forces to achieve the required fast operational tempo.

The 21st TSC currently had one other serious limitation. It was constrained because a large portion of their forces was tied up performing critical logistical life support functions for the military installations and units in Germany, Italy, Israel, and Afghanistan. To fully extricate themselves from their home-station was near impossible. Consequently, when called upon to deploy in support of a contingency operation, they struggled with the problem of mission over stretch.

Because the Government of Turkey ultimately denied the movement of U.S. combat forces through their country, it can only be speculated as to the success that would have been achieved opening the Northern Theater using the few assets that were scheduled to arrive in time to support the 4th ID. This mission did highlight that relying on RC units to perform...
theater-opening functions is ineffective and that the mission over-stretch for the TSC is real and must be managed closely.

SOLUTIONS FOR THE FUTURE

The lessons learned from the attempt to open the OIF’s Northern Front identify the need for a change in the Army’s operational level organizations that will be required to rapidly open a theater. Three organizational changes need to be executed to meet the challenges of global rapid military action.

In order to correct the command and control shortcomings caused by throwing together ad hoc organizations, the Army should always use established operational headquarters. An ASCC typically has three standing organizations that could possibly fill the role. The first is a TSC headquarters. The TSC could be used in special situations where the focus of the operation was mostly towards logistics. In particular, they would be effective in support of humanitarian assistance operations, and some theater opening missions. The TSC is not the most versatile unit in the operational C2 role because they lack expertise with regard to maneuver, and other non-logistic planning functions.

The second organization often resident in an ACSS is an Army Corps headquarters. This unit is designed to plan and conduct operations at both the tactical and operational level, making it an ideal unit to fulfill the deployable theater role. The only issue with using a Corps headquarters, is that there are only four in the U.S. Army, and their use is tied to one or more operations plans national (OPLANS). This makes their availability problematic.

The last standing organization that can perform as a deployable operational headquarters is the ASCC itself. For example, CENTCOM’s ASCC, 3rd Army performed this role during OIF. But with the complexity of today’s environment, the ASCC is more times than not, involved in more than one major operation, making their ability to deploy and focus appropriately on a single mission questionable. This leaves a fourth alternative, create a standing operational level Army headquarters or Task Force (SATF). This headquarters would directly support DoD’s concept for creating Standing Joint Task Force (SJTF) Headquarters in each Regional Component Commander’s area of responsibility. The term ‘standing’ implies the need for the headquarters to be equipped, manned and trained to deploy to a remote location and immediately operate. With these attributes the unit would avoid JTF-N’s problem of being incapable of providing command and control for the first 90 days they existed.

To be extremely effective, the SATF would need to have a habitual relationship with the Regional Combatant Command (RCC) staff. Currently, the ASCC itself is the only Army
organization that has this kind of relationship with its RCC. In order for the SATF to achieve the same level of interaction with the RCC as the ASCC enjoys, it would be practical for the SATF to be a detachable and deployable component of the ASCC headquarters. For example, the detachable SATF could have as its commander the deputy ASCC commander. Additionally, each staff section would have a deployable section that would man the SATF. Lastly, the planning cell of the ASCC responsible for the SATF mission would deploy with the SATF. With this relationship, the SATF will be able to conduct focused, parallel planning with the RCC’s staff, ensuring completely synchronized resourcing, and eliminate ad hocery. The figure below illustrates the design of this organization.

FIGURE 8: RECOMMENDED STANDING ARMY TASK FORCE HEADQUARTERS

The second organization change required to create an operational unit, capable of rapidly opening a theater, is to reorganize the theater support command. As demonstrated by the 21st TSC, its dependence on CONUS based and RC units, rendered it unable to react nimbly to the changes in the strategic environment caused by the GOT. In order to support today’s dynamic environment TSCs must reorganize to attain the following attributes:

- All forces and equipment necessary to open a theater must be immediately deployable -- this could require that only active component units perform this role.
- Get closer to the area of crisis. The closer the TSC’s equipment is to the crisis, the more rapidly it can react. To achieve this goal extra sets of unit equipment could be placed on Army Preposition Ships (APS), stored in strategically placed pre-positioning warehouses around the globe, or positioned at ports of embarkation within CONUS. This would facilitate rapid movement and subsequent arrival.
• Remove the burden of home-station logistic support. This rearward focus forces the TSCs to split assets and unduly limits their ability to support a crisis operation.

With the TSC fixed, the last recommended organizational structural change is to create a standing task force of enabler organizations. This functional command should include medical, NBC, communications, engineering, law enforcement, and command and control units. By not tying this command to a specific logistic or tactical maneuver organization, allows it to be functional rather than specifically organized for a single type of mission. This unit would be more able to rapidly support multiple forms of crisis. An enabler task force would further be ideal to support internal homeland defense and disaster relief. Essentially the units depicted in figure 9 are critical to nearly every type of operation from combat to humanitarian assistance. They are rarely, if ever, used separately. Their habitual association with one another would make their interoperability immediate when called.

![FIGURE 9: ENABLER TASK FORCE DESIGN](image)

CONCLUSION

Due to decisions by the Government of Turkey, the ARFOR-T was unable to complete the opening of ground route through Turkey into the Northern Front for OIF. Therefore, we can only speculate as to the ultimate success of this operation. The effort in Turkey was extremely valuable for the U.S. Army and the U.S. military as a whole because it clearly identified cracks in our command and control structures, and gaps in our ability to rapidly support theater opening and sustainment operations. Armed with these lessons and many others from OIF, the Department of Defense is prepared to take the next step in transformation and perhaps create standing, functional organizations whose habitual relationships facilitate immediate, synchronized, and effective response. But to the credit of all the ARFOR-T, they whole-
heartedly embraced their responsibilities and used every opportunity to plan, train, and execute this mission – overall an amazing accomplishment.
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