TRANSFORMATION AND THE FUTURE OF POST-CONFLICT OPERATIONS: LESSONS FROM OUR NATION'S PAST

by

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This SRP is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the Master of Strategic Studies Degree. The views expressed in this student academic research paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

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ABSTRACT

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In the aftermath of the United States led attack that disposed Saddam Hussein, serious questions have been raised as to the preparations for post-conflict operations. The major conflict itself lasted a mere three weeks but since then delays in restoring pre-conflict civilian services and security have raised questions as to the preparedness of both the American government and its military to win the peace. Post-conflict and counterinsurgency operations actually begin during combat operations. Transformation efforts, specifically in this case the United States Army, are attempting to ensure the army is organized, equipped, and trained to conduct full spectrum operations successfully, and throughout all phases of operations, including the post-conflict phase. This paper examines what post-conflict operations’ lessons learned should be incorporated into the transformation efforts of the United States military. It does so by reviewing the Philippine War, the Second World War, and a critical lesson from the Korean War.
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INTRODUCTION

In the aftermath of the United States led attack that disposed Saddam Hussein, serious questions have been raised in many quarters as to the preparations for post-conflict operations. The major conflict itself, lasting a mere three weeks from the first troops crossing the line of departure until President Bush landed on the USS ABRAHAM LINCOLN, was by and large a display of professional military might so overwhelming that even the United States’ most ardent detractors had to be impressed. But in the time since then, delays in restoring pre-conflict civilian services and security have raised many questions in the minds of even the strongest supporters of military actions as to the preparedness of both the American government and its military to win the peace. More soldiers have been killed after the end of major conflict than during; it took almost a year to return oil production (the nation’s main source of income) to pre-war levels; and humanitarian agencies, Non-Government Agencies (NGO’s), Private Voluntary Organizations (PVO’s) and international organizations have refused to remain in post conflict Iraq due to security concerns. Animosity runs high among Iraqi citizens towards the American occupation, and tensions within the international community, even amongst American’s long-term allies, have reached their highest level since at least the end of the Cold War.

This does not mean the war was not merited, or that the overall impact on Iraqis, the region, the Global War of Terror, or American security has not been positive. One looks at Iraq today and sees a country and its citizens that are much better off than they were under the brutal regime of Hussein and his Baathist Party. Although Weapons of Mass Destruction have not been found, and may never be, a strong case can be made that the world is safer with a democratic and disarmed Iraq. This paper is not addressing the decision of whether or not the United States and its partners should have conducted military operations to depose Saddam Hussein and his henchmen. Nor does it examine the strategic political decisions that resulted in military actions. Instead it will review the method and manner that the operations were carried out, specifically the post-conflict and counterinsurgency operations conducted by the military at the tactical and operational level and their strategic impact. Finally, it will examine what lessons should be incorporated into the transformation efforts of the United States military preparing for full spectrum operations in the 21st century. This review will not only look at Operation Iraq Freedom, but will also review two major conflicts of the past century—the Philippine War and
the Second World War—as well as a critical lesson following the Korean War, to determine if there are common lessons to be extracted as to the conduct of post-conflict and counterinsurgency operations.

The Philippine War of 1898-1902 has a number of similarities to the present conflict. This war, which on the strictest of military terms was won on the first day of battle with the sinking of the Spanish Fleet in Manila Bay on May 1, 1898, proceeded to drag on through four years of counterinsurgency operations, resulting in thousands of deaths and domestic turmoil both in the Philippines and at home in America.¹ The Second World War is generally held up as a model of post-conflict effective planning, though often with more admiration than likely it deserves. Nevertheless, the planning and innovations implemented in occupied Germany are worthy of review. Following the Korean War, the Korean Augmentation Troops to the United States Army (KATUSA) Program has proven to be one of the most effective programs the military has undertaken to improve civil-military relations between United States soldiers stationed in a foreign country and the local civilian population. This paper will examine these historical cases for lessons to carry forth in our transformation efforts, particularly as they deal with counterinsurgency and post-conflict operations.

Much has been written about Phase IV operations recently. In a number of critical articles, the American military has been taken to task for conducting brilliant Phase III combat operations, but being ill-prepared for Phase IV post-conflict operations. Unfortunately, this is an accurate critique of a United States military failing that has reoccurred often in American history. At least part of the reason lies with the false dichotomy of Phase III and Phase IV operations. As Conrad Crane has argued, Phase IV operations should more accurately be considered Phase IIIIB operations, or perhaps we should do away with phasing all together. Either way, it is clear that the two phases are not sequential.² Post-conflict and counterinsurgency operations actually begin during combat operations. If the military—as well as the interagency community—has not been organized, trained, and equipped to handle these operations simultaneously, the results are typically disastrous. The planning and preparation for operations across the entire spectrum must address simultaneous conflict, post-conflict and counterinsurgency operations to ensure the military can ‘win the peace’ and fulfill the ultimate goals of the operations, unless the goals are to ensure continued turmoil and tragedy.

Transformation efforts ongoing in the United States military, specifically in this case the United States Army, are attempting to ensure the army is organized, equipped, and trained to conduct full spectrum operations successfully, and throughout all phases of operations. As part of transformation, the army is moving towards a restructuring of its ground forces into Units of
Action and Units of Employment. As currently envisioned, the Units of Action will be similar to a brigade combat team and emphasize combined operations, effects based targeting, and network centric warfare. Units of Employment will incorporate a much more robust Joint capability, and are envisioned as somewhat of a Division/Corps hybrid. Do the current Transformation proposals and plans adequately address the lessons learned over the past century to ensure the United States Army, as part of Joint and Combined efforts, can not only win the military battle but can also win the peace?

THE PHILIPPINE WAR

In 1898, Spain occupied and controlled, or at least attempted to control, the Philippine Islands. United States President William McKinley sent Commodore George Dewey against the Spanish Fleet in order to liberate the Islands. The reasons behind the Spanish-American conflict are beyond the scope of this study, but under the Spanish during the 1890’s the Philippines were struggling through social tension, disease, hunger, banditry, and outright rebellion. Commodore Dewey put a quick end to the Spanish Fleet in Manila Bay on May 1, 1898, and soon afterwards the United States government declared the Philippines liberated from the Spanish, but in need of a protectorate force until stability could be secured in the Islands. McKinley sent Major General Wesley Merritt to the Philippines as the military governor and commander of United States forces there for “the twofold purpose of completing the reduction of the Spanish power in that quarter and of giving order and security to the islands while in the possession of the United States.” After Major General E.S.Otis replaced Merritt later that year, President McKinley sent another letter instructing Otis to “publish a proclamation declaring that we come, not to make war upon the people of the Philippines nor upon any party or faction among them, but to protect them in their homes, in their employments, and in their personal and religious rights.” Unfortunately, this mission would require four tough years of fighting by American soldiers against insurgents and revolutionaries before these guerilla forces were eventually subdued in 1902.

Historians such as Stuart Miller often look at the final campaigns of that War, especially the battles and actions in Samar and Batangos, as evidence of American heavy handedness if not outright war crimes. Some have painted a picture of lawless, xenophobic, and brutal United States troops barely controlled by their military commanders fighting against an insurgency supported throughout the Philippines by the native population. This was hardly the case. Over half of the 7000 islands making up the Philippine archipelago never witnessed any fighting or insurrection, and much of the fighting in the remainder was localized, of short duration, and with
few casualties. While racism and brutality on the part of the Americans certainly existed, the occupation was marked as much by benevolent assimilation as by military might. The ultimate success of the campaign was due in no small part to the support the Americans received from the local population, who rightly feared the insurgents' terrorist actions and the resulting chaos more than they resented the United States military forces. Although there were indeed serious challenges and outright failures in both policy and execution, overall the operation turned out extremely successful and with important lessons to be gleaned for counterinsurgency, post-conflict operations, and Operations Other than War.

The United States military was dominant in every aspect in this three-way war between Spanish forces, the America military, and the Philippine revolutionary forces. The Spanish were quickly defeated by the United States Navy, and soon after withdrew from the Islands. The revolutionary forces under Emileo Aguinaldo were routed each and every time they joined in conventional battle against the American soldiers or marines; a tactic they abandoned quickly because of the lopsidedness of the results. The revolutionaries soon adopted guerilla tactics, killing soldiers in small ambushes and attempting to control the local populations through a combination of propaganda, coercion, bribery, and intimidation.

The Americans possessed a number of clear advantages. The Navy was dominant, a key factor in a country consisting of thousands of islands and whose lines of communication and supply were almost totally dependent on sea lanes. In the littorals, the marines and United States Navy developed tactics, techniques, and procedures that permitted them to quickly overwhelm any coastal village or town. Artillery weapons, the Krag rifle, and heavily armed gunboats, as well as almost a limitless supply of ammo, gave the Americans clear superiority in firepower. The open-order tactics developed by the United States Army in 1891 and the ability of American soldiers and tactical leaders to adapt to both the Philippine environment and the revolutionaries’ guerilla tactics was impressive.

Yet, the greatest asset the United States Army possessed at his time was a large cadre of experienced officers who had spent many years in post-conflict operations and civil-affairs duties at the tactical level. These men had developed their critical experience base first during the years of Southern reconstruction and then during the Indian Wars fought in the American West. Following Appomattox, these soldiers struggled while learning the hard lessons associated with enforcing stability and control on a defeated but still hostile populace. Later, theses experiences were broadened as these soldiers and leaders were sent to man western frontier forts. Although the common perception in American western folklore is of cavalry soldiers and war-painted Indians constantly fighting on the American plains, in actuality United
States Army officers spent almost their entire time in what today are termed peacekeeping activities. These dual experiences—Reconstruction and the Indian Wars—would prove invaluable during their Philippine duty, enabling the tactical commanders to overcome poor or misguided orders, plans, guidance, and actions originating at the strategic level, whether these came from the American administration unable to fully comprehend the situation in the Islands or from the military governors assigned to secure the peace on the Islands. Neither fully understood the challenges faced by their commanders who were in direct daily contact with the local populace.

At the American strategic level, there was a lack of clear guidance throughout the four years of counterinsurgency and nation-building operations. From the very beginning, President McKinley’s ambiguous missions and directions frustrated the American generals. In December of 1898 McKinley sent instructions to Major General Otis, stating: (1) the destruction of the Spanish fleet and the capture of Manila meant the United States had practically effected the conquest of the Philippine Islands, (2) Otis was to occupy and administer all the Philippine Islands and extend the military government over all ceded territory, and (3) the Army was now to win the confidence, respect and affection of the inhabitants.¹² Not only was the first assertion an incredibly naïve exaggeration, the last two were far beyond the capabilities of a small occupying force barely strong enough to hold the capital and a few key coastal cities. There were also many questions left unanswered, such as who would be in charge of the occupation, the length of their stay, what the status of the native government should be, and what was the size of the force the military governor could count on receiving. What was clear to those in theater from the beginning was the size of the United States force was insufficient. Although the American military strength in the Philippines peaked at 70,000 in December of 1900, the actual average strength available for operations was about 24,000. Enemy estimates ranged as high as 100,000, and the occupying forces were incapable of providing any force presence in most of the islands simultaneously.¹³

At the operational level, the generals who became military governors—Merritt, Otis, MacArthur, and Chaffee in succession—were experienced commanders who understood both occupation duty and the employment of military forces. They understood the dynamics and necessity of providing security in occupied territory and of benevolent assimilation. General Order 100, Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field, was emphasized (it was issued during the Civil War but was still in effect). This listed the instructions for an occupying army, including the requirement to administer force “strictly guided by the principles of justice, honor, and humanity” and to protect “religion and morality, strictly private
property, and the persons of the inhabitants.” But it also emphasized that continued resistance in the form of guerilla warfare or assisting the enemy could be harshly dealt with, up to and including summary execution. The military governors ordered their subordinates to win the hearts and minds of the populace by enforcing the rule of law, by providing security, through the completion of civic projects and public works, and by ensuring government and education operations continued. They indeed had a good grasp of the issues surrounding occupation duties. Yet these same operational commanders often underestimated the enemy and overestimated the capabilities of their own forces. They also tended to remain in Manila and thus did not fully understand the very different and disparate challenges the tactical commanders faced in the hundreds of different districts and villages spread throughout the Philippine Islands.

So how was the war won? More importantly, how did the United States military win the hearts and minds of the people and reestablish both security and a functioning government? It happened at the tactical level. A hallmark of the Philippine War was the decentralization and independence at the tactical level of command—brigade and below operations. Soon after arriving in the Philippines and securing the capital of Manila, the United States military began establishing local garrison commands. This command and administrative structure was based on the Department-Division model developed out of the experiences of Reconstruction and the Western frontier. This divided the territory into semiautonomous geographic commands, each with a garrison force. This dual command structure resulted in a military commander of the local garrison force, who coordinated operations against armed resistance, and an Office of the Military Governor (OMG), who supervised civic projects and established civil government in each district. These commanders followed General Order 43 and General Order 40, which provided blueprints for municipal organization. These commands were decentralized and very independent at the tactical level, and the local military commander had almost complete control to adjust the implementation of these orders to fit the local situation. By November of 1899 there were 51 such commands, and this grew dramatically to 639 by December of 1900.

An example of one of these commanders was Brigadier General Robert P. Hughes. He had first been appointed as the Provost Marshall in Manila, where he forced the cleaning and improved sanitation of slaughterhouses, marketplaces, dispensaries, and hospitals; reestablished garbage-collection; opened public schools; fixed city lighting and water systems; and rebuilt roads and bridges. He reestablished a police force, and reopened government administrative offices. Later, after being given command of a brigade and appointed as one of the local military governors, he took this same approach within his district and quickly won over
the local populace. Another example was Brigadier General James Smith, a brigade commander assigned as the military governor on the Island of Negros. He was experienced in Civil Affairs, humanitarianism, and political issues as well as military affairs. Upon attempting to immediately implement self-rule in his district, he found local tribal in-fighting was putting his plans in jeopardy. He therefore shifted the focus of his office as military governor to the establishment of local elections, and most importantly, he recruited, trained, and equipped a local police force. Once security was established and local elections were held, he implemented self-rule, which then worked well. The great majority of the 639 commands enjoyed success stories similar to these.\textsuperscript{18}

Clearly there were factors that make a direct comparison of the Philippine War and today’s operations difficult. There were cases then, especially during the last year of the war when the United States followed a get-tough policy with the last revolutionary holdouts, when American commanders and forces on the ground conducted military actions that today we might well regard as war crimes.\textsuperscript{19} American soldiers also died at a rate much greater than those today in Iraq or Afghanistan, and morale of the soldiers often dropped very low. This was partly due to the environmental conditions soldiers faced in the Philippines, and the lack of capability of the United States to provide sufficient medical support and supplies to its troops. Another significant factor was the lack of technology prevented news coverage from directly impacting military daily activities at the tactical level as it often does today.

Yet there are more similarities to today’s missions and circumstances than differences. Security and reconstruction efforts did succeed, and they succeeded because leaders and soldiers effectively achieved strategic and operational objectives through decentralized execution at the tactical level. This was enabled by a flexible system built around the Department-District model, and by the vast experience of the soldiers and leaders at all levels in these types of missions garnered during the years prior to the Philippine War. Of critical importance, long tours during the Philippine War were the standard, and tactical commanders and their soldiers would remain in the same local area for most if not all of their time in theater. They became very familiar with the local villagers and tribal leaders, as well as with the language and customs of their area. They understood what tactics and techniques worked, began to recognize who was friend and who was foe, and garnered tremendous trust from the local population over time. Civil-military operations were successfully conducted by tactical level conventional forces operating in a decentralized manner, but under the direction of supportive centralized general policies established at the operational and strategic level.
WORLD WAR II

During and after World War II the military again successfully conducted security and reconstruction efforts, and rebuilt the nations of Germany and Japan. This paper will restrict its review to Germany, but there are equally valuable lessons to be learned by studying the American occupation of Japan. Military officers often view World War II as the epitome of what security and reconstruction efforts should look like, but that view glosses over the many problems and issues that arose. The most serious of these involved the general lack of experience within the Army in nation building activities. The Army of 1942 found itself with few soldiers or officers, even at the highest levels, who had experience with post-conflict operations, unlike the situation in 1898. The need to prepare for this mission was recognized, but the effort to organize, train, equip, and execute the mission was slow in developing, disjointed and often implemented very hauntingly.

Initially, many influential members of President Roosevelt’s cabinet believed post-conflict operations were strictly a State Department responsibility, a view the President himself espoused early on during the War. For numerous reasons the State Department was unable to plan or prepare for this mission adequately. Some blamed a lack of State Department resources while others argued it was not an appropriate mission for the State Department because of the simultaneous nature of conflict and post-conflict operations within a war zone. It was not until November 28, 1942 that General Eisenhower was able to convince General Marshall and his superiors that the State Department could not control civil matters in a combat zone until such time as the military had completed military operations and reestablished a secure environment. The President acquiesced, and assigned the War Department the lead for civil-military operations in Europe until such time as security and stability were achieved and the State Department was prepared to conduct battle handover of the mission. This led to the establishment of the Army’s Civil Affairs Division on March 1, 1943, and the subsequent Civil Affairs Training Program and its offshoots that would prove invaluable in 1945. The British joined in the program, though with much initial disagreement with the Americans about the organization and planning process. By October 1943, the British and Americans military leaders had agreed they would need at least 14,400 trained officers and soldiers to man the civil affairs detachments required once the continent was occupied, and began an active program to reach that level.

Unfortunately, many of the early painful lessons in establishing a civil-military capability could have been avoided if the Army had more quickly heeded the civil-military operations After Action Reviews extensively laid out in the Hunt Report, published right after World War I.

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of the key lessons identified in the Hunt Report was that “tactical units still controlled civil matters.” 27 These lessons, as well as many concepts developed at the United States Army War College during the inter-war period, eventually were incorporated into a civil-military training program, but not until after the outbreak of World War II. Even then, the initial planning and training proved inadequate. Additional lessons learned garnered from the experiences with occupation following the Sicily and Italy landings in the summer of 1943 were implemented to improve the program.28 These included issues dealing with reestablishing security; handling refugees and displaced persons; controlling of Typhus and other infectious diseases in a war zone; restarting government services; and preventing the looting of government buildings, artwork, and museums.29 Nevertheless, further mistakes were made during the early Rhineland occupations around Aachen and Monschau in late 1944. The Allied slow down in late fall of 1944 and the German Ardennes offensives of that winter actually provided the United States Army time to readjust its planning for civil-military governance and incorporate these lessons learned in time to be much more effective the following spring and summer when the military began its large scale occupation of Germany.

Just as in the Philippines and in World War I, World War II demonstrated that is at the tactical level—in this case within the military commands who took charge of each town and city—that the hearts and minds of the people are won. Regardless of the actions at the highest levels, it was the combination of civil affairs detachments and local occupying troops that impacted greatest on the German civilians faced with a war in its last throes and with a monumental rebuilding effort. As towns were conquered, the local civilians were “gripped with fear that the Nazis might return and take vengeance on them.”30 Military government detachments successfully incorporating their earlier training to “supply courage and stamina to thousands of frightened people, suppress hysteria where it threatened to break out, control refugees, keep the roads open for military traffic, and in some places, provide security against German paratroopers and partisans.”31 But there were also many lessons to be learned at the local level that would have been hard to anticipate at the schoolhouse, but were quickly learned by experience. An example occurred when the civil-military detachment and local military commander in Herzogenrath were ordered to confiscate all bicycles to hinder counterinsurgency operations and to prevent further refugee migration. Unfortunately, without their bicycles “the miners stopped going to work and doctors and nurses could not make their rounds.”32 The bicycles were quickly returned to the local inhabitants. There were many unintended consequences of rules being imposed from higher levels that were first felt at the local level, and that was where the mitigating solutions were enacted.
The difference between the strategic level view and those at the tactical level was illustrated by the following memo sent from Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces (SHAEF) in December 1944 to the army groups for dissemination throughout their commands and to the European Civil Affairs Division (ECAD). This memo arrived when local commanders and civilian affairs detachments were trying to prevent the starvation and death of civilians critically short of food and coal in the conquered towns near the Rhine. In the memo, tactical commanders were told “that no effort will be made to rehabilitate or succor the German people. Rather, the sole aim of military government is to further military objectives.... Reports from the field indicate that military government detachments and G-5 staffs and subordinate formations are inclined to try and do too much to relieve the problems of the German people. There seems to be a disposition to approach the administration of Germany with the idea that it is our job to make Germany a ‘happy land’ again. It is essential that all military government personnel be disabused to this concept.”

Most military units ignored these directions almost as widely as they did the non-fraternization policy. They just did not make sense to the soldiers on the ground dealing with the grim realities facing them each day, and who, “even though they might accept the idea of German collective guilt...did not feel at ease as agents of collective retribution.”

This is not to suggest that the American government and policy makers, nor the strategic level commands, were indifferent to the problems faced by the Army and civilians in liberated and occupied countries, including Germany. The Bretton Woods agreements of 1944 and the European Recovery Program (ERP) of 1947 were crucial for the reconstruction of Europe, and especially Germany. In four years the ERP, better know as the Marshall Plan, pumped in over $13 billion to Europe. Especially crucial were the vast amounts of food, coal, electric power, oil, steel, and transportation infrastructure provided. But the Marshall Plan did not start until 1947, and until then much of the work conducted was planned and executed at the tactical levels by young commanders and troops.

Most of the work in the local villages and small cities went to the I detachments, consisting of four officers and five enlisted men, and two jeeps with trailers. Their first order of business upon entering a town just captured (they traveled with the front line units—hence their nickname of spearhead detachments), would be to arrange for the dead to be buried, restore rationing, put police back on the streets, and if possible get electricity and water working. Soon after, they would begin identifying Nazis from non-Nazis (as best they could), and when possible reestablish a local government. In the larger cities the same formula was used, although the spearhead detachments were much larger, and the difficulties they faced much more
pronounced. In both cases, these military government officers observed that the people’s first reaction “seemed to be to regard any unguarded property as free for the taking.” Aside from this looting, other common problems were the inability to get the railroads, the power grid, and the food distribution systems functioning again. Later, as the war came to an end, the largest issues dealt with the handling of displaced persons, refugees, and prisoners of war, as well as the reestablishment of functional governments and institutions at every level within Germany.

As the American Army moved across Germany, the civil-affairs detachments moving with the tactical units would be assigned to run towns based on the ECAD plan established in 1944. Unfortunately, the number of detachments was insufficient. By the spring of 1945, detachments were forced to handle multiple towns and areas. Soon afterwards, there were no unassigned detachments remaining, and the armies began to draw provisional detachments out of their tactical units. An example is the Ninth Army, which, modeled its internal detachments after those of the ECAD, established a Ninth Army Military Government Unit of 900 officers and soldiers. They rushed these detachments through a two-week course and assigned them to municipalities as they continued their march towards Berlin.

This inevitably resulted in problems, as these detachments were basically untrained. The two-week course could not possible provide the training required, and often many of the local appointed commanders had no training at all. When Lieutenant Colonel Mason, Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces (SHAEF) G-5 historian, traveled into the Third Army area in April of 1945, he “sensed something was amiss the moment we hit Weimar.” The acting military governor was a field artillery Lieutenant Colonel who had been firing in the line 56 hours earlier, and neither he nor his officers “had the least grounding in the responsibilities and powers of military government.” Although the common belief now is that the occupation of Germany and the resulting military government established and run by the War Department was a model for the future, the reality was something quite different. The winter of 1945-1946 saw widespread hunger, with rationing of food set at 1500 calories a day—1200 of that in bread and potatoes—and very little heating coal and electricity available. Three months after the war ended, industry in the American zone was only running at 5 percent of capacity, and housing was a serious problem, as three quarters of the dwellings were in serious need of repair. Not only were there serious problems with post-war government and reconstruction, the American soldiers became restless and ill-disciplined. In late November of 1945, the Seventh Army report found that “the general opinion of the Germans is that American soldiers are men who drink to excess, have no respect for the uniform they wear, are prone to rowdyism and to beat civilians with no regard for human rights, and benefit themselves through the black market.” Numerous
incidents of rape and murder were substantiated, to the point that General Eisenhower warned the soldiers that these acts could give the U.S. forces "a bad reputation that will take our country a long time to overcome." As for the denazification process, the resources were not there to really complete this task with much effectiveness. Of the 3.6 million Germans considered chargeable, only 887,252 were ever tried, and of these only 8,385 saw confinement. The rest melted back into the population and German society. Finally, President Truman announced on 31 October 1945 that the shift from military governance to State Department control in Germany would be made by 1 June 1946.

Although the American military can take credit for both a spectacular victory and for ultimately successful post-conflict operations in Germany, the lack of trained personnel in civil-military affairs and reconstruction caused major problems. The civil affairs detachments did yeoman’s work, but their numbers were too few. The tactical units then bore the brunt of post-conflict duties but were untrained and unprepared for those missions. It was only a combination of American perseverance and production, and of German industriousness and overwhelming desire to rebuild their nation, along with the eventual establishment of the European Recovery Plan, that enabled the successful stabilization and reconstruction of Germany to succeed.

THE CURRENT SITUATION

There are numerous initiatives within both the Department of Defense and the Department of the Army to restructure military forces to enable our tactical formations to successfully conduct full spectrum operations, including operations other than war, and through all phases of an operation, including post-conflict. In its Strategic Planning Guidance 2006-2011 (Final Coordinating Draft), the Department of Defense states the direction it wants the Army to go to better serve Combatant Commanders’ ability to conduct full spectrum operations: “Services will continue to modernize force organizations to achieve improved modularity so Combatant Commanders can more readily organize forces to tasks.” The intent is to create a modular ‘brigade based’ Army that is more responsive to regional combatant commanders needs, better employs Joint capabilities, facilitates force packaging and rapid deployment, and fights as self contained units capable of full spectrum operations.

The Army Planning Priorities Guidance FY 2006-2023 nests well with that concept, and directs the Army to “reorganize the Army into smaller, lethal, deployable, full-spectrum brigades with stand-alone modular command and control at echelons above brigade.” The Chief of Staff of the Army, in his guidance to the Army G-8 in February of 2004, followed suit, charging the Army to:
Design a modular force focused on Brigade Unit of Actions (UAs) with enhanced near term capabilities

Generate a greater number of Brigade UAs than existing Brigade Combat teams (BCTs)

Design a modular Unit of Employment (UEx and UEy) with enhanced near term capabilities optimized for full spectrum operations

The Army G-3 Force Development, the Army G-8, the Objective Force Task Force, and the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) have been working since the late 1990’s to design and field brigades that would fulfill these requirements. Early designs, first reflected in the Stryker Brigade Combat Teams (SBCTs), envisioned a Brigade level headquarters as a Unit of Action that was prepared to accept modular attachments of civil affairs, public affairs, psychological operations, and other Special Operations Forces as part of its go-to-war organization. Additionally, the training of the first SBCT focused on full spectrum operations by included a substantial amount of security, counterinsurgency, stabilization and reconstruction exercise scenarios for training both the brigade staff and for its subordinate units. Force designers changed the traditional ‘Fires Planning Cells’ to ‘Fires and Effect Cells’ and then ultimately to ‘Effects Cells’, reflecting the desire and need for these brigades to be able to conduct full spectrum operations that would use non-kinetic targeting as well as traditional kinetic means. A requirement for linguists was identified, and in-depth training in cultures was instituted for NCOs and junior officers within the first SBCT at Fort Lewis, Washington. This involved individual training of the NCOs and officers through college level classes and seminars, unit training using computer simulations, and a variety of situational training exercises incorporated into field training. The TRADOC Brigade Coordination Cell submitted a proposal in January of 2003 for these post-conflict training scenarios and practices to be adopted for subsequent SBCTs, and eventually for the follow-on Units of Actions. Unfortunately, this expansion of the program was not only denied, it was cut for the current Stryker brigades due to lack of funds. In hindsight, considering the challenges of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM and Operation IRAQ FREEDOM, one wonders if the Army had the opportunity to choose again, would they reconsider funding this brigade level training, especially training that focused on the conduct of post-conflict operations within urban areas and amongst non-western cultures.

There have been numerous organizational designs of future Units of Action that have floated within the Army over the past few years. Most of these designs are modular and thus tailorable per the transformation guidance, yet almost all include assigned Civil Affairs teams, Public Affairs personnel, and a Special Operations Forces’ planning cell. Additionally many
include a Military Police company to assist with security operations. Although the Unit of Action organization has not been finalized, each design recognizes the need for the above capabilities at the tactical level. Additionally, each anticipates there are specialty positions, such as for linguists, which would be filled upon notification for deployment.

Linguists are a key requirement. As explained earlier, they were clearly needed in both the Philippines and in Germany. Later, in Korea, the United States realized the benefit of having units at every level—down to the lowest tactical formation—possess organic Korean language and cultural capabilities through the assignment of Korean soldiers to American military units. These soldiers are provided through the Korean Augmentation Troops to The United States Army (KATUSA) program, a vital component of American military forces in Korea today. Although started simply as a program to fill “US units that were understrength and for which American replacements were not available,” the linguistic and cultural benefits of the program were soon recognized. Today, fully ten percent of the soldiers in United States Army tactical units are actually Korean Army augmentees. These soldiers are typically assigned at the battalion level, yet are pushed down to platoons and sections. Within the combat arms formations every section—infantry, armor, medical, maintenance, reconnaissance, administrative, food service, etc.—has a Korean soldier assigned. It is not at the strategic level that the ability to interact with the local people is most needed. Those who are in the most direct contact, and who have the most direct impact on operations, are the young leaders and their soldiers within each tactical unit. Each KATUSA soldier replaces an American soldier, lives and works side-by-side with his American crewmates, and thus is a component part of the unit. The KATUSA soldiers provide language translation capability, but more importantly are the main source to ensure the American soldiers understand the culture of their Korean hosts. There are cases over the past fifty years of tensions between United States Army units and their Korean hosts due to unfortunate incidents, such as the two Korean girls who were accidental killed by a engineer vehicle in 2002. Yet the American Army by and large has enjoyed a good relationship with Korean society over the past five decades, and many observers credit that at least in part to the KATUSA program. It is at the tactical level where the hearts and minds of the local populace are won over.

Today, each of the services maintains a cohort of officer personnel trained as regional and linguistic experts. The Air Force and Navy programs identify officers who already possess some level of foreign area expertise, while the Marines follow a smaller but similar program as the Army. The Army program is the oldest and most advanced, and since 1996 officers have been able to specialize as Foreign Area Officers (FAO) as a single career track. Current requirements
are for an officer to complete the three-phase FAO qualification regime: language training, an advanced degree in regional studies, and a regional tour. Unfortunately, none of the services has a great number of trained linguists or foreign area specialists. The Army FAOs available by region are:

- Latin America – 189
- South Asia – 35
- China – 41
- Northeast Asia – 71
- Sub-Saharan Africa - 83
- Europe – 195
- Eurasia – 184
- North Africa/Middle East – 140
- Southeast Asia – 64

There are not a substantial number of linguists within any one area either, with the exception of Germany and Spanish speaking Latin America, the areas currently with the least need. Despite all the talk of United States prowess in its Special Operations Forces (SOF), the fact is that all services remain woefully short of FAOs and linguists in languages relevant to likely future conflicts or insurgencies. Robert Kaplan, at a recent conference on security planning and military transformation, argued convincingly that “winning at insurgencies depends more on day-to-day small tactical and PR [public relations] successes over the long haul rather than ordnance on sexy targets or battlefield victory.” Those small successes begin with soldiers at the tactical level—in daily contact with the local population—who understand their culture and with at least a few soldiers who can speak their language.

Another key requirement in post-conflict operations is the continuing use of an effective Information Operations (IO) campaign. Department of Defense Directive 3600.1 Version 6 (DRAFT) defines IO as “Actions taken to influence, affect, or defend information, information systems, and decision-making.” IO involves five core capabilities: psychological operations, military deception, operational security, electronic warfare, and computer network operations; four supporting capabilities: intelligence and counterintelligence, kinetic attack, physical security, and information assurance; and two related capabilities: public affairs and civil military operations. One of the key lessons learned this past year in both Afghanistan and Iraq and identified by the Joint Center for Lessons Learned was that IO capabilities were concentrated at the strategic level. A critical shortcoming identified stated that leaders and staff officers at the tactical level simply “do not now what they do not know.” Because of a lack of familiarity and inadequate training with IO, tactical leaders focus by nature on mission essential tasks (METL) generally associated with kinetic operations. Although the Joint Center for Lessons Learned looked at IO through the prism of the entire campaign, and with a focus on special operations units, their conclusions clearly include the security and reconstruction phases of operations, and
can be applied to conventional tactical units. Their conclusion that special operations units are not well trained on IO operations at the tactical level reinforces the fact that conventional forces are even less prepared for these operations.

All these capabilities—FAO’s, linguists, civil affairs, public affairs, psychological affairs, IO experts, and other Special Forces operatives—are needed for full-spectrum operations. But as history has shown, they are needed not just at the strategic and operational planning levels, nor just as shadowy special teams operating apart from the major tactical units on the ground, but rather as a critical component of operations at the tactical level and in tandem with conventional forces. That is where the critical actions and interactions occur; that is where the battle for security and reconstruction, and for the hearts and minds of the population, is won or lost. As the United States further develops its Unit of Actions’ organization, manning, and training structure, an omission of these critical elements would be a terrible shortcoming, and could lead to a repeat of the mistakes made throughout the past century.

These changes should not wait. General Schoomaker believes these capabilities are urgently needed, as “the nation has developed a national strategy, a military strategy that says we’re going to be more proactive than we have in the past. And that means we’re going to have to be able to be strategically agile [and] able to do things faster and farther and deeper than we have before.” He recently described a new focus on army units smaller than the divisions that are the dominant organization today: “My view is we need to be thinking about brigade kinds of things, how many brigades do you have to rotate to meet requirements…What we’re looking at internally as we reorganize the army is how to increase the brigade-level organizations, how will we move enablers into brigade-level organizations to get a brigade that is more capable, and [provide it] with the joint connectivity that is required for it to be able to leverage all of the joint resources at that level.” According to the Army Chief of Staff, each new brigade must be able to:

- Have enough command-and-control capability to operate independently.
- Establish and maintain information superiority.
- Conduct prompt and sustained land warfare.
- Engage and attack precisely.
- Control people and territory.
- Deploy flexibly.

The redesigned brigades must also be more joint — that is, networked with units from other services on the battlefield.
CONCLUSIONS:

There are six key lessons that need to be addressed. First, the United States has successfully conducted nation building and stability and support operations throughout its history, but not as efficiently nor as effectively as was possible. In spite of the military’s reluctance to accept post-conflict, civil administration, and nation building tasks, it has invariably been pulled into these operations time after time. Although historians often cite the post-World War II occupations of Germany and Japan as America’s first successes with the use of military forces following a conflict to enact rapid and fundamental societal transformation, there is actually more history of success than just World War II. For example, the District-Division Program of post-conflict reconstruction and stabilization of the Philippines after 1899 enjoyed much success once it was instituted following an initial year of generally uncoordinated activity. The KATUSA Program in Korea demonstrated the importance of linguists and civil affairs, and provides us an important lesson learned for the need of these assets at the tactical level. The Combined Action Program instituted by the Marines in Vietnam also was an attempt to push civil-military actions down to the tactical level, and many marines still insist the program was one of the true success stories of that war. More recently, the Provincial Recovery Team concept being instituted in Afghanistan shows early promise, and most in the military are optimistic about the implementation of a similar if not a duplicate program in Iraq. These latter two programs have strikingly similar characteristics to the programs of the past. Lesson 1: Security and reconstruction activities are a consistent element of war.

In each of these cases the United States found itself in a precarious situation, with military success generally a foregone conclusion but experiencing incredible difficulty in solidifying the desired outcome due to post-conflict turbulence and discord. America and its allies often win the fight against enemy conventional military forces rather quickly, but then spend an enormous amount of time, money, effort, and lives securing the peace. Stability and reconstruction efforts by the military in the Philippines continued for four years after the United States “won the war,” seven years in Germany and Japan (and one could argue they continued many decades after that), certainly continued for decades in Korea, and are still ongoing in Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq. In those areas where they did not continue for a substantial time, we failed (Somalia and Haiti). Lesson 2: Security and reconstruction efforts continue for years after major military operations cease.

United States military planners are tremendous in preparing for war. Unfortunately stability and reconstruction operations have a different track record. The ability to concurrently plan these operations with the war planning, to include civil-military plans, has been and continues to
be problematic. With the United States growing dominance in warfighting capability, the need for concurrent civil-military planning at the outset is even that more important, since stability and reconstruction operations are likely to more frequently coexist with combat operations, as we have seen in Iraq. As America’s military dominance becomes more pronounced, the time between the start and end of military operations may continue to shrink. Phase III operations have lasted for just months rather than years since at least the end of the Cold War. Because what have typically been called Phase IV operations begin so soon after the start of modern day wars, the United States can no longer afford to wait until after the conflict has begun to complete its post-conflict operations planning. Lesson 3: Security and reconstruction efforts are not a separate phase, but begin soon after the start of military operations and run concurrently with those operations.

Although the military is charged with providing a safe and secure environment in their area of operations, it is civilian agencies that are normally responsible for reconstruction. But this will not happen until the warfighters have obtained a relatively secure environment. During the period of combat operations, and often for some time after while a secure environment is being developed, civilian agencies will not have access to the areas where they are needed most. This is also the period of time when the most critical humanitarian assistance, public security and governance is often required. Therefore the military must be prepared to conduct these operations—even if they must do so while concurrent military operations are ongoing—until the mantle can be passed to the later arriving civilian agencies. Initial law enforcement, humanitarian assistance, reconstruction efforts, restoration of civil administration and emergency and public services such as medical, power, water and other economic recovery and quality of life services will fall to the military to accomplish. This will occur at a time when the status of the war effort is in the most flux, and Rules of Engagement may be changing. Lesson 4: Security and reconstruction efforts will be run by the military during the earliest and most difficult stages.

Unfortunately, the preparations for these operations are historically conducted far too late, often involve the wrong or incomplete cast of interested and knowledgeable participants, and usually are restricted to the strategic level of operations. The planning, training, manning, equipping, and organizing for these operations is held either within a separate functional command (Special Operations Command), or is conducted at the theater level by the geographic component command, the Joint Force Land Component Command, or at the Joint Task Force level. Yet it is at the tactical level where the need is greatest, where the requirements are best identified, and where the actions must be performed. Civil affairs and
Special Operations Forces do tremendous work, but do not have the manpower resources to accomplish security and reconstruction mission by themselves. Historically it is the tactical conventional force on the ground that makes the greatest impact on these operations, and on winning the hearts and minds of the local populations. The operational and tactical units must be integrated closely with Civil Affairs and Special Operations assets and expertise early in the planning and training for an operation. Lesson 5: Security and reconstruction efforts require a unity of effort between the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of command, as well as between the specialists in these operations and the tactical Units of Action that are in the most direct contact with the civilians affected.

The United States and its allies are in the midst of major changes in their militaries. Regardless of whether one considers these changes evolutionary or transformational, the United States Army is conducting large-scale reorganization of its commands, and across the entire spectrum of DOTMLPF. This is the opportune time to effect changes in the Army’s doctrine, organization, training, manning, leader training, and personnel programs, and in facilities design, to enable the military to more effectively conduct security and reconstruction efforts. Lesson 6: Although important, simply increasing the number of Civil Affairs units or personnel on active duty will not solve the problem; the United States Army must imbed capabilities and training within the Units of Action to dramatically increase its capability to successfully accomplish post-conflict operations.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. Assign civil affairs and public affairs teams to the Units of Action; ensure the developing Units of Employment (both E and Y) have complementary organizations. The current operational concept of only attaching these personnel upon deployment has proven ineffective, as has the concept of their working concurrently within a tactical unit’s area of operations but not under its control.

2. Implement a training program that incorporates substantial Special Operations interaction with the Units of Action, to include home station Unit of Action staff training, and habitual interaction and training of Special Operations Forces and conventional force units down to the lowest tactical levels. Do not leave this type of training to Combined Training Center rotations and Mission Readiness Exercises alone.

3. Dramatically increase the linguist capabilities within the military, especially in those languages wherein the greatest chance of military operations exist (i.e. Arabic, Chinese, Korean, Russian). Each of the 48 anticipated Units of Action should have assigned linguists.
based on the most likely area they may be deployed. This would likely require a substantial effort to be made to enlist a few hundred linguists through bonuses and targeted recruitment. If a Unit of Action deploys outside its primary focus area, swaps of personnel or temporary attachments of linguists could be implemented. These personnel need to be assigned and not attached upon deployment in order to assist in the staff and unit training mentioned in #4 below.

4. Incorporate additional culturally and historically based civil-military training within institutional training curriculums, and during home station training. The latter can be assisted with training scenarios developed through TRADOC (as occurred at Fort Lewis in preparing the first SBCT), as well as with distance learning resources and local colleges. Incorporate this training in home station training exercises and in home station professional development programs. Having the personnel identified above (1-3) as part of the habitual relationships with in a Unit of Action would greatly enable this training capability.

5. Build regional urban training centers such as the newest one at Fort Lewis, Washington for both active and reserve training units use. The current cost of approximately $25 million to create a computerized full-scale small city environment to provide the means to conduct full spectrum operations training for a Unit of Action is critical. Very few units have access to this type of training experience outside their annual or biannual trip to a Combined Training Center. Yet this is acknowledged to be the most likely environment these units will find themselves in during both combat and post-conflict operations for the foreseeable future.

The United States Army is in the midst of a major paradigm shift. For decades tactical units—brigades and battalions—have typically deployed and operated as part of larger division and corps formations. Additionally, interaction with the local populations was considered the preserve of Special Operations Forces and civilians acting apart from conventional forces. The attitude within both the United States military and its civilian counterparts was that conventional military forces would fight and win battles, while Special Operators and the interagency and international community (both governmental and non-governmental) would handle post-conflict operations and nation building. The conventional Army would win the war; the others would win the peace. After a century of proof otherwise, it appears the Army, and the military as a whole, finally grasps that is not the case. The solutions outlined above are dramatic; that just may be what transformation is all about.

WORD COUNT= 8,998


3 The ideas in this paragraph are based on remarks made by a speaker participating in the Commandant’s Lecture Series.

4 Letter from President William McKinley to Major General Wesley Merritt dated 18 May 1898. U.S. Department of the Army. Correspondence Relating to the War with Spain, Including the Insurrection in the Philippine Islands and the China Relief Expedition, April 15, 1899 to July 30, 1902. (Washington D.C.: Center of Military History, 1993), 676.

5 Letter from President William McKinley to Major General E.S. Otis dated 21 December 1898. U.S. Department of the Army. Correspondence Relating to the War with Spain, Including the Insurrection in the Philippine Islands and the China Relief Expedition, April 15, 1899 to July 30, 1902. (Washington D.C.: Center of Military History, 1993), 858-859.

6 Ibid.

7 Stuart Miller, Benevolent Assimilation: the American Conquest of the Philippines, 1899-1903 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982).

8 Brian Linn, The Philippine War, 1899-1902 (Lawrence: The University Press of Kansas, 2000), 64-70, 185-188.

9 Ibid.

10 Ibid., 325.

11 Ibid., 8-9.

12 Ibid., 29-31.

13 Ibid., 325.

14 General Order No. 100, United States War Department (Washington D.C.: United States War Department, 24 April 1863), 2, 8.

15 Ibid., 15-18.


17 Linn, The Philippine War, 1899-1902, 199.

18 Ibid., 75-77.

19 Miller.


22 Coles, 43. In a letter to Eisenhower dated 28 November 1942, Marshall acquiesces to Eisenhower’s 26 November 1942 request that Eisenhower, as the senior military commander for the North African theater, maintain control of ongoing civil affairs missions until North Africa is made thoroughly secure.

23 Coles, 68.

24 Ziemke, 17.

25 Ibid., 32.


27 Ibid., 279.

28 Ziemke, 52-59.

29 Ibid.

30 Ibid., 156.

31 Ibid.

32 Ibid., 157.

33 Ibid., 162-163.

34 Ibid., 160.


36 Ziemke, 186.

37 Ibid., 189.

38 Ibid.

39 Ibid., 238.

40 Ibid., 243.

41 Ibid.
42 Ibid., 410.
43 Ibid., 351.
44 Ibid., 421.
45 Ibid., 421.
46 Ibid., 446.
47 Ibid., 403.
49 Ibid.
52 Comments above are observations from the author’s personal experiences as the Chief, SBCT 3-6 Transformation, TRADOC Brigade Coordination Cell, from July 2002 to July 2003. One of the responsibilities of that position was to assist in the planning and resourcing of training programs required for SBCT fielding and transformation.
54 Ibid., 1.
55 Comments above are observations from the author’s personal experiences as a tank battalion commander in Korea (2-72 Armor, 2d Infantry Division) from 2000-2002. There were over 60 Republic of Korea (ROK) soldiers in 2-72 Armor under the KATUSA program.
59 Ibid.


60 Ibid., 2.

61 Ibid.

62 General Peter Schoomaker, “An Interview with Gen Peter Schoomaker - Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army,” interview by Kim Burger, Jane’s Defence Weekly, 1 October 2003, 40.

63 Ibid.


65 DOTMLPF is a TRADOC acronym for the key components of creating and training a military force, and refers to the Doctrine, Organization, Training, Material, Leadership, Personnel, and Facilities required to design, organize, train, equip, man, and support a military force.
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