# Embedded Media: Failed Test or the Future of Military/Media Relations

**Author:** Michael Oehl

**Performing Organization:** U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Carlisle, PA, 17013-5050

**Distribution/Availability Statement:** Approved for public release; distribution unlimited

**Abstract:** See attached file.

**Subject Terms:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. Report</td>
<td>unclassified</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Abstract</td>
<td>unclassified</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. This Page</td>
<td>unclassified</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Abstract:**

See attached file.
Since Vietnam, the United States military has had a tenuous relationship with the American Media. Although both institutions serve to protect the constitution, a palatable distrust has defined the relationship; a distrust that seems to reach its apex when the country is at war. On one hand the military has viewed the media as intruding on its operational jurisdiction, willing and desiring to report on any negative events resulting from an operation. Concurrently, the media has viewed the military as a closed society, accountable to the American people, yet not open to scrutiny by the same people it has sworn to protect. This pervasive distrust was evident during Vietnam, Grenada and Panama and reached its peak during Desert Storm. After Desert Storm, a series of dynamics served to relieve some of the tension between the military and the American media, and set the stage for the advent of the Embedded Media Program experienced in Operation Iraqi Freedom. This student paper will address the historical relationship between the United States military and the American Media, analyze where that relationship stands presently, and propose a course for the future.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT

INTRODUCTION

VIETNAM

GRENADE

PANAMA

DESERT SHIELD/STORM

OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM

CONCLUSION

ENDNOTES

BIBLIOGRAPHY
EMBEDDED MEDIA: FAILED TEST OR THE FUTURE OF MILITARY/MEDIA RELATIONS?

The Military View?  “Four hostile newspapers are more to be feared than a thousand bayonets”
—Napoleon

The Media View?  “War is a drug……it is peddled by myth makers, historians, war correspondents, filmmakers, novelists and the state……” —Chris Hedges (War is a Force That Gives Us Meaning)

INTRODUCTION

The relationship between the United States military and the media has been a complex one for years. Like any relationship, it can be characterized by ebbs and flows, good times and bad from the perspective of both institutions. From Vietnam to Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), the military/media relationship’s complexity has been the result of a clash of cultures. The glaring philosophical differences between the two institutions make them unlikely bedfellows. The military is a fundamentally closed society; arguably more conservative than most American institutions. It is accountable to civilian leadership within the United States government and its mission focus is on the protection of American interests. The media by comparison is considerably more liberal. It is, with few exceptions, privately owned and accountable to stockholders with a mission of reporting newsworthy events that will either sell newspapers, magazines or airtime for a monetary profit. The goal of the American media is to write or present an intriguing story. That “attention-getter” translates to money. The military, by contrast, is not a profit making entity. It exists solely because the American public wants it to exist due to a perceived need for protection from those that would do the country harm. It’s an institution funded by tax paying Americans that does not provide a service to the country that is easily quantifiable. This places it in a sensitive position: its competence can be proved to the American public only on rare opportunities. Those opportunities, more often than not, come during times of conflict. Furthermore, its success or failure reflects not only on the military as an institution but also on the administration that made the decision to use military force. The irony of this relationship is that one institution is committed to defending the Constitution of the United States, the very document that allows the other institution to ply its trade. Both are fundamental to American democracy. Despite that ironic link, the military and the media continue to have a love-hate relationship. This paper will attempt to explore that relationship, as it has existed from Vietnam through OIF, while identifying the causes for such a relationship and what it means for the future.
This history of clashing cultures precedes Vietnam, but one could argue that the challenges apparent in the relationship have not changed much. This analysis will address the relationship as it evolved from that period. Additionally, for clarity, the definition of the relationship cannot always be narrowed to the military. Those governmental institutions that provide the military its marching orders; the Executive Branch of government and the Department of Defense (DOD) often affect it. Therefore, any fair assessment of a relationship between the media and the military will include the influence of such governmental institutions.

Although the cultural differences between the media and the military are significant, the relationship is affected at times by tangible and often interpersonal events. In any commitment of military force, the United States Government eventually comes to the crossroads of having to justify, or at least explain, such a commitment to the American people. The avenue for such an explanation inevitably runs through the media. This reality held true during Vietnam when President Lyndon Johnson’s administration ordered an increase in American military involvement. As the conflict in Vietnam escalated from the perspective of a greater commitment of manpower, the Johnson administration found itself in a position where it had to justify such escalation. Unfortunately, when it turned to the media to present the administration’s part of the story it turned to an institution that was becoming increasingly frustrated with the administration, and its apparent disdain for the media. The perception of the media was that the Johnson administration failed to treat them with respect. This was especially evident in the White House Press Corps where reporters felt they were not treated as human beings, and that there was no consideration for the reporters as people with lives of their own. By relying on routine last minute announcements of press conferences the administration hampered their travel and personal plans. It left them tied to the White House Press Room, unable to make plans of their own. This process bred contempt as the press considered themselves targets of an administration bent on secrecy. This outlook clouded their perception of how the President handled Vietnam.\(^1\) Johnson and his advisors were astute enough to realize they needed the media to tell their side of the story. With 5000 reporters from 60 countries covering the war at different times, they had no choice but to attempt to get their arms around the media, lest the story get told in a less than flattering way.\(^2\)

During the spring of 1967 Johnson made attempts to endear himself to the media, perhaps subscribing to Sun Tzu’s theory that, “to know your enemy, you must become your
enemy........ keep your friends close and your enemies closer.” He became more forthcoming and invited key correspondents to the White House for social gatherings. This tactic appeared to pay dividends for the President as a noted reporter who lost a son in Vietnam in 1966, Merriman Smith, mentioned at a breakfast he was attending that he felt “Johnson had been treated unfairly by the press – worse than he’d seen in 25 years of covering the White House.” Unfortunately, the honeymoon was short-lived. Soon Johnson was reported commenting “about sympathizing with those who would chloroform reporters, and that some reporters would rather drink hemlock than accept the truth of some of his statistics.” These comments turned the press against him again. Rather than attempt to repair a failing relationship, the President lashed out. “Counted among those doubters and gloom spreaders, in Johnson’s tally, were the members of the media. Unfortunately, a student carrying a sign or a protestor wearing a beard, or an attention-seeker burning a draft card in front of a camera can get more attention – and more billing – than all 10,000 of these volunteers” (referring to the military stationed in Vietnam).

This relationship degenerated as time went on, with the administration continuing to present an appearance of secrecy while the media was more aggressively questioning the methodology of the President and his closest advisors. Consequently, Johnson was unable to clearly communicate his vision of victory in Vietnam through the press to the American public. As a result, journalists’ support for the war declined and they reflected their dismay in the articles they wrote.

The contentious relationship was not resident solely within the beltway. The President’s ranking military officer in Vietnam, General William Westmoreland, had his own struggles with making the media/military relationship work. Despite early attempts to enhance the relationship by improving the flow of information to reporters by frequent press conferences the relationship declined as more reporters arrived in Vietnam as a result of troop increase through 1965. As the involvement of U.S. troops increased, commanders became concerned about the potential for reporters to release sensitive operational information. In the early part of 1965, General Westmoreland explored the possibility of censoring the press. The growing number of reporters in the country made that option remote. It was ultimately decided that any release of sensitive information would result in a correspondent’s loss of press credentials. The end result of this “voluntary restraint” was a freedom on the part of the press never before experienced in a war zone.

The press in Vietnam had relatively free access. That access presented a challenge for Westmoreland as the relationship between his civilian leaders and the media deteriorated. As
operations began, the relationship was generally strong. When things soured, negative stories made the papers and airwaves. The military and administration, hyper-sensitive about negative war publicity, lost what little trust they had in the media, effectively throwing fuel on a fire that was already beginning to burn out of control.

As the administration wrestled with the challenge of getting its side of the story out through an increasingly suspicious media, the news rolled on with stories influenced less by governmental input. Throughout the decline of the relationship Americans and the media became more aligned in their view of the war. Their shared skepticism was driven by the feeling that they were uninformed; that the United States Government was keeping something from them.⁹

As he addressed the operational issues on the ground, General Westmoreland was undoubtedly influenced by his Commander-In-Chief’s view of the media. Evidence of this can be seen in comments made to Westmoreland during a visit to Johnson’s ranch after he was out of office. Johnson commented to Westmoreland that “…early in the war he should have proposed press censorship, no matter how complex the problems that might have generated.”¹⁰ This is an indicator of how extensively the relationship had degenerated and the real level of distrust that defined the administration’s view of the media. Furthermore, the timing of this comment, after Johnson’s departure from government service speaks volumes about the emotional impact the strained relationship had on the president.

In the summer of 1967 a Gallup Poll revealed that 65% of Americans felt the administration wasn’t telling them all they should know about Vietnam. Vietnam, in essence, became a turning point with regard to press passivity. During previous wars, the press generally deferred to the United States Government with regard to information passed on regarding military issues. As the consensus on foreign policy began to disintegrate during Vietnam, journalists began to question that deference. The media became aware that a government under pressure will not always speak the truth.¹¹ This issue would have longstanding negative implications for future military/media relations and lies at the very core of the tension that has existed between the media and the military since Vietnam.

As support for the war waned, the Johnson administration’s attempt to repair the damage was met with distrust by a media that was engaged in reporting on the ground, often embedded with units. The media was seeing through what they perceived to be the “spin” of the administration since they were seeing a different Vietnam on the ground than the administration was reporting. The TET Offensive of 1968 drove the point home through the
media that the Johnson administration was being less than truthful in its claims that the American military was making significant progress towards winning the war.  

Westmoreland’s many challenges dealing with the press can be seen by comments in his memoirs that Vietnam was “the first war in history lost in the columns of the New York Times”. Westmoreland was, in some ways, the recipient of the media’s wrath with the administration. Instead of human-interest stories, the focus over time shifted to reports of failures of the service’s rifle (the M-16), and poor morale amongst troops, and criticism of the South Vietnamese government. 

Those in the military and the media affected by the relationships that were born in the fields of Vietnam often went on to assume more influential positions within their respective institutions. Reporters in the field, like their military counterparts, were elevated to leadership positions within major news bureaus. They carried their experiences with them as they moved up the organization ladder. Those experiences were often based on a significant amount of distrust. Westmoreland’s contention, that the war was “lost in the columns of the New York Times” was not a unique opinion among military leaders or the administration that endorsed their involvement in Vietnam. The end result of this dynamic was a relationship built on distrust. 

This contentious relationship can be traced to vast cultural differences between the media and the military. It is summed up well by Melissa Healy, a Los Angeles Times reporter that covered the Pentagon. She writes:

I began to recognize that I was operating, for all practical purposes, as a foreign correspondent. I was dipping into a world with a language of its own, with a society of its own that, in every respect paralleled U.S. civil society. But it paralleled it; it was not part of it. It was separate. It had its own justice system, its own retail system, its own health-care system. Everything was different. It’s really important to have reporters who can be on the beat long enough to understand that……It’s a culture of conservatives and of careerism in the military that sees no potential investment in talking to reporters, that truly sees no benefit to one’s career. The point is that you can find few, if any, career military people who can conceive that talking to a reporter not only is in the normal line of responsibility to taxpayers, but that it could ever be of any benefit to them. They can only see the possibility that it could hurt their careers. It’s a deeply, deeply inbred attitude.

The opinions of Ms. Healy certainly proved prophetic as the United States moved from Vietnam into other conflicts around the globe, namely Grenada, Panama and Desert Storm. The classic clash of cultures stemming from the obvious differences between the media and the military is striking and can be linked to challenges in each of these conflicts. The media as an institution is trained to be skeptical of authority while those in the military are expected to respect authority. Journalists generally relish their individualism, while their military
counterparts are so disciplined that they appear to have sacrificed their individuality. The media see eccentricity as having its own utility while those in uniform are more likely to reject “out of the box” behavior. Given these divergent cultural positions, it should be no surprise that the two institutions have had differing opinions through the years.  

GRENADA

Despite the palpable tension that continued to exist between the media and the military, public affairs personnel were not involved in the planning for Grenada. As the invasion progressed in 1983 the media made multiple attempts to cover the operation. Nearly 600 reporters from various news agencies arrived on Barbados as the operation began, hoping to cover the invasion. Surprised commanders, having not planned for any media intervention, effectively stiff-armed the media, keeping them away from the area of operations for two days. Journalists that were resourceful enough to make it to the island were detained by the military. Unfortunately, from the perspective of military/media relations, the lack of media access only served to heighten suspicions that the Pentagon was hiding something. Grenada infuriated the press and caused them to exert a great deal of pressure on the DoD in order to preclude a reoccurrence of such an incident. The inability of the press to effectively cover the Grenada invasion, and their subsequent appeal to the Pentagon’s leadership, resulted in then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General John Vessey, convening the Sidel Commission to investigate the best way to ensure access is afforded the media in future conflicts. The end result of this commission was the establishment of the DoD National Media Pool (DNMP). On the surface, the commission’s recommendations appeared to be a viable first step towards allowing greater, and timelier, media access to military operations. The new arrangement would allow a representative pool of journalists and photographers, representing all aspects of the media, to report back from a given conflicts’ area of operations to a centralized military headquarters.

PANAMA

One unintended result of the DNMP’s establishment was that military commanders believed the organization would take care of itself without significant involvement of the military chain of command. This approach proved disastrous for an already strained relationship as the United States planned and executed the invasion of Panama in 1989. The Pentagon delayed sending its “pool” of reporters from Washington. Instead, non-pool reporters made their way to Panama on their own to cover the invasion. Those chosen for the job, and sanctioned by DoD, arrived late and developed reports off of prepared DoD briefings and CNN reports from those
reporters that were independent of the pool.\textsuperscript{21} Hence, the invasion of Panama saw the failure of the DNMP. Left on their own, reporters without the necessary support from commanders required to operate within Panama, were only able to cover the later stages of the operation.\textsuperscript{22} The Pentagon did little to demonstrate good will towards the media, and the new CJCS, General Colin Powell, was compelled to put the word out to commanders that he expected their personal involvement with respect to public affairs planning and execution.\textsuperscript{23}

A greater emphasis was placed on Public Affairs planning after the CJCS articulated his guidance. However, the propensity of the media to cover less-than-flattering stories would keep the relationship strained up through Desert Storm. Whether it was covering military shortcomings in the way of sex scandals or cost overruns of weapons systems, the media was in search of a story. Unfortunately, that “story” was often at the expense of career military personnel. The result of this unique arrangement was a military that remained distrustful of the media. This was a military that, as Ms. Healy wrote, saw “no potential investment in talking to reporters, that truly sees no benefit to one’s career”.

The failure of the Pentagon to effectively balance its desire to assuage the media with its need for a coherent media strategy was a nagging thorn in the side of military/media relations. The media was growing increasingly frustrated as it was promised access that was never delivered.

**DESERT SHIELD/STORM**

As the Pentagon found itself planning to push the Iraqi military from Kuwait in 1990 a concerted effort was made by the Pentagon and the media to facilitate coverage of any developing conflict. In a continuing effort to repair the relationship with the press, the Pentagon activated the seventeen-member DNMP at the beginning of Operation Desert Shield. Despite the Pentagon’s good intentions, Saudi restrictions on granting visas to reporters stymied the pool. Faced with another Panama fiasco, many reporters decided to fly into Bahrain and find their own way to Saudi Arabia.\textsuperscript{24}

And senior military leaders remained suspicious of the media. These suspicions, coupled with improvements in technology that allowed for more rapid transmission of stories, set the stage for another contentious military/media showdown. The Commander, U.S. Central Command, General Norman Schwarzkopf, was a Vietnam veteran. It is not too much of an intellectual leap to assume that General Schwarzkopf harbored some ill feelings towards the media from his time as a young officer in Vietnam. Evidence of this was his desire for a controlled press rather than a workable pool arrangement. “Veterans of Vietnam, they
remembered not that war was messy but that news accounts made the military look inept. They had no intention of letting reporters have a clear view of the battlefield. Retired Lieutenant General Bernard Trainor, U.S. Marine Corps, believes there is some truth to this Vietnam bias. However, he concluded that the real fallout from this passing of the torch was a new generation of military officers that don’t trust the media. “It is a legacy of the war, and it takes root soon after they enter service. Like racism, anti-Semitism, and all forms of bigotry, it is irrational but nonetheless real. The credo of the military seems to have become ‘duty, honor, country, and hate the media’.”

It appears to be this credo that permeated the relationship between the media and the military during the Gulf War. As a result, the military in the Gulf was successful at “managing” the media that were sent to Saudi Arabia to cover the war. Ironically, the very way it was managed by different services appears to have redefined the relationship for future conflicts.

It was generally believed by the different services that the Army and Navy eschewed a golden opportunity to tell their story while the Marine Corps could never get enough media people in the field to cover their units. While General Schwarzkopf was restricting interviews to those reporters he liked, and Army commanders were only grudgingly accepting journalists assigned to them, Lieutenant General Walter Boomer, former Marine Corps Public Affairs Officer and the senior Marine Corps commander in the Gulf War, pushed for more journalists even as the war kicked off. John Fialka states; “The differences between the two services’ skills at handling public affairs were so vast that reporters sometimes wondered whether they represented different countries”.

The Navy also forfeited a big opportunity in the Gulf War by allowing every ship commander the option of deciding whether or not he wanted media coverage. Although the media desired to cover battleship involvement in the war, the commander of the USS Iowa refused to allow media on his ship. Although the Iowa was a significant supporter of the offensive effort through Naval Gunfire support of ground maneuver, its actions and those of its crew never received media coverage.

In contrast, America witnessed many minutes of video provided by the Air Force of precision-guided munitions striking their intended targets as well as Marine Corps units arriving on the outskirts of Kuwait City. What was largely missed were the largest tank battles since World War II because of the Army’s reluctance to allow media to go along during 7th Corps’ attack. Although never quantified, it could be argued that the inability of Americans to see the relative value of the Army’s contribution to the Gulf War could only hurt when the service competes for its share of a limited Defense Department budget.
OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM

In the 13 years between Desert Storm and OIF, the military appears to have come to the conclusion, at least temporarily, that it needs the media. Although the media has no legal right to force its way onto the battlefield, the American people are not likely to tolerate a military that operates under a veil of secrecy. So, despite vast cultural differences, the military, as the controller of access to the battlefield, allowed the media unprecedented access to its operations as it set the stage for overthrowing the Iraqi regime. The interesting dynamic that defined embedded media during OIF reveals a continuing culture clash that will likely forever define the military/media relationship.

The media had unprecedented access to military operations during OIF. The term “embedded”, although in existence long before OIF, became the defining word with regard to the media’s coverage of the conflict in Iraq. Despite this unfettered access, the future of the relationship between those who fight the nation’s battles and those who report on those battles remains in question. Countless articles published before, during and after OIF judged the embedded media program as flawed. Embedding was said to skew the objectivity of the reporters assigned to units; it was called a propaganda ploy on behalf of the Pentagon.

Embedded reporters, these commentators said, could not be trusted because they were “inbed” with the military. Poynteronline interviewed Chris Hedges, an accomplished war correspondent with experience in El Salvador, Kosovo, and the Persian Gulf just before the ground offensive of OIF. During the interview he identified his perceived flaws with the embedded media program. Some of these point directly to the inexperience of the reporters that were embedded with units. He cited the fact that these reporters would be dependent on the military for everything, and claimed that they would not want to get very near actual combat; which he said was something that the military would “be all too willing to oblige.”

Part of this statement is true; namely that the majority of embedded reporters had no experience covering combat operations. However, the latter part of Hedge’s opinion is flawed.

Despite the lack of the reporters’ combat experience, my personal experience with five embedded reporters showed a genuine willingness to cover the most direct combat. In fact, as a battalion commander, I usually tried to appease my five embeds who all wanted to be with the first unit in contact. Because of their willingness to confront the dangers associated with combat they developed a close relationship with the Marines with whom they moved. This relationship was predictable in that it is no secret that human beings who share a traumatic experience together tend to bond emotionally. All of my embeds developed personal relationships with the Marines of 2d Tank Battalion; relationships that would continue after the war. Despite the new
found relationships, two of my embedded reporters, Mike Cerre of ABC News Nightline, and Jim Landers, of the Dallas Morning News were not only able to witness the horrors of war, but were given the “green light” to report about whatever they saw. Cerre reported at length for ABC on 2d Tank Battalion’s involvement in a five-hour firefight and an incident involving civilian casualties during the evening of 4 April 2003. At no time was he ever restrained with regard to reporting on the command, despite the nature of the subject matter. Cerre comments:

On the same day that ammo dump blew, I was involved in probably the worst nightmare for the Department of Defense concerning the embed process because I was right there when this civilian tragedy happened. The incident started when a civilian vehicle tried to come through the checkpoint and ignored the warning shots. The Marines opened fire to try and disable the vehicle – which they did. Two people were killed in that vehicle and in the backseat were women and children who were wounded. I looked up and saw the headlights of a truck. I could hear it accelerating. The Marines opened fire on it and disabled the driver. The truck careened, hit a dirt mound on the side of the road, flipped over on its side, and went right over our heads. It crashed fifty feet beyond us. It was a dump truck that was beige with military painting and had military colored stripes on the radiator. The driver had an AK47 and a set of uniforms in a duffle bag in the back of the truck. But following right behind was an agricultural truck and a minibus filled with civilians. The Marines opened fire on all the vehicles as they came through the checkpoint. They killed three children and two women on the bus. Because I had such an open relationship with the unit, they knew I was going to have to make this report.

The media covering the war for the 2d Tank Battalion were given seamless access to the command’s Marines as well as the story of combat as it unfolded, with little influence from the commander. Mike Cerre was the first reporter to transmit live from a ground combat unit as the battalion crossed the border into Iraq from Kuwait during the early evening hours of 19 March 2003. His timely story, portrayed to ABC News’ Peter Jennings back in the states, was made possible by a commander that allowed him to report whatever he wanted, as long as it was accurate and did not compromise operational security. Jim Landers and Cheryl Diaz-Meyers, reporter and photographer for the Dallas Morning News, had the same access Cerre had. Landers wrote an article on the incident Cerre described above, and Diaz-Meyers photographed the scene. The article was published on 6 April 2003, describing the incident with the same detail of Cerre.

They carried the bodies of the children out first. There was a girl of about 12, whom the Marines wrapped in her black abaya cloak. Next off the shattered minibus was her brother, a boy of about 4, whom the Marines covered in a sports jacket. A sister, about 6 years old, had fallen between the seats. They placed her beside her siblings on a blanket.
Before releasing the article, Landers asked me to take a look at it, not because he was required to, but as a professional courtesy. I reviewed it without any intent of debating what we knew to be the facts at the time. No Marine, if given the choice, would have wanted to see either Cerre’s or Lander’s stories get aired or published. The Marines were not proud of what happened that evening, but it was what it was. It was the ugly side of war, and the reporters reported it.

CONCLUSION
The military/media relationship has evolved over the years, driven largely by a desire on the part of the media establishment to open the door into a society that it feels is too secretive; a society that they may never truly understand. It is likely that the process of embedding media will continue in future conflicts. The proverbial cat is out of the bag and any attempt to put it back in is likely to result in the Pentagon getting “clawed” by the media. For the Pentagon leadership it has become a “damned if you do, damned if you don’t” scenario. After being criticized by the media for not providing enough access to combat, they now find themselves as the subject of criticism for allowing a level of access that is “too close”; so close that it skews the objectivity of journalists that stake their professional reputations on their ability to remain detached from the subjects they cover.

The idea of embedding reporters with combat units must have been seen as a media utopia to those making the decisions within news organizations around the United States. However, criticism of embedded media continues to focus on the lack of objectivity of the reporters that lived with, and reported on, the servicemen with whom they were embedded. A number of renowned journalists have voiced their opinions that the Pentagon is skewing the view of war that Americans are seeing. Both Morley Safer and Andy Rooney, of 60 Minutes fame, are skeptics. “They called Vietnam ‘McNamara’s War’, says Morley Safer in reference the former defense secretary. This is Rumsfeld’s war – and he seems to be managing it far better than McNamara did. The operative word is ‘managed.’” Mr. Rooney stated, “It’s very difficult to write anything critical about a guy you’re going to have breakfast with the next morning. Ernie Pyle didn’t write any stories about cowards in World War II, even though there were some. I suspect in this war, we’re going to get a lot of stories about heroes.” These sentiments were not uncommon with regard to discussions about the embedded media program. Despite viewership being up (300 percent for the cable news channels and 10 percent overall) for broadcasts since March 19, skeptics were readily available. Marvin Kalb, a senior fellow at Harvard University’s Shorenstein Center on the Press, stated, “If a reporter is
with a soldier, sleeps in the same tent, eats the same food, faces roughly the same danger – if the reporter is a human being, it is very difficult to…write critical copy about the guy he just had dinner with.” These negative comments on the objectivity of embedded media are ironic. These same commentators would likely have argued for greater access to military operations had there been no embedded media program.

A generation of combat veterans, both military and media, evolved from the experience of OIF. The process of embedding media served to breakdown some of the preconceived notions and prejudices that the military and media industries had towards one another by educating both sides on the duties and responsibilities of the other. The shared experiences of military members, and the reporters embedded with them, should ultimately result in a better understanding of not only why a relationship is necessary but how such a relationship can be mutually beneficial to both camps. It is for this reason that the process of embedding media with military units should continue as a method to allay the natural distrust found between two institutions with such vast cultural differences. Nonetheless, the ongoing debate on the success or failure of the program points to a future relationship that is destined to be fraught with tension, despite the concessions made by both sides.

WORD COUNT= 5339
ENDNOTES


3 Thurman, 180.

4 Ibid., 179.

5 Ibid., 181.

6 Ibid., 186.


8 Ibid., 42.

9 Thurman, 190.


12 Ibid., 43.

13 Ibid., 10.

14 Thurman, 42.

15 Ankofer, 83.


17 Neuman Lights Camera War p 206

18 Ibid

19 Ankofer p 44

20 Neuman p 207

21 Ibid p.208

23 Ibid., 44.


27 Fialka, 27.

28 Ibid., 26.


BIBLIOGRAPHY


